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NAPOLEON THE FIRST 



A BIOGRAPHY 



BY 



ns7 



AUGUST FOURNIER ISH 



TRANSLATED BY MARGARET BACON CORWIN 
AND ARTHUR DART BISSELL" 



EDITED BY 

EDWARD GAYLORD BOURNE 

Professor of History in Yale UniversHy 




NEW YORK 

HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY 
1903 



THE LIBRARY OF 
CONGRE3S, 

[Two CoPivs* RSDErVED 






7a- 



Pi 



Copyright, 1903, 

BY 

lENRY HOLT AND COMPANY. 



ROBERT PRUWMC'ND, PRlNTERj NEW YORK, 



EDITOR'S PEEFACE 

Before the appearance of the recent Lives of Napoleon by 
"*rofessor Sloane and Mr. J. H. Rose, the work here presented 

EngUsh was generally recognized by competent judges to 
.)e the best brief history of Napoleon that had been written. 
Whatever relative position would be accorded to it to-day, com- 
pared with these biographies, it may be affirmed confidently 
and without invidiousness that its positive merits are lo less 
great than formerly and that it has the relative advantage in 
this edition of being comprised in one volume and of being 
accompanied by a classified bibliography equally well adapted, 
within its limits, to serve as a guide to the student of Napo- 
leonic history and as a manual for the librarian. 

Among the positive merits of Fournier's Napoleon I. should 
be mentioned the thorough research upon which the narrative 
is based, the interesting, vivid, and at times dramatic style in 
which it is written, its broad historical spirit and impartiality 
of judgment, its excellent proportions, not allotting undue space 
to certain phases nor neglecting the civil side of Napoleon's 
career, and, finally, its lucid exposition of the general historical 
situation and of the various contending factors. 

These merits so strongly impressed me at the time of its 
original publication that I felt that a good translation would 
be a distinct and valuable addition to the large mass of Napo- 
leonic literature already accessible to the English reader. Some 
years later I secured the author's sanction for such an under- 
taking and entrusted the work of translation to my friend and 
former pupil Mr. F. H. Schwan of Cleveland. Mr. Schwan 
executed the task with scholarly fidelity. As I was not able, 
however, at the time arrangements were made for pubHcation to 



iv Editor's Preface 

give the manuscript the Hterary revision which seemed desirable 
to the publishers and to myself, I enlisted the services of Mrs. 
Corwin for the work. After revising the first chapters Mrs. 
Corwin became convinced that she could accompHsh better 
results if she could labour with a freer hand, and she therefore 
proceeded to make a new translation. Mr. BisselFs experience 
was similar with his part of the work, which is to an equal 
degree an independent version, although its preparation was 
facilitated by consulting Mr. Schwan's manuscript. Mr. 
Schwan's contribution to the production of the book, there- 
fore, although not exactly measurable, deserves appreciative 
recognition. For Mrs. Corwin's part of the volume, the 
first fifteen chapters, the French translation of the first 
two volumes of the original by E. Jaegle proved of consid- 
erable assistance, and, in most cases where the French text 
differed from the German, it was followed as representing a 
revised edition. Mr. Bissell translated the third volume of the 
German, i.e., the last six chapters in this edition and the bibli- 
ographies accompanying them. The index, in the main, is 
the work of the translators. 

As editor, I have gone carefully over the entire work in manu- 
script and in proof, making such changes as seemed desirable, 
translated the Table of Contents and the bibhographies for 
Chapters I-XV, and supphed the material supplementary to the 
bibhographies as contained in the original. I have refrained 
almost entirely from editorial comment, and beyond adopting 
the readings of the French version in most cases of variation, 
I have made no changes in Fournier's text except a very few of 
minor character, such, for the most part, as the correction of 
obvious errors in dates or numbers. I cannot flatter myself 
that no mistakes have escaped my eye or that I have made none 
of my own, but I hope that few serious errors will be found. I 
shall be glad to have my attention cahed to any that may be 

discovered. 

E. G. B. 

New Haven, August, 1903. 



AUTHOR'S PEEFACE* 

The purpose of the following pages is to recount briefly and 
simply for the benefit of the wide circle of cultivated readers 
the rise, the ventures, and the achievements of a man of incom- 
parable historical importance. I am well aware that persons 
competent to judge have recently and repeatedly stated that 
the time has not yet come for the history of Napoleon I. to be 
written. If I undertake the task in spite of this warning, it is 
due to the conviction that the historian, even if unable to pre- 
sent definite and final results, is nevertheless under obligation 
to supply those far from the laboratories of science with infor- 
mation in regard to the existing state of knowledge, just as it 
is their right to demand of him such information. To delve 
for ore and never do anything but delve for ore cannot be the 
chief aim of his life's work; the world demands ornaments and 
arms, and their makers may not be idle. 

To the historian of Napoleon I. the task is moreover not 
such an easy one as would be involved in simply clothing in 
appropriate words a record of present results in historical re- 
search. For these results • are frequently contradictory to one 
another and again often not sufficiently substantiated to allow 
of their being at once accepted as settled. Consider the 
changes that have come over the memory of the mighty Corsican 
even in France, from the hymns of Beranger to the satires of 
Barbier, from the glorifying narrative of Thiers to the anni- 
hilating criticism of Lanfrey. The latter work, which was 
published between 1867 and 1875, overthrew forever the legend 
of the immaculate glory of Napoleon L, and since that time the 

* To the first volume of the German edition. 



vi Author's Preface 

general judgment in regard to the first Emperor of the French 
has but increased in severity. Two causes have been espe- 
cially prominent in bringing about this result. In the first 
place authentic memoranda made in the days of Napoleon and 
published since Lanfrey's work — such, for instance, as the 
memoirs of Madame de Remusat — have kept disclosing new 
faults and weaknesses in this the most celebrated self-made 
man of all ages, and have so influenced and affected the esti- 
mate of history in respect to him that at the present time the 
inclination is but too marked to overlook his greatness in 
dwelhng upon what is petty. In the second place the imperial 
reign of his nephew, Napoleon III., which had been founded 
upon the basis of the as yet unshaken Bonapartist tradition, 
was in 1870 compelled to give place to the Repubhc, that is 
to say, to that form of government which Napoleon I. earlier 
violently and arbitrarily destroyed. France having again 
decided in favour of a republic, the historians who had been its 
opponents were thrown as it were for reasons of state into dis- 
credit, while the acts and achievements of the great Revolution 
were brought forward into undeservedly favourable light. Not 
until quite recently has it been recognized among earnest 
French scholars, detached from party strife,^ — having perhaps 
been incited thereto by the investigations of the Germans, — 
that there is not only a Napoleonic but also a Revolutionary 
legend which must needs be rejected as the other has been, and 
be replaced by the truth without reserve. The efforts made 
in this direction have not as yet produced incontestable results, 
nor has the light yet been turned Upon all the questions involved 
in the history of the last hundred years in France. But already 
it may be seen that with a more correct estimate of the first 
Republic, 1792-1799, a more accurate appreciation is at the 
same time to be gained of the historical importance of Napo- 
leon I. The fact must be borne in mind that he was at the 
same time the product and the consummation of the Revo- 
lution, and that he still continued to tread the path which it 
had marked out even while his hand was boldly preparing to 
grasp the diadem of France. 



Author's Preface 



Vll 



It is from this point of view that Napoleon's biographer of 
to-day must approach his problem, and it is from such a stand- 
point that I have attempted in a most modest way to make my 
contribution to its solution in so far as permitted by the nar- 
row limits imposed by circumstances upon this work. It makes 
no pretence to being anything further than a simple outKne. 
To what extent I am indebted to earher works it is impossible 
to acknowledge in detail; it will be obvious at once to speciahsts. 
At times I have, however, preferred to follow my own course, 
which I hope has led me, avoiding political bias on the one hand 
and the mere cavilling of a moralizer on the other, to a portrait 
which, though imperfect and indefinite in its lines, is perhaps 
a faithful picture of the character and work of this man who 
more than any one before him has influenced the destinies of 
the world. 

Bibliographical notes are appended, but they are of course 
far from complete even in regard to the most essential points. 
Neither they nor the notes at the bottom of the pages are in 
the least intended to corroborate statements in the text, but 
are offered rather as guidance in finding the works which'may 
best be relied upon to serve such readers as may be stimulated 
through this book to wider reading and deeper research into 
the subject. Only by stimulating such a desire will this work 
accomplish the result which is desired for it. 

The Author. 

Vienna, December, 1885. 



CONTENTS 



Editor's Preface. 
Author's Preface. 



PAGE 

iii 

V 



CHAPTER I 

The Bonapartes in Corsica. Napoleon's Birth and Early 
Training, 1769-1788 

J. J. Rousseau on Corsica. P. Paoli and the French Occupa- 
tion. Carlo Buonaparte and his Family. LsBtitia. Napo- 
leon's Birth and Childhood. Autun and Brienne. Character 
of the Boy. Studies and Day-dreams. Napoleon at the Ecole 
militaire. Appointment as Lieutenant of Artillery. Judg- 
ment of his Teachers. Officers of the Ancien Regime. Valence. 
Rousseau and Raynal. Literary Essays. Various Perplexities. 
Napoleon's Twofold Nature. His Patriotism as a Corsican. His 
Ambition and the Obstacles to it under the Prevailing Conditions. 



CHAPTER II 

The Revolution. Napoleon's Corsican Adventures, 1789-1793 19 

The Inevitable Decay of the Old Regime. The National As- 
sembly and its Laws Establishing Equality. The Revolution 
in Paris and in the Provinces. Napoleon at Auxonne. His Views 
in Regard to Corsica. Parties in Corsica. Napoleon at Ajaccio. 
He Acts the Demagogue. First Lieutenant Buonaparte. Love 
of Books and Attempts at Authorship. The Constitution of 
1791 and the Flight of Louis XVI. The Volunteers of Ajaccio 
and their Commander, The Easter Uprising of 1792. Napo- 
leon in Paris. The 10th of August. Captain Buonaparte. New 
Ventures in Corsica. Critical Incidents. Without a Country. 



Contents 



CHAPTER III 

AGE 

The Siege of Toulon, and the Defence of the Convention, 

1793-1795 38 

The Girondists and the Mountain. The System of the Terror^ 
The Opposition to it. Lyons, Marseilles, Toulon, Napoleon 
with the Army of the South. Before Avignon. "The Supper of 
Beaucaire." Important Acquaintances. Napoleon in Com- 
mand of a Battalion. His Part in the Siege of Toulon. Ap- 
pointed Brigadier-General of Artillery. Relations with Robes- 
pierre. Mission to Genoa. Recalled and Imprisoned. Sali- 
cetti. Restored to the Army. Expedition to Corsica. In Paris, 
Jacobin or Thermidorian. Napoleon's Plan of Campaign. Hopes 
and Disappointments. His Precarious Situation. The Con- 
stitution of the Year III (1795). The Opponents of the Con- 
vention. Barras. The 13th of Vendemiaire. Major-General 
Bonaparte. 

CHAPTER IV 

Jop^KPHiNE, 1798 60 

Society under the Directory. Napoleon and the Women. 
Plans for Marriage. Desiree Clary. Madame de Permon. The 
Marchioness de Beauharnais. Descriptions of Contemporaries. 
Napoleon in Love with Josephine. Intervention of Barras. Pas- 
sion and Calculation. Wooing and Marriage. Command of the 
Italian Expedition. Josephine's Character. 

CHAPTER V 

Tf« Campaigns in Italy and the Peace of Campo Formio, 1796- 

1797 72 

Foreign Policy, The Revolutionary System of Conquest. 
The Scene of War in Italy. Scherer and Bonaparte. A Promise 
and its Fulfilment. Montenotte, Milesimo, Dego, Mondovi. 
Severing the Alliance between Austria and Sardinia. Lodi and 
Milan. The Directory and Napoleon's Victories. Borghetto. 
The Blockade of Mantua. Spoils of Yv^ar. Napoleon's Tactics. 
Struggle for Mantua. Lonato and Castiglione. The Battle of 
Bassano and its Importance. Verona and Arcole. Rivoli. 
Surrender of Mantua. The French Invade the Papal States. 
The Peace of Tolentino, Ambition on Historic Ground. The 
Campaign of 1797. The French in Styria. The Preliminaries of 
Leoben. Napoleon and the Republic of Venice, Criticism of 



Contents xi 

PAGE 

the Opposition in Paris. The Coup d'Etat of the 18th of Fructi- 
dor. Napoleon's Independent Activity. The Negotiations of 
Passariano. The Peace of Campo Formio. 

CHAPTER VI 

Egypt, 1798-1799 Ill 

Oriental Plans. France and Egypt. Napoleon in Paris. 
His Attitude on the Eastern Question. Celebrations and Public 
Addresses. The Code Complet de Politique. Aiming at 
Supreme Power. Momentary Hopelessness of the Idea. Reasons. 
The Egyptian Expedition Resolved upon. Napoleon's Real In- 
tentions. Malta. Landing in Egypt. The Mamelukes. Dis- 
appointments and Difficulties. The Battle of the Pyramids. 
The Disaster at Aboukir. Its Consequences. Rising in Cairo. 
Fighting the Turks. Syrian Expedition. Actual and Alleged 
Plans. El Arish, Gaza, Jaffa. The Resistance of Acre. The 
Battle of Mt. Tabor. Enforced Retreat. Distresses. Victory 
of the Army near Aboukir. Resolution to Return to France. 
This Resolution Examined. 

CHAPTER VII 

The Coup d'Etat and the Consulate, 1799 154 

The Return. Landing at Frejus. Enthusiasm of the French. 
Causes of the Change in Public Opinion. The Dictatorship of 
the Directorate. Renewal of the War on the Continent in 1799. 
Inadequate Preparation. Defeat Follows Defeat. Reaction 
on Internal Affairs, Opposition Gains at the Elections. The 
Parliamentary Coup d'Etat of the 30th of Prairial. Sieyes 
Director. His Views. The Opposition of the Jacobins. New 
Defeats in Italy. Hopes Resting on Sieyes Shattered. Public 
Opinion Declares for Napoleon. His Conduct in Paris. The 
Plans of the Reformers and the Plot against the Constitution. 
The 18th and 19th of Brumaire. The Resolution of the ''Rump 
Parliament." The Consuls and the Constitutional Commissions. 
Sieyes' Outline of the Constitution. Napoleon's Changes in it. 
He is Named First Consul and Head of the Executive. New 
Chambers. 

CHAPTER VIII 

War and Peace, 1800-1802 188 

Napoleon and the Revolution. The Principle of Equality 
and the Spirit of Conquest. Love of Peace and Preparation for 



xii Contents 

PAGE 

War. Plan of Campaign for 1300. The Passage of the Great 
Saint Bernard. Milan. The Battle of Marengo. Armistice. 
The Mission of Saint-Julien. The Battle of Hohenlinden. The 
Peace of Luneville. Napoleon and Paul I. The Limitation of 
the French Sphere of Influence. Understanding with Spain, 
Naples, and Rome. The Concordat. Death of Paul I., and its 
Results. Negotiations with England. The Preliminaries of Oc- 
tober 1st, 1801. General Peace. The Programme of the French 
Hegemony. 

CHAPTER IX 

The New France and her Sovereign, 1802 221 

Napoleon's Contribution to the Reorganization of France. 
The Council of State. The Ministries. The General "Directions." 
The Secretaryship of State. The Reorganization of the Admin- 
istration. Its Problems. Public Finances before the I8th of 
Brumaire. Financial Reform. The Caisse d'Amortissement. 
The Bank of France. Judicial Reforms, The Code Napoleon. 
The Organization of Public Instruction. Scholars and the Legion 
of Honour. The Laws against the Emigres Repealed. The Op- 
position of the Liberals, of the Radicals, and of the Royalists. 
Conspiracies. Regulation of the Tribunate. Napoleon First 
Consul for Life. The Mistake of the French. 



CHAPTER X 

The Last Years of the Consulate. The Emperor, 1802-1804. 242 

France after the Peace of Amiens. Political Reaction. The 
Co;.r' of the First Consulate. His Family. Warlike Projects. 
The Dependent States. The Constitutional Changes in Holland 
and in the Cis-Alpine Republic. Incorporation of Piedmont in 
France. Liguria, Lucca, Elba. Switzerland. The Seculariza- 
tions in Germany and the Isolation of Austria. Unpopularity 
of the Peace in England. Reasons. Bonaparte's Colonial Policy. 
San Domingo and Louisiana. Malta. Otto's Instructions. 
The Demands of the British. The Outbreak of War. Hanover 
and Taranto. The Contributions of the Dependencies and the 
Army of Boulogne. The Plot against the First Consul. The 
Affair of the Due d'Enghien. Its Effects. The People Demand 
that the Chief Magistracy be Hereditary. The Proposition of 
Curee. The Constitution of the Year XII (1804). Emperor 
Napoleon I. and his Court. Empire and State. 



Contents xiii 

CHAPTER XI 

PAGE 

The War of 1805 283 

The Emperor's Army. The Project of the Invasion of England. 
Discussion of it. Napoleon's Plan of a Continental War. Breach 
with Russia. The Intermediate Powers. Austria's Submissive 
Neutrality. Pius VII. in Paris. The Coronation. The Italian 
Question. Austria in the Camp of the Coalition. Demonstrations 
at Boulogne. The Beginning of the War on the Continent. 
Austria's Preparations and Plans. Mack on the Iller. Napo- 
leon's Manoeuvre to Surround the Austrians. The Disaster at 
Ulm. Trafalgar. Napoleon's Advance on Vierma. Kutusoff. 
Murat and the Affair at Hollabrunn. Prussia's Approaches to 
the Coalition. Napoleon in Briinn. His Precarious Situation. 
Helped out by the Enemy. AusterUtz. The Russians Fall 
Back. Armistice with Austria. Haugwitz. Peace of Press- 
burg. National Patriotism and the Revolution on the Throne. 

CHAPTER XII 

Napoleonic Creations. Breach with Prussia, 1806 325 

The Effects of Recent Events on the French. Their Twofold 
Mistake. Naples. The Italian Titular Fiefs. Their Inter- 
national Character. Emperor and Pope. Extension of the 
Napoleonic System. The Kingdom of Holland. South German 
Princes are Made Sovereigns and Vassals of Napoleon. Family 
Alliances. Dalberg and the Founding of the Confederation of the 
Rhine. The Attitude of the German Powers. Francis II. Re- 
signs the Imperial Crown and Dissolves the German Empire. 
Permanent Occupation of South Germany by the French. Its 
Meaning. The Treaty between France and Prussia, February 
13th, 1806. Negotiations with England and Russia, fheir 
Failure. Prussia is Threatened by France. She Takes Arms. 
Napoleon's Plan. National Uprising in Germany. Palm. 
Prussia Refuses to Disarm. War again. 

CHAPTER XIII 

From Jena to Tilsit, 1806-1807 356 

Napoleon's Prudent Plan of Campaign. Confusion in the Prus- 
sian Headquarters. The Advance of the French from Bamberg 
to Thuringia. They Take the Enemy in the Rear. The Battles 
of Jena and Auerstadt. Dispersion of the Prussian Army. 



xiv Contents 

PAGE 

Napoleon in Berlin. He E^efuscs to Negotiate. Russia Inter- 
venes. Napoleon's Counter-measures. His Relations with Po- 
land and Turkey. The Berlin Decree against England. Advance 
toward the East. Pultusk. The Army in Cantonments in Po- 
land. Bennigsen's Offensive Movement toward the West. 
Napoleon's Counter-march to the North. The Battle of Eylau. 
The French on the Passarge. Napoleon at Osterode and Finken- 
stein. His Critical Situation. Negotiations with Prussia, 
Austria, and the Eastern Powers. Reinforcements. Resump- 
tion of Hostilities. Friedland. Napoleon and Alexander I. 
The Agreements at Tilsit. The Treaty of Peace and the Secret 
Alliance. Their Significance. 

CHAPTER XIV 

The Situation of Affairs in France. Bayonne and Erfurt, 

1808 391 

Napoleon and the French. Secret Opposition. Napoleon's 
Counter-measures. Averting Want and Promoting Prosperity. 
The Jewish Question. Financial Policy. Hereditary Official 
Nobility. The Army Denationalized. Restraints upon the 
Freedom of the Press. The Tribunate Abolished. The Judges. 
The Senators. Educating Imperialists. The University. Per- 
sonality of Napoleon. The Court at Fontainebleau. Steps 
Taken against Prussia. Napoleon's Intrigues. His Conduct 
toward Prussia and Austria. Tuscany Annexed to France. 
Action Taken in Regard to the States of the Church. Napoleon 
in Spain. His Designs. Portugal and the Treaty of Fontaine- 
bleau. Its Significance. Contentions at the Spanish Court. 
The French Occupation. The Intrigue at Bayonne, Napoleon's 
Mistake. The Uprising of the Spanish People. The Capitulations 
of Baylen and Cintra. Reaction upon Napoleon's Position in 
Europe. Hostile Disposition of Austria and Prussia. Under- 
standing between France and Russia. The Days at Erfurt. 
The New Treaty. Napoleon and the Great German Authors. 

CHAPTER XV 

The Campaigns in Spain and Austria. Marie Louise, 1808-1810 445 

The ''Grand Army" directed toward Spain. Napoleon Fights 
for his Prestige. Weakness and Lack of Unity of the Spaniards. 
Espinosa and Tudela. Napoleon in Madrid. Expedition of Sir 
John Moore. Napoleon Marches against Him. His Plan. The 



Contents xv 

PAGE 

Enemy Escapes. The Object in Spain only Half Attained. 
Return of the Emperor to Paris. The Causes. Talleyrand and 
Fouche. Threatening Preparations of Austria. Her Unavail- 
ing Efforts to Secure Help from Prussia and Russia. War Un- 
avoidable. Austrian Plan of Campaign. Their Loss of Time. 
Berthier's Errors. Napoleon at Headquarters. His Successes 
at Abersberg, Landshut, Eggmiihl, and Ratisbon. Their Sig- 
nificance. Advance on Vienna. The Battle of Aspern. The 
Political Situation Changes. Wagram. Armistice of Znaim. 
The Negotiations at Altenburg. The Peace of Schonbrunn. 
Dissatisfaction of the French. Their Desire for a Legitimate 
Heir to the Throne. Napoleon's Divorce from Josephine. He 
Plays with Russia. Secret Negotiation for Marriage with Marie 
Louise. Its Reception in Vienna. The New Empress. Mo- 
tives of Napoleon. The King of Rome. 

CHAPTER XVI 

At the Zenith, 1810-1812 493 

The Resistance of the Nations. Pius VII. Excommunicates 
Napoleon. He is Taken to Savona. The Council of the Em- 
pire. Guerilla Warfare on the Spanish Peninsula. Incorpora- 
tion of Spain as far as the Ebro with Spain. Massena's Expedition 
to Portugal. Why Napoleon did not Take the Command. The 
Continental Blockade as a Weapon of the Revolution. Napoleon 
and Neutral Commerce, The Edict of Trianon. Holland 
Becomes a French Province. The Incorporation of the German 
North Sea States and the Hanseatic Cities with the Empire. 
Relations with Denmark and Sweden. Designs on Sicily. Plan 
to Annihilate England. French Finances. Lordship of the 
World. Difficulties with Russia. Their Causes. Russia and 
the Neutrals. Preparations and Diplomatic Fencing. Internal 
Policy of Napoleon. The Confederation of the Rhine. Relations 
with Prussia. Franco-Prussian Alliance. Policy of Metternich, 
and the Austro-French Alliance. Failure -of the Effort to Gain 
Turkey and Sweden. Congress of Princes at Dresden. The 
Significance of Napoleon in History. 

CHAPTER XVII 
Moscow, 1812 536 

Warnings of the Generals. Napoleon's Reply. His Care 
of the Army. The Strategy of the Advance. Attitude 
of the Russians. Their Mistake and its Effect upon the 



xvi Contents 



Course of Events. To Vilna. Indifference of the Lithuanians. 
Its Causes. First Misfortunes. To Drissa. Sacrifices of the 
March. Napoleon's Personality. Longing for a Battle. Vi- 
tebsk. The Fight for Smolensk. Deliberations. Patriotism of 
the Russians. The Battle of Borodino. To Moscow. Entering 
the City. The Fire. Great Plans. Napoleon's Hope of Peace 
Disappointed. Resoluteness of Alexander I. and its Causes. 
Necessity of Retreat. Reopening of Hostilities. Plans for the 
March. Retirement from Moscow. Affair at Malojaroslavetz. 
Deciding in Favour of the Old Road. Fighting at Viasma. Cold 
¥/eather. In Smolensk. Fighting at Krissnoi. Pitiable Con- 
dition of the Army. At the Beresina. The Battle of November 
28th. The Disaster to the Rear. Break-up of the Army. Bulle- 
tin No. 29 and Napoleon's Journey to Paris. Its Dangers. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

Leipzig, 1813 580 

Shattered Plans. The Beginnings of the European CoaHtion 
against Napoleon. New Levies. Uncertainty of the AlHes of 

1812. Yorck's Revolt. Its Effects. Napoleon's Arrangement 
with the Pope at Fontainebleau. Financial Measures. The 
Corps Legislatif and the Speech from the Throne February 14th, 

1813. Foreign Policy. Fidelity of the Princes of the Confedera- 
tion of the Rhine. Hardenberg's Territorial Policy. Austria 
During the Last War. Metternich's Peace Policy. Popular 
National Movement in Prussia. Russia Makes Use of it. The 
Treaty of Breslau. Saxony. Forming the Coalition. Reaction 
on the Court of Vienna. Renewal of War. Napoleon's New 
Army. Battle of Liitzen. The King of Saxony. Austria Draws 
off. Napoleon's Plan for a Separate Peace with Russia. Battle 
of Bautzen. Armistice. Motives Therefor. Armed Inter- 
vention by Austria. Treaty of Reichenbach. Metternich in 
Dresden. Extension of the Armistice. Effect of the English 
Victory at Vittoria. Austria Joins the Coalition. The Congress 
of Prague. Reinforcements of Napoleon and of the Allies. 
Plans of War on Both Sides. Napoleon against Bliicher. The 
Battle of Dresden. Why Napoleon did not Follow up Llis Victory. 
Kulm. His Designs on Berlin. Their Failure. Distress of the 
Army. Bliicher's Withdrawal to the Right and its Consequences. 
Napoleon Leaves Dresden. At Diiben. To Leipzig. The Bat- 
tle of Wachau and the Fighting at Mockern. Napoleon's Delay. 
The Battle of Leipzig. The Disaster of October 19th. Retreat 
to the Rhine. The Victory at Hanau. Napoleon in Mainz. 



Contents xvii 



CHAPTER XIX 

PAOB 

Elba, 1814 643 

Nations and Princes. Dissolution of the Empire. Negotia- 
tions with Ferdinand of Spain and Pius VII. St. Aignan's 
Mission. Manifesto of the Allies. Its Effects. The Closing of 
the Corps Legislatif. Napoleon as the General of France. The 
Allies Press Forward. The Plan of Operations. The Fighting 
at Brienne. The Resolutions at Langres. The Battle of La 
Rothiere. Napoleon and the Boundaries of 1792. His Victory- 
over Bliicher. He Faces Schwarzenberg. Bliicher Decides it. 
Fighting at Craonne. Battle at Laon. The Treaty of Chaumont. 
The FeeUng in Paris. The Battle of Arcis sur Aube. Napoleon's 
Plan to Transfer the Campaign to the East Ignored by the Allies. 
The Manifesto from Vitry. Napoleon's Desperate Condition, 
He Hastens Back to Paris. Entry of the Allies. Their Declara- 
tion of March 31st. Napoleon in Fontainebleau. France Deserts 
Him. The Marshals. Napoleon" Abdicates in Favour of His Son. 
Desertion of Marmont. Unconditional Abdication, April 6th. 
Napoleon's Treaty with Europe. Attempted Suicide (?). Depart- 
ure for Elba. Dangers of the Journey. Activity at Elba. The 
Idyll of Marciana. Hopes. Discontent in France. Its Causes. 
Dissentions of the Powers at the Congress of Vienna. Napoleon's 
Calculations. He Leaves Elba. From Cannes over the Moun- 
tains into Dauphin^. Winning Over the Troops. Grenoble, 
Lyons, Paris. 



CHAPTER XX 

Waterloo, 1815 694 

"Peace and Liberty." Napoleon Gives Guarantees. Benja- 
min Constant. War Instead of Peace. Hostile Resolution of 
the Powers at Vienna. Its Decisive Effects in France upon the 
Civilians and upon the Army. Gloomy Mood of the Emperor. 
His Constituent Assembly. The "Acte Additionnel" of April 
22d. Dissatisfaction with it. The Champ de Mai, The Opening 
of the Chambers. Distrust on All Sides. War. Strength of the 
Parties. Napoleon Resolves upon the Offensive. His Reasons. 
Surprising the Enemy. It is Incomplete. Napoleon Deceived 
in Regard to it. The Battle of Ligny. Gneisenau's Act. Na- 
poleon's Second Mistake. Grouchy Sent to the East. The 
Battle of June 18th. Napoleon in Flight. "Courage, Resolution." 



xviii Contents 



CHAPTER XXI 

1>AGE 

St. Helena, 1815-1821 721 

Paris During the Battles. Napoleon at the Elys^. The 
Ministry and the Chambers. The Chambers Request the Em- 
peror to Abdicate. He Hesitates. "Horslaloi!" Abdication 
FoUows. Napoleon at Mahnaison. To Rochefort. England's 
Prisoner. The Traces of the Hundred Days. In the Harbour at 
Plymouth. The Sentence. On the Northumberland. Landing 
at St. Helena. Longwood. Sir Hudson Lowe. The Prison- 
er's Manner of Life. "Letters from the Cape of Good Hope." 
Calculations on the British Opposition Prove False. Napoleon 
Seriously 111. His Last Arrangements. His Death. The Intel- 
lectual Legacy of the Emperor. "The Campaign of 1815." 
Discourses on the Wars of the Republic. Their Purpose. The 
Legend of St. Helena and History. 

Bibliography 745 

Index 789 



Napoleon the First 



CHAPTER I 

THE BONAPARTES IN" CORSICA. NAPOLEON'S BIRTH AND 
EARLY TRAINING 

"There is still one country in Europe susceptible of mould- 
ing by legislation — the island of Corsica. The courage and 
steadfastness which enabled this brave people to regain and to 
defend its liberty well deserve that a sage should teach it how 
that blessing should be preserved. I have a presentiment that 
this little island will some day astonish Europe." Thus wrote 
Jean Jacques Rousseau in 1762 in his immortal book ''Le Con- 
trat Social." A few years later the prophecy of the philosopher 
was fulfilled in the birth, on ^Hhis little island/' of one by the 
power of whose genius the whole world was to be convulsed. 

Jean Jacques Rousseau was not alone in his sympathetic 
interest in Corsica. The attention of all Europe was attracted 
toward the patriotic little nation which since 1729 had been wag- 
ing a war for independence against Genoa, under whose sov- 
ereignty it had groaned for centuries. The best minds of Europe 
were interested in its fortunes; the works of Frederick the Great, 
of Voltaire, and of Montesquieu speak with respect and sym- 
pathy of these energetic mountaineers and of the imposing 
personality of their leader, Pasquale Paoli. The latter, having 
been declared regent of the "kingdom" by his compatriots, had 
wrested the island, with the exception of the seaboard cities, 
from the grasp of Genoa ; had established a wise and beneficent 
government without infringing upon the liberties of the people, 



2 Birth and Early Training [1769 

and had thereby exempUfied within narrow bounds the pohtical 
ideal of the advocates of progress and of a rational system of 
government. And success would certainly have attended his 
efforts to drive the enemy out of these last positions and to win 
complete independence for his country had there not interposed 
a power whose superior resources finally drove both combatants 
from the field. That power was France. 

This took place during the course of the Seven Years' War, 
when Genoa gave its adhesion to France, and Louis XV. prom- 
ised in return to support that republic in its contest with Corsica. 
For three years (1756-1759) the French occupied the harbours 
of San Fiorenzo, Calvi, and Ajaccio, and attempted to mediate 
between the belligerents. Soon, however, they took measures 
toward securing for themselves this important island in the 
Mediterranean. 

Negotiations with the Doge of Genoa resulted in a treaty in 
1768, by the terms of which the King of France, in return for 
the remission of sums due him from Genoa, and the payment 
of an annual subsidy, was granted the sovereignty of Corsica 
"as security." Despite the restrictive clause the whole world 
understood it to mean a definitive annexation. And indeed 
who was to prevent it? The attention of the great powers was 
focussed on a different object and Louis XV. had thus but a single 
antagonist to deal with — the Corsican people. To surrender 
their independence to France seemed in nowise more endurable 
than to submit to the rule of Genoa, and Paoh ventured the un- 
equal contest, but only to succumb. After gaining a few unim- 
portant victories he suffered defeat in a decisive battle on the 
Golo (May, 1769) and was obHged to flee. In July he left the 
island to find in England a hospitable refuge. Only a few of 
his most faithful companions in arms accompanied him thither. 
The greater part of them had retreated to Monte Rotondo, and, 
having been offered favourable terms by the French, they laid 
down their arms. France was in possession of the island. 

Among the speakers of the deputation sent to sue for peace 
from the victor was Carlo Buonaparte, the father of Napoleon. 
This confidential mission was entrusted to him doubtless on 



Napoleon's Father .^ 

account of the respect in which his family was held at Ajaccio, 
where they had hved for two centuries. In later years, when the 
little Corsican had become great, inventive flatterers were not 
wanting who traced back his lineage to a Byzantine emperor 
of the Middle Ages. His line can, however, be traced, with any 
degree of certainty, only to the sixteenth century, when one 
Gabriel Buonaparte quitted Sarzana in Tuscany to establish 
himself at Ajaccio. The Buonapartes were of the nobility. At 
least the Grand Duke of Tuscany, Leopold of Austria, did not 
hesitate to confirm the nobihty of Napoleon's grandfather in 
1757. It was also confirmed later by the Heralds' College of 
France. The Buonapartes (this was the original spelling of 
the name and thus Napoleon himself wrote it until 1796), like 
most of the residents of the seaboard cities, remained loyal to 
Genoa until no longer able to withstand the patriotic uprising. 

When war with France opened. Carlo joined the ranks of the 
patriots and was rewarded with special distinction by Paoli. 
After the victory of the enemy, however, he soon became a 
zealous supporter of the newly-established government. A 
cordial welcome was ever extended to the foreigners in Carlo's 
house at Ajaccio, where his beautiful young wife Lsetitia (nee 
Ramohno) made a charming hostess, and the French command- 
ant. Count Marbceuf, was a frequent visitor. 

Carlo Buonaparte was a man of some attainments, although 
not remarkably gifted; ambitious, also somewhat frivolous and 
fond of pleasure, yet solicitous withal in caring for his numerous 
family. He was a lawyer by profession, and his own client; 
he had nothing more at heart than the litigation he was carry- 
ing on for the recovery of a valuable estate bequeathed by a 
pious relative to the Jesuits. The latter were for this reason 
detested by him, and indeed he could never have been counted 
a very devout Catholic. The lawsuit carried on by the French 
authorities as legal successors to the banished monks wasted 
much time and money, as did also the repeated journeys to 
Versailles, whither his office of deputy of the Corsican nobility 
led him. It was while on an expedition of this kind that death 
overtook him at Montpelher in 1785, at the early age of thirty- 



2}. Birth and Early Training [i769 

eight. He left, besides the undecided lawsuit, but scant means 
of subsistence for his family. 

Maria Lsetitia had borne her husband thirteen children. 
When he died eight were still living, five of them boys. Je- 
rome, the youngest, was but three months old. It was no easy 
task for the widow to carry on her household and provide for 
so large a family with these Umited resources. But Lsetitia 
solved the problem. A woman of quick perception and sagacity, 
with the tenacious energy that overcomes difficulties; impul- 
sive yet thoughtful, undaunted and, at the same time, calculating, 
she was a true Corsican. With no great mental gifts and slight 
pretensions to education, she had much common sense and was 
not wanting in a certain loftiness of sentiment. When, at the 
time of the war with France, Carlo joined Paoli, she had coura- 
geously followed her husband into the mountains, and, although 
she was with child, had willingly borne all the hardships of the 
campaign. Now she governed her household with a firm hand 
and utiUzed her limited means with prudence and economy. 

In truth Carlo's unreserved adherence to France and the 
friendship of the governor had at length proved of practical 
benefit. The elder sons had been put to school in French insti- 
tutions at the king's expense; now at his father's death Joseph, 
the eldest, returned to Corsica to help his mother, and in the 
same year, 1785, Napoleon, the second son, left the Paris Military 
Academy as lieutenant, no less ready to help those at home to 
the extent of his ability. Who would have dreamed that under 
the protection of this little officer the whole family should some 
day attain to grandeur, power, and distinction? 

Napoleon was born in Ajaccio on the 15th of August, 1769; 
a date the accuracy of which is put in question by the most 
recent investigation. Indeed the latest researches cast no 
little doubt upon the much-celebrated Napoleon's Day.* Accord- 
mg to these the year of his birth should be 1768, and his birth- 
place Corte. 

* See the bibliography, cli. I, for the arguments for and against the 
accepted date. — B. 



Mt. 1-10] Napoleon's Boyhood 5 

The evidence, however, is not so strong as to give cause for 
abandoning the traditional date, to say nothing of the fact that 
it is a matter of comparatively little importance whether our 
hero was born a year earlier or later, whether in the interior 
of the island or on the coast. Suffice it that there he was and 
that he soon made his presence felt. 

In his childhood he is said to have resembled his mother in 
appearance, having inherited also Lsetitia's energetic disposi- 
tion, while his brothers were more like their father. Wilful 
and stubborn. Napoleon gave trouble to all about him. To 
quote his own words written toward the close of his life: "I 
was self-willed and obstinate, nothing awed me, nothing discon- 
certed me. I was quarrelsome, exasperating; I feared no one. 
I gave a blow here and a scratch there. Every one was afraid 
of me. My brother Joseph was the one with whom I had the 
most to do; he was beaten, bitten, scolded; I complained that 
he did not get over it soon enough." His mother alone was 
able, by the exercise of great severity, to control the headstrong 
boy, while his father usually defended him. As is evident, his 
early training was not of the best. Under the instruction of 
his uncle Fesch, a half-brother of Laetitia's, Napoleon learned 
the alphabet, and, later, in a girls^ school of the little town he 
acquired the essentials of his mother tongue. 

Doubtless he gave much greater attention to the many tales 
which he overheard of Paoli and the war for independence 
and eagerly constructed ideals from the material which lay so 
near at hand. He was overflowing with heroic dreams of this 
kind when he afterward went to France. 

The lad's untamable spirit may have led his father to dis- 
cover his predisposition for a military life. He applied for a 
scholarship for his son at one of the royal schools where the 
scions of the French nobility were prepared for a military career, 
and his request was granted. Toward the end of the year 1778 
he left home in order to place his two elder sons in the College 
of Autun, where Napoleon was to learn French before entering 
the military school at Brienne, while Joseph was to finish his 
classical studies preparatory to taking orders. In three months 



6 Birth and Early Training [1769-1779 

,the former had made some progress in learning to express him- 
self in French, and on the 23d of April, 1779, Napoleone de 
Buonaparte was enrolled among the students at Brienne. The 
die was cast — he was to be a soldier. 

The five years spent in this place were not of the happiest 
for the young Corsican. To be transported from the ever- 
smiling scenes of the south to the northern gloom of Champagne, 
from the sea to the most monotonous province of the interior, 
from untrammelled freedom to a monastic discipline, where 
he knew no one of the trifling pleasures which made home 
happy, what wonder that the sensitive nature of the boy should 
become gloomy and morose? What above all brought about 
this unhappy state of affairs was his unsociable disposition. 
His imperious, defiant temperament found all too soon resolute 
antagonists in the haughty sons of the Castries, the Comminges, 
and all the other illustrious houses represented by his fellow 
students at Brienne. He had to endure the mortification of 
learning that they considered his title to nobility defective, 
and that they spoke insultingly of his father, whom they dubbed 
the "usher" in derision of his incessant petitioning at Ver- 
sailles. For a time Napoleon revenged himself in his own un- 
governed fashion, but at length sullenly withdrew from the 
society of them all. 

Two of his schoolfellows have left us credible accounts of 
his life at the Military Academy and of his unsociable demean- 
our. One of them writes: "Gloomy and even savage, almost 
always self-absorbed, one would have supposed that he had 
just come from some forest and, unmindful until then of the 
notice of his fellows, experienced for the first time the sensations 
of surprise and distrust; he detested games and all manner of 
boyish amusements. One part of the garden was allotted to 
him and there he studied and brooded, and woe to him who 
ventured to disturb him! One evening the boys were setting 
off fireworks and a small powder-chest exploded. In their 
fright the troop scattered in all directions and some of them 
took refuge in Napoleon's domain, whereat he rushed upon the 
fugitives in a passion and attacked them with a spade.'' Winter 



Mt. 10-15] At Brienne 7 

alone compelled him to be more companionable. Then was 
his opportunity to show the others how to build snow forts and 
defences of all sorts, and how to attack and defend them. But 
the first day of spring found him again in his corner of the 
garden, serious and solitary. Naturally he made no friends 
among his schoolmates, — he never had one during his hfe. 
One is even inclined to doubt whether he ever had any youth; 
it seems indeed as if no ray of the springtime of life, which fills 
so many hearts with gladness, had ever brightened the path 
of this early embittered nature. 

It was not long before troubles of a more material nature 
were added to the pangs of wounded pride. The straitened 
condition of the family did not admit of keeping the boys at 
school supplied with an abundance of pocket-money, a new 
mark of inferiority to the hated Frenchmen. On this account 
Napoleon, then twelve years old, sent to his father a letter of 
expostulation which is exceedingly characteristic of the disposi- 
tion and mental attitude of the writer. He begs to be taken 
away from Brienne, and rather, if need be, to be set to learn 
some handicraft, than to be compelled further to exhibit his 
poverty. He writes : '' I am weary of advertising my destitu- 
tion and of seeing it ridiculed by insolent schoolboys whose 
only point of superiority to me is in their wealth, for there is 
not one amongst them who is not a hundred degrees below me 
in nobility of feeling. What! Sir, would you have your son 
continually the butt of a lot of high-born clowns, who, vain 
of the pleasures they are enabled to enjoy, insult me in laugh- 
ing at the privations which I am obliged to undergo?" * He 
learned in reply that it was indeed impossible for those at home 
to furnish him with funds necessary to keep up appearances. 
Another cause of embitterment augmented by his distress over 
the situation of the family at home. 

Napoleon was neither a very industrious nor talented scholar. 
When he left the school after five years of study his spelHng was 
wretched. Indeed he never was able to write pure French. 
His acquirements in Latin were of so limited a character that 

* This letter is rejected by Masson, ''Napoleon inconnu," I. 55. — B. 



8 Birth and Early Training [i779-i784 

there were among his teachers men narrow-minded enough 
to consider him on this account without intellectual gifts. His- 
tory and geography, on the contrary, he studied with pleasure, 
and above all he preferred mathematics. ''It was the general 
opinion," said he in later days, ''that I was fit for nothing except 
geometry." Taken all in all he matured early. The letters 
which he wrote from Brienne to his uncle Fesch are throughout 
serious, clear, and logical. He showed ability to compare, dis- 
criminate, and judge acutely. One hears with astonishment 
the way in which this boy of fourteen characterizes his elder 
brother who proposed to enter the military service in place of 
the priesthood. "He is mistaken in this for several reasons," 
wrote Napoleon to Fesch. "1. As my father says, he has not 
the intrepidity necessary to confront the dangers of a battle. 
His feeble health does not permit his undergoing the hardships 
of a campaign. Indeed my brother considers a military career 
only from the standpoint of garrison life. He would unques- 
tionably make an excellent officer of the garrison. Well built, 
with ready wit, therefore fitted for paying frivolous compliments, 
and with his talents he will make an excellent appearance in 
society. But in battle? — ^That is the point whereon my father 
has his doubts. 2. He has been educated for the church; it is 
now very late to make a change of profession. The bishop of 
Autun would have given him a rich living and he would with cer- 
tainty have become a bishop. What advantages that would entail 
to the family! My Lord Bishop of Autun has done his utmost 
to induce him to persevere in his original course, assuring him 
that he will never have cause to regret it. All in vain, — he is 
not to be moved. I should commend his determination if it 
arose from a decided taste for that calling, which is after all the 
finest, and if the great Controller of human affairs had planted 
in his breast (as in mine) a real love of things military. 
3. He wants a place in the army; very good, — ^but in what 
branch of the service? . . . Doubtless he prefers the infantry, 
that is readily understood; he wants nothing to do the livelong 
day, to promenade up and down the streets all day. And to 
add to all this what does a petty officer of infantry amount to? 



Mt. 15] His Devotion to Corsica 9 

A loafer three quarters of the time, and that is one thing which 
neither my father, nor you, nor my mother, nor my uncle the 
Archdeacon desire, so nmch the less that he has already shown 
himself somewhat frivolous and extravagant, etc." 

In his moments of leisure Napoleon gave free play to his 
lively imagination. In his reveries he was carried back to his 
island home with its high mountains and the ever-clear sky 
above them, its picturesque seacoast and the deep blue sea, — 
back to the happier days of his childhood. These day-dreams 
were his sole recreation and comfort, and in his cheerless solitude 
in the midst of strangers, his longing for the land of his birth 
grew to be a glowing patriotism. Are not those who humiliate 
and sneer at him here at the same time the foes and subjugators 
of his native land? 

The thought that his father had helped to further the cause 
of the French in Corsica was unbearable, — forgive him he could 
not, and he took no pains to conceal his feelings. The heroic 
figure of Paoli appears before his mind in radiant splendour, and 
he expresses the wish to become another such as he. ''I hope," 
he exclaims, "some time to be in a position to restore her free- 
dom to Corsica." 

The fact that he was preparing himself for that purpose at 
the expense of France gave him not the least uneasiness. But 
first of all he feels impelled to acquaint himself thoroughly 
with the history of the Corsican people, and begs those at home 
to send him Boswell and other books dealing with the subject. 
Perhaps the plan has even now taken shape in his mind to 
become himself the historian of his native island. In short, 
he was an out-and-out Corsican, and implacably hostile toward 
the French. But above all he detested those among them who 
arrogantly vaunted their superiority of birth and fortune and 
looked with scorn upon those who were not their equals in rank. 

Thus in the solitary broodings of this mind, naturally given 
to reflection, were developed those revolutionary ideas which 
were just then beginning to agitate the whole of France. When 
once he meets them in the minds of others, they will appear 
neither strange nor unfamihar. 



lo Birth and Early Training [1784 

According to his father's wishes and his own inclinations 
Napoleon was to have entered the navy. But Fate willed it 
otherwise. So large a number of applications had already been 
made by boys from the military schools who preferred the marine 
service that had he insisted upon carrying out his intention he 
would have been obliged to lose a whole year. The straitened 
circumstances of the family scarcely admitted of this, and he 
decided without delay upon entering the artillery, a branch of 
the service usually avoided by the boys on account of the heavier 
work involved. His resolution once taken he was placed in the 
company of cadets of the nobility in Paris, to which place he 
removed on the 23d of October, 1784. This change had but 
slight effect on the inward workings of his mind. At Paris, as 
at Brienne, the difference was manifest between the sons of the 
great families and those of the lesser nobility who were edu- 
cated at the king's expense. The same insurmountable barrier 
which separated him from the Comminges and the Castries at 
Brienne interposed here to keep him from the Rohans and the 
Montmorencys, and wounded anew his unbounded self-esteem. 
He made himself no more beloved in Paris than at Brienne and 
even added to his unpopularity by protesting in a memorial 
against the effeminate luxury which made the Ecole militaire 
one of the most costly institutions of the state, while it at the 
same time unfitted its graduates for active service. 

Just at this time came the tidings of his father's death, and 
his attention was turned entirely to the question of an appoint- 
ment as officer at the earliest possible moment, an advance- 
ment to which he was entitled to aspire, having reached the 
required age of fifteen years. His examination passed after a 
fashion, he presented a petition to be assigned to the Artillery 
regiment of La Fere stationed at Valence; his commission as 
second heutenant followed on the 1st of September, and in 
October — having borrowed the money necessary to defray his 
travelling expenses — he departed for the garrison. 

The instructors at the military school, among whom at that 
time was Monge, the celebrated mathematician, gave, in regard 
to the student who had just taken leave, the following dis- 



^T. 15] Garrison Life 1 1 

criminating report: "Reserved and studious, he prefers study 
to amusement of any kind, and takes pleasure in reading the 
works of good authors; while diligent in his study of abstract 
science, he cares little for any other; he has a thorough knowl- 
edge of mathematics and geography. He is taciturn, preferring 
solitude, capricious, haughty, and inordinately self-centred. 
While a man of few words, he is vigorous in his replies, ready 
and incisive in retort; he has great self-esteem, is ambitious, 
with aspirations that stop at nothing; he is a young man worthy 
of patronage." 



"When I entered the service," said Napoleon one day to 
Madame de Remusat, "I found garrison life tedious; I began 
reading novels, and that kind of reading proved interesting. 
I made an attempt at writing some ; this task gave range to my 
imagination. It took hold of my knowledge of positive facts, 
and often I found amusement in giving myself up to dreams in 
order to test them later by the standard of my reasoning powers. 
I transported myself in thought to an ideal world, and I sought 
to discover wherein lay the precise difference between that and 
the world in which I lived." He was then the same dreamer 
as of old! The fondness for seclusion and meditation, which 
appeared under the restraint of his school days, was not lost in 
the free intercourse of e very-day life without its walls. What 
sort of men could have peopled his ideal world if, on comparison 
with them, his fellow mortals no longer appeared worthy of his 
companionship? 

One thing at least we may gather with safety from his con- 
fessions: that the officers of the royal army had ample time 
for novel-reading, for dreaming, and for meditation. And as 
a matter of fact imder the old regime the organization of the 
army was such that neither private soldiers nor their superiors 
had cause to complain of hardship. Thorough drill, camp- 
exercises, manoeuvres, were things unknown. To be sure, 
after the discomfiture at Rossbach in 1757 there had been those 
who demanded reform, but no one heeded them; the weakness 
of the government and the indolent ease of the officers of the 



1 2 Birth and Early Training [1784 

nobility proved an insurmountable obstacle. There was then 
no want of leisure, but the prospect of the future presented to 
the mind of one of these young officers, had he cared to employ 
his leisure in considering it, could not appear brilliant unless he 
belonged to a powerful and wealthy family. Such alone might 
aspire to the rank of staff-officer and general, while the poor 
and inferior nobility must be satisfied throughout their lives 
with subaltern positions. 

Imagine the fiery-natured Napoleon, with his feverish thirst 
for appreciation, facing the barren prospect of a half-dozen 
years of waiting for his promotion to the rank of first Heutenant 
with at least the same time of weary waiting before he could be- 
come captain, finally as such to retire and end his days, having 
been faithfully accompanied throughout his career by want 
and privation. 

Who wonders that his thoughts turned into other channels, 
or even that he openly held aloof from those who found pleasure 
in so modest a lot? He associated with his comrades in the 
garrison as little as he had with those at school. Indeed, they 
differed at bottom from the youths at Brienne and Paris only 
in being a Uttle more mature. Napoleon found much more 
to his taste the society of royal officials, lawyers, and other 
persons of the middle class who suffered in a way similar to his 
own from the rigid distinctions of society and who paid more 
attention to the outbreaks in which he vented his radical opin- 
ions than did the officers of La Fere, who, incensed at his keen 
derision, threw him, one day, into the Rhone. 

For a time he consorted with the social circle of Valence and 
frequented particularly the house of Madame de Colombier, in 
which the Abbe de Saint-Ruf was the most prominent guest, 
and in which assembled the daughters of the neighbouring fami- 
lies of rank. But this was only transitory. He soon resumed 
his former solitary manner of life. 

Was it, perchance, through some tender attachment that 
he had been drawn toward this house, and had his feeling re- 
mained unrequited? We have no certain knowledge as to this. 
But five years later — at the age of twenty-two — he wrote the 



^T. 15] Literary Studies 1 3 

following in his "Dialogue on Love": "I was once in love and 
I still retain enough of its recollections not to require these 
metaphysical definitions which never do anything but confuse 
matters. I go further than to deny its existence; I consider 
it dangerous to society as well as to the happiness of the indi- 
vidual. In short, I hold that love does more harm than good 
and that it would be a beneficent act on the part of a protecting 
divinity to rid us of it and deliver mankind from its thrall." 

But his leisure time was by no means entirely devoted to 
novel-reading and the fantastic play of his imagination. He 
developed an interest greater than ever in serious study and 
read especially political and historical works. 

This was the time in which the greatest minds of France 
had appeared as leaders and teachers of the nation to proclaim 
those rationalistic theories which condemned existing conditions 
and demanded in their place a new form of state and of society. 
The writings of Voltaire and Montesquieu, Rousseau and d'A- 
lembert w^re in the hands of every one. Bonaparte* had already 
given himself with eagerness to the study of their works while 
at the Military School in Paris, and rarely have the words of 
Jean Jacques fallen upon more fruitful soil. He made excerpts 
from the '^Contrat Social" and added notes thereto, and eagerly 
adopted the extravagant enthusiasm of the Genevan philosopher 
for the state of nature. He Ukewise read Filangieri's ''Scienza 
della legislazione," which had enjoyed since 1780 a quite un- 
deserved consideration, Adam Smith's '^ Wealth of Nations," 
Necker's ''Compte-rendu," and much else. But more than any 
of these, Raynal appears to have influenced his further develop- 
ment. Raynal was during the eighties the most widely read 
author in France. His "Histoire philosophique et politique 
des Etabhssements et du Commerce des Europeens dans les Deux 
Indes" had acquired an unrivalled popularity on account of its 
revolutionary tendencies. The book offered more than was to 
be inferred from its title. It discussed, for instance, not only 
the political situation of China, but compared the same with 
that of France to the distinct disadvantage of the latter. It 

* I shall henceforth adopt this spelling. 



14 Birth and Early Training [i784 

depicted with impressive eloquence the condition of his native 
land, the unreasonable privileges of the nobility and higher 
clergy, the immense abyss separating the rich from the poor, 
and the wrongs suffered by the middle class without power of 
redress ; the demoralizing corruption shown in the sale of office, 
and the wretched administration of the finances. It prophesied 
the collapse of the government soon to follow, nay, more, it 
summoned openly to revolution as a clear duty under such 
circumstances. This doctrine made a profound impression on 
Napoleon, more profound than that made by any of the teach- 
ings of Rousseau. He acknowledged himself, later, a zealous 
disciple of Raynal in a pamphlet entitled ^'Discours sur le 
Bonheur," which he presented (blunders in spelling included) 
to the Academy of Lyons in 1791. In 1787 he became personally 
acquainted with Raynal, and spoke with him about his studies 
into the history of his native land. A few years later he be- 
stowed upon Raynal a fragment: "Lettres sur I'Histoire de 
la Corse," which he had begun writing in 1786 and in which he 
narrated the history of the island down to the time of Paoli. 
Napoleon's brother Lucien would have us believe that Raynal 
showed the "Lettres" to Mirabeau, and that the latter extolled 
the genius of their author. But Lucien's veracity is not un- 
impeachable. 

However that may be. Napoleon had become a writer and 
now, with indefatigable pen, composed, in addition to his history, 
a novel, the scene of which is laid in Corsica, a drama — "le 
Comte d' Essex," and stories after the manner of Diderot and 
Voltaire.* 

But to him it was not sufficient to put his thoughts on paper; 
he could not be satisfied until they should be printed and read, 
and this not merely for the sake of vanity and ambition, but in 
order to gain money. For pecuniary cares had not deserted 
him in his garrison life; on the contrary, they had become 
more than ever importunate and tormented him beyond en- 

* Bonaparte himself eventually burned, with but few exceptions, all 
"the rubbish of his youthful Hterary attempts." (Th. Jung, "Lucien 
Bonaparte et ses M^moires," t. II. p. 144.) 



^T. 17] Family Adversities 1 5 

durance. Not that the one hundred livres a month which he 
received as pay would have been insufficient for his personal 
expenses; his wants were not many or great. His lodgings 
at the house of Mademoiselle Bon cost him something more 
than eight livres, and for a time he ate but one meal a day; 
the fact that he had little intercourse with his gay fellow soldiers 
was in itself an additional economy. But there were times when 
real want threatened those at home. In September, 1786, death 
bereaved them of their benefactor and patron, Marbceuf, the 
governor of Corsica, and a great-uncle, the archdeacon Lucien, 
who had always helped them with his watchful care and advice, 
lay seriously ill. Joseph, who, in spite of remonstrance, had 
discarded the clerical for the military profession, and who, after 
his father's death, had been obliged to renounce this also in 
order to find a position at home, was still seeking remunerative 
work. Up to this time the Bonapartes had been the annual 
recipients of a certain sum of money, in return for the care of 
one of the nurseries of mulberry-trees which the government 
had established in Corsica; now notice was given that this 
stipend was to be discontinued. It was not long before the 
household was without money. 

This succession of disappointments and troubles was more 
than even Laetitia's spirited nature could endure. She wrote 
her son Napoleon of her distress and besought him to return to 
her. The impression made upon him by this letter was both 
deep and painful. He resembled his father in his solicitude 
for the welfare of his family, and to know them to be in difficul- 
ties caused him unaffected sorrow. This feeling became the 
more intense when his request for immediate leave of absence 
met with the reply that such could be granted him only by 
the beginning of the following year. Bitter were the words 
in which his emotions found vent in his diary: 

"Always alone when in the midst of men, I return to my 
room to dream by myself and to give myself up to the full tide 
of my melancholy. Whither did my thoughts turn to-day? 
Toward death. In the springtime of my life, I may still hope 
to live for a long time. I have been away from my native 



1 6 Birth and Early Training [i786 

land now for six or seven years. What pleasure shall I not 
feel in seeing once more, four months hence, both my com- 
patriots and my relatives? From the tenderness felt in recalling 
the pleasures of my childhood may I not infer that my happiness 
will be complete? What madness then impels me to desire 
my own destruction? What, forsooth, am I here for in this 
world? Since death must come to me, why would it not be as 
well to kill myself? If I were sixty years old or more, I should 
respect the prejudices of my contemporaries and would patiently 
wait for Nature to finish her course, but, since I begin life in 
suffering misfortune, and nothing gives me pleasure, why should 
I endure these days when nothing with which I am concerned 
prospers? 

'' How far men have departed from Nature! How dastardly, 
abject, and servile they are! What sight awaits me at home? 
My fellow countrymen loaded with chains kissing with trembling 
the hand which oppresses them. These are no longer the gal- 
lant Corsicans roused by the virtues of a hero, enemies of tyrants, 
of luxury, of base courtiers. . . . Frenchmen, not content with 
having ravished us of all that we held most dear, you have in 
addition corrupted our morals! (The picture thus presented 
of my country, and my own powerlessness to change it, are a 
new reason for leaving a world where duty compels me to praise 
those whom virtue bids me despise.) When I reach my own 
country again what attitude am I to take; in what manner am 
I to speak? When his country ceases to exist, a loyal citizen 
should die. . . . My life is a burden to me, for I relish not a single 
pleasure and everything causes me pain; it is a burden to me 
because the men among whom I live, and shall probably always 
live, have habits of mind as far remote from mine as the hght 
of the moon differs from that of the sun. I am, therefore, 
unable to follow the only manner of living which could make 
life endurable, from which results a disgust toward everything. '^ 

Nothing could be more characteristic than this effusion of a 
soul filled with discontent. It is evident that Goethe's Werther 
(which Napoleon claims to have read five times) and Rousseau's 
impassioned writings have had their effect upon his mind; 



/Et. 17] Napoleon Returns Home 17 

their influence is plainly discernible in more than one place. 
And yet, side by side with this apparent subserviency, there 
exists a vigorous and self-reliant judgment, and one is at once 
convinced that the writer of the diary, however readily he 
may speak of his thoughts of death, has as little real intention 
of making his words good as had the dethroned emperor at 
Fontainebleau, twenty-eight years later, of taking his own life. 
It is always the same double nature to which he himself bears 
witness in the conversation with Madame de Remusat above 
cited; the same fantastic dreaming, to which nevertheless is 
always applied the measuring-rod of a calm and methodical 
deliberation; an idealism subdued, corrected, and controlled 
by a highly developed, realistic intelligence. This is the funda- 
mental trait of his character and at the same time its key. 

And now he has suddenly fixed upon a practical resolution. 
Once in Ajaccio, he will get his leave of absence prolonged, "on 
the ground of ill health," as far as the forbearance of the Minis- 
ter of War will permit. In this way his family will profit by 
his pay, while he himself will have the opportunity to carry 
out his literary projects. And as a matter of fact he did not 
rejoin his regiment at Auxonne before May, 1788. 

It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that the young 
officer's concern for the support and future of his family and 
the cheerlessness of his own prospects were alone responsible 
for his dejection. What tormented him beyond all these was 
the conflict between what he recognized as his duty and what 
he himself honoured as civic virtue in the light of his specula- 
tions on the natural rights of mankind. 

He had once written in a letter to Fesch: ''A soldier's sole 
attachment should be to his flag." But did not this flag bind 
him to the cause of the French whom he had learned to hate 
even while at school, before whose doors his pride had been 
obliged to humble itself to beg assistance and benefits for the 
Buonaparte family — the French who had subjugated his country, 
in the liberation of which he saw realized the most audacious 
dreams of his fancy? He, to whom Sampiero and Paoli had 
been shining ideals, had sworn allegiance to their victorious 



1 8 Birth and Early Training [i786 

foes and thereby imposed upon himself fetters which para- 
lyzed his ambition and condemned his existence to insigni- 
ficance. He had purposed to become the hero of his nation 
and he had become merely one of its armed custodians. This 
state of affairs was intolerable and yet it was scarcely to be 
changed. 

For unheard-of things must take place in order to overcome 
the obstacles which towered before the feverishly urgent deter- 
mination of this ambitious youth. The established order of a 
world must be overturned to make way for the flight of this 
extraordinary genius. 

And behold! the unheard-of came to pass: the order of the 
world was disestablished and a new era opened. 



CHAPTER II 

THE REVOLUTION. NAPOLEON'S CORSICAN ADVENTURES 

It is impossible to undertake to set forth here all the causes 
and occasions which brought about in France that revolutionary 
movement to which a large proportion of our modern political 
and social conditions owe their existence. In point of fact, 
the necessity for these changes was felt long before the decisive 
year of 1789. As early as the middle of the century^ during the 
reign of Louis XV., notorious in history for his mistresses and 
his defeats, the word ''Revolution" had been uttered with 
something of that prophetic tone with which the Old Testa- 
ment seers pronounced the name Messiah, and having once 
acquired a foothold, it never again disappeared from the lan- 
guage. Upon the succession of Louis XVI. to the throne of his 
grandfather he showed the best of intentions toward the cor- 
rection of abuses, but it soon became evident that the evil was 
too deep-rooted to be moved by well-intentioned attempts at 
reform. No minister, however able, could hope by means of 
judicious measures to overcome the difficulty. Ever since the 
seventeenth century the government in France had been tend- 
ing toward despotism and centralization; the welfare of the 
nation rested solely upon the caprice of the king and the will of 
nis domineering ministers. The fundamental rights of the 
people were ignored; the States General — the legal representa- 
tives of the three political classes, the clergy, nobility, and 
commons — had for a long time not been convoked for partici- 
pation in the framing of laws, though this right was accorded 
to them by the ancient constitution of the realm. As a conse- 
quence there existed a constant feud between the government 
and the Parhaments, the highest judicial courts of the country. 
The clergy and nobility had submitted to the position of political 

19 



20 The Revolution [i789 

insignificance which the new system gave them, and were re- 
warded with lavish hand by the king for their loyalty; their 
exemption from taxation, together with all other prerogatives 
formerly granted them by the state in acknowledgment of 
their services as judges and guardians, was preserved to them. 

On the other hand, the third estate, which had not shared 
in any of these privileges, was obliged to assume, almost unaided, 
the burden of the state's expenses. Of the land two thirds 
were owned by the two privileged classes and were accordingly 
free from taxation, while the remaining third was divided among 
a large number of small property-holders who were in nowise 
entitled, as were their superiors, to exact feudal service and 
levy turnpike and bridge toll of the peasantry, but were com- 
pelled to pay taxes of all descriptions upon their meagre lands. 
The peasants, living exclusively upon the domains of the privi- 
leged classes, had to pay taxes to state, church, and stewards 
of the landlord, and there remained to them after the deduc- 
tion of these imposts an all too scanty means of subsistence. 
In the cities a few rich and favoured circles were opposed to a 
populace without property, who, excluded from guilds, corpo- 
rations, and all municipal offices, earned their living in daily 
labour for the upper classes. Thus the poor man of France was 
oppressed, while the aristocracy squandered the fruit of others* 
labour in Paris or at the prodigal royal court at Versailles in 
leading the brilliant and luxurious life of the salons. 

That these conditions were contrary to nature had long been 
recognized by thinking minds. In imperishable works, con- 
spicuous for their brilliancy and elegant simplicity of language, 
they attacked the intolerance of the church, which, even after 
1760, incited the willing authorities to harsh measures against 
the members of the reformed churches; they demonstrated that 
existing social conditions were in violation of the rights of man, 
and sought, in sundry ways, the ideal government to replace 
the present one when that should collapse as it deserved to do. 

And the catastrophe followed soon. Bad financial admin- 
istration on the one side, with failure of crops and distressing 
need on the other, hastened the crisis. After the disclosure by 



^T. 20] The Meeting of the States General 21 

Necker, Minister of Finance, in the early eighties, of the des- 
perate condition of the State's treasury; after the ineffectual 
laboiu*s of his successor Calonne over the problem of how to draw 
upon the wealth of the two privileged classes for the benefit of 
the country; after repeated borrowings had exhausted credit 
and bankruptcy seemed inevitable, the king at last decided to 
yield to the universal demand and to convoke the States General 
at Versailles early in May, 1789. 

The States General as they had assembled for the last time 
in 1614 was no such united deliberative body as, for instance, 
the English Parliament or the modern German Reichstag. 
The deputies of the three estates debated and voted separately, 
and the majority of votes of all three — two to one — was neces- 
sary to enact or reject a bill. Under such conditions the com- 
mons were of necessity at a disadvantage when opposed to the 
clergy and the nobility. 

But the third estate of 1789 was a different body from that 
of 1614. The example of two great and successful revolutions, 
that of England in the seventeenth and that of America in the 
eighteenth century, had not remained without effect upon the 
minds of its members. 

The doctrines of philosophers and political writers had 
penetrated their minds, the conviction of the injustice of exist- 
ing conditions was pre-eminently theirs, and the wish to give 
expression to this conviction in deeds impelled them to take 
the first step toward revolution. 

Contrary to the provisions of the ancient constitution, as 
well as to the wish of Louis XVI., the representatives of the 
third estate, who equalled in number those of the other two 
combined, refused to conform to the former manner of sitting. 
They declared themselves to be the representatives of the nation, 
and summoned the deputies of the other two estates to co-operate 
with them in their deliberations and decrees. (Jime 17th, 1789.) 
This purpose was accomplished and thus the feudal States 
General were transformed into a modern Chamber of Deputies, 
which, far from contenting itself with complacently approving 
the government loans, felt itself called upon to do away en- 



22 Corsican Adventures [i789 

tirely with the old regime and to constitute in its place a new 
France. The first part of this task was accomplished before the 
end of the year. In the night session of the 4th of August, 
amidst universal excitement, those memorable decrees were 
passed which annulled all privileges of rank, removed all feudal 
burdens from the peasant, declared ecclesiastical tithes . re- 
deemable, suppressed the selling of public offices, and pro- 
claimed all citizens eligible to any office whether civil or military. 
By this action — too precipitate, to be sure — was demolished 
the crumbling edifice of ancient France and the foundation laid 
for a new and habitable structure. 

These decrees were, however, not the result of calm considera- 
tion and deliberate judgment. While the lawmakers at Ver- 
sailles were drawing up the code of newly-acquired liberty the 
capital near by was in the wildest uproar. Riots had for years 
been frequent in Paris, but now they became the estabhshed 
order of the day. Shortly before the above-mentioned decrees 
were passed by the National Assembly, the populace of Paris, 
having become "sovereign," had repulsed the royal troops on 
the Place Vendome, had taken by storm the Hctel des Invalides, 
and had razed to the ground the Bastille. It was with the 
greatest difficulty that the Deputies were able to restrain the 
mob from further excesses. Strange and varied elements 
constituted the populace of Paris: fairly-educated, honest 
enthusiasts in the cause of freedom stood side by side with 
brutish vagabonds whom the poverty of the open country had 
driven by thousands into the city; oppressed labourers who were 
contending for their just right to live decently, marched beside 
impudent adventurers and light-fingered gentry who brazenly 
declared war upon all movable property; theorists ready to 
piish their cherished ideas to the last extreme were beside 
legions of ignorant beings who blindly acted upon any suggestion 
overheard in the streets — an imposing array enlisted in the 
interests of anarchy and soon to assume a fearful importance. 

The capital did not remain alone a prey to revolt. The 
provinces also felt the force of the current from the beginning 
of the political movement. Here hunger assumed the executive 



Mt. 20] Outbreaks in the Provinces 23 

power. Hundreds of grain riots were but the precursors to 
further excesses. The harvests of 1789 in the south of France 
had proved a faihire. In the middle and northern parts of the 
country, where the yield had been sufficient, no one showed the 
spirit necessary to put the grain on the market. The high 
prices kept up and occasioned new disturbances. Proprietors 
were forced by threats of violence to deliver up their supplies. 
Peasants assembled before the castles of the nobility and com- 
pelled them to yield not only their feudal rights, but their 
possessions. Whoever resisted forfeited his life. Eastern 
France, from the extreme north down to Provence, was dis- 
tracted by peasant-uprisings and confiscations of property. 
Murder and assassination were nothing unusual. All authority 
was powerless to restrain the disorder. 

Auxonne on the Saone, where the artillery regiment La Fere 
was stationed in garrison, was not undisturbed by the Revolu- 
tion. In July, 1789, the alarm-bell had sounded here also, the 
toll-gates had been broken down, the office of the tax-collector 
destroyed. A detachment of cannoniers, appointed to re- 
establish order, refused obedience to commands and stood with 
their weapons passive spectators of the disturbance. Their 
captain, who attempted to arrest one of the ringleaders, was 
pursued by the mob and barely escaped with his life. Not until 
some companies of the city's National Guard began to quell 
the tumult would the troops give the least assistance. Whether 
the young Lieutenant Bonaparte participated in this affair is 
unknown, nor can we gain any knowledge as to his attitude in 
these days, interesting as any information on this subject would 
be. We know only that after his return from Ajaccio he was 
more than ever friendly to the idea of a radical change in the 
government. In his diary we find under date of October 23d, 
1788, the outUne of a ''Dissertation sur TAutorite Royale." 
"This work," it reads, ''will begin with setting forth general 
ideas upon the origin and growth of the name of king in the 
mind of man. Military government is favourable to it. This 
work will enter next into the details of usurped authority en- 
joyed by the monarchs of the twelve kingdoms of Europe. 



24 The Revolution [i789 

There are but very few kings who have not deserved dethrone- 
ment/' Tolerably advanced ideas for a lieutanant in the royal 
army at the age of twenty! 

Still his mind remains fixed upon Corsica. He revises his 
'•Lettres sur THistoire de la Corse" and purposes dedicating 
them to the banished Paoli. In a letter of June, 1789, in which 
he attempts to approach his hero, he manifests most unmis- 
takably his hatred toward the French oppressors. Presently 
a single idea seizes possession of his mind — to take advantage 
of the Revolution to obtain power and influence in his native 
land, and to acquire at the same time with his own independence 
that of his people. This is no longer the hour for written words. 
The "Lettres sur THistoire de la Corse," which Paoh declined 
to have dedicated to himself, remain unprinted. Their author 
is seeking for himself a place in the history of his country. 

Since their conquest by the French, the Corsicans had been 
divided into two parties — the partisans of the foreigner, who 
had reconciled themselves with the new order of things and 
turned the same to their own advantage, and the Nationalists, 
who submitted with the greatest reluctance to the yoke of the 
new supremacy. To the former faction, the Conservatives, 
belonged the inferior nobihty and the clergy with its blind 
following, as did also a part of the residents of the seaport towns; 
indeed those who lived along the coast and were thus at the 
mercy of every passing frigate speedily learned submission to 
the will of a foreign power, while the mountaineers of the in- 
terior, not unlike their neighbours, the Montenegrins, preserved 
more readily their free and independent spirit. 

The Nationalists were themselves cleft into two divisions, 
of which one hoped to secure civil liberty by making common 
cause with the revolutionists in France, while the other wished to 
have nothing to do with them or with any compact in which 
they were concerned. 

The Conservatives elected to the States General the official 
candidates, General Buttafuoco and the Abbe Peretti. The 
Nationalists chose Salicetti and Colonna di Cesare Rocca, 
members of the opposition. The latter succeeded in making 



^T. 20] Napoleon's Designs in Corsica 25 

the wishes of their constituents prevail in the National Assembly: 
the Commission of Nobles, who acted as advisory board to 
the governor of the island, was to give place to an elective 
Council of Administration, and a paid native militia was to be 
maintained. 

While the idea of a native administrative body originated 
in the ambition of a group of young Corsicans, Pozzo di Borgo, 
Peraldi, Cuneo, and others, who were already dreaming of them- 
selves as Regents, the creation of a militia was the suggestion 
of Lieutenant Bonaparte in Auxonne, who was kept informed 
by his uncle Fesch as to all events on the island, and whose 
family after the death of Marbceuf had joined the opposition. 
He, too, aspired to the highest office at home, but his ambition 
did not rely upon elections and debates and fickle pubhc senti- 
ment. Even now the bayonet was to him the surest means 
of acquiring power. He felt that his military education would 
assure him a high command in the Corsican militia and that he, 
once in possession of such a command . . . But such projects 
demand one's presence on the scene of action. Accordingly 
he again obtains a somewhat extended leave of absence and the 
month of September, 1789, finds him back in Ajaccio. 

Difficulties present themselves at once upon his arrival. 
The Conservative deputy Buttafuoco had prevailed upon the 
royal government to defer the carrying out of the changes 
demanded by the opposition. For the present there was no 
hope of a popular council or a paid militia. 

But the time has come in which the opposition resorts .to 
violence. Napoleon, also, has not passed through the expe- 
rience of this revolutionary summer without result. He has 
seen the National Guard form in French cities and recognized 
the magic of the cockade; he now utihzes his observations and 
displays a feverish zeal in making preparations for carrying out 
his aims. He plans to wrest the power from the hands of the 
reactionary authorities, to organize a National Guard, to seize 
the Bastille of Ajaccio and drive the French from the island. 
The patriotic club of the city, to which he confides his purposes, 
is full of the wildest enthusiasm in favour of them. 



26 Corsican Adventures [1789 

And in fact a National Guard was formed, and the revolu- 
tion, under the leadership of the young lieutenant in the royal 
army, started under most favourable auspices. One of his 
biographers tells us that ''in Ajaccio he moved, he electrified 
everything with his indefatigable activity." But at this point 
Napoleon's plans were interfered with by the reinforcement of 
the French garrison, the suppression of the club, and the dis- 
banding of the National Guard; the leaders of the revolution 
had to content themselves with addressing a protest, drawn up 
by Napoleon, to the National Assembly at Paris begging its pro- 
tection to their hberties. (Last of October, 1789.) 

Meanwhile, in imitation of Ajaccio, other towns had revolted, 
and in some instances, as in Bastia and Isola Rossa, remained 
victorious. Upon the advice of Buttafuoco the government 
determined to quell the insurrection by levying for that purpose 
a large detachment of troops, and orders therefor had already 
been issued, when the National Assembly, at the instigation of 
SaHcetti, raised Corsica, hitherto considered merely as con- 
quered territory, to the dignity of a French province enjoying 
all the rights and immunities to which others were entitled. 

No regard was paid to the treaty of 1768 by which Genoa 
had surrendered the island to France "as security." An am- 
nesty made it possible for PaoU and his companions in exile to 
return to Corsica. The government at Paris was forced to 
abstain from carrying out the harsh measures intended, and the 
radicals of the island recovered complete hberty of action. In 
Ajaccio the club resumed its sessions in the summer of 1790, 
the National Guard was drilled under Napoleon's directions, 
and a new municipal council was elected wherein Joseph Bona- 
parte at last found employment. 

What was more natural than to resume the plans inter- 
rupted the year before? Nothing but the watchfuhiess of the 
garrison which occupied the citadel prevented Napoleon from 
carrying out his plan of seizing the stronghold; to his proposal 
of laying a regular siege the club would not consent. The hated 
French remained in possession. 

Shortly afterwards Paoli returned. Thousands assembled 



^T. 21] Napoleon Returns to France 27 

to do him honour and greeted him with ecstasy and transports 
of joy. Deputations from all cities met him. The former 
dictator, the glorious chief, whom the recollections of the struggle 
for independence and the martyrdom of exile surrounded with 
a subhme halo, was the object of unmixed veneration. When, 
in accordance with the new constitution of France, the election 
of pubUc officers took place in each of the departments in Sep- 
tember, 1790, Paoli was unanimously chosen president of the 
Council of Administration. All who had political aspirations 
gathered around him. Napoleon was among these, always con- 
fident that the paid militia, to the command of which he so 
ardently longed to be appointed, was about to become a reality. 
This would have enabled him to resign his commission in the 
royal army which was such a burden to him and withheld him 
from the real scene of his ambition. At the side of Paoh, who 
was not a trained soldier, he would have played a distinguished 
part — and Paoli was already an old man. Vain hopes! The 
ministry refused to arm the Corsican people at the expense of 
France, and Bonaparte at last was obliged in February, 1791, 
to rejoin his regiment. 

Meanwhile the emigration of the royahsts had deprived 
the regiment of La Fere of many of its officers, and it was owing 
to this circumstance that Napoleon was not called to account 
for being deficient in his sense of duty and in discipline, but was 
even promoted, June 1st, 1791, to the position of first lieutenant 
in the fourth regiment of artillery at Valence. 

The country was enjoying then an apparent calm, and he 
was able to resume his manner of life such as it had been two 
years earher, except that he now shared his modest lodging and 
meagre pay with his younger brother Louis, the future king of 
Holland. When, twenty years later, Louis created difficulties 
for the Emperor of the French by arbitrarily resigning his crown, 
Napoleon alluded in conversation with Caulaincourt to these 
bygone days. ''What ! " exclaimed he, ''my brother injiu-e instead 
of helping me! This Louis whom I brought up on my pay of 
a lieutenant, at the price of Heaven knows what privations ! I 
found means of sending money to pay the board and lodging of 



28 The Revolution. [1791 

my younger brother. Do you know how I managed it? It 
was by never setting foot inside a caf^ or appearing in the social 
world; it was by eating dry bread and brushing my clothes 
myself so that they should remain the longer presentable. 
In order not to be conspicuous among my comrades I lived 
like a bear, always alone in my little room with my books — 
then my only friends. And those books ! By what strict econ- 
omies, practised on actual necessities, did I purchase the enjoy- 
ment of possessing them! When, by dint of abstinence, I had 
at length amassed the sum of twelve hvres, I turned my steps 
with the joy of a child toward the shop of a bookseller who lived 
near to the bishop's palace. I often went to visit his shelves 
with the sin of envy within me; I coveted long before my purse 
allowed of buying. Such were the joys and dissipations of my 
youth." 

But frequently his small income could not be brought to cover 
his expenses. Debts had to be contracted, modest to be sure, 
but nevertheless oppressive with the hopelessness of increasing 
his resources. 

Presently he resumed his Uterary projects. His "Discours 
sur le Bonheur," presented to the Academy of Lyons in the 
hope of its being awarded the prize of twelve hundred francs, 
brought nothing but disappointment to its author. His hterary 
reveries were resumed and resulted in the above-mentioned 
''Dialogue sur T Amour." Besides this he wrote ''Reflexions 
sur I'Etat Naturel," in which he combated Rousseau's hy- 
potheses and gave evidence of being a keen observer of human 
affairs. 

All at once the speculative solitude of the young officer is 
interrupted by the noise of unprecedented excitement which 
prevails throughout all France. 

During the first months of 1791 the fundamental provisions 
of the new Constitution of France had been formulated, and 
they needed but the royal sanction to become law. But since 
this Constitution reduced the royal authority almost to insig- 
nificance, and the radical laws concerning the church woimded 
the religious conscience of the king, Louis XVI. decided to flee 



JEt. 21] Political Activity 29 

from Paris and seek in some foreign land safety and defence 
for his person and kingly dignity. 

The plan failed; the king and his escort were stopped on 
the way ana brought back to Paris. 

A storm of indignation swept the country against the king 
and against those who had persuaded him to abandon his people. 
The National Assembly suspended the royal authority, and 
in all the towns of France the clubs, the militia, and the troops 
of the line swore unswerving fidelity to the decrees of the Par- 
liament and to the new Constitution. With difficulty only 
could the more moderate, the " Feuillants," restrain the radical 
"Jacobins." Only when the king had accepted the Constitution 
was order in some slight degree restored. 

At this time First Lieutenant Bonaparte subscribed to the 
following oath: 

"I swear to use the arms dehvered into my hands in the 

defence of my country, and to support against all enemies, 

whether from within or from without, the Constitution decreed 

by the National Assembly, to perish rather than suffer the 

invasion of French territory by foreign troops, and to obey only 

such orders as are given in accordance with the decrees of the 

National Assembly. 

Buonaparte, 

Officer in the 4th Regiment of Artillery. 

Valence, the 6th of July, 1791." 

Napoleon was taking an active part in the political clubs. He 
was secretary of the "Amis de la Constitution" of Valence, who 
were affiliated with the Jacobins in Paris, and in that capacity 
he composed an address to the National Assembly in which its 
acts were approved by the members of the club. 

On the occasion of a patriotic banquet he offered a toast in 
honour of the radicals. But it would be an error to regard these 
acts as evidence of the patriotic enthusiasm with which at that 
time all Frenchmen were carried away and which raised to a 
new significance the word "Nation." 

In the midst of all this Napoleon remained a Corsican, and 
only a Corsican, and held firmly to the plans which linked his 



30 Corsican Adventures [1791 

destiny with that of his native land. These projects were soon 
to assume more soUd form. 

In the session of July 22d, 1791, the National Assembly 
determined to create battalions of paid volunteers, the force 
to include something over one hundred thousand men. The 
department of Corsica was to furnish four such battalions. 

Hardly had the news reached Napoleon when it became an 
impossibility for him to remain longer at Valence. The long 
and ardently desired opportunity to play a military part in his 
native island had presented itself. Before the end of September 
he was again on furlough in Ajaccio. What mattered it to him 
that France was on the eve of war? He was equally uncon- 
cerned that his leave of absence would terminate on the 1st of 
January, 1792. He sought later to exculpate himself on the 
ground of "unforeseen circumstances," and of "the dearest and 
most sacred duties to be fulfilled." "In these difficult cir- 
cumstances," he writes to Sucy, the Commissary of War, "the 
post of honour of a good Corsican is in his own country." That 
he was at the same time a French officer, educated at the ex- 
pense of the king, and that he had just sworn to defend France, 
counted for nothing with him. He succeeded in getting his 
name struck off from the army list, the act taking effect January 
1st, 1792, and more zealously than ever endeavoured to obtain 
the position of heutenant-colonel in the volunteer battalion 
of Ajaccio, which appointment lay with the vote of the troops. 

For years he had ingratiated himself with the mountaineers 
who now voted for him, and this resulted in giving him a majority 
above his rival. Meanwhile, until the election should be over, 
Napoleon took the precaution to seize and detain in his own 
house one of the commissioners of the election who was hostile 
to him. With an insignificant man chosen as first Heutenant- 
colonel, Bonaparte became virtual commander of the battalion 
from his native city. This was his first coup d'etat. Again 
his eyes turned toward the citadel, still the residence of French 
officers and soldiers. Now, at the head of a band of devoted 
men, the blow could not fail. Nothing was needed but to await 
a favourable opportunity. 



Mt. 22] Conditions in Corsica 



31 



There was in Ajaccio, as in other Corsican cities, a consider- 
able number of ardently pious Catholics to whose rehgious 
feeling the new laws governing the church seemed no less iniqui- 
tous than to the King of France. It was no difficult matter 
for the numerous priests of the island to strengthen this element 
in its hatred toward the new order of things and its advocates. 
It was no wonder that there were many bitter enemies of the 
Jacobin Club, which was in close touch with the clubs of Toulon 
and Marseilles. Napoleon was particularly detested, not only 
as having attached himself at home, as in Valence, to the radical 
party, but as having, with the collaboration of his imcle Fesch, 
pubhshed a pamphlet deahng with the question of the oath 
required of priests. 

Even as far back as in July, 1790, there had been tumults in 
which were heard such cries as ''Vive la Revolution! Death to 
Jacobins, death to the officer!" 

Once the frenzied mob had hurled itself upon him, and his 
rescue from its hands was due alone to the intervention of a 
friendly bandit. This feeling had not modified since that time, 
and the church laws were accorded but slight respect. Napo- 
leon now made use of this circumstance. 

" In order to secure respect for the decrees of the National 
Assembly," he took possession with his volunteers of the con- 
vent of the Capuchins in the city. He calculated that in the 
conffict which must ensue with the friars, the moderate sup- 
porters of the Constitution among the civil authorities would 
be obliged to take their stand on his side, which would afford 
liim the desired influence against which the gates of the citadel 
could not remain closed. Having gained an entrance, his plan 
was to fraternize with the French soldiers, compel the officers 
to decamp and make himself master of the city. As he had 
anticipated, during Easter week, 1792, a furious brawl arose 
in the streets and Napoleon hastened to occupy the most im- 
portant points throughout the city. He had already erected 
a mighty barricade facing the gate of the citadel, in preparation 
for a contest with the garrison, when commissioners of the gov- 
ernment, sent by Paoli, appeared and demanded a cessation of 



32 



Corsican Adventures [1792 



hostilities, and delivered to Bonaparte the censure of the 
governor for instigating the disorder, and the order to leave 
Ajaccio at once with his forces for the interior of the island. 
The occurrence was further reported to the Minister of War, 
and only the turmoil of the time prevented the trial by court- 
martial of the officer guilty of such misdemeanours. 

Again all seemed lost. Hated at home by a large number 
of his countrymen and regarded with just suspicion by the 
authorities, with charges filed against him in France, and with- 
out a position in the regular army, to what could he look forward 
when the brief one year's term of service of the volunteers 
came to an end? 

Nothing but decisive measures taken at the right place 
could help in this quandary. With the consent of the govern- 
ment Napoleon betook himself to Paris. 

He found the capital a prey to the most violent agitation. 
The truce between Crown and Revolution had been of short 
duration. Louis XVI. had incurred anew the resentment of 
the progressive parties by denying his sanction to the decrees 
of the legislative assembly against the priests who refused to 
take oath to support the new church laws, and against the emi- 
grant princes and aristocrats, whose assembling in arms on the 
frontiers was to be punished by confiscation of their property. 
The Jacobin clubs already openly declared themselves in favour 
of a republic. 

Besides, there could be no longer any doubt concerning the 
relations between the Court and foreign countries, and the 
opposition was persuaded that a successful war against foreign 
powers would be at the same time a triumph over the French 
monarchy. Accordingly the republicans of the Assembly 
agreed to foster a war against foreign princes, overthrew the 
ministry desirous of peace, and compelled the king to declare 
war against Austria, a court to which he was personally related. 
(April 20th, 1792.) 

The result was, however, at first disappointing. An attack 
upon the Austrian Netherlands was easily repulsed and the 
defeat of the French troops created prodigious excitement in 



Mt. 22] The Fall of the Monarchy 3 3 

Paris. "Treason/' was the cry on all sides. The king was 
regarded as personally responsible and a conspirator against his 
own people, a suspicion which was strengthened by the fact that 
just at this time, June 13th, 1792, Louis dismissed the radical 
ministry and surrounded himself with advisers chosen from 
among the moderate royalists. 

The leaders of the radical parties profited by this feeling in 
playing the animosity of the anarchistic elements of the capital 
against the Crown. On the 20th of June a great crowd con- 
sisting mainly of an armed rabble streamed into the Tuileries to 
compel the sanction of the two decrees. Nothing but the calm, 
dignified manner of the king averted an attempt upon his life. 
But on August 10th, at the instigation of the Jacobins, the 
populace returned to the charge. Bands of pikemen, workmen 
from the suburbs of St. Antoine and St. Marcel, and all manner 
of riffraff besieged the royal palace and forced Louis XVI. to 
seek protection in the National Assembly. But here his dignity 
as sovereign was declared forfeited and the monarchy sus- 
pended. With him fell likewise the conservative ministry, 
giving place to a government consisting of republican Girond- 
ists. 

This change in the course of the revolution was to Bona- 
parte of the greatest importance. Without means of sub- 
sistence, in disrepute at home, he had come to the capital to 
solicit readmission into the army. He was not entirely without 
patrons, but they were powerless in deahng with the June 
ministry, which was perfectly informed as to the recent occur- 
rences in Corsica. It was not long before he was unable to 
secure the necessaries of life. He chanced to meet Fauvelet de 
Bourrienne, a former schoolfellow at Brienne, whom he tried 
to induce to enter with him into a scheme for subletting apart- 
ments, but nothing eventually came of the plan as Bourrienne 
just then received an appointment at the Legation in Stuttgart. 
Napoleon's embarrassment increased so that he was at length 
obliged for a time to part with his watch. Those were hard, 
distressing days. The only possible chance of help lay in the 
downfall of the refractory Minister of War who had shown him- 



34 The Revolution [1792 

self so obdurate in regard to Bonaparte's application. For 
this reason was the 10th of August a day of great significance 
to Napoleon. Whether it was a fact, as has been asserted, that 
he helped to keep up the agitation by harangues in wine-shops 
is unknown. His own account of what took place, given at a 
somewhat later time, would not indicate that such had been 
the case: ''I felt, on the 10th of August, that, had I been called 
upon to do so, I should have defended the king. I was opposed 
to those who would establish the Republic by means of the 
populace; besides I saw civilians attacking men in uniform, 
that gave me a shock." No doubt that was his inmost feehng; 
but it did not accord with his personal interests of that time. 
These demanded victory to the despised rabble, and that vic- 
tory was welcome to him. 

At any rate Napoleon's circumstances now improved of a 
sudden. To the new radical ministry the machinations of the 
young officer seemed nothing extremely blameworthy; he 
was again received into favour, and more, he was appointed 
captain in his regiment, the commission being dated February 6th, 
1792, that is, on the day when his promotion would have oc- 
curred if he had not quitted the army. Indeed, in consequence 
of the flight of aristocrats, advancement of officers was at this 
time unusually rapid. It will be supposed that Napoleon 
now went to rejoin his regiment at the front, to fulfil the duties 
for which he was at least receiving payment. Not at all. The 
fate of France did not interest him in the least. The horizon 
of his thoughts and efforts was still bounded by the coast-line 
of his native island. To regain there his lost repute was to him 
a higher aim than honours and triumphs in the service of those 
principles for which at that time thousands of Frenchmen 
joyfully met death. Had accident not furnished a pretext 
for his return to Corsica he would nevertheless have found some 
means of accomplishing that purpose. But it so happened that 
the new ministry closed the boarding-schools for young gentle- 
women and sent the pupils back to their homes. Among these 
young ladies was Napoleon's sister, Marianne Bonaparte. Who 
could wish to hinder a brother from accompanying his sister in 



iET. 23] The Crisis in Corsica ^5 

times such as these with the entire country in a state of agita- 
tion? By the middle of September they were both again in 
Ajaccio. Napoleon remained there into the summer of 1793. 
This period of nine months was decisive for his career, and 
likewise for the fate of the world. At once upon his arrival 
Napoleon had several violent altercations with Paoli, owing to 
the fact that Napoleon resumed his command of the volunteer 
forces just as if nothing had meanwhile occurred and he were 
not a captain in the regular army. The young officer was, 
indeed, in so far successful in what he desired as to be granted 
the command of the troops provisionally and for the time during 
which they were engaged in an (unsuccessful) expedition against 
the island of Sardinia. But the relations between him and the 
aged governor grew more and more strained in the course of 
the next few months, to end eventually in complete rupture. 
The cause lay to a large extent in the general situation of affairs. 
Paoli had returned from England with a strong predilection 
for constitutional monarchy and had approved the French 
Constitution and agreed to serve under it only because it was 
in accordance with that condition of affairs which he had learned 
to admire on British soil. But this Constitution had been 
shattered in its most essential provisions, the new National 
Convention had abolished royalty, the king had been deposed, 
accused of treason, tried, and put to death, January 21st, 1793. 
The government was in the hands of extremists who could give 
no assurance of stability. Futhermore, at the time of his return 
to Corsica, PaoU, moved by a sense of gratitude to those who 
had received him so hospitably during his exile, had stipulated 
that he should never be called upon to bear arms against Eng- 
land. Nov/, after the execution of Louis XVI., war had broken 
out with England, and Paoli was a French general. He refused 
to comply with the order to leave Corsica and attach himself 
to the Army of the South, and when, in reply to this resistance 
to command, the Convention, on April 2d, 1793, issued a warrant 
for his arrest (later withdrawn as having been the result of 
misapprehension), nine tenths of the Corsican population of 
the island declared themselves for their aged chieftain and 



36 Corsican Adventures [1793 

against the republican government and its adherents upon the 
island. 

Among the latter figured Napoleon Bonaparte. It was the 
critical moment of his hfe; two courses lay before him, and he 
had to choose between them. Another had achieved what it 
had been his dream to accomplish in Corsica, what he had striven 
for. Should he attach himself to the Paolists it was certain that 
there would be nothing but a subordinate part for him. On the 
other hand, his duty as an officer of the French army imperatively 
demanded his presence with his regiment. Moreover, all the 
political opinions which he had entertained up to this time 
drew him toward the Convention, where the Radicals were 
continually gaining ground. If there were still a possibility 
of his mastering Corsica, his ambition could be realized only with 
the aid of France. Accordingly, early in May, 1793, he broke 
openly with Paoli, — who had made one more effort to win over the 
son of his friend Carlo, — and threw himself unreservedly into 
the arms of the French who had for so long been the objects of his 
bitter hatred. Shortly afterwards a Corsican popular council 
declared him an outlaw and the whole Bonaparte family in- 
famous. It was with difficulty that Lsetitia escaped to Calvi 
with her children; her house in Ajaccio was sacked and set 
afire. 

A final effort was made by Napoleon to conquer Ajaccio. 
Relying upon the continued devotion of his battalion in the 
militia, he planned an attack upon the city with the aid of 
French expeditionary troops. But the enterprise miscarried. 
On the 11th of June, 1793, he and his family left the island 
and withdrew to Toulon. His brother Lucien had preceded 
them by a few weeks, having hurried over to France with a 
deputation of like-minded men, to denounce Paoli as a con- 
spirator against the Repubhc, and at the same time to demand 
support of the Jacobins. Napoleon had himself made accusa- 
tions against the aged patriot in a memorial of the 4th of June, 
and therein calumniated and insulted the ideal of his boyhood 
and youth. 

His role in Corsica has been played to the end. Two motives 



-^T. 23] Napoleon Ceases to be a Corsican 37 

had guided him in his revolutionary undertakings there: a 
strong local patriotism which almost ignored everything which 
lay beyond the confines of the island, and an uncontrollable 
impulse toward the acquisition of power and influence by the 
aid of which he beheved himself called to be the deliverer and 
ruler of his people. Of these two motives one had lost its 
object. The curse of his own nation had deprived him of his 
country and annihilated in him every tender feeling which he 
had hitherto cherished toward it. In truth the desire to con- 
quer the island was still active within him during the next two 
years, and many were the schemes which he conceived to carry 
out this purpose; but these were no longer due to patriotism, 
but rather to hatred toward the patriots and to fulfil his craving 
for revenge. When later, in 1796, he actually brought Corsica 
again under French dominion this feeling also had ceased to 
exist and his native country could inspire no greater interest 
in him than, for example, Corfu or Malta. 

If sympathetic interest in the weal and woe of his own people 
be a moral element in the nature of a man, Napoleon's subsequent 
life and acts were lacking in this characteristic. He ceased 
of necessity to be a Corsican, he never succeeded in becoming 
a Frenchman. His ambition, likewise, became divested of 
national feehng; this ambition, hitherto circumscribed by the 
coast-line of a small island, knew henceforth no bounds. 



CHAPTER III 

THE SIEGE OF TOULON AND THE DEFENCE OF THE 
CONVENTION 

The revolt of Corsica was but one of a long series of uprisings 
in opposition to the rule of the Jacobins which had developed 
in Paris after the execution of the king. The contest, carried on 
over the grave of Louis XVL, between the two repubhcan factions 
of the Convention — ^the radicals of the Mountain, and the mod- 
erate Girondists — ended in the defeat of the latter in the summer 
of 1793. All among them who had not fled were imprisoned 
and perished on the scaffold. The victors thenceforth governed 
France by means of that body appointed by the Convention 
and known as the Committee of Public Safety, the members of 
which, led by Robespierre, relied upon the Jacobin Club and its 
branches for support. This Jacobin government possessed one 
quality lacking to its Girondist predecessor and indispensable 
to success under the extraordinary conditions then existing: 
unparalleled energy. The Girondists, the greater part of whom 
were young orators, entirely unequal to the political issues ("des 
fous extremement honnetes"), had plunged France into an inter- 
minable war with almost the whole of Europe, unprovided as the 
country was with either information or resources necessary to 
encounter the dangers they had conjured up. Their successors 
in executive power assumed with this war a gigantic problem, 
and they found its solution, though not without constant resort 
to illegal measures, unsparing bloodshed, and cruelty. Com- 
missioners of the Convention travelled throughout the country 
overseeing the compulsory recruiting among the people and 
supporting, ''in the name of the Representatives of the People," 
the courts-martial and revolutionary tribunals appointed to 

38 



Mt. 23] Conservative Reaction in the South 39 

punish the refractory and to judge the suspicious. And since 
those now in power owed their advancement solely to absolute 
subservience to the will of the lowest class and could preserve 
their authority only by further concessions to it, there arose in 
the capital, as in the cities of the provinces, a tyranny of the 
common people which, not content with threatening and perse- 
cuting holders of moderate political opinions, eventually accused 
as 'traitors to their country" all wealthy and educated people. 

Such a Reign of Terror could not long remain unopposed. 
It was not only in those parts of the country where the partisans 
of the king and of the old faith had taken up arms against the 
Parisians that the opposition manifested itself, as in Vendee 
and Brittany, but also among those who had originally and 
enthusiastically promoted the revolutionary movement. Such 
was the case particularly in the towns of southern France, which 
had zealously taken part in the contest against the old regime, 
but which now, incited by fugitive Girondists, rose up against 
radicalism carried to the point of anarchy. 

In Lyons, Marseilles, and Toulon the Jacobins were overcome 
by the more moderate and peace-loving element in the commu- 
nity, and in Provence there arose a central committee which 
constituted itself an independent government and decreed armed 
resistance to the terrorism of the Committee of Public Safety. 
Battalions of insurgents had already advanced from the south as 
far as Avignon, when the Convention, which by the exercise of 
a little moderation could have easily restored order without 
bloodshed, eagerly accepted the challenge, proclaimed as the 
primary object of the government the complete extermination 
of all domestic opponents and directed its Commissioner, Dubois 
de Crance, to subjugate Lyons and prevent the concentration 
of the forces of the insurgents. Dubois hurriedly collected a 
corps of men from troops of the line and volunteers and sent it 
under command of his subordinate Carteaux against the rebels 
at Avignon. In the middle of July, 1793, this force encamped 
before the ancient residence of the popes. 

Here aid was forthcoming to Carteaux. He was, to be sure, 
reinforced only to the extent of a single petty officer of artillery, 



40 The Siege of Toulon [1793 

but yet a man who was to render no slight service in the expedi- 
tion against the cities of the south: Captain Bonaparte. 

After his flight from Corsica, Napoleon had established his 
family in needy circumstances at La Vallette near Toulon and 
gone to rejoin his company, stationed at that time in Nice, which 
had been recently conquered. He bore a certificate from his 
fellow countryman and friend, Salicetti, Commissioner of the 
Convention, to the effect that his presence in Corsica had been 
imperatively necessary during the last few months, and this 
attestation shielded him from censure. On the 25th of June, 
1793, he began his service in the shore battery established on the 
Riviera. The defences at Nice being inadequate, Napoleon 
was ordered to Avignon to bring back the cannon parked there. 
Here he came upon the before-mentioned corps commanded by 
Carteaux, who straightway took him into his own service, and 
assigned to him, as officer of artillery, a small flying column. 
Soon afterwards the insurgents and the troops of the Convention 
disputed in battle the possession of Avignon, and the forces under 
Carteaux were successful. Napoleon is said to have aimed the 
cannon himself in this engagement, and to have brought about 
the flight of the enemy through his personal efforts. The former 
statement is not improbably true, the latter is supported only by 
the assertions of sycophants of a later day. As the result of this 
victory, the neighbouring towns of Tarascon, Cavaillon, and 
Beaucaire had to be abandoned forthwith by the insurgents, 
and the way to Marseilles lay open to the troops of the govern- 
ment. Napoleon was despatched back to Avignon to organize 
an artillery park. The leisure afforded him by this task he 
utiUzed in writing "Le Souper de Beaucaire," in which he dis- 
cussed the question of the civil war, the object being to convince 
the Marseillais of the futility of their resistance to the Convention. 
Two merchants of Marseilles, a native of Nimes, a manufacturer 
from Montpellier, and a soldier of the line accidentaUy meet one 
evening at an inn in Beaucaire, and the soldier, aided by the 
travellers from Nimes and Montpellier, attempts to prove to one 
of the merchants from Marseilles that from a military point of 
view the position of that city is untenable and that its political 



iET. 24J "Le Souper de Beaucaire" 41 

stand is to be condemned. One passage, particularly, is interest- 
ing historically, in which, the citizen of Marseilles having adduced 
the Girondists as testimony in behalf of his views, the soldier, 
who voices the personal opinions of Napoleon, replies: ^'The 
case, as I am satisfied, is, that 'the Mountain,' actuated by public 
or by party spirit, having proceeded to the harshest extremities 
against them, having outlawed, imprisoned, and, I will admit, ca- 
lumniated them, the Brissotins (Girondists) were lost without a 
civil war which would put them into a position for laying down 
the law to their enemies. It is then in reality to them that your 
war is useful. Had they merited their early reputation they 
would have thrown down their arms upon the formulation of the 
Constitution, they would have sacrificed their own interests to 
public welfare; but it is easier to cite Decius than to imitate 
him." To this the traveller from Marseilles makes answer that 
he and his friends also desired the Republic, but wanted a Con- 
stitution formulated by representatives who were free to act; 
they also desired liberty, but liberty as granted by worthy 
deputies; what they did not want was a Constitution favouring 
pillage and anarchy. To this Napoleon makes reply through 
the manufacturer from Montpellier, who reproaches the insur- 
gents with rebellion and counter-revolution, "for," he declares, 
''the Convention is the centre of unity, the real sovereign, espe- 
cially when the nation is divided." 

Hardly was this piece finished when the Commissioners of 
the Convention arrived in Avignon. These were his friend 
SaHcetti, the younger Robespierre, brother of the autocrat at 
Paris, and the deputy Gasparin; they were on their way to the 
Army of the South. Napoleon was introduced to the others by 
Salicetti, and his penetration and culture charmed Robespierre, 
with whom he from this time entered into near relations. The 
"Souper" was listened to with attention and satisfaction by the 
Commissioners, who at once published it at the expense of the 
state. In this wise Napoleon made his entrance into the political 
movement. 

Meanwhile Carteaux had marched upon Marseilles and, 
after a victorious engagement, retaken the city for the Con- 



42 The Siege of Toulon [1793 

vention. The '' treason " of the inhabitants toward their country- 
was punished with frightful barbarity. After a short interval 
the march was resumed toward Toulon. The conquest of 
this port was the more essential as the insurgents there had 
opened negotiations with England and had actually already 
delivered into her hands the fleet which lay before the town 
and was the best in France. In the siege laid to this strong- 
hold Napoleon was now to play a distinguished part. During 
an engagement in the neighbourhood of Toulon, one of the 
superior officers in the artillery had been wounded, and on the 
19th of October, 1793, Napoleon was promoted to the command 
of a battalion in the Second Regiment of Artillery; from this 
time he was able to act with greater independence. To add 
to this his new friends had made every effort to recommend him 
to the Convention, representing him as the only man in the 
besieging army capable of projecting a plan of operations. He 
himself had addressed a memorial to the Committee of Public 
Safety in which he complained of the neglected condition of 
his branch of the service, and asked for the appointment of an 
artillery general with full powers, "who, by virtue of his very 
rank, would increase respect and make an impression upon a 
lot of ignorant fellows on the staff with whom one has to be 
continually laying down first principles and coming to terms 
in order to carry out plans approved both by theory and by 
experience." 

Carteaux was soon afterward removed from his position and 
the chief command given Major-General Dugommier, whose 
coolness, perseverance, and military perception Napoleon com- 
mends; General Duteil was entrusted with the command of 
the artillery, while Napoleon himself was put in charge of the 
battery established to the west of the city. He proposes now — 
this is the plan which he submitted to the Council of War — 
to capture the peninsula of Cepet lying to the southwest^ 
from this point to clear the harbour, and by this roundabout way 
to bring the city to surrender. His plan having been adopted 
by the generals, he at once set about the task with the greatest 
zeal. It was not long before his guns were placed in the desired 



yEt. 24] The Fall of Toulon 43 

locations; a sally on the part of the English was repulsed on 
the 30th of November, and for his fine conduct on this occasion 
Bonaparte was appointed colonel. On the 17th of December 
Fort TEguillette, and with it the before-mentioned peninsular 
fell into his power. When this gain was followed up by a con- 
centric attack of all the divisions upon the defences of the city, 
the besieged Toulonese, menaced with certain destructioA by 
Napoleon's batteries, dared make no further energetic resist- 
ance. The English and Spaniards, allies of the insurgents, 
promptly embarked their troops and sailed out of the harbour, 
taking with them many fugitive inhabitants of the city. On 
the 19th of December the victors made their entrance into 
Toulon, and, in mad rage for vengeance, as at Marseilles and 
Lyons, relentlessly condemned all who were under suspicion 
or who were in any way compromised. Hundreds of such were 
assembled together and shot down. It was the intention of 
Freron, one of the Commissioners of the Convention, to leave 
not a single rebel alive, but this was opposed by Dugommier, 
and one readily accepts the statement that Bonaparte also 
counselled moderation. He was not inclined to the exercise of 
useless cruelty, and was animated in no degree by that spirit 
of bloody fanaticism to which in that awful year such innumer- 
able victims were sacrificed. 

While the part played by Bonaparte before Toulon was one 
of great importance, he occupied but an inconspicuous position; 
he was nothing more than commander of a battalion. He had 
none the less rendered great service to the government through 
the strategy which he advised. An attack from the north and 
east would not have led to such prompt results, and upon this 
•point much depended just at this time when the alhed foes of 
France were beginning to turn the closest attention to Toulon, 
when already the English had despatched an expedition, pri- 
marily intended for Vendee, toward southern France, and the 
Austrian court had determined to send forces thither. Accord- 
ingly it was but a well-earned acknowledgment of his services 
when Napoleon was now appointed brigadier-general of artillery 
by a provisional decree of the Commissioners of the Conven- 



44 The Siege of Toulon [1794 

tion on the 22d of December, 1793, a nomination afterwards 
confirmed by the Committee of PubHc Safety. 

When on this occasion the authorities demanded the neces- 
sary record of his hfe he dis<jlaimed all nobihty of origin. It 
could but have told against him with the Jacobins, to whom he 
had allied himself, and in whose service he was employing his great 
talents. Whether he was really in sympathy with them, whether 
he inwardly espoused their cause, or whether it was due to 
anything more than ambition that he cast in his lot with the 
Radicals, is not made clear by this act. Once, — shortly after 
his appointment as general, — unmindful of the prevailing radi- 
calism and on purely strategic grounds, he recommended the 
rebuilding of the Marseilles Bastille, Fort St. Nicholas. He 
was at once declared ''suspect," and called upon to justify him- 
self before the Convention. Sahcetti had much difficulty in 
disposing of the matter. From that time Napoleon lost no 
opportunity of showing himself a zealous republican. Says 
Mile. Robespierre in her memoranda: ''Bonaparte was a repub- 
lican, I should say even that he was a republican of the Moun- 
tain, at least he made that impression upon me from his manner 
of regarding things at the time when I was at Nice (1794). Later 
his victories turned his head and made him aspire to rule over his 
fellow citizens, but then, while he was but a general of artillery in 
the Army of Italy, he was a believer in thoroughgoing liberty and 
genuine equality." The younger brother of the dread Presi- 
dent of the Committee of Pubhc Safety recommended him in 
April, 1794, as a man of transcendent merit, and reposed such 
confidence in him that the initiated called him the "privy 
counsellor" of the Commissioner. Yet the latter did not fail 
to add to his praise this observation: "He is a Corsican, and* 
offers only the guaranty of a man of that nation who has with- 
stood the petting of Paoli and whose property has been laid 
waste by that traitor." 

But Robespierre had absolute confidence in Napoleon's 
military counsels and discussed with him and Ricord, the Com- 
missioner, a secret plan of operations for the so-called "Army 
of Italy." That portion of the French forces was encamped 



^T. 24] The Fall of Robespierre 45 

on the Riviera, engaged in war against the alhed Sardinians 
and Austrians, who occupied the heights of the Apennines. The 
revolt in southern France had exhausted the land, and the Army 
of Italy was compelled to draw its supphes from the neutral 
territory of Genoa. Two problems presented themselves in 
the management of this part of the army : first, to protect these 
indispensable importations against interception and attack by 
the allies, and, second, by some fortunate offensive movement 
to clear the way into the rich plain of Piedmont. This plan of 
offensive operations was elaborated in several ways by Bona- 
parte, who had been detailed as general of artillery to the Army 
of Italy in May, 1794. In July he himself went on a mission to 
Genoa, officially to treat with the Doge on the subject of the 
condition of roads and coasts, but secretly to investigate the 
fortifications of Savona as a possible gateway of invasion. 
Two aides, Marmont and Junot, — the subsequent Dukes of 
Ragusa and Abrantes, — accompanied him; he was himself 
filled with joyful hope of being able soon to carry his plans into 
execution as General-in-chief . 

But too soon these high-soaring dreams were to come to 
naught. When, at the end of July, he returned to Nice, affairs 
in France had taken a complete change. Robespierre, who 
had gradually rid himself of his rivals in the Convention, Danton, 
Hebert, and their adherents, and had been more and more 
openly aiming to secure the dictatorship, was overthrown by a 
coalition of the radical and conservative elements of the Con- 
vention and condemned to the scaffold, July 27th, 1794 (Ther- 
midor 9th). With him fell the government to which Napoleon 
had but recently offered his services. His fate could not but 
be affected by this change, particularly as the plan of cam- 
paign upon which he had been labouring had been under dis- 
cussion between him and Robespierre without the knowledge of 
the Convention and the Committee of Public Safety. The Jaco- 
bins, regardful of their own safety upon the fall of their powerful 
leader, sought to protect themselves in the denunciation of 
others. And thus it came to pass that Salicetti accused his 
fellow countryman Bonaparte to the Convention of being 



46 The Siege of Toulon [1794 

''plan-maker" to the Dictator. Napoleon was deprived of his 
commission as general, and on the 12th of August, 1794, im- 
prisoned in Fort Carre.* What a tempest of distracting re- 
flections must have assailed him here! In the midst of his 
ambitious hopes he found himself paralyzed and suddenly cast 
out of the way whereby so many had already arrived with 
rapidity at power and influence. The reform in the organiza- 
tion of the army, begun in 1793 under Dubois de Crance, a 
member of the Convention, with its principle of universal mili- 
tary obligation and its revised list of officers, had already begun 
to bear fruit. At the end of the year 1792 there had been not 
more than a hundred and twelve thousand men of the regular 
troops in France, by the summer of 1794 there were not less 
than seven hundred and thirty thousand, animated by a fatal- 
istic patriotism, controlled by rigorous discipline, and com- 
manded by generals whose abilities, developed by equal com- 
petition in the open field, were brought to recognition with 
unexampled rapidity. At the head of the Army of the North 
stands Pichegru, who had at one time superintended as sergeant 
the little cadets at Brienne; he was now driving the enemy out 
of France and conquering the Austrian Netherlands. Jourdan, 
one of the volunteer officers of 1792, is in command of the Army 
of the Sambre-et-Meuse, fighting victoriously against the 
Austrians in the battle of Fleurus, June 26th, 1794, while the 
decisive attack is led by General Marceau, a man of Napoleon's 
own age. Another, Hoche, his senior by a year, at the beginning 
of the Revolution a mere subaltern, had, as general-in-chief, 
vanquished the Austrians at Weissenburg and driven them out of 
Alsace in December of the preceding year, thereby covering 

* He may have anticipated this outcome, for he wrote a letter a few 
days previous to his arrest to Tilly, the French Charge d' Affaires at 
Genoa, who would, as he knew, make report in Paris concerning it. In 
this he speaks of his relations with the younger Robespierre and adds: "I 
was somewhat affected by the catastrophe of Robespierre the younger, 
to whom I was attached and whom I believed to be pure ; but, had he 
been my father, I would have stabbed him myself if he had aspired to 
tyranny. '' Napoleon III. considered it advisable to omit this letter from 
the official edition of the correspondence of his uncle. 



Mt. 25] Napoleon's Appeal 47 

himself with fame and honour. Following these was a long 
succession of others: Saint-Cyr, in 1792 still a captain of volim- 
teers, was now general of division; Bernadotte, sergeant- 
major at the opening of the Revolution, commanded in 1794 
likewise a division: Kleber, a volunteer in the year 1792, had, 
a year later, reached the same rank; and so on. And he, the 
most ambitious of them all, fully conscious of his abilities and 
qualifications, saw himself shut out of this circle, perhaps for- 
ever, and, moreover, threatened by an accusation which had 
already cost many their lives in that terrible year. 

But he was not the man to give himself up to despair. One 
thing already in his favour was that he had not been sent to 
Paris. In a letter addressed to the Commissioners of the Con- 
vention, he attempted above all to manifest his unquahfied 
patriotism. "Have I not," it reads, "been attached to its 
principles ever since the beginning of the Revolution? Have 
I not been seen in the struggle here with the domestic enemy, 
or there as a soldier against the foreign foe? I have sacrificed 
my residence in my own department, I have abandoned my 
property, I have lost all for the Republic. . . . Ought I then 
to be confounded with the enemies of my country; and are 
patriots heedlessly to lose a general who has not been unservice- 
able to the Republic? Should Representatives put the govern- 
ment under necessity of being unjust and impolitic? Hear me, 
make way with the oppression which surrounds me, and restore 
to me the esteem of the patriots. An hour later, if the evil- 
minded desire my life, I will yield it to them gladly; I care so 
little for it, and I have so often wearied of it. Yes, only the 
idea that it may still be of service to my country helps me to 
bear the burden of it with courage." 

Necessity had taught him to use the word "Patrie" in 
speaking of France; his own country had become to him merely 
a " D^partement." 

The letter produced the desired effect. Furthermore, Sali- 
cetti had come to the conclusion that he was himself no longer 
in danger and again took up the defence of his fellow countryman, 
whose papers he examined personally and declared to be free 



48 The Siege of Toulon [1794 

from anything of a suspicious character. On the 20th of August 
Napoleon was released from custody. A few weeks later, on 
the 14th of September, he was rehabilitated with his rank of 
general, and in the same month was permitted to take part in 
the offensive movement of the Army of Italy by means of which 
the Austrians were driven back from the crest of the mountains 
of the Riviera as far as Dego and Acqui. Upon the return of 
the French to the coast Bonaparte was assigned the post of 
commander of artillery in the expedition fitting out for the 
reconquest of Corsica. 

There the last remaining French strongholds had fallen 
into the hands of the English: San Firenze on the 17th of 
February, Bastia on the 24th of May, and finally Calvi, on the 
1st of August. In the interior of the island the British had 
established themselves somewhat earlier. Paoli was invited 
by King George III. to come to England. Influenced by the 
English, a popular meeting was held at Corte on the 18th of 
June, 1794, in which the Corsicans declared their island a con- 
stitutional monarchy under the protection of England and 
under Sir Gilbert Elliot as viceroy. Upon hearing of these 
events the new Committee of Public Safety at Paris undertook 
once more to wrest the department from the enemy. But 
while the division of troops intended for this service stood ready 
by the end of autumn, the wretched condition of the navy 
delayed the expedition into the following February. Napoleon 
in one of his letters represented the prospective conquest as a 
mere military ''promenade," but the result was far from justify- 
ing this assumption. When in March, 1795, the French fleet at 
last set sail to clear the Corsican waters of English craft, an 
encounter which took place between Cape Corso and Livorno 
ended disastrously to the French. Two of their ships fell into 
the hands of their adversary and the remainder were obliged to 
retreat into the Gulf of Saint-Juan. After this rebuff the 
expedition was abandoned; the troops already on board the 
transports were disembarked and detailed to the Army of 
Italy; Corsica was, for the present, lost. 

Again Napoleon was without a command. Unexpectedly 



^T. 25] The Reaction from the Terror 



49 



came the order to betake himself to the Army of the West. 
On the 2d of May, 1795, he left Marseilles; on the 10th he 
reached Paris. He had no intention of leaving that city for 
some time. 

After the events of the 27th of July, 1794 (Thermidor 9th), the 
more calm and cautious elements of the population of Paris had 
waked, as from a state of torpor, into life. As if with the death 
of one man all terror had ended, they now fearlessly expressed 
their opinions and set forth their demands. In newspapers 
and pamphlets, no longer under any restraint of censorship, 
and in all public resorts of the capital the abhorrence in which the 
Jacobins were held came to unreserved expression. For the 
first time the number of their victims began to be appreciated. 
There were but few famihes who had not suffered under the 
iron yoke; many among them had lost one or more members, 
many had lost their property during the Terror. The opening 
of the prisons brought day by day new horrors to light and 
increased the indignation of those who had suffered injury. 
In the Convention itself, where the factions of the "Mountain^' 
had formed an alliance to depose the Dictator Robespierre, one 
of these, composed of the former adherents of Danton, with- 
drew from the Jacobins. They styled themselves Thermidorians, 
as they claimed the merit of having brought about the decisive 
step of that day. Their leaders. Merlin and Talhen, Freron and 
Barras, sought to come into touch with the moderate element 
of the Centre against the extreme Left. The banished Girond- 
ists were recalled to the Convention, and the readiest tools 
of the fallen government, after making a futile attempt at 
resistance, expiated their offences on the scaffold. 

Just at this time Napoleon arrived in Paris. Hardly a 
favourable moment in which to make an appearance for a man 
recently under accusation of being a sharer in the designs of 
the abhorred tyrant. Very hkely he had not pictured to him- 
self so complete a change in the situation of affairs. For his 
outward circumstances this was exceedingly unfavourable. 
The mere order to betake himself to the Army of the West and 
serve under Hoche, who was barely his elder, as simple brigadier- 



50 The Siege of Toulon ti7&5 

general, was intolerable to his boundless ambition. And this 
in a war against peasants and irregular troops where little 
opportunity would offer for his art to display itself! He was 
determined not to obey the order, and sought above all to gain 
time and await the outcome of a new move on the part of the 
Jacobins, for he still belonged to that party. - But this new 
insurrection against the Convention, that of the 1st Prairial 
(20th of May, 1795), ended in the defeat of the rebeUious Jaco- 
bins and increased the difficulty of Bonaparte's situation. He 
was transferred, as being a supernumerary in the artillery, to 
the infantry, and received peremptory orders to depart for the 
west. If he now hoped to maintain himself under the new 
condition of things, he must cut loose from the radicals and 
try to come into touch with the Thermidorians. He under- 
took this feat and was successful in accompHshing it. At no 
time did Fortune completely forsake him. It was certainly a 
happy coincidence for him that two of the leaders of the party 
now in power, Freron and Barras, had, as Commissioners of the 
Convention, been present at the council of war held before 
Toulon, when the proposals of the young captain of artillery had 
been accepted. To them, at least, the conduct of Bonaparte, 
in serving a government they were themselves at that time 
endeavouring to uphold, could not appear blameworthy. They 
accordingly received him well and lent him their support. 

Those plans which Napoleon now submitted to them were 
essentially his projects of an offensive war which he had com- 
municated a year before to Robespierre, but with certain altera- 
tions imposed by the general poHtical situation. Prussia had 
retired from the hst of the enemies of France and had concluded 
a separate treaty of peace, April 5th, 1795. Negotiations had 
already been entered into with Spain which were soon also to 
lead to peace. There remained on the Continent but one of 
the great powers as adversary, but Austria was making prepa- 
rations to prosecute the war with all possible vigour. These 
changes in the situation of affairs necessitated the modifica- 
tion of the young general's plan of campaign. The year before 
it had been his proposal to have the Army of Italy take 



.Et. 25] Plan of an Italian Campaign 51 

the offensive, co-operating with the troops in Germany, accord- 
ing to which plan the weight of action would fall upon the last- 
named country. "It is Germany/' said he in the memorial 
addressed to Robespierre, "which should be overpowered; that 
accomplished, Spain and Italy will fall of themselves. . . . The 
defensive system should be adopted on the Spanish frontier, 
and the offensive system on that of Piedmont. Our blows 
should be directed against Germany, never against Spain or 
Italy. If we have great success, we should not allow ourselves 
to be thrown off the scent by penetrating into Italy while Ger- 
many still presents a formidable and un weakened front." * 

Now that, through the withdrawal of Prussia, the power 
of resistance on the German side had become weaker, he pro- 
poses striking the decisive blow against the Austrians in Italy. 
For this purpose the force of the Italian Army should be sub- 
stantially increased, an achievement easily possible by drawing 
for that purpose upon the troops set free by the peace with 
Spain. The Riviera having been seized and secured as far as 
Vado, the army thus reinforced would press forward along the 
coast and across the mountains toward Piedmont, cutting off 
the King of Sardinia, known to be already desirous of peace, 
from Austria and winning him over to the cause of France. 
Once in the plains the army could support itself by levying 
requisitions. If the expedition were started at the most fa- 
vourable time, in February, Mantua could be conquered before 
the end of spring, and by the termination of this first campaign 
the army could have reached Trent. In a second campaign, 
united with the Army of the Rhine, it would penetrate into the 
heart of Austria and dictate terms of peace. 

Such was the daring plan which a year later he was to carry 
into execution with amazing ability, laying thereby the founda- 
tion of his fame and power. This plan was not entirely original. 
For a great part of it he was indebted to the profound study 
which he had made of military history, particularly of the cam- 
paign in Italy conducted by Count de Maillebois in 1745. This 
campaign had been the object of his conscientious study while 

* Jung, " Bonaparte,'' II. 436. 



52 The Siege of Toulon [1795 

captain of artillery at Nice, as we are assured by a credible 
witness.* 

This plan was based upon his knowledge of a territory which 
he had studied minutely during the last few years, and of an 
adversary who was no stranger to him. And now he was called 
upon to remove himself from both in order to play a secondary 
part in Vendee, while perhaps another would be carrying out 
these plans of his in Italy! He could not submit to such a fate. 
Hardly had the conservative Aubry, who had been the occasion 
of his transference to the infantry, retired from the Committee 
of PubUc Safety, when he made bold, relying upon the pro- 
tection of his friends, to make an energetic protest against such 
an arrangement. He says in this document: "General Bona- 
parte rehes upon the justice of the members of the Committee 
of PubUc Safety to reinstate him into his former position, and 
to spare him the pain, after having commanded the artillery 
under the most unfavourable conditions during the war and 
having contributed to its most briUiant successes, of seeing his 
place occupied by men who have always kept in the rear, who 
are absolute strangers to our successes, unknown in our armies, 
and who have the impudence to present themselves to-day to 
grasp from you the fruit of victory which they have not been 
willing to incur risk in obtaining." He was so much the more 
confident of a favourable reply to this complaint as Aubry's 
successor, Doulcet de Pontecoulant, had accepted his plan of 
operations and had sent it to the generals commanding the 
ItaHan Army for consideration. He was temporarily assigned 
to serve on the committee having the duty of directing the 
armies and plans of campaign, and was full of happy confidence. 
The same hope that had been frustrated by the sudden down- 
fall of Robespierre animated him once more. He writes at 

* See the excellent article ",Sur la Campagne de Napoleon en TAnn^e 
1796," in the third supplement of the "Militar-Wochenblatt," 1889, where 
it is shown that the young general-in-chief followed the "Histoire des 
Campagnes du Mar^chal de Maillebois en 1745 et 1746," by Pezay (Paris, 
1775), with regard to the ruling idea which was to separate the Piedmont- 
ese from the Austrians, impose peace upon the former, and drive back 
the latter as far as the Adige. 



iET. 26] The Plan Rejected 53 

this time: ''My offensive plans have been adopted; we shall 
soon have serious action in Lombardy." Under date of Sep- 
tember 8th, 1795, he writes to Joseph: "I see nothing but 
pleasant prospects before me, and, should it be otherwise, one 
must nevertheless hve in the present. A man of courage may 
disregard the future." 

And "otherwise" it resulted, and his courage was soon put 
to a new and severe test. It was his fate henceforward to cut 
his way through ceaseless vicissitudes of good and evil fortune. 
The end of Doulcet de Pontecoulant's term of service on the 
Committee of Public Safety arrived, in accordance with the 
law of rotation in office, before the protest of the young general 
had been acted upon. In him the suppliant lost his strongest 
supporter. Nor was he without personal enemies, and when 
the time for decision of his case arrived, his petition was rejected 
by the offi.cials of the War Department, and his name was again 
stricken from the list of French generals on duty, on account of 
his refusal to proceed to the post assigned him. (Decree of 
September 15th, 1795.) 

And now once more his brightest hopes had been dashed. 
Without a position at a period whose uncertainties had already 
been the ruin of thousands; without money, for, as Marmont 
relates, ''the small fund of bank-bills which he had brought 
back from the army " had been lost in unfortunate speculations; 
without credit in a financial crisis in which by the end of July, 
1795, paper money had depreciated to one fortieth of its face 
value, he was impotent to help his family again in need through 
the changed pohtical situation. He had been mistaken: one 
cannot always "hve in the present." 

And what made his situation appear the more gloomy was 
the fact that a new and great danger was already imminent. 
The royalists and the liberals of '89 and '91 menaced the hated 
Convention in which his friends sat. If they should be successful, 
he and his friends were lost together. 

The last revolts of the Jacobins had inclined the factions of 
the centre of the Convention, the Thermidorians and indepen- 
dents, — to use a modern expression, — farther toward the right. 



54 The Siege of Toulon [1795 

The new Constitution, drafted during the summer of 1795, was 
moderate in character and was to render a return to the cir- 
cumstances of the last few years forever impossible. First of all, 
the executive and legislative powers were no longer to be united 
in the hands of the national representatives. The legislative 
power was to be entrusted to two bodies instead of one: a 
'^ Council of Five Hundred," and a "Council of Ancients" (An- 
ciens) numbering two hundred and fifty members; while the 
executive authority was to be vested in a "Directory" of five 
men who must be at least forty years of age. One third of the 
members of each of these legislative councils was to retire an- 
nually, their places to be filled by election. It did not come 
within the domain of the executive body to propose bills, nor 
could it refuse to execute laws passed by the legislature; one 
of the Directors must retire yearly, and the outgoing member 
was not eUgible for re-election until five years had elapsed. 
The Directors, to whom the ministers of departments were sub- 
ordinated, were chosen by the Ancients from a hst drawn up by 
the Five Hundred. They were to have the charge of Foreign 
Affairs, Finance, War, Justice, and Affairs of the Interior. The 
Constitution accorded liberty of the press, of worship, of com- 
merce, and of trade; it extended its protection to home and 
property, but clubs were forbidden and political societies were 
tolerated only on condition that no pubUc meetings should be 
held and that there should be no affifiation between them; no 
petitions of the masses, no banding together of the people was 
allowed; the Emigres were forbidden to return home, and the 
Jacobins were prohibited from reappearing at their club. 

These were the distinctive features of the Constitution of the 
year III (1795). It was as Uttle in keeping with the desires of 
the Jacobins as with those of the RoyaHsts. The moderation 
of the parties in power tended rather to convince the latter that 
the hour for them to strike had come. Already there was talk 
of restoring the monarchy and of proclaiming the son of the 
decapitated king as constitutional sovereign under the name 
of Louis XVII., when the child died, worn out by the inhuman 
treatment to which he had been subjected during the preceding 



Mt. 26] The Royalist Reaction 55 

years. At once the partisans of the Bourbons turned to Louis 
XVIII., the emigrant brother of the former king, who from 
Verona was flooding France with his unskilful agents. 

The agitation was accompanied by outrages on the part of 
the royalists in the provinces almost equal to the horrors of the 
Reign of Terror. In Vendee the civil war, but just quenched by 
Hoche, blazed up anew. In Paris itself the common people, 
who were royalists, or at least of the moderate party, armed 
themselves against the Convention. These events made a deep 
impression upon that body; its repubhcan elements, who 
recognized that with the loss of control their very existence 
was threatened, united and decreed that two thirds of the new 
legislative body of Five Hundred must be composed of members 
of the Convention, the remainder to be elected without restriction. 
This transition decree as well as the Constitution was to be 
submitted to the people of France for approval by vote. While 
they thus secured for themselves a majority in the new con- 
stitutional legislature these members of the Convention believed 
also that they were assuring in the best way the new dispensa- 
tion and preventing the return of the old monarchical govern- 
ment. To protect themselves further against probable attack 
from the Paris populace, the Thermidorians united once more 
with the Jacobin deputies, gathered to the capital a few thousand 
soldiers of the line and formed a "battalion of patriots" from 
those brigand elements upon whose pikes the throne of Ter- 
rorism had been erected. 

This last precaution increased beyond measure the wrath 
of the Parisians who were opposed to the Convention. The 
Constitution they were ready to accept, it is true, but they 
rejected the additional decree, and when, in spite of their re- 
monstrance, the Convention promulgated, as law, the new 
Constitution including the transition provisions, the citizens 
from forty-four out of the forty-eight sections revolted, 
assembled some thirty thousand men of the National Guard, 
and on October 4th successfully resisted General Menou in 
command of the troops of the Convention, who in consequence 
of this defeat was charged with treason and removed. The 



56 The Siege of Toulon [1795 

situation of the legislature was distinctly critical. Barely six 
to eight thousand men were available with which to confront 
the miUtia of the National Guard, and absolutely no artillery. 
The Convention declared itself a permanent body and appointed 
from the Commissioners of Government a committee of five 
who were empowered to maintain order. Barras was one of 
these, and as he had formerly been an officer in the navy he 
.assumed charge of the mihtary part of the task. He was indeed 
courageous, but he was without the requisite breadth of view 
for the emergency and shrank from extraordinary efforts for 
which he did not feel himself equal. On the same day that 
he was appointed he called to his assistance his friend Bonaparte 
and discussed with him the problem, of protecting the legislature 
against an attack which had been planned for the ensuing day. 
Barras having been made commander-in-chief of the Army 
of the Interior as the result of a stormy night-session of 4th-5th 
October, he induced the Committee to appoint Napoleon second 
in command and invest him with full power necessary to the 
defence of the Convention. 

In later life Napoleon gave Madame de Remusat the following 
account of this decisive moment of his career : * " One evening I 
was at the theatre, it was the 12th Vendemiaire (October 4th, 
1795). I overheard some one say that there was to be a 'row' 
(^du train') on the following day; you know that was the cus- 
tomary expression of the Parisians who had come to view with 
indifference changes in the government, since they did not in- 
terfere with their business, their pleasures, or even their dinner. 
After the Reign of Terror they were satisfied with anything which 
did not disturb their way of living. They were saying around 
me that the sittings of the Assembly were permanent; I hurried 
thither, I found nothing but confusion, hesitation. From 
the depths of the hall a voice was suddenly raised which said: 
*If any one knows the address of General Bonaparte, he is 
requested to go and say to him that his presence is desired by 
the Committee of the Assembly.' I have always liked to take 
note of the element of chance in certain events; this determined 

* Mme. de Remusat. *'M€moires." I. 269. 



Mt. 26] Napoleon's Account 57 

me; I went to the Committee; I found there several deputies 
who were quite distracted; among others Cambac^res.* They 
expected to be attacked on the morrow and did not know what 
course to pursue. My advice was asked; I repUed by demand- 
ing cannon. This suggestion appalled them; the whole night 
passed without coming to any conclusion. The next morning 
brought bad news. Thereupon the whole affair was turned 
over to me, after which they began to deliberate whether after 
all they had the right to repel force by force. 'Do you expect/ 
I said, 'that the people are going to give you permission to fire 
upon them? I am now involved, since you have nominated 
me; it is no more than just that you should let me act according 
to my own discretion.'" 

Unfortunately we are compelled to accept with great mis- 
trust all accounts given by Napoleon of events in his own hfe. 
He seldom restricted himself to the exact truth, least of all where 
his purpose was to disguise his obvious ambition in the garb 
of unconstrained and disinterested conduct. Who is going to 
believe that the intimate of B arras and Tallien first learned of 
the permanent sittings of the Assembly on the decisive night 
while innocently attending the theatre? No one. Even 
though we had no knowledge of a certain note from Barras, 
dated on the 3d of October, summoning Napoleon to meet him, 
to the suspension of all other business, on the morning of the 
4th of October. It is nothing unusual to encounter in the hfe 
of this ambitious man an attempt to make his decisive measures 
appear to be the work of the last moment and a sudden inspira- 
tion of his genius. In the present instance also he would have 
one believe that the really masterly arrangements for the de- 
fence of the Convention were devised only on the morning of 
the 5th and immediately carried into execution. But it would 
be safe to conclude that everything had been carefully weighed 
and considered on the previous day and the essentials deter- 
mined upon when the deputies gave Napoleon permission to 
"act according to his own discretion." 

* One of the leaders of the moderates who appreciated Napoleon's 
genius. Cambac^res had recommended him to Doulcet. 



58 The Siege of Toulon [1795 

It was but natural that he should insist upon the use of 
energetic measures. His fate was linked to that of the Con- 
vention. As a good artiller5rman he knew the power of his 
weapon. The National Guard had no cannon. Everything 
depended upon getting the ordnance from an artillery park 
outside the city to the Tuileries. A spirited cavalry officer, 
Murat, the future brother-in-law of Napoleon, was despatched, 
doubtless at the suggestion of the latter, to assure their safe- 
conduct before daybreak. He was successful, and when, on 
the afternoon of the 5th of October (13th Vendemiaire), the 
National Guard advanced upon the Tuileries where the Con- 
vention was in session, they found it already flanked by guns 
behind which the general in command had posted infantry and 
cavalry. Seeing the numerical superiority of the sections, the 
deputies wavered and were disposed to parley with the insurgents. 
But a shot was fired which gave the signal for battle. It will 
never be known whether this shot came from the side of the assail- 
ants or the defenders, or whether, perchance, in obedience to a 
secret order from Napoleon. The police reports on the occur- 
rences of this day are missing from among the archives of Paris. 
At once the strong position held by the insurgents at the church 
of Saint-Roch was carried, and the street of Saint-Honore effec- 
tively raked by cannon, the bank of the Seine was swept clean 
by volleys of grapeshot, and the Guards were driven back 
during the night of the 5th of October to the most remote quar- 
ters of the city, where they were easily overmastered on the fol- 
lowing day by separate detachments of troops of the line. 

Napoleon had saved the Convention and the Convention 
showed its gratitude. In the session of October 10th, upon 
the motion of Barras and Freron, his appointment as second in 
command of the Army of the Interior was confirmed. But 
this did not satisfy Napoleon. He understood striking while 
the iron was hot. He first of all urged his reassignment to ser- 
vice in the artillery, then — in a petition of the 16th of October — 
he requested for himself the commission of general-of-division, 
and on the 26th of the same month he was appointed com- 
mander-in-chief of the Army of the Interior in the, place of 



Mt. 26] Napoleon^s Belief in Fate 59 

Barras, who now at the close of the session assumed the duties 
of Director in the new government. 

But a few weeks before without a position and with forbid- 
ding prospects, a suppUcant for a mission to Constantinople, 
he had suddenly attained to one of the highest military posi- 
tions in France. It was not without cause that he wrote to 
Joseph on the day after the 13th Vendemiaire: "Fortune is on 
my side." It is said that destiny can make fatalists of men; 
it produced in Napoleon, with its sudden changes of favour, a 
man who from that time forth journeyed through life with full 
confidence in his star. "Au destin" became his motto, and this 
was engraved in the wedding-ring of her whom he chose to 
become his partner in life. But this reliance on fate was not 
blind. Whenever fortune appeared to hesitate, he had learned 
to put forward the whole of his own reckless power, his abundant 
talent, and — that heritage of his nation — subtlety and cunning. 
Fortune did not make a slave of him, he understood controlling 
it and making it serve his ends. Certainly the paths by which 
he climbed unremittingly to power, if regarded merely from the 
standpoint of a moralist, were not always of the straightest, the 
means employed to accomplish his purposes sometimes equivocal 
and objectionable, and if history had but to pass judgment upon 
the way in which such assertive individuals come to dominate 
over others, words could not be found harsh enough to charac- 
terize the conduct of this man. But there yet remains the far 
more important question: how was the acquired power utihzed 
and turned to account? Only in the answer to this question 
can be found the means of deciding upon the historical signifi- 
cance of Napoleon Bonaparte. 



CHAPTER IV 

JOSEPHINE 

The downfall of Robespierre and his associates had brought 
about not merely a political revolution, but also a profound social 
change. It did more than simply to replace one of the political 
factions in power by another. The population itself, heretofore 
paralyzed by terror, now came forward to demand and recover 
the freedom of action of which it had so long been deprived. 
Every one rejoiced to feel that his life was safe once more and 
the general joy was unbounded. The theatres were crowded, 
and poets, enthusiastic in the cause of peace and order, lashed 
the overthrown rule of arbitrary cruelty, eliciting unprece- 
dented applause from the audience. From the houses and 
apartments, in which they had been living in retirement, the 
timid thronged into the streets, rejoicing in their deliverance 
from self-imposed captivity; and in the open squares where the 
guillotine had but recently . done its cruel work, thousands of 
happy couples joined in the whirling dance. In the salons of 
the people of rank assembled a heterogeneous company of up- 
starts of both sexes who tried to assume the manner and appear- 
ance of the aristocracy of the " ancien regime." Everywhere 
reigned joy and pleasure, with gallantry and levity, corruption 
and undisguised indulgence. The iron bondage of the Reign 
of Terror had deprived womankind of her ruling influence over 
the other sex. Now upon its overthrow they again exercised the 
power of their charms. As if to make amends for the lost years 
of sway, they now attempted to captivate the men by the practice 
of all the arts of seductive beauty, their dress was designed to 
reveal much of the person, and conversation became more than 
ever frivolous and animated. Those who like Madame de Stael 
had wit, brought that also into play. The other leading ladies 

60 



Mt. 26] The Revival of Social Life 6i 

of the new society, Madame Tallien, the beautiful Madame 
Recamier, Mesdames de Beauharnais, HameUn, and others were 
the centre of the society which gathered about the victors of 
Thermidor. Barras, the hero of the day, was the idol of this 
female throng, but not the only object of their devotion. 

No man however uncouth and unsociable could resist the 
charm of this newly-awakened life of heedless enjojonent. One 
of those attracted and dazzled by this gay existence was the 
young General Bonaparte, the author of the "Dialogue sur 
FAmour, " who held the omnipotence of love in contempt. We 
know that his interests led him also to seek the society of Barras 
and Tallien; but he failed to acquire in their salons such polish as 
to make him a particularly attractive member of society. Care- 
lessly dressed and indifferent as to his personal appearance, with 
nothing engaging in his looks or manners, he attracted attention 
only by his singular appearance. The wife of his friend Bourri- 
enne says of him that he was ill-dressed and negligent in his 
toilet, his character cold and often gloomy, his smile forced and 
often badly out of place. To be sure he could relate anecdotes 
of his campaigns in a way which was sprightly and charming, 
though sometimes tinged with cynicism. He gave way at 
times to outbursts of wild hilarity which gave offence and repelled 
those who were about him. At the theatre, while the rest of the 
audience was convulsed with laughter, he would remain entirely 
unresponsive and change no line of his face, or he would sit brood- 
ing with a gloomy and sullen expression as if totally unaffected 
by what was taking place before him. And yet we know from 
his own account that the unrestrained conviviality of this new 
life with its surroundings of splendour and beauty made a pro- 
found impression upon him. His letters bear witness to this. 
^'Luxury, pleasure, and the arts are reviving here in an astonishing 
way," he writes from Paris to his brother Joseph in July, 1795. 
'^Carriages and people of fashion reappear, or rather they remem- 
ber only as a long dream that they had ever ceased to shine. All 
that can help to pass the time and make life agreeable is here 
crowded together. One is torn away from incongruous reflec- 
tions, and indeed how is it possible to regard anything in a dismal 



62 Josephine [1795 

way in the midst of such ready wit and such a whirlwind of activ- 
ity? The women are everywhere : at the theatre, on the prome- 
nades, at the Ubraries. In the study of the scholar you find 
charming young ladies. Here alone among all the places of the 
earth do they deserve to control the rudder; and the men are 
all crazy about them, think of nothing but them, and live only 
for them. A woman needs just six months of Paris to know 
what is due to her and what the extent of her dominion. '' A 
few days later he adds: "This great people gives itself up to 
pleasure; dances, plays, and women, who are here the most 
beautiful in the world, are the questions of chief importance." 
On the 9th of August he writes: ''Life is pleasant here and 
much inclined to gaiety; it seems as if every one were seeking 
to indemnify himself for his sufferings in the past, and the uncer- 
tainty of the future prompts them to be unsparing for the pleas- 
ures of the present. Good-bye, my dear fellow; do not be 
anxious about the future, be happy in the present and gay, and 
learn to enjoy yourself." 

What a transformation in this soUtary nature! He who 
had hitherto preferred seclusion, for whom society had no 
charms, was now its captive. Not only that, but woman, 
who had become all-powerful, cast her spell upon him. He 
was seriously considering taking unto himself a wife and 
beginning family life. He was then at work in the Central 
Committee, full of hope and with bright prospects before him. 
A year previous Joseph had married Juhe Clary, the daughter 
of the rich silk-merchant of Versailles; Napoleon had her sister 
Desir^e in mind. He wrote to Joseph requesting him to make 
advances for him to this lady, ''for," as he says in his letter, 
"I've taken the notion to have a home of my own." His 
removal from the army on September 15th put an end to this 
plan for the time being, and the outcome of the 13th Vende- 
miaire turned the thoughts of the suitor in another direction.* 

Now that he had made such a position for himself why 

* Three years later D^sir^e married General Bernadotte, and, after 
a further lapse of twenty years, ascended the throne of Sweden as the 
wife of Charles XIV. 



^T. 26] The Earlier Life of Josephine 63 

should he not choose from among those brilUant women who 
were leaders of fashion at the capital and who had influence 
and prestige? There was, for instance, Madame Permon, a 
widow. She was of very ancient lineage, known in Corsica, and 
had been moreover a friend of his father's. This lady was by 
many years his senior, but wealthy and highly esteemed. It 
is said that Napoleon made proposals to her, but was rejected. 
Shortly afterwards another woman inspired him with genuine 
passion — a passion as real and true as his soul was susceptible 
of. The object of this affection was the Marquise Josephine, 
widow of General de Beauharnais. 

Josephine, the eldest of the three daughters of Joseph Gas- 
pard Tascher de la Pagerie, was born June 23d, 1763, on the Island 
of Martinique, where her father, formerly a captain of the Royal 
Dragoons, managed his estates. The family was originally of 
Chateauneuf in Thimerais (central France). Educated in 
Paris at Port-Royal, Josephine was married in 1779 to the 
young Viscount Alexandre de Beauharnais, son of the former 
governor of Martinique, who had long been an acquaintance 
and friend of the Tascher family. The first fruit of this marriage 
was a son, Eugene (born September 3d, 1781). But the union 
was not a happy one. Beauharnais left for the Antilles the 
following year to fight against the English, and there fell in 
love with a Creole and tried to get a divorce. Meanwhile his 
wife gave birth to a daughter who is known in history as "Queen 
Hortense." When the Revolution broke out, Beauharnais, who 
had returned to France, was elected deputy of the First Estate, 
and was one of the few of that order who gave energetic support 
to the new Constitution. In the memorable night of August 
4th, 1789, he was particularly zealous in taking part against the 
old regime. Furthermore, he did not emigrate but remained 
as an officer, and when the monarchy was replaced by a republic 
he became a general and was given an independent command 
in the Army of the Rhine. 

Not until the Prussians had retaken Mayence in 1793 did 
he resign his commission. During the Reign of Terror he was, 
as an aristocrat, accused of treason toward his country, and, 



64 Josephine [1795 

though innocent like many others, was executed four days 
before the fall of Robespierre. 

Josephine, who had rejoined her husband while he was 
playing a part in the National Assembly, was also imprisoned, 
and her release was due to the intervention of her fellow prisoner 
Madame de Fontenay-Cabarrus and of this lady's lover, Tallien. 

But Josephine had lived too many years out of sympathy 
with her husband to mourn him now for long. She was too 
fickle, weak, and fond of pleasure to turn her back on the gay 
Hfe which the salons of the "nouvelles couches" of 1795 offered 
her. She showed her preference by attaching herself the more 
closely to Madame Cabarrus, and soon became one of the best- 
known members of Parisian society and the intimate friend 
of Barras. Her relations with him have been disclosed in re- 
cent times by the publication of his "Memoires," but she did not 
at that time have the reputation of a prude.* To the captivating 
charm of her person all witnesses testify. Even Lucien, who 
was not particularly well-disposed toward her, had to admit 
this. In his ''Memoires" he gives us the following picture: 
"Hardly to be noticed in the midst of this circle of pretty women, 
generally reputed to be of easy morals, is the widow of the 
Marquis de Beauharnais. With Httle, very little wit, she had 
no trace of what could be called beauty, but there were certain 
Creole characteristics in the pliant undulations of her figure 
which was rather below the average height. Her face was 
without natural freshness, it is true, but the artifices of the 
toilet remedied this defect so as to make it appear fairly well 
by the light of the chandeliers. In short, her person was not 
entirely bereft of some of the attractions of her youth." 

Arnault, in his ''Souvenirs d'un Sexagenaire," does her 

* "At that time her reputation was badly compromised." (Madame 
de R<^musat, " M^moires," I. 138.) 

"My father was chamberlain to the Empress Josephine. He had 
been her lover prior to her marriage to Napoleon, and resumed his rela- 
tions with her after her divorce." (Viel-Castel, " M6moires," II. 16.) 

Barras' "Memoires" were published 1895-96, but critical readers will 
make some reservations as to Barras' veracity in recounting his gallantries 
and in characterizing those to whom he bore ill will. — B. 



^T 26] Her Character 65 

better justice. He says: ''The evenness of her disposition, her 
good-nature, the aixdabiUty that shone in her eye and which 
expressed itself not only in her words but in the tones of her 
voice, a certain indolence peculiar to Creoles which was recog- 
nizable in her carriage and movements even when she was 
making an effort to please, all these lent to her a charm which 
transcended the dazzHng beauty of her two rivals Mesdames 
Recamier and Tallien." 

Madame de Remusat, who had known Josephine since 1793, 
gives perhaps the most accurate description of her friend in these 
words: ^'Without being precisely beautiful, her whole person 
was possessed of a pecuhar charm. Her features were deUcate 
and harmonious, her expression gentle, her tiny mouth dex- 
terously concealed defective teeth; her somewhat dark com- 
plexion was improved by her clever use of cosmetics. Her 
figure was perfect, every outline well rounded and graceful; 
every motion was easy and elegant. Her taste in dress was 
excellent, and whatever she wore seemed to have its beauty 
enhanced. With these advantages and her constant care for 
her appearance, she succeeded in being never outshone by 
the beauty and youth of so many women around her. She was 
not a person of especial wit ; a Creole and coquette, her education 
had been rather neglected; but she knew wherein she was 
wanting, and never betrayed her ignorance. Naturally tactful, 
she found it easy to say agreeable things. . . . Unfortunately 
she was lacking in earnestness of feehng and true elevation of 
mind." 

At that time she felt no warm affection for the young general. 
And indeed Napoleon was by no means a handsome man. Short 
of stature, hardly five feet in height, with an abnormally de- 
veloped chest and disproportionately short legs, he was far 
from irresistible. Moreover, he was thin at the time, and the 
angular Hues in his face sharply prominent; his sallow skin 
made him look like a sick man ; the glance of his gray eyes was 
full of determination and resolve, frank and straightforward, 
but often with something wild about it. The nervousness of 
his disposition, which had been marked even in childhood, had 



66 Josephine [1795 

developed in later years under the stress of violent emotions 
caused by the continual changes in his fortunes and the re- 
peated disappointments to his inordinate ambition, until it had 
become morbid. A contemporary informs us that at this time Na- 
poleon slept but three hours a day and was in reaUty ill. Later 
a facial neuralgia asserted itself together with several idiosyncra- 
sies, such as shrugging of the right shoulder and an involuntary 
moving of the lips. We may safely attribute to this extreme 
nervousness much of his downright selfishness and rudeness and 
the irritability which suffered no contradiction, as well as his 
distrust of every one and his occasional strange and excited 
behaviour. On the other hand his confidence in himself im- 
pressed everybody and involuntarily one became interested 
in him. To Josephine he became an object of interest if nothing 
more. 

Very different was the impression which she produced upon 
him. "I was not insensible to the charms of women," he said 
later at St. Helena, ''but up to that time I had not been petted 
and spoiled by them and my disposition made me timid in their 
company. Madame de Beauharnais was the first to reassure 
me. She said some flattering things to me about my military 
talents one day when I chanced to be seated next to her. That 
praise intoxicated me; I addressed myself continually to her; 
I followed her everywhere ; I was passionately in love with her, 
and my infatuation was generally known among our acquaint- 
ances long before I ventured to declare myself to her. When this 
rumour became general, Barras spoke to me about it. I had 
no reason for denying it. 'If that is the case,' he said to me, 
'you ought to marry Madame de Beauharnais. You have rank 
and talents to be turned to good account, but you stand alone, 
without fortune and without connections; you must marry; 
that will give you position. ' " 

To what manner of man did Barras say this? Napoleon 
was capable of suppressing any passion if it were found to inter- 
fere with his ambition. He gave way to this one because it 
was evident to him that his union with this lady of rank, the 
influential friend of the Directory, would strengthen his social 



Mt. 26] Her Feeling Toward Napoleon 67 

position and secure advantages for the future. He felt himself 
to be exalted by this marriage which enabled him to ascend 
from his rank of plebeian to a higher social station wherein his 
past could sink into oblivion. Even while still a Jacobin he 
could not conceal a certain predilection for the aristocratic 
mode of life; the coarse instincts of the masses were repugnant 
to him, and the courtesy and politeness of people of culture 
were all the more agreeable to one who was himself completely 
lacking in social talent. There was still another reason in 
favour of this union. Barras valued Napoleon's genius at its 
true worth, and his somewhat indolent nature led him to try 
to put under obligations to himself a man whose ambition and 
ability might some day raise his benefactor again to power. It 
is said that he made an attempt to have Napoleon appointed Min- 
ister of War, but that his colleagues refused their consent. Now 
Barras undertakes to obtain Josephine's hand for him. In a 
letter to a friend she admits that she does not really love Napo- 
leon, but that she does not feel any aversion toward him; her 
feehng is rather that of indifference, which is as little favourable 
to love as it is to rehgion. ''I admire the General's courage," 
continues she, 'Hhe extent of his knowledge upon all sorts of 
topics, upon all of which he talks equally well, the vivacity of 
his mind, which enables him to grasp the thoughts of others 
almost before they have been expressed, but I am frightened, 
I admit, at the control he tries to exercise over everything about 
him. His searching glance has something unusual and inex- 
phcable in it, but which compels the respect even of our Directors ; 
judge for yourself whether a woman has not good cause to feel 
intimidated by it ! Finally, that which ought to please me, the 
force of his passion, which he expresses with an energy which 
leaves no room for doubt of his sincerity, is precisely that which 
makes me withhold the consent which I have often been ready 
to give. Can I, a woman whose youth is past, hope to hold 
for any length of time this violent affection which in the General 
resembles a fit of dehrium? If, after our marriage, he should 
cease to love me, will he not reproach me with what he has done 
for me? Will he not regret having failed to make a more ad- 



68 Josephine [i796 

vantageous marriage? And what answer can I make then? 
What will there be for me to do? Tears will be my only re- 
source/' And yet the fatalistic confidence with which Napoleon 
spoke to her of his plans and his future allured her, and when 
the rumour became general that the Directory would make him 
Commander-in-chief of the Army of Italy she yielded to his 
suit. As a matter of fact her friends wondered that she could 
marry a man so little known.* 

On the 9th of March, 1796, the civil marriage ceremony 
was performed. Barras and TalHen acted as witnesses. But 
Truth veiled her face when the couple presented their forged 
certificates of baptism to the magistrate of the deuxieme 
arrondissement. Napoleon pretended to have been born Feb- 
ruary 5th, 1768, and Josephine, who was in reality six years 
his senior, gave as the date of her birth June 23d, 1767 — a 
sacrifice of facts to the cause of female vanity to which the 
bridegroom gladly consented. People were then not very 
(scrupulous in such matters, and Napoleon was the last man to 
hesitate at straining the truth. Joseph and Lucien hkewise 
made false representations at their marriages. By an absurd 
coincidence each of the three brothers declared as his birthday 
a different day of the same year, 1768. Indeed the moral stand- 
ard of the whole family was low. 

Two days before the marriage, upon the motion of Carnot, 
the Directory had signed the decree (dated March 2d) appoint- 

* A genuine love-letter from the man who a few years before had 
spoken so harshly of love will not be without interest. "I awake full of 
thoughts of thee. Your portrait and the intoxicating evening of yester- 
day give my senses no rest. Sweet and incomparable Josephine, what a 
strange effect you have on my heart ; are you angry, do I see you sad, are 
you anxious, . . . my soul is bowed down with anguish and there is no 
rest for your lover; but is there then more for me, when, yielding to the 
immeasurable feeling which overpowers me, I draw from your lips, from 
your heart, a flame which consumes me? Ah! it was but this very night 
that I reahzed fully that your portrait was not you. Thou leavest at noon, 
in three hours I shall see thee. Meanwhile, ' mio dolce amor,' a thousand 
kisses, but do not give me any, for they set my blood on fire." (Mme. 
deR^musat, "M^moires," I. 182.) 



Mt. 26] Napoleon's Opportunity 69 

ing Napoleon Commander-in-chief of the Army of Italy; on 
the 11th he took leave of his wife and set out for his post. 

To what an extent were his interests already advanced ! 
Here was an independent command and with it the opportunity 
of showing the world what he could do, and of turning from 
Hoche to himself the universal admiration which that general 
had won by his unbroken series of victories. To be sure his 
former position as commander of the Army of the Interior had 
been both high and important, for he had soon acquired a con- 
siderable following of men whose hopes for the future rested 
in this general who had become so influential. On the other 
hand he had been detested by the Parisian populace ever since 
the 13th Vendemiaire, and he was besidas pursued by the envy 
of those who begrudged him his rapid advancement and who 
were systematic and persistent in calUng attention to his errors 
and defects, his adventures in Corsica, and his connection with 
Robespierre, even to his foreign accent and his lack of breeding, 
all of which were made much of and used against him. Who 
could assure him that he would not soon be pushed aside by 
new elements, inasmuch as the Constitution provided for changes 
in the highest positions of the government? While at Paris 
and General of the Army of the Interior he was but the hero 
of a single party, and victory in the streets of the capital could 
secure for him nothing more than the thanks of one faction. 
But in conflict with foreign enemies, upon what he himself had 
designated the most important theatre of war, glory and honour 
were to be acquired in the eyes of the whole nation, the nation 
to which he had more closely allied himself by marrying a French 
gentlewoman of ancient family. This was more in accordance 
with the extravagant plans for the future which his exuberant 
fancy invented and which were too vast and undefined to depend 
upon the fortunes of a pohtical coterie. Power was his party, 
and its possession his aim. 

Even before her marriage Josephine had written these re- 
markable words to her friend: ^'Barras assures me that if 
I marry the General he will obtain for him the appointment 
of Commander-in-chief of the Army of Italy. Yesterday, in 



JO Josephine [i796 

speaking to me of this favour, — which is already the occasion of 
grumbhng among his companions in arms, although it has not 
yet been bestowed, — Bonaparte said: 'Do they suppose that 
I am in need of their protection in order to succeed? They will 
all be but too happy some day if I will grant them mine. My 
sword is at my side and with it I shall go far.' What say you 
of such certainty of success? Is it not a proof of assurance 
bom of excessive self-esteem? A brigadier-general protect the 
chiefs of the State! I know not, but sometimes this absurd 
self-reliance leads me to the point of believing possible every- 
thing that this singular man would put it into my head to do.'' 

If the letter be genuine, the woman's instinct in Josephine 
recognized in the soul of this extraordinary man what the acute 
observation of his teachers had before discovered — ''an ambi- 
tion with aspirations that stop at nothing." * 

Whatever Josephine lacked in love for her husband she made 
amends for in her belief in him, in his genius, in his future; nor 
did that faith deceive her. Yet she does not seem to have had 
the necessary moral strength to fulfil her duty of fidelity to the 
man she admired. Hers was a sensual nature; not like that of 
Catharine II., whom not even the risk of participating in crime 
prevented the satisfaction of her passion ; Josephine was passive, 
weak, vacillating, and in danger even of becoming a victim like 
Mary Stuart. Her faithful friend, Madame de Remusat, who 
fondly dwells upon her merits, does not conceal the fact that her 
reputation was badly compromised before she made Napoleon's 
acquaintance, and we cannot but gather from his letters that 
during the early years of their married life she never ceased to 
play the coquette with the men with whom she came in contact. 

* His brother Lucien in his "Memoires" (II. 314) also furnishes 
proof of the fact that Napoleon obtained command of the Army of Italy 
on account of his marriage with Josephine. Seven years later, in 1803, 
Lucien dared to brave the anger of his all-powerful brother who tried to 
compel him to separate himself from his wife and marry the Queen of 
Etruria. "What absurd presumption," said Lucien to Cambac^res,— or 
at least claims to have said, — 'Ho dare to hope that he could make me 
abandon my wife ! A wife who was not forced upon me and who brought 
me neither dowry nor command of an army." 



^T. 26] His Unhappy Marriage 71 

Some weeks after his parting with his bride he wrote a letter 
full of yearning desire asking her to follow him into Italy. She 
waits two months, until the close of the Paris season., before she 
decides to comply. He writes to Carnot at this time: *^I am in 
despair, my wife does not come; she must have some lover who 
detains her in Paris. Cursed be all women!" 

During the summer and autumn in which Napoleon was win- 
ning his immortal triumphs, she whiled away the time in Milan, 
Bologna, and Rome. The beginning of winter finds her again in 
the beloved capital on the Seine. Later, in the spring of 1798, 
when Napoleon undertook his Egyptian expedition, she remained 
in France, and her conduct during that time caused much anxiety 
to her distant husband, who was minutely, although perhaps not 
always accurately, informed of all that was taking place. From 
Cairo he wrote in July, 1798, to Joseph in these resigned words: 
''I have many domestic sorrows, for the veil is at last entirely 
removed. You alone are left to me on earth, your love is very 
dear to me, nothing more is needed to make me a complete 
misanthrope but to lose that and to find myself betrayed by you. 
. . . It is a sad condition to have to harbour at the same time 
all kinds of feeUngs toward one person in one poor heart. You 
will understand me. See to it that on my return I have a 
country-seat near Paris or in Burgundy; I count upon shutting 
myself up there and spending the winter; I am tired of human 
nature. I need solitude and isolation ; greatness wearies me, my 
feeUngs are dried up." 

After the Coup d'Etat, when Napoleon had made himself the 
master of France, — it was at the time when her charms began to 
be less alluring to other men, — Josephine clung to him with a 
lasting affection, and she was almost beside herself with jealous 
rage whenever his heart was occupied, even if but temporarily, 
in some other quarter. This devotion on her part and the beUef 
that his good fortune was associated with her prevented him for 
a long time from divorcing himself from her. In the end his 
selfish policy triumphed over this last vestige of sentiment. 



CHAPTER V 

THE CAMPAIGNS IN ITALY AND THE PEACE OF 
CAMPO FORMIO 

The fact has already been mentioned that in 1795 Prussia 
and Spain withdrew from the great coahtion which had been 
formed two years previous against revolutionary France. Even 
before this act Tuscany had been led to conclude a separate 
treaty of peace with the great republic in order to secure its 
own immunity in case of the advance of the French army into 
upper Italy. Holland also had been conquered during the win- 
ter and compelled to become the humble ally of France under the 
name of '^The Batavian RepubUc." It was even rumoured 
that Austria was secretly making negotiations in Paris, but such 
report was entirely without foundation; Emperor Francis II. 
had not the slightest intention of effecting a separate treaty of 
peace. In view of the victories of the enemy during the fore- 
going year, such a peace would have but entailed losses to 
Austria, and Thugut, the chief adviser of the Emperor, was 
intent upon making gains. Since the loss of Silesia, the conquest 
of which had raised Prussia to one of the Great Powers, the 
Court of Vienna was seeking compensation everywhere: in 
Poland, Turkey, Germany — where Bavaria was the coveted 
territory, — and in Italy — where the object was to acquire Venice 
in order to connect Lombardy with the hereditary domains of the 
house of Habsburg. Thugut had made advance toward the real- 
ization of his plans to the extent of receiving from Russia, on 
January 3d, 1795, a promise of support together with a portion 
of Poland, on condition that Austria should continue to oppose 
France. This put all thought of treaty with the RepubHc out of 
the question. On the contrary, Thugut entered, May 20th, 
1795, into a treaty of alliance and mutual guaranties with Pitt, 

72 



iEr. 26] Social Disintegration 73 

Prime Minister of England, the aim of whose secret stipulations 
was to induce the Czarina to take part in active hostilities 
against France. On September 28th of the same year Catharine 
II. agreed to be a third party to this alliance. 

The majority of the German States having refused Prussia's 
offer to mediate for peace, they, with Sardinia, Portugal, and 
Naples, joined also in this powerful coalition. ' Peace was not to 
be thought of in that quarter. 

A pacific outcome of affairs between France and Austria might 
perhaps have been possible had the Republic been willing to 
renounce its recent conquests and restore them to the great 
power on the Danube. The situation of internal affairs in 
France during the last months of the Convention had been 
discouraging enough to make a conciliatory attitude appear 
not unadvisable. The demoralization was unprecedented. In 
its precipitate zeal the Revolution had made an end of the rotten 
feudal system, but had not yet been able to set up in its stead a 
more enduring form of government. As with ''Liberty" for 
the watchword all political institutions had been destroyed, so, 
in the name of ''Equality," — which had degenerated into an 
ever-increasingly tyrannical principle, — the entire social edifice 
had been overthrown. Laws of marriage and inheritance were 
changed to accord with revolutionary ideas, with the sole result 
4Df depriving the family of its former importance and respect. 
jThe government had confiscated the estates of the Church as 
well as the property of the emigrants, who were for the most part 
victims of arbitrary proscription. Public credit had been based 
on what had been thus appropriated without heed to the fact 
that the value of real estate decreases as the protection of the 
laws becomes insecure, and where that protection is wanting 
becomes a mere fiction. In consequence France was now 
flooded with worthless paper money; honest tradesmen were 
reduced to poverty, speculators and gamblers flourished, deahng 
in stocks took the place of legitimate business, corruption and 
fraud reigned supreme. 

In addition to these disheartening circumstances came the 
confusion in the affairs of the Church and the inadequacy of the 



74 The Campaigns in Italy [1796 

new educational system, which decreed compulsory education 
/without being able to enforce its commands. The Marquis of 
Poterat, a man of dubious character but of unusual intelligence, 
describes the situation of France in a memorial addressed to the 
government in July, 1795, and verily his picture is in every respect 
accurate and faithful. "Consider the dangers of your position, 
they are truly alarming; with the exception of Prussia, which I 
mistrust, you have as declared enemies all the Great Powers of 
Europe; most of the young men of the land you have lost in 
battle or hospital; before long recruiting will have become im- 
possible. Agriculture is neglected for want of hands, horses, 
and fertilization ; trade, both domestic and foreign, is destroyed ; 
labourers in the arts, manufactures, and trades have lost either 
life or reason. You are in need of provisions and of naval 
stores as well as of every variety of imports, and you are without 
credit either at home or abroad. Currency is inflated with an 
immense amount of worthless paper money. The administra- 
tior of the Interior does not work because it is subdivided into 
too many departments and because those departments are 
wretched. In short, you have as yet no government at all. 
When shall you have one? Shall you ever do so? If so, will 
there yet be time for it to avail?" , 

There was indeed every reason for thinking of peace and giving 
the country opportunity to recuperate. And in fact there was in 
the Convention's Committee of Safety a party which was desirous 
of a general peace even at the price of contenting itself with the 
old boundaries of France. But the old boundaries represented 
the system of the Old Regime. The radical Revolution had 
wider aspirations, and for this reason its leaders would agree upon 
peace only on condition that France should retain her conquests 
of the previous year and that the "natural boundary " along the 
banks of the Rhine should be secured to the state. This idea 
was due to the doctrines of Rousseau, who derived from nature 
not only his theory of law and morals, but was indebted to her as 
well for his views of what constituted the frontiers of his country. 

Inasmuch as the need of rest was deeply felt throughout the 
country and especially in Paris, the conservative poUcy naturally 



^T. 2()] The Expansion of France 75 

received the support of the people, while the Progressives placed 
themselves in violent opposition to it and eventually brought 
the Convention into that critical position from which it was 
rescued by Napoleon's strategic talent on October 5th, 1795. 
Three days previous the majority of the Convention had acceded 
to the proposition of the government committee to incorporate 
Belgium with France, thereby giving sanction to a principle of 
conquest which was henceforth for twenty years to remain the 
policy of France.* 

* Whoever reads the acts and debates of the year 1795 with reference 
to the question then under consideration of the natural boundaries of 
France and the incorporation of Belgium will find therein the already 
developed germs of Napoleon's subsequent insatiable policy of conquest 
with its contempt for traditional rights. In an edict of the Committee 
of Public Safety dated June 26th, 1795, addressed to Barthelemy, Charge 
d' Affaires, occurs, for example, this query: " Of what use to us then would 
have been this terrible war and this long Revolution if everything were 
to return to former conditions; and do you suppose that the Republic 
could maintain its existence in the midst of circumstances which had 
undergone no change?" 

Rewbell, who was afterwards to direct the foreign policy of the Di- 
rectory, discussing this question with a diplomat, gives utterance to his 
views, saying that one must be but little enlightened in regard to the true 
interests of the Republic or be completely given over to Austria and Eng- 
land to dare to propose a return to the former limits of the country in 
order to obtain peace; such a peace would not only cover France with 
disgrace, but would infallibly lead to the destruction of the Republic; 
that one could not shut his eyes to the fact that the country was insuffi- 
ciently provided with manufactured goods, gold, silver, and produce; 
that, on the return of the armies to a country without means for recom- 
pensing its defenders and without other resources than valueless paper 
money, discontent would soon become general; the soldiers would of 
necessity take part in political and religious dissensions, and the inevitable 
result would be civil war of the most cruel order; foreign powers would 
not fail to take advantage of such circumstances, and as a consequence 
France would suffer the same fate as Poland. . . . Those who advocate 
peace at any price should not omit to take into account the fact that in 
Belgium alone there was public property to the amount of at least three 
billions in specie, and that there was still more in the other countries 
which had been conquered and annexed, and that this was the only 
resource for the redemption of the assignats. (Revue historique, 
XVIII. 208, 308.) 

Tallien never wearied of recalling the principle of 1792, that France 



76 The Campaigns in Italy [i796 

When, shortly afterwards, the Directory succeeded to the 
Convention, it accepted with other responsibihties the war 
against three of the Great Powers of Europe together with 
their dependencies; and inasmuch as the five men who now 
were placed at the head of the French government, Barras, 
Rewbell, Carnot, Letourneur, and La Revelliere-Lepeaux, all 
belonged to the dominant party a change of policy was not to be 
expected. Their close alliance with the republican Thermi- 
dorians (under Tallien) and the Jacobins (under Sieyes) gave 
them no choice but to make war upon existing monarchies. 
This was a war apparently without end and, indeed, not intended 
to have one, as its termination would have brought about the 
close of the Revolution, and thereby the end of the power of 
its ambitious leaders. To them the revolutionary tendencies of 
foreign countries were the most welcome of allies, and for that 
reason Germany, Switzerland, and, if possible, Italy were to be 
roused to insurrection by a systematic propaganda and drawn 
within the range of French political action. It was a programme 
of expansion in every direction. 

It must be confessed that at the outset the execution of 
this plan was greatly inferior to the boldness of its conception. 
Generals Jourdan and Pichegru, who had crossed the Rhine in 
order to take the offensive, were repulsed by the Austrian com- 

should surround herself with a circle of republics of her own founding 
and which should be dependent upon the mother country. Sieyes had 
even elaborated a plan for the secularization of the ecclesiastical princi- 
palities of Germany which was in all respects similar to that which was 
carried out in 1803. 

Mallet du Pan, the clear-sighted correspondent of the Cabinet at 
Vienna, writes as follows in a letter of August 23d, 1795 : " The Monarchists 
and many of the deputies of the Convention would sacrifice all conquests 
made for the sake of hastening and securing peace, but the fanatical 
Girondists and the committee led by Sieyes persist in this plan of expansion. 
Three motives impel them to this course : 1st. The scheme of extending 
their doctrine with their territory; 2d. The desire of uniting Europe 
by degrees in a federation with the French Republic; 3d. That of pro- 
longing a war, involving a part of the nation, which prolongs at the same 
time extraordinary powers and revolutionary measures." (Correspond- 
ance in^dite, I. 288.) Cf. Chapter VIII below. 



^T. 26] The Military Situation 77 

manders Clerfayt and Wurmser and thrown back to the other 
side of the river; at the south, hkewise, the ItaHan Army was 
accompUshing but Uttle. The latter had indeed been reinforced 
by troops drawn from Spain and put under command of Scherer, 
a general of advancing years who had hitherto been active in 
the Pyrenees. His instructions from Paris were to press forward 
through the passes of the Apennines into the plains beyond, 
and success attended his first efforts in the victory of Loano 
(November 23d-25th, 1795), but the winter season opened and 
interrupted hostilities against the united Austrian and Sardinian 
armies. Fortunately Russia sent no aid to Austria, and the 
latter, being unsupported in her endeavors to hold France in 
check, could not bring her forces to bear on the Italian theatre 
of war. For a moment, it is true, Vienna had considered re- 
moving the weight of her army from the Rhine to Italy, a move 
which would probably have made far more difficult the victories 
which Napoleon was soon after to gain in those regions. Thugut 
was indeed informed that the French government was seeking 
to separate Sardinia from Austria by offering her Lombardy 
in exchange, and the reports which Mallet du Pan sent to Vienna 
in the beginning of the year 1796 asserted confidently that the 
French were determined to penetrate into Piedmont and Milan, 
cost what it might. 

But in spite of everything no decisive measures were taken. 
The EngHsh were able by means of subsidies to keep the Austrian 
forces in Germany, which was in accordance with her interests; 
the Grand Duke of Tuscany refused to allow Neapolitan auxiliary 
troops to pass through his territory; Thugut himself feared 
aggressive measures on the part of Prussia and wished to be 
armed for resistance in Bohemia, and therefore refrained from 
sending reinforcements, beyond a few battalions, to the army 
in Italy; in short, everything conspired to the neglect of a field 
of operations upon which events of the utmost importance were 
soon to take place. 

While Scherer and his troops remained inactive in the South, 
the plan of campaign as elaborated by Napoleon demonstrated 
not only the possibility but the necessity of commencing hos- 



yS The Campaigns in Italy [1796 

tilities as early as February. To Scherer's complaints that 
his troops were needy and in distress (a situation which the 
financial state of the repubUc did not admit of rectifying), 
Napoleon made reply by pointing to the rich plain of Lombardy 
and promised to support the army upon the enemy's country. 
On the 19th of January, 1796, his plan was at length adopted 
and sent to the Army of Italy for execution. This Scherer 
refused to do. Such projects, he said, might be carried out only 
by the man who had conceived them, and asked for his own 
discharge. The request came opportunely. On the 13th Ven- 
demiaire the little general had saved the lives of the men 
who were at present in power; now he showed them the way in 
which their policy might be saved. Then, when every miUtary 
reverse shook the foundations of the Directory and strengthened 
the opposition, he promised triumphs which would justify 
the conduct of the governing body and assure its position. 
Scherer was relieved of his command and Napoleon took his 
place. On March 27th he assumed in Nice the command of the 
army. 

The new general-in-chief found his troops in deplorable 
condition. Of his effective force of six divisions, numbering 
60,282 men, something more than 22,000 were in hospital, 
leaving about 38,000 in fighting trim. These were men inured 
to war and hardened to fatigue, but suffering for the want of 
proper nourishment and equipment, for the declivities of the 
Apennines with their poor httle villages could contribute but 
little to the support of the soldiers, and the state's treasury was 
empty. To these troops the manifesto now issued by the young 
commander-in-chief — for Napoleon was younger than any one 
of his generals — fell on their ears like a message of deliverance: 
''Soldiei-s, you are ill-fed and almost naked; the government 
owes you much, it can give you nothing. Your patience, the 
courage which you exhibit in the midst of these crags, are worthy 
of all admiration; but they bring you no atom of glory; not 
a ray is reflected upon you. I will conduct you into the most 
fertile plains in the world. Rich provinces, great cities will 
be in your power; there you will find honour, glory, and 



;Et. 26] Supporting War by Plunder 79 

wealth. Soldiers of Italy, will you be lacking in courage or 
perseverance? " 

This language, of which, to be sure, we have no record 
beyond the recollections dictated by the Emperor at St. Helena, 
is the unvarnished expression of that policy to which finan- 
cial embarrassment now for some time had reduced France. 
Before this time the Convention had instructed the armies 
which crossed the Rhine that they must support themselves 
at the expense of the enemy, and their leaders were to use 
every means to obtain the required articles of subsistence from 
their adversary. The Directory made no change in this maxim 
beyond extending its significance. But these words are at the 
same time characteristic of the man who uttered them; he 
knew human nature too well to fail to promise wealth and 
glory to the poor and ambitious. It required audacity to 
make such promises, but still greater was the audacity of action 
by means of which they were to be realized. 

It will be remembered that two years previous to this time 
Napoleon had demonstrated to Robespierre the importance of 
effecting a passage of the Apennines from Savona, and that 
he had in secret, under orders of the Dictator, informed himself 
minutely as to the territory and fortifications of the enemy.* 
He was now able to profit by the knowledge thus acquired, 
avaihng himself of the very same strategic principles which 
he had submitted in 1794 to the all-powerful deputy in Paris. 
He said then: ''In the management of a war, as in the siege of a 
city, the method should be to direct the fire upon a single point. 
The breach once made, equihbrium is destroyed, all further 
effort is useless, and the place is taken. . . . Attacks should 
not be scattered, but united. An army should be divided for 
the sake of subsistence and concentrated for combat. Unity 
of command is indispensable to success. Time is everything." 

The road which leads from Savona to the north over the 
crest of the Apennines divides upon the further side into two 
branches, one of which proceeds westward by way of Millesimo 
and Ceva to Turin, the other northeastward through Cairo 

* p. 45. 



8o The Campaigns in Italy [i796 

and Dego to Alessandria and thence to Milan. The former 
was held by the Piedmontese, the latter by the Austrians, the 
two armies being in close touch with one another. How to 
make his way through between them was the problem which 
confronted Napoleon. It was the plan of Beaulieu, commander- 
in-chief of the Austrian forces, to attack from the east the French 
division of Laharpe which had been thrown forward as far as 
Voltri, while the Austrians under Argenteau were to fall upon 
its rear from Montenotte, a village to the north of Savona. 
The plan was badly conceived, and in order to take advantage 
of this mistake on the part of the foe Napoleon was obliged to 
give battle before the arrival of the expected army supplies. 
Laharpe retreated before Beaulieu to Savona, while Argenteau 
was surprised at Montenotte on the 12th of April by a force 
twice outnumbering his own and defeated with great loss. On 
the following day a second Austrian division which had been 
detailed to the assistance of Colli, the Piedmontese general, 
was dispersed at Millesimo by Massena and Augereau, Bona- 
parte's subordinates. 

Without loss of time Napoleon turned in person again toward 
the north, and on the 15th, at Dego, completely wiped out the 
remnant of Argenteau's corps. Beaulieu, fearing to be cut off 
with the main body of his army on the road to Alessandria, 
withdrew on the 16th from the mountains into the plain near 
Acqui. Napoleon had accordingly scored a success in his first 
move on the chess-board. He had forced his army between those 
of the allies, driven back the Austrians, and isolated the Pied- 
montese at Ceva. The latter soon abandoned their advanced 
position, and on their retreat were overtaken at Mondovi, April 
22d, where they suffered grievous defeat. 

The promised plain now lay open before the French, and 
their advance guard soon extended as far as Cherasco and Alba. 
Napoleon had generously fulfilled his promise to his soldiers. 
From this time they clung with blind confidence to him. His 
genius had triumphed not only over the Austrians and Pied- 
montese, but also over a third foe — mistrust and the envy of 
his subordinate generals. The greater number of them were 



iET. 26] Treaty with Sardinia 8i 

henceforward devoted to him, and thanks to his talent for giving 
precise orders with the requisite firmness, he was able to exact 
absolute obedience from such as were not personally attached 
to him. The Directory in Paris was again compelled to recognize 
the superiority of his policy when he, contrary to their orders, 
pursued ColH rather than Beaulieu, his unanswerable argument 
being that he could not operate with a hostile army in his rear. 

King Victor Amadeus of Sardinia took precisely the course 
which Napoleon had foreseen; insufficiently supported by 
Austria, and threatened in his own country by revolutionary 
tendencies, without means of strengthening himself, he turned 
to the French and requested an armistice preliminary to peace. 
Bonaparte granted this on condition that three forts should be 
surrendered to him as security and that his army should have 
freedom of passage throughout Piedmont. On April 28th the 
treaty was signed whereby France rid herself of her Sardinian 
opponent. At once Napoleon hastened to pursue the Austrians, 
who had retreated from Piedmont into Lombardy, and were 
awaiting the enemy in a strong position behind the Ticino. 
But Bonaparte failed to appear at the place where Beaulieu 
was expecting him; he had instead marched down the Po with 
a view to crossing it at Piacenza and thus come upon the Aus- 
trians in the rear. By the time that Beaulieu became aware 
of this step he was able only with the utmost exertion, and at 
the price of abandoning Milan, to reach Lodi and take up his 
stand behind the Adda. But even this position was untenable. 
On the 10th of May the French columns appeared at Lodi and 
forced a passage across the river with unheard-of gallantry. 
The Austrians fled, and the remains of the scattered and crest- 
fallen army gathered only on the farther side of the Mincio 
and in the fortress of Mantua. Lombardy was conquered. 
On the 16th of May Napoleon made his triumphal entry into 
Milan. 

But at the seat of government in France this unprecedented 
series of victories by the ambitious general was followed with 
a certain feeling of apprehension. Without consultation with 
Salicetti, who accompanied the army as commissioner of the 



82 The Campaigns in Italy [i796 

government, Bonaparte had agreed upon a truce with Pied- 
mont, while the government had intended to make this land 
a republic. When at last the Directory reluctantly signed the 
treaty, he wrote to Paris: "I have received the articles of peace 
with Sardinia, the army has approved it." This was a new 
tone. The army now gave its sanction to the acts of the govern- 
ment and set up in opposition to it a purpose and decision of its 
own! Hitherto it had been the docile instrument of the leaders 
in Paris. A decisive change in the order of things announced 
itself in these few words which did not pass unnoticed. There 
were indeed some who were of opinion that the writer of such 
language should be shot. But his protector Barras and the 
Jacobinical war-party put up even with this insult. 

But with a view to controlling in the future the course of a 
general so prone to act according to his own desires, Kellerman, 
Commander-in-chief of the Army of the Alps, was ordered with 
his troops to strengthen the army in Italy, he himself to share 
with Bonaparte the command of the whole force and the direc- 
tion of further operations, while to Salicetti was to be reserved 
the management of all diplomatic affairs. The news of this 
decree reached Napoleon just after his victory on the Adda, and 
he was incensed by it. Give up to another the glory and the 
power which he was on the point of acquiring! The thought 
was intolerable. His ambition dictated a reply which his acute- 
ness of perception enabled him to put in a form at once tactful 
and unmistakable: ''If you impose all sorts of fetters upon me," 
he wrote. May 14th, 1796, to the Directory, "if I must refer 
every step to the Government Commissioners, if they have the 
right to alter my dispositions, to remove or send me troops, you 
may look for no further successes. ... In the present situation 
of affairs it is indispensable that you should have a general in 
whom you have entire confidence. If I am not the person I 
shall have no complaint to make, but shall use redoubled zeal 
to merit your esteem at whatever post you may see fit to entrust 
to me. Each person has his own way of making war. General 
Kellerman has had more experience and will do it better than I ; 
but both together we shall do it badly." To Carnot, the Director 



Mt. 26] The Directory Yields to Napoleon 8 3 

in charge of military affairs, he wrote: ''I can be useful to you 
only if granted the same confidence which you bestowed on 
me when in Paris. Whether I wage war here or elsewhere is 
a matter of indifference to me; to serve my country, to merit 
from posterit}^ a page in our history, to give the government 
some proofs of my attachment and of my devotion, that is the 
sum of my ambition." 

Most certainly it was not a question of indifference to him 
where he should make war; of the whole asseveration only the 
appeal to posterity was sincere; the judgment of succeeding 
generations was ever present in Napoleon's mind, and even 
during the last hours of his life he sought to influence that 
opinion by a vast tissue of inventions and embellishments. 
"Human pride," said he to Madame de Remusat while Consul, 
'^creates a public to its own taste in that ideal world which it 
calls posterity. If one has brought himself to think that in a 
hundred years beautiful verses will recall some fine action, that 
a picture will preserve its memory, then imagination rises, 
the field of battle has no further dangers, the cannon roars 
in vain, it seems but the voice which is to carry through a 
thousand years the name of a brave man to our remotest 
descendants." 

Whatever the case, whether he was sincere or not, the 
Directory yielded. Kellerman was to them a person of small 
consequence, and Bonaparte, with his talent for making requisi- 
tions of which he had just given such marvellous proof, was 
hardly to be spared while the treasury of France remained in 
the impoverished condition of that time. The order was re- 
tracted and the Directory contented itself with merely expressing 
the wish that an expedition toward Rome and southern Italy 
should precede the march northward. "From this time," 
according to the recollections at St. Helena, "Napoleon had 
faith in his own greatness and in his call to play a decisive 
part in the pohtics of France." The fact was that he was now 
completely at Hberty to do as seemed best to him in Italy. 
And the matter of first importance was to reduce Beaulieu to 
entire harmlessness. 



84 The Campaigns in Italy |ii796 

The territory of the Republic of Venice extended at that 
time a long distance westward, as far as the Lake of Como ; Brescia 
and Bergamo formed Venetian provinces. Bonaparte marched 
a portion of his army into this country, thereby threatening 
the retreat of the Austrian commander from the Mincio toward 
the north and leading him to suppose that the French were going 
to invade the Tyrol. Beaulieu fell into the snare and scattered 
his forces along the whole length of the Mincio from Mantua to 
Peschiera. Suddenly Bonaparte turned toward the southeast 
and on the 30th of May forced his way with but little difficulty 
across the Mincio at Borghetto. He thus cut in twain the 
Austrian army, one portion being driven back into Mantua and 
the other on to the Adige and toward Tyrol. With the excep- 
tion of 12,000 men who occupied Mantua, there was not an 
Austrian corps left on Italian soil and Bonaparte could turn 
his attention toward subjugating the allies of the emperor, or 
at least to extorting from them the heaviest possible contribu- 
tions. The Directory had charged him to ''bring away from 
Italy everything which was of value and capable of transporta- 
tion." He fulfilled these instructions to the letter. On the 
9th of May he concluded a truce with the Duke of Parma, and on 
the 17th with the Duke of Modena, in both cases at the price 
of many millions of francs besides works of art and supplies of 
all kinds, for paintings by the old masters figured beside beeves 
and corn in the list of his demands. After his victory on the 
Mincio Naples was constrained to sign a treaty according to the 
terms of which that state promised to remain neutral and to 
withdraw her ships from the British fieet. Thereupon the 
Papal government, fearing to see the Eternal City occupied 
by the godless republicans, ransomed the capital on the 23d of 
June by surrendering to the French the Legations of Ferrara 
and Bologna and the important harbour of Ancona, promising 
that EngUsh ships should be kept at a distance from the coast of 
the Papal States, besides making payment of something over 
20,000,000 francs and yielding from their galleries a great number 
of works of art. Finally, the trading port of Leghorn was seized 
and occupied a few days later, with a view to further crippling 



^T. 26] The Old and the New Warfare 85 

the English, whose merchandise was confiscated and sold to the 
profit of the French treasury. 

But the French were yet far from being where they could 
enjoy their successes in peace. Austria, whose interests, as has 
been shown, depended upon maintaining her possessions and 
influence in Italy, was straining every nerve to reconquer her 
lost position. General Wurmser, who had been in command 
of the Army on the Rhine, was ordered thence to the Tyrol to 
replace BeauHeu at the head of the army and, with the aid of 
fresh troops, to advance to the relief of Mantua. 

Napoleon was fully aware that he had before him a struggle 
of no mean extent, upon the issue of which depended the question 
whether he were able or not to maintain his own despotic position, 
and he took his measures accordingly. What the young general 
accomplished during the ensuing months, in combat with four 
armies successively relieving one another, belongs among the 
wonders of military history. His successes were due to the 
superiority of a genius of inexhaustible resources, a clear-sighted- 
ness which recognized at a glance favourable or unfavourable 
points in a territory, as well as the weakness or strength, ad- 
vantages or mistakes on the part of the enemy. Napoleon's 
watchfulness was always on the alert, he grasped all phases and 
all details of an action and kept them in mind, and he fully 
appreciated the value of making use of the right moment. 

To these considerations must be added another. The 
generals who were his opponents in these Itahan campaigns 
were trained and experienced in a methodical kind of strategy 
only and, like all the generals of the older governments, in 
duty bound to be as saving as possible of their costly armies 
of mercenaries; to them a series of bloodless manoeuvres was 
the object aimed at. The generals of the Revolution, on the 
contrary, commanded armies composed of hundreds of thousands 
of their countrymen, animated by a frenzy for conquest and 
liberation ; their recruits cost nothing, and with war thus carried 
on at the expense of foreign nations they had an immense ad- 
vantage over those who were obhged to subordinate strategy 
to economic considerations; their object was decisive battle 



86 The Campaigns in Italy [i796 

at whatever cost. Frederick the Great, of whose writings Na- 
poleon was an assiduous student, had advocated the same prin- 
ciple; dire necessity and the pressure brought to bear against him 
by allied and superior forces had compelled him to act upon it. 
In one essential point, however, his method of warfare differed 
from Bonaparte's, for, as has been very justly remarked, ''he 
did not, like the French general, have 10,000 men a month to 
spend." Dubois de Crance and Carnot share the merit of having 
organized the revolutionary armies. But to Napoleon belongs 
the honour of having applied these tactics in offensive warfare 
in a manner displaying transcendent genius. Throughout the 
campaign which was about to take place, the contrast between 
the leaders of the antagonistic forces was but too clearly dis- 
played. The general of the repubhcan army was scarce twenty- 
seven years old, reckless and daring, heeding only the commands 
of his own inspiration, while the commander of the Austrian 
troops at the age of seventy-nine was dependent for direction 
upon the Emperor, his ministers, and the Aulic Council. 

At the end of July — far too late — the Austrians, in two 
divisions, advanced impetuously southward from the Tyrol. 
One of these columns, under command of Quosdanovich 
marched down the western bank of Lake Garda, the other, 
under Wurmser, followed the course of the Adige. Their 
forces outnumbered those of the French by more than 10,000 
men, the latter having not more than 42,000 in fighting condi- 
tion, including those who were engaged in laying siege to Mantua. 
Should they succeed in the execution of their plan to surround 
Napoleon's army by means of concerted and simultaneous 
action, its fate was sealed, and the outlook appeared so much 
the more ominous since the Austrians gave proofs in the very 
first engagements of unusual courage and firmness, and had cut 
off the avenue of retreat for the French to either Milan or Verona. 
Napoleon recognized to the full the danger of the situation and 
considered the advisabihty of making a retreat behind the 
Adda, but finally allowed himself to be led by the audacious 
confidence of Augereau, one of his generals, and risked an engage- 
ment, though in constant danger of being caught between two 



Mt. 27] The Attempt to Relieve Mantua 87 

fires. The daring venture was successful. With all available 
troops he threw himself first on Quosdanovich, defeated him 
on the 3d and 4th of August at Lonato, and compelled his re- 
treat toward the Tyrol. Then he turned against Wurmser, 
whose overcautious advance cost him a crushing defeat at 
Castiglione on the 5th of August; for him also the only way of 
escape lay toward the mountains. Mantua, whose blockade had 
been necessarily abandoned, was at once reinvested by the 
French. 

But no decisive outcome had yet been reached notwith- 
standing these victories. As long as this important fortress 
was not within his power Napoleon could not consider making 
further advance, inasmuch as the mere investiture of the city 
required so great a proportion of his troops as to make it impossi- 
ble for the rest to penetrate unsupported into the Tyrol or the 
interior of Austria. 

The Court of Vienna, moreover, appreciated as clearly the 
significance of this stronghold to themselves; its loss would 
entail that of all the Austrian possessions in Italy, and for this 
reason their efforts were redoubled to relieve and liberate the 
city. On the 19th of August positive instructions were sent to 
Wurmser by Emperor Francis bidding him advance again to 
the relief of Mantua. This order he obeyed early in September 
with one division of the army through the valley of the Brenta, 
while the second, under command of Davidovich, was to hold a 
position on the Adige, whence, in case Wurmser should turn 
westward from Bassano and draw the enemy upon himself, 
they were to descend the valley of that river at full speed to his 
assistance. But shortly after the opening of this action the whole 
scheme was shattered by the course pursued by Napoleon, who 
marched with the bulk of his army into the Tyrol, where he de- 
feated Davidowich and drove him far behind Trent, then, turn- 
ing into the valley of the Brenta, hastened to overtake Wurmser, 
and inflicted upon him an overwhehning defeat on September 
8th. 

Only by the practice of the most strenuous exertions did the 
aged general with the remnants of his vanquished army succeed 



88 The Campaigns in Italy [i796 

in gaining the sheltering walls of Mantua. One division had 
made its retreat eastward behind the Isonzo. This enterprise 
had cost Austria more than 100 cannon, all her munitions of war, 
and far above 10,000 men. 

For Bonaparte the achievement was one of much wider- 
reaching importance than had been his victory at Castiglione. 
Its significance was enhanced by the fact that it came just at 
the time when disaster had overtaken the armies at the North 
under Moreau and Jourdan, who had lost the advantages which 
they had previously obtained in Germany. By the recall of a 
portion of her troops from the Rhine to the aid of the forces con- 
tending against Napoleon, Austria had considerably weakened 
her forces in the North. The young Archduke Charles, who 
had given evidence of military talent in the Netherlands, now 
succeeded Wurmser in the chief command of the army. To 
him it seemed advisable (overestimating as he did the strength 
of his adversary) to withdraw his troops to the east of the Rhine. 
Moreau, who now, in place of Pichegru, commanded the Army 
of the South, took this as a challenge to cross the river, where- 
upon he defeated the Archduke and forced him to retreat 
beyond the Danube. Jourdan also was successful in an advance 
made against the second division of the Austrian army under 
Wartensleben which enabled him to invade Franconia. Wiir- 
temberg and Baden hastened to make peace with France, while 
Saxony recalled her troops from the field and declared herself 
neutral. It seemed as if the projected junction of the Repub- 
lican armies in the Tyrol for a united advance upon Vienna 
were really about to take place. Just then, early in September, 
Archduke Charles met Jourdan at Wiirzburg and totally de- 
feated him, thus compelling both his army and Moreau's to 
retreat from southern Germany back to the Rhine. The honour 
of the Austrian arms was at least splendidly retrieved. More 
than ever now everything depended upon the fate of Mantua. 

After his last victories Bonaparte had again acted contrary 
to the intentions of the Directory, which purposed restoring 
Lombardy to Austria when peace should be agreed upon in 
return for Belgium and the Rhine frontier. His method of pro- 



iET. 27] Renewed Efforts of the Austrians 89 

cedure had been to stir up revolt among the peoples of northern 
Italy against their hereditary rulers, and to incite them to the 
creation of national legions; such were, in fact, organized in 
Milan and Bologna. Austrian prestige hung in the balance. 
The most strenuous efforts were put forth to maintain it. Ex- 
tensive armaments, especially in Croatia and the military borders, 
were fitted out, the Tyrolese sharpshooters were called into 
requisition. Everything was done to increase the effective 
force of the Imperial Army, so that presently Davidovich found 
himself at the head of upward of 18,000 men in the Tyrol, while 
Quosdanovich was in command in Friuli of more than 25,000. 

The command of the whole army was entrusted to Alvinczy, 
a brave but aged general who had become immovably attached 
to the old methods. It seemed as if Fate had ordained that the 
generals opposed to this young and energetic genius should be of 
the oldest and those most wedded to tradition, thus giving to his 
victories the appearance of being the triumph of a new era.* The 
Austrians again had the advantage in point of numbers when on 
November 1st they advanced westward from the Piave under 
command of Alvinczy, and southward toward Verona under 
Davidovich. But these troops consisted largely of young 
recruits, who, like the Croatians, showed their best points in 

* In 1797 Bonaparte expressed himself thus in regard to the enemy: 
"My military successes have been great; but then consider the service of 
the Emperor! His soldiers are good and brave, though heavy and inac- 
tive as compared with mine; but what officers! They are wretched. 
The generals who were sent against me were unfit and absurd. A Beaulieu 
who had not the slightest knowledge about localities in Italy ; a Wurmser, 
deaf and eternally slow; an Alvinczy who was altogether incompetent. 
They have been accused of being bribed by me; those are nothing but 
falsehoods, for I never had such a thing in view. But I can prove that no 
one of these three generals had a single staff of which several of the 
superior officers were not devoted to me and in my pay. Hence I was 
apprised not only of their plans but of their designs, and I interfered 
with them while they were still under deliberation." (Jung, "Bona- 
parte," III. 154.) 

To what extent this harsh judgment is justified there is no way of 
ascertaining. Other evidence indeed indicated that demoralization did 
exist among the officers of the Austrian army. 



90 The Campaigns in Italy [i796 

attack, while their lack of firmness and endurance soon put them 
at a recognizable disadvantage. 

And in truth the opening of this new campaign was in every- 
way unfavourable to Napoleon, so that for a time he stood in the 
same danger as at Castiglione of being attacked by both divisions 
of the Austrian army at the same time. 

But the enemy did not take advantage of the victory which 
they gained on November 12th at Verona, where the French lost 
some 3,000 men, and Napoleon thus had time to prepare a new 
stroke of genius by means of which he caught Alvinczy in both 
flank and rear. 

With unheard-of daring he reduced to a minimum the forces in 
Verona and before Mantua, and with all available troops, about 
20,000 men, descended the course of the Adige, which he crossed at 
Ronco to the eastern bank of the river, in order to surprise the 
enemy. But this was by no means to be so easily accomplished. 

At Arcole on the little river Alpon two battalions of Croatians, 
commanded by their colonel, Brigido, stationed themselves so as 
to defend the bridge until the arrival of reinforcements. Every- 
thing depended upon forcing a passage across and securing the 
hamlet which commands the position before the strength of the 
foe should be increased by the expected forces. The successive 
assaults of the French were repulsed by the murderous fire of the 
enemy, who were under cover; thereupon Napoleon in person 
seized a flag and rushed upon the bridge, followed by his staff; 
an aide-de-camp fell at his side and several officers were wounded. 
But all in vain : an attack of the Austrians brought everything 
into confusion, and the commander-in-chief, who was swept 
backwards in the rush of the fleeing soldiers, fell into a quagmire, 
where his life was in the utmost peril. With difficulty his aide 
Marmont and his brother Louis succeeded in extricating him 
from the morass and in concealing him from the pursuing enemy. 
Only under cover of the night did the French regain their position 
on the Adige (November 15th). Meanwhile the whole force 
under Alvinczy had massed itself around Arcole and there the 
battle was renewed on the next day and the following in a bloody 
and long-indecisive struggle, until at length the physical endur- 



^T. 27] Rivoli 9 1 

ance of Napoleon's hardened troops carried the day against 
the brave Austrian recruits, and in the afternoon of the 17th 
the bold charge of a handful of mounted officers sufficed to assure 
the victory on the Alpon. The French had won in the three 
days' batttle of Arcole (November 15th to 17th, 1796). 

Davidovich, who through delay had failed to take part 
therein, was in hke manner attacked immediately after the 
battle and compelled to withdraw into the Tryol. The third 
attempt to relieve Mantua had failed. 

But Austria ventured a fourth trial, being unwilling to yield 
this advanced position in Italy until her utmost endeavours 
had been put forth. In the opening of the year 1797 Alvinczy 
made another advance against the enemy, this time from the 
Tyrol, while two lesser subdivisions commanded by Pro vera 
and BajaHch marched from the east to overcome Napoleon. 
Alvinczy had himself no further hope of victory and was only 
acting under orders of the Emperor. And yet there came a 
critical moment, on the plateau of Rivoli, which, properly put 
to advantage, might have brought about decisive results in 
favour of the Austrians. This was on the 14th of January, 
when one of the Austrian columns fell upon the French position, 
threatening its rear, while four others attacked it from the front 
with marked success. But Bonaparte was no longer the same 
man as before Lonato ; he hurled all his available forces against 
one of these columns, which recoiled under the shock, the three 
others followed, and soon all the forces of the enemy attacking 
from the front were put to flight. The column executing the 
flank movement found itself cut off and was taken captive by 
the French. The battle of BivoH terminated in a total rout 
of the Austrians. Their last attempt had gone against them. 
On the 3d of February the fortress of Mantua capitulated. 
Austria's dominion in Italy was at an end. 

Thugut, a man of inflexible purpose and of great poHtical 
abihty, was scarcely able to beheve the fact. Hardly two years 
previous, when Austria had divided with Russia all that re- 
mained of Poland, he had obtained the promise of pohtical 
support from this northern neighbour for whatever further 



92 The Campaigns in Italy [1797 

acquisitions Austria should make in Italy, an agreement similar 
to that which had formerly been made with Kaunitz and Joseph 
II, But in November, 1796, Catharine II. died, just at the time 
when the command had been issued for the mustering of the 
Russian auxiliary troops, and her successor Czar Paul I. refused 
to contribute aid toward the aggrandizement of Austria. And 
when in addition to this disappointment Austria's other ally, 
England, withdrew her fleet from the Mediterranean, thereby 
greatly facilitating the operations of the French in Italy, the 
task became more than ever difficult. And now the struggle 
had ended in a decisive overthrow. Yet in spite of all Thugut 
was of opinion that the contest ought not to cease. At the 
close of the preceding year, relying upon the strength of the 
Austrian forces alone, he had refused the proposal of the Direc- 
tory which required the cession of Belgium and the Rhine 
frontier. Even recent events had not sufficed to shake this 
confidence. ''We are not yet at the end of our resources," he 
exclaimed; ''all we need is to gather together all our courage." 
He advocated removing all troops from the Rhine so as to con- 
centrate their entire force in Italy, a step which might in truth 
far better have been taken a year earlier. Archduke Charles, 
who had been victorious in the preceding year, was to assume 
the chief command of the ItaUan army, reinforced by the divi- 
sions which had been active on the Rhine, and to make a vigorous 
advance toward the South and thus bar the passage for Bona- 
parte through central Austria to Vienna. It was, of course, 
essential that this move should be made as promptly as possible. 
But the contrary occurred. The Empress was a daughter of 
the Queen of Naples, and she, at her mother's solicitation, be- 
sought the Emperor to make peace ; he was moreover prejudiced 
by the Tory party against his minister, Thugut, who was a 
commoner who had risen to power. Accordingly he hesitated 
which course to pursue, and it was several weeks before he 
finally determined to continue the war. And when at length 
this resolution had been taken, it was not in the Tyrol that the 
main body of the army was assembled, but in Friuli, whither it 
had retreated after the defeat of Rivoli and where it had re- 



^1.27] The Attack on the Pope 93 

mained, evidently because there it was most easily supported. 
The fatal drawback to this arrangement was that the reinforce- 
ments from the Rhine were thus detained several weeks longer 
on the way to their destination, communication between Friuh 
and the Tyrol by means of the Val Sugana being interrupted. 
These troops were in fact still on the way when operations 
were begun by the French in the early part of March, 1797. 

Upon the part of the French, also, hostilities against Austria 
had not been continued immediately after the fall of Mantua. 
Bonaparte's army, as well, had suffered and was in need of 
considerable additions from the Rhine and the Sambre to fit it 
for new and daring enterprises. The intervening time was turned 
to account in a move upon Rome. Pius VI. had refused the 
proposals of peace made by the Directory, since they encroached 
upon the jurisdiction of the Church in demanding recognition 
of the civil constitution of the clergy in France, the suppression 
of the Romish Inquisition, and sundry other similar concessions. 
In accordance with an agreement entered into with Austria 
he had also failed to pay to France the millions of indemnity 
promised in June. But with the fall of Mantua the cause of 
the Holy Father was lost, and on the 1st of February, 1797, 
Napoleon declared war against him. With a small force he 
dispersed the Papal troops, who proved to be unspeakable 
cowards, and opened up a way for himself through the Romagna 
and the Duchy of Urbino as far as Ancona. It will never be 
forgotten how Lannes, who commanded the advance-guard, at 
the sUghtest possible cost compelled thousands of the foe to 
surrender, nor how, while himself escorted by a few officers, he 
came one day upon some hundreds of cavalrymen of the army 
of the Pope, who, upon being ordered to dismount, were entirely 
disconcerted and allowed themselves to be disarmed. It was 
in vain that the monks exhorted the Papal soldiery to courage 
and steadfastness, in vain that everywhere images of the 
Madonna stood with averted eyes in wrath against the French; 
the soldiers of the Pope were not a whit the more courageous, 
and the faU of Rome was imminent. But here Napoleon stayed 
his hand. To threaten the capital would have entailed the. 



94 The Campaigns in Italy [1797 

flight of the Pope and prolonged a war which the General re- 
garded as a mere episode in the greater conflict and wished to 
bring to a close with the greatest speed consistent with profit. 
He was far too shrewd a statesman to underestimate, as did the 
Directory, the immense pohtical importance of the Church, 
and his sagacity in that respect contributed much to his success. 
Instead of striking at the root of Cathohcism, as he was in- 
structed to do, he left the Pope entirely at hberty in all matters 
pertaining to rehgion, and Rome unmolested; on the 19th of 
February he concluded at Tolentino a treaty which was, from 
a material and political point of view, advantageous to the 
French in every particular: Pius renounced every aUiance 
antagonistic to France, closed his harbours to the English, re- 
linquished the Legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna 
together with the important port of Ancona to the French, 
and paid 14,000,000 francs in addition to the 16,000,000 still due. 
Once more Bonaparte had carried out his own intentions, 
contrary to those of the Directory, precisely as he had concluded 
the armistice with the King of Sardinia upon his own authority. 
It was evident that his designs in regard to Italy differed from 
those of the government. And what may these designs have 
been? Something may be inferred from the fact that he at 
one time thought it necessary to defend himself against the 
charge of having had thoughts of setting himself up as Duke of 
Milan or even King. It is not impossible that he may have had 
some such object in view and consequently sought a modus 
Vivendi with the Pope. More probably, however, he now had 
a clear and definite apprehension of the possibiHty of himself 
reigning some time on the Seine and of then establishing his 
rule on a firmer basis and extending his sway over a wider 
territory than the Directory had succeeded in doing. Camot 
suspected him of being "o, second Ccesar, who would not hesitate 
to cross the Rubicon as soon as the occasion should present." 
Certain it is that of the tremendous contributions levied in 
Italy but a small portion was put at the disposal of the govern- 
ment and used in the support of the other armies. On the con- 
trary, Napoleon was far from displeased when his generals seized 



^T. 27] The Vision of the Orient 95 

their share of the booty; he thus assured himself of their devo- 
tion. The treasure thus obtained was secretly conveyed to 
Switzerland for safe-keeping. 

When Bonaparte arrived in Ancona the proximity of Turkey 
made a profound impression upon him. ''Ancona is an excellent 
port/' he wrote to Paris; ''in twenty-four hours from here one 
can reach Macedonia, and in ten days Constantinople. We 
must keep this port when a general peace is made, and it must 
remain always a French possession; this point will give us in- 
valuable influence upon the destinies of the Ottoman Empire, 
and will give us the mastery of the Adriatic Sea as we now 
have that of the Mediterranean through Marseilles, the island 
of Corsica, and St. Pierre." Doubtless the form of Alexander 
the Great appeared at this time to his imagination and suggested 
to his ambition the idea of an Oriental Empire of the like of 
which the Directory then scarcely dreamed. Under its spell 
he afterwards made his expedition into Egypt, and it was only 
upon his return thence in order to establish his dominion in 
France that the alluring vision of the conquering Macedonian 
gave place to that of Charlemagne as model. It was in just this 
respect that Napoleon differed from his immediate precursors 
in their systems of revolutionary conquest of the world, — from 
the doctrinaire Girondists with their ideal of universal liberty, 
and from the Directors with their system of purposeless agita- 
tion, — that his ambitious designs were based upon the solid 
ground of history and carried out according to a policy with a 
definite aim. Only the fact that he too was never able entirely 
to free himself from the spell of the Revolution finally caused 
his downfall.* 

* At the very time when Bonaparte's victories in Italy were occurring 
in such rapid succession Mallet du Pan addressed these remarkable words 
to the Court at Vienna: ''Those who think that the imperishable Republic 
will perish in the course of time are certainly correct in their surmises, 
but if they mean thereby that this downfall more or less near is to insure 
actual stability to the rest of Europe, if they expect that everything 
then will change from white to black, they are greatly mistaken ; jor to the 
Republic of to-day there may succeed another Republic which may be under 
either a monarch or a dictator. Who knows? In the course of twenty years 
a nation in commotion may give a hundred different forms to a revolution of 



96 The Campaigns in Italy [1797 

The campaign of 1796 had estabHshed Napoleon's military 
fame; he had even eclipsed Hoche, who had been so much 
admired. But he knew very well that public opinion in France 
was more in favour of peace than of new victories, and that the 
Directory was detested and execrated because of its war policy. 
Elections for replacing one third of the members of the Council 
of Five Hundred were at hand, and no one doubted that their 
places would be filled by conservatives in favour of peace, and 
a majority thus created hostile to the Directors. Bonaparte 
foresaw that if he should succeed in compelling Austria to 
conclude a preliminary peace upon terms favourable to France 
he would thus not only gain the favour of the people, who had 
not yet forgotten the 13th Vendemiaire, but he would also 
put the five Directors under obhgations to himself, since they 
would then be in a position to face the elections more composedly. 
But Bonaparte knew also how highly Austria valued her footing 
in Italy, and that she would not permit herself to be thrust out 
of the peninsula without determined resistance, and that for a 
long time the power on the Danube had planned the conquest 
of Venice. He accordingly resolved upon availing himself of 
the first opportunity to offer Emperor Francis the territory of 
San Marco and its dependencies in Istria and Dalmatia in 
exchange for Lombardy and Belgium. The fact that he should 
thereby destroy an independent neutral state was no obstacle 
in the eyes of this man whose ruling principle it was to press 
forward toward his aim regardless of the consequences to others. 
Had not the legitimate monarchies dealt with Poland in the 

this kind." Mallet du Pan did not at all events suspect then that the * ' revo- 
lutionary monarch " was to be the very man of whom he then wrote con- 
temptuously. "This Bonaparte, this little puppet with dishevelled hair, 
whom the orators of the Councils delight to call 'the young hero' and 
'the conqueror of Italy,' will soon have to suffer for his mountebank 
glory, his misconduct, his thefts, his fusillades, his insolent slanders It 
would be an entire mistake, in reading the last declaration which the 
Directory had printed in eulogy of the General, to suppose its expressions 
sincere. There were voices in favour of sendmg 'the >oung hero' to the 
'Place de la Kevolution' to have a score of bullets lodged in his pate; 
but, as a friend of Barras, protected by the Jacobins of all classes, he has 
escaped the penalty of his folly." 



jSt. 27] The Campaign of 1797 97 

same manner? It is evident that this plan already filled his 
mind when he began the campaign of 1797. To accomplish 
his purpose it was indispensable that Austria should be placed 
at the earliest possible moment in such a situation as to make 
this offer acceptable, and that before the armies on the Rhine 
imder Hoche and Moreau might be able to dispute his laurels. 

While the Austrian reinforcements were yet far distant, 
those of the French arrived at headquarters during the latter 
days of February; the beginning of March Napoleon resumed 
hostihties. Three small divisions under General Joubert were 
ordered to the Tyrol to protect the flank of the French army 
against more than 20,000 Austrians. With but four others, 
amounting in all to about 34,000 men, Bonaparte himself under- 
took the expedition which was to lead to peace. As in the 
preceding year at the opening of the campaign, his plan was 
once again to prevent the armies of the adversary from effecting 
a union of forces by placing himself between the two, and then, 
with a superior number of troops, to defeat the main body of 
the enemy. On March 10th he brushed aside the advance- 
guard of the Austrians stationed on the Piave and hastened 
on to the Tagliamento, behind which Archduke Charles had 
withdrawn with the main body of his army, while Massena 
upon the French left endeavoured to turn the right wing of the 
enemy. Before these superior forces the Austrians, instead 
of receding to the northeast along the valley of the Taghamento 
to Pontebba, retreated southeastward to Udine and Cividale 
and at length to the Isonzo, where they intended to await the 
arrival of the troops from the Rhine. But these did not come, 
and Bonaparte, who continued to press impetuously forward, 
threatened their position, which now became untenable. The 
Austrians withdrew in two columns, one marching from Goerz 
straight toward Tarvis, the other aiming for Laibach. They 
planned to unite at Villach, but that proved impracticable, for 
the Pontebba Pass, inadequately defended after a struggle of 
some days, fell into the hands of Massena on the 23d of March, 
thus cutting off communication with the Pusterthal, through 
which the eagerly expected reinforcements were to have come. 



98 The Campaigns in Italy [1797 

For the present any serious resistance to the French was out of 
the question. In these few days the losses of the Austrians 
had been enormous, particularly in prisoners; the Archduke 
had remaining at his disposal only about 15,000 men; these 
he conducted first to Klagenfurt and then northward on the 
high road to Vienna. 

This seemed to Napoleon the favourable moment, before 
Hoche and Moreau could strike a decisive blow in Germany, 
for making his proposals of peace, especially as his position was 
more or less critical in the heart of a hostile country, without any 
possibility of support from the army in Germany. On the 
31st of March he wrote from Klagenfurt to the Prince a letter 
which he himself designated as "philosophical." He alludes 
therein to the attempt on the part of the Directory to conclude 
peace with Austria, which attempt had been frustrated by 
England. "Is there then no hope whatever of coming to some 
agreement between us, and must it be that, for the sake of the 
interest or passions of a nation untouched by the evils of this 
war, we must continue to cut each other's throats? I appeal to 
you. Sir, the Commander-in-chief, who by your birth are so near 
the throne and above all the petty passions which so often 
animate ministers and governments, are you determined to win 
for yourself the title of benefactor of all mankind and of true 
deliverer of Germany? ... As for myself. Monsieur the General- 
in-chief, if the proposals which I have the honour to submit to 
you could be the means of saving the life of a single human being, 
I should account myself more justly proud of the civic crown to 
which I should feel myself thus entitled than of the melancholy 
glory which may come as the reward of military successes." 

In order to give proper emphasis to these words, he recalled 
to himself at Lienz, Joubert, who had made a victorious advance 
as far as Brixen and had driven back the enemy to the north- 
west as far as Sterzing and to the west as far as Meran, and 
ordered Massena to seize the passes at Neumarkt, an operation 
during the course of which, in truth, the life of more than "one 
human being" was sacrificed. Thence he was to advance far 
enough into the valley of the Mur to be able to cut off at St. 



Mt. 27] The Preliminaries of Leoben 



99 



Michael and Leoben all communication remaining to the enemy 
with the west. On April 7th, this task having been accom- 
pHshed, Massena entered Leoben with his troops. 

Archduke Charles meanwhile had lost no time in transmit- 
ting Napoleon's letter to Thugut. This statesman was hkewise 
unwilhng to enter unsupported by a mihtary force into negotia- 
tions with a general who had perhaps already advanced too far 
into the territory of his foe. Thousands of volunteers were 
enHsted, the Hungarians were called upon for assistance, and 
preparations made for the defence of Vienna before the plenipo- 
tentiaries were sent by the minister to Leoben. 

Here, at the Chateau Gocss, were carried on the negotiations 
between General Merveldt and Marquis Gallo, representing 
Austria, and Bonaparte, in which the latter made the astounding 
offer of the Venetian mainland in exchange for Milan and Bel- 
gium. The proposal made a sensation at Vienna. Importuned 
by both Court and nobihty to make peace, unsupported by 
Russia, deluded by England, whence he had been led to expect a 
fleet in the Adriatic in addition to considerable subsidies, and 
convinced of Prussia's determination to extend her borders, the 
outlook was indeed unpromising and Thugut reluctantly yielded. 
The acquisition of the long-desired territory seemed in a measure 
to indemnify his country for the losses she was sustaining; there 
still remained to her a firm foothold on Italian soil, and at the first 
favourable opportunity the lost preponderance might be re- 
gained. But argeement became more difficult when Napoleon 
introduced his demand for the relinquishment of Modena. It 
was clear that his intention was to restrain Austrian influence in 
Italy within the line traced by the river Oglio, or, if possible, to 
make the Adige the boundary of the dominion of Francis 11. 
Thugut, on the contrary, sought to preserve Modena to its prince 
and the House of Habsburg, and to estabhsh a boundary fine to 
the poHtical power of France which should extend from Lake Iseo 
along the Ogho to the Po, and then should follow the valley of 
the Enza, and strike the coast near Massa and Carrara, thus 
cutting off the peninsula from the territory of the Republic. 
But Austria failed to secure her point in this diplomatic contro- 

L. ^ ;. 



loo The Campaigns in Italy [1797 

versy; Modena had to be yielded and remained a portion of the 
RepubUc. On April 18th, 1797, the compact was signed in the 
Eggenwald Garden at Leoben. It was merely a preliminary 
convention, containing indeed the principles of agreement, but 
capable of modification in regard to sundry points when the final 
treaty should be ratified. According to its secret articles Austria 
was to cede Milan and the Duchy of Modena to the newly- 
created Republic of Lombardy, while Belgium was to be given to 
France ; Austria was, on the other hand, to acquire the mainland 
of Venice as far as the Oglio, besides its dependencies (Istria and 
Dalmatia) on the eastern shore of the Adriatic, for which Venice 
was to be indemnified by the bestowal of the three former papal 
legations, Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna.- 

At the very moment when Napoleon was putting his signa- 
ture to the contract which ended hostilities, Hoche was winning a 
momentous victory from the Austrians on the Rhine, which he 
followed up by penetrating deep into the country of the Germans. 
But these victories came too late. Bonaparte had rendered them 
fruitless, that is, provided that the Directory were wilHng to 
ratify a treaty which, as a matter of fact, he had been totally 
unauthorized to make. In a letter accompanying the papers 
he had artfully laid stress upon the merely preliminary character 
of the agreement, and laid at Austria's door the initiative in the 
detestable Venetian business which had in reality been his own 
work. The government, thus misled, and desirous of remain- 
ing upon friendly terms with the mighty General, raised no objec- 
tion and ratified the treaty, making the one stipulation that no 
further steps were to be taken against Venice, inasmuch as the 
transaction which had been proposed was in violation of the prin- 
ciples that a people should have the right to determine their 
own future. The exhortation came too late. One week before, 
on the 3d of May^ Napoleon had declared war on the Senate of the 
island city. He had deemed it quite unnecessary to inform the 
Directory that he had undertaken in Leoben to obtain the 
Venetian territory for Austria, and for this cause would open 
hostihties against the Republic of San Marco immediately upon 
the conclusion of the treaty. 



^T. 27] Napoleon's Designs on Venice i o i 

The pretext for this he had long been holding in readiness. 
In spite of his statements to the contrary, it may safely be 
assumed that Napoleon before invading Austria had organized 
in the Venetian cities also a democratic revolution against the 
aristocratic rule of that state. The ''Patriots" rose in revolt. 
The unlooked-for result was that the peasantry, who were friendly 
to the government, turned upon the insurgents, and a number 
of French soldiers, who had openly taken part in the uprising, 
were killed. Thus in Verona there occurred a counter-revolution 
which cost the Uves of many democrats and Frenchmen, and it 
was quelled only by the energetic intervention of the French 
garrison. Two days later there took place in the harbour of 
Venice a fight between a French and a Venetian war-ship in 
which the captain of the former was killed. Thereupon fol- 
lowed Napoleon's declaration of war against the Doge. A 
democratic uprising in the city openly supported by a French 
Charge d' Affaires contributed largely toward increasing the 
disturbance. On May 15th the "Great Council" was forced to 
abdicate and a provisional government was set up by the "Pa- 
triots," who at once disbanded such troops as the government 
still had at its disposal and came to an agreement with Napo- 
leon according to which that general, in return for a consideration 
of 5,000,000 francs and a number of war-ships, promised to cease 
hostilities and to give the Republic the protection of his arms 
(May 16th, 1797) . How little in earnest he was with this promise 
of protection is shown by the fact that within a few days he 
offered to the Marquis Gallo, who had been sent by Thugut to 
Milan to conduct negotiations for the final treaty, to surrender 
to Austria the city of Venice in addition to the mainland territory, 
on condition that the Austrian boundary line be receded from 
the Oglio to the Adige (May 24th, 1797). In order to reassure 
the Venetians, he wrote, two days later, to the new municipality: 
"Whatever the circumstances, I shall do all in my power to give 
proof of my warm desire to see your liberty confirmed and to see 
unhappy Italy at length take her place with glory, free and inde- 
pendent of all foreign powers, upon the world's stage, to resume 
among the great nations the rank to which she is entitled by 



I02 The Campaigns in Italy [1797 

nature, position, and destiny. . . . Venice has the only popu- 
lation worthy of the blessing of liberty." Directly contradic- 
tory to all of these statements was his report to the Directory 
written on the following day, which reads: '^Venice, which has 
been in process of decay ever since the discovery of the Cape of 
Good Hope and the rise of Triest and Ancona, can but with 
difficulty survive the blows which we have just dealt her. This 
is a wretched, cowardly people, entirely unfit for liberty, without 
land and under water ; it seems but natural that they should be 
turned over to those to whom we are giving the mainland. We 
shall take all their ships, we shall despoil the arsenal, carry off 
all their cannon, and destroy their bank. Corfu and Ancona we 
will reserve for ourselves." The haughty city was to be bled ere 
her carcass should be delivered over to Austria. 

It was questionable whether the Court of Vienna, which 
desired above all things to acquire the three papal legations, 
would accept the new proposals made by Napoleon. But 
meanwhile affairs in Paris were assuming an aspect which of neces- 
sity affected Bonaparte's attitude. In these affairs he was per- 
sonally concerned, and in consequence they reacted upon foreign 
relations. 

The elections of April, 1797, had resulted, as was to have 
been foreseen, in an outcome entirely unfavourable to the 
Directory, giving the Moderates a majority in the Councils 
both of the Five Hundred and of the Ancients. A new Director 
was also to be appointed at this time. The choice fell upon 
Barthelemy, who with Carnot, likewise a Moderate, formed a 
Conservative minority in opposition to Barras, Rewbell, and 
Larevelliere. Consequently from this time the democratic- 
Jacobin element prevailed in the Directory, while the Conserva- 
tives and Royalists controlled the legislature. The antagonism 
grew fiercer from day to day and a clash was inevitable. One 
day the opposing majority would spring an attack on the 
wretched financial policy of the government, which with diffi- 
culty continued its existence despite a double bankruptcy; 
next day its dealings with priests and emigres would be arraigned, 
then its colonial administration, its commercial policy, and 



JEr.27] Napoleon Supports the Directory 103 

finally its foreign policy, which was more and more clearly re- 
vealing its character of revolutionary propagandism, whose 
acknowledged aim was to make Europe repubhcan. The 
Directory was openly accused of prosecuting an endless war 
because it could not maintain the troops at home. The suicide 
of several naval officers, who took their lives because they were 
unable to procure food, produced a deep impression. The 
proceedings in Italy were censured with especial severity, and 
particularjy the dealings against Venice. The Directory was 
accused by the right wing of the opposition of declaring war 
without securing consent of the legislature as the Constitution 
demanded, and of interfering, equally unconstitutionally, in 
the domestic affairs of foreign states, thus systematically pre- 
venting the settlement of a definitive peace. 

Bonaparte, who felt himself personally implicated in these 
charges, espoused the cause of the majority of the Directory 
against the majority of the legislature. On July 14th, in honour 
of the anniversary of the storming of the Bastille, he issued a 
manifesto to his army which contained a formal declaration of 
war against the adversaries of his party. The opposition thus 
menaced was composed in part of royalists, and these were 
detested by the republican armies chiefly on account of the 
emigres. "Soldiers," said he, "I see that you are profoundl}^ 
affected by the misfortunes which threaten your country; but 
the country cannot undergo any real dangers. The same men 
who have made her triumphant over Europe in coalition are 
at hand. Mountains separate us from France, but you would 
clear these with the rapidity of the eagle if necessary to uphold 
the Constitution, to defend liberty and protect the government 
and repubhcans. Soldiers, the government keeps watch over 
the laws which are entrusted to its custody. The Royahsts 
will cease to exist from the moment that they show themselves. 
Let us not be disquieted and let us swear by the spirits of the 
heroes who have died beside us in the cause of liberty, let us 
swear upon our new banners, implacable war to all enemies of 
the Republic and of the Constitution of the year III!" This 
summons found an echo in every garrison of his army, and in 



I04 The Campaigns in Italy [1797 

the other armies as well, and sundry detachments affirmed their 
loyal devotion to the Republic in addresses to the Directory. 
In addition Bonaparte composed a number of memorials which, 
in a way as masterly as it was false, were intended to justify 
his course in relation to Venice. "I forewarn you,'^ he vocifer- 
ates to the orators of the opposition, "and I speak in the name 
of 80,000 men, that the day is past when cowardly lawyers and 
wretched babblers sent soldiers to the guillotine!" And he 
was not the man to content himself with words. He sent one 
of his generals, Augereau, to Paris bearing the addresses of the 
divisions, and put him at the disposal of Barras and his two 
colleagues for their defence in case of need. Hardly had he 
arrived before he was put in command of the Army of the 
Interior. Besides this Napoleon rendered the three Directors 
another and peculiar service. In Venice one of the principal 
agents of the Bourbons, the Comte d'Antraigues, had fallen 
into Napoleon's hands, and in conversation with him the count 
made disclosures concering Pichegru's relations with the Bourbon 
Prince de Conde in 1795. Such revelations were now the more 
valuable since Pichegru had become one of the leaders of the 
majority and President of the "Five Hundred." By means of 
promises or threats Napoleon induced d'Antraigues to commit 
these statements to paper, and before long this writing found 
its way to Paris, where it served the three Directors as an effec- 
tive means and ostensible reason for a Coup d'Etat by means of 
which they rid themselves on September 4th, 1797 (18th Fruc- 
tidor), first of their two colleagues Carnot and Barthelemy and 
then of a considerable number of conservative deputies. The 
vacant places in the Directory were filled by two men of con- 
firmed democratic principles. Merlin de Douai and Frangois de 
Neufchateau. The attempt had been successful in every par- 
ticular. As justification for it Pichegru's alleged treason was 
made public. But the real victor of Fructidor was Bonaparte, 
exactly as he had been on the 13th Vendemiaire. There is in 
truth warrantable doubt whether, in giving his support to the 
Directory, he had desired that affairs should assume this aspect, 
whether his intention was not simply to overthrow Pichegru, 



^1.28] Napoleon on the i8th Fructidor 105 

It is possible that Augereau compromised him more deeply 
than was necessary in regard to his designs. That at least 
would appear to be the case judging by the Memoires of Barante 
recently published. But in face of the accomplished fact, in 
order to remain master, he was obUged to lay claim to the victory 
for himself and his army, and this he publicly did in a bulletin 
issued on the 22d of September, the anniversary of the birth 
of the RepubHc. Therein occurs this passage: ''Soldiers, far 
from your native land and victorious over Europe, chains were 
being prepared for you; you knew it, you spoke, the people 
roused itself and secured the traitors, and already they are in 
fetters." 

He was more than ever in favour with the government. 
Augereau, who had supposed himself the ruling power in the 
Coup d'Etat, though he was in reality but the undiscerning tool, 
was put out of the way by his appointment as Commander-in- 
chief of the Army of the Rhine. Hoche, the Corsican general's 
only rival worthy of mention, died just at this time of an 
acute pulmonary disease, though the report then current that 
his death was due to poison seemed all too probable. The 
Army of the Alps was united with that of Italy and Napoleon's 
forces thus very considerably increased. The Royalists were 
vanquished, the Moderates condemned to inaction, and the 
new Directory, which was under obligation to the General, 
avoided any resolute opposition to his wishes. His ambition 
no longer knew any bounds. Some years later he said, in con- 
versation with Madame de Remusat: ''It has been said of me 
as a reproach that I facilitated the events of the 18th Fructidor. 
They might as well reproach me for having upheld the Revolu- 
tion. Advantage had to be taken of that Revolution, some 
profit derived from the blood which it had caused to flow. 
What! consent to yield unconditionally to the princes of the House 
of Bourbon, who would have thrown in our faces the calamities 
which we have suffered since their departure, and imposed 
silence upon us by pointing to the need which we had shown 
of their return ! Exchange our victorious banner for that white 
flag which had not feared to take its place amid the standards 



io6 The Campaigns in Italy [1797 

of the enemy; and finally I myself be content with some miUions 
and with some dukedom or other!* Of a surety, the part 
played by Monk is not a difficult one; it would have cost me 
less trouble than the Egyptian campaign or than the 18th Bru- 
maire; most certainly I should have found a way, if there had 
been need for it, to dethrone the Bourbons a second time, and 
the best advice which could have been given them would have 
been to rid themselves of me." 

How well this avowal accords with what attentive observers 
say of him in that same year ! One of his old friends, Sucy, the 
Commissioner of War, writes in August, 1797: "I know for 
him no halting-point other than the throne or the scaffold.'' 
And the before-mentioned Comte d'Antraigues says in a report 
made that September: ''This man means to subjugate France 
and, through France, Europe. . . . Were there a king in France 
other than himself, he would wish to have enthroned him, and 
that the royal authority should rest upon the point of his own 
sword, from which sword he would never be separated so that 
he might plunge it into the heart of his sovereign should that 
monarch for a moment cease to be subservient to his will." 

Was this calumny or exaggeration? Neither one nor the 
other. Napoleon himself made some strange confidences to 
Melzi and Miot in June, 1797, before the Coup d'Etat of Fruc- 
tidor: ''Do you suppose that I gain victories to increase the 
glory of the lawyers in the Directory, for Carnot, or for Barras? 
Have you the impression that I have any thoughts of establish- 
ing a Republic? What an absurd idea! A Repubhc of 30,- 
000,000 souls! And with our customs and our vices? How 
would such a thing be possible? . . . The nation wants a chief- 
tain covered with glory, and cares nothing for theories of gov- 

* Bonaparte, like Pichegru, had been approached by agents of the 
Bourbons. The claimant to the throne had even written him a letter in 
his own hand, and in December, 1796, he was promised the title of Duke, 
the hereditary viceroy alty of Corsica, and the baton of a Marshal of 
France on condition that he would declare himself for the hereditary 
monarchy. These short-sighted conspirators had indeed no idea that 
what they thus offered him had long ceased to be sufficient to curb Napo- 
leon's ambition. 



^1.28] His Characterization of the Italians 107 

eminent, fine words, or dreams of idealists, none of which the 
French understand. ..." No one questioned who was to be 
this chieftain, for already his outward bearing gave evidence 
of his independent power. He held court, hke a prince, in his 
villa of Montebello in the vicinity of Milan. There, Hke a 
prince, he received ambassadors from Austria, Naples, and 
Piedmont. He even took his repasts in public with a few 
privileged persons, exhibiting himself to the gaze of the curious 
as was customary with monarchs. And like a monarch he 
now negotiated the final treaty of peace with Austria, accord- 
ing to his own designs and in no wise in accordance with the 
intentions of the government at Paris. The latter did indeed 
attempt to make Bonaparte follow the line of conduct prescribed 
by its democratic doctrinairism, to force him to revolutionize all 
Italy, and to exclude the Emperor completely. But he rejected 
this demand as impracticable with so much decision, and with 
the threat of his own abdication in case of persistence in it, 
that there remained to the Directory no choice but to let him 
follow his own inclinations. In the letters which he addressed 
to the Foreign Office at the capital he assumes throughout a 
superior and didactic tone. In one of the most noteworthy, 
dated October 7th, 1797, and addressed to Talleyrand, the 
newly-appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, he says: ''You 
but little know these Italians. They are not worthy that 
40,000 Frenchmen should be killed for them. I see by your 
letters that you are acting upon a mistaken presumption; you 
imagine that the possession of liberty will bring about the 
accomplishment of great deeds by a people effeminate and 
superstitious, buffoons and cowards. . . . The distinguishing 
characteristic of our nation is to be far too rash in time of pros- 
perity. If, as the basis of all our deahngs, we make use of true 
poHcy, which is nothing else than the reckoning of combinations 
and chances, we shall for a long time be the great nation and 
arbiter of Europe. More than that: we hold the balance of 
Europe; we will make it incline according to our wishes, and, 
should it be the will of fate, I see no reason why it should be 
impossible for us in the course of a few years to attain even to 



io8 The Campaigns in Italy 1797 

those great results already dimly seen by the heated and enthu- 
siastic imagination, and which only the extremely cool, per- 
severing, and rational man may ever hope to reach." 

It was soon to be the turn of the Court of Vienna to feel 
this pre-eminence and superior bearing of Bonaparte. Thugut 
had expressed a readiness to deviate from the stipulations of 
the prehminary convention of April, his intention being, of 
course, to add to Austria's territory in Italy through the acqui- 
sition of the Legations. But in this he failed. Napoleon, to 
be sure, had wilhngly consented to the alteration of the former 
treaty, but only in order to reduce still further the influence of 
Austria. It was to gain this point that he had in May offered 
the city of Venice with the Adige as a boundary. Thugut had 
at once rejected this proposal. But in vain he prolonged the 
negotiations for months, evidently in the hope that a victory 
of the Moderates in Paris would also bring about a more con- 
servative foreign policy in France; in vain he sent to Udine to 
treat with Bonaparte, Count Louis Cobenzl, the ablest diplomat 
in the service of the Emperor; in September the situation was 
such that, in view of the isolation of Austria and the supremacy 
of the peace party at court, not even the terms offered at Leoben 
could be insisted upon, and those now proposed by their ad- 
versary had to be accepted. It was at the end of a series of 
stormy sessions that the final treaty was at length concluded. 
Bonaparte used all the resources of his temperament for the 
purpose of influencing the Austrian envoy; he flattered, he 
cajoled him with seductive promises, he threatened and insulted 
him. Once, upon a refusal on the part of Cobenzl to some pro- 
posal. Napoleon was seized with a veritable paroxysm of fury; 
snatching up a porcelain vase, he hurled it to the floor and 
rushed out of the room, cursing and shrieking; a scene similar 
to those which, in later years, he repeatedly, and not without 
premeditation, enacted in the presence of the envoys of foreign 
powers. At last, on October 17th, 1797, after two occasions 
upon which negotiations were on the verge of being completely 
broken off, the definitive treaty was signed at Passariano, near 
Udine, though the paper was dated Campo Formio. Belgium 



Mt. 28] The Treaty of Campo Formio 1 09 

and the Ionian Isles were to belong to France, while Austria 
received the city of Venice and the mainland of that republic 
as far as the Adige and southward from this river the district 
between the Bianco Canal and the main branch of the Po. The 
territories of Mantua, Milan, Bergamo, Brescia, Modena, and 
the three Legations were collectively to constitute the Cisalpine 
Republic. The Duke of Modena was to receive the Austrian 
Breisgau as indemnity for his former possessions. Austria, 
which, in addition to the Breisgau, was obhged to surrender 
the county of Falkenstein and the Frickthal in the Aargau, 
was to receive in compensation the archbishopric of Salzburg 
together with that portion of Bavaria lying on the right bank 
of the Inn, and France engaged to sustain these claims in behalf 
of the Emperor. In return for this Austria promised her 
friendly intervention in the treaty yet to be concluded with 
the Empire, whereby France was to obtain the long-desired 
Rhenish boundary-hne between Basel and Andernach. The 
affairs of the German Empire were to be regulated at a special 
congress soon to assemble at Rastatt. The German princes 
whose lands might be encroached upon were to receive com- 
pensation in territory upon the right bank of the Rhine. In 
token of his good faith the Emperor at once put the French in 
possession of the commanding fortress of Mainz. 

' The tidings that peace had been concluded brought boundless 
joy at Vienna among the people at large as well as at the court. 
Only a few clear-sighted statesmen, Thugut especially, deplored 
the stipulations of the treaty as a misfortune to the monarchy, 
and had no faith in the durability of the situation thus brought 
about. The Emperor had consented to the diminution of the 
territory of the Empire and had expressed his willingness to 
annex to his own the domain of an ecclesiastical prince when it 
was precisely these ecclesiastical States of the Empire upon 
which the House of Habsburg most depended for its hold on 
the imperial crown. If only Austria could have gained the 
longed-for increase of power, there would have been some con- 
solation, but instead she had been driven inexorably backward 
toward the East. 



no The Campaigns in Italy [1797 

Napoleon, on the contrary, had every reason to contemplate 
his achievement with satisfaction. It is said that on the day 
that the treaty was signed he gave unreserved expression to his joy 
and showed the Austrian ambassador a charming amiability of 
manner which was as much at command of his talent as an actor 
as had been his former anger and violence. To him personally 
the failure to reach a conclusion through these negotiations 
would have entailed the undesired discomfort of a winter cam- 
paign in the inhospitable Alpine regions, with the possibility in 
the mean time that the decisive victory might be gained elsewhere 
by another, while their successful termination enabled him to 
carry out the vast designs which he had been maturing during 
the course of the summer — designs which, for their world-em- 
bracing extent and clear conception of purpose, have rarely been 
equalled in the mind of a human being. 



CHAPTER VI 
EGYPT 

When Napoleon, under the guise of a faithful ally, concluded 
the treaty with the new government of Venice, his object was not 
merely to secure a compensation which he could dehver to Austria; 
he reserved to France a portion of the Venetian inheritance : the 
position of the ancient Republic as a power in the Orient was to 
descend to the French. In May, 1797, Bonaparte sent General 
GentiU, a French officer, with a Venetian fleet to occupy the Ionian 
Isles, whose population joyfully received the emissary of the 
illustrious general as their deliverer from the oppressive rule of the 
Lion of St. Mark. He had thus taken a momentous step toward 
the Orient, where he saw extended a vast field for the develop- 
ment of French influence and his own ambition, provided that 
they could be made to coincide. As long before as the previous 
May he had insisted that France must retain Corfu. 'Torfu and 
Zante," he afterward wrote to Talleyrand, ''make us masters of 
the Adriatic and of the Levant. It is useless for us to attempt 
to sustain the Turkish Empire; we shall see its downfall within 
our own times; the occupation of these four beautiful Ionian 
islands will put us in a position to support it or to secure a portion 
for ourselves." It was in accordance with this scheme that he 
by means of clever agents established relations for himself from 
the Ionian Islands with the Greeks, the Mainotes, and the Pashas 
of Janina, Scutari, and Bosnia. And already his far-seeing eye 
had discovered new objects for his activity. It had long been a 
part of the poUcy of France to cut off England's communication 
with India, and to this end to secure as much foothold as possible 
in the Mediterranean. 

It was on this account that, upon the departure of the English 
fleet from those waters in 1796, Napoleon had had Corsica re- 
in 



I 1 2 Egypt [1797 

occupied by General Gentili,* and for the same reason also, during 
the ensuing spring, similar proceedings were carried out against 
Genoa as had been instituted against Venice, and on June 5th, 
1797, a treaty was concluded making France the absolute master 
of the " Ligurian Republic," which now received a new demo- 
cratic constitution. Finally, on the 16th of August, 1797, he 
wrote to the Directory: ''The time is not far distant when we 
shall feel that in order to really disable England we must possess 
ourselves of Egypt. The Vast Ottoman Empire, which is rapidly 
crumbling into decay, makes it our imperative duty to take 
prompt measures for protecting our Eastern commerce." With 
a single bound his thought traverses the space which intervenes 
between him and the land of the Pharaohs. On the 13th of 
September he writes to Talleyrand: "Why should we not possess 
ourselves of the island of Malta? Admiral Brucys might readily 
anchor there and take possession of it. Four hundred knights 
and a regiment of five hundred men constitute the entire garrison 
of the city of La Vallette. The people there are much inclined 
toward us and much out of conceit with their knights, who have 
no means of subsistence and are dying of starvation. I had all 
their property in Italy confiscated on purpose. With the island 
of St. Pierre, which the King of Sardinia has ceded to us, Malta, 
Corfu, etc., we shall be masters of the whole Mediterranean. If 
it should prove necessary for us to give up the Cape of Good Hope 
when the time comes for us to make our peace with England, we 
must take possession of Egypt. One could start from here with 
25,000 men escorted by eight or ten ships of the line or Venetian 
frigates. . . . Egypt does not belong to the Sultan. I should 
like to have you make investigations in Paris so as to let me 
know what the consequences of our Egyptian expedition would 
be to the Porte." 

Talleyrand eagerly entered into the projects of the General, his 
penetration having doubtless recognized the future master under 

* Napoleon accorded amnesty to the Corsicans, making exception 
only in the case of the heads of those families who had ranged themselves 
under Paoli's banner against him, particularly Pozzo di Borgo, Peraldi 
Bertholani, and others. Pozzo di Borgo remained henceforth his foe 
and implacable adversary. 



Mt. 28] Napoleon's Designs on Egypt 113 

this exterior of brutal superiority. These schemes of Napoleon's 
were akin to conceptions and projects of his own. Before the 
receipt of Napoleon's letter^ he had, in July, 1797, read a paper 
before the members of the National Institute, "Sur les avan- 
tages a retirer des colonies nouvelles apres les revolutions," in 
which he directed attention to Egypt and claimed for Choiseul 
the honour of being the first to conceive the idea.* 

Furthermore, Magallon, the French consul at Cairo, had for a 
year reiterated in his reports the advantages to be gained from 
an Egyptian expedition. For these reasons Bonaparte's pro- 
posals met with approval on the part of the minister, who entered 
into the plan himself and furthered it, laying stress upon the 
importance of French supremacy on the Mediterranean and 
especially upon the Nile. In fact he once even claimed to the 
Prussian envoy that he had himself been the instigator of the 
enterprise. 

It may reasonably be questioned whether at this time Napo- 
leon had the intention of assuming himself the leadership of this 
expedition. It was quite out of keeping with his ambitious plans 
to undertake such an adventure in a distant land with 25,000 
men, setting at stake upon an uncertain issue the glory which he 
had so rapidly and completely won, giving up his position of 

\* But the idea was an older one. Leibniz had urged the same upon 
Louis XIV. in order to distract the attention of the French from the 
Rhine. In 1738 d'Argenson, the future French minister, again brought 
up the suggestion and counselled the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez. 
Since that time the French government had taken up the question a 
number of times. Thus in 1780 the explorer Sonnini came upon a 
French officer in Cairo who had been sent to study the possibihty of mak- 
ing a conquest of Egypt and a way thence to the Indies. Five years later 
the question was again under discussion, for Emperor Joseph II. assigned 
Egypt to France in his plan for the division of Turkey. In 1795 and 1796 
emissaries of the Republic scoured the valley of the Nile. It is, moreover, 
a certainty that Bonaparte concerned himself about Egypt long before 
1797. He had in 1792 made the acquaintance of Volney, who had trav- 
elled throughout the Orient and had published five years before his 
"Voyage en Syrie et Egypte." Volney had an estate near Ajaccio. In 
his "Considerations sur la guerre actuelle desTurcs" (1788), the idea 
of a French expedition to Egypt is the subject of detailed study. ' 



114 Egypt [1797 

power in France and relieving the Directory at so small a price of 
the anxiety caused by his ambitious efforts. He did indeed later 
conduct the expedition, but only because compelled by circum- 
stances unforeseen in the autumn of 1797. For the conquest of 
Egypt was but a single link in the chain of projects whose final 
aim was disclosed in a proclamation to the fleet: "Comrades, 
when we shall have accomplished our task of pacifying the conti- 
nent we shall unite ourselves once more with you to conquer the 
Hberty of the seas. . . . Without you we could carry the 
glory of the French name but to a small corner of the continent. 
United with you we shall cross the seas, and the remotest regions 
shall behold the national glory." On the day following the con- 
clusion of peace with Austria he indicated the present moment, 
in a letter to Talleyrand, as particularly favourable to combat 
with Great Britain: "Let us concentrate all our activity upon 
the upbuilding of the navy, and let us destroy England. That 
accomphshed, Europe is at our feet!" Even before this time 
the Directory had taken into consideration a landing on the Brit- 
ish coast and made preparations accordingly. Bonaparte 
favoured the idea. When on the 2d of November he was in- 
formed in Milan of the ratification of the Austrian treaty he was 
notified at the same time of his appointment as commander-in- 
chief of the Army of England. He at once directed fifteen demi- 
brigades of the Italian army to march to the seacoast, and ordered 
cannon cast of the calibre of those used by the English, "in order 
to be able, in the enemy's country, to avail one's self of English 
projectiles." 

But another matter concerned him far more deeply than 
these military designs. He had long ceased to be the mere 
military servitor of the Directory. His whole being was ex- 
pressive of the determination to conquer for himself, if possible, 
a leading position and, if such a thing could be accomphshed, 
to exercise in the government at the heart of France the same 
power which he had up to this time enjoyed in foreign lands. 

November 17th, 1797, he left his headquarters in Milan in 
order to betake himself to Rastatt, where he as first French 
plenipotentiary was to negotiate with the ambassadors of the 



Mt. 28] Napoleon in Paris 1 1 c 

Emperor the treaty with the Empire. He remained but a 
short time in this httle town in Baden, — where he occupied the 
same apartments put at the disposal of Villars during a previous 
congress, — only until Cobenzl arrived and he had signed with 
him the agreement concerning the surrender of Mainz, Decem- 
ber 1st, 1797. Then on the same evening he began his journey 
toward Paris, whither Barras in his capacity of chief of the 
Directory had bidden him and whither he was driven by his 
own desire of profiting by the fame he had acquired. 

He was received by the Directory with every outward token 
of amity. Fetes were given for him at the Luxembourg and 
at the Louvre, whose walls were adorned with the works of art 
brought as plunder from Italy, while theatrical performances 
and similar festivities were organized in his honour. Even 
the populace appeared to have forgotten its mistrust of the man 
of the 13th Vendemiaire, and saw in him only the war hero; 
interest and curiosity at least, if not sympathy, were every- 
where manifest. In the theatres the public boisterously de- 
manded a sight of the General upon learning that he was present; 
it was scarcely possible for him to elude such ovations. He 
was elected by the National Institute to a Hfe-membership in 
that body in the place of Carnot, and from that time he appeared 
only in the ordinary garb of the scholar by way of demonstrating 
his ''civism." In fact he affected a complete simphcity of 
manner and conduct which must have been irksome to a man so 
eager for glory. He hved in his wife's unpretentious house in 
the Rue Chantereine, which had been rechristened Rue de la 
Victoire in his honour; the many attentions bestowed upon him 
he met with studied reserve and rarely showed himself in public. 
To his old comrade Bourrienne, who had become his confidential 
secretary, he said: ''At Paris nothing is long remembered. 
If I remain inactive for any considerable time, I am lost. One 
celebrity crowds out another in this Babylon. They need only 
to see me three times at the theatre to pay no further attention 
to me, and I shall appear there but seldom." Upon the ob- 
servation of Bourrienne that he must nevertheless feel flattered 
to see the people throng thus about him, he repUed: ''Pshaw! 



ii6 Egypt [1797 

They would crowd around me just as eagerly if I were on my 
way to the scaffold." 

Of all the official festivities the chief event was the splendid 
fete given in his honour by the Directory on the 10th of Decem- 
ber, 1797, at which he was to deliver to them the treaty of 
Campo Formio ratified by the Emperor Francis. All the dis- 
tinguished people and high officials in Paris were assembled 
that day in the great salon of the Palais de Luxembourg, which 
was magnificently decorated. Minister Talleyrand delivered 
the official address in which he lauded Napoleon's old-fashioned 
preference for simplicity, his predilection for the sciences, his 
contempt for vain splendour. '* Afi these qualities," said he, ''are 
to us the surest guarantee that he will never allow himself to 
be led away by ambition." The audience awaited with intense 
interest Napoleon's reply, which was as follows: ''The French 
people, in order to be free, had to fight against kings. To obtain 
a Constitution founded upon reason, it had to overcome the 
prejudices of eighteen centuries. The Constitution of the 
year III (1795) and you yourselves have vanquished all these 
obstacles. Religion, feudahsm, and monarchy have in turn 
governed Europe during twenty centuries; but from the peace 
which you have just concluded dates the era of representative 
governments. Success has attended your efforts to organize 
this great nation whose vast territory is circumscribed by the 
confines which nature herself has imposed. You have done 
even more. The two fairest countries in Europe,* once so 
celebrated for the arts, the sciences, and the great men of which 
they were the cradle, now see with the brightest hopes the spirit 
of liberty rising from the tombs of their ancestors. These are 
two pedestals upon which destiny will rear two powerful nations. 
I have the honour to deliver to you the treaty signed at Campo 
Formio and ratified by his majesty the Emperor. . . . When 
the happiness of the French people shall be established upon 
the best organic laws, all Europe will become free." 

The meaning of these words was far from clear. The last 
phrase especially was enigmatic. Its solution was vaguely 

* Italy and Greece. 



.Et. 28] Napoleon's Political Ideas 117 

divined by a few, while the remainder of his auditors exhausted 
themselves in conjecture. Then with this vaunted Constitu- 
tion of the year III France was not yet '^estabUshed upon the 
best organic laws"? Far from it, according to Napoleon's 
innermost convictions. Shortly before he had written con- 
fidentially to Talleyrand upon this subject; the letter, dated 
September 19th, reads: "The organization of the French nation 
is then in reahty nothing more than roughly outlined. In 
spite of our conceit, our thousand and one pamphlets, and our 
verbose and endless harangues, we are very ignorant in pohtical 
science. We have, as yet, no definite conception of what is 
meant by executive, legislative, and judiciary power. Mon- 
tesquieu has given us misleading definitions; not that this 
celebrated man was not abundantly able to give us what we 
need, but his work, as he himself says, is only a kind of analysis 
of that which had existed or was then in existence ; it is a sum- 
mary of notes made during his travels or in his reading. He 
fixed his eye upon the government of England and defined in 
a general way executive, legislative, and judiciary power. Why, 
indeed, should one regard as an attribute of the legislative 
power the right to make war or conclude peace, or the right to 
fix the quantity and the nature of taxes? The Enghsh Con- 
stitution has very reasonably entrusted one of these attributes 
to the House of Commons, and this was an excellent step, be- 
cause the English Constitution is simply a charter of privileges, 
it is a black ceiling but bordered with gold. As the House of 
Commons is the only body which actually represents the people, 
it alone should have the right to determine this question of 
taxation; it is the only discoverable bulwark against the des- 
potism and insolence of courtiers. But in a government where 
every authority emanates from the nation, where the sovereign 
is the people, why class among the attributes of the legislative 
power things which are foreign to it? The governmental power, 
using the term in the broadest sense, should be considered as 
the true representative of the nation, and this should govern 
in accordance with the written constitution and organic laws. 
This governmental power appears to me to be subdivided natu- 



1 1 8 Egypt [1797 

rally into two very distinct jurisdictions, one of which should 
supervise without acting, while that which we now call the 
executive power should be obliged to submit to the former all 
important measures; this, if I may be permitted the expression, 
would be the legislation of the executive. The first of these 
bodies would be in fact the great council of the nation ; it would 
have all that part of the administration or of the executive 
which according to our Constitution is entrusted to the legisla- 
tive power. The governmental power would thus be vested 
in two magistracies appointed by the people, one of them, con- 
sisting of a large number of men, to which no one would be 
eligible who had not already held some office which would have 
given experience in state affairs. The legislative power would 
in the first place make all the organic laws, and alter them, but 
not in the course of two or three days, as is the present practice; 
for, once an organic law has been made operative, according to 
my idea, it could not be changed without five or six months of 
discussion. This legislative power, without rank in the Republic, 
impassive, without eyes and without ears for its surroundings, 
would be free from ambition and we should no longer be inun- 
dated with a thousand laws passed for the occasion which annul 
themselves by their very absurdity and which make us, with 
three hundred folio volumes of legislative enactments, a nation 
without laws." 

These conceptions, which Napoleon calls his /'Code Complet 
de Politique," are of the greatest possible interest. They demon- 
strate not only his dissatisfaction with existing circumstances, 
but it is noticeable also that no word escapes him relative to the 
nature of the real executive power; that was, and should remain 
for the present, his own secret. The letter, as has been said, was 
directed to Talleyrand, who was to show it in confidence to Sieyes, 
the great theorist and constitution-maker. Both of these men 
were as little in favour of the Constitution of that time as was 
Bonaparte himself. The last named was then twenty-eight years 
of age, and Article 134, to the effect that Directors must have 
reached the age of forty, was to him particularly obnoxious.* 

* According to the testimony of Prince John of Liechtenstein, who 



^T. 28] The Fall of the Papal Government 1 1 9 

It needed only a favourable opportunity to bring about the over- 
throw of this obstacle to his further progress. Should such an 
one present itself during the winter of 1797-98 Napoleon was 
prepared to make a Coup d'Etat against Directory and Constitu- 
tion. When in the midst of the festivities of the 10th of Decem- 
ber a curious spectator fell from the roof of the palace to the 
ground, the sad occurrence was regarded as an omen of the ap- 
proaching downfall of the government. 

But the authorities were using every means to maintain their 
friendly relations with Bonaparte. The Directors consulted him 
upon all questions of foreign policy and accepted his recommenda- 
tions with a greater or less degree of readiness. Toward the end 
of December, 1797, there arose in the Papal States a revolt of 
the democratic elements of the populace under French protection, 
and this insurrection was forcibly suppressed by the papal troops. 
When upon this occasion General Duphot was killed, the Direc- 
tory, acting upon the counsel of Bonaparte, took advantage of 
this pretext to advance upon the papal government. Berthier 
received command from Napoleon to enter Rome, where the 
rule of Pius VI. was declared at an end and a republican govern- 
ment proclaimed, February 15th, 1798. It is improbable that 
it was the intention of Bonaparte* that these measures should be 
carried out as far as the deposition of the Pope. The inference 
is that here the feeling in the Directory was too strong for him to 
resist. 

The Batavian Republic was at this time ruled by federalists, 
and, the government feeling itself incapable of meeting the hea\'y 
demands for money and ships imposed upon it by the alliance 
with France, the French envoy openly came to the aid of the 
democratic centrahsts, who rose into power January 22d, 1798, 
by means of a Coup d'Etat similar to that of the 18th Fructidor, 
and placed themselves absolutely at the disposition of the Direc- 
tory. Joubert, the favourite of Napoleon, received the command 
of the Dutch troops. 

But it is in respect to relations with Switzerland that Napo- 

saw him in Udine, he had, to be sure, even then the appearance of a man 
of forty. 



I20 Egypt [1797 

leon's influence is most clearly seen. While still in Italy he had 
released the Valtelline from the dominion of the Grisons, — " since, 
according to the rights of nations under the new liberty^ no people 
could remain subject to another/' — and this territory he had 
incorporated in the Cisalpine Republic. 

The treaty with Austria had delivered into his hands the 
Frickthal, which belonged to the Canton of Aargau. He now 
conceived a desire for a thoroughfare through Valais which 
would facilitate communications between France and Loni- 
bardy. This purpose could be achieved if Switzerland could 
be induced to accept a place like that of the Batavian and the 
Cisalpine in the circle of dependent republics with which France 
was to surround herself as a shield against the rest of Europe. 
Accordingly the democratic element in Switzerland was aroused 
and supported in opposition to the aristocratic government of 
the patricians, and the same means were employed which had 
proved so efficacious in Holland and Venice, in Rome and Milan 
and Genoa. Upon the solicitation of the democrats of the 
Canton of Vaud for assistance from the French against the rule of 
Bern, the Directory willingly granted their request and charged 
its diplomatic agents in the chief cities throughout Switzerland 
to fan the flame of the insurgent movement to their utmost. 

Bonaparte and Rewbell had contrived with Ochs of Basel, 
the leader of the democratic centralists, a regular plan of revolu- 
tion. General Brune invaded the Bernese territory and under 
the guise of a liberator succeeded in separating the adversaries 
only to take possession of Bern, March 5th, 1798, whence he deliv- 
ered to the Directory the "Bernese treasure" consisting of about 
25,000,000 francs * besides an immense supply of provisions and 
munitions of war. A burdensome treaty of alliance with France 
was then imposed upon the newly-established "Helvetian Re- 
pubhc.'' Switzerland had become a French dependency. Of 
the money seized 3,000,000 francs passed into Napoleon's military 
chest to be used in defraying the expenses of the projected under- 

* According to Dandliker the value of this treasure has been greatly 
exaggerated. "It actually consisted of about seven millions in money 
and twelve millions in bonds." (Short Hist, of Switzerland, 217.) — ^B. 



^T. 28] Napoleon Looks to the Orient i 2 1 

taking against England, and, according to the statements of 
Madame de Stael, it was commonly believed that the general 
had advised this lucrative enterprise as a means to this very- 
end. 

But however great the condescension whereby the Directors 
permitted the victorious general to take part in their deliberations, 
he was nevertheless without any secure official position such as 
this influence upon proceedings would appear to denote. Bour- 
rienne affirms that he demanded admittance to the Directory in 
spite of the Constitution, but was unable to accomplish his pur- 
pose. It is not impossible that there was ground for the surmises 
of the observant that the massing of great bodies of troops at that 
time was ordered less with a view to the enterprise against 
England than to the establishment of a dictatorship. Disa- 
greeable scenes took place in the Directory over this question of 
which something appears to have reached the public, for the 
Prussian envoy reports that the populace of Paris were already 
asking one another what the general was doing so long in the 
capital and why he did not set sail for England. 

Napoleon had thus not only failed of securing a position at 
the head of the government, but he was at the same time running 
great danger of seeing the glory of his former triumphs wane in 
the light of every-day existence, and of losing, by continued 
inaction, the popularity which he had acquired. He recognized 
that, for the present at least, there was no hope of a successful 
issue to a Coup d'Etat. Hated as the Directors were by the 
people, he was himself far from being beloved to such an extent 
as to be able to rely upon his popularity in a struggle against them. 
His chief concern must be to ''keep his glory warm," to use his 
own expression. In view of the inefficiency of the French navy a 
landing in England seemed to him too hazardous a venture. 
Even later, in 1805, he again eagerly availed himself of the occa- 
sion furnished by the coalition to lead his forces elsewhere. He 
much preferred a return to his former plan of a campaign in the 
Orient. ''I will not remain here," he said to Bourrienne, "there 
is nothing to be done. I see that if I stay it will be but a short 
time before I am done for. Everything wastes away here below. 



122 Egypt [1798 

I am already bereft of my glory. This little Europe has not 
enough to offer. The Orient is the place to go. All great repu- 
tations have been made there.* I mean, however, to make a 
tour of inspection of the northern coast in order to convince 
myself as to what may be ventured. If I see reason to doubt the 
success of a landing in England, as I fear may be the case, the 
Army of England will become the Army of the Orient and I shall 
go to Egypt." 

On February 8th, 1798, the proposed journey along the coast 
was undertaken. It was soon completed. Bonaparte easily 
satisfied himself of the present impracticability of the enterprise, 
and upon his return tried to bring the Directory to the same con- 
clusion. 

In two memorials of February 23d he demonstrates that a 
landing in England without having first secured the mastery of 
the seas would be a most difficult and daring measure, which, if 
achievable, could only be accomplished during the long nights 
and consequently not before the coming autumn. Meanwhile — 
as he explains in a later communication bearing date of April 
13th — the expedition on the Mediterranean with Egypt as its 
destination might be undertaken which would compel the English 
to detach a part of their Channel fleet to send to India and the 
Red Sea. Meantime the forces in the northern ports of France 
could be increased to a considerable army, so that a landing in 
November or December with 40,000 men might be possible. 

The Directory, with a feeling of relief, at once decided in 
favour of the expedition to the Levant, and on the 12th of April 
sent to Napoleon the commission, drawn up by himself, appoint- 
ing him General-in-chief of the Army of the Orient. He was 
authorized and commissioned to take possession of Malta and 
Egypt, and to drive the English from their possessions as far 
as he was able to reach them, but particularly from the Red 
Sea, and he was to cut through the Isthmus of Suez in order 

* While still in Italy he had spoken to Bourrienne in a similar way: 
*' Europe is nothing but a mole-hill; it is only in the Orient that there have 
been great empires and mighty revolutions, there where 600,000,000 
people live." 



Mt. 28] The Egyptian Expedition 123 

to assure to the French the possession of that sea. Until his 
return a substitute should take his place in command of the 
army destined to make war upon England directly, for it was 
a matter of course that, upon the termination of the Egyptian 
expedition, he should reassume command of the combined 
forces directed against the British. At Toulon he apostro- 
phized the troops of the expedition in these words: "You are 
one wing of the Army of England!" and in his official orders 
issued at the end of April he styles himself: '^General-in-chief 
of the Army of England." 

The die, then, was cast. "I do not know what would have 
become of me," he said later to Madame de Remusat, ''if I had 
not had the happy idea of going to Egypt." Two of the greatest 
minds of his age have tried to answer this question: "Had he 
remained in France," says Madame de Stael, "the Directory 
would have launched against him calumnies without number 
by means of all the newspapers under their control, and would 
have dimmed his exploits in the minds of the idle. Bonaparte 
would have been reduced to powder even before the thunderbolt 
had struck him." According to Beyle, things might have 
resulted even worse: "Napoleon lent himself to this project, 
impelled by the double fear of being forgotten or being poisoned." 
This is doubtless exaggeration, but in any case the Egyptian 
expedition seemed to have been undertaken because the Direc- 
tory and Bonaparte were antagonistic and yet could not attempt 
an encounter to decide the question of supremacy. The Direc- 
tory sought a means of disencumbering itself of a dangerous 
rival, while Bonaparte was trying to avoid the loss of all authority; 
he was resolved upon increasing it by the acquisition of new 
glory, and to renew the combat with the Directory when a 
favourable moment should present. His genius at once per- 
ceived all the advantages offered him by the new combination, 
and, with characteristic energy, he proceeded to execute the 
mission consigned to him. 

He set about his preparations with a zeal such as had never 
before been seen in him by those who were about him, and his 
arrangements were made upon so vast a scale as to guarantee 



124 -^gyp^ t^^Q^ 

the result and to incur no risk to the renown of the general in 
command. This was no longer the modest expedition which 
could easily be undertaken by 25,000 men with a few frigates. 
The expedition to the Orient was begun with an army of 40,000 
of the best soldiers, embarked upon one of the greatest fleets 
which had ever been equipped by France, and which was de- 
signed to assure to the Republic the supremacy on the Medi- 
terranean. The general was accompanied by a staff of a 
hundred and twenty scholars, mechanicians, and engineers, 
among whom figured Monge and Berthollet, who were to make 
scientific investigations in that distant country, to prepare the 
way for projected colonization and to open the necessary water- 
ways. Talleyrand was to follow a little later to enter upon 
direct negotiations with the Porte and convince the Sultan that 
the expedition was in nowise aimed against him, but solely 
against the Mamelukes, who, despising his suzerainty, were 
governing Egypt like independent princes. A library was 
selected to be carried on the expedition, and among these books 
were Ossian,Tasso's ''Jerusalem Delivered," Homer and Virgil, 
Rousseau's "Nouvelle Heloise" and Goethe's ''Werther." It 
is characteristic and interesting to note that the Bible, the 
Koran, and the Vedas were grouped with the works of Montes- 
quieu under the head of ''Politics." History was prominent 
in the collection. Naturally Plutarch's "Lives" were there as 
well as the Anabasis, Arrian's "Alexander," and Raynal's "His- 
toire philosophique des deux Indes." The deep and lasting 
impression made on Napoleon by this work has already been 
observed. The passage referring to Egypt had doubtless been 
of particular interest to him. It reads: "At sight of a region 
situated between two seas, of which one is the gate of the Orient 
and the other the gate of the Occident, Alexander formed the 
project of establishing the seat of his empire in Egypt and of 
making it the centre of the world's commerce. This prince, 
the most enlightened of conquerors, recognized that, if there 
were a means of cementing the union of the conquests which 
he had already made and those which he proposed to himself, 
it would be in a country which nature seemed, so to speak, to 



Mt 28] Example of Alexander the Great 125 

have attached to the point of junction between Africa and Asia 
to bind them to Europe." 

It would be easy to prove that the designs of the great Mace- 
donian now engrossed the attention of Napoleon with special 
vigour and tempted him to imitate, to surpass his predecessor. 
His imagination soared aloft, but we know how he controlled 
it. "I always have two strings to my bow," was a customary 
phrase with him. And thus in the midst of his vast concep- 
tions he did not overlook what lay at hand to be achieved. To 
Bourrienne, who asked him how long he expected to remain in 
Egypt, he replied: ''A few months or six years, everything 
depends upon the outcome of events." And in fact as matters 
then stood it was but too probable that within "sl few months" 
a new war would break out in Europe which would of necessity 
recall his name to popular remembrance. For the progress 
made by the spirit of revolution in Italy and the republicaniza- 
tion of the Papal States had approached near enough to Tus- 
cany and Naples to appear threatening, and the probabihty 
was only too strong that Austria would extend her protection 
to the ruHng princes of those countries, they being related to 
the House of Habsburg, and thus at the same time defend her 
own interests. 

Moreover, Russia would of course resent the interference of 
France in the Eastern question. It would be a mistake to 
attribute to Bonaparte the introduction of this policy. France 
had begun her system of revolutionizing her neighbours long 
before the young general had acquired the slightest influence 
upon affairs.* But there can be no doubt that he now secretly 
advocated it in the selfish hope that the difficulties accruing to 
the Directory through war with a new coalition would bring 
that body into discredit, apparently necessitate his own return 

* The perspicacious MaUet du Pan wrote to Vienna as early as May 
25th, 1796: ''In all countries which they do not care to retain they will 
sow the seed of repubhcanism, declare themselves allies of every State 
which will imitate the example set by France, and provoke such imita- 
tion in every possible way; they flatter themselves by the use of such 
means to achieve in a short time what has been, ever since 1792, one of 
the first and most important aims of the war." 



126 Egyp^ t^'^^^ 

to France, and elevate his power and authority to a position 
whence he hoped to grasp the reins of government. To this 
end France must be beaten in Europe, while he should be win- 
ning fresh laurels to his name in the Orient; such was the aim 
of his unpatriotic ambition. This was the occasion also for 
removing all the best soldiers and ablest generals. He said to 
his brother Joseph: ''I start for the Orient with every means 
for achieving success; if my country needs me, if the number 
increases of those who think as do Talleyrand, Sieyes, and 
Roederer, if war breaks out and is not auspicious to France, 
then I shall return, surer than now of public opinion. If, on 
the contrary, the war is favourable to the Republic, if a new 
warrior like myself should arise and gather about him the hopes 
of the people, well! I may perhaps still render greater service 
to the world, in the Orient, than he ! " 

But while he still tarried in Paris the first indications of new 
complications on the Continent became apparent. At Rastatt 
the Austrian envoy had opposed the demand of the Directory 
for the cession of the entire left bank of the Rhine, and in Vienna 
Bernadotte, who represented France, had offended the court 
and incited the populace to an uprising on account of which 
he was obliged to leave the country. The situation looked 
serious. War was imminent. Napoleon hesitated and delayed 
his departure. If report is to be believed, his thoughts turned 
again for a moment to a Coup d'Etat and dictatorship. But in 
spite of all peace was preserved, and in the night of May 3d 
Napoleon left Paris to embark at Toulon, urged to departure 
by the anxious Directors, who preferred to feel that this ambi- 
tious schemer was in Africa. 

The preparations in the port of Toulon had been prosecuted 
with the greatest zeal. The actual destination of the expedition 
was known to but few. It is true there had been much talk of 
Egypt and the newspapers had commented upon it, but precisely 
for this reason no one believed in the genuineness of a venture 
which would place at a distance the best general in the French 
army at a time so critical. And yet such was really the case. 
On the 19th of May, 1798, the fleet weighed anchor with a part of 



^T. 28] The French Fleet Evades Nelson 1 27 

the expeditionary troops on board, the General-in-chief being on 
the flag-ship "Orient." At the same hour the divisions of 
Baraguay d'HilHers, Vaubois, and Desaix sailed from Genoa, 
Ajaccio, and Civita Vecchia to join the squadron from Toulon, and 
the combined forces made an imposing armament of fifteen ships 
of the line, as many frigates, seven corvettes, and over thirty 
smaller war-vessels carrying all together two thousand guns as 
protection to the four hundred transports conveying the ex- 
peditionary troops. 

Among the generals of division who took part in this campaign, 
in addition to those already mentioned, were Kleber, Menou, Rey- 
nier, and Dugua, while among the brigadier-generals were the 
bearers of those names which were later to be made so glorious, 
Lannes, Davout, Murat, Andreossy, and others; at that time 
Marmont, Junot, Lefebvre and Bessieres still ornamented the 
rank of colonel. 

The chief danger to the expedition lay from the EngUsh, 
who had, it is true, some time before withdrawn their fleet from 
the Mediterranean to the Channel as a protection to their own 
coast against the landing of the French, but since that time the 
ships at Toulon had attracted their attention, and the decision 
had just been reached to send a squadron under Admiral Nelson 
to observe them. Napoleon was totally unaware of this proceed- 
ing. Fortunately for him. Nelson was driven by a storm from 
his ambush a few days before the departure of the French fleet, 
and returned to his hiding-place only after they had made their 
way out of the harbour he was watching. Doubtful whither they 
had gone, he sought them in Sicily and Naples, while they had 
already captured the first important halting-place on their jour- 
ney, — Malta. 

A year previous French agents had bribed certain of the 
Knights of the Order of St. John which had been in possession of 
the island since the time of Charles V. The Grand-master, Herr 
von Hompesch, was an incapable and short-sighted man, whose 
faculties deserted him completely on this occasion; he made no 
attempt at resistance to Napoleon, and on June 13th, 1798, he 
yielded to him the strong fortifications of La Vallette without even 



128 Egypt [1798 

an effort to hold them until the arrival of succour from the Brit- 
ish. It was scarcely an honourable capitulation — a word 
which, by- the way, Napoleon avoided using in the articles of 
rendition, in order, as he sarcastically observed, not to employ a 
term which would sound harshly to the ears of an Order once so 
celebrated for its martial valour. The property of the Knights 
was confiscated, while they themselves, provided with scanty 
pensions, were compelled to leave the island; some of them 
joined the army of the conqueror. The Order itself was placed 
under the suzerainty of Naples and under the protectorate of the 
Czar of Russia. In accomplishing its annihilation Bonaparte 
counted doubtless upon thus hastening the conflagration with 
which Europe was already menaced. 

Leaving at Malta a suitable garrison. Napoleon set sail 
toward the East, and while off Candia received his first intimation 
of the fact that he was being pursued by a powerful English 
squadron. This was entirely out of keeping with his designs, for 
not only the Egyptian expedition, but also the future invasion 
of England was based upon the supposition that the French fleet 
was to remain mistress of the Mediterranean at least until the 
vanquishers of the Mamelukes should be brought back to France. 
It was now all-important to evade the pursuing enemy and reach 
Alexandria with these hundreds of transport ships. On this 
occasion Bonaparte made it evident that if in his boyhood he 
had, according to his incUnation, been appointed to the marine 
service, he would have furnished France with a most efficient 
admiral. By saihng close to the southern shore of Candia he 
eluded the vigilance of the pursuer and thus escaped the threat- 
ening danger. Nelson, having failed to come upon the object of 
his quest in the Gulf of Naples, had decided to direct his course 
to Egypt. Sailing along the coast of Africa, he, in his zeal to 
overtake the enemy, outstripped the French and arrived ahead 
of them in Alexandria. Finding that roadstead empty he at 
once hastened away again, this time setting his helm for Syria. 
Immediately after his departure the French fleet arrived in 
Egypt, July 1st, and had time to land the expeditionary troops. 

While still on the high seas, on the 22d of June, the com- 



^Et. 28] The Mamelukes 129 

mander-in-chief had issued a proclamation to his soldiers pre- 
paring them for the task which awaited them. ''Soldiers/' said 
he to them, ''you are about to undertake a conquest the effects 
of which will be incalculable upon the situation and commerce 
of the world. You will deal to England the most certain and 
terrible blow while awaiting the hour in which you may inflict 
her death-stroke. We shall have some fatiguing marches to 
make, we shall fight a number of battles, we shall succeed in all 
our enterprises; fortune is with us. . . ." He admonished 
them to respect the religion of the Mohammedans and their muf- 
tis, adding: "The people whom we are about to encounter treat 
woman differently from what we do; but, in any country, he 
who violates is a monster. Pillage enriches but a few; it dis- 
honours us, it destroys our resources, it makes hostile to us 
those whom it is to our interest to have as friends. The first city 
to which we come was built by Alexander. We shall find at 
every step reminders of great deeds worthy to excite the emula- 
tion of the French." Many of his soldiers doubtless understood 
him better when in Toulon he made the promise of enough 
money to each of them, upon the return of the expedition, to 
buy six acres of land. 

Bonaparte, having taken Alexandria on the 2d of July, 
likewise addressed himself to the inhabitants of the country. 
In a proclamation rendered into the Arabic he represented him- 
self as the friend of the Sultan come to destroy his enemies the 
Mamelukes and to deliver the Egyptian people from their tyr- 
anny. He proclaimed the equahty of all men before God, the 
same God whom he recognized in the Koran ; and in order to 
awaken more completely the confidence of the population and 
counteract the precepts of the Koran which forbade submission to 
any nation not of the faithful, he declared that the French were 
true Mussulmans, and adduced in evidence the fact that they had 
vanquished the Pope and annihilated the Knights of Malta. All 
this was hardly likely to make any great impression upon the dull 
sensibilities of the Fellaheen. They submitted to the new inva- 
sion as to any other domination. The actual enemy with which 
Bonaparte had to contend was the cavalry of the Mamelukes. 



130 Egypt [1798 

Originally in the twelfth century only a body-guard of the 
Caliph, created of slaves purchased for the purpose, the Mame- 
lukes soon possessed themselves of the mastery of Egypt, which 
advantage they retained until overcome in the sixteenth century 
by the Ottomans, when Selim I. committed the administration of 
affairs of the country, as a Turkish province, to twenty-four of 
their chieftains. Each of these Beys commanded a considerable 
body of horse, and as the Turkish power began to wane the posi- 
tion of these Beys became more and more independent until the 
authority of the Sultan dwindled to a mere name. At the time 
when Bonaparte took up arms against them their two generals, 
Ibrahim Bey and Murad Bey, commanded over 8000 splendidly 
equipped and practised horsemen, who were dexterous in the use 
of sabre, lance, and firearms, but of other troops there were none. 
Infantry and artillery were entirely lacking, except that the 
small flotilla on the Nile carried a few cannon. These were cir- 
cumstances, coupled with the fourfold superiority in numbers of 
the French, to leave little room for doubt as to the issue of the 
campaign in favour of the invaders. The real difficulties arose 
from other causes. 

First among these was disheartening disappointment. Alex- 
andria fell far short of all expectations. Not more than a 
twelfth part remained of the metropolis of civilization to which 
the Macedonian hero had given his name, the rest had fallen away 
into ruin and dirt. And when, on July 7th, Napoleon broke 
camp to proceed to Cairo, choosing the more direct way across the 
desert instead of the longer and easier route via Rosetta and 
along the Nile, the suffering from hunger, thirst, and heat was so 
great that the artfully cherished visions of an Eastern paradise 
suddenly vanished. The soldiers grumbled, threatened to turn 
back, and reviled the scholars to whom alone they imputed the 
blame of the deception practised upon them. In the Fellah 
villages there was no trace of civilization; grain there was in 
abundance, but neither mills nor ovens, and for drink there was 
nothing to offer but slimy cistern-water. Many of the soldiers 
perished with thirst, while terrible homesickness prevailed in the 
ranks and was the cause of frequent suicide; even the superior 



Mt. 28] First Encounters i 3 1 

officers felt the demoralization. At length the Nile was reached 
at Ramanieh, but there the enemy, roving about in detached 
bands, began to harass the divisions, so that progress could be 
made only by forming hollow squares and marching thus with 
the cavalry in the centre. At Shebreket they came upon the 
bulk of the army of Murad Bey. The two flotillas on the Nile 
joined battle; Murad made two ineffectual attacks and then 
withdrew.* 

It was not until the Pyramids came in sight on July 19th, 
at Om Dinar, three miles from Cairo, that a serious engage- 
ment took place. With toil and hardship, marching only in 
the early morning hours from, two to nine, the French reached 
Embabeh, the place where Murad had intrenched himself, and 
now, on the 21st of July, offered battle with something over 
5000 horsemen and a troop of Fellaheen against the French 
forces numbering five times as many as his command. It was 
scarcely necessary to excite the fervour of the Republican troops 
by pronouncing those celebrated words: "Soldiers, from the 
summit of these Pyramids forty centuries are looking down upon 
you!" 

The superiority of their numbers alone made a victory seem 
easy, and the longing to escape from the desert increased their 
ardour for battle. The issue was the only one possible. Bona- 
parte's five divisions formed at once in squares six men deep, 
with the cannon at the corners, the staff and baggage in the 
middle. Murad threw himself impetuously upon that of Desaix. 
Repulsed here, the Mameluke renewed his attack upon the 

* One example, taken from many, will serve to show the extent to 
which the deeds of the Army of the Orient were exaggerated by the time 
they reached the Directory at Paris in Napoleon's reports. Marmont, 
in his Memoires, mentions only four or five Mamelukes at Shebreket 
who with mad impetuosity rushed upon one of the squares and were cut 
down. There were unquestionably more than that, but in a letter written 
by Bonaparte to Menou, who had remained in Alexandria, the number had 
already increased to fifty, and in his report to the Directory, dated July 24th, 
1798, it had become nothing less than a "battle at Shebreket" wherein 
three hundred of the enemy were slain. At a later day he frankly said 
that a statesman must understand lying to perfection, and the negotiator 
of Udine and Passariano was a statesman. 



132 Egypt [1798 

divisions of Reynier and of Diigua (wherein Napoleon had taken 
his position), with the same lack of success. Then he galloped 
away. 

His camp at Embabeh fell after a short resistance into the 
hands of the conquerors, who derived from it a rich harvest. 
Ibrahim, who had been posted on the farther side of the Nile, 
at Boulak, with a portion of the Mameluke army, abandoned 
his position and withdrew eastward to the borders of the Syrian 
desert. The battle of the Pyramids delivered Cairo into the 
hands of the French. On the 22d of July, Napoleon took up 
his headquarters in Murad's palace. 

Hitherto the complaints of the troops had been met with 
the promise of consolation for their pains in the booty which 
Cairo with its splendour and treasures was to afford. What 
they found in this city of 300,000 inhabitants proved only 
another disappointment. Provisions could be obtained for 
money, but there was no vestige of the abundance and good 
cheer which had been counted upon; everything, even to the 
deserted Mameluke quarter, bespoke only poverty and squalor. 
Discontent in the army increased. The many letters written 
home by soldiers and officers in their dejection, which were 
seized and published by the English, testify to the spirit of 
dissatisfaction which was making itself felt. Bonaparte had 
all he could do with punishing, appeasing, and promising, be- 
sides the thousand details of organization and administration, 
with the dispositions to be taken necessary for the reduction 
of the enemy, who had withdrawn only to renew the charge 
with fresh forces. And what added greatly to his cares was 
the entire lack of tidings from Europe, while from Alexandria 
came news of crushing disaster: on August 1st the English 
fleet under Nelson had reappeared on the Egyptian coast and 
totally overwhelmed that of the French in the roadstead of 
Aboukir. 

Bonaparte in leaving the squadron under Admiral Brueys 
had instructed him to convey the fleet into the old harbour of 
Alexandria provided it were of sufficient depth; if not, he was 
to occupy a secure position in the roadstead of Aboukir^ or, if 



.Et. 28] The Battle of the Nile 133 

this should prove impossible, he was to leave the transports 
and sail for Corfu. Brueys found the entrance to the harbour 
impassable, and anchored at Aboukir in a position which he 
deemed strong enough to withstand attack of the enemy. In 
a letter to Bonaparte dated July 20th he even declared it 
impregnable, since he was protected on one side by the coast 
defences and no hostile ship could take up its position between 
him and the land. The error was a fatal one. On August 1st 
Nelson appeared with his squadron. He had until this time 
been seeking eagerly and excitedly, but in vain, for a trace of 
the enemy, and now rushed without delay upon the French 
ships, a large portion of the crews of which were not on board. 
It now became evident that Brueys' position was quite open to 
attack and that the EngUsh ships of the hne, though fewer in 
number, were manoeuvred with such skill and audacious courage 
as to enable them in spite of everything to push between their 
enemy and the coast. Caught between two fires, the French 
vessels succumbed one after another notwithstanding all the 
heroism of their defenders. Brueys atoned for his mistake with 
his life. The ''Orient" blew up with him and all his crew; the 
vaHant warriors met their death shouting, ''Vive la Repu- 
blique!" It was such a victory as had never before been won 
on the sea. Only two ships of the line and two frigates were 
saved by the rear-admiral, Villeneuve, in the flight. Two others 
had been previously towed into the harbour. Everything else 
was destroyed or in the hands of the enemy. 

Bonaparte received the tidings on his return from a march 
eastward in pursuit of Ibrahim, while he at the same time entered 
upon negotiations with Murad, though the latter were without 
result. He was in Marmont's tent when the news was brought 
to him, and at first received the message with perfect com- 
posure; he even began then and there to estimate its significance. 
In his Memoires Marmont records the words of his superior on 
this occasion. "Here we are now,'' said he, "cut off from the 
mother country. . . . We have got to be sufficient unto our- 
selves. Egypt was once a powerful kingdom. . . . What a 
point of vantage this position would be in offensive warfare 



1 34 Egypt [1798 

against the English! What a point of departure for the con- 
quests which the possible disintegration of the Ottoman Empire 
may bring within our reach ! We are perhaps destined to change 
the face of the Orient and to inscribe our names beside those 
recalled to our remembrance with the greatest radiancy by 
ancient and mediaeval history. . . . This is the hour when 
characters of a superior order should show themselves." 

These were spirited words and they did not fail of their 
effect. They did not, however, express the whole of the im- 
pression produced upon the commander of the expedition by the 
information just received. The loss of the fleet had been more 
of a blow to him than he had allowed himself to show. His 
intention, as we know, had been to conquer Egypt, and, having 
secured its possession, to return to Erance if meanwhile the 
fortunes of the new Continental war should have been of such 
a character as to enhance the value of his sword in the mind of 
the nation. In Bourrienne's Memoires we read: ''According 
to what General Bonaparte said to me before receipt of the 
news of the 1st of August, he intended, the possession of Egypt 
once assured, to start again for Toulon with this fleet, which 
with its mission accomplished was thenceforth useless; to send 
thence troops and provisions of every kind to Egypt and to unite 
the fleet with all the forces which the government should have 
collected for use against England, ... to which France would 
then be superior. . . . The loss of the navy shattered all these 
schemes." * Its further consequences were even more serious; 
it even put in jeopardy the position of the French in Egypt. 

Napoleon had been in hopes that the Sultan might be de- 
ceived as to the character of his expedition, or at least that he 

* Bourrienne was at that time as little as Napoleon in a position to 
know that the DirecTtory had already renounced the plan of making the 
projected invasion in the following autumn, and had sent the ships sta- 
tioned in the northern ports to the help of the Irish, who had revolted 
against England at the end of May, 1798. This enterprise entailed noth- 
ing but losses to the French. Dispersed in separate expeditions, some 
of the ships were lost, others were driven out of their course. A new 
concentration of the maritime forces in the north was for the present 
entirely out of the question. 



.Et. 29] Turkey Declares War 135 

could be prevented from interfering. This was to have been 
Talleyrand's task, but since the appearance of the English in 
the Mediterranean he had lost courage for the enterprise and 
transferred the office to the envoy in Constantinople. The 
Sultan wavered for a long time between friendship with the 
Republic and an alliance with Russia, which was offered him 
by the Czar Paul L, whose political sphere of action was likewise 
disturbed by the French intervention in the Orient and the 
seizure of Malta. Just at this critical juncture news arrived on 
the Bosphorus of the destruction of the French fleet and decided 
the question in favour of the Russian alliance. What had been 
counted impossible was accomplished; Turkey, wishing to 
defend her rights of suzerainty against the invader in Egypt 
and the Ionian Isles, had been won over by Russia. On Sep- 
tember 1st the Porte declared war against France. 

Bonaparte, who was now cut off from all tidings of events, 
did not at once learn of this turn of affairs. But he soon sus- 
pected it. Immediately upon his arrival in Egypt he had made 
offers of friendship to Achmed Pasha, Grand Vizier and Lieu- 
tenant-Governor of Syria, who was sumamed Jezzar, the 
Slaughterer, on account of his cruelty ; to him Bonaparte repre- 
sented the object of his mission as being none other than the 
protection of French commercial interests against the Mame- 
lukes. No reply had been received to these letters. On the 
other hand he learned in the early part of October that the Porte 
had ordered the arrest of French consuls everywhere. But he 
still had no certain knowledge of the attitude of Turkey, and 
until he was definitely informed he could not think of leaving 
Egypt. If advices should prove of unfavourable character, 
the task before him would be a double one; he should have to 
defend his recently acquired position not only against the hos- 
tihty of the Arab population and the forces of the Mamelukes, 
but also against the rightful lord of the land — the Sultan. After 
the defeat of his fleet at Aboukir, which naturally had made a 
bad impression at home, he stood in need of fresh triumphs to 
efface the remembrance of that disaster; the laurels which he 
had won in the battle of the Pyramids, even when the loss of the 



136 Egypt [1798 

enemy had been multiplied by ten, were insufficient to maintain 
his personal renown. And yet he had come to Egypt only to 
increase his fame while waiting for the war on the Continent to 
open to him a new field of action ! On the 18th of September 
he wrote to the Directory: ''I am awaiting news from Con- 
stantinople; I cannot be at home, as I promised you, by October, 
but the delay will be only for a few months." 

During this time of anxious waiting Bonaparte had oppor- 
tunity to convince himself that the Egyptian people submitted 
only with great reluctance to foreign rule and that his professed 
sympathy with Islam was of little avail. In October the in- 
habitants of Cairo revolted. The insurrection was occasioned 
by the rumour that the Sultan had declared war against France, 
that Jezzar was advancing from Syria, that the French were 
going to be compelled to withdraw, but were resolved first to set 
fire to the city. The populace assaulted the French in their 
houses and killed a number of them, among others twenty-five 
sick or wounded soldiers. The masses armed themselves and 
organized a revolt. Napoleon at first attempted to pacify the 
insurgents by the use of gentle means. When these failed he 
ordered the rebellious quarter surrounded and bombarded. 
The uprising was soon at an end. To insure himself against 
repetition of the offence he ordered the immediate decapitation 
of a number of prisoners. '^That will serve as a lesson to them," 
he wrote to his generals. He had supposed that he could 
accomplish his ends with mild measures, but with these people 
intimidation alone was effective. 

The time of quiet following these terroristic measures was 
employed in the development of the organization of the interior. 
The scholars who had accompanied the expedition, with certain 
officers of education, such as Caffarelli and Andr^ossy, founded 
an "Institute," at which they read papers on the subject of 
cultivation of the country. These papers were pubHshed in a 
periodical entitled "La Decade Egyptienne," while political and 
local news were reported in "Le Courrier d'Egypte." The first 
session of the Institute was held on October 23d. Bonaparte 
himself on that occasion proposed a series of questions the study 



iEr. 29] Scientific Work in Egypt 1 37 

of which was committed to different sections of the organiza- 
tion. The sessions were held every five days. It was here that 
the materials were brought together for the imposing scientific 
production which began to be pubhshed ten years later. This 
work, wherein the foundations were laid for the scientific study 
of Egypt in all its aspects, constitutes a title to imperishable 
honour for the man who made it possible by his energy and the 
interest which he gave to it. The best possible feeling pre- 
vailed between the members of the Institute and its president. 
Upon a single occasion, as is reported by an officer of the expe- 
dition, Bonaparte got into a dispute with BerthoUet and allowed 
his anger to overmaster him upon being repeatedly contra- 
dicted by the latter, whereupon the great chemist observed: 
**You are in the wrong, my friend, for you are getting uncivil." 
When upon this Desgenettes, the chief surgeon, took sides with 
the naturaHst, Napoleon broke forth: "I can see plainly enough 
that an understanding exists between you all. Chemistry is 
the kitchen department of medicine, which is itself the science 
of murderers." To which Desgenettes coolly rephed: ''And 
how do you define the art of the conqueror, Citizen General?" 

Since he could look for no further suppHes of money from 
home, Bonaparte had recourse to the wealth of the rich Arabs. 
One is reminded of the art of financiering as practised by Mephis- 
topheles in ''Faust" when one hears that the French commander 
was continually searching for hidden treasure and in the interim 
ordered the manufacture of 100,000 francs in paper money. 
The need for money was real, for a new campaign was about to 
be entered upon. 

The tidings of the declaration of war by Turkey, which had 
been the cause of the Cairo revolt in October, were later sub- 
stantiated, but the report of the advance of Jezzar proved to 
have been premature. In December, 1798, Bonaparte went 
to Suez to make a search for traces of the old canal, and to in- 
vestigate into the actuahty of the miracles of Moses; there he 
received the information that the troops of Achmed Pasha had 
made an incursion into Egypt and had estabhshed themselves 
in the frontier fortress of El Arish. He at once made prepara- 



138 Egypt [1799 

tions for taking the offensive in Syria. The opportunity had 
now come for winning new victories, and he seized it with ardour. 
His own tranquiUity of mind was contributed to by the news 
brought by a Frenchman who had reached Alexandria on a 
merchantman from Ragusa: the negotiations at Rastatt were 
still pending and only Naples was at war with France. This 
was exactly in accordance with Napoleon's wishes : to be assured 
that the great Continental war had not yet burst into flame 
and yet at the same time to realize the probability that, kindled 
by the contest with Naples, it would not be long before it would 
break out generally. It was his intention to return then to 
France, and of this he openly informed the Directory in a letter 
of February 10th, 1799, written before he set out for Syria. 

In the same letter he made known the plan which he was 
following in penetrating into Syria : he meant not only to repulse 
the invasion and by means of fortifications on the frontier to 
prevent any co-operation between the Syrian army and a second 
which would probably land on the Delta, but, in addition, once 
he had acquired possession of Syria, to take advantage of it to 
exercise some pressure upon Turkey. The Syrian expedition 
was thus designed to restore the political ascendency lost through 
the destruction of the fleet. Whether his designs extended 
still further may be inferred from the fact that on January 25th 
he had written to Tippo Sahib, Sultan of Mysore and sworn 
enemy of England, inviting him to enter into relations with 
himself. Toward the Shah of Persia also he had made some 
advances in regard to the necessary halting-places on a march 
to India. Five years afterwards he said to Madame de Remusat : 
''In Egypt I felt myself freed from the shackles of a restricting 
civiHzation; I dreamed all sorts of things, and I saw means of 
executing all that I had dreamed. I created a religion, I saw 
myself on the way to Asia, mounted upon an elephant, a turban 
on my head, and in my hand a new Koran which I had com- 
posed to my own hking. I should have brought together in 
my undertakings the experiences of the two worlds, gathering 
to my own profit from the history of all countries, attacking 
the power of England in India, and by means of this conquest 



Mt. 29] The Invasion of Palestine 139 

renewing my relations with ancient Europe." His imagination 
following in the footprints of his great predecessors was evidently 
inexhaustible in its projects. But in a historical narration it 
is not permissible to attach too great weight to such fantasies. 
For even when indulging in these dreams calm reason was ever 
at hand and ready to assert itself. He told Bourrienne in con- 
fidence that he should not venture upon the expedition to India 
unless Egypt were first made secure and he could leave 15,000 
men there while pursuing his march with 30,000 more. Since 
these prerequisites were lacking he was obhged to content him- 
self with the Syrian campaign. ''He himself felt keenly/' 
observed his confidant in his M^moires, "that all these projects 
were too little in accord with our means, the weakness of the 
government, and the distaste already evinced by the army to 
these deserts." 

The conquest of the Holy Land was undertaken with four 
divisions (about 13,000 men), under Kl^ber, Reynier, Lannes, 
and Bon. On February 20th the garrison at El Arish was led 
to capitulate, being granted the right of withdrawal without 
molestation, and on the 24th the advance-guard reached Pales- 
tine, where the troops could refresh themselves, having been 
driven nearly to desperation by thirst and heat and a parching 
wind which kept them on their march in the midst of a cloud of 
sand. Gaza soon fell into their hands, no determined resist- 
ance being shown by the few thousand men who were its defend- 
ers, and on the 4th of March the fortified city of Jaffa was invested 
by the French. And here was the beginning of more obstinate 
resistance. The French officer sent to negotiate terms with the 
garrison was beheaded by order of the Turkish commander of the 
place, and the ardour for battle on the part of the expeditionary 
troops was thereby goaded to reckless fury. By March 7th their 
batteries, consisting only of light field-pieces, had made breaches 
in the walls, and the fortress was at once stormed and taken. 
Hereupon followed a general massacre in the streets of all that 
fell into the hands of the victors. Of the garrison, originally 
4000 men strong, 1000 had already been killed. The others 
retired, fighting their way, to a caravansary. Upon the appear- 



140 Egypt [1799 

ance of two of Bonaparte's aides-de-camp, the besieged Turks 
offered from this refuge to surrender on condition that their 
Hves should be spared, to which condition the officers agreed 
without waiting to obtain further orders, to the extreme chagrin 
of the commander-in-chief, to whom the great number of prisoners 
was the cause of no small embarrassment. To send them to 
Egypt was impossible on account of the necessary escort; to 
release them would mean only to strengthen the enemy; to 
divide and maintain them offered difficulties no less considerable; 
the French soldiers grumbled at being obliged to share their 
bread with the murderers of the negotiator; the generals, in a 
council of war held to decide the question, voted unanimously to 
allow that law of war to take its course which forfeits the lives of 
defenders of a fortress taken by assault. Bonaparte considered 
the question for three days before approving the decision of his 
officers. Finally the prisoners were taken to the beach and 
massacred in a body. 

History has condemned this horrible act, but military writers 
have declared it justifiable.* But certainly this can apply only 
in so far as concerns the garrison of Jaffa, who were taken in the 
assault with arms in their hands after having rejected every 
manner of capitulation. These were, however, according to 
report, not the only ones who were put to the sword. In addi- 
tion 800 militiamen from the garrison of El Arish were murdered 
with them. To these the promise of unmolested withdrawal 
had been made, but, in the end, not kept, for fear that they 
should go to strengthen the enemy. If this be true, it is an 
abomination such as no argument of military usage can excuse. f 

* For example, Yorck, in his recently published book on ''Napoleon 
als Feldherr" (I. 132), says: "History of a pedantic order has been shocked 
and horrified at this deed ; from a military standpoint the question wears 
a very different aspect. The welfare of his own army, and with it the 
possibility of winning a victory, must precede all other considerations in 
the mind of the commander. If the proceeding were necessary to the 
safety of his army, not only was the act in this case justified, but its repe- 
tition in a future war would be the same, and any convention would be 
powerless to make any change in the matter." 

t A staff-officer in the expeditionary army relates: "Contrary to the 
terms of the capitulation, the prisoners from El Arish had been dragged 



^T. 29] The Siege of Acre 1 4 1 

On the 19th of March Bonaparte encamped before Acre. 
The fortress differed apparently but httle from those of the 
easily conquered El Arish and Jaffa. A superficial reconnois- 
sance of its works yielded a similar impression, and since the 
heavy artillery which had been ordered sent on from Alexandria 
had not yet arrived, — if, indeed, it ever should succeed in escap- 
ing the English cruisers, — the commander-in-chief began this 
siege with the same means which had proved sufficient in the 
former cases. But at Acre the result was to be a different one. 
The works were much better adapted to effectual resistance, 
being provided with a counterscarp behind the outer walls. In 
addition, the English rear-admiral, Sir Sidney Smith, was in the 
offing with several ships whence he furnished the fortress 
with provisions and means of defence, and sent to Jezzar a 
capable officer of engineers who conducted the defence. By a 
strange coincidence that officer was Picard de Phelippeaux, a 
fellow student of Bonaparte's at the Paris ''Ecole Militaire.'' 
These two men who had sat together on the same bench at 
school were now opposed to one another at this moment so 
significant in the world's history, the Corsican in the service of 
France, the Frenchman as the instrument of the EngHsh. 

The speedy conquest of this place was very important for 
Bonaparte, for war had now really broken out on the Continent. 
In March he received from the Directory a despatch of Novem- 
ber 4th, 1798,* which confirmed the report that the NeapoHtan 

along in the train of the army; Bonaparte feared that instead of going 
to Bagdad they would go to Jaffa or to Acre, where they would have 
reinforced the enemy. After the taking of Jaffa these militiamen pro- 
tested and became unruly. Bonaparte, said they, had no further occasion 
to fear their going to Jaffa, he ought to let them depart according to 
agreement. Still he could not make up his mind to permit this, and as 
he had resolved upon ridding himself of the prisoners made at Jaffa, he 
secretly ordered those from El Arish included with the others, and had 
them all massacred together on the 10th of March." (Jahrbiicher fiir 
die Deutsche Armee und Marine, XXXVI. 141.) 

This account would agree with Bourrienne's statement, giving the 
number of the victims at about 4000, — 3000 men of the Jaffa garrison, 
with the 800 militiamen. 

* Since the battle of Aboukir, and in consequence of the constant 



142 Egypt [1799 

forces were about to take the field under command of Austrian 
generals (Mack and Sachsen), which was at the same time an 
indication of the renewal of hostilities on the part of Austria. 
Further, that an Austrian detachment had penetrated the 
Grisons, thus violating the neutrality of Switzerland, the ally of 
France. To meet these complications the Directory had ordered 
a levy of 200,000 men and given to General Jourdan the com- 
mand of the Army of the Rhine, and to Joubert that of the Army 
of Italy, where presumably the decisive blows were to be dealt. 
Bonaparte himself was to act according to circumstances and 
the dictation of his own judgment. The Directory not being 
in a position to give him any support, it would refrain also from 
giving him any commands or instructions. The despatch 
closed with the words: "Since a return to France appears to be 
difficult of achievement at the present juncture, three alternatives 
seem to offer among which you can choose: to remain in Egypt 
and so establish yourself as to be safe against all attacks of the 
Turks, — in which case, as you are aware, the fact must be taken 
into consideration that there are seasons there extremely calami- 
tous to Europeans, especially if without aid from the mother 
country; to penetrate into India, where, on your arrival, there 
is no question but that you would find men ready to unite with 
you to accompHsh the overthrow of British domination; or, 
finally, to march toward Constantinople against the enemy which 
threatens you." This letter was accompanied by newspapers 
dated as late as February, which the consul at Genoa had given 
the courier to take with him and which told of war actually 
broken out between France and Naples and Sardinia, and of the 
advance of the Russians toward Italy. 

Much impressed by these tidings, and disregarding the pro- 
cruising about of English ships, intercourse with France had been made 
extremely difficult, especially when, after Turkey's declaration of war, 
the Barbary States also assumed a hostile attitude and communication 
between Tripoli and Egypt became altogether unsafe. This despatch 
h"i.d reached Alexandria in safety by means of a Genoese transport-ship; 
jut how many letters fell into the hands of the English is evidenced by 
the two volumes of the "Correspondence of the French Army in Egypt" 
which appeared in London in 1799. 



^T. 29] Assaults Fail 143 

tests of Kleber, Bonaparte, toward the end of March, 1799, 
ordered the storming of Acre with all possible speed. Only 
this ''heap of stones" more to conquer, and then — covered 
with the glory of having outshone the crusaders— away to 
Europe, alone, where the Directory, as their letter shows, are 
undertaking a war with very little confidence of success. These 
were his reflections. Moreover, when leaving Cairo he had an- 
nounced to Bourrienne that if he received in March tidings that 
France was at war against the coalition, he should depart at 
once. These tidings had reached him, and immediately he told 
General Dommartin in confidence that he counted upon return- 
ing to France with a certain number of generals and higher 
officers. He needed then only to acquire a little glory before 
taking his departure. 

But Acre resisted all attempts. The assault was repulsed, 
and the result heightened the self-confidence of the besieged. 
Good artillery manned by English gunners inflicted serious 
losses upon the French; Albanian sharpshooters threatened 
the slightest indiscretion with certain death; Caffarelli, the excel- 
lent general of engineers, died of a wound received in the trenches; 
the besiegers were kept constantly on the alert by frequent 
sorties. To add to their difficulties, an army of relief organized 
in Damascus was hastening to the aid of the besieged and had 
already crossed the Jordan. Kleber's division, which was sent 
out against it, was soon surrounded by forces twenty times as 
many as his, and in spite of the heroism of his soldiers they were 
in a most critical situation. Napoleon had to go to their assist- 
ance, and on the 16th of April, by means of a brilliant feat of 
arms, he was successful in routing the enemy at the foot of 
Mount Tabor. Murat then drove the remainder back across the 
Jordan. 

Meanwhile the work of the besiegers had been pushed vigor- 
ously forward. Mines had been laid, but with insignificant 
results. The assault had been again and again renewed, but 
all in vain. Finally the point of attack was changed with no 
better success than before. At command of Phelippeaux a 
second "enceinte" was constructed within the fortress and the 



144 ^gyP^ [1799 

streets barricaded. An assault on May 8th, 1799, undertaken with 
unparalleled gallantry, broke upon this accumulation of defences, 
and only a few hundred of the most foolhardy grenadiers reached 
the interior of the city, where they were obliged in the end to 
give themselves up to the English. It was not long before 
pestilence began to spread in the French camp, ammunition 
was growing scarce, and, as if to take from Napoleon his last 
ray of hope of success, a Turkish squadron landed reinforcements 
for the besieged. When, on the 16th of May, there followed 
the last decisive attack upon the nearly demolished city, it 
miscarried, as had the others. To tarry further was now useless, 
indeed ruinous, especially to the personal standing of Bonaparte 
with his troops, whom he sacrificed without number. Two days, 
May 7th and 8th, had alone cost 3000 men and two generals. 
The army began to murmur and to contrast their unfeeling 
commander-in-chief with the humane Kleber, and there were 
individuals who even wanted the chief command transferred 
to the latter. Napoleon determined upon retreat to Egypt. The 
more improbable the conquest of Acre became, the more he had 
expatiated upon his far-reaching designs in case the siege were 
successful. Where his deeds no longei yielded the coveted 
glory, he had recourse to his imposing dreams. With the 
weapons plundered from the fortress at Acre he should arm the 
discontented tribes of Syria, march upon Damascus and Aleppo, 
proclaim the end of the tyranny of the pashas, and, with the 
hordes which should come to swell the ranks of his army, move 
upon Constantinople. ''Then," said he to Bourrienne, 'Hhe 
Turkish Empire falls before me; I establish in the Orient a new 
and great empire which will assure my place with posterity, and 
perhaps I shall return to Paris by way of Adrianople or Vienna 
after having crushed the House of Austria." 

Here were again the visions of that imagination of which he 
had said in the before-mentioned conversation with Madame 
de R^musat that it had "died confronting Acre." That may 
have been, but in any case we know from his own letters written 
from Syria to those who had remained in Egypt that his efforts 
were to be directed toward a return to Cairo whether the fortress 



^T. 29] The Retreat 145 

yielded or not. For he was convinced that a Turkish army, 
which had already been seen at Rhodes, was designed to land 
at the Delta of the Nile, and it was clear to him that these 
forces must be conquered if everything were not to be lost. The 
imyielding claim of this immediate necessity put to flight all 
further dreams of advance toward Constantinople or India, or 
the foundation of an Oriental kingdom. And an empire might 
not impossibly be founded elsewhere than in Asia. 

On May 20th the siege was raised and the retreat begun. 
According to descriptions of contemporaries the latter was 
horrible in the extreme. The march from Acre to Jaffa is por- 
trayed in these words: ''A consuming thirst, total lack of water, 
excessive heat,* a fatiguing march through scorching dunes, 
demoralized the men and caused all generous feeling to give 
place to the most cruel selfishness, the most distressing indiffer- 
ence. I have seen officers with amputated limbs thrown from 
the litters upon which they were to have been transported 
according to orders, even in cases where the wounded man had 
paid the bearers for their labour. I have seen abandoned to 
their fate those who had suffered amputation, the wounded 
together with those who were attacked by the plague or only 
suspected of being so. The march was illumined by torches 
kindled to set fire to small cities, towns, villages, hamlets, and 
the rich harvests with which the land was covered. The whole 
country was in flames. We were surrounded only by plunderers, 
incendiaries, and the dying. By the side of the road where they 
had been thrown lay men half dead, calling out with feeble 
voice, ' I am not sick with the plague, I am only wounded,' and 
to convince the passers-by many of these poor wretches could 
be seen reopening their wounds or inflicting new ones upon 
themselves. No one believed in them. . . . The sun in all its 
splendour under this clear sky was obscured by the smoke from 
our incessant conflagrations. We had at our right the sea and 
behind us the desert which we had created, before us the priva- 

* In the desert, between Syria and the Nile, the thermometer regis- 
tered 34° Reaumur (108° Fahr.) when exposed to the air, and 42° Reau- 
mur (125° Fahr.) when in contact with the ground. 



1 46 Egypt [1799 

tions and sufferings which awaited us; such, in truth, was our 
situation/'* Besides there were hovering all about them swarms 
of Nabulusians, one of whom on one occasion shot at Napoleon, 
who had fallen asleep upon his horse while on the march. 

On the 24th of May they reached Jaffa. Here yet lay those 
wounded during the attack on the city. The plague had asserted 
itself here as in the ranks of the army. Napoleon himself 
hastened through the wards of the hospital, calling out to the 
sick: "The fortifications are destroyed. Fortune was against 
me at Acre. I have got to return to Egypt to keep it from 
enemies who are about to descend upon it. The Turks will be 
here in a few hours; let all who feel able to get up come with 
us; they will be transported on litters and horses." And how 
about the others? There were about sixty stricken with the 
plague who were obliged to remain. Fable has exaggerated 
this visit to the hospital both in art and writing, while ill-disposed 
criticism has set forth as a crime his suggestion that those who 
must remain should be protected from the fury of the pursuing 
foe by administration of a narcotic which should bring about 
painless death. He never denied having taken this view of the 
situation, and at St. Helena he declared himself to his physician 
to be still of the opinion that the measure suggested would have 
been the wisest, and that under similar circumstances he should 
have pursued the same course toward his own son. 

Through Ascalon and Gaza and then for nine long days 
through the burning sands of the desert, the expeditionary 
troops, wofully reduced in number, dragged their weary way; 
a procession smaller in extent but otherwise closely resembling 
that awful retreat from Russia's bitter cold and ice which thir- 
teen years later prefaced the end of the ''Fortune" of the Em- 
peror of the French. Five thousand men had been sacrificed 
without making the shghtest impression upon the Porte. And 
to disperse a Turkish army there was no need for travelling that 
long road of suffering to Mount Tabor. Least of all had any- 
thing been accomplished toward the satiation of the ambition 
of the commander. His chief concern now was that there should 
* Jung: "Bonaparte et son Temps," HI. 290.— B. 



^T. 29] Deceptive Bulletins 147 

be no avowal of the truth. While still before Acre, on the 
10th of May, he had announced to the Directory that his object 
had been attained, the season was growing unfavourable, and 
Egypt demanded his presence; he should return through the 
desert after having demolished the fortress. In another report, 
of May 27th, his statement was that he might have occupied 
the city, but had abstained from doing so on account of the 
plague which, his spies, prisoners, and deserters all concurred in 
testifying, was raging there most frightfully. (What a pity 
that his spies had been so late in making this discovery!) In 
a war bulletin of the 16th of May he announced to the Divan 
of Cairo, an organization of his own creation, that he was bring- 
ing with him a vast number of prisoners and flags, that he had 
razed to the ground the palace of Jezzar, likewise the ramparts 
of Acre, and so bombarded the city as to leave no stone upon 
another; the inhabitants had all fled by way of the sea; Jezzar, 
who was wounded, had retired with his followers into one of 
the forts on the seacoast. He even went so far as to reassure 
his own soldiers with the confidently affirmed falsehood that 
they might have hoped in a few days to overpower the Pasha 
of Syria himself in his palace, but that at this season, with the 
possibiHty of a landing of the Turks in Egypt, the capture of 
Acre would not counterbalance the loss of time spent in the 
effort. When his secretary ventured to protest against this 
distortion of the actual circumstances. Napoleon silenced him 
with the observation that he was a simpleton who tormented 
himself about trifles and had no comprehension of matters of 
this kind. 

Toward the middle of June, the Syrian army, reduced it is 
true to only 8000 men, made its triumphal entry into the capital 
of Egypt. A short time afterward Bonaparte received word 
from Marmont in Alexandria that 100 Turkish ships had ap- 
peared on the 11th of July in the roadstead of Aboukir under 
escort of Sir Sidney Smith and had landed 18,000 men.* The 

* The number fluctuates between 8000 and 18,000 according as the 
statement be made by the EngUsh or by the French. The former is 
certainly too low an estimate, the latter too high in comparison with the 



148 Egypt [1799 

same message had evidently reached Ibrahim and Murad, whom 
Desaix had mitil now kept at a respectful distance; for the former 
now again appeared on the Syrian frontier, while the latter 
made efforts to reach the North with some hundreds of Mame- 
lukes, both with the object of co-operating with the Turkish 
forces just landed. The latter had intrenched themselves tem- 
porarily upon the peninsula of Aboukir, Alexandria being 
fortified by the French. 

Bonaparte determined upon attacking them in this place and 
at the earliest possible moment. Murad was speedily driven 
toward the South, while a close watch was *^ept upon Ibrahim. 
To facihtate the concentration of the French forces, Desaix was 
ordered to evacuate Upper Egypt, while with all other disposable 
troops — numbering about 6000 men, besides a reserve of 2000 
entrusted to Kleber — the commander-in-chief advanced against 
the enemy. It was a hastily conceived plan brilHantly exe- 
cuted on the plain of Aboukir, July 25th, 1799. The plan of 
action in this battle was characteristically Napoleonic — to unite 
all forces before the onslaught, make use of them all in the en- 
gagement, and seek to annihilate his foe; its execution was made 
much easier through the defective order of battle adopted by 
the Turks. The success was complete. The left wing of the 
enemy having been surrounded and driven into the sea, the right 
was made to undergo the same fate. Lannes then succeeded in 
gaining possession of a commanding redoubt which Murat and 
his cavalry, with mad impetuosity, had ridden around and which 
constituted the strongest point of the Turkish centre. That 
also was now forced, and only a few remnants of the Turkish 
forces escaped to the fort on the apex of the little peninsula. 
These were reduced by starvation and forced to capitulate a 
week later. This time Napoleon confined himself strictly to the 
truth in writing to Cairo: "The staff will have acquainted you 
with the outcome of the battle of Aboukir; it is one of the finest 
I have ever witnessed. Of the army landed by the enemy not a 
man has escaped.'* 

number of transport-ships. More than 15,000 men were scarcely to be 
conveyed on 100 transport-vessels. 



^T. 29] French Losses in Europe 149 

In addition to this triumph but one thing more was needed 
to fulfil the requirements of his self-seeking ambition: to be 
assured that he had been correct in the second assumption upon 
which he had based his departure to Egypt — that the war broken 
out meanwhile in Europe should result disastrously to France, 
thus not only increasing his own personal importance, but bringing 
the government at Paris into discredit so that a determined 
soldier who knew how to conquer at this time might with the 
same blow easily acquire the power of the State. And the cer- 
tainty of this condition of affairs Napoleon obtained for himself. 

Since the message which had overtaken him while before 
Acre no other had reached him. He could not know that at the 
end of May, 1799, the French admiral Bruix had received orders 
to unite his squadron with the Spanish fleet to defeat the Eng- 
hsh on the Mediterranean and bring home the expeditionary 
army from Egypt — an enterprise which fell through on account 
of the refusal of the Spanish commander to co-operate. He 
failed also of receiving a letter sent to him on May 26th by the 
Directory notifying him of Bruix's mission and recalling him to 
Europe.* But he heard nevertheless what he needed to know. 
It is almost a certainty that he received occasional tidings from 
his brothers by way of Tunis through the consuls of Genoa and 
Ancona, who were devoted to his interests. And here again 
chance came to his aid. Sir Sidney Smith, who now lay at 

* A passage from this letter signed by three of the Directors runs 
thus: ''The extraordinary efforts just put forth by Austria and Russia, 
the serious and almost alarming turn taken by the war, necessitates to 
the Republic the concentration of all its forces. The Directory has 
accordingly just given command to Admiral Bruix to employ all means 
in his power to make himself master of the Mediterranean and to bear 
toward Egypt for the purpose of bringing back from thence the army 
under your command. He has orders to arrange with you as to the method 
to be employed in effecting its embarkation and transport. It is left' 
to your discretion, Citizen General, to decide whether you can with safety 
leave in Egypt a part of your forces, and you are authorized by the Direc- 
tory in this case to entrust the command to whomsoever you may judge 
fit. The Directory would take pleasure in seeing you at the head of the 
republican armies which you have up to the present time commanded, 
with. so much glory." 



150 Egypt [1799 

anchor before Alexandria and was entering into negotiations 
with Bonaparte in regard to the release of prisoners, took pleasure 
in communicating to him the late defeats suffered by the French 
in Italy, where indeed Scherer had been overcome in April and 
the Cisalpine Republic dissolved. As testimony to the truth of 
his assertions he sent to Bonaparte a package of the most recent 
newspapers, announcing in addition that he was under orders to 
prevent the return of the expeditionary army desired by the 
Directory. Nothing more was needed to determine Napoleon's 
immediate execution of the plan long before resolved upon. In 
the words with which he announced his decision to Marmont may 
be found the entire plan by which his actions were to be directed 
during the ensuing months: "I have determined upon taking 
my departure for France, and I count upon taking you with me. 
The state of affairs in Europe forces me to this momentous step ; 
reverses have overwhelmed our armies, and Heaven knows to 
what point the enemy may have already advanced. Italy is 
lost, and the reward of so many efforts, of so much bloodshed, 
escapes us. And what, in truth, is the use of these incapables put 
at the head of affairs? There is nothing but ignorance, stupidity, 
or corruption amongst them. It is I, I alone, who have borne 
the burden and by means of constant victory given strength to 
this government, which without me would never have been able 
to lift its head and support itself. As soon as I was gone every- 
thing had to collapse. Do not let us wait until the destruction 
be complete. . . . The news of my arrival and of the destruc- 
tion of the Turkish army at Aboukir will be heard in France 
almost at the same moment. My presence, in raising their 
spirits, will restore to the army the confidence which it lacks, 
and to good citizens the hope of a brighter future." 

His intentions were confided to but a few trusted men and 
concealed from most of the generals. With the utmost secrecy 
also were the two frigates at anchor in the harbour of Alexandria 
fitted out for the voyage. Sir Sidney Smith, to whom it was 
apparently inconceivable that the commander-in-chief should 
return to France without this army, had left the roadstead for a 
short time to renew his supply of water at Cyprus. Hardly had he 



^T. 30] Napoleon's Decision to Return 151 

taken his departure before Napoleon profited by this new favour 
of fortune and made his way out to sea during the night of August 
21st, accompanied by only a few devoted adherents, Lannes, 
Marmont, Murat, Monge, Berthollet, and a few hundred soldiers of 
the guard. To the gallant Kleber, whose inconsiderate frankness 
had made him obnoxious to Napoleon, was left, by written order, 
the command of the army remaining in Egypt. 

The fact does not appear to have been taken into considera- 
tion by Napoleon that honour required his continuance with the 
troops which had been entrusted to his leading and which had 
courageously shed their blood in the furtherance of his own 
ambitious designs. And yet it is scarcely admissible to accuse 
him of abandonment of the army, nor — as has even been done — 
of desertion. His position toward the Directory was without 
question exceptional. At the time of his departure for Egypt it 
was understood that he was to return during the autumn of 
1798 to resume command of the Army of England. This was 
not to be the case with the entire expeditionary corps, since it 
was the plan also to found a colony and to organize plantations 
which would require perpetual protection. The letter of No- 
vember 4th, 1798, from the National authorities at Paris, re- 
ceived while besieging Acre and which has been before cited, left 
him entire freedom in his decisions. He himself had repeatedly 
and openly announced his approaching return to France, which 
he would certainly not have done had it been directly contra- 
dictory to instructions. But it is equally certain that in taking 
this step he was acting only out of regard for his personal ambi- 
tion and interests. For neither of these was anything further to 
be acquired in Egypt and everything to be lost. The situation 
of the expeditionary army must inevitably grow more and more 
critical, and in announcing that he left it just after a victory in 
the field which would long protect it from molestation his state- 
ments did not wholly coincide with the truth. He kept silence 
upon one point which he afterwards divulged at St. Helena: 
that he was already convinced from the moment of the loss of 
the fleet at Aboukir that expedition could end only in catastrophe, 
since any army which cannot be recruited must eventually 



152 Egypt [1799 

capitulate. He also prudently refrained from communicating 
what was revealed by the honest Kl^ber in a letter to Talleyrand : 
that the army, already reduced by one half, was suffering for 
the want of munitions and clothing; that the population of 
Egypt, roused by the Sultan against the Christians, was ready at 
any moment to rise in revolt; that an advance of new Turkish 
forces was threatening, and that Alexandria was almost defence- 
less, since the heavy artillery had been lost in the Syrian campaign 
and the remainder of the equipment used in fitting out Napo- 
leon's two frigates ; finally, that the distress of the situation was 
aggravated by a grievous lack of money, since the arrears of pay 
to the troops now amounted to 4,000,000 francs, and Napoleon 
had left nothing but debts with not a single sou in the treasury. 
Much has been said of the courage shown by Napoleon in 
exposing himself to the dangers of a voyage upon the Mediterra- 
nean, infested as it was by ships of the enemy. But it may be 
questioned whether it would not have required greater courage 
to remain under such desperate circumstances. And in this 
courage Napoleon would not have been found wanting if his 
ambitious schemes had not impelled him to make this effort 
toward the acquisition of supreme power in France. Of these 
schemes the distinguishing features had long been determined 
upon, nor was there any lack of devoted adherents, so that even 
before the expedition to the Orient they had been on the point 
of realization by means of a Coup d'Etat. The Army of the 
Orient was composed almost exclusively of fervent republicans. 
He felt not the least pang in separating himself from it; it suited 
him perhaps better to know that it would be far from France at 
the moment when his designs were to be executed. During the 
campaign in Italy Napoleon had already obeyed only his own 
impulses, regarded himself as sovereign in conquered countries, 
and negotiated and concluded the treaties of Leoben and Campo 
Formio by which France had been bound. Here in Egypt, 
where even more than before he acted as his own master, his 
spirit of domination had found new sustenance and his yearning 
desire to become the head of an independent government had 
struck, deeper root than ever into his character. He coiild. 



Mt.30] Napoleon's Desire to Rule 153 

scarcely think of himself any longer as without a crown. Only 
it seemed to him manifestly easier to pluck it from the withered 
liberty-tree of the Revolution than to disinter it from the endless 
sands of the desert. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE COUP D'JETAT AND THE CONSULATE 

At that time, when everything depended upon wind and 
weather alone, a voyage to or from Egypt was a question of 
the season. From the beginning of spring until autumn it was 
an easy matter, driven by the constant northwest wind, to 
reach Alexandria from Toulon, but just so much the more 
difficult to make the trip in the opposite direction. It was, 
therefore, no favourable season for a journey to France when 
the two frigates, ^^Muiron" and ^^Carrere", with Bonaparte 
upon the former, left the Egyptian harbour. Only for the 
sake of eluding the vigilant watch of Sir Sidney Smith had 
they put to sea in August. The contrary wind compelled the 
two ships to give up the direct course to Toulon and to sail 
along the north coast of Africa. Their progress was scarcely 
to be designated as such. A number of times they were driven 
back ten miles during the day and only regained their former 
position by night when the breezes blew from the shore. Not 
less than three weeks were thus consumed by the impatient 
travellers before they arrived off the Carthaginian headlands, 
in constant anxiety of being attacked from the rear by the 
enemy. But the real danger began only when the wind at 
last turned to the advantage of the homeward bound. The 
narrow passage between Sicily and Tunis had to be passed, and 
this was guarded by an Enghsh cruiser belonging to Nelson's 
fleet, which was at anchor off Syracuse. Should the frigates 
be discovered by this vessel, it would be a very short time 
before the dreaded admiral would be in pursuit. Fortunately 
they succeeded in passing the scout at night with lights ex- 
tinguished, and now directed their course toward the north 
along the west coast of Sardinia as far as Corsica, which they 

154 



.Et. 30] Changes in Paris 155 

reached in the beginning of October. And here they were 
again detained for several days by a return of the northwest 
wind to the vexation of Napoleon, who was overrun in Ajaccio 
by cousins and godparents and every one who could claim 
relationship of any kind. He was totally unmoved by every- 
thing except the meeting with his old nurse, who hailed him 
eagerly as ''caro figlio." He showed to his companions, not 
without a certain pride, the former estates of the Bonapartes, 
and hunted with them in the adjoining thickets. This was the 
last time that he ever saw his native island. 

As if his programme were to be literally carried out, he 
learned in Ajaccio that the French armies had suffered new 
reverses, that on June 19th a battle had been lost on the Trebbia, 
and on August 15th another at Novi, and that Joubert had been 
killed. But something else which he learned was of still greater 
importance to him: that the Directory had succumbed after 
a struggle with the legislative bodies in June (the 30th Prairial), 
and had been compelled to admit new members, among them 
Sieyes. It is well known that Napoleon's confidence in the 
abbe was great, and these tidings consequently could not but 
be reassuring to him. They induced him to change his plan 
for the rest of the voyage. It had been his intention to hasten 
at once to the theatre of war in Italy, there to assume the su- 
preme command, and having by new victories ingratiated him- 
self with the people of France, as their deliverer in the hour of 
need, to present himself before the Directory with all the weight 
of his renown. This plan being now abandoned, he put forth 
all efforts to reach the capital. The circuitous route by way 
of the battle-field seemed now only a loss of time. 

But first of all it was indispensable to reach the shores of 
France, and this was to be more difficult than had been fore- 
seen, now that, after having passed through so many dangers, 
they were so near the goal. A favourable wind had at last 
carried them away from Corsica, and on the 8th of October 
they were already in sight of the islands of Hyeres and saiHng 
toward Toulon, when suddenly at sundown an English squad- 
ron was made out bearing directly upon their course. The 



156 Coup d*Etat and Consulate [i709 

critical moment was at hand, for the Enghshmen had also 
observed the frigates and began to give chase. The French 
admiral attempted to turn back toward Corsica, but Napoleon 
gave orders to veer again to the north and continue in their 
course. He was resolved in case of necessity to throw himself 
into a small boat carried by the ship, and to attempt an escape 
to land alone. And once again was his courage rewarded by 
success. The English were misled in the distance by the ap- 
parent direction of the sails, and fancied them to be steering 
in a northwesterly direction. Under this mistaken impression 
they pressed rapidly forward. Nightfall prevented them from 
discovering their error until too late. The frigates escaped 
thus narrowly, and the following morning, October 9th, found 
them safely at anchor in the harbour of Frejus. 

The tidings of Bonaparte's return was spread in a moment 
throughout the town. At once the sea was covered with craft 
which, regardless of the danger of pestilence, escorted the hon- 
oured general to land. Here, as in Ajaccio, the question of 
quarantine was entirely set aside, affording no small gain in 
time to Napoleon, and what must have seemed to him of still 
greater consequence was the inference to be drawn from this 
enthusiastic reception that the public mind had become most 
favourably disposed toward himself. It is even related by 
Marmont that he was publicly greeted by a club-orator with 
the words: "Only go and beat the enemy. General, and drive 
him away, and then we will make you king if you so desire!" 

After a few hours of repose he pursued his journey without 
stop as far as Aix, whence he sent on a messenger to the Direc- 
tory to announce his arrival. Every word of his letter was 
carefully weighed. It opened with the statement that the 
General had received the communication sent by the govern- 
ment on November 4th of the previous year, and had concluded 
from it that war was about to break out on the Continent. 
That if he had not at once put himself at their disposal the 
incursion of the Turks was to blame, since they had first to be 
overcome before he might think of return. He should have 
ventured to make the voyage home whatever the circumstances 



/Et. 30] Napoleon's Welcome 157 

even had it been possible only '^ in a small boat and wrapped in 
a mantle." He, of course, asserted in the letter that he had 
left Egypt perfectly organized, nor did he fail to take precau- 
tions that the arrival of the courier should precede his own 
but by a very short interval. 

He travelled rapidly after leaving Aix. The journey was 
a veritable triumphal procession. His companions can hardly 
find words to describe the enthusiastic reception accorded along 
the entire route between Lyons and Paris. The cities vied 
with each other in tokens of homage to the man in whom they 
saw not so much the conqueror of the foreign enemy as the 
deliverer in time of need from intestinal dissension, the saviour 
from the dilemma of having to choose between anarchy and the 
Bourbons, the man who was to raise the country from the state 
of utter despondency into which it had fallen. And this feeling 
was not confined to the provincial towns. At the capital also 
the same effect was produced by the tidings of his return, in 
the possibility of which faith had ceased to exist. When it 
became known the news was greeted with a wild outbreak of 
joy. Since the beginning of the Revolution never had the 
hopes of every one been so fastened upon a single name as now 
when the end of political upheaval was so ardently desired. 
And yet this was the same people who a year and a half before 
had with no very great regret seen this same man sail away 
to take part in a dangerous adventure! What was it which 
had brought about this rapid and complete change in the popu- 
lar feeling and realized the hopes of Napoleon based upon it? 
The answer to this question is to be found in the events which 
had taken place in France during his absence. These must be 
more carefully considered. 

After the Coup d'Etat of the 18th Fructidor the Directory 
had sought to protect itself against a recurrence of the danger 
of being driven from power by the conservative elements of 
the populace, and had for this purpose resorted to the same 
means by which the rule of the Radical minority over France 
had once before been made possible. It had established a 
tyrannical dictatorship which stopped the mouth of the oppos- 



158 Coup d'Etat and Consulate [1799 

ing press, proscribed nobility and clergy, and compelled more 
than 100,000 men of means to emigrate, while rendering 
almost valueless by means of forced loans the possessions of 
those who remained; it had scaled down the public debt one 
third, deported to the colonies political opponents, and called 
forth into prominence those elements which had been fright- 
ened away by the events of the 9th Thermidor: and this des- 
potic rule was expected to insure to the Directors the contin- 
uance of their power. In order that they and their creatures 
might remain in supremacy these men, Barras, Rewbell, and 
Larevelliere-Lepeaux crushed millions of people into timid 
subjection; in order to assure great revenues to themselves 
and their followers they ruined property throughout the 
country. 

But soon the Directory had to recognize that the Radicals, 
its allies of the 18th Fructidor, might become quite as dangerous 
opponents as the Conservatives and the Monarchists. The 
more quiet and peaceable elements of the population had indeed 
been conquered, but the sympathizers with the system of ter- 
rorization pushed themselves only so much the more boldly 
into the foreground. 

Although forbidden by law, numerous Jacobin clubs were 
organized and confederated with one another, and these by 
resort to the old methods of intimidation were successful in con- 
trolhng the elections in the spring of 1798, at which a third of 
the Council of Five Hundred was to be chosen. The vanquished 
Conservatives stayed away from the polls, and the adherents of 
the Directory, who had separated themselves from the Jacobins, 
were left in a minority with their candidates. The rule of the 
Directory was consequently as seriously endangered now through 
the preponderance of infuriated members in the legislature as it 
had been a year before through that of the Conservatives. But 
the Directors knew a remedy which might perhaps be of avail; 
it had proved efficacious in the preceding summer and should 
again be made useful : this was the violation of the Constitution 
on the part of the government. Instead of annuUing the elections 
and appointing new ones, on the ground that these were illegal 



Mt.so] The Plight of the Directory 159 

since intimidation had been practised upon the voters, the Direc- 
tory induced the Five Hundred to confirm the elections of the 
members of the minority devoted to the existing government, and 
to exclude sixty Radical deputies (May 11th, 1798; 22d Floreal). 
All that had been gained by this measure was that the govern- 
ment ceased from this moment to be sustained by either of the 
two great parties. The Conservatives detested it and had been 
its sworn enemies ever since the 18th Fructidor; since the 22d 
Floreal the Jacobins had become equally antagonistic. Its exist- 
ence was assured only so long as the army yielded obedience to 
its commands. But party division began to affect the generals; 
Moreau, for example, was a Conservative, while Jourdan was a 
Jacobin; among officers and privates alike the antipathy to this 
government of lawyers was becoming pronounced, so that the 
situation of the administration was liable to become precarious if 
war did not soon break out on the Continent to give another direc- 
tion to the attention of these various dissatisfied elements. 

And measures had been taken which would prevent the possi- 
biUty of its being longer delayed. The peace-party had been 
overcome on the 18th Fructidor, just as it had been before on the 
13th Vendemiaire. The abrupt discontinuance of negotiations 
with England which followed, the arrogant demands of the 
envoys at Rastatt, the defiant attitude of Bernadotte in Vienna, 
the revolts against the legitimate powers in Italy and Switzer- 
land, the instigation of repubhcan propaganda in Southern Ger- 
many, and the encroachments in the Orient, — all these could not 
but lead to a new and tremendous conflagration in Europe which 
would give employment to all the forces of France and would 
prolong the rule of those in power. 

And first of all there arose in Russia an inexorable enemy. 
For the unconcealed support given by the Republic to the Poles, 
the occupation of the Ionian Isles, the secret alliance with the 
turbulent elements on the Balkan peninsula, the expedition to 
the Levant and particularly the seizure of Malta, whose Order 
of Knights had but recently put themselves under the protec- 
torate of the Czar, combined to make Paul I. an adversary of 
France and the champion of hereditary monarchy threatened 



i6o Coup d'Etat and Consulate [i799 

and combated by the Republic and its agents. He concluded 
treaties of alliance with England and Turkey, whose hostility 
also had been incurred by the encroachments of the French, and 
urged immediate attack. England on her part induced the 
King of Naples as early as November, 1798, to open hostihties 
against the French who were in possession of the States of the 
Church — a premature and hazardous attempt which failed 
miserably— with the result that the French forces under General 
Macdonald penetrated as far as Naples, compelled the flight of 
the king into Sicily, and founded the ''Parthenopean RepubUc." 
This was one more step toward the complete ascendency of 
France in Italy, and the blow was nowhere more keenly felt than 
in Vienna, whose court was linked by kindred with that of Naples 
and had made the loan of one of its generals (Mack) to command 
the Neapohtan army. From the time of the departure of the 
French ambassador, Bemadotte, from Vienna all relations be- 
tween Austria and France had been broken off, nor were the 
conferences held at Selz between Cobenzl and Frangois de Neuf- 
chateau, the former Director, able to bring about their renewal. 
The outbreak of hostilities was no longer anything but a ques- 
tion of weeks, when Austria also made an agreement with Russia 
and a corps of Russian auxiliary troops marched into GaUcia. 
And when the French demanded the withdrawal of these northern 
troops, stating that non-compliance with this requisition would be 
regarded as cause for war, the last hope of maintenance of peace 
was at an end. The Russians continued to advance, and Thugut 
paid not the slightest attention to the menaces of France. Early 
in March the French crossed the Rhine, the Austrians under Arch- 
duke Charles passed to the other side of the Lech, and on March 
12th. 1799, France declared war against the power on the Danube, 
hostilities being at once begun. To add to the gloom of the 
situation the congress at Rastatt came to a tragic end: on 
March 28th the French envoys in taking their departure from 
the town were attacked by Austrian hussars and massacred 
with the exception of one man. It may have been through a 
misunderstanding of orders or it may have been due to some 
other motive as yet unexplained. 



^T. 30] Weakness of the French Army 1 6 1 

It would be reasonable to suppose that the Directory which 
had by its poUcy provoked this war would have been fully 
armed so as to be perfectly prepared to meet the danger. But 
it now became evident how disastrous was the reaction upon 
public affairs of the system of personal government. Under 
this wretched administration the finances had at length reached 
a condition of total disorder, and the contributions levied in 
neighbouring countries did not suffice to make up the deficit. 
The army, upon whose ranks the government depended at all 
times as a last resort, stood in need of the energetic and watchful 
care of the banished Carnot, and its best commander tarried 
far away in the East. It is true that in September, 1798, the 
institution of conscription had been established, and according 
to the law all Frenchmen between the ages of twenty and twenty- 
five years were to serve in the army divided into five classes, 
but this law had been but imperfectly carried out. In Italy 
not more than 50,000 men could be opposed to the Austrians, 
and in Southern Germany not more than 40,000. The troops 
were ill-armed, and the commissariat in the hands of speculators 
who were in no wise more conscientious than the government. 
Besides these drawbacks a difference of opinion prevailed in the 
Directory as to what generals should be put in command. Among 
these, certain ones, hke Joubert, had quarrelled with the govern- 
ment commissioners who accompanied the armies; others, such 
as Moreau, were too conservative ; the outcome of it was that to 
the old and incompetent Scherer had eventually to be assigned 
the important supreme command in Italy. 

The adversary came into the field far better equipped. 
Austria unassisted had the advantage in point of numbers upon 
the three fields of operation, Suabia, Switzerland, and upper 
Italy; she had in Archduke Charles an able leader, and in the 
Russians under the vaHant Suvaroff a powerful support and 
helper. And the result was inevitable. Jourdan, who had 
advanced to the Danube, was defeated at Osterach and Stockach 
by the Archduke before the end of March, 1799, and forced back 
to the Rhine; Massena, who had begun by victoriously pushing 
his way eastward from Switzerland, was checked at Feldkirch, 



1 62 Coup d'Etat and Consulate [1799 

while Scherer was met by the Austrians under Kray at Mag- 
nano in the Cisalpine Republic and thrown back behind the 
Adda. 

And what Scherer had been unable to accomplish against the 
Austrians alone, his successor, Moreau, was still less able to do 
against the united Austro-Russian armies under Suvaroff. At 
Cassano on the Adda he underwent a decisive defeat, on April 
27th, 1799, which opened to the northern conqueror the gates of 
Milan and Turin and caused the Cisalpine Republic to vanish. 
Austria again entered into possession of Lombardy, supported 
by a flood of conservative feeling among the population which 
everywhere drove the Democrats from their positions. The for- 
tresses alone remained in the hands of the French. Through a 
victory of the Archduke over Massena at Zurich on June 4th a 
third of Switzerland soon after fell into the hands of the Austrians. 
These occurrences compelled Macdonald to evacuate Naples and 
march toward the north, and with his departure the Parthenopean 
Republic was at the same time brought to an end. The only 
hope of recovering what had been lost now lay in Macdonald's 
effecting a junction of forces with those which Moreau had been 
able to withdraw to the Genoese Riviera and, with these rein- 
forcements, winning a victory. But this attempt also was 
doomed to failure. Even before the projected union could take 
place Macdonald's army was attacked by the Russians in a 
furious onslaught and defeated in the three days' battle on the 
Trebbia, June 17th-19th. The loss of the French was severe, 
and they were compelled to retreat beyond the Apennines. This 
disaster was followed in a few weeks by the capitulation of Man- 
tua, for the sake of which so much blood had flowed two years 
before. 

A natural consequence of these losses in the field was a 
diminution of respect for the Directory throughout France. The 
war had, it is true, two years before secured in its position of 
power a most unpopular government. But then there had been 
a series of victories won by a general who had adopted as his 
own the government's policy of expansion and conquest, while 
now the reputation of the army was being constantly dimin- 



.Et. 30] Changes in the Directory 163 

ished by a succession of defeats, under commanders, moreover, 
in no political sympathy with the leaders of the government. 
It is consequently not surprising that the elections in the 
spring of 1799 should bring to the Directory new discomfiture 
such as they were not able to recover from as heretofore by 
the use of force. It was also a sign of the general mistrust 
that when, in accordance with the law, one of the Directors 
had to retire, the man chosen to take his place was one well 
known to have shown opposition as a member of the Convention 
to the Constitution of the year III, and to be ambitious of 
providing France with a better one; this was the abbe Sieyes, 
the same man to whom Napoleon had confided, through Talley- 
rand, his ideas upon the framing of a constitution. Barras, 
who was entirely without principles, at once attached himself 
to the popular abbe, with the result that there arose, as in 1797, 
a minority in the Directory (Sieyes and Barras against Treilhard, 
LareveUiere, and Merlin), corresponding with a majority in the 
Chambers opposed to the existing government ; hence came new 
contentions. In face of the defeats abroad the majority in the 
Directory could no longer think of attempting a Coup d'Etat as 
on a former occasion; they were obliged to confront their 
adversaries in the legislature, who, attacking them upon their 
weak point, the financial disorder, succeeded in overthrowing 
the detested three. On June 18th, 1799 (30th Prairial), they 
retired, their places being filled by two pronounced Radicals 
(Gohier and Mouhns), and a partisan of Sieyes (Roger-Ducos). 
Thus the party of the latter obtained a majority in the Direc- 
tory.* 

This overthrow of the government had been the work of a 
coalition between the two great parties making up the Five 
Hundred, the Radicals, all branches of which were classed 
together under the denomination of Jacobins, and the Moderate 
Republicans under the leadership of Boulay de la Meurthe, to 
which party belonged Napoleon's brothers, Lucien and Joseph. 
This alliance was, however, at once dissolved upon the accom- 

* The Constitution required for the validation of an act of the gov- 
ernment the signatures of at least three of the members of the Directory. 



164 Coup d'Etat and Consulate [1799 

plishment of its object. ^ The Moderates being now in power, 
since they were in the majority in the Directory (with Sieyes, 
Ducos, and Barras), the Jacobins joined themselves to the 
opposition. At first they were so upheld by the neutral mem- 
bers that they succeeded in enacting a forced loan to be levied 
upon the wealthy, and a law against the nobility who were to 
serve as hostages in the Royalist departments of France. Elated 
by these successes, they, contrary to law, reopened their club in 
Paris, they proposed a succession of radical measures to the 
effect that children should be brought up in common, that public 
workshops should be opened for the benefit of the poor, that the 
people should have the right to form federations, and demanded 
further the re-establishment of the old Convention and public 
declaration that the country was in danger, in order to introduce 
by this means a government similar to that of 1793; but here 
their allies abandoned them and they found themselves in the 
minority. Sieyes could now venture to close their club and to 
organize a system of strict surveillance, which he entrusted to 
a former member of the Convention, Fouche, with the title of 
Minister of Police. 

To Sieyes the essential thing now was to secure in the army 
a support upon which he could rely, and his first care had to be 
to establish his influence by means of decisive successes gained 
at the theatre of war. Accordingly the equipment of troops 
was vigorously advanced during July, and the young General 
Joubert put in the place of Moreau in command of the Army of 
Italy. Should he be victorious in his encounter with the enemy, 
it was more than possible that he could be made by the Director 
a very useful instrument for effecting a change in affairs of the 
interior. But Sieyes was destined to be no more fortunate than 
his predecessors. The reinforcements which Joubert took with 
him to the Genoese Riviera were insufficient to support him in 
withstanding the allied Austrians and Russians. He also was 
defeated by Suvaroff. In the bloody battle of Novi, on the 
Bormida (August 15th, 1799), the Repubhc lost 12,000 men, 
Joubert his life, and Sieyes his prestige. 

One person only profited thereby. It was the man whose 



/Et. 30] Basis of Napoleon's Popularity 165 

name, as he had foreseen, would be recalled by every one upon 
the discomfiture of the French armies. "Where," the people 
began to ask, "was the victor of former days? Why was he 
not at hand? Where were the thousands he led away? Was 
it really better for the interests of the country that its sons 
should shed their blood far away upon the sands of the desert, 
while at home upon the scenes of former triumphs the fame of 
the nation was suffering disgrace?" The unseated govern- 
ment was accused of having "deported" the general, the radical 
opposition even demanded that the former Directors be brought 
to judgment upon this charge and inveighed against those now 
in power for abandoning to their fate the members of the ex- 
pedition.* Talleyrand was forced to resign his position as 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and tried to justify himself by 
asserting that it was not he but his predecessor who had pro- 
posed the expedition to Egypt. Formerly, in 1798, when public 
opinion still connected Napoleon with the detested Directory, 
he could acquire but Httle popularity despite his victories; but 
now that he was considered to be in opposition to the govern- 
ment and to be as it were the victim of its self-seeking policy, 
he became the favourite of the people and the ideal of millions 
belonging to no party who desired quiet and order and a vigorous 
government which should put an end to the perpetual changes 
in the organic laws of France and to the horrible confusion of 
the administration, that the land might have peace and the 
citizens enjoy the wholesome fruits of the Revolution. To 
them Napoleon was not merely the tried conqueror who could 
defeat the enemy, but still more the man of energetic purpose 
who could suppress anarchy. This was the reason why his 
return was greeted everywhere by such boundless enthusiasm 
and why his popularity did not abate when it became known 
that in the last days of September the Russians and Austrians 
had been defeated in Switzerland by Massena, that the EngHsh 
had suffered in like manner at the hands of Brune in Holland 

* Lucien and Josephine did all in their power to foster the idea that 
the Directory had sent Napoleon upon the expedition in order to rid itself 
of him. 



1 66 Coup d'Etat and Consulate [1799 

early in October, that the Coahtion had been ruptured, and 
danger to France from every foreign foe had vanished. Napo- 
leon had no longer any need for fresh triumphs on the field to 
prepare the way for him, the cherished favourite of the people, 
before proceeding to extreme measures. He had not been 
mistaken when he had before his departure expressed to his 
brother the conviction that he should be " surer of public opinion" 
upon his return.* This had been lacking to him a year and a 
half earlier when a Coup d'Etat had been under consideration; 
now that this had been secured nothing should prevent him 
from putting his ambitious schemes into execution. 

When, in 1803, Napoleon was telling Madame de Remusat 
of his past hfe and came to the time following the Egyptian 
expedition, he said: "The Directory trembled at my return; 
I kept a careful watch upon myself; it was one of the periods 
in my life when I acted most skilfully. I saw the abbe Sieyes 
and promised to put into execution his wordy constitution; 
I received the leaders of the Jacobins and the agents of the 
Bourbons; I refused advice to no one, but I gave only such as 
was to the interest of my plans. I concealed myself from the 
people because I knew that when the time came curiosity to 
see me would throw them at my feet. Every one fell into my 
snare, and when I became the head of the State, there was not 
a party in all France which had not some hope based upon my 
success." 

Bonaparte did in fact act the part of an impartial man, but he 
nevertheless followed in reality a well-defined plan in his compli- 
cated system of dissimulation and intrigue. His object was 
power, that point was settled. Only the means by which to 
acquire it could need consideration. The readiest way would 
have been to get himself elected Director. But when for the 
sake of appearances he sounded the presiding Director Gohier, a 
zealous and honest Jacobin with that political narrow-minded- 
ness which at one time constituted the strength of his party, the 
latter referred him to the Constitution which excluded men under 
forty years of age from the Directory. This provision was but too 

* See page 126. 



^T. 30] The Plan of the Coup d'Etat 167 

well known to Napoleon. Once before it had presented itself as 
an obstacle in his way, and the thought had long been maturing 
in his mind of overthrowing this embarrassing Constitution. 
Nothing was more natural than that he should now join with 
those who were likewise planning to make an end of it. Sieyes 
was foremost amongst these. Since his outline of a constitution 
had been declined in 1795, the abbe had ostentatiously kept 
aloof from the government. Not until 1799 did he take a lead- 
ing position, for he believed the time now come for him to put 
an end, by means of his Constitution, to the general discontent 
with existing conditions and to prove himself thus the saviour of 
his country. And the encroachments of the Jacobins seemed 
about to hasten the realization of his plans. Sieyes found secret 
support in the moderate Republicans in both Chambers who 
styled themselves '' Reformists"; among these belonged Lucien 
Bonaparte. An agreement was reached upon the following 
points: In order to strengthen the executive power the five 
Directors should be replaced by three Consuls elected for a 
term of ten years; beside these there should be a Senate with 
life-membership and a Chamber of Deputies eleeted by universal 
suffrage. In order to have this Constitution adopted the Council 
of Ancients, a majority of whom had been won over, was to decree 
the transfer of the two legislative bodies to a place outside the 
capital so that the Jacobin opposition in the Council of Five 
Hundred should be separated from their following in the suburbs, 
x^rticles 102-104 of the Constitution of the year III. conferred 
upon the first Council the power to take this measure. Once 
assembled outside of Paris the Ancients would recommend Sieyes' 
proposition to the Five Hundred, win over to it the neutral 
element among them, and finally cause the new Constitution to 
be sanctioned by a plebiscite. Every step in this plan was clear 
but one. Would the Council of Five Hundred consent without 
opposition to the decree of the Ancients and leave Paris ? Its 
refusal to comply might be a dangerous matter, the more so 
since Generals Jourdan, Augereau, and Bernadotte were all 
numbered among the Radical deputies. A soldier of renown 
was needed to whom the execution of this measure could be en- 



1 68 Coup d'Etat and Consulate [1799 

trusted. Sieyes had undoubtedly counted at first upon Joubert, 
and after his death upon Moreau, who seemed to him the right 
instrument since he was devoid of all political ambition, his 
aspirations being entirely mihtary; he summoned the General 
to Paris. But at the same time with Moreau, Bonaparte entered 
the capital, the former in perfect silence, the latter surrounded 
by the acclamations of milUons; the one defeated, the other as 
conqueror; and Sieyes could not hesitate as to which of these 
soldiers he should confide the execution of his project. He 
had to choose Napoleon even at the risk of being overshadowed 
by him. 

Immediately upon his arrival Napoleon was made acquainted 
through Lucien with the contemplated reform, and expressed 
himself as in sympathy with it. He himself stood in need of a 
new Constitution in order to come into power, and Sieyes was in 
want of a general esteenied by the army to establish his Consti- 
tution. This was the pivot about which the destinies of France 
at that time revolved. Talleyrand, who was desirous of regain- 
ing favour with Napoleon, assumed the task of bringing the two 
men into relations, and on November 1st they met secretly at 
the house of Lucien. Bonaparte was not in favour of submitting 
the new Constitution to the Chambers at once in the form given 
it by Sieyes, but expressed a desire to entrust it first to a com- 
mission of Deputies for examination and meanwhile to have all 
energies bent upon obtaining the establishment of a provisional 
government to be composed of Sieyes, Roger-Ducos, and himself. 
Sieyes was obliged to consent whether or no. He recognized 
that his role of saving genius was at an end from the moment 
that his Constitution should have to undergo examination by a 
committee, and it was no less clear to him that in a provisional 
government with Bonaparte as colleague he could have no hope 
of obtaining the foremost place. But it was too late to with- 
draw.* 

* After a dinner at which Sieyes met Joseph Bonaparte and the Dep- 
uty Cabanis, who was in the secret, he said to them: "I am going to join 
forces with General Bonaparte because o^ all our military men he is the 
most of a civilian; nevertheless I am aware of what is before me: success 
attained, the General will do like this to his two colleagues," whereupon 



^T. 30] Generals of the Army Sounded 169 

Sieyes and Bonaparte met again on November 6th, after a 
banquet given by the Chambers in honour of Moreau and Bona- 
parte at which the latter proposed the toast, "The unity of all 
Frenchmen," and at this time the fmal arrangements were dis- 
cussed. The abbe had brought with him a draft which he had 
already made of the decrees to be issued by the Ancients. The 
first convoked the Chambers at St. Cloud, the second appointed 
Napoleon to supreme command of all troops, and a third pro- 
posed him with Roger-Ducos and Sieyes as provisional Consuls. 
Each Chamber was to appoint a special committee to pass upon 
the Constitution and adjourn for three months. The action 
was to be taken on the 18th Brumaire (November 9th). 

During the ensuing days Napoleon sounded the generals 
and officers. Several regiments of the Paris garrison had for- 
merly served under him in the Italian army, the officers' positions 
in the National Guard had been for the most part of his be- 
stowal while General of the Army of the Interior after the 13th 
Vend^miaire; inclination and discipline would assure to him 
the fidelity of the troops who idoHzed the "little corporal." Of 
the generals only Jourdan and Augereau held themselves at a 
distance; Bernadotte, who, as he wrote to Lucien in 1804, might 
easily have roused the suburbs to opposition, yielded to the 
sohcitations of Joseph, whose brother-in-law he had recently 
become; Moreau simply obeyed the man in supreme command. 
Possibly he took this course because he hoped, as has been 
affirmed, that, the illustrious general having once been made 
the head of the government, he should no longer have him as a 
rival at the head of the army; or it may have been, as he himself 
assured Napoleon at a later date, because he firmly beHeved 
that this audacious adventurer would be overthrown six weeks 
after the event.* 

he stepped suddenly between Joseph and Cabanis and threw them by a 
powerful swing of his arms into the chimney-corner and stood alone in 
the middle of the room. Napoleon, to whom Joseph related the scene, 
was much amused and laughingly exclaimed: "Long live the witty! This 
augurs well." 

* See the letter of General Willot of October 30th, 1809, in Boulay 
de la Meurthe's "Les dernieres amines du Due d'Enghien," p. 293. 



170 Coup d'Etat and Consulate [1799 

Meanwhile Sieyes and his confidants were taking the last 
steps to make sure of the Council of the Ancients. A threat- 
ening outbreak of the Jacobins was used as a bugbear to win over 
those who wavered. Those deputies who could not be counted 
upon were, through the connivance of the hall-inspectors, kept 
away from the decisive session, some being summoned at a later 
hour and some not at all. 

On November 9th (18th Brumaire), at seven o'clock in the 
morning, the Ancients assembled. Regnier, who had been taken 
into confidence, at once took the floor to make the following 
motion: ''The Council of the Ancients, in accordance with 
Articles 102, 103, and 104, decrees : 1st. That the Legislature be 
transferred to the commune of St. Cloud, where both Councils 
will hold session in the two wings of the palace. 2d. That they 
will there assemble to-morrow, the 19th Brumaire (November 
10th), at noon. All continuation of functions or deliberation 
is prohibited elsewhere and until that time. 3d. That General 
Bonaparte be charged with the execution of the present decree. 
He will take all the necessary measures to protect the National 
Republic. The general in command of the seventeenth division, 
the guard of the Legislative Body, the National Guards and the 
regular troops in Paris, in the constitutional arrondissement, 
and in the whole seventeenth division are put directly under his 
orders and are bound to recognize him as commander. Every 
citizen will be required to render him assistance upon demand. 
4th. That General Bonaparte be summoned to appear before 
the Council of the Ancients to receive a copy of the present decree 
and to take the oath. 5th. That this decree shall be at once 
communicated to the Council of the Five Hundred and to the 
Directory. That it shall be printed and promulgated through- 
out the length and breadth of the Republic by means of special 
messengers.* The motion was carried unanimously and a mani- 



* The Articles of the Constitution of 1795 upon which the Ancients 
relied for their authority in this matter were the following : "Article 102. 
The Council of the Ancients may change the place of meeting of the 
Legislative Body. It shall, in such case, indicate another place and 



Mt.so] Napoleon to the Ancients 171 

festo to the nation was decided upon in like manner, announcing 
that the Council of the Ancients had decreed these measures in 
order to control the factions which wanted to tyrannize over the 
National Representatives and for the sake of securing peace 
within the country. 

While the Council of Ancients was thus engaged Bonaparte, 
surrounded by officers and generals, was awaiting at home his 
nomination. As soon as it had been delivered to him he mounted 
his horse and proceeded with a numerous retinue to the Tuileries, 
where he entered the hall in which sat the Council of the Ancients 
in order to take the required oath. Here he made a short 
address in his accustomed tone of command and closing with 
the following words: "Your wisdom has passed this decree; 
our arms will find a way to execute it. We are desirous of a 
Republic founded upon true civil liberty, upon representation 
of the people. And we shall have it, I swear it; I swear it in 
my own name and in that of my companions in arms." Of 
maintenance of the Constitution he said not a word; on the 
contrary, every syllable intimated a change in public affairs. 
The members of the Council were none the less warm in their 
applause of the General, and the session was brought to a close 
not to be reopened before the following day at St. Cloud. When 
shortly afterwards the Council of the Five Hundred assembled it 
was met with the announcement of the decree of the First Cham- 
ber, and Lucien Bonaparte, who had been elevated to the presi- 
dency as a token of honour to his brother, at once adjourned 

time at which the two Councils must assemble. The decree of the Council 
of the Ancients in this matter shall be irrevocable. 

"Article 103. Upon the day that this decree is issued neither of the 
Councils may deliberate within the conmaunes in which its sessions have 
until that time been held. Members who shall there continue their fimc- 
tions will be guilty of assault upon the safety of the Republic. 

"Article 104. Members of the Executive Directory who shall delay or 
refuse to seal, promulgate, and send out the decree for the transfer of the 
Legislative Body, will be guilty of the same misdemeanor." 

Of the right of entrusting to a general the execution or the protection 
of the decree there was no word in the Articles. This was the first un- 
lawful act, and this the managers of the Coup d'Etat cleverly shifted on to 
the shoulders of the representatives of the people. 



1/2 Coup d'Etat and Consulate [1799 

the session. The activity of the Legislature had been sus- 
pended. 

Upon leaving the hall of the Ancients, Napoleon betook him- 
self to the garden of the Tuileries, where he passed in review the 
troops drawn up there. He next issued a proclamation to the 
National Guard and another to the regular troops. In each he 
arraigned the government which had until now been in power. 
*'For two years," said he to his soldiers, "the Repubhc has been 
badly governed. You have been in hopes that my return would 
put an end to so many evils; you have celebrated it with such 
a unanimity as to impose upon me obligations which I am about 
to fulfil. . . . Liberty, victory, and peace will restore to the 
French Republic the rank which she formerly held in Europe 
and which incapability or treachery alone could have caused 
her to lose. Long life to the Republic!" Execution followed 
close upon the heels of accusation. As had been arranged, 
Sieyes and Ducos presented their resignations as members of the 
Directory. It needed but to persuade Barras to do likewise to 
stop the wheels of government altogether, since the vahdation 
of every act required the signatures of at least three Directors. 
Up to this day Napoleon had kept his former friend and patron 
in ignorance as to his real designs, and had made use of him to 
hold Sieyes to a certain extent in check. The time had now 
come to lay aside precaution, and he sent to him two of his con- 
fidants, Talleyrand and Bruix to demand the resignation of his 
office. Barras announced his willingness to accede to this 
requisition; he was led to this decision by the power at the dis- 
posal of Bonaparte and by the universal contempt in which he 
was himself held ; his only request to the all-powerful man of the 
day, made through his secretary Bottot, was for a safe-conduct 
beyond the city. Bonaparte made use of this occasion to ex- 
press himself before a number of witnesses concerning the policy 
of the Directory. To Barras's frightened messenger he ex- 
claimed: "What have you done with that France which I left 
you so glorious? I left peace and find war! I left you victory, 
I find only defeat! I left you the millions of Italy, I find every- 
where poverty and laws that plunder! . . . What have you 



^T. 30] The End of the Directory 173 

done with the hundred thousand Frenchmen whom I knew, my 
companions in glory? They are dead! This state of things 
cannot last; before three years had passed it would lead us to 
despotism. We want a RepubUc founded on the basis of 
equality, of morality, of civil liberty, and of political toleration." 
These at least were the words in which the '^Moniteur" repro- 
duced the speech two days afterwards. 

With the retirement of Barras, Moulins and Gohier became 
powerless. The latter had been invited by Josephine to break- 
fast at eight o'clock in the morning of this eventful day. Was it 
Bonaparte's intention to make sure of this man? Did he hope 
in spite of everything to win him to the support of the movement 
in hand? Gohier did not come. Only during the course of the 
forenoon did he learn of what had occurred, and hastened with 
Moulins to Napoleon to expostulate with him. His remon- 
strances were of course without avail. The two Directors 
returned with their mission unaccomplished to the Palace of 
the Luxembourg, where the Executive of the government had 
hitherto held its sessions. Moreau received instructions to detain 
them there. 

The Directory had ceased to exist. All that was needed 
further was to get the two Councils at St. Cloud to ratify the 
political change, to accept the provisional government, and to 
appoint the committees which were to pass upon the proposed 
Constitution. Sieyes had advised that on the following day 
some twenty or thirty of the most pronounced Radicals, espe- 
ciall}^ Jourdan and Augereau, should be prevented from attending 
the session of the Five Hundred. This, however, Bonaparte 
declined to do ; it should not be said of him that he stood in fear 
of these two men. ''On the whole," said he exultingly to 
Bourrienne that evening, ''things have not gone badly to-day. 
Good-night; to-morrow we shall see what comes next." He 
did not, however, fail to take the precaution to load his pistols 
before going to bed. 

On the morrow, the 10th of November (19th Brumaire), 
the deputies of both Chambers assembled at noon, the appointed 
hour, in St. Cloud. To the Ancients had been assigned a hall 



^' 



174 Coup d'Etat and Consulate [1799 

in the second story of the palace, while the Five Hundred were 
to sit in the Orangery on the ground-floor. Before the opening 
of the session the deputies met in the park and eagerly discussed 
the event of the day. The Jacobin members of the Five Hundred 
and such of the Ancients as had been excluded on the previous 
day demanded explanations; others began to comprehend that 
assent to this momentous decree had been drawn from them 
under false pretences and for the purpose of making a Coup 
d'Etat; they had intended at the utmost to aid in effecting a 
/ change in the Executive and not at all in overthrowing the Con- 
stitution; their indignation waxed hot at sight of the troops 
which filled the courtyard. Thus began the sessions of the two 
Chambers. Napoleon had taken his place with his generals in 
the hall of the inspectors of the legislative body. Here he was 
kept informed, as he had arranged, of the progress of affairs in 
both of the assemblies. The reports were hardly of a nature to 
give him satisfaction. 

In the Council of the Ancients continual excitement pre- 
vailed, and the feeling grew still more intense when it became 
known there that three of the Directors had abdicated and that 
the remaining two were forcibly detained. In the Council of 
the Five Hundred one of the initiated had taken the floor, but he 
was interrupted by cries from the Radicals of ''No dictator- 
ship! Down with dictators!" They further proposed and 
carried a motion that every member should at the roll-call 
renew his oath to support the existing Constitution. Upon 
receipt of this news Napoleon could contain himself no longer. 
Should he allow this hostile feeling to grow, and perhaps even 
finally to spread among the troops, all would be lost. "This 
must be put a stop to," said he, suddenly jumping up, to officers 
of his retinue, and going at once to the hall where the Ancients 
were in session. He was no orator, and his words on this occa- 
sion seemed altogether incoherent and abrupt. They were 
standing on the crater of a volcano, he told them. He and 
his companions in arms had gladly obeyed the summons of the 
Council, and now he was calumniated with the charge of playing 
the part of a Caesar or a Cromwell. Had he wished to destroy 



.Et. 30] Napoleon Before the Ancients 175 

the liberty of the country he might have availed himself of fre- 
quent opportunities which had presented. He then spoke in a 
general way of the dangers threatening the Republic; "liberty 
and equality must be preserved," said he. ''And how about the 
Constitution?" called a voice. This was striking Napoleon in 
the most sensitive spot, and he broke forth: "The Constitution? 
you yourselves rendered it of no account. You violated it on 
the 18th Fructidor. you violated it on the 22d Floreal and on 
the 30th Prairial. It is appealed to by all parties, and all parties 
have sinned against it. It cannot afford safety to us, for no one 
respects it any more. Let us find the means of assuring to 
every one the liberty to which he is entitled and which could 
not be guaranteed to him by the Constitution of the Directory." 

Some members having demanded enlightenment concerning 
the threatening dangers of which he had spoken, he was unable to 
get out of the difficulty without recourse to falsehood. He 
declared that two of the Directors, Barras and Moulins, had 
proposed to him to place himself at the head of a party pur- 
posing to overthrow all men of liberal ideas. This was palpably 
nothing but an invention which irritated his adherents and put 
his opponents out of patience to such an extent that the presi- 
dent, Lemercier, was forced to call upon him to reveal the details 
of the plot. But Napoleon, having no exact information to 
impart, could only reiterate what he had said before ; he declared 
the Constitution ineffectual, and finally turned in his helpless- 
ness and agitation to the soldiers who were stationed outside 
and who were totally unable to hear him ; he apostrophized them 
in flattering words and expressed to them his confidence that 
they would protect him in case any speaker should attempt to 
raise the cry of "outlaw" against him, "for," said he, "I am 
accompanied by the god of war and the god of fortune ! " With 
these words he lost all command over what he was saying. 
Bourrienne, who with Berthier was standing at his side, whis- 
pered in his ear: "General, you no longer know what you are 
saying," and induced him to withdraw. The session was then 
brought to a close. 

But the most difficult task was yet before him. Napoleon 



176 Coup d'Etat and Consulate [1799 

went down-stairs and presented himself at the session of the 
Five Hundred, where its members had meanwhile one by one 
taken oath to support the Constitution and were, for their part, 
awaiting a disclosure from the Upper Chamber as to the motive 
for the transfer of the Legislative Body. This communication 
was not forthcoming, which fact in nowise tended to increase their 
calmness of mind. Instead of the expected message there 
arrived a letter from Barras presenting his resignation and saying 
that he retired before the man made so glorious alike by his per- 
sonal renown and by the marks of confidence given him by the 
National Representatives. The Jacobin deputies hereupon 
demanded to know what circumstances could have determined 
the Director to resign his office. Suddenly, just at this juncture, 
appeared Bonaparte in the hall, unannounced and followed by 
four grenadiers. This was an act of flagrant dii-sregard of all 
conventionalities. There arose at once a frightful uproar of 
indignation against him. ''Armed men in the hall!" cried the 
Jacobins, and a number of Radicals rushed in uncontrollable 
excitement upon the intruder. Hands were laid upon him 
and he was pushed toward the door. In the tumult he for a 
moment lost consciousness. He sank into the arms of the grena- 
diers and was carried by them into the open air. But from 
within there followed him furious clamours of ''Hors la loi!" 
"Outlaw him!" — a cry which but a few years before had meant 
certain death. 

And who knows what would have occurred if the Jacobins 
had quietly listened to Napoleon? A careful observer, Brink- 
mann the Swede, at that time resident in Paris, expresses in his 
recently published letters only the general verdict when he says : 
"Evidently they ought either to have slain the general on the spot, 
or to have listened to him quietly, keeping always themselves 
within the limits of the Constitution and of prudence ... in 
order to lay all the blame upon the shoulders of the aggressor.*' 
Certainly the behaviour of the Jacobins was of a kind to put 
them at a disadvantage if the circumstances were cleverly made 
use of. To no one was their mistake more promptly evident 
than to Lucien Bonaparte, the president of the Council, against 



^T. 30] Lucien Saves the Day i jj 

whom their attack was now directed ; the most excited demanded 
that he should put to vote the proscription of his brother; others 
demanded that Napoleon be declared not in command of the 
troops since the Council of the Ancients had been in nowise 
authorized to appoint him to that post. The desk in the 
middle of the hall was surrounded by members clamouring to 
be heard. 

In the midst of the uproar Lucien resigned the chair to the 
vice-president in order to speak from the tribune in his brother's 
favour. His voice, however, was unable to make itself heard 
above the din, and he sent a deputy who was in sympathy with 
the plot to Napoleon with the message that he was compelled to 
relinquish his seat and required mihtary protection. At the 
same time he took off his toga. Just as he was being forced by 
his colleagues to resume his seat appeared the soldiers sent to his 
assistance by Napoleon, and by them he was escorted out of the 
room. A number of deputies followed him. 

Outside in the courtyard Napoleon waited with his officers 
at the head of a battalion of the Garde du Corps Legislatif. 
Near him stood certain confidential friends. Sieyes, Ducos, 
and Talleyrand sat in a carriage at the gate ready to save 
themselves by flight if affairs should assume an unfavourable 
aspect. Intense excitement could be recognized in every face. 
Before the Councils the cause of the Coup d'Etat seemed as 
good as lost. The question now was in regard to the troops. 
The outcome of the day depended upon their attitude. Lucien 
at once recognized this fact, and mounting a horse he addressed 
the battalion in a few words in which he exaggerated the 
tumult provoked by the Jacobin minority to the extent of 
making it an attack upon Napoleon's fife. '' Frenchmen/' 
he cried, ''the President of the Council of Five Hundred 
declares to you that the immense majority c>f this Council is 
at the present moment held in terror by certain Representa- / 
tives armed with daggers who beset the tribune threatening their V 
colleagues with death and proposing to them the most frightful 
resolutions. I declare to you that these audacious brigands, 
inspired no doubt by the evil spirit of the English government, 



178 Coup d'Etat and Consulate [1799 

have put themselves in the position of rebels toward the Council 
of the Ancients in demanding the outlawry of the general charged 
with the execution of this decree of the Council, as if we still 
belonged in those awful times of their reign, when that word 
^hors la loi' was enough to cause the fall of any head however 
dear to our country. ... To you warriors I entrust the duty of 
deUvering this majority of the Representatives of the People, 
so that, protected by bayonets against stilettos, we may delib- 
erate in peace upon the interests of the Republic. . . . You will 
recognize as Deputies of France only those who present them- 
selves with their president in your midst. As for those who will 
persist in remaining in the Orangery in order to vote proscrip- 
tions, let them be put out by force!" ''And if any one offers 
resistance," added Napoleon, ''kill, kill! Yes! follow me, 
follow me. I am the god of the day!" And he would have 
continued in this strain if Lucien had not whispered to him for 
heaven's sake to keep still. "Vive Bonaparte!" shouted the 
soldiers, but they made no attempt to move. And it was 
indeed no light matter to direct the bayonet against the Na- 
tional Representatives. But Lucien, recognizing this fatal 
hesitation, seized a dagger and pointed it against his brother's 
breast, swearing to strike him down with it should he ever 
attempt to violate the liberties of the French. At this the grena- 
diers ceased to waver. At a sign from Napoleon one division 
with drums beating allowed itself to be led by Murat into the 
hall. Upon the failure of the deputies to comply with his order 
to disperse, the soldiers advanced, and the legislators were forced 
to take flight through the windows. 

Nothing could more clearly show the deep gulf which sepa- 
rated the army from the nation than this painful scene. Con- 
stant absence from home had made the militia strangers to the 
people, and whoever commanded the soldiery could domineer 
recklessly over the nation. It is true that the Bonapartes had 
been obliged to resort to calumny and invention in order to set 
this force in motion against the constituted authorities; the 
allusions to Enghsh influence in Lucien's speech were totally 
without foundation; in fact the "daggers" of the deputies 



Mt. 30] The Provisional Government 1 79 

had been seen by no one, personal danger to the President of 
the Chamber did not exist, and the dagger brandished against 
Napoleon was an unparalleled piece of buffoonery; but the 
fact that such means could be successful and sufficient to decide 
the fate of a great nation showed to what an extent disintegra- 
tion had taken place. And what of the people itself? On 
the 18th and 19th Brumaire the Parisians quietly occupied 
themselves with their private affairs, totally indifferent to events 
which a few years before had thrilled every fibre. That for 
which hundreds of thousands had then risked their Uves in 
fanatic devotion to liberty now seemed scarcely able to awaken 
curiosity. 

The Coup d'Etat once accomplished everything else was very 
soon reduced to order. Lucien could now describe to the Coun- 
cil of the Ancients the occurrences in the lower house with the 
same degree of partiahty as had marked the account which he 
had given to the troops. He summoned the Ancients to pass a 
resolution 'Hhat the fasces of the Consuls, those glorious symbols 
of republican liberty of ancient times, be raised to disarm our 
calumniators and to give reassurance to the French people, 
whose universal approbation will not withhold its sanction to 
our labours." And the Council at once agreed upon adjourn- 
ment of both Chambers, upon the nomination of a provisional 
government of three Consuls, and upon the election of a com- 
mission for consideration of the new Constitution. And similar 
action was taken during the same night by such members of the 
Five Hundred as could, with no small difficulty, be assembled. 
The number of those present seems to have been from fifty to one 
hundred and twenty.* Lucien presided at this gathering, just 
as he had occupied the chair at the session of the whole number, 
in order that appearances of legahty at least might be preserved. 
The proposed amendments to the Constitution were submitted, 
whereupon Boulay de la Meurthe made a long speech in justifica- 
tion of them, during the course of which he denounced the Con- 

* The last number is given by Brinkmann from the statements of im- 
partial eye-witnesses. Bourrienne, on the other hand, speaks of only 
thirty deputies. 



i8o Coup d'Etat and Consulate [1799 

stitution of the year III and the pohcy of the late Directory. 
This "Rump Parhament" then passed the following definitive 
resolutions formulated in sixteen articles: "The Directory has 
ceased to exist. A committee consisting of three Consuls, 
Sieyes, Ducos, and Bonaparte, is to constitute a provisional gov- 
ernment. They are clothed with all directorial power and 
authorized to re-establish order in public affairs, to secure domes- 
tic tranquilhty, and to establish an honourable and lasting peace 
with foreign nations. The Legislative Body will adjourn until Feb- 
ruary 20th, 1800, after having declared sixty-two deputies, desig- 
nated by name, to have forfeited their seats, and after having 
elected a commission of twenty-five members who, in conjunction 
with a similar one appointed by the Ancients and the three Con- 
suls, shall act upon the urgent business of police and financial 
legislation, formulate a new representative constitution and a 
new civil code." The commission was hereupon elected and 
the decree transmitted to the Ancients and ratified by them. 
Finally, the three Consuls took an oath of inviolable fidelity to 
the sovereignty of the people, to the French Republic, to liberty, 
equality, and the representative system of government. It was 
long after midnight before the assemblage broke up. The Coup 
d'Etat had been accomphshed. 

How correct Napoleon had been in his calculations when he 
risked everything on the 19th Brumaire was shown at once in the 
events of the ensuing days. France approved the Coup d'Etat. 
The fact was not to be denied. "Every previous revolution," 
wrote the Prussian ambassador, Sandoz-RoUin, to the govern- 
ment at home under date of November 13th — "every previous 
revolution had inspired much distrust and fear. This one, on 
the contrary, as I myself can testify^ has cheered the spirits of 
everyone and awakened the liveliest hopes." And the causes of 
this phenomenon are given us by Brinkmann in a remarkable 
letter of November 18th: "Never, perhaps, did a legitimate 
monarch find a people more devoted to his will than did Bona- 
parte, and it would be unpardonable should this clever general 
fail to profit by this fact to estabhsh a better government upon 
a more stable basis. It is literally true that France will accom- 



iET. 30] Popular Approval i8i 

plish the impossible in order to contribute to this result, for the 
people, with the exception of the contemptible horde of anar- 
chists, is so tired, so disgusted with revolutionary horrors and 
follies, that all are inwardly convinced that they cannot but gain 
by any change. All classes of society jeer at the heroics of the 
demagogues, and everywhere the demand is rather for their 
expulsion than for the reahzation of their ideal dreams. Even 
Royahsts of every shade are sincerely devoted to Bonaparte, for 
they suppose it to be his intention to bring back Httle by little 
the old order of things. Those unattached to any party adhere 
to him as the man best fitted to procure peace to France, and 
the most enUghtened RepubHcans, while trembling at the danger 
of destruction to their system, are better satisfied that it should 
be one man of talent rather than a club of obscure conspirators 
who should gain exclusive control of public affairs." 

Even when it became known that the accusation made against 
Moulins and Barras was a mere slander, that the alleged con- 
spiracy and the daggers of the deputies were all fabrications, the 
hatred felt toward the Jacobins and the yearning for a return to 
conditions of social order were so great that, in spite of all, in the 
end achieved it was forgotten that the means employed had 
been anything but moral. 

It is surprising to observe in contemporaneous accoimts of 
the Coup d'Etat how Bonaparte is nearly always the only actor 
named, while Sieyes and Ducos, if mentioned at all, are spoken 
of only incidentally. And yet all three were formally invested 
with equal executive power and at first shared equally in the 
labour of government, strictly maintaining their equahty. But 
at the end of a very short time Bonaparte alone was in full pos- 
session of the executive power. For this there were sundry 
causes. In the first place the people regarded him alone as 
their deliverer, while Sieyes and Ducos, in disfavour as former 
Directors, interested nobody, and, justly appreciating this fact, 
voluntarily kept themselves in the background. Moreover, 
there was among the three really only one who had had practical 
experience in affairs of state; that one was Napoleon, who, 
having governed Italy in 1797, and organized the affairs of 



1 82 Coup d'Etat and Consulate [1799 

Egypt in 1798, was acquainted with all the detail of administra- 
tion. Finally, he alone had the unswerving desire for work and 
marvellous capacity for it which was needed to bring security 
and order out of the appalling confusion into which affairs had 
sunk. Ducos, appreciating his unfitness, soon withdrew alto- 
gether, and Sieyes, perceiving that his cherished plan of playing 
poHtical saviour had stranded, contented himself with elaborat- 
ing his Constitution in interminable discussions with both com- 
mittees, while abandoning to his zealous colleague the arduous 
labours of the ruler. 

Napoleon was thus left free to act as he saw fit. He chose his 
own ministers. Gaudin, who had acquired much experience in 
the administration of public revenues under the monarchy, and 
who had refused to accept a portfoho under Sieyes, now willingly 
assumed the burdensome duties of Minister of Finance. Talley- 
rand, formerly Bishop of Autun, whose sordid avarice and irregu- 
lar manner of life were a reproach, but whose penetration in 
statecraft was unequalled, was again made Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. As a token of respect to the National Institute, Laplace, 
the great mathematician, was appointed Minister of the Interior, 
a position he however soon yielded to Lucien Bonaparte on 
account of entire lack of capacity in the management of affairs. 
Berthier, the skilful manager of military operations in Napo- 
leon's campaigns, became Minister of War, but later gave place 
to Carnot. Fouche retained command of the department of 
police, Cambaceres was given the portfoho of justice, and Forfait 
received that of the Navy. 

The Ministry having been constituted, attention was turned 
to the regulation of the desperate financial situation. Such 
was the confidence inspired by the new government that the five 
per cents rose from 7 to 12 after the Coup d'Etat, and to 17 
within a few weeks. When thereupon Napoleon did away with 
the pernicious compulsory loans, capitalists became somewhat 
more confident. By way of compensation taxes on real estate 
were raised, and in order to secure the revenue thus levied, a 
project which had already previously been under discussion was 
made law reorganizing the collection of direct taxes. In every 



/Et. 30] Sieyes' New Constitution 183 

department the Receivers General had to furnish security by 
means of which contributions of money the most crying needs 
could at least be met. That capital might be still further re- 
assured more than fifty Jacobin deputies, among them General 
Jourdan, were sentenced to deportation or imprisonment, but 
this sentence was afterwards commuted to police surveillance. 
These measures did not, it is true, themselves remedy the desper- 
ate financial straits of the State, but they furnished the conditions 
essential to the bringing about improvement. Everything 
depended upon whether Napoleon were confirmed legally in his 
ascendency in the government. He began seriously to concern 
himself in regard to the new Constitution. 

Sieyes had sought to make his draft of a Constitution accepta- 
ble to both committees appointed by the former Chambers. It 
was based on the principle that the different branches of the gov- 
ernment should counterbalance one another. The people was 
declared sovereign and universal suffrage guaranteed. But the 
people were not to elect their representatives directly, merely to 
cast their votes for candidates from among whom the legislators 
were to be appointed by the supreme power of the State. The 
five miUion adults comprising the voters of all France were to 
elect from their number one tenth, 500,000 men, who were to be 
called Notables of the Communes, eligible for communal offices; 
these were to elect from among their number 50,000 Notables of 
the Department, eligible for departmental offices; finally, these 
last were to elect one tenth of their number for Notables of 
France, candidates for the legislative body, and for central admin- 
istration offices up to that of Minister. All such as had during 
the last ten years held high office or been representatives were to 
be included in the list of Notables of France, and all lists were 
to be vaUd for ten years. From the Notables of France were to 
be chosen the members of two legislative bodies, one of which 
should discuss but not vote upon bills originating in their own 
assembly or proposed by the government, while the other was to 
vote without discussion. At the head of the State there was to 
be a president styled the Grand Elector. He was to enjoy an 
ample income, represent the Republic, sign laws and treaties 



184 Coup d'Etat and Consulate [1799 

and appoint or dismiss the two chief magistrates, the Consuls, 
but this was to be the hmit of his functions. Of the Consuls, one 
was to have charge of the war department (army and foreign 
affairs), the other of the peace department (Ministry of the 
Interior). Each was to appoint his subordinates. As an out- 
ward check upon the government and as a guardian of the 
Constitution there was to be an independent body, the Constitu- 
tional Jury, to consist of eighty members appointed for hfe. 
They were to choose their own successors, appoint the Grand 
Elector and the members of the two legislative houses, and annul 
unconstitutional laws. In case the Grand Elector or any other 
high official abused his authority this Jury was empowered to 
appoint him a member of their own body, thus depriving him of 
his former office, since, as member of the Jury it was impossible 
for him to hold any other official position. 

Such were the principal features of the Constitution which 
Sieyes had elaborated with so much subtlety. The sovereign 
people was rendered powerless by the Jury, the first Chamber by 
the second, the power of the Consuls was neutralized through 
the Grand Elector, and that of the Grand Elector in his turn 
through the Jury. This system, however perfect theoretically, 
was altogether impractical. So insecure a mechanism could 
least of all find approval with a man like Bonaparte, whose 
dreams of rule were on the threshold of realization. He ridiculed 
the contrivance, characterized it to Joseph as far too ''metaphysi- 
cal," and compelled the commission, zealously desirous of being 
serviceable to so powerful a man, to undertake radical changes 
therein. The useless Grand Elector, " this shadow of a 'roi faine- 
ant,' this fatted swine," as Napoleon designated him, was at once 
ehminated. He was replaced by a First Consul as head of the 
government, charged with the execution of the law, to be elected 
by the Senate for a term of ten years. He was to appoint and 
dismiss ministers, ambassadors, councillors of State, administra- 
tive officials (prefects, sub-prefects, and mayors), all officers 
whether of the army or navy, and all judges excepting members 
of the "cour de cassation" (highest court of appeals), and the 
" juges de paix." His will should be law when promulgated in the 



^T. 30] The Departments of Government 185 

form of a decree. He was to direct in matters of diplomacy, 
and was to be Commander-in-chief of all military forces. He 
was to sign treaties and laws upon their adoption by the legisla- 
tive body. He was to appoint the members of a Council of State 
which constituted a part of the executive and which was to assist 
the government with its advice. At the side of the First Consul 
there were to be two colleagues whose powers were, however, 
much less extensive, since they could assist only with counsel 
and could exercise no influence in the appointment of State 
officials. It would almost seem as if they had been created to 
veil the omnipotence of the First Consul. 

In the face of a governing power thus constituted an efficient 
legislative body was scarcely possible. Bonaparte therefore 
readily agreed to the manner of election by means of the before- 
mentioned lists of candidates. The legislative power was to be 
exercised by three bodies. Sieyes' Constitutional Jury was trans- 
formed into a Senate with life-membership (Senat conserva- 
teur), whose 80 members were to be chosen from the Notables 
of France. From the same list of candidates the Senate was to 
choose the Corps legislatif, with 300 members, and the Tribunate, 
with 100. No one of these bodies possessed the right of initiating 
legislative measures. The executive laid bills before the Tri- 
bunate ; the latter debated questions thus brought before it, but 
could vote only as to whether certain of its members designated 
for that purpose should speak for or against the measure before 
the Corps legislatif. The members of this last body, on the other 
hand, did not debate the question, but voted at once after hearing 
the Tribunes. In a letter to Talleyrand already quoted Napoleon 
had spoken of a legislature '^impassive, without eyes and without 
ears for its surroundings." Such an one had now been found. 
In the same letter the Council of State was also designated as one 
of the two branches of the executive. Now for the first time 
could it be seen who was to constitute the other branch. It 
became suddenly apparent that the real authority was to rest in 
his hands and his alone.* 

Other provisions of the Constitution concerned the judicial 

* See page 118. 



1 86 Coup d'Etat and Consulate [1799 

and financial regulations, especially the court of appeals ("cour 
de cassation "); whose members were to be elected by the Senate, 
as were also those of the exchequer (''cour des comptes "). The 
yearly salaries of the dignitaries were then fixed. That of the 
First Consul was to be 500,000 francs, while his colleagues were 
to receive 150,000. All three were to have residences in the 
Tuileries. Senators were to receive 25,000 francs, the Tribunes 
15,000, and members of the Corps legislatif 10,000. 

To this modified form of the proposed Constitution the fifty 
members of the Commission had on the whole given their approval 
with but little opposition. It remained only to elect the three 
chief magistrates whose names were to appear in the Constitution 
of the year VIII. All naturally were agreed upon Napoleon for 
First Consul. Sieyes having declined to serve in the capacity 
of one of the other Consuls, the choice fell upon Cambaceres and 
Lebrun. The former, who had befriended and patronized 
Napoleon in Paris in the days before the 13th Vendemiaire, ^\as 
an eminent jurist, though decidedly inclined toward a life of ease. 
The latter was a financier of like ability who contributed to the 
new regime the benefit of his wide experience acquired under 
the monarchy. To Sieyes was accorded the sinecure of the presi- 
dency of the Senate with a handsome income besides a great estate 
in the vicinity of Paris, a price gladly paid by Napoleon to relieve 
himself of the abbe. Ducos was made a Senator. 

With these appointments the Committee of Fifty completed 
its task in a night session of December 12th. Nothing was now 
lacking but its sanction by the sovereign, that is to say. by the 
people of France, as was clearly expressed in the Constitution. 
Upon this absolute rehance could be placed. The more the 
new statute differed from those which had during the last ten 
years led to the overthrow of order at home and to a state of war 
abroad, the more favourably would it be received. Napoleon 
might safely venture, without waiting for the vote of the people, to 
fill the places created for the representatives of the nation . Sieyes 
and Ducos in company with Cambaceres and Lebrun chose thirty- 
one Senators according to their discretion, or rather that of 
Bonaparte, and these thirty-one selected colleagues sufficient 



^T. 30] "The Revolution is at an End'' 187 

to bring their number up to sixty, which was for the present to be 
its limit. Their ranks being filled, the Senate proceeded at once 
to the appointment of the Tribunes and the members of the 
Corps legislatif, while Napoleon appointed the members of the 
new Council of State, which held its first session on December 
25th. A new government having many positions to bestow 
always finds many adherents among the ambitious, the enter- 
prising, and the covetous — a power which Napoleon well under- 
stood making use of to estabhsh his rule. And from this time 
forth he was master of France. 

The manifesto of December 15th, 1799, in which the Consular 
Constitution was presented to the people of France for its ratifi- 
cation, closed with these words: "Citizens, the Revolution is 
estabUshed upon the principles which were its origin. It is at an 
end/' 

That was the question. 



CHAPTER VIII 
WAR AND PEACE 

No, the Revolution was not at an end. Napoleon might ac- 
quire an unlimited dictatorial power over France, he might render 
the representatives of the nation a blind, impassive instrument of 
his will, he might finally destroy the Republic and set up in its 
stead his own absolute sovereignty, still the Revolution had 
not reached its end. It had but undergone a change of form, a 
metamorphosis, such as would be described chemically as an allo- 
tropic state of the Revolution resulting from the decomposi- 
tion of the Directory. For two of its most essential principles 
were retained by the Consulate: that of equality at home and 
that of extension in all directions abroad. 

Civil and social inequality, the barriers separating classes and 
circles, had been set aside by the Revolution, and these were not 
restored by the Consulate. ''Liberty" had been far too often 
misused by the people in the ten years of their supremacy to be 
valued highly now; ''Fraternity" had become a hated word 
owing to the many deeds of violence committed in its name; 
"Equality" alone was still held in respect, and Napoleon was 
correct in his repeated assertions that the French cared far less 
for pohtical hberty than for equahty, a point which the Bour- 
bons were too bhnd to recognize.* It was, to be sure, only the 
equality of all under one superior, but at least it was but one. 
This man had himself learned its value at the time when, through 

* In 1804, shortly before he became Emperor, he remarked to Mme. 
de R^musat: "One must needs have regard for people's vanity; the plain- 
ness of the Repubhc bored you people. What began the revolution? 
Vanity. What will put a stop to it? Vanity. Liberty is a pretext. 
EquaUty is the hobby. The people are pleased to have a man who has 
risen from the ranks for king." 

z88 



^T. 30] The Spirit of Conquest 189 

it, the way was opened before him, a young heutenant without 
a future, for the possible reahzation of his vast designs; and 
again v/hen, through it, he, a man of ordinary family, obtained 
the hand of a lady belonging to the nobihty ; finally, when it had 
enabled him with no other claim than that of merit to become 
the ruler over a great nation. 

The second revolutionary principle retained by the Consulate 
was that of conquest. Many historians have represented the 
striving for universal dominion as due entirely to Napoleonic 
ambition. Whether seeing therein a new and glorious proof of 
the grandeur of his genius, or condemning him for his criminal 
and insatiable greed, writers have concurred in imputing this 
tendency to him personally and in placing the responsibihty for 
it upon his shoulders alone. But this view of the situation is 
hardly to be accepted, for ever since the year 1792 the revolu- 
tionary holders of power in France had pursued this course 
toward universal dominion. It was indeed at first intended 
that this should be the universal dominion of revolutionary ideas 
only, of the rights of man which they styled ''universal." But 
when these ideas met with material resistance put forth by 
the old States, the opposition was overcome by armies consisting 
of hundreds of thousands of enthusiasts for these principles 
which pressed forward deep into foreign territory, calling the peo- 
ple to hberty and to resistance against hereditary rule. As Mo- 
hammed propagated his rehgion with the aid of the sword, and 
as the rehgious parties of the sixteenth century took up arms 
for their faith, so now did the behevers in the new political dogma 
rush upon the neighbouring countries to convert while conquer- 
ing. And when the question arose whether acquisitions made in 
war were to be retained in time of peace, it was decided by no 
ideal considerations, but by material need : the only hope of re- 
lieving the financial distress in France was by drawing upon the 
resources of these neighbours either by means of downright an- 
nexation or by creating a fringe of dependent repubhcs on the 
borders of France and transferring to them a portion of the 
State's burden. It has already been seen how this motive of 
self-preservation determined the revolutionary government in 



190 War and Peace [1799 

1795 to incorporate Belgium.* Some one at that time having 
offered a prize for the best answer to the question whether it 
would be advantageous or prejudicial to France to extend her 
borders as far as the Rhine, he was officially denounced in the 
''Moniteur" as suspected of high treason. Thus had the Revolu- 
tionary theory of the liberation of nations become in practice 
the conquest of nations. Conquests were no longer made in 
order to give liberty : liberty was now declared only in order to 
facihtate conquest. ''When the Committee of Public Safety pro- 
poses peace/' wrote Mallet du Pan in October, 1795, "this word 
must be understood to mean submission. Its invariable inten- 
tion is to compel every State laying down its arms before France 
to become her ally, that is to say, her tributary and her imitator. 
Such princes of secondary rank who hope to escape this fate by 
means of treaties or capitulations strangely misapprehend the 
character of this Revolution." As will be seen, this system is 
identical with that pursued by Napoleon up to the year 1812. f 

The greatest antagonist to the extension of the boundaries of 
France was now, as it had been in the time of Louis XIV., Eng- 
land. Should France stick to that pohcy to which she had been 
forced by the ideal purpose of the Revolution and to which she 
had been obliged to hold on account of material need, the con- 
sequence would be that Great Britain must also keep to her system 
of opposition by means of her ships upon the ocean and through 
her allies upon the Continent. For this reason, if reports of that 
time are to be believed, there was in France, as early as the 
summer of 1796, a clearly defined intention not only to land an 
army in the British Islands, but also to annihilate that country 
by closing to her commerce the ports of all Europe; Napoleon's 

* See page 75. 

t In August, 1801, the Prussian Envoy, Lucchesini wrote to Berlin: 
"Whatever advantages may accrue to the French government from ex- 
changing the anarchy of the Directory for the Consular authority, there 
will be no change in foreign policy. The same ambitious plans and the 
same arbitrary connections will prevail, and if General Bonaparte is as 
well qualified for administration as he is to deal with enemies without 
and within, he is still too much of a conqueror to give France and, through 
her, Europe lasting peace." 



^T. 30] Napoleon's Policy Prefigured 1 9 1 

''Continental System" was therefore also prefigured at this time. 
Even Bonaparte's Eastern plans had been evolved before his 
time by the rulers at Paris. At the same time that the 
descent upon England was planned, long before Bonaparte 
had turned his mind upon imitating Alexander the Great, the 
Directory was concerning itself about the source of Britain's 
wealth, India. Mallet du Pan writes in a report dated July 3d, 
1796: ''The incendiary activity of the Directory no longer knows 
any bounds. It is rousing Persia to rebelhon, working up Con- 
stantinople, and peopling Hindostan with its emissaries." In a 
similar way the policy towards Germany afterward pursued by 
Napoleon may be found mapped out in all its details during the 
last ten years of the century. The idea of the secularization of 
the German ecclesiastical principalities originated with the Girond- 
ists, and in 1795 Sieyes was the author of a memorial containing 
a scheme for the indemnification and aggrandizement of the 
secular principahties at the expense of the ecclesiastical, a plan 
which, with shght alteration, was actually put into practice in 
1803. The suggestion of the confederation of Rhenish princes 
under French protection which in 1806 became a reahty will also 
be found to have had its origin in the diplomacy of the Directory 
of 1798, as was Hkewise the case with the design of driving back 
Prussia and Austria as far toward the East as possible in order 
to bring under French control the mouths of the Weser and Elbe 
and cut them off from EngUsh commerce. In a report to the 
Directory sent by Sieyes from Berhn in July, 1798, he says plainly 
that the German coast of the North Sea is "for France the most 
important portion of the earth's surface in view of the fact that 
by means of it the Directory may at its will close to English 
commerce all the markets and all the ports of the Continent from 
Gibraltar as far as Holstein or even to the North Cape." 

It is evident that the Revolution had determined upon ex- 
tending its influence and power to the furthest confines of the 
Continent. This intention was, to be sure, without system 
or method, — just as in the legislation of the interior one law 
was heaped upon another without regard to order or relation, — 
and it needed a man of extraordinary perspicacity and practical 



192 War and Peace [1799 

insight to apply both system and method to this vague purpose. 
And here begins Bonaparte's direct participation in the poHcy 
of the Revolution. Up to this time he had been merely its dis- 
ciple and advocate, as far as its interests coincided with his own, 
and except for the latter he recognized none. Neither his inter- 
ests nor his ambition knew any bounds. Once master of France 
he would satisfy them by letting things take their course, and 
before him would open up the prospect of a universal empire 
such as perhaps no power on the globe had ever founded. He 
was Hke a swimmer whose destination is the river's mouth: he 
needs but to throw himself into the current to reach it. Even at 
the time when with Robespierre the younger he was considering 
the plan of offensive warfare against Italy he had begun to de- 
velop a policy of his own founded upon that of revolutionary 
conquest, and this had matured so that it could not now be aban- 
doned without danger to himself and to the power which he had 
acquired. 

History shows us monarchs whose lives are tragedies. But 
there are also nations whose story is a tragedy, where for cen- 
turies the people suffer and pine as the result of a single great 
crime, and the anguish is not lessened by the fact that it is shared 
by millions. France gives us an example of such a nation. 
Nothing can be more affecting than the fate of this people, so 
full of enthusiasm for the real good of humanity, overtaken in 
the course of a few years by all that was glaringly contradictory 
to humane feeling; yearning for peace, and condemned to long 
decades of warfare involving untold sacrifice. Immediately upon 
the overthrow of Robespierre's Reign of Terror the people had 
begun to clamour for peace with the rest of the world; this cry 
was repeated when the Convention was succeeded by the Direc- 
tory; and again when Sieyes took his place in the government 
the same hope centred in his name. Now that Bonaparte had 
siezed the rudder, the nation, so often disappointed, turned 
its gaze once more in hope upon him. Was it to be again in 
vain? 

It has been asserted that by accepting certain restrictions 
Napoleon might have concluded peace at once in 1800. This is,. 



^T. 301 Difficulties in the Way of Peace 193 

however, improbable. For since the Directory had become accus- 
tomed to making the ''Uberated " countries bear a portion of the 
state burdens and to having the contributions levied in hostile 
territory figure as a permanent item in the budget, it had in- 
dolently avoided the arduous and tedious labour of remedying the 
disorder in the finances. Napoleon's energy had brought about 
an amelioration, but in the few months of his rule nothing more 
could be done than merely to lay the foundation for his reforms. 
Capital was still withheld, the rate of interest was still very high, 
the revenue collected was still not much exceeding that of pre- 
ceding years, and many arbitrary measures had to be resorted to 
in order to procure funds. Consequently, if the State was to 
continue in existence, it was unavoidable to draw for the present 
upon the aUies for contributions together with the money ex- 
torted from conquered foes. To conclude peace at this time 
would have meant nothing less than the rehnquishment of 
wealthy Holland, Switzerland, the conquered German territory 
beyond the Rhine, the Riviera, Malta, Egypt, and above all, the 
possibility of levying contributions ; it would have meant to draw 
back within the narrow confines of a land whose resources were 
to a great extent exhausted or at least still inaccessible, where 
the disbanded army would only increase the starving populatior , 
and where the contrast between the misery of the poor and the 
wealth of unscrupulous upstarts who had taken advantage of 
the financial embarrassment to enrich themselves would have 
probably led to social revolution and civil war. Moreover, not all 
Frenchmen demanding peace meant thereby peace at any price 
or based upon the reverses of the preceding year, but upon terms 
dictated by new and glorious victories promised by the mere 
name of Bonaparte. One of the missions undertaken by the 
consuls on the 19th Brumaire was that of concluding an 
honourable peace. Barante says in his '' Souvenirs ": ''There 
prevailed everywhere a desire for improvement and for national 
glory." Added to this there was in the army especially a crav- 
ing for war and victory by means of which its reputation 
might be retrieved. It was in response to this desire that 
Bonaparte, on the first day of the Coup d'Etat, had spoken 



Y 



194 War and Peace [1799 

to the soldiers not only of liberty and of peace, but alsa of 
victory.* 

Finally, and this was the essential point, the First Consul 
himself stood in need of war in order to strengthen and maintain 
the power which he had so boldly assumed, according to the time- 
honoured method of securing obedience from the parties at home 
by employing abroad the forces of the State; he stood in need 
of war in order to acquire new personal glory and fame, and to 
silence the whispers about disaster at Acre and the whole futile 
expedition to the Orient; he stood in need of war, moreover, to 
satisfy his measureless ambition, which aimed at the acquisition 
of supremacy over all Europe in the same way that he had ac- 
quired it over France, 

It was therefore only a matter of form when, on the 25th 
of December, 1799, he addressed letters to the King of England 
and to the Emperor Francis in which, without making any 
definite propositions, he simply expressed his desire for peace. 
Such advances of course could not be considered. England was 
holding Malta and Egypt in a state of blockade, and the fall of 
these two French positions was only a question of weeks; both 
of these acquisitions were of far too great importance to British 
interests for Pitt to give them up. He declined to enter into 
any negotiations for peace. Austria had indeed quarrelled with 
Russia. After the victories of the allied forces in Italy Thugut 
was not to be satisfied with regaining the former Austrian terri- 
tory of Lombardy, but wanted also the three Legations and Pied- 
mont, a purpose which was suspected by his Russian neighbour 
and to which Suvaroff opposed resistance upon his own au- 
thority. Thugut succeeded in procuring from the Court of St. 
Petersburg an order for this capable general to take command in 
Switzerland, while Archduke Charles, then stationed there, was 
forced against his own better judgment to pass over into South- 
ern Germany. During the marches entailed by these changes 
of location Massena succeeded in defeating a corps of Russians 
at Zurich and by means of this victory in regaining posses- 
sion of the whole of Switzerland. Suvaroff returned to Russia. 

* See page 172. 



^T. 30] Austria's Conditions 195 

Austria was now absolute mistress of the situation in Upper Italy 
with the exception of Genoa, where the remnants of the French 
armies were collected, and this supremacy she hoped to maintain. 
Hence when Napoleon's letter reached Vienna Thugut also was 
unready to accede to its vague propositions of peace. He de- 
manded first of all assurance upon the question as to "whether 
the First Consul would return to the actual causes of the war so 
as to prevent for all time their recurrence; whether he would 
abandon the very source of that mistaken policy, fatal to France 
herself and threatening the existence of the other powers ; whether 
there existed any difference between the overtures of the new 
government and those of its predecessors; and, finally, whether 
General Bonaparte would bring the French public to recognize 
the general principles of international law which alone can bind 
nations together and teach them reciprocal respect for peace and 
independence." On February 28th Talleyrand answered by 
proposing to negotiate on the basis of the treaty of Campo Formio, 
that monument of French offensive policy. Thugut knew then 
v/hat might be counted upon. 

How little Napoleon meant by his offers of peace is shown by 
the fact that on the very day on which those letters were dated 
he addressed the French soldiers in these words: ''You are the 
same men who conquered Holland, the Rhine and Italy, and dic- 
tated terms of peace under the walls of astonished Vienna. Sol- 
diers ! it is no longer your frontiers which you are called upon to 
defend; you are now to invade the territory of the enemy." To 
the army of Italy, posted on the Riviera and which had just been 
placed under the command of Massena, he addressed a procla- 
mation in which the starving soldiers were consoled with the 
prospect of victories soon to foUow, exactly as he had done in 
1796.* In short, war was from the very first a foregone conclu- 

* In this second manifesto Bonaparte displayed in its full perfection 
his incomparable skill in dealing with the common soldier. A demi- 
brigade had given evidence of discouragement: "Are they then all dead," 
he exclaimed, "those brave hearts of Castiglione, of Rivoli, and of Neu- 
markt? They would have died rather than desert their flags, and they 
would have recalled their younger comrades to honour and duty. Sol- 
diers! you say that your rations are not issued to you with regularity. 



196 War and Peace [I800 

sion with Bonaparte, and his only object in writing to the two 
sovereigns was to make the French people believe that it was he 
who desired peace, and the enemy who was forcing war upon him.* 

But in order to make headway against the foreign enemy, 
those at home must first be overcome. La Vendee was still in 
revolt, but just at this time the favourable outcome of the cam- 
paign in Holland set at liberty a magnificent army of 30,000 men, 
which Napoleon further reinforced in order to give weight to a 
manifesto caUing upon the insurgents to lay down their arms, 
offering full amnesty to those who obeyed, but threatening with 
annihilation all who continued in resistance to the law. The 
inhabitants of Vendee were taken entirely by surprise in this 
proceeding, coming from a man of whom they had scarcely any 
knowledge except as the conqueror of Toulon and the confidant 
of Robespierre. They were still further amazed when they saw 
this man compelling respect to the Catholic religion and setting 
the priests at liberty. The success of the manifesto was com- 
plete. Among all the bands in La Vendee, only three ventured 
to resist and they were forced to capitulate. By February, 
1800, the province had been quieted and the Army of the West 
was appointed a new destination. 

As for the rest of the French forces, the 120,000 men com- 
manded by Moreau in Switzerland were equal in number to the 
Austrians in Suabia under command of the brave but otherwise 
incapable Kray, Archduke Charles having retired from the chief 
command, sick and wounded by Thugut's arbitrary proceedings. 

What would you have done if you had found yourselves, like the 4th and 
22d light infantry and the 18th and the 32d of the Hne, in the midst of the 
desert, without bread or water, with horse or mule meat as your only 
food? 'Victory will give us bread,' said they; but you — you desert your 
standards! " etc. 

* There is in existence a communication from Talleyrand to the First 
Consul of precisely this time (the first weeks of the year 1800), in which 
he says: "It is always assuming a good position at the beginning of a 
campaign to manifest a warm desire for peace and to make every attempt 
toward its re-establishement. If the result of the campaign is favourable, 
one has acquired the right to show severity; if disastrous, one need not 
bear the reproach of having brought it on." (Bailleu, "Preussen und 
Frankreich, 1795-1807," I. 522.) 



^Et. 30] Why Napoleon Took the Field 197 

In Italy, however, Mass^na had but 30,000 men with which to 
oppose the 80,000 Austrians under Melas, a general who had dis- 
tinguished himself the year before at Novi by deciding the battle 
in favour of the Austrians; he was old, feeble, conscientious, but 
very deliberate. In order to counterbalance the enemy's superior- 
ity of numbers the First Consul gave secret orders in January, 
1800, to Berthier, the Minister of War, to assemble a reserve army 
of 50,000-60,000 men, using as a nucleus the above-mentioned 
Army of the West. His plan for the ensuing campaign was mas- 
terly: Moreau was at the earliest possible moment to cross the 
Rhine at Schaffhausen, engage Kray in Germany, and force the 
Austrians back, while Massena was to hold Melas before Genoa, 
retreating to that city fighting every inch of the ground. Bona- 
parte himself meanwhile designed to cross the Swiss Alps with 
the reserve army, penetrate into Lombardy and there cut off 
communication between Vienna and the Austrian army, which 
he hoped to surprise; the decisive blow would then be struck 
or the Austrians forced to capitulate. In pursuing this course 
he was, without the least doubt, carrying out hidden ends in 
addition to his acknowledged aim, which was to inflict defeats 
upon the enemy and obtain advantageous terms of peace. He 
was unwilhng that France should owe that peace to Moreau, 
who, by a reinforcement of his army, would have been enabled, 
undoubtedly, to prevail over Austria. Nor was he perhaps 
willing that this honour should fall to Massena. Peace must be 
the gift of Bonaparte himself alone. This is the reason why the 
head of the government determined, to the great surprise of 
every one, to take the field ; this was doubtless his motive in being 
so conciliatory toward the insurgents of Vendee, in order to have 
done with them and be able to take to his own use the troops of 
which he stood in need; it was for the same reason again that 
Moreau was instructed to send into Upper Italy by way of Switzer- 
land one of the corps of his army for his reinforcement at the 
risk of reducing the Army of Germany to a number inferior to 
that of the enemy.* 

* Before deciding upon this course, Napoleon had planned to allow 
things to take their own course in Italy, to unite the reserve army with 



198 War and Peace [I800 

Of all these designs and preparations no inkling had reached 
Vienna. There the Austrians had elaborated their own plan: 
Melas was as promptly as possible to clear the Riviera of the 
French and then to direct a detached corps into Switzerland 
from the south, while Kray should attack Moreau's position 
from the north. The order to carry out this plan was communi- 
cated to Melas on the 24th of February, and its execution might 
have been begun in the early part of March, before Napoleon had 
come to any agreement with Moreau in regard to the detail of 
the campaign. It would then have been possible to shut Mas- 
sena up in Genoa by the end of the month before his reinforce- 
ments could reach him, and compel him to surrender at latest in 
the beginning of May; this accomplished, it would have been pos- 
sible to turn northward with a considerable force where he 
might perhaps have encountered Napoleon's reserve army while 
still on the march. As it was, however, Melas, after long delay, 
did not begin the contest until the beginning of April, and did not 
succeed until the 21st in driving Massena into Genoa, and then he 
wasted precious time in pursuing a French corps sent to the 
relief of Massena. As a matter of fact the middle of May found 
Melas with 30,000 men just across the French frontier on the 
Var, while his subordinate Ott was still besieging Genoa with 
24,000 men. and to the north 17,000 men in sundry detachments 
were scattered among the valleys of the Alpine foot-hills. No 
situation of affairs could have been more favourable to Napoleon. 
And he stood in need of such conditions for his audacious under- 
taking. 

The equipment of the new French army had been excessively 
delayed by the lack of the commonest necessities arising from 
the mismanagement of the previous year. Moreau did not for 
a long time make his attack. Time was pressing, for Massena 

that under Moreau, and, assuming command himself, with these superior 
forces to surround Kray's left wing, cut it off from communication and 
march at once upon Vienna — a manoeuvre which he was five years later, 
in 1805, to execute with brilliancy. That he renounced this plan is due 
to the fact that Moreau with his excessive military ambition would not 
serve in a subordinate capacity and that, at that time, Bonaparte still 
had reasons for using tact in dealing with him. 



^T. 30] Crossing the Alps 199 

could hold the enemy in check for but a few weeks. Accordingly 
Bonaparte determined to venture, without waiting for Moreau 
to take the offensive, upon taking up his march through Lausanne 
and over the Great Saint-Bernard to the Dora Baltea with but 
32,000 men. Moreau was to send one corps as soon as practicable 
across the Saint-Gothard to the aid of Bonaparte. On the 14th 
of May the first columns cHmbed the pass, drawing behind them 
the cannon in troughs or cases made of hollowed logs, under the 
difficulties entailed by such a manoeuvre, but with favourable 
weather and without serious accident. On the 22d of May the 
last detachment had crossed the heights. The irruption of an 
entire army at this point had been least of all expected by the 
Austrians, and their defences were insignificant. The impreg- 
nable Fort Bard alone made difficulties. "There the Consul took 
many a pinch of snuff/' relates one of his grenadiers who later 
became Captain Coignet; "he had much to do with all his great 
genius." But eventually this obstacle also was overcome. The 
infantry and cavalry passed beyond the fort by means of a cir- 
cuitous route, while the cannon with wheels wrapped in straw 
were conveyed past, under cover of the night, by the direct road, 
which had been spread with manure. During the last days of 
May a small band of the enemy was put to flight, Ivrea taken, 
and Napoleon's advance upon Milan begun. His entry into that 
city was made on the 2d of June. The venture had succeeded. 
Melas had been advised too late of the invasion of the French; 
he now sought to collect all available forces at Turin in order to 
maintain commimication with Austria while conducting his re- 
treat through Alessandria, Piacenza, and Mantua. But in this 
design also he was to fail. He got no farther than Alessandria, 
in the vicinity of which the decisive blow was struck. 

In the first two weeks of May Moreau had defeated the Aus- 
trians at Stockach, Engen, and Moeskirch, driving them back as 
far as Ulm, and he was thence in a position to send to Napoleon 
the desired auxiliary corps. These reinforcements reached the 
army of reserves during the first days of June, bringing the aggre- 
gate number to ten divisions (about 60,000 men). Always bear- 
ing in mind his purpose of cutting off the retreat of the enemy, 



200 



War and Peace [isoo 



Napoleon now advanced with five of these divisions, making his 
way across the Po between Pa via and Piacenza, and, after a suc- 
cessful encounter with Ott, who had finally taken Genoa, arrived 
June 12th at Tortona, a Httle town in the neighbourhood of Mon- 
tebello. These troops were commanded by Lannes, Victor, and 
Desaix, who had just arrived from Egypt. Three other divisions 
were sent by the Consul to the Ticino and toward Piedmont to 
prevent the escape of Melas toward the north; two more were 
set to guard the Adda and the left bank of the Po. Having 
encountered no serious resistance on the march from Piacenza 
to Tortona and beyond, Napoleon was uncertain what direction 
Melas would take, knowing him to be then in Alessandria. He 
did not credit his antagonist with capacity for the bold resolu- 
tion of facing the French army and cutting his way through. 
Pride had led him to esteem lightly the souls as well as the minds 
of his adversaries. 

The Scrivia and Bormida rivers run parallel to each other 
northward to the Po; on the one hes Tortona, on the other, a 
few miles west, the fortress of Alessandria. The two towns are 
connected by the highway running from Turin by way of Asti 
to Piacenza and the east; between Tortona and Alessandria, but 
nearer to the latter, is situated the village of Marengo. A road 
running south from Tortona is joined at Novi by one running 
southeast from Alessandria; they form, united, the way to Genoa. 
The two corps under Lannes and Victor had advanced as far as 
Marengo, when Bonaparte, failing to encounter the Austrians 
in the open country, finally concluded that the enemy must have 
turned toward Novi in order to avoid him and secure a strong 
position near Genoa, where he could avail himself of the resources 
of the English fleet. In order to get light upon this question 
Bonaparte sent Desaix on June 13th with a division in the direc- 
tion of Novi. He himself remained with another division and 
the Consular Guard in the vicinity of Tortona.* The army was 
thus cut up into three detached parts. Should Melas now attack 
with his 30,000 well-concentrated men, the issue might readily 

* The Guard numbered at that time 1200 men, every one of whom must 
have been through four campaigns. 



^T. 30] Marengo 201 

prove fatal to the French. And the following morning was to 
display the danger in this disposition. During the forenoon of 
that day, June the 14th, the Austrian general crossed the Bormida 
and pressed forward in the direction of Tortona. At Marengo he 
came upon Lannes and Victor, drove them back and out of the 
village, and after a struggle of six hours' duration compelled them 
by his superiority of numbers to give way. Napoleon now real- 
ized that the decisive battle was to be fought out on this occasion 
and that he had made an egregious blunder. He at once de- 
spatched an ordnance officer to Desaix commanding his return, 
and himself hastened to the field with his Guards and reserve 
division, where he succeeded in the early afternoon hours in stem- 
ming the tide of battle. But the conffict had not raged long 
before the French again began to give way and the retreat threat- 
ened to become a stampede. Napoleon sat by the roadside in 
nervous excitement, beating up with his riding- whip the dust 
through which his defeated troops fled past him. In vain he 
called to the soldiers to stand and hold out since the reserves 
were coming. It was but an empty promise. About 7000 men 
were already killed or wounded, and Desaix, the only remaining 
hope, was still beyond reach. There could be no question but 
that the battle had been won by the Austrians. Rejoicing in 
their victory, with shouldered arms, they marched, formed in 
an immense column, behind the fleeing French on the road that 
their valour had opened to them. Melas himself, slightly wounded, 
had already yielded the command to a subordinate and had 
ridden back to Alessandria. All at once appears Desaix with 
his division of fresh men, and these dash impetuously upon the 
dismayed Austrians; Napoleon makes one more attempt to im- 
pose a check upon the retreat, and is rewarded with success. 
KeUermann the younger, cheered by the sight of approaching 
help, turned about with his dragoons and made a furious charge 
upon the pursuing foe, who wavered, fell back, and finally took 
to ffight in their turn. The pursuers became the pursued. The 
battle lost to the French at five o'clock was retrieved by seven. 
It had been lost by Bonaparte, as must be conceded by any im- 
partial judge; the victory was due to the gallant Desaix. Hear- 



20 2 War and Peace [isoo 

ing the roar of cannon, he had halted to await new orders. It 
was due to this that he was overtaken by Napoleon's messenger 
and was able to reach the scene of battle before it was too late. 
But at the opening of the assault which was to save the day 
Desaix was cut down by a shot from the enemy, and the victor's 
laurel wreathed a brow cold in death. 

Napoleon was for a long time unable to reconcile himself to 
the thought that he had been surprised on this occasion and that 
the battle had been won without his assistance. He repeatedly 
attempted by means of official reports on the battle to exalt the 
purely fictitious deeds of the commander-in-chief above the real 
services of Desaix and Kellermann. Even as late as 1805 he 
tried, through Berthier, to estabhsh these claims, and he had 
almost convinced the nation of their vahdity until the concur- 
rent testimony of eye-witnesses proved his assertions to be false. 

But even if the victory gained at Marengo on June 14th, 
1800, were not of his achieving, it was nevertheless he who had 
directed the whole campaign which had brought the foe into 
such precarious circumstances, and he justly reaped the benefit 
of its results. This battle was, according to the expression of 
one of the deepest thinkers of that time, 'Hhe baptism of Napo- 
leon's personal power." The Austrians had lost more than 
9000 men ; a renewal of attack was not to be thought of. Melas 
asked for an armistice and the right of withdrawal without 
molestation, and on June 15th a convention was signed grant- 
ing both requests upon condition that he retire with his troops 
beyond the Mincio and surrender to Napoleon all the country 
west of that river. The fruit of all the victories gained in 1799 
had been lost in a single day. The Cisalpine and Ligurian 
Republics were again set up, and in Tuscany and Ancona alone 
were Austrian garrisons for the time being permitted. 

After the battle Napoleon left Massena in command of the 
army and went to Milan for the purpose of reaping pecuniary 
advantage first of all from the result of the war. The Cis- 
alpine Republic was compelled to furnish two milhon francs a 
month and Piedmont a million and a half; public domains and 
property of the Church were confiscated and sold; the support 



Mt. 30] The Results of the Victory 203 

of the army was as a matter of course imposed upon the country. 
MoreaU; who had meanwhile advanced further into Germany 
and occupied Munich, was ordered to levy contributions also, 
and Southern Germany was in like manner compelled to main- 
tain the hostile army and pay in addition 40,000,000 francs. 
The financial object of the campaign had thus been attained, 
but the advantages which Napoleon himself derived were of 
no small importance. His position in France was now firmly 
established. That such had not previously been the case is 
proved by letters and comments written at the time. What 
was to be the consequence if he lost his life in Italy or even in 
case he were defeated was a question secretly discussed in 
Talleyrand's house by Sieyes, Carnot, Lafayette, Fouche, and 
others. The question became a burning one when the report, 
though entirely unfounded, was circulated in Paris that he had 
suffered a defeat. They were still wavering between Carnot 
and Lafayette in their choice for the next First Consul, when 
tidings of the victory at Marengo arrived and interrupted the 
consultation. Bonaparte was aware of what was taking place 
during his absence, and this fact unquestionably had no Httle 
influence in determining him to leave the theatre of war as early 
as June. Early in July he was again in Paris with the fixed 
intention not to leave the capital again for a long time, but 
rather to take advantage of the success at Marengo to bring 
about a speedy conclusion of peace. This he was determined 
to accomplish at whatever cost, for thus alone could he claim 
success and the glory of having secured for the nation the peace 
so ardently desired. 

He had addressed while at Milan a second letter to the 
Emperor Francis proposing a conclusion of peace and again 
offering to treat upon the basis of the treaty of Campo Formio. 
But in Vienna they had not yet reached the point of having 
to accept such unfavourable propositions. Moreover, Austria 
had shortly before bound herself, in return for considerable sub- 
sidies from the British government, not to conclude a separate 
peace with France before the following February, but she was 
not without hopes that Bonaparte would depart from these 



204 War and Peace [isoo 

conditions and make proposals to which England also could be 
brought to accede. It was with these considerations in mind 
that the Emperor's reply to the First Consul was composed. 
General Count Joseph de St. Julien, who had just come from 
Italy, had been the bearer of Bonaparte's letter to the Emperor, 
and he was now entrusted with the dehvery of the reply. Not 
finding the Consul in Milan the Count followed him to Paris. 
Here the messenger was made by Napoleon the object of a 
special intrigue. Talleyrand was appointed to persuade the 
Count that he was entrusted by the Emperor with full powers 
to negotiate for peace, and that failure to make use of these 
powers would lead to immediate renewal of war. St. Julien 
was completely taken in, and within a week the vain and stupid 
envoy was led to sign preliminaries which, entirely contrary 
to the spirit of the Emperor's letter, accepted as a basis the 
stipulations of Campo Formio and not only totally ignored 
all claims on the part of England, but even closed to her all 
Austrian ports. 

Had Napoleon really supposed that his purpose could be 
accomphshed at so sUght a cost? Whatever may have been 
his hopes, this end was not to be reached for the present, though 
when once attained it was but so much the more assured. The 
Austrian court dechned to ratify the preliminaries and put 
forth all its powers toward the equipment of troops for the 
continuance of the war. New troops were levied, and Kray, 
who had proved himself incompetent, was replaced by Arch- 
duke John, an extremely young man, who relates in his Me- 
moirs that he had but recently learned to saddle a horse. His 
instructions were to follow impHcitly the directions of Lauer, 
his chief of staff, and thus he had to assume the responsibihty 
for all that officer's monstrous blunders. In Italy Melas gave 
place to Bellegarde, a general far less competent than himself. 
These changes had so, little improved the condition of the Aus- 
trian armies that toward the end of September Emperor Francis 
was obHged to ask for an extension of the truce concluded with 
Moreau in July. According to instructions Moreau granted 
this request on condition of Austria's surrender of three of her 



Mr. 31] Futile Negotiations 205 

most important fortresses (Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt), 
and the withdrawal of her troops beyond the Inn. Napoleon 
had been beyond measure exasperated at the refusal of the 
Austrians to accept his preliminaries, and it was with the utmost 
difficulty that Talleyrand was able to calm him. Only the 
strong personal interest which he now had in a speedy conclu- 
sion of peace led him to consent to the presence of an Austrian 
diplomat at Paris for the purpose of negotiating new conditions 
of peace. Cobenzl, who had shown much skill in the negotia- 
tions at Passariano in 1797, was sent as the ambassador to 
France, but here he was most unfortunate in his efforts. Hith- 
erto his talent had been able to adjust itself to circumstances, 
but the sudden revolution of conditions brought about by the 
fortunes of war was more than he could grasp; he persisted in 
demands which no longer corresponded with the actual relations 
of the powers, and renounced them only when Napoleon had 
already resolved upon a continuance of the war. The great 
contrast between revolutionary and conservative diplomacy 
was here again exemphfied : Cobenzl, who was bound by Austria's 
agreement with Great Britain, demanded that an EngUsh diplo- 
mat should take part in the negotiation; Bonaparte, on the 
contrary, insisted upon a separate agreement with Austria so 
as to isolate England from her alhes and close to her the Con- 
tinental ports, so that he might meet her alone in combat. 
Cobenzl was not altogether disinclined to consent to such an 
arrangement provided that France pay a sufficiently high price, 
more especially in Italy. Ancient Austria and new France had 
met face to face; each was pursuing a poHcy of conquest, and 
neither could be successful without excluding the other. A 
solution of the problem seemed possible only in the total subju- 
gation of one of the parties. Napoleon, who was perfectly in- 
formed as to the situation of the Austrian forces, resolved upon 
bringing about the crisis, and at the end of November, 1800, he 
declared the armistice at an end. Although Cobenzl still carried 
on negotiations with Joseph Bonaparte at Luneville on the 
French frontier, the questions at issue were decided elsewhere. 
When hostilities were resumed the French were posted on 



2o6 War and Peace [isoo 

the Isar, while the Austrians occupied an advantageous position 
on the further side of the broad Inn. Had they understood 
making use of their advantage they might at least have kept 
their opponents occupied longer than would have been agreeable 
to the chief ruler on the Seine. On the 1st of December, just as 
Moreau was making preparations for the difficult task of effect- 
ing a crossing of the stream behind which the enemy lay en- 
sconced, his left wing was suddenly attacked and thrown back 
while on the march toward the Inn. It seemed beyond belief 
that the enemy should have abandoned their strong position, 
and yet such was the case. Moreau at once profited by the 
advantage so unexpectedly offered him, united the centre with 
the left wing at Hohenlinden, and now in his turn awaited the 
enemy while occupying a strong position. The onslaught of 
the Austrians was sustained by Moreau in front, while two of 
his divisions under command of Richepanse circumvented 
them and attacked them from the rear. Taken by surprise, 
the Austrians sought safety in flight, the Archduke barely 
escaping capture. The battle of Hohenlinden (December 3d, 
1800) had been won by the French, the way to Vienna lay open 
before them. On the 25th of December Moreau signed an 
armistice at Steyer which was to lead to definite peace. On 
the 26th General Brune, who had succeeded Massena in com- 
mand of the Army of Italy, advanced from the south across 
the Mincio and a few days later across the Adige. Austria, 
with her policy of conquest and extension, had been vanquished. 
At Luneville the success attending the French arms had 
speedily made itself felt. Cobenzl had at last agreed to treat 
separately, he was even ready to sign for the German Empire 
as well, and was desirous of coming to an understanding with 
France in regard to a partition of Italy between France and 
Austria in accordance with a proposal of Joseph Bonaparte; 
but the events on the field put an end to all these agreements. 
Austria's diplomacy, like her army, was driven back relent- 
lessly from one position to another: in November Cobenzl had 
still clung to the Oglio as the boundary of Austrian territory in 
Italy, by December he had already receded to the Mincio, and 



^T. 31] The Peace of Luneville 207 

in January he could make claims only as far as to the Adige. 
When finally the definitive treaty of peace was signed, Febru- 
ary 9th, 1801, it contained stipulations which not only de- 
stroyed Austria's plans of conquest, but were even detrimental 
to her position as one of the Great Powers, while to France the 
result of the treaty was to be the confirmation of her revolu- 
tionary system of territorial expansion. The stipulations of 
the treaty of Campo Formio were therein established and in 
certain respects made still more severe. In Italy the Grand- 
duke of Tuscany, whose house was aUied to that of Habsburg, 
was deprived of his estates. Compensation was to be made 
him in German territory, just as the Breisgau had been assigned 
to the Duke of Modena by the treaty of Campo Formio. Aus- 
tria's last foothold in Central Italy was thus taken from her, 
and the entire peninsula surrendered to French influence. 
Moreover, that influence was now beginning to make itself 
felt in Germany also. As had been agreed upon in Rastatt, 
the Rhine throughout its course was to form the boundary Une 
of France, and all temporal princes losing territory on the left 
bank were to receive indemnification in ecclesiastical domains 
on the right of the stream. The old scheme of secularization 
had thus been resumed, and Austria, whose power in Germany 
rested mainly on the ecclesiastical princes, had been constrained 
to sanction it. Napoleon had in the treaty secured to himself 
the right of superintending its execution, and French inter- 
vention in Germany was thus conceded by the head of the 
Empire. Provision for compensation to Austria by means of 
Bavarian territory as far as the Inn had been made in the treaty 
of Campo Formio, but of this there was now no further thought. 
Austria, thus defeated in Italy and threatened in Germany, 
must perforce reUnquish aU hope of conquest such as had ani- 
mated Joseph II. Thugut, the representative of Austria's 
policy of extension, was deprived of his office upon the demand 
of Napoleon. On the 6th of March the Reichstag ratified the 
treaty for the Empire. 

This peace of LuneviUe was not, however, due exclusively 
to success in arms. It was at the same time the result of clever 



2o8 War and Peace [isoi 

diplomatic action. While the armies were yet in the field 
Napoleon had contrived to widen the breach existing in the 
coalition, and had succeeded not only in wholly separating 
Russia from Austria, but even in winning the good-will of the 
Czar for France. Prior to the last campaign Napoleon had 
offered to release about 7000 Russians captured in the last 
battles at Zurich and in Holland, and these he now fitted out 
with new clothing and equipments, and in addition offered 
the Czar the possession of the island of Malta. Paul, who 
regarded the mighty general as the subduer of the detested 
Revolution, was delighted and now became as much prejudiced 
in favour of Napoleon as he had been shortly before against the 
Directory.* The Consul had weighed carefully the conse- 
quences of this step. Malta could no longer be provided with 
suppHes, and consequently could be held but a little while 
longer against the Enghsh besiegers. If the fortress capitulated, 
his offer of it to the Czar would be throwing the apple of dis- 
cord between the two allies. And this was precisely the out- 
come. When, on the 5th of September, 1800, the French 
garrison at Lavallette surrendered and the English took pos- 
session of the island without regard for the rights of the Grand 
Master, the Czar abandoned his allies and seized upon all British 
ships l3dng in Russian harbours. He even proceeded to join 
with Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia in a '' league of armed neu- 
trality" against England's arbitrary proceedings on the seas. 
Napoleon's policy was never so successful as when dealing with 
a state represented by an absolute sovereign; some years later 
he played the same game with Alexander I., and with like suc- 
cess as rewarded his present transactions with the father of 
that monarch. 

The annihilation of EngHsh maritime supremacy was the 
object upon which were now concentrated all the efforts of 

* Without further confirmation it must still remain questionable 
whether Napoleon actually wrote to Paul I., as has recently been asserted 
by Lalanne (" Les derniers jours du Consulat, " p. 4 f .), promising the res- 
toration of the Bourbons and demanding only an Italian principality 
for himself. 



Mt. 31] Isolating England and Austria 109 

French policy. From this time approaches were of necessity 
made toward the United States of America, with which ever 
since the Directory France had for mercantile reasons been 
upon a footing bordering upon warfare. To this state of affairs 
the First Consul put an end. Upon receipt of the tidings of 
the death of General Washington in December, 1799, he 
showed respect by ordering the French army to assume the 
badge of mourning, and a short time afterwards, September 
30th, 1800, a treaty was signed at Morfontaine recognizing the 
absolute independence of the neutral flag. 

In the same way in which he sought to win alhes to his cause 
against England by land and by sea he was endeavouring to 
gain confederates on the Continent against Austria. Imme- 
diately after the Coup d'Etat Napoleon had sent to Berlin his 
aide-de-camp Duroc, in whom he had absolute confidence. His 
mission was to induce the Prussian cabinet to assume armed 
intervention in order to compel Austria to accept the conditions 
imposed upon her by France, and in particular the cession of 
the left bank of the Rhine. Frederick Wilham III., who had 
been King of Prussia since 1797, while unwilUng to accept exactly 
this role, consented at least to remain neutral and came to an 
agreement with Napoleon whereby he was to assist in bringing 
about relations between France and Russia and to consent to 
French acquisition of the Rhine boundary, receiving in return 
the promise from France that Austria should by the terms of 
the treaty of peace make no accessions of territory in Germany, 
that is to say, that she should not obtain an inch of Bavarian 
soil. Jealousy was accordingly the force which moved both of 
these nations to take sides with Napoleon : jealousy on Russia's 
part concerning accessions to Austria in Italy, jealousy on the 
part of Prussia of Austria's making gains in Germany. Their 
consent to the results obtained by the Revolutionary poHcy of 
conquest strengthened the power of the First Consul and enabled 
him to compel Austria to greater sacrifices than he could have 
demanded without this support. French supremacy on the 
Continent had received confirmation at the hands of the Great 
Powers themselves. 



2IO War and Peace [isoi 

Napoleon at once profited by these successes to establish 
definitely the sphere of action of the country over which he 
ruled. His attention was turned first of all to Italy, where the 
Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics were again recognized and 
guaranteed. The former had been very considerably increased 
by the annexation of Modena and the Legations; in both, French 
statesmen stood at the head of the government; both remained 
mere dependencies of France, and the will of the First Consul 
was supreme there as in France. Between these two countries 
lay Piedmont, whose destiny or that of its king had not yet been 
decided, with the exception of Savoy, which had been incor- 
porated into France; but of its eventual fate no one felt the 
least doubt. Napoleon took advantage of the acquisition of 
Tuscany to place Spain under obligations to himself and thus 
gain a directing hand in the management of her policy. After 
the battle of Marengo he had succeeded in driving out of office 
in Madrid a ministry hostile to France. Affairs were then placed 
in the hands of Godoy, the paramour of the queen, who had 
received the title of '' Prince of the Peace." This man was 
ambitious of power and friendly to the interests of France. 
Napoleon's object was attained October 1st, 1800, through the 
treaty of San Ildefonso, by which Tuscany, under the name of 
Kingdom of Etruria, was promised to the queen's daughter, 
who had married the Bourbon Prince of Parma. The trans- 
action was completed by the signature of the Peace of Lune- 
ville, and on the 21st of March, 1801, Spain declared herself 
ready not only to cede to France Parma and its dependency 
Elba, and to give up Louisiana, but, what was to Napoleon of 
greater importance, to constrain Portugal to sever its aUiance 
with Great Britain and to close its ports to all English ships. 
A Spanish army reinforced by a French auxihary corps was 
despatched across the Portuguese frontier, and on the 6th of 
June, 1801, John VI. was forced to sign the treaty of Badajoz, 
which closed all Portuguese harbours to the EngUsh, and by a 
special convention, September 29th, he was bound to pay France 
twenty million francs. 

In Italy there yet remained Rome and Naples to be dealt 



Mt. 31] Naples and the Papal States 2 1 1 

with. In the time of the Directory these two states had each 
been made a repubUc. Were these to be re-estabhshed? Napo- 
leon followed, it is true, the course of development which France 
was undergoing, but always with the stamp of his own indi- 
viduality and according to his own judgment. He was far too 
practical to act simply according to the theories of the ''Idea- 
logues,'' whom he openly ridiculed. It is clear, moreover, that 
as an autocratic ruler the preservation of the repubhcan form 
of government was of no great moment to him. And he ac- 
comphshed his purpose without setting up the republics again. 
During the recent war Russia had made special intercession for 
Naples, and, out of regard for his newly won friend, the First 
Consul was obliged to be lenient with the royal house of the Two 
Sicilies. On March 18th, 1801, he concluded with Ferdinand IV. 
the Peace of Florence, wherein the king agreed to the evacua- 
tion of the Papal States, which had been occupied by Neapohtan 
troops during the war, ceded to France his rights to the island 
of Elba and the principality of Piombino, besides binding him- 
self to what we recognize as the two essential points of the 
poUcy of conquest pursued by the Consul: to close his ports 
to Enghsh ships, and to maintain at his own expense a corps 
of French soldiers in and about Taranto. 

Nor did the States of the Church vacated by the Neapolitans 
come again under the administration of French functionaries. 
It was in this that Napoleon differed most essentially from his 
predecessors in authority. He was by no means religiously in- 
clined and far removed from holding any positive relief. Among 
the writings of his youth figures one, composed no doubt in 
imitation of Voltaire, entitled ^'Un Parallele entre ApoUonius de 
Tyane et Jesus-Christ," in which the result of the comparison is 
in favour of the Greek philosopher.* But this in no wise pre- 

* When in 1802 Lucien reminded him of this dissertation Napoleon 
ordered him not to speak of it inasmuch as, in case it were known of, his 
whole work of religious pacification might be thereby compromised. This 
was not among the writings of his youth which Napoleon himself con- 
signed to the flames. This had been borrowed by Fr^ron and never 
returned. (Lucien, Memoires, II. 114.) 



212 War and Peace [isoi 

vented his recognizing to the full the political significance of the 
Papacy. It has been seen how in 1797 he allowed the States 
of the Church to exist contrary to the wishes of the Directory. 
He was actuated to this poUcy by the fact that during the pre- 
vious year by far the greater proportion of the French people 
had already openly professed faith again in the Cathohc rehgion. 
''The people of France have become Roman Cathohc again," 
wrote General Clarke to Napoleon in December, 1796, " and we 
have perhaps reached the point of needing the Pope himself to 
compel the support of the Revolution by the priests and through 
them by the country districts, which they have succeeded in 
getting again under their control. . . . Would not the attempt 
to overthrow him just at this time be incurring the danger of 
cutting off forever from our government a multitude of French- 
men who are devoted to the Pope and whom we might retain? " 
Napoleon was so entirely convinced of the justice of these 
observations that even at that time after the peace of February, 
1797, he tried to induce the Pope to exhort the priests to obedi- 
ence to the laws of the State. These plans were interrupted by 
the events of the 18th Fructidor. The reason for his present 
attitude toward Rome in 1800 was likewise to be foimd in the 
situation of affairs in the interior of France. Everywhere, in 
Paris as well as in the provinces, crowds flocked to the churches 
presided over by priests who had refused to take the oath of 
allegiance to the laws of the State, while those of the State Church 
priesthood remained empty. The significance of this Napoleon 
rightly appreciated. A great part of the general hatred toward 
the Directory arose from the antipathy they had shown toward 
satisfying the religious wants of the people. He was determined 
to be the object of no such hatred. Moreover, he needed to come 
to an understanding with Rome in order to bring about a definite 
pacification of La Vendee. He resolved upon making a compact 
with the Pope. To Pius VII., who had been elected in Venice, 
March 13th, 1800, he made the proposition, soon after the battle 
of Marengo, of assuring the continued existence of the States of 
the Church, — divested, indeed, of the Legations, — on condition 
that the Holy Father would lend his aid to the estabhshment of 



Mt. 31] The Concordat 213 

an acceptable peace between Church and State in France. Pius 
VII. accepted these terms with alacrity and sent his Secretary 
of State, Cardinal Consalvi, to Paris, where, on the 15th of July, 
1801, a concordat was signed. This aboUshed the rehgiotis laws 
of 1790 (new divisions of dioceses, election of bishops and priests 
by parishes, abolition of celibacy), and recognized the Pope as 
head of the Church; and accorded him the right to confirm the 
bishops nominated by the First Consul; on the other hand the 
aUenation of the Church property was accepted by the See of 
Rome, the old maxim of the Galilean Church was acknowledged 
that the Church exists in the State, and not the State within 
the Church, and the agreement made that dignitaries of the 
Church should receive their remuneration, Uke officials of the 
State, at the hands of the government. 

In restoring the States of the Church to Pius VII. Napoleon 
made no sacrifice, but rather secured through this means a marked 
advantage to himself. All-powerful as he now was in Italy, the 
Pope, as a secular prince, would of necessity assume a position 
of dependence toward him, and he thus attained a result which 
Kaunitz, Joseph 11. , and Thugut, with their schemes of conquest 
in the Apennine peninsula, had striven for in vain. Referring 
on one occasion at St. Helena to his attitude toward Rome at 
this time, he expressed himself in these remarkable words : " Ca- 
thoHcism preserved the Pope for me, and with my influence and 
our armies in Italy I did not despair of acquiring sooner or later, 
by one means or another, the control of this Pope, and then how 
vast would be my influence ! What a lever I should have with 
which to move the rest of the world ! " 

Thus had Napoleon estabhshed his sway in western Europe 
after the conclusion of peace at Luneville. Holland, Portugal, 
and Italy furnished their quota toward reimbursement of the 
French treasury; everyivhere, extending far into German territory, 
French troops were sustained at the expense of neighbouring and 
dependent countries ; from Holland to Sicily the ports were closed 
to ships and products of the powerful enemy across the Channel. 
In the Channel itself the First Consul collected a flotilla in order 
to keep the English in ceaseless fear of a descent of the French 



214 War and Peace [isoi 

army. And in fact there came a moment in which the crushing 
of this antagonist also seemed no distant possibility. The aUied 
powers, Denmark, Sweden, and Russia, took up arms against Eng- 
land, atid the Czar Paul I. was so far carried away by his visionary 
ardour as to project an expedition which was to march by way 
of Khiva and Herat to India, there to strike the common enemy 
a death-blow. Napoleon's visions of universal supremacy 
took on more definite shape than ever before. Was not the 
French army yet in Egypt, whence it might with profit aid and 
support this Russian expedition against the Punjab? 

But this dream was destined to last only for a moment. 

During the night of March 23d, 1801, the Czar fell a victim 
to a palace revolution. His despotic arrogance had degenerated 
into insupportable cruelty toward those nearest to him. His 
son, Alexander I., succeeded him on the throne of Russia. It is 
said that upon the arrival of this news, which reached Paris on 
the 17th of April, Napoleon was thrown into a state of genuine 
despair. His magnificent schemes were all overthrown for the 
present, for it soon became known that Alexander had released 
all the Enghsh ships which had been seized in Russian ports and 
that he renounced all claim to the office of Grand Master of the 
Knights of St. John, that is to say, to possession of the island of 
Malta. Thus by a single blow Napoleon saw deferred into the 
remote future the fulfilment of those aims which had seemed so 
near through the friendship of one who was, it is true, partially 
demented, and was forced to content himself for the time being 
with advantages less brilhant than those upon which he had 
counted. 

It so happened that, even before the imlooked-for death of 
the Czar, Pitt had, for reasons connected with the domestic 
pontics of the kingdom, retired, March 14th, 1801, from the 
leadership of the British government. The peace-loving Adding- 
ton succeeded him as prime minister and at once made overtures 
to Napoleon. Were these to be rejected? The French people were 
clamouring daily more loudly for peace, and their demand was no 
longer to be overlooked. The public was aware of England's 
proposition, and the First Consul could no longer justify his 



Mt. 32] Manoeuvres toward a Peace 2 1 5 

policy of war, as he had done in the preceding year, by alleging 
Great Britain's unwillingness to treat. He accordingly accepted 
England's proposal, although solely for the purpose of taking the 
utmost advantage of his opponent's disinclination for war. In 
the course of her long contest on the seas England had made a 
number of valuable acquisitions. The Antilles, with the excep- 
tion of Guadeloupe, and the factories at Pondicherry and Chander- 
nagore in India had been taken by her from the French, while 
Holland had been compelled to give up Ceylon and the Cape of 
Good Hope, and Spain had yielded Trinidad to her superior 
forces. In the Mediterranean Malta and Minorca had already 
fallen into her hands, and apparently the time was not far distant 
when Egypt also must be reckoned among the conquests of Great 
Britain. Relying upon the friendship of the ''neutral" powers, 
Napoleon thought himself strong enough to compel England to 
give up all of these acquisitions. But a sudden end was put to 
aU such aspirations on the part of Napoleon by the arrival of 
tidings of the death of the Czar, followed shortly by word from 
Egypt that General Menou, who had succeeded to the command 
of the army in Egypt upon the assassination of Kleber, had been 
defeated before Alexandria and driven back into the city. Upon 
learning of this the Enghsh showed themselves again less dis- 
posed to obtain peace at a sacrifice. Negotiations were broken 
off and each party strove to get the advantage of the other by 
means of mihtary or diplomatic successes. England prosecuted 
every possible means for bringing about a reconcihation with 
the new Czar, and sent a corps of troops to Egypt which was 
there to join forces with the Turks in order to compel the French 
to capitulate. Napoleon on his part urged upon Spain the con- 
quest of Portugal with a view to acquiring thus a territory which 
might be given to England as compensation for terms of peace 
of the most favourable character, just as he had deUvered Venice 
to Austria in 1797. He further sought to secure to France the 
good-will of Alexander I. by sending to St. Petersburg his aide- 
de-camp Duroc, a man in whom he felt unHmited confidence. 

In the midst of these conflicting interests it was England 
which was successful. In Egypt Cairo was surrendered in June, 



2i6 War and Peace [isoi 

and with its fall the capitulation of Alexandria was assured. 
On the Peninsula, too, the hopes of France were blasted, for 
there Spain concluded with Portugal the separate peace already 
mentioned guaranteeing independence to the latter country. 
It was now Napoleon who made the proposal to resume nego- 
tiations. To this England was not ill-disposed, for Nelson, who 
had but a short time before compelled Denmark to retire from 
the league of neutral powers, had been repulsed in an attack 
on the French Channel fleet. Concessions were made upon 
both sides, and on the 1st of October, 1801, preUminaries were 
signed at London according to the terms of which England 
was to retain of all her recent conquests only Trinidad, which 
had been taken from Spain, and Ceylon, which had belonged 
to Holland; the islands and ports of the Mediterranean were 
to be evacuated by her, and Malta was to be restored to the 
Knights of the Order of St. John. The French, on the other 
hand, pledged themselves to restore Egypt to Turkey, to guar- 
antee the integrity of Portugal, and to withdraw their troops 
from the kingdom of Naples. 

England might perhaps have obtained more favourable 
terms had the signing of the treaty been delayed, for but a short 
time after this event the tidings reached Europe that Menou 
had been obhged to surrender Alexandria to the combined 
forces of England and Turkey. This capitulation put an end 
to French occupation of Egypt and to one of the most glorious 
of Napoleon^s dreams. For he never returned to a scheme of 
which he had made so unequivocal a failure. He was now 
definitively thrown back upon the Continent of Europe for the 
working out of his plans. It was, however, a triumph of no 
mean order, when England, which for a century had contested 
with her whole might every encroachment made by France upon 
the Continent as a direct detriment to her interests, was com- 
pelled to acquiesce at a time when Napoleon had far surpassed 
Louis XIV. in his most ambitious designs. 

France and Russia, October 8th, 1801, signed a treaty of 
peace which contained the important stipulation that the two 
States bound themselves not to tolerate secret agitations of 



^T. 32] The Peace of Amiens 2 1 7 

the emigres against their country. In this manner Napoleon 
renounced for the time being all support of the Poles, and the 
Czar that of the Bourbons (article 3). Three days later, in a 
secret compact which determined for Europe its immediate 
future and so was of equal importance with the treaty with 
England, these two powers engaged to regulate in common the 
compensations to be made to the German princes, and in the 
same way to decide the Italian question together so far as it 
was not already determined through the treaties of peace with 
Rome, Austria, and Naples. At the same time — October 9th, 
1801 — an agreement was signed between France and Turkey 
according to which all previous compacts between the two 
countries were made valid. Finally, a treaty full of promise 
to the Elector had been signed with Bavaria a short time 
before, and with it the last armed foe had been appeased. 

The cry of Peace ! rang out through the length and breadth 
of the land. All the nations rejoiced to see the end of a struggle 
which had become unendurable. To his fame as a hero of war 
Napoleon had added that of estabUsher of peace, and to him 
was accorded both at home and abroad an esteem without 
parallel — ^in France, where the people saw the hopes fulfilled 
which they had founded on him on his return, and in other 
countries, where the governments of the old States welcomed 
him as the subduer of the Revolution and cherished the firm 
expectation that, content with what had been acquired, he 
would by his power insure tranquillity to Europe. ''This is 
no ordinary peace," said the English prime minister, Addington, 
"it is the actual reconciliation of the two foremost nations of 
the world." And Fox, having met Napoleon in Paris, returned 
to London full of enthusiasm for the great man. But even at 
that time there were far-seeing statesmen who felt less confident 
of this desirable outcome. When on the 27th of March, 1802, 
the Treaty of Amiens confirmed the terms of the prehminaries 
signed between France and England in the preceding October, 
the acclamations of joy with which the news was received were 
disturbed by the warning voices of the members of the opposi- 
tion in Parliament with the reminder that "We have sane- 



21 8 War and Peace [I802 

tioned the possession of Italy by France and at the same time 
her supremacy over the Continent." Indeed, Napoleon him- 
self but half concealed his ambitious designs. But a few weeks 
after the battle of Marengo he said to the Prussian envoy at 
Paris: ''I desire peace for the sake of establishing securely the 
existing government of France as well as for the sake of saving 
the world from chaos." And these words were no empty figure 
of speech. Their true meaning is to be gathered from a semi- 
official pamphlet published in 1801 and entitled "De TEtat 
de la France a la fin de Tan VIII." Hauterive was its author, 
one of the most excellent of the officials in the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Talleyrand's right-hand man. The follow- 
ing principles were therein advocated: At the time of the break- 
ing out of the Revolution the political system of Europe had 
long since been impaired and was no longer worthy of being 
maintained; the war between France and the other powers 
was nothing but a consequence of this condition. France, 
victorious in this contest, had undertaken to establish in the 
place of the discarded system of the balance of power a new 
system of federation, and this purpose had been already partially 
accomplished. By reason of her military and financial resources 
as well as on account of her principles of government France 
was destined to become security for peace and prosperity, to 
be the director of this new European confederacy, and it was 
to the interest of all the other powers to yield themselves with 
full confidence to her guidance. 

Such, in plain terms, was the political programme of the new 
France. At bottom it did not differ from that of the Revolu- 
tionary government, its predecessor. But if it had been the 
design of the Convention to create a federation of republics in 
Europe under French leadership, Napoleon's object was far less 
concerned with the giving of freedom to the nations than with 
securing the submission of their rulers to the hegemony of the 
State governed by himself. In his criticism of Hauterive's 
pamphlet, Gentz, the famous publicist and a man of genius, 
showed his discrimination by calling certain facts to the atten- 
tion of the statesmen of the old system in 1801 in the following 



Mt. 32] The Question of the Future 219 

words: ''When it is said that France has extended her bounda- 
ries in all directions through her conquests, that her old in- 
violable territory has been surrounded by new defences, and 
that her influence upon all neighbouring countries has been 
increased to formidable proportions, the truth has been but 
partially stated. The actual fact is this: France in her present 
condition recognizes no boundaries whatsoever; all neigh- 
bouring States are now in fact, even if not nominally, her de- 
pendencies and property, or may become such upon the first 
convenient occasion whenever it may seem desirable to the 
men placed at the head of the government." No, the peace now 
prevaiUng over Europe was not a reconcihation of the peoples 
such as short-sighted ministers had been deluded into calling 
it, this was but a halting-place on the road to universal domin- 
ion along which Napoleon unremittingly advanced, impelled by 
revolutionary tradition as well as by personal ambition. 

But in case he had determined to abide by revolutionary 
poHcy in relation to other countries, the question arises, the 
most important perhaps of any to the historian of those times: 
to what extent might and must this pohcy affect the govern- 
mental and social conditions of these other countries and nations 
of Europe whose organization differed so materially from that of 
the new France? The revolutionary armies had carried but little 
into foreign countries during the last few years of the eighteenth 
century beyond riot and disorder, for in France itself nothing 
else existed. Were the armies of Napoleon to introduce nothing 
better wherever they should penetrate? That depended upon 
whether he were really successful in restoring lasting conditions 
of order in the interior, in selecting from the chaos of revolution- 
ary legislation such laws as were salutary, thus fulfilling the 
second great hope which the nation had builded upon him at 
the time of his return. This task he took upon himself, and he 
accomplished it, not for the sake of making the French people 
happy, — ^he never loved them enough for that,* — but in order 

* See a most interesting scene in the "M6moires de Mme. de R^musat," 
I. 246, and the observation of Mme. de Stael (Considerations, II. 199): 
" He despised the nation whose approbation he coveted." 



220 War and Peace [isol 

to create a secure foundation for the structure of his world-empire. 
For this purpose, and for this purpose only, should France herself 
become strong, powerful, and rich, for under these circumstances 
alone would she be equal to making the sacrifices demanded by 
his ambition. Neither he nor France could indeed foresee at 
the beginning of the revolutionary monarchy that these sacrifices 
made for the sake of an experiment which shaped the history 
of the world would in the end cost the Hves of a million men and yet 
fail of attaining the object sought. It must be confessed that 
his predecessors in power, the Convention and the Directory, had 
sent almost as great a number of Frenchmen to their death 
without even procuring in compensation order and prosperity^ 
to the country. This at least Napoleon wholly accomplished. 



GHAPTER IX 

THE NEW FRANCE AND HER SOVEREIGN 

The great work of reorganizing France was carried through 
by Napoleon with the aid of a large number of talented and ex- 
perienced assistants, some of whom, as members of the Council 
of State, discussed the new measures and formulated them into 
decrees and laws, while others in the capacity of ministers and 
director-generals carried them into effect with precision after 
they had been passed by the Chambers. The Council of State, 
which has continued to exist in France up to the present day, 
furnished the First Consul with an exact portrayal of the condi- 
tion of affairs within the country; it put at his disposal the wealth 
of experience acquired by gifted men not only during the event- 
ful ten years of the Revolution, but also, before that time, in the 
employ of the royal government; it enabled him to make use of 
the practical intelligence of men whose fitness for service of the 
State had been developed in the free atmosphere of the Revolu- 
tion as fully as the mihtary genius of Hoche and of Bonaparte. 
It is to these first Councillors of State, such men as Boulay de la 
Meurthe, Roederer, Chaptal. BerUer, Duchatel. Defermon, Du- 
fresne, Fourcroy, Cretet, Barbe-Marbois, Regnault de Saint-Jean- 
d'Angely,to whom honour is due for having accompHshed the final 
regulation of French finances, the reform in internal administra- 
tion, the codification of the laws, the estabhshment of perma- 
nent institutions for worship and education, — ^in short, for having 
brought together all the valuable material from which arose under 
the eye of the most skilful of architects the commodious edifice 
of modem France. In their pohtical past these collaborators of 
Napoleon's differed widely from one another. The RoyaUsts 
were represented among them by Dufresne, the Girondists by 
Defermon, Radical members of the Convention by Fourcroy 

221 



222 The New France and Her Sovereign [isoo 

and Berlier, Moderates of the time of the Directory by Regnaud 
and Roederer, and exiles of the 18th Fructidor by Portalis and 
Barbe-Marbois. 

Napoleon had purposely chosen his men from different parties 
so that his reforms might not appear to be the work of any par- 
ticular faction. They were divided into Commissions of Finance, 
Justice, War, the Navy, and the Interior. The First Consul pre- 
sided at their deliberations, and such was the capacity of his intel- 
lect that he could enter into all the detail of affairs without be- 
coming confused and was, on the contrary, ready at any moment 
to judge of the matter under discussion in its entirety from the 
point of view of the sovereign. 

The second task of the public administration, the execution 
of the laws and decrees passed by the Council of State, was in- 
cumbent upon the ministers, and their measures were likewise 
as much under the supervision and control of Bonaparte as were 
the dehberations and resolutions of the Council of State. The 
names of the men to whom he entrusted the seven existing port- 
folios when taking up the reins of government have already been 
given, and here also the men were selected with a like regard 
to diversity of political faith. He said one day to his brother 
Joseph: ''Where is the revolutionary who will lack confidence in 
a state of affairs in which Fouche is Minister of Pohce? and where 
is the nobleman, if he has remained a Frenchman, who will not 
hope to find his wants provided for in a country where a Perigord, 
a former bishop of Autun, is in power? I am protected on the 
left by one and on the right by the other. I mean that my gov- 
ernment shall unite all Frenchmen, It is a broad road in which 
all may find room." To certain of the ministries Napoleon asso- 
ciated "directions generales," an institution still existent in the 
administrative organization of France. These ''directions" in- 
cluded bridges and roads, public instruction, worship, the treas- 
ury, customs, registration fees, domains, the liquidation of the 
pubhc debt, and sundry others from among which independent 
ministries were soon created. 

Official communication between the First Consul and his 
ministers was made through the Secretary of State. This im- 



.Et. 30] Internal Administration 223 

portant office had been filled ever since 1799 by the faithful and 
capable Maret, who continued to execute his functions in that 
position almost up to the end of the Napoleonic rule. He was 
without an equal in his abihty for giving immediate form and 
expression to the thoughts hurriedly let fall by his master and 
for following inteUigently his hasty dictation. Maret was in 
reahty a Cabinet Minister kept at the level of a clerk by the con- 
summate superiority of Napoleon. It is from the office of the 
Secretary of State that there issued those innumerable letters 
addressed to all sorts of officials and persons which make up to- 
day the many quarto volumes of Napoleon's correspondence and 
bear witness to the indefatigable activity of master and servants. 
The laws and ordinances with the execution of which the 
ministers were charged were transmitted by them to newly cre- 
ated subordinate officials, by whom they were introduced into 
the "departments." On February 17th, 1800, the law was pro- 
mulgated which forms to-day the basis of French administrative 
apparatus. According to its provisions in every " department " 
the chief administrative officer is a prefect, in every ^'Ar- 
rondissement " a sub-prefect, in every '^Commune" a mayor, 
— all three classes being appointed by the Chief Magis- 
trate and subordinated to the Minister of the Interior. During 
the Revolution the government of the provinces had rested in 
the hands of elective councils, a system which had led not only 
to partiahty and to irregularities of many kinds, but even to 
downright disobedience to the central authority, with the result 
that the Constitution of 1795 establishing the Directory totally 
aboHshed the autonomous municipahties. Napoleon now re- 
established these communal authorities; the officers, however, 
were not to be elective. The chief official of the commune was to 
be the mayor, appointed and paid by the State, while the members 
of the municipal council assisting him, who were advisers merely 
without votes, were to be appointed by the prefect from the list 
of notables. In like manner the sub-prefect had his district council 
and the prefect his general council, both appointed by the First 
Consul to regulate the direct taxes to be levied in the depart- 
ment, to make appropriations, and to bring to the attention of 



224 The New France and Her Sovereign [I800 

the government the needs and interests of their jurisdictions. 
It was a system of rigid centraHzation which gave to the man 
placed at the head of government boundless influence upon the 
smallest details of the communal administration. It was, as 
Napoleon himself said, a hierarchy of ''First Consuls in minia- 
ture," a bureaucracy resembling that established under RicheHeu 
and Louis XIV., but with this distinctive difference, that its 
mechanism was not hampered and impeded either by the privi- 
leges and local tariffs of the provinces, nor by reason of the ex- 
ceptional conditions of privileged classes and corporations; more- 
over, it did not govern a people filled with theoretical aspirations 
toward hberty, but one which had through practical experience 
grown heartily tired of it and who longed more than anything 
for the opportunity to live in tranquillity. 

Early in March, 1800, the first prefects were appointed, 
being selected, just as the ministers and Councillors of State had 
been, with care to avoid making one political party more promi- 
nent than another; the royalist Count La Rochefoucauld figures 
beside the arch-Jacobin De Bry and the Girondist Doulcet de 
Pontecoulant. There was no lack of work for all. During 
the year 1800 there were still no taxes collected and the amount 
of revenue due from the departments was scarcely known. 
The State was indebted to the lowest of its servants for half a 
yearns salary; some among them even died of starvation. In 
the open country the most appalling insecurity prevailed. The 
highroads, fallen into disrepair, were the lurking-place of numer- 
ous bands of robbers, who pursued their calling up to the very 
outskirts of Paris, and whose misdeeds form the chief subject 
of report on the part of the officials. In a single department, 
that of Vaucluse, not less than ninety cases of highway 
robbery and murder were committed within the year 1801. 
Many communities were driven by terror into maldng common 
cause with the brigands and affording them refuge. In the 
cities the state of affairs was not in the slightest degree better 
than in the country. Speaking of what was to be seen in Toulon, 
a Councillor of State writes: "No police in the city, no street- 
lamps, every night stores broken into and robbed, no pave- 



Mt. 30] The Restoration of Prosperity 225 

merits, no cleanliness, no safety, no town taxes, no bread at 
the hospitals." Only with the greatest difficulty could the 
new government fulfil its most important duty, of protecting 
the Ufe and property of citizens. Special tribunals were estab- 
lished in February, 1801, and these with the aid of the "gen- 
darmerie," now reorganized by Napoleon, soon purged the 
land of the bands of criminals which had infested it. This 
police force had already undergone a reform in the time of the 
Directory, but its effectiveness was vastly increased and its 
zeal for duty greatly stimulated by being put under the com- 
mand of a general of merit and experience. By 1802 cases of 
murder or highway robbery had already become rare. A law 
of February 17th, 1800, provided for the security of towns b}^ 
instituting a commission of police in every commune of more 
than 5000 inhabitants and pohce "directions" in all such as 
included more than 100,000 souls. By a decree of July 1st, 
1800, a prefect of poUce was established in Paris who had charge 
of both the political detectives and the city pohce force. 

Measures having thus been taken to insure protection to 
the hfe and property of citizens, the next step to be considered 
must be toward promoting or rather laying the foundations 
of general prosperity, for there was none at the time. The 
arbitrary financial legislation of the revolutionary governments, 
incessant war, which had put an end to all export trade, and 
the imstable paper-money system had combined to ruin in- 
dustry and traffic. The manufacturer in Paris who had for- 
merly employed from sixty to eighty workmen now contented 
himself with ten. The lace-making industry, once so flourishing 
in the North, the Hnen industry in Brittany, and the celebrated 
paper manufactory in the department of Charente were all 
practically annihilated, and the number of silk-manufacturing 
concerns at Lyons had diminished by one half. In Marseilles 
the amount of sales per month no longer equalled what it had 
been per week before the Revolution began. The harbours, 
more especially those on the ocean, had become choked with 
sand; their defences had fallen to ruin, the inhabitants were 
starving. Such business as continued, to be carried on at all 



2 26 The New France and Her Sovereign [isoo 

was done at the Stock Exchange, where the vast and constantly 
fluctuating difference between real and fictitious values was a 
temptation to gambling or to speculation in army suppHes, 
whereby the contractors and the officers whom they had bribed 
were enriched at the expense of the soldiers who were being 
driven to want and death by the unscrupulous conduct of the 
government. Only a complete reform of the administration 
of finances could secure respect for the government, money 
for its treasury and national credit, all of which were essential 
to any scheme for improving in a radical way the position of 
the substantial people of the country. 

It is an exceedingly interesting historical study to see how 
France, almost overwhelmed during the rule of the Convention 
and Directory by a sea of worthless paper money, worked its 
way out in spite of everything and returned to normal economic 
conditions and a regulated standard of values. In order 
to re-establish the national credit, which had been exhausted 
through the innumerable debts contracted by the royal govern- 
ment, the revolutionary authorities declared the estates of the 
clergy and of the nobles who had emigrated to be the property 
of the nation, and issued notes or ''assignats" based on these 
lands as currency. But in consequence of the general feeUng 
of uncertainty the value of real estate decreased and the prop- 
erty became for the most part unsalable; the war, which in the 
intoxication of untried liberty had been declared against all 
Europe, consumed immense sums, and eventually the assignats, 
of which more and more were continually being issued, became 
worthless. In 1795 a louis d'or rose in value from 24 francs to 
1800, and in February, 1796, to 8137 francs in assignats, so that 
a Hvre in gold was worth almost 340 livres in paper. The 
Directory had recourse to arbitrary enactments. The 24 
billions of assignats in circulation were called in towards the end 
of March, 1796, and the holders received in exchange but one 
thirtieth of their face value in so-called ''mandats territoriaux." 
These, however, were in turn nothing more than orders upon 
the national lands and, in spite of their enforced circulation, 
they fell at the end of a few weeks to one twentieth of their 



iET.30] The Public Debt 227 

nominal value, and in the following year to one hundredth. 
When finally the government was compelled to repeal the act 
forcing the people to accept them as currency, they disappeared 
entirely from circulation. They had only served to enable 
certain speculators to purchase from the Directory during the 
course of a year the larger part of the government lands, so that 
the State lost in this way most of its domains, having received 
in return in ready money scarcely one hundredth part of their 
value, which amounted to several bilUons. Sordid usurers, 
unscrupulous speculators, and a vast number of small con- 
tractors — estimated to number not less than 1,200,000 — had 
thus acquired the estates of monasteries and of ancient famiUes 
of rank, a change of ownership so rapid and so complete as to 
be unequalled either before that time or even in the nineteenth 
century, in spite of its rapid economic and social changes. 

The original intention had been to pay the pubhc debt of 
France with the proceeds of the sale of State property, but this, 
under existing circumstances, could no longer be thought of. 
In 1793 the Convention had already been obhged to decree that 
the outstanding public debt should be entered in the ''Great 
Book of the public debt" as a consoUdated fund irredeemable 
beyond the payment of 5% annual interest. In 1797 the 
annual interest had risen to over 250 million francs, of which, 
however, only one fourth was paid in cash, the remainder being 
in bonds upon the national estates, which had been added to 
by the confiscation of the Belgian monasteries. But the burden 
remained nevertheless far too heavy, and the Directory sought 
relief by retaining only one third of the national debt in the 
''Great Book," the other two thirds being paid to the creditors 
in land bonds. But since these bonds fell with the credit of the 
government to ^% of their face value before the end of the year 
1798, the reduction of the debt had been in fact simple bank- 
ruptcy whereby the creditors of France were robbed of two 
thirds of their claims. But even the remaining so-called "con- 
solidated " third was not paid in specie, but again in bonds. 
Under such conditions no further confidence in the govern- 
ment could exist among the solid men of the business world. 



228 The New France and Her Sovereign [isoo 

The people replied by a refusal to pay taxes. The Directory 
resorted to forced loans. In 1800 the arrears had reached the 
sum of 1100 millions. 

To reduce to order such a state of affairs required an iron 
determination.* But in the course of this single year a 
remedy was found for the most serious of these abuses, and 
provisions were made which prevented the possibility of a 
return to such conditions. On November 24th, 1799, "direc- 
tions (boards of managers) of direct taxes " were established in 
every " department " such as are still in operation at the present 
time. Further, the assessment of taxes, which had hitherto 
varied from year to year, was now regulated upon fixed prin- 
ciples. "There is no real security of possession," said Napo- 
leon, "except in a country where the rate of taxation does not 
vary every year." An exact survey of all real estate in France 
was another matter to which he turned his attention. In Sep- 
tember, 1801. were appointed a "direction g^n^rale" of the cus- 
toms and of the registration of landed property; the reorganized 
bureau of forestry in a single year almost doubled the revenue 
obtained during the preceding twelve months. The revenues 
and income from public property being at length regulated 
and entrusted to the management of the Minister of Finance, 
the department of expenses and of the national debt under- 
went a similar reform and was committed in 1801 to the care 
of a special "treasury department," at the head of which was 

♦Reference has already been made to the first steps taken by 
Gaudin. the new Minister of Finance. To enable the State to continue 
its existence during the first year of his administration he was obliged to 
make use of the old system of expensive loans and extortion of funds 
from adjacent countries. Seventy millions were practically repudiated, 
as he simply forbade the payment of the orders on the revenue which the 
Directory had issued to contractors, except within a given time and at 
their value in specie or short-time bills Jt was important above all to 
regulate and assure the position of the landholders With this end in 
view the Constitution of the year VIII had solemnly guaranteed to 
holders of national estates, no matter how obtained, the ownership of 
those lands (articles 93, 94). Other measures to be taken belonged to 
the province of financial policy. 



iET. 30] The Bank of France 229 

placed the Councillor of State Barbe-Marbois.* To this de- 
partment was submitted the control of the sinking fimd (caisse 
d'amortissement), which had been since July, 1801, under the 
management of MoUien, a most capable man. It was this 
institution doubtless which did more than anything else toward 
raising the national credit. The Consulate had inherited from 
the Directory a residue of unsold national domains worth 400 
millions. Instead of squandering these resources as his prede- 
cessors in power had done, Napoleon sought to make them more 
profitable. He assigned 90 millions to the sinking fund to 
be gradually disposed of, the proceeds being used to redeem 
state bonds so that they should continue to circulate at 50, 
to which point they had risen after the treaty of Luneville. 
Napoleon could then issue new bonds at this rate of exchange 
and thus discharge floating debts and arrears of interest from 
former years. A further 120 miUions of this national property 
were dedicated with their proceeds to the administration of 
Public Instruction, while 40 miUions were to go to the support 
of disabled soldiers, thus reheving the budget. The victorious 
outcome of the war made it possible to leave the greater part 
of the army to subsist on foreign territory, which also aided 
to lighten the burden which the state had to bear. 

In order to promote industry and trade the Bank of France 
was established on the 18th of January, 1800, with a capital 
of 30 miUions, the state holding shares for 5 millions which had 
been taken from the security furnished by the Treasury officials. 
The Bank was given the privilege of issuing notes up to a certain 
amount; in return it bound itself to put its capital at the dis- 
position of the Treasury. Ordinances were passed also regu- 
lating the affairs of the stock exchange, re-establishing the 
chambers of commerce suppressed by the Revolution, providing 
for frequent national expositions, etc. With confidence and 
good-will on the part of the people it would now be possible to 

* This division of the administration of finances between two ministers 
was maintained until 1815. Napoleon attempted to justify this course 
by saying that a single minister offered him no such security. Where there 
were two, each acted as a constant check upon the other. 



230 The New France and Her Sovereign [I800 

restore equilibrium to the finances and, this accomplished, the 
lost credit of France would soon be recovered. The govern- 
ment having done all in its power to bring this about, the people 
no longer hesitated to do their share. Taxes were promptly paid 
in, and the financial undertakings of the government again met 
with the support of the substantial business men. Progress in 
this direction was marked after the signing of the peace of 
Amiens, which seemed to mean the dawn of a new era of uni- 
versal peace. 

But this entire organism would have been without lasting 
value if the rights and duties of individuals toward one another 
had not at the same time been definitely determined and made 
known to every one. The demand was imperative for a code 
clearly and precisely setting forth the law of the land, which the 
Revolution had completely changed. Up to 1789 there had 
been no uniformity of law in France. The North was governed 
principally by the customary law (coutumes) formulated in 
the sixteenth century, while in the South the Roman law 
(droit ecrit) prevailed; in addition there were numerous local 
laws. Even before the Revolution the Chancellor Maupeou 
had pointed out the necessity for a reform of the judicial system 
and a codification and simplification of these manifold forms 
of law. But the Revolution, which followed with its ruling 
principle of "Equal rights for all," made an end of the diversity 
in French jurisprudence. A new national civil code was prom- 
ised in the Constitution of 1791; in that of 1793 the promise 
was renewed and extended to include a code of criminal law 
to be likewise national, but in 1799 neither promise had yet 
been fulfilled, and in the night session of November 10th, in 
which Napoleon was invested with the supreme power, the two 
commissions were again instructed to formulate a code. And 
now at last through the strong will of a single man was accom- 
plished what had been fruitlessly attempted by the many. On 
the 12th of August, 1800, Napoleon appointed a committee 
consisting of three eminent jurists, Tronchet, Bigot de Preame- 
neu, and PortaHs (of the Council of the Ancients), with Male- 
ville as secretary, to draw up a civil code. These men appor- 



MT.d2] The Civil Code 231 

tioned the work among themselves and, taking as a basis a 
scheme which Cambaceres had at one time laid before the Con- 
vention, by the end of four months had finished the task. The 
proposed code was then dehberated upon in the Council of State, 
where it was revised by the jurists Boulay de la Muerthe, Berlier, 
Abrial, and the Consuls Cambaceres and Lebrun (former secre- 
tary to the Chancellor Maupeou), Napoleon himself frequently 
taking part in the discussion and settling disputed points. 
Those who were present bear witness to his penetrating observa- 
tions and clear ideas, though these at times betrayed a point 
of view quite foreign to the jurist. The laws restricting the 
grounds for divorce and placing parents under obligation to 
support their children are with sundry others said to have been 
due to him. 

Before the end of the year 1801 the Code had already been 
presented in three parts to the Council of State for discussion. 
The ordinances of the Chancellor d'Aguesseau enacted between 
1737 and 1750 were found to contain many things of value 
which were incorporated among the new laws; the ancient 
"Coutumes" and the Roman law were also drawn upon so far 
as they did not conflict with the Revolutionary principle of 
Equality, for this spirit was dominant throughout the whole 
of this monumental work. The Revolution had abohshed 
hereditary nobiUty, the civil code did not re-estabhsh it; in 
the laws concerning inheritance it had set up as a principle that 
children of different age and sex should enjoy equal rights, and 
this also was approved by the civil code; the Revolution had 
granted, though not without hesitation, all rights of citizenship 
to the Jews, and these were confirmed without reserve by the 
civil code; it had introduced for all classes and for all reUgions 
registration of civil status [births, marriages, etc.], and civil 
marriage, both of which innovations were retained by the civil 
code; it had declared the marriage relation capable of dissolu- 
tion, and the civil code abode by this decision. But whereas the 
National Assembly and the Convention had elaborated only certain 
portions of the laws governing individuals, the Consulate carried 
the work much farther and formulated a system of laws em- 



232 The New France and Her Sovereign [isoi 

bracing the whole civil life of the people. The merit for this 
belongs indisputably to the First Consul of France, and the 
book in which the laws of the land are inscribed is accordingly 
rightfully named the "Code Napoleon." The three parts of 
the civil code, adopted in turn by the Council of State, were, on 
the 21st of March, 1804, incorporated together into a single 
body of laws. 

The codification of criminal law, of laws of procedure and 
of commerce was likewise undertaken, and the value of the result 
of these labours, so extensive that their branches cannot even be 
enumerated here, is proven by the wide circle into which they 
have been adopted.* For these books of the law were not to 
benefit France alone : wherever the power of Napoleon extended 
the new laws were carried with it, and when, later, a time came 
when the French people were driven back within their former 
boundaries, their laws remained a testimony to the former great- 
ness of their country. Up to the present day the "Code Napo- 
leon" is still in force in Rhenish Prussia, Rhenish Bavaria, Rhenish 
Hesse, and, with slight modifications, in the Grand Duchy of Ba- 
den, in Holland, Belgium, Italy, etc. It is only within a very 
few years that the French method of procedure in criminal 
cases, public and oral with the assistance of a jury, has ceased to 
prevail in the Prussian provinces on the Rhine. To this day the 
"Code de Commerce " is in force in Belgium and Italy, in Greece 
and the principahties on the Danube, and has served as a model 
in almost every land where laws of commerce have been framed. 
With these codes of law the principles of equality upon which 
they were based were also carried into foreign countries, where 
they exerted a civilizing and refining influence which was within 
a short time to change the face of the world in spite of all reaction 
against them. Who would deny the greatness of the man whose 
powerful hand brought into being and controlled such a lever ! 

* The deliberations concerning the "Code penal" and the "Code d'in- 
struction criminelle" were begun in March, 1801, and brought to com- 
pletion in 1810. The "Code de procedure civile" was drafted in 1802, 
submitted to the "Corps l^gislatif in 1806," and put into operation in 
1807. The "Code de Commerce" was elaborated between 1801 and 1807, 
and was put in force in 1808. 



iET. 32] Education 233 

The rights and welfare of the existing generation provided 
for, Napoleon turned his attention to the education and training 
of the next. In the matter of pubhc instruction, just as had 
been the case in all other branches of the administration, the 
Revolution, in seeking to better the condition of things, had 
abolished what was useless and had laid down excellent principles 
without having been able to estabhsh much that was solid or 
durable. Its axiom of Equality had already been applied to the 
question of pubhc instruction in the Constitution of the year 1791, 
in which the provision is made that "A system of pubhc instruc- 
tion shall be created and organized which shall be open to all 
citizens and shall be gratuitous in respect to those branches 
which are indispensable to all men." But in spite of excellent 
recommendations submitted by Talleyrand and Condorcet, much 
time elapsed before a general statute was passed. Not until 
October, 1795, was there a law providing for primary schools 
in each commune, central schools in the departments, and 
special schools preparing for ten different professions. But even 
in 1800 the primary schools were but rare, there was a scarcity 
of both scholars and teachers, and the Councillor of State when 
making report of these conditions proposed outright that the 
parish priest should be charged with the giving of instruction 
where such schools existed. At the central schools, where there 
were neither examinations nor diplomas, owing to the tempes- 
tuous spirit of the times, the mathematical and technical courses 
alone found a meagre following, the others remained entirely 
unattended. The same was true of the professional schools. 
The important creations of the Convention dating from 1794 
could not gain Ufe and vigour in these agitated times. The " Poly- 
technic School" counted but few pupils; the ''Normal School," 
for the training of teachers, existed for less than a year; the 
"Medical School" amounted to little more than the faculty of 
former times and was still awaiting reorganization; the ''Con- 
servatoire des arts et metiers," an institution due to suggestion 
by the philosopher Descartes in the seventeenth century, which 
was mtended for the instruction of working men by means of 
observation, remained totally neglected up to the last days of the 



2 34 The New France and Her Sovereign [isoi 

Directory. And here again the task remained to the Consulate 
of elaborating the plans as well as of building up the institution. 

The month of December, 1799, already witnessed the estab- 
lishment of a special sub-department for Arts and Sciences in 
the Department of the Interior, and this developed two years 
later into the '' Direction generale de I'lnstruction publique/' 
May 1st, 1802, a new statute concerning public instruction was 
promulgated : primary schools were to be estabhshed in every 
country parish under supervision of the sub-prefect, the teachers 
to be appointed by the mayor; in the capitals of the depart- 
ments there were to be secondary schools under supervision of 
the prefect, permission being at the same time granted to private 
persons to open and maintain schools subject to the approval 
of the government; further, there were to be 32 "Lycees " with 
classical and scientific instruction to which the better scholars 
of the secondary schools should be promoted and from which 
one fifth of the students upon completion of the course should 
be admitted into the upper schools for special instruction.* In- 
spectors were appointed to supervise the entire system of public 
instruction, and in order to put the new system at once into 
active operation the government granted no less than 6400 
free scholarships, of which 2400 were awarded to the sons of 
meritorious government officials and military men. Success 
crowned the work. Within two to three years later 4500 elemen- 
tary schools were in operation with more than 750 secondary 
schools, counting 50,000 pupils, and 45 Lycees.f 

In issuing these decrees Napoleon's object had not been so 
much the disinterested advancement of knowledge as to train 
up for himself passably educated and completely docile subjects 

* Of these special or professional schools the statute of May 1st. 1802, 
recognized nine: 1. Law; 2. Medicine; 3. Physical and Natural Sciences; 
4. Mechanical and Chemical Technology; 5. Pure Mathematics; 6. Geog- 
raphy, History, and Political Economy; 7. Graphic Arts; 8. Astronomy; 
9. Music and Composition. 

t The first Consul did not prohibit, as did the Revolutionary gov- 
ernments, the clerical schools. The clergy established elementary and 
secondary schools, and the girls' schools were generally conducted by 
Sisters. 



^T. 32] The Legion of Honour 235 

whose education need not be carried to a point whence they 
might presume to make unreserved criticism of his adminis- 
tration of the government. When in 1802 Fourcroy, the Direc- 
tor-General of Pubhc Instruction, submitted to him an elaborate 
plan of education, Napoleon rejected it as being far too compre- 
hensive with the observation: ''A little Latin and mathematics 
is all that is needed." And yet, on the other hand, he was never 
found wanting in respect toward scholarship or its representa- 
tives. He took delight in associating with great artists as well 
as with learned men, and never ceased to confer honours and dig- 
nities upon those who had won his esteem by their talents or 
scientific attainments. As early as 1800 of the sixty senators 
seventeen were members of the Institute, and when on May 19th, 
1802, the Legion of Honour was established for the purpose of 
recognizing service to the State whether military or civil, it was 
the naturalist Lacepede who was appointed by Napoleon '^ High 
Chancellor" of the new order.* 

It ill accorded with this system of combining and centrahzing 
all the forces of the State that one portion of the nation should 
be still debarred by law from returning to their native land. 
Those who were thus excluded were partly those emigres who 
had left France of their own free-will at the beginning of the 
Revolution, and partly those who had fled a little later because 
of the terrorist measures and threats of the Radicals in power. 
Even vmder the Directory the law had been re-enacted which 
made return punishable with death. That no possible doubt 
might remain as to the strength and security of his new govern- 

* According to the statute of 1802 the members of the Legion were 
compelled among other things to swear on their honour to combat every 
attempt to restore the feudal regime with its attributes and titles. The 
decoration of the order was exceedingly distasteful to the pronounced 
Republicans, some of whom made complaint to Napoleon. ''I challenge 
you," he replied, *'to show me a Republic, whether ancient or modern, 
in which such marks of distinction have not had their place. They are 
indeed gewgaws (hochets), but it is with gewgaws that men are led." It 
was at this same period that he said to Madame de Remusat: "The fact 
is that it is very convenient to govern the French people by appealing to 
their vanity." 



236 The New France and Her Sovereign [I801 

ment Napoleon repealed this law of proscription. The only 
difficulty lay in the fact that the property of the emigres had 
in the meanwhile been confiscated and sold by the State, and 
the purchasers saw cause for alarm concerning their possessions 
in the return of the former owners. The new Constitution, as 
has been already stated, not only guaranteed the ownership of 
these estates to their purchasers, but for this very reason for- 
bade the return of the emigres. But in spite of all the First 
Consul advanced step by step to the reahzation of his design. 
In March, 1800, an edict appeared, in the first place, closing the 
list of emigres and empowering the government to strike from it 
the names of those who would request it and renounce all claim 
upon their former possessions. This was followed by making 
vast numbers of erasures from the hst, — Constitutionalists of 1789, 
thousands of banished priests, etc. Finally, after the conclusion 
of peace with foreign powers in April, 1802, a general amnesty 
was granted, always with the understanding, however, that 
present owners of national domains would be protected in their 
rights. Scarcely had this law been promulgated when the ban- 
ished families began to flock back to France. Not less than 
forty thousand of them returned at this time. Thanks to this 
measure and to the Concordat, which put an end to schism within 
the country, the reorganization of France was practically com- 
pleted. 

But this task had not been accompUshed without consid- 
erable resistance. The autocratic character of Napoleon's 
government became daily more pronounced and stirred up ad- 
versaries both within the Chambers and without. These 
showed themselves first among the Liberal Constitutionahsts, 
who, under the leadership of Benjamin Constant, the intimate 
friend of Madame de Stael, arrayed themselves, in society as 
well as in the Tribunate, in opposition to the tendency toward 
absolutism shown by the First Consul. But since, while oppos- 
ing this, they at the same time attacked his beneficial and neces- 
sary constructive work, such as the financial and judicial laws, 
their opposition only served to confirm him in the course which 
he was pursuing. The implacable Jacobins and Terrorists took 



.^T.32] An Attempt at Assassination 237 

the same position, and in their secret meetings, as Fouche 
learned through his agents, did not shrink even from the idea 
of assassinating Bonaparte. This plot, according to the testi- 
mony of the Prussian ambassador, failed only because of lack 
of funds with which to stir up the populace. And finally the 
opposition was augmented by the stiff Royalists, who had re- 
mained loyal through everything to Louis XVIII. and hated 
Napoleon because they saw in him the principal obstacle to 
the reahzation of their hopes. They were led by the inde- 
fatigable Georges Cadoudal, a leader of the Vendeans who lived 
abroad; they were encouraged in their resistance by subsidies 
from England. Their representatives in Paris were young Hyde 
de Neu^dlle and Andigne. Hardly two months after the Coup 
d'Etat Bonaparte had said to them: ''There is no further hope 
for the Bourbons. Range yourselves under my banner," he 
added, hoping to persuade them; ''my government is to be the 
government of youth and of talent. Would you blush to wear 
the uniform worn by Bonaparte?" But these allurements were 
all in vain. Among the Royalists there were men who did 
not hesitate at the most extreme measures, and they proceeded 
to carry into execution what had been only planned by the 
Jacobins. On the evening of December 24th, 1800, as the First 
Consul was being driven to the opera, he narrowly escaped 
being killed by the explosion of an infernal machine, consisting 
of a barrel filled with gunpowder, bullets, and fireworks, which 
was set off in the httle rue St. Nicaise and which killed several 
passers-by, but left him uninjured. This crime was at first 
supposed to be the work of the Radicals, and, with the assent 
of the Senate and of the Council of State, Napoleon ordered 
one hundred and thirty of them sentenced to deportation, one 
of the most distressing penalties. The real perpetrators of 
the deed were not discovered until later when most of them had 
already made good their escape, and only two could be brought 
to execution. The Terrorists were none the less carried off to 
the colonies, for, as Fouche observed: "It was not only a ques- 
tion of punishment for the past, but above all of insuring social 
order.'* A certain number of Radicals were deported without 



238 The New France and Her Sovereign [I801 

trial, among others three generals who made no attempt to con- 
ceal their Republican sentiments and who were said to have 
tried to stir up the army against the First Consul. 

Napoleon had thus become an arbitrary ruler. His ar- 
bitrary acts had already begun when in January, 1800, he sup- 
pressed no less than sixty out of the seventy-three political news- 
papers pubhshed at that time and forbade the estabhshment 
of any new ones.* It was an arbitrary act, again, by which he 
defended himself against the opposition in the Tribunate in 
1802. When that body rejected certain provisions of the 
''Code civile," in the elaboration of which Napoleon had himself 
participated, his first impulse had been to attempt a ''Coup 
d'Etat " in view of the fact that the government had not the right 
to dissolve the Chambers; Cambaceres, however, succeeded in 
persuading him to resort to a less direct way of accomplishing 
his ends and to save appearances by means of a seemingly con- 
stitutional expedient. Article 38 of the Constitution of the 
year VIII provided that, beginning with the year 1802, one 
fifth of the membership of the Tribunate and the Corps Legis- 
latif should be annually renewed. The time appointed for this 
renewal had now come. Since the Constitution did no*t defi- 
nitely prescribe the manner in which this should be accom- 
plished, it was decided not to follow the logical and ordinary 
method of deciding by lot what members should yield their 

* This decree was but a poor return on the part of Napoleon to those 
newspapers which four years before had received his instructions, as he 
took his departure for the campaign in Italy— *' to write about him and 
about nothing but him," — and which had as a matter of fact contributed 
in no small degree to his glory. This was however only the first step towards 
the actual re-establishment of the censorship which took place three years 
later. A decree of September, 1803, runs thus: *'In order to secure 
liberty of the press (!) no bookseller shall henceforth offer for sale any 
work without its having first been submitted to a Commission of Revision, 
who will return it if it be found to contain no ground for censure." A 
similar regulation applied to new theatrical representations. The First 
Consul was encouraged in the adoption of these measures toward the 
newspapers by the attitude of the public, which, intent upon securing 
internal peace, was not exactly averse to seeing a rigorous course pursued 
in regard to a disputatious and frequently corrupt press. 



^T. 32] Consul for Life 239 

positions, but to prevail upon the Senate to designate not only 
who should constitute the incoming fifth, but also who should 
step out. The Senate, threatened with the dreaded wrath of 
Napoleon, obeyed, and Tribunate and Corps L^gislatif were 
purged in January, 1802, of the obnoxious element, consisting 
of such men as Benjamin Constant, Chenier, Chazal, and Daunou. 
Their places were filled by entirely docile persons who voted 
without protest in favour of all the bills which had been so 
fiercely contested by their predecessors; nor did they offer any 
opposition to other bills which had not before been submitted 
for consideration, such as the enactments in regard to the emi- 
gres, the Concordat, and the Legion of Honour. The brothers 
of the First Consul attempted on one occasion to convince him 
that opposition was a necessity and cited England in support of 
their argument, whereat he replied: ''For my part I have never 
yet seen the advantages of opposition of any kind. Whatever 
its nature, it serves only to lessen respect for the authority in 
power in the minds of the people. Let some one else come and 
govern in my place, and if he does not attempt as I do to put a 
stop to idle talk, he will see what happens to him. I tell you ab- 
solute unity of power is indispensable to good government." 

But Napoleon had still greater demands to make from the 
new Chambers. The power which he wielded was far from 
extensive enough to satisfy him. It ill accorded with his vast 
designs that he should, in conformity to the constitution, hold 
authority for only ten years. And therefore he hated the Con- 
stitution of 1799 just as he had for a similar reason hated that 
of 1795. He yearned to rule over France and rule as other 
sovereigns ruled over their dominions, not bound and humiliated 
by a petty paragraph which confined his haughty ambition 
within a period which could be calculated to a minute. But 
the more passionately he fostered this design the more carefully 
he concealed his purpose, until toward the end of March, 1802, 
definitive peace with England had been concluded, when, sus- 
tained by his popularity, now greater than ever, he could with 
safety allow something of it to be divined. But the majority 
of the Senate showed how fittle they comprehended the situa- 



240 The New France and Her Sovereign [1802 

tion by their proposal, in recognition of the great services ren- 
dered by the head of the government to the State, to continue 
his term as First Consul for another ten years. Napoleon was 
exasperated. He was on the point of flying into a passion and 
declining their proffer, when Cambaceres — or Lucien according 
to other authorities — again had an expedient to suggest: an 
appeal to the nation. He therefore replied to the Senators 
that he could not accept this offer without again consulting the 
people which had in former times clothed him with the supreme 
power. The question, however, as put by him to popular vote 
differed widely from the vote of the Senate, for it was formulated 
in these words: ''Shall Napoleon Bonaparte be made Consul 
for life, and shall he be given the right to appoint his successor?" 
And again his calculations proved correct. Three and a 
half millions of "ayes" against a few thousand "noes," such 
was the nation's response. Then the Senate recognized the 
course which it was called upon to pursue. It hastened to 
convey the thanks of the nation to the object of its choice, and 
two days later, by the Senatus consultum of August 4th, 1802, 
it very considerably increased the power in the hands of the 
First Consul. Henceforward he had exclusive right to pardon 
malefactors, to ratify treaties with foreign powers, and to ap- 
point senators. The significance of this last prerogative will be 
perceived when the importance which the Senate itself had 
acquired is taken into consideration. It could, by means of 
special decrees (Senatus consulta), interpret, amend, or totally 
suspend the Constitution, suspend the court of assizes within 
certain departments, dissolve both Chambers, and reverse the 
judgments of the courts when they were held to endanger the 
safety of the State, — all of these at a nod from the man who 
now governed France as absolute master. A monarchy had been 
established, not indeed such as Napoleon desired it to be, that 
is to say, under the form of a hereditary power, but nevertheless 
established, and for the time being he was obliged to content 
himself with this result.* "I am henceforth," said Napoleon, 

* The French did not apparently hesitate to accept even the name 
with the new arrangement, for it was as a Republican Monarchy that the 



^T. 32] Source of Napoleon's Strength 241 

"upon the same level with other sovereigns, for, when all is said 
and done, they hold their power only for Hfe. It is not right 
that the authority of a man who directs the policy of all Europe 
should be precarious, or even seem so." When, two years later, 
he places the Imperial crown France upon his head, it is only 
the outward sign of a power now already in his hands. 

That which made possible this decisive step toward his abso- 
lute sovereignty was the same element which had been Bona- 
parte's secret ally on the 18th Brumaire — non-partisan pubhc 
opinion. All its sjonpathies were with the man who had put 
an end to anarchy, who had established order and prosperity 
and made peace with all the world. And it was above all to 
this last consideration that his popularity was due.* 

But little did the French know the man to whose unlimited 
power they were committing the destiny of their country! He 
was no man of peace. He did indeed at the cost of indefatigable 
labour and unparalleled energy restore to France her lost vigour 
and power, but this was done with no thought of peace, but solely 
as preparation for a confhct in which the victor's reward was 
to be a dominion extending far beyond the borders of France. 

new system was designated early in the year 1803 by the "Journal de 
Paris," the official organ of the government. 

* Article II of the Senatus consultum of August 4th, 1802, is expressed in 
these words: "A statue of Peace bearing in one hand the laurels of victory 
and in the other the decree of the Senate shall bear witness to posterity 
of the gratitude of the Nation." 



CHAPTER X 

THE LAST YEARS OF THE CONSULATE. THE EMPEROR 

The general peace of 1802 brought France prosperity and 
respect. Innumerable foreigners journeyed to Paris to visit the 
places immortahzed by the Revolution and to see the great man 
who had cahned the tempestuous waters. The centre of the 
world appeared to be removed to the banks of the Seine, where 
a well-regulated manner of life with its work and its social enjoy- 
ment had become the rule. These were no longer the days of 
mad intoxication such as those early in the reign of the Direc- 
tory, when every one rejoiced to have escaped the horrors through 
which he had passed and yet awaited the morrow with un- 
certainty and dread. Excitement had given way to moderate 
and peaceful enjoyment; instead of bold speculation for disrepu- 
table gains, there were steady activity and honest earnings. 
Greater security than ever before was felt under the new gov- 
ernment by the moderate law-abiding citizen, the same element 
which Napoleon had on the 13th Vendemiaire so mercilessly 
mown down with grape-shot that, according to his statements, 
gloomy visions of the scene still continually haunted his dreams. 
The unjust deportation of Jacobin deputies also carried convic- 
tion — as it had been intended to do — ^that the man who had 
been in control since the 18th Brumaire had no longer any- 
thing in common with the general commanding the forces of the 
Convention in 1795. Adherents to the royal cause had returned 
home in great numbers and had to some extent again come into 
possession of their property. The so-called "nouveaux riches,'* 
who had become owners of extensive tracts of state property 
through speculation and stock-jobbing, gradually came to feel 
secure in their possessions as Napoleon was seen to depart more 
and more widely from the role played by Monk. To one ele- 

242 



iET. 33] Reaction 243 

ment, accordingly, personal power in Napoleon's hands seemed 
desirable as security against further Revolutionary excesses, 
while to another it seemed equally so as a guarantee against the 
return of the Bourbons, the aim of all being to make it possible 
for labour and enjoyment to continue undisturbed. 

In the face of such material forces and interests what mat- 
tered it that a certain number of unyielding republicans be- 
moaned the loss of their unrestrained political hberty, or that 
the haughty nobility of the faubourg Saint-Germain should 
prefer to become subjects of a legitimate sovereign rather than 
of an ill-bred upstart? The great body of the people had wearied 
of pohtical questions and gladly submitted to the tyranny of the 
new government which had re-established order and vouched 
for its continuance. The period of the Consulate is characterized 
by the absolute confidence placed in the man who had van- 
quished the foes of France both without and within her borders. 
Unhmited power in the hands of one individual was now as 
much in popular favour as the '^Liberty, Equahty, and Frater- 
nity " of all had been a short time before. In reliance upon this 
feehng the new monarch of France might safely venture very 
far. It was only that he finally ventured too far that brought 
him to ruin before his death. To any one who had left Paris at the 
beginning of the Consular period and who, hke the Councillor of 
State Miot de Mehto, returned thither at the end of a few years, 
the changes wliich had meanwhile taken place were astounding. 
The last traces of Revolutionary times had everywhere disap- 
peared. In the place of the half-mihtary, half-civil costimie 
which fachion had imposed toward the end of the century, the 
mode of dress prevailing during the ^'ancien regime'! had been 
resumed ; instead of the sabre was worn the sword of ceremony, 
and boots had given way to stockings with buckled shoes. The 
returned aristocrats alone retained the garb of equahty, the dress 
coat and trousers, as evidence of their impoverishment. Men no 
longer addressed one another as ^'Citoyen," but as ''Monsieur," 
and in 1803 the official almanac even expHcitly enjoined the use 
of the title ''Madame " in place of "Citoyenne." Although the 
Revolutionary calendar was still in use, the Decadi had already 



244 The Last Years of the Consulate [I802 

been replaced by the Sunday of old, and no one — least of all the 
First Consul — failed of attending mass on that day. The names 
of the streets had again been changed to those which they had 
borne before the days of the Republic, the ''Palais Egalite " had 
again become the "Palais Royal," the "Place de la Revolution" 
was again known as "Place Louis XV." In fashionable litera- 
ture the names of the foremost representatives of enlightened 
France, Voltaire and Rousseau, were repudiated because they 
were regarded as having been through their writings originators 
of the Revolutionary movement. 

But it was in what immediately surrounded Napoleon that the 
change was most striking. The Tuileries, which he had occupied 
since January, 1800, as the residence of the chief magistrate, 
had been transformed into the palace of a sovereign. There a 
rigid etiquette was enforced and everything was regulated ac- 
cording to the rules of a court. Woman, to whom the democracy 
had conceded no political rights, was now given her place : Jose- 
phine had her days for giving audience just as her husband did. 
Everything, with the exception of the words "Consul " and "Re- 
public," was monarchical and centred in a single dominating per- 
sonality. 

In this court, where the usages of the old monarchy had been 
restored by command, and where aristocrats schooled in the 
ways of the world were preferably installed as officials of the 
palace, there was indeed much to recall the sudden elevation 
of its sovereign. People were to be seen there who, according 
to Talleyrand's sarcastic comment, did not understand walking 
on waxed floors; officers with awkward wives of obscure origin 
and lacking in every grace; generals, better drilled than bred, 
obeying with awe and servility capricious behests resulting from 
a mixture of calculation and nervousness in a man who made it 
a principle to stimulate zeal by means of fear. 

Napoleon was tolerant of no contradiction in his despotism, 
as indeed he refused to feel himself restricted in any respect 
even by such rules of conduct as all the world was agreed in 
accepting. "I am no ordinary man," said he, "and laws of pro- 
priety and morals are not applicable to me." It is said that he 



.Et. 33] Napoleon's Inner Nature 245 

even carried to such an extent his disregard of what was sacred 
to others that he was by his own wife taxed with incestuous re- 
lations with his sisters. In his nature he still remained gloomy 
and morose as he had been in earlier years. His successes had 
not made a happy man of the dreamer. There was at this time 
a tinge of sadness in his character which in later years developed 
into a surly ill-humour. *'I am not fitted for taking pleasure," 
he was accustomed to say, and from what is known of his 
modes of diversion the truth of these words is fully corroborated. 
Madame de Remusat, who had since 1802 filled the office of lady 
in waiting to Josephine, writes thus of him: "I have seen him 
go into transports at the murmur of the wind, and talk with en- 
thusiasm of the roaring of the sea; tempted at times to think 
nocturnal apparitions not altogether beyond credence, he was in 
fact inclined toward entertaining certain superstitions. When 
he left his council-chamber to pass the evening in the drawing- 
room of Madame Bonaparte, he would take the notion sometimes 
to have the candles veiled with white gauze and, having enjoined 
profound silence, would amuse himself with relating or listening 
to stories of ghosts and apparitions; at another time he would 
listen to slow, sweet music executed by Italian singers to the 
sole accompaniment of a small number of instruments softly 
played. He would then be seen to sink into a re very which was 
respected by all, no one daring to make a motion nor to stir from 
his place. Upon coming out of this state, which appeared to 
serve as a sort of relaxation to him, he was usually more serene 
and affable.'^ 

Ever since the attempt had been made upon his life Bona- 
parte shut himself off more and more thoroughly from the out- 
side world. It was only during the review of troops in the 
court of the Tuileries that it was possible to approach him 
and present petitions. Whenever he rode out through the city 
he was always escorted by a large force of mounted guards, and 
his regular visit to the theatre called forth a special detail of 
police for whose accommodation even the first set of side-scenes 
opposite the Consular box were pressed into service. Out at 
Malmaison the walks throughout the park were constantly 



246 The Last Years of the Consulate [I802 

patrolled by a competent force of men, and at no time did the 
First Consul return to Paris until after the police had searched 
the streets through which he had to pass. He was filled with a 
profound mistrust of every one. At times even his ministers 
were denied access to him; under such circumstances some young 
aide-de-camp was made the bearer of his commands to them. 
Since every action of his own was the outcome of calculation, he 
was always trying to scent out motives and designs in the con- 
duct of others. Nothing seemed to him so trustworthy as the 
maxim of Macchiavelli, that in dealing with friends one must 
always bear in mind that they may become enemies. Entirely 
devoid of magnanimity himself, he ascribed nobility of purpose 
to no one. When, upon one occasion, a lost watch was returned 
to Bourrienne his secretary. Napoleon was so impressed by this 
act of integrity that he freed the finder from military duty and 
interested himself in the welfare of his family. In regard to 
veracity his ideas did not differ from those which he held con- 
cerning honesty. It was not always advantageous, he thought, 
to tell the truth. He used to relate with pleasure his uncle's 
prediction ^' that he would some day govern the world because he 
was in the habit of lying on all occasions." With his estimate 
of mankind it is therefore not strange that he did not rely solely 
upon the faithfulness of the official police, but estabhshed in addi- 
tion, particularly after Fouche was deprived of his office of Minis- 
ter of Police in 1802, a number of secret poHce agencies under the 
direction of his most devoted generals: Duroc, Savary, Davout, 
Moncey, Junot, and others, who were expected to keep watch 
upon each other. 

It was Josephine, the aristocrat by birth, who formed the 
link connecting the nobility of France with the court of the 
First Consul. Through her and her former relations with 
people of rank many a family of ancient name now became recon- 
ciled with the existing order of things and alHed their interests 
with those of the new regime. On the other hand the brothers 
of the Consul, Joseph and Lucien, were distinguished by certain 
repubhcan tendencies which were, however, not deep-rooted 
enough to prevent their being eventually overcome by the 



/Et. 33] Napoleon's Family 247 

resolute determination of the new Caesar. Such at least was the 
case with Joseph. Lucien, who as ambassador to the court of 
Madrid had acquired a large fortune, had a faUing-out with 
Napoleon because he persisted in contracting a marriage with 
the daughter of a tradesman instead of with the widowed Queen 
of Etruria, and refused to procure a divorce in spite of his broth- 
er's protests, a course which eventually brought about his ban- 
ishment from France. At a later date he was pleased to make 
a display of his democratic principles, although there is little 
room for doubt that in 1801 he indulged the hope of being made 
a king. 

The third brother, Louis, through Josephine's influence 
had been brought January 3d, 1802, to marry her daughter, the 
beautiful Hortense Beauharnais. The union, unwiUingly en- 
tered upon by both parties, was no happy one and brought to 
a culmination the hostihty existing between the two famihes, 
Bonaparte and Beauharnais. The cause of this discord lay 
in Josephine's sterility, which gave to Napoleon's stepchildren 
an importance resented by the Bonapartes and which was a 
hindrance in the path of their ambition. The fact has been 
estabhshed that the brothers and sisters of the Consul, par- 
ticularly Lucien, began even at this time to talk of a divorce, 
and that Josephine, in her fear of being abandoned, even es- 
poused the cause of the Bourbons.* Jerome, Napoleon's 
youngest brother, was leading at this time rather a frivolous 
life in the United States, where he married the beautiful EUza- 
beth Patterson of Baltimore, whom he, at the command of his 
superior, subsequently abandoned in Europe. He had been 
appointed by his brother to a position of importance in the 
navy, but he was to mount still higher. Of the sisters of the 
all-powerful Consul the eldest, Ehsa, had been married in 1797 
to Pascal Bacciochi, an Italian nobleman and an officer in the 
French army, to whom in 1803 was given the command of Fort 

* See Jung, "Lucien Bonaparte et ses M^moires," II. 67, the letter 
written by Lucien from Madrid under date of April 4th, 1801, to Napoleon 
in which he alludes to the Infanta Isabella, whom the Queen of Spain was 
desirous of marrying " to the future lord of the world-monarchy." 



248 The Last Years of the Consulate [I802 

Saint- Jean in Marseilles. She was a woman of fine intellectual 
ability, and with the aid* of her brother Lucien assembled about 
her in Paris a circle of distinguished men of letters, among whom 
were Fontanes and Chateaubriand, whom she recommended 
to the notice of Napoleon and for whom she obtained his favour. 
The beautiful but frivolous PauHne had married General Leclerc, 
who with thousands of his fellow countrymen died, stricken with 
yellow fever, in San Domingo. Wlien, in 1803, she returned to 
France, her hand was at once asked in marriage by the Prince 
Borghese. The ambitious Caroline, married in 1800 to Murat, 
the cavalry general, to whom she was intellectually far supe- 
rior, was one of the most ardent of those who were intrigu- 
ing against the Beauharnais family. Napoleon's mother, 
Lsetitia Bonaparte, now lived in her own palace at the Capital, 
basking in the splendour of her son, not, however, as an experi- 
enced woman, relying so impHcitly upon her good fortune as 
to fail to improve such a favourable opportunity for the acqui- 
sition of considerable funds against a possible evil day. She 
had remained precisely the same woman as in former years, 
even to retaining her Corsican dialect, a point which Napoleon 
keenly resented, since 'it was his will that nothing should act 
as a reminder of his foreign origin.* A kinsman who proved 
more useful was found in his uncle Fesch, the former abbe and 
more recently War Commissary to the Army of Italy. After 
having made his peace with the Church, an ecclesiastical mem- 
ber of the family was of no little value to the Consul. Fesch 
must needs resume the discarded cassock, and soon after the 
conclusion of the Concordat he was appointed Archbishop of 
Lyons and Cardinal. 

Such was the court of the man who, to use his own words, 
directed the political course of Europe. Nor was this state- 
ment an exaggeration. Direct it he did in reality, ready to 
crush out by force of arms any sign of resistance wherever it 
appeared. He had concluded the general treaty of peace be- 

* His alien birth was a source of real mortification to him. "To put 
it in plain terms," said he to his brothers, "I am very sorry to have been 
born a Corsican." (Jung, " Lucien Bonaparte," etc.) 



^T. 33] The Outlook for Permanent Peace 249 

cause this step was necessary to the furtherance of his own 
interests; to maintain it was in keeping neither with the revo- 
lutionary system which he had made his own nor with his own 
incUnations. There has been handed down from a rehable 
source the report of a conversation which he held with a Coun- 
cillor of State shortly before he was invested with the Consular 
power for life. The Councillor having expressed the opinion 
that the maintenance of peace in Europe was above all necessary 
to the welfare of France, the Consul replied by asking whether 
he did not, then, believe in the enmity of the Powers who had 
signed the treaty of peace. The Councillor was obUged to ac- 
knowledge that England, Austria, and the others would doubtless 
remain hostile to France in the future as they had been in the 
past. "Well, then," said Napoleon, ''what are the conse- 
quences? If these Powers are continually going to cherish 
war in their hearts so that it must break out some day, then the 
sooner it comes to that the better, for every day helps to dissi- 
pate in them the recollection of their last defeats, while it tends 
to diminish at home the prestige of our last victories. All the 
advantage in delay is accordingly on their side.* Bear in mind 
that a First Consul is not like one of these kings by the grace 
of God who look upon their State as a heritage. Ancient usages 
are to them an advantage and a support, while to us, on the con- 
trary, they are a hindrance. The French government of to-day 
bears no resemblance to anything which surrounds it. Hated 
by its neighbours, compelled to hold in restraint within its do- 
main sundry classes of evil-disposed persons, in order to preserve 
an imposing appearance in the face of so many enemies it stands 
in need of brilUant deeds and consequently of war. France 
must be first or utterly fail. I will tolerate peace if our neigh- 

* How correct were these observations may be seen by the recently 
published despatch sent by the English ambassador Whitworth on the 
1st of December, 1802. "Every added year of peace," so it runs, "while 
enfeebling the Consular government, will give strength and courage to 
those whose aim and interest it is to overthrow it. As a matter of fact 
in maintaining peace we are keeping up a state of war against this govern- 
ment which is more decisive and more deleterious in itself than open 
hostilities." 



250 The Last Years of the Consulate [I802 

bours know how to keep it, but if they compel me to take up 
arms again before they become unserviceable through neglect 
or long disuse I shall regard it as to our advantage, . . . There 
is always a spirit of hostility existing between ancient mon- 
archies and a newly-formed repubhc. . . . Situated as we are, 
I regard every peace as a brief truce and the ten years of my 
consulship as destined to be an uninterrupted warfare." * 

To any one reading with attention these utterances spoken 
during the summer of 1802 — ^whether the words are exactly 
quoted or no — it will be clear that Napoleon was determined 
upon carrying out by force of arms the programme for the 
hegemony of France formulated by Hauterive in 1801. But 
was this after all the ultimate aim to which he aspired? Was 
it really his only concern, as he asseverated, to procure this 
hegemony for the French government, or did he have a purpose 
deeper than might be disclosed to a member of the French 
Council of State? Perhaps he had already at this time con- 
ceived in secret the idea which he imparted two years later to 
a circle of intimate friends: '' Europe cannot be at rest except 
under the rule of a single head who will have kings for his offi- 
cers, who will distribute his kingdoms to lieutenants, making of 
one King of Italy, of a second King of Bavaria, of a third Land- 
amman of Switzerland, of a fourth Stadholder of Holland, 
each having his position in the Imperial household with title of 
Chief Cup-bearer, Grand Master of the Pantry, Grand Master 
of the Horse, Grand Master of the Hounds, etc. It may be 
objected that this plan is nothing but an imitation of the con- 
stitution of the German Empire, and that there is nothing novel 
in the idea ; but there is nothing in existence which is absolutely 
new, political institutions only revolve in a circle, and it is often 
necessary to return to what has been already tried." It is 
plain that he was no true Frenchman at heart, fond as he was 
of representing himself as such, especially during the years of 
the Consulate. Had he been what he pretended he would have 
been content with securing for France the leading position 

* Miot de Melito, M^moires, II. 226. 



Mt. 32] Changes in the Vassal States ^^ t 

among the Powers. But that was precisely wherein he failed 
the nation which had put its trust in him. Possessing no spark 
of French patriotism or of ambition for France, from the time 
when he had been forced to give up his httle native country he 
had recognized no national limits to his ambition, gigantic in 
truth, since it embraced the whole world, and yet at the same 
time infinitesimally small, since it was to serve only to satisfy 
the inordinate passion for glory on the part of a single indi- 
vidual.* To any one so resolved upon war there can be no 
difficulty in bringing it about without appearing a direct ag- 
gressor. And indeed Napoleon's conquests in time of peace 
were most efficacious in preparing the way for war, and finally 
even brought about the outbreak. 

In the later months of the year 1801, when the preliminaries 
concluded with England and the treaty with Russia had estab- 
lished universal peace, Bonaparte had already begun with inde- 
fatigable activity to take advantage of the need felt by all the 
nations of Europe for a time of recuperation, and to make the 
acquisitions necessary to his system. For, as a result of the 
recent strife, the temporary exhaustion felt by the Powers had 
made possible the turning of the balance of power in favour of the 
conqueror. It behooved him above all to bring those countries 
lying within the sphere of French authority more directly under 
his control by means of their internal organization ; for, being for 
the most part furnished with strictly repubhcan constitutions 
modelled upon that of France in the time of the Directory, they, 
with their continual changes of party government, were not 
always to be relied upon. It was therefore essential to modify 

* According to Lucien, to conquer Europe for his own sake and not for 
that of France had already been determined upon by Napoleon in 1802. 
Referring to that year, Lucien says in his M^moires (fidition Jung, II. 
165): "I am not one of those who have believed and who persist 
in believing that my brother Napoleon made war contrary to his choice 
at any time in his career. I was too well acquainted with what he thought 
at bottom, particularly at the time of which I speak. And, to be quite 
candid, his designs, which were far more ambitious than patriotic and 
which made war a personal necessity to him at that time, were revealed 
to me almost without attempt at disguise." 



252 The Last Years of the Consulate [I801 

these constitutions to correspond with the new one which France 
had adopted in 1799. 

This was at once put into operation in Holland. With the 
concurrence of the ambassador of the Batavian Republic a new 
constitution was elaborated in Paris according to which the five 
Directors were superseded by a President bearing the ancient 
title of Grand Pensionary, while the two Chambers gave place to 
a legislative body of deputies with limited powers. This new 
constitution was forced upon the Dutch people by its own Direc- 
tory, which had been bribed by France and which was most 
forcibly supported by French troops (October 17th, 1801). At 
the plebiscite which was then held 50,000 of the people voted 
against the change; the remainder held their peace. This silence 
was construed by Napoleon to mean acquiescence, and the new 
constitution was announced the free act of the Batavian people. 
This was done as a matter of form in order to satisfy the demands 
of Article 11 in the Treaty of Luneville, which read: "The con- 
tracting parties mutually guarantee the independence of the said 
RepubUcs (Batavia, Helvetia, Cisalpine, Liguria), their inhab- 
itants being vested with the power to adopt whatever form of 
government shall to them seem good." 

In the Cisalpine Repubhc matters stood exactly as they had 
in Holland. Here also was still in force a republican constitu- 
tion similar to that of France under the Directory, and here also 
the power was made to pass entirely out of the hands of the 
Councils into those of a single executive body, which was far 
easier to direct from Paris than had been the fluctuating mass 
of parties in the Chambers. In September, 1801, Napoleon had 
already conferred with certain men in Lombardy who were in his 
confidence; the next step was to arrange for the elaboration of 
a constitution according to his directions, which duty he assigned 
to Maret. The result of these labours was sent to Milan in order 
that it might there be secretly deliberated upon. According to it 
a single President was in this case also to be put at the head of 
the government. The authorities in Milan consented to every- 
thing, asking only that Napoleon would do them the favour to 
appoint the proper persons to the offices of State. And again 



^T. 33] The Italian Republic 253 

the First Consul tried to conform with the provisions of the before- 
mentioned Article in the Treaty of Luneville by inviting to 
Lyons the most prominent representatives of the three classes 
into which the people were divided according to the constitu- 
tion — ^the landowners, the scholars, and the tradespeople (pos- 
sidenti, dotti, commercianti). At this place and with the con- 
currence of these deputies men were assigned to the principal 
offices with the exception of a single one, that of the Presidency- 
This Napoleon was reserving for himself. Talleyrand had been 
charged with the arrangements for bringing this about. The 
wily minister made use of the occasion of a review of the returned 
Egyptian troops, which attracted most of the strangers outside 
the city, to assemble the few deputies who had remained, — pos- 
sibly a third of the whole number, — ^when a trial vote was cast. 
The choice fell upon Melzi d'Eril, whereupon Talleyrand gave the 
ItaUans to understand that a far better selection might be made. 
They grasped his meaning and resolved upon offering the Presi- 
dency to Napoleon, while Melzi should be vice-president. On 
the 26th of January, 1802, the First Consul declared himself ready 
to accept this position. His first official act was to change the 
name "Cisalpine RepubHc " to the '* Italian Republic " — a clever 
stroke, for already many hearts had been fired with enthusiasm 
by the words of Alfieri: "Itaha virtuosa, magnanima, hbera et 
una." The name was taken to signify a complete programme of 
national unity and independence. And who was better fitted to 
make this dream a reality than the victor of Marengo? 

But this was after all nothing but a decoy. Napoleon's real 
designs were most clearly shown by the fate which overtook 
Piedmont. This country lay at the portals of France and formed 
a sort of bridge leading to the Republic of Lombardy. The 
French had occupied it ever since their last victory over the Aus- 
trians, and had not evacuated it after the conclusion of the Treaty 
of Luneville. During the hfetime of Paul I. of Russia, who had 
drawn his sword among other things in defence of the legitimate 
rights of the King of Sardina, Napoleon contented himself with 
simple occupation of the territory in order to avoid giving offence 
to his new-found friend. Hardly had the Czar breathed his last, 



^54 The Last Years of the Consulate ti802 

however, before Gen. Jourdan — the Jacobin of the 18th Bru- 
maire and now the docile tool of the new monarch — ^was forth- 
with commissioned to proclaim to the Piedmontese that their 
country was to form a French miUtary division and to be por- 
tioned off into six prefectures. This was exactly the procedure 
of the Convention in former days when it set about the annexa- 
tion of German possessions along the Rhine. For the formal 
incorporation of Piedmont the First Consul waited until the 
definitive peace with England should be concluded. During the 
negotiations leading to that end his plenipotentiaries received 
the strictest injunctions to tolerate no interference of any kind 
on the part of Great Britain in Continental questions, and actu- 
ally so absolute was England's need of a time of respite how- 
ever short that this sacrifice was made to it; the Treaty of 
Amiens contained no word in behalf of Victor Amadeus, King 
of Sardinia. As soon as all had been made safe in that quarter 
Napoleon proceeded without delay to take formal possession of 
the coveted territory. On September 4th a Senatus consultum 
dated at Paris declared Piedmont a French province with six 
departments, of which one was to bear the glorious name of 
Marengo. 

At the Court of Vienna the greatest consternation prevailed 
at this rapid extension of French authority in Italy. Count 
Ludwig Cobenzl, the successor of Thugut as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, writes at this time to the Austrian ambassador at Paris: 
"How may any portions of Italy, not now belonging to France, 
hope to escape her domination? More rapid and devastating in 
times of peace than in war, where are the ravages of this torrent 
to cease? " * It was to be a long while before the course of ''this 
torrent " would be arrested. To the south of Piedmont was the 
Ligurian Repubhc, territory of the old ducal city of Genoa. The 
Constitution here again was out of date, and on the 26th of June, 
1802, a draft of a constitution prepared in Paris was delivered to 
the Genoese by the French ambassador SaHcetti, the same person 
whose name is associated with Napoleon in his youth. This 

* Archives of Vienna. 



^T. 33] Elba Annexed to France 255 

constitution was gratefully accepted by the government while 
announcing to the people of Genoa that '4t was meet that he 
who changed the face of all Europe should also give a new form 
to the Ligurian Repubhc." Even before this time, in December, 

1801, the Uttle Republic of Lucca had been provided from the 
Tuileries with a constitution placing at the head a Gonfalonier 
who, Hke the Dutch President, was to hold office for a brief 
period lest he should acquire lasting importance, the real ruler 
being the pohtical agent of France. No less dependent upon 
France was the kingdom of Tuscany-Etruria, where Napoleon 
appointed his generals Clarke and Murat as guardians to the 
incapable young king, after whose death, in 1803, they continued 
in like office to the queen, while even the details of the military 
organization were determined upon in Paris. Finally, in August, 

1802, when the British had withdrawn from it, the island of 
Elba, rehnquished by Spain, was declared a French province. 
For the sake of making it appear in this case also as if he proceeded 
according to the will of the people, the Consul summoned to Paris 
a delegation from Porto Ferrajo, which on its arrival at the capital 
was sumptuously entertained by the Minister of the Interior, while 
to each of its members was presented a purse of several thousand 
francs, whereupon these gentlemen expressed in a speech ready 
prepared for the occasion the gratification felt by their country- 
men at being united with France. 

Thus by midsummer of 1802 the whole of Upper Italy as 
far as Austrian Venetia had come to be directly or indirectly 
under the sceptre of France. Piedmont alone was insufficient 
to furnish uninterrupted and adequate communication with 
these territories. During the course of the last campaign 
Napoleon had learned the value of communication by way of 
the Swiss Alps, and, with his mind always intent upon the 
renewal of hostilities, he determined upon securing these per- 
manently for himself. He accordingly demanded of the Re- 
pubUc of Helvetia the relinquishment of the district of Valais 
through which ran the highway over the Simplon, for which 
he proposed to give in exchange the Frickthal, ceded to him by 
the Emperor Francis in the Treaty of Luneville. But the in- 



256 The Last Years of the Consulate [I802 

habitants of Valais were averse to any scheme of incorporation 
with France, and Napoleon was discreet jenough not to insist 
upon it. He never hesitated to employ ''roundabout means to 
reach an end when it proved unattainable by the more direct 
way. So he contented himself for the time being with seeing 
Valais separated from Switzerland and formed into a repubUc 
by itself with a president of its own (August 30th, 1802). Actual 
independence was here entirely out of the question, for by 
Article 2 of its constitution the entire republic was at the outset 
put under the "protection " of the French and Italian RepubUcs, 
while Article 7 exempted the government from the duty of 
guarding its passes, and Article 9 directly forbade the inhabit- 
ants to open any roadway leading beyond the country without 
the consent of France. The rest of Switzerland was moreover 
quite as much under the supremacy of its western neighbour. 
As far back as the time of the Directory Helvetia had already 
been indispensable as a connecting hnk between French an- 
nexations in Italy and those along the Rhine, and if Napoleon 
was to maintain the offensive position of the Revolution, — and 
in this he had no choice, — ^he could not give up his supremacy 
in this mountain country. For this reason it was generally 
supposed in Europe at the time of the Consulate that he would 
place himself at the head of the government here as he had done 
in Lombardy, and it is asserted that such was for a time his in^ 
tention. But in the way of carrying out such a programme there 
were two obstacles, — first, the Treaty of Luneville guaranteeing 
to Switzerland its nominal independence, and second, an ad- 
monition from Russia to the First Consul requesting him to 
respect the independence of his neighbours and thereby help to 
dissipate the apprehensions of Europe. Any design which Na- 
poleon may have entertained of securing the presidency of Switz- 
erland for himself was promptly given up, but in the withdrawal 
of his troops which followed he nevertheless insured his own 
power in the country by stirring up into open warfare the dissen- 
sion which existed between the Federalists of the aristocratic 
party and the liberal Centralists, affording him the opportunity 
of appearing on the scene as a party concerned and armed 



/Et. 33] Switzerland 



257 



mediator.* The Old-Federalists had already asked aid from 
England and Austria, and a British agent had already reached 
Berne with a view to operating here against French influence, 
when Napoleon suddenly intervened. At his command 30,000 
men imder Gen. Ney were again marched into the country, and 
a delegation of fifty deputies of Switzerland summoned to meet 
the Consul in Paris, where they were granted an "Act of Media- 
tion." In this the aspirations of both parties were taken into 
consideration; it was acceptable to the Federahsts, since it 
granted to every canton its own constitution, and to the Lib- 
erals because it upheld the principle of equality among all citi- 
zens. A diet composed of representatives of all the cantons 
and presided over by a Landamman was to regulate the foreign 
affairs of the State (February 19th, 1803). t By this clever 
artifice the First Consul obtained his much-desired end, for 
throughout the entire course of his rule in France Svvitzerland 
remained at peace within and, while inaccessible to all ap- 
proaches from other powers, was absolutely submissive to the 
influence of France. 

The spread of Napoleon's power found, as has been seen, 
no great obstacle in the Alps, one of the natural boundaries 
of France. Was the second of those boundaries, the Rhine, 
destined to be held in any greater respect? 

After the Treaty of Luneville as after that of Campo Formio 
there yet remained unsettled the question of indemnity to 
those German princes who had lost to France a part or the 
whole of their lands along the left bank of the Rhine. After 
Campo Formio the Congress of Rastatt was empowered to solve 

* As early as April 30th, 1801, he had submitted to delegates of both 
parties a rough draft of a constitution intended to give satisfaction to 
both, but they had been unable to come to an agreement upon the sub- 
ject. 

t Jomini in his account, "Precis politique et militaire des campagnes 
de 1812 k 1814," 11. 224, says that "the 'Act of Mediation' was the 
work of the best heads of Switzeriand and not that of the First Consul." 
This statement is correct to this extent, that Napoleon instructed Haute- 
rive, Director of Foreign Affairs, to submit to him the result of the propo- 
sitions made by both parties. 



258 The Last Years of the Consulate [I802 

this problem, when renewed war deprived its decisions of validity. 
This question was now taken up again. It had been deter- 
mined in Rastatt that the secular princes who had suffered these 
losses should receive compensation in the shape of ecclesias- 
tical territories lying on the right bank of the Rhine. This 
was confirmed by the Treaty of Luneville. Napoleon's motive 
in this was exactly that of the Revolution, which had done 
away in France with the political significance of mortmain and 
which carried across the boundary into Germany the principle 
of universal secularization of Church property. There was in 
Germany a class of ecclesiastical and consequently non-heredi- 
tary princes who were moved by no interest of family to try, 
like the secular princes, to obtain all possible independence and 
sovereignty for their houses. They had for that reason always 
been firm supporters of the feudal empire, and their Catholic 
faith had retained them as partisans of Austria and its ruHng 
house. Now, should these principalities be subdivided among 
the secular, that is to say the dynastic. States, the old imperial 
constitution would be shaken, the Empire would lose its stanch- 
est adherents, the tendency to disintegration would prevail, 
and, as a result of this subversion of the order of things, there 
would, at the best, arise a confederation in place of the Empire. 
The only possibility of maintaining the Constitution of the Em- 
pire lay in preserving to the princes of the Church all property 
not needed to indemnify those princes who had been deprived 
of their lands; but it would fall inevitably if all of the ecclesias- 
tical principalities were secularized. The Revolutionary govern- 
ments of France had each adopted as a principle the necessity for 
the secularization of all. In the year 1795, when for a moment 
a general treaty of peace was under consideration in Paris, this 
project was brought by Sieyes before the Convention Com- 
mittee of Public Safety, his proposal being the complete dis- 
memberment of German ecclesiastical principahties for the 
benefit of secular princes, and this scheme was doubtless sub- 
mitted at a later date to the consideration of Napoleon and 
his ministers.* The famous abbe had in those earher days 
* How important a part in foreign politics during the Consulate and 



^T. 33] The Secularizations in Germany 259 

established the principle that the ruling German powers, Prussia 
and Austria, should be kept at the greatest possible distance 
from the Rhine, while along the river there should be tolerated 
only States of secondary importance. Against encroachments 
from the two other powers these States would be protected by 
France, to which country they would be faithful adherents. 
But to such a plan, according to Sieyes, the ecclesiastical prin- 
cipahties were not adapted, since they as elective principalities 
without dynastic interests furnished no guarantee of permanent 
alliance. Consequently they ought to be secularized, as had 
already been done with some of their number at the time of 
the Peace of Westphaha. 

And while this was the view of the situation taken by France, 
that of the two ruhng German powers was not directly opposed to 
it. In so far as Prussia was concerned, the secularization which 
had been a part of the Treaty of Westphalia had very consid- 
erably strengthened the power of Brandenburg, and the great- 
ness of this State in the past accordingly rested upon the very 
principle which was now being promulgated by the Revolution. 
Moreover, the House of Brandenburg was just then interested in 
seeing indemnified on German soil the ejected hereditary 
Stadtholder of Holland, who was a relative. Austria, on the 
other hand, in demanding for herself in the Treaty of Campo 
Formio an ecclesiastical principaUty, — the Archbishopric of 
Salzburg, — ^had already conceded to France the right to assist 
her in acquiring it.* Later, in the Treaty of Luneville, a stipula- 
tion was made to the effect that the Grand Duke of Tuscany 
also was to receive compensation in Germany for his loss of 
territory, for which purpose Salzburg was again set aside with 
Berchtesgaden. The fact was that in Vienna the interests of 
Austria outweighed those of the German Empire, as had once 
before been the case, under Joseph II., when the scheme had 

the Empire is to be ascribed directly to Sieyes is a question which will 
be more closely examined later. 

* Article 5. The French Republic will use its good offices to enable 
His Majesty the Emperor to acquire for Germany the Archbishopric 
of Salzburg, etc. 



26o The Last Years of the Consulate [I802 

arisen for the general secularization of the ecclesiastical princi- 
palities of Germany. Consequently neither of the great Ger- 
man powers was opposed on principle to this solution of the 
problem — a fact of decisive importance. Another of equal 
weight was that the question had ceased to be such as to in- 
volve Germany alone. By this policy of assigning German 
territory to princes not themselves German, — such as the Stadt- 
holder of Holland and the Grand Duke of Tuscany, — and record- 
ing the agreements in international treaties, German questions 
of indemnification had become the common concern of all Eu- 
rope. It is therefore not surprising that France, which had won 
for herself the first place among the nations, should assume in 
this case the predominant part, and that the question should 
be decided, not at the Imperial Diet at Ratisbon,but attheTui- 
leries. The various German dynasties at once hastened to open 
direct negotiations with the First Consul. Then followed a 
scene of courting and enlisting the good-will of Talleyrand and 
his ofl&cials, a buying and selling of favour and protection, a 
disgraceful driving of bargains in which the glory of the Empire 
and honour of the nation were sacrificed on account of a few 
scraps of land. At length, on the 20th of May, 1802, a separate 
treaty was concluded between France and Wiirtemberg by 
which the latter was promised a considerable increase of terri- 
tory from ecclesiastical sources; the House of Wiirtemberg 
being related to that of Russia, it was hoped that the assent of 
Alexander I. would thus be obtained to the whole transaction. 
Three days later followed a similar treaty with Prussia which 
awarded likewise to Frederick WiUiam III. extensive ''indem- 
nification" taken from Church possessions.* On the 24th of 
the same month a treaty with Bavaria was signed at Paris, 
which was soon followed by settlements with Baden and Hesse. 
Upon the strength of these agreements there was devised in 
Paris a comprehensive scheme of general secularization which 
left undisturbed only the single Archbishopric of Mainz. To 

* The ecclesiastical territories named in this treaty are Hildesheim, 
Paderborn, Eichsfeld, Essen, Werden, and Quedlinburg, all of which were 
already mentioned as the share of Prussia in Sieyes' project of 1795. 



^T. 33] The German Empire Undermined 261 

this on June 3d, 1802, Napoleon obtained Russia's consent with 
her promise to assist France in securing its adoption at the 
Imperial Diet at Ratisbon. 

Austria had purposely been kept in ignorance of these pro- 
ceedings. Her ambassador at Paris first learned through the 
"Moniteur " of the fact of the agreement with Russia and of the 
scheme for indemnification. Emperor Francis protested, not 
because as Head of the Empire it was his duty to protect its con- 
stitution and honour against foreign intrusion, but because the 
portion of the spoils accruing to Prussia was too large and that 
to Austria too small. But it was in vain that his troops were 
sent to occupy the territory of the bishopric of Passau, which 
had been allotted to Bavaria. The German princes had, for 
once, made common cause with France, and Napoleon's categori- 
cal summons forced the Austrian Court to yield. Further, the 
Austrians were forced to accept with such grace as they could 
the dispositions according to which the Grand Duke received in 
exchange for Tuscany not only Salzburg and Berchtesgaden, but 
Brixen, Trient, and a portion of the bishopric of Eichstadt as well, 
while, as a return for these losses, the Austrians were compelled 
by a treaty with France dated December 26th, 1802, to confirm 
all the changes made in Upper Italy. Meanwhile the Diet at 
Ratisbon had been brought to accept the scheme for indemni- 
fication presented by France and Russia; it was ratified Feb- 
ruary 25th, 1803, by formal enactment. The temporal power of 
the German princes of the Church had ceased to exist; the founda- 
tions upon which rested the ancient constitution of the Empire 
had been demolished. 

Thus had the nations beyond the Rhine also been made to 
feel Napoleon's political power, while the small neighbouring Ger- 
man States, particularly those in the south, had been brought 
into a certain attitude of dependence toward his government. 
In the diplomatic campaign which he had been carrying on 
against Austria Napoleon had come off victorious at every point; 
the power on the Danube had been completely isolated, its conclu- 
sive defeat being marked by the treaty of December, 1802. If his 
persecution of the conquered power now ceased, the cause lay 



262 The Last Years of the Consulate LI802 

solely in the fact of new developments in another quarter demand- 
ing his attention. 

The treaty with England signed at Amiens had, it is true, 
brought about a condition of affairs making it possible for arms 
to be cast aside for a moment, but it had given no promise of 
lasting peace. There were voices, as has before been observed, 
raised in the British Parliament emphatically denouncing the 
abandonment of Italy to Napoleon, thereby giving him the mas- 
tery over the Continent. While the preliminaries of peace of 
October, 1801, were greeted with rejoicing by the English people 
exhausted by the long and expensive war, the ratification of the 
same in March, 1802, met with far less enthusiasm. And for good 
reason ; for the expectations of the EngHsh of being able to make 
use of the cessation of hostihties for the benefit of their com- 
merce proved by the end of a few months to be but an illusion. 
Napoleon had not only refused to accede to the renewal of the 
Treaty of Commerce of 1786, but, in order to protect French in- 
dustry, by the imposition of high duties he had practically 
closed to English goods the ports of France and of her dependent 
States, Italy and Holland. Thus it was that manufacturers and 
merchants on the British side of the Channel had come to desire 
war, which would at least be less prejudicial to their interests 
than this peace which was working their ruin. And what if the 
First Consul were to be successful in extending still further the 
French federative system, thereby restricting to a yet greater 
degree England's commercial sphere on the Continent? In 
1798 he had menaced her colonial existence with his Egyptian 
expedition, and now his attitude was equally threatening 
toward her industries. And now, as had then been the case, 
it was a matter of life or death to the island nation. Further 
extension on the part of her rival must be prevented and 
her utmost endeavours put forth to lessen the ascendency of 
France. 

Napoleon was himself convinced of the probability of a rup- 
ture with England, to judge at least by what he said to the 
Austrian ambassador as early as May, 1802 ; but so absolute did 
he take to be England's need of peace, since she had intervened 



Mt.s's] Napoleon's Colonial Policy 263 

in favour of neither Italy nor Holland when the treaty was drawn 
up, that he counted nevertheless upon a somewhat longer season 
of peace in that quarter. In any case he began to put mto oper- 
ation a comprehensive economic experiment which could suc- 
ceed only under that supposition. This was nothing else than 
a vast colonial scheme which, while it was to have San Domingo 
as its principal base, was also to include the Antilles and the 
American territory of Louisiana, which had been ceded to France 
by Spain. Obstacles to this plan presented themselves on both 
sides of the Atlantic. 

At the time of the last war a remarkably intelHgent negro, 
on the island of San Domingo, Toussaint Louverture by name, 
had distinguished himself in his leadership of the negroes, op- 
posing so determined a resistance to the Enghsh that they had 
been obliged to withdraw. He had then assumed authority and 
founded a severe but excellent government. According to the 
Constitution with which he provided the island, the suzerainty 
of France was to be maintained as strictly nominal, while he him- 
self, as president for life, should rule independently. (Evidently 
Napoleon had already made disciples.) Under this government 
San Domingo flourished. Its coloured inhabitants, though freed 
from slavery, were nevertheless kept at work by the authority 
of their president; commerce released from restriction, brought 
rich returns to the country. But all this was utterly irreconcil- 
able with the colonial scheme which Napoleon was meditating 
and of which Talleyrand was perhaps the instigator. The Consti- 
tution was accordingly rejected by the First Consul, who sent his 
brother-in-law, Leclerc, with an army of 25,000 men to the island 
to re-estabhsh its commercial dependence upon France. This 
army, it may incidentally be remarked, which was assigned by 
Napoleon to operate at such a distance in a noxious climate, was 
selected, doubtless not without design, from those bodies of troops 
which had been under the command of Moreau in the recent war 
and who were among the most faithful adherents of his cause 
and of the republican system. Leclerc, like Richepanse, who 
had been sent to Martinique, was under orders to re-establish 
slavery among the negroes; Toussaint, at the head of his people, 



264 The Last Years of the Consulate [I802 

resisted; and it was only at the expense of extraordinary courage 
and perseverance on the part of the French that he was at length 
forced to surrender on condition of amnesty to himself and his 
followers. But the expedition proved nevertheless a failure. 
Every day hundreds of brave soldiers were carried off by yellow 
fever, so that in July, 1802, after seven months upon the island; 
Leclerc had only 8000 men left under his command. He feared 
a new onslaught on the part of Toussaint, who had retained his 
rank as general, and recommended to Napoleon that the redoubt- 
able leader of the San Domingans be summoned to France and 
there kept in confinement. This was done, and toward the 
close of March, 1803, Toussaint ended his days in the fortress of 
Joux, a victim to the harsh climate and to ill treatment by his 
custodians. But on the other side of the ocean Leclerc also died; 
smitten by yellow fever, nor, in spite of considerable reinforce- 
ments, was his successor able to re-establish French supremacy 
in the island, so that before the end of the year 1803 the French 
were obliged to abandon it altogether. The second of the bases of 
operation in Napoleon's colonial scheme came, likewise, to naught, 
for the United States of America entered a threatening protest 
against the expansion of French influence in Louisiana. And 
now, in addition, peace with England was on the point of rup- 
ture earher than Napoleon had counted upon, robbing his scheme 
of that most essential consideration, safety of traffic upon the 
sea. 

During the course of the year 1802, while France was engaged 
in the San Domingo enterprise, public opinion in England had 
taken a more and more pronounced attitude against France, and 
so marked had this feeling become that finally even the peace- 
loving ministry of Addington was compelled to yield to the pres- 
sure. The stipulations of the Treaty of Amiens had not yet all 
been fulfilled ; an important pledge yet remained in British keep- 
ing — the island of Malta, that highly-prized halting-place on the 
route to India. In view of the encroachments of France upon 
the Continent England had delayed the fulfilment of her com- 
pact to restore the island to the Knights of St. John, and now 
rather regarded its possession as a desirable compensation for 



iET.33] Threatening England 265 

Napoleon's expansion. The situation was aggravated by the 
scathing attacks of EngHsh newspapers upon the ruler of France, 
and by the fact that when he demanded a cessation of this 
joumaUstic persecution, the London government waived respon- 
sibility, referring him to the legalized freedom of the press in Eng- 
land. It was a time of suspense in which the hostihty of feeling 
on both sides increased from day to day. But Napoleon did not 
long remain undecided. His next step was to threaten. Should 
this foreign power be intimidated by threats he would derive this 
advantage, that his prestige in France and in Europe would be 
enhanced by just so much; but in case England really meant war, 
the colonial scheme must of course be given up, in which case, 
however, there opened up the alluring prospect — since England 
would not remain without alhes — of a profitable war upon the 
Continent, a prospect which, as has been seen, was continually 
kept in mind by the First Consul.* 

A pretext was found in the autumn of 1802, when England 
made complaint of a violation of the neutrality of Switzerland 
through the entry into that country of the French army under 
Ney. Hereupon Napoleon dictated to his Minister of Foreign 
Affairs instructions for the guidance of the French ambassador. 
Otto, in London, and these reveal in the germ his entire future 
policy. In regard to Switzerland, the matter was to be con- 
sidered closed. The establishment of British hirelings in the 
Alps would not be tolerated by him. In case war were 
threatened upon the further side of the Channel the question 
would arise of what sort it was to be. A mere naval warfare 
would be of little advantage to England on account of the paucity 
of spoils. It would, it is true, blockade the French ports, but 
it would at the same time bring about a counter blockade, since, 
upon the outbreak of hostilities, all the coast from Hanover 
to Taranto would be guarded by French troops. And what 
if the First Consul were to assemble the flat-boats of Flanders 
and Holland, thus providing means of transport for a hundred 

* Napoleon had already announced to the Austrian ambassador in 
May, 1802, that a rupture with England would necessarily involve war 
upon the Continent. 



266 The Last Years of the Consulate [I802 

thousand men with which to keep England in a perpetual 
state of alarm over an always possible, and indeed even probable, 
invasion? If, on the other hand, the London Cabinet should 
conclude to rekindle war on the Continent, Napoleon would 
thereby simply be compelled to proceed to the conquest of all 
Europe. "The First Consul is but thirty-three years of age," 
concludes this document, " up to this time he has destroyed none 
but states of secondary rank. Who knows, if he were forced to 
it, what length of time he would require to change once more the 
face of Europe and to resuscitate the Western Empire ? ". (Octo- 
ber 23d, 1802.) 

It was but a feeble echo of this strain which was transmitted 
by the ambassador in London, and, for the time being, peace was 
preserved. Talleyrand and the other ministers as well as Na- 
poleon's brothers were unreservedly in favour of the avoidance 
of open warfare. The Consul alone, irritated by the continued 
refusal to evacuate Malta and the defiant tone of the English 
press, allowed himself to be impelled to war. He now definitely 
gave up his colonial plans and himself sought to precipitate 
matters. He ordered copied in the Moniteur a report made by 
General Sebastiani, whom he had sent on a secret mission to 
Egypt. This report was to the effect that the British had failed 
as yet to evacuate Alexandria ; also that, while existing hostih- 
ties continued there between the Turks and Mamelukes, 6000 
French soldiers would be sufficient to reconquer the country. 
If this report was pubhshed with a view to exasperating Eng- 
land, no doubt could remain as to its having accomplished its 
purpose.* The prospect of seeing the route to India again im- 
perilled was intolerable to the English, and any thought of re- 
nouncing the possession of Malta was from now on out of the 
question with them. 

But Napoleon carried matters yet further. In the annual 

* Sebastiani himself bears witness that this was the intention, for he 
recounts somewhat later that after his report had been read the Consul 
exclaimed: "Well, we shall see whether that is not enough to drive 
John Bull to fight. As for me, I have no dread of war." (M^moires de 
Lucien, II 165.) 



^T. 33] The Beginning of Hostilities 267 

report which he submitted to the legislative body in February, 
1803, the subject discussed was the conflict between the two 
parties into which the English were divided, those in favour 
of peace as opposed to those who were hostile to France. A 
half-million of soldiers, said he, must be kept in readiness by 
France against the possibility of victory to the second of these 
parties. England alone, however, — so the report went on, — ■ 
was not sufficient to cope with France. British national pride 
was touched to the quick by this new insult. George III. 
promptly offered an ultimatum requiring, among other things, 
the indemnification of the King of Sardinia and the evacuation 
of Holland and Switzerland on the part of France. These terms 
were rejected. Toward the middle of May, 1803, the ambassa- 
dors of both countries were recalled. War was declared. 

Hostilities had meanwhile already begun. For weeks before 
that time England had given chase to all French merchantmen 
who had ventured out relying upon peace, and Napoleon made 
returns by putting under arrest all such Englishmen as were 
Hving in France. Soon after British squadrons were sent to 
blockade the French ports, whereupon Napoleon began to 
carry out to the letter the plan of campaign which he had mapped 
out in his instructions to Otto. It consisted, as has been seen^ 
chiefly in three acts : the first being to blockade England in her 
turn by making inaccessible to her ships the coast of the Con- 
tinent ''from Hanover to Taranto," all of which should be 
guarded by French troops; the second step was to threaten 
an invasion by the gathering of an expeditionary army on the 
Channel; and third, in case the British power should be success- 
ful in kindhng a war on the Continent in which her alhes should 
be opposed to France, it was his purpose to make the Con- 
tinent tributary to himself as far as the weapons of France 
could be made to carry. This programme was further accen- 
tuated by the order now issued by the Consul reviving the cele- 
bration of the birthday of the Maid of Orleans for the sake of 
nourishing the spirit of jingoism toward the ancient enemy of 
France. 

Before the month of May had expired a French army corps 



268 The Last Years of the Consulate [i803 

was marched into Hanover, which territory belonged to the 
King of England, and the troops of the Elector without 
much show of resistance capitulated. By means of this occu- 
pation the ships of the enemy were debarred from the mouths 
of the Weser and Elbe rivers, thus closing to British trade the 
most important avenues of communication with Northern 
Germany. The consequences soon became evident. "You 
have dealt England a fatal blow/' writes Napoleon to General 
Mortier; "many houses have become bankrupt." He admon- 
ishes him to be personally watchful to prevent any possible 
British consignment of merchandise finding entrance. Soon 
after this, in June, a second army corps under command of 
Gouvion Saint-Cyr penetrated into the kingdom of Naples and, 
contrary to the terms of the treaty, occupied the ports of Taranto, 
Brindisi, and Otranto. 

The two extremes of the cordon being thus made secure, 
all that remained between was now closely and inseparably 
attached to the policy of France. First in turn came the Ba- 
tavian Republic. It was compelled by treaty to provide sus- 
tenance for French troops to the number of 18,000 men and 
to hold in readiness for service a force of 16,000; in addi- 
tion, five ships of the line and a hundred sloops carrying cannon 
were to be furnished for the naval war. In return Napoleon 
guaranteed to the republic the integrity of its territory, and prom- 
ised to restore to it any colonies which might be lost during the 
course of the war and (circumstances permitting) with the 
addition of Ceylon (June 25th, 1803). Switzerland was the 
next to pledge herself in favour of France. An offensive and 
defensive alliance with her powerful neighbour imposed upon 
her the obligation to raise an army of 16,000 men, which was 
to be increased to 28,000 in case France were attacked; that is 
to say, that a large proportion of the military force of the nation 
was put at the service of a totally foreign interest. Finally 
Spain and Portugal also were induced to enter the league. With 
Spain it had become a question of no slight significance. When, 
in the spring of 1803, Napoleon definitely renounced his colonial 
enterprise, he came to the conclusion that Louisiana, which had 



iET. 34] Napoleon Sells Louisiana 269 

been acquired from Charles IV., would prove to him nothing but 
a burden. The territory was coveted by the United States, and 
Napoleon now offered to sell it to that country. The offer 
was accepted, and for the sum of 80,000,000 francs Louisiana 
became a part of the United States. 

But Spain in her treaties with France had reserved to her- 
self the privilege of reclaiming Louisiana, and Napoleon's vio- 
lation of the agreement aroused such intense excitement at 
Madrid that Godoy, the Prince of Peace, considered for a time 
the advisability of opposing resistance to this neighbour, espe- 
cially in view of the fact that, instead of the 25 ships and 28,000 
men which the Court of Madrid had agreed in 1796 to hold in 
readiness for the service of France in the event of war, the Consul 
now demanded vast subsidies of money, 6,000,000 francs a 
month, enforcing his requisition by means of an army gathered 
at Bordeaux. 

But Bonaparte would accept of no gainsaying. He made 
complaints to the king concerning the Prince of Peace, not even 
forbearing to make allusion to the scandalous relations existing 
between the latter and the queen. The expedient proved 
effectual. The minister humbled himself, and on October 19th, 

1803, the treaty was concluded according to the wishes of Na- 
poleon. Spain was thus ranged among the enemies of England 
and forced to undergo the experience of having war declared 
against her by the British Cabinet in the year 1804. Naturally 
Portugal could not remain unaffected by all that was thus taking 
place, and she was compelled to purchase neutrality by the 
payment to France of 1,000,000 francs a month. In February, 

1804, Genoa also was put under obligation to furnish 6000 
sailors to her powerful neighbour for use in his naval warfare. 

While the Consul in these ways prepared the ''blockade" 
of England, he was assembhng on the coast of the Channel near 
Boulogne an imposing army, which he thoroughly equipped and 
exercised — whether as mere demonstration or with a view to 
actual occasion — in what was requisite to accomplish with 
success the transit across the Channel. Flat transport-boats 
were built in great number, and the field-soldiers practised in 



270 The Last Years of the Consulate [i803 

the duties of the sailor. It was a gigantic apparatus which was 
here displayed for the consternation of John Bull. But it was 
not to be brought immediately into action. The enemy from 
without was, unfortunately for him, not the only one against 
which Napoleon had to do battle. In the interior of the country 
arose another enemy which was not to be subdued with army 
and navy. Against this foe he now turned. In this case 
also he was destined to conquer, and, with his genius for making 
ever)rthing contribute to his end, his prostrate antagonist was 
made to serve but as a stepping-stone to new greatness. 

After the death-blow had been dealt to the Jacobin party in 
the decree of proscription issued in 1801, there remained but two 
political factions who followed with irreconcilable vindictiveness 
the existing system of personal government and its representa- 
tive: there were, first, the Moderate Republicans, the citizens 
of the 13th Vendemiaire, who recognized General Moreau as their 
leader; and, second, the Ultra-Royalists who had been driven 
out of the country and who regarded the capitulation of Vendee 
in 1800 as only a truce which they were determined to disregard 
at the first favourable opportunity. The last-named had their 
headquarters in England, their head being Charles d'Artois, the 
brother of the executed monarch, Louis XVL, while among their 
most active agents were Pichegru and Dumouriez. These two 
parties had remained quiescent during the continuance of peace, 
but, now that war had again broken out, they had imbibed fresh 
hope. There even arose at this time a kind of coalition between 
them, although this was only of an outward character. Pichegru 
went to Paris and made advances to Moreau. To the latter, who 
was indispensable to the accomplishment of their purpose, was 
to be accorded a temporary position of power, that he might then 
play the part of the English General Monk and prepare for the 
Bourbons a way of return to their native land. The conspiracy 
was based upon the supposition that it was going to be possible 
to do away with Napoleon. This time he was to be more surely 
dealt with than had been the case on that Christmas evening in 
the rue Saint-Nicaise when the infernal machine failed to accom- 
plish its purpose. To carry out this plan for assassination, 



iET. 34] The Royalist Plot 271 

Georges Cadoudal, a leader among the Vendeans, came secretly 
to Paris and put himself there at the head of trusted partisans 
whom the many years of civil war had transformed into veritable 
poUtical bandits. The plan was for a sufficient number of them 
openly to assail the First Consul when he drove through the 
streets surrounded by his body-guard, to seize him and — so it 
was asserted in the ^' Moniteur " — to kill him and, with his death, 
overthrow the government. Certain English ministers were 
initiated mto the plan, and sanctioned it at least in so far as it 
went toward bringing about the downfall of their hated enemy.* 
But Napoleon received warning in time to avert the threatening 
danger. His London agents had revealed the plot to him before 
any one of the conspirators had so much as set foot upon French 
soil. One by one, then, as they reached the country they were 
put under arrest and the whole extent of the conspiracy ascer- 
tained, though not without application of coercive measures. 
Moreau, also, was taken into custody. At the end of a pro- 
longed trial Cadoudal, with a number of his assistants, was sen- 
tenced and shot ; Pichegru was discovered strangled in his prison 
cell; Moreau, whose collusion with Pichegru could be proven, — 
though there was no evidence of any understanding with Cadou- 
dal, — ^was sentenced to two years' imprisonment, but, though 
judgment had already been pronounced. Napoleon insisted upon 
a revision of the case, and the penalty was changed to banish- 
ment to America. But the essential point lay in the fact that 
the cause of the Bourbons was apparently compromised, and 
that Moreau, the only dangerous rival to the First Consul, lost 
his influence in the army as a consequence of his connection, 
however shght, with the conspirators, while Napoleon's popu- 
larity with the non-partisan mass of the people was only the 
further increased by the danger which had threatened him. 

But he himself undid no small part of this favourable im- 
pression through an act which defies all attempt at justification. 
Cadoudal had asserted during the course of his trial that the royal 
princes of France were cognizant of the projected assault, and 

* On the character and degree of the complicity of the English govern- 
ment see Rose, "Life of Napoleon I.," I. 416-17. — B. 



272 The Last Years of the Consulate [i804 

that they had been intending to be present when it was perpe- 
trated. Artois was the person thus denoted, he having as a mat- 
ter of fact been party to the scheme with the declared intention 
of being present in Paris. From this of course it was clear that 
certain members of the House of Bourbon were abettors to the 
crime ; but this was not true of all, not, for instance, of the Con- 
des, who disapproved of the conspiracy and had refused all par- 
ticipation in it. To this branch of the Bourbons belonged the 
young Prince d'Enghien, the last scion of his line. Love for his 
cousin, Charlotte de Rohan, had drawn him to Ettenheim in the 
grand duchy of Baden, which modest town still belonged to the 
diocese of the Cardinal de Rohan and had served as residence for 
him and his niece since he had been ejected by the Revolution 
from Strasburg. Here the prince was secretly married to the 
lady of his choice, and here he lived upon a pension granted to 
him by England, it being his desire, now that war was about to 
begin, to show his gratitude either by fighting in the ranks of the 
English or by doing service upon the Continent in some such way 
as by organizing a corps of volunteers from among the discon- 
tented elements always to be met with in Alsace and neighbour- 
ing garrisons. His offer was, however, refused by the British 
government, and Enghien had to content himself with remain- 
ing inactive in his exile. It so chanced that England was just 
at this time secretly sending out agents into Switzerland as well 
as into Southern Germany, in the effort to stir up feeling against 
France, and of these machinations exaggerated reports were car- 
ried to Paris. One of these rumours now associated the name of 
the young prince with these emissaries, among whom it was 
claimed that the feared and hated emigre Dumouriez had been 
discovered. From this Napoleon concluded that Enghien also 
could not be entirely unconcerned in the conspiracy against his 
person, and conceived the idea of taking him into custody, since 
he had been unable to get possession of the Comte d' Artois. It 
was of little consequence to Napoleon that, in order to carry out 
this scheme, it would be necessary to invade foreign territory 
and violate the law of nations. On the 15th of March General 
Ordener crossed the Rhine with a few hundred dragoons, laid 



jet. 34] The Due d'Enghien 273 

hold of the prince, who was just making ready to start on a hunt- 
ing excursion, and carried him off to Strasburg, whence he was 
at once conducted to Paris by a competent escort. 

While he was yet on the way the ultimate fate of the prisoner 
was being deliberated upon in privy council. Napoleon ex- 
pressed the opinion that he should be tried before a court-mar- 
tial; Cambaceres advised against this course, while Lebrun, 
when questioned, made an evasive reply; Talleyrand and Fouche, 
however, counselled strongly in its favour, and the First Consul 
accordingly decided upon it, although there was no difficulty in 
convincing himself from the prince's papers that he stood in no 
sort of relationship to the conspirators, while the hated "Du- 
mouriez " turned out to be a person of very small consequence 
by the name of ''Thumery." These revelations did not, how- 
ever, change Napoleon's decision, for he was determined upon 
sacrificing one of the Bourbons for the sake of terrifying the 
others from any further attacks. 

On the very evening of Enghien's arrival in Vincennes 
a mifitary tribunal of carefully selected judges was there con- 
voked. The accused was subjected to a trial in which he denied 
connection of any kind with Pichegru and the others, but on 
the other hand, proudly asserting the truth, he declared that, 
since the commencement of hostilities, he had, as a matter of 
fact, sought to engage in the service of England and had hoped 
to have a part to play on the Rhine, while the fact that prior to 
this time he had fought against France was known to all. This 
was sufficient to induce the judges to pronounce a sentence which 
would, as they knew, give satisfaction to their lord, — and one not 
altogether without semblance of justice, since the Revolution in 
each of its phases had threatened with death open warfare on the 
part of a Frenchman against his native country, and the law in 
question had never been abrogated. Doubtless it was to this 
also that Napoleon had reference when he met his wife's entrea- 
ties for leniency toward the prisoner with the reply: ''I am the 
man of the State, I am the French Revolution, and I shall up- 
hold it." Hardly had the verdict of the court-martial been 
signed by the colonels composing it, before the prince was led 



274 The Last Years of the Consulate [i804 

out in the darkness of the same night — March 20th, 1804 — to 
the castle moat; there he was placed in front of a grave already 
prepared; and shot by a company of gendarmes. According to 
all authentic accounts the last of the Condes died like a true 
hero.* 

At the tidings of this crime mute horror took possession of 
every one. A member of the family which for centuries had 
governed France had been sentenced and executed in its capital 
at the nod of a foreigner ! The massacres of the Reign of Terror 
it seemed, then, had not yet come to an end even under this gov- 
ernment which had understood drawing up such excellent codes 
of law. If the prince had even really been in collusion with the 
conspirators against the head of the state, his fate would have 
been more comprehensible. But this was not the case. It had 
been necessary first to abduct him from a foreign country in 
order to slay him. Moreover, the deed had not been commanded 
in the heat of blind, tumultuous passion at the criminal assault, 
but after long and quiet dehberation such as is given an act of 
the state. With the words ''my policy" Napoleon had expected 
to be able to silence every objection raised against his severity? 
and this policy he characterized in this wise : ' ' At least they will 
see what we are capable of and henceforth, I hope, they will let 
us alone." But he was unable to convince any one. Even the 
classes which were closely bound to him through regard for their 
material interests did not remain entirely unmoved. On 'Change 
stocks fell very considerably, and the Consul was obhged to ex- 
pend millions in order to sustain prices and to abate the ex- 
citement. 

Up to this time, besides the respect rendered to his genius. 
Napoleon had elicited the sympathy of many. But this was 

* A moment before his death the prince put into the hands of the 
commanding officer a ring and a lock of hair to be dehvered with his 
last farewell to the Princess de Rohan. This wish of the condemned 
was allowed to remain unfulfilled. The relics were deposited with the 
records of the trial among the archives of the Paris Prefecture de Police, 
whence Napoleon III., in the early years of his reign, ordered them re- 
moved to the imperial chancery. Since then they with the papers have 
vanished. (Lalanne, "Les Derniers Jours du Consulat," p. xii.) 



Mr. 34] The Moral Effect of the Execution 275 

now withdrawn, and his rule was henceforth tolerated solely with 
a view to the advantages to be derived from it. Obedience 
might still be counted upon, but affection no longer accompa- 
nied it, and what he yet held would be withdrawn whenever the 
French ceased to feel that their interests were best served 
through him. Their confidence in this respect, however, had 
not been impaired by the crime of Vincennes. ''The trial of 
General Moreau, and above all the death of the Due d'Enghien, 
brought about a revulsion of feeling, but opinions still remained 
unshaken,' ' says Madame de Remusat in her Memoires; and 
Lucchesini, the Prussian ambassador at Paris, whose excellent 
account of these events has recently been made public, says in 
the course of it : ' ' If the character of the French nation had not 
at all times given to its acts the stamp of fervour rather than of 
steadfastness, one would suppose that the First Consul in his 
act of tyranny toward the Due d'Enghien would have lost a 
large and important part of the confidence, the enthusiasm, the 
devotion, and the attachment upon which his present authority 
rests and upon which his future dignity must be founded. But 
it is possible that he knows the French better than they know 
themselves; perhaps he has been taught by the example of 
Cardinal Richelieu, who ordered the execution of a Mont- 
morency, that in France just those most daring poUtical acts 
tend rather to secure than to shake the supreme power." 

The conjecture of the Prussian diplomat was in many re- 
spects correct. We have watched through all of their phases 
Napoleon's efforts to secure a monarch's power. Two years 
before he had contented himself with the consulship for life; 
but it was no part of his plan to stop at that. In May, 1802, 
the Austrian ambassador had already seen enough to lead him 
to notify the home government that supreme power for life was 
to be conferred upon Napoleon with the title of ''Emperor of 
the Gauls," and at precisely the same time the Prussian 
charge d'affaires announced to his superiors that the Consul 
was intending not only to change his title, but also to make the 
supreme power hereditary in his family. In March, 1803, the 
EngUshman Jackson made a note to the same effect in his diary, 



276 The Last Years of the Consulate [I804 

and from that time the idea of an ' ' Empire des Gaules " never 
again disappeared below the surface. Napoleon himself played 
in this case exactly the same part that he had played on former 
occasions. This time also he wished to be sought. And again 
was found just the person needed to bring this about. Fouche, 
who had never ceased to repine at the loss of his lucrative posi- 
tion as Minister of Police, hoped to recover it if he could bring 
about the fulfilment of the First Consurs secret desire. An 
admirably adapted pretext was furnished by the conspiracy 
against Napoleon's life and the danger to the peace of the in- 
terior of the country threatened in his removal. After his 
escape numberless congratulatory addresses had poured in from 
the departements, corporations, etc., and upon the ground of 
these demonstrations Fouche came to an agreement with a 
tumber of senators in regard to a new amendment to the con- 
stitution, for the power of amendment since 1802 had been 
acknowledged to belong to the Senate. Upon this body also the 
deepest of impressions had been made by the danger in which 
the Consul had been involved. A subversion of the existing 
government would unquestionably have deprived the senators 
of their lucrative positions by putting an end to the corrupt 
munificence of Napoleon. But with this self-interested con- 
sideration was associated another less unworthy. It was un- 
deniable that a Coup d'Etat with the civil discord which would 
follow was far more readily possible while the system of govern- 
ment was dependent upon a single individual and its overthrow 
could be accomplished by the removal of one person only. The 
matter assumed a different aspect if the office of the chief ruler 
were made hereditary, so that a legitimate successor could at 
once step into Napoleon's place and continue to rule according 
to his maxims ; heredity would in this wise of itself give promise 
of greater stability, since it would prevent further attempts at 
assassination by making them vain and fruitless. The estab- 
hshment of a hereditary revolutionary-monarchical power was 
thus at once demanded by the common interest and by the 
personal advantage of the senators, and for that reason even 
the crime of Vincennes did not prevent this act of legislation^ 



^T. 34] The State of Public Feeling 277 

and a week had scarcely elapsed after that miserable proceeding 
before a deputation from the Senate presented itself before the 
First Consul and addressed him in these words: ^'You have 
foimded a new era, but it is your duty to perpetuate it; the 
result attained is as nothing if not permanent. We cannot 
doubt that this great idea has already received your consid- 
eration, for your creative genius embraces everything and over- 
looks nothing. But do not longer delay. Everything urges 
upon you the necessity for this step, the state of the times and 
recent events, conspiracies and plots of the ambitious, and, in 
another way, the spirit of anxiety which agitates every French- 
man. You have the power to master both times and events, 
to disarm the ambitious, to calm and tranquillize all France by 
giving to it institutions which will cement the edifice which you 
have erected and which will continue to the children that which 
you have given to the fathers. The ship of state may not be 
exposed to the danger of losing her pilot without an anchor to 
protect her against shipwreck. Citizen First Consul, be assured 
that the Senate speaks thus here to you in the name of every 
citizen." 

The senators were not mistaken. When their proceeding be- 
came known there were many more voices raised in commenda- 
tion than in disapproval. ''Not that any movement of affection 
toward the First Consul had favoured this new accession of 
greatness to him and his family," says Miot de Melito; ''on the 
contrary, at no time had he been less beloved; but so urgent 
was the need of rest and stabihty, so disquieting the future, so 
great the dread of terrorism, so much to be apprehended seemed 
the return of the Bourbons with their many wrongs to be avenged, 
that the people seized eagerly upon everything that could avert 
these dangers against which no other means of defence could be 
devised.* 

* Other witnesses concur with Miot in these assertions. The Prussian 
envoy reported at Berlin : "The event is everywhere expected, and however 
considerable may be the number of persons who are jealous or discon- 
tented with an enterprise contrary alike to the wishes of the Royalists 
and to the principles of the Republicans, Paris and all France will hardly 
make their true feelings apparent in this case. The universal demand is 



2/8 The Last Years of the Consulate [i804 

But to Napoleon it was not enough that the new dignity 
should be conferred upon him by the Senate. The subjection 
of this body to the ruling power was for his purpose far too noto- 
rious. He wished to receive it as the offer of those who had 
previously opposed the idea of a monarchy. 

He doubtless reasoned that he would thus provide before- 
hand against opposition of any kind and at the same time pre- 
vent any possibility of confusion between his rule and that of 
the kings of France. For, it would be argued, it would not be 
possibly for him to kill one of the Bourbons to-day and to 
appear himself on the morrow as planning to usurp their in- 
heritance. Consequently the initiative must come from the 
Tribunate. A member of that body, named Curee, was induced, 
by the promise of one of the richly endowed places in the Senate, 
to make the following proposition which had been formulated 
in the Cabinet of the Consul: 1st. That Napoleon Bonaparte 
be entrusted as Emperor with the government of the French 
RepubHc; 2d. That the imperial dignity be declared hereditary 
to his descendants. A second tribune, an exile of the 18th 
Fructidor, was commissioned to second the motion. In the 
session of April 30th, 1804, Curee presented his proposal, and 
there appeared but a single individual who argued against its 
acceptance — Carnot; all the others voted in favour of it. The 
legislative body also was then assembled in all haste for a special 
session and cast a similar vote. Thereupon a new Constitution 
was elaborated under the direction of Napoleon by a govern- 
ment committee which included Talleyrand and Fouche with 
the Consuls. This constitution was then discussed in the Council 
of State and finally transmitted to the Senate for sanction. 
In the solemn session of May 18th, 1804, it was then adopted 
by that body — ''this change being demanded by the interests 
of the French people " — ^by a vote in which there were but four 
dissenting voices, one of them that of Sieyes; the new Con- 
stitution of France was then delivered over to the First Consul 

for tranquillity, the guarantee of present possessions is the object of desire, 
with the prospect of a future undisturbed. The new order of things affords 
hope of this." 



^T. 34] New Dignitaries 279 

at Saint-Cloud, where it was published upon the same day as the 
fundamental law of the state. The RepubUc had an Emperor. 

This Constitution of the year XII was not of those which 
impose limitations to the power of the monarch. Nor had 
that by any means been the intention in its preparation. In 
the Senate only the suggestion was brought forward in an ex- 
cessively timid fashion. Importance was attached chiefly to 
the question of the hereditabiUty of the chief power of the state. 
To the Emperor, who was himself childless, the right was con- 
ceded to adopt as his own the children or grandchildren of his 
brothers, in which case the power was to pass to them on his de- 
cease. But should Napoleon die without sons, whether the 
issue of his marriage or adopted, his brothers Joseph and Louis 
and their descendants were to succeed him in the imperial 
office. These possible heirs were proclaimed French princes. 
The civil Ust of the Emperor was fixed at the figure named in 
the royal constitution of 1791; that is to say, a yearly income 
of 25 millions of francs. The imperial throne was to be sur- 
rounded by six grand dignitaries, who were to enjoy the same 
honours as the princes and, hke them, were to be addressed as 
" Your Highness " and ' ' Monseigneur " ; these were the Grand 
Elector (Grand Electeur), the Arch-Chancellor of the Empire, 
the Arch-Chancellor of State (Archichanceher d'Etat), the 
Arch-Treasurer, the Constable, and the Lord High Admiral. 
Then followed the high officers of the Empire; that is to say, 
sixteen marshals and a number of great civil functionaries; these, 
like the six grand dignitaries, were all members of the Senate. 
Besides this House of Lords, which Napoleon did not consider 
as possessing either national or representative character, there 
yet remained the legislative body and the Tribunate. Indeed, 
to the first of these they went so far as to restore the power of 
speech, of which, however, they might make use only behind 
closed doors and in the privacy of the three sections (the juridi- 
cal, the administrative, and the financial) into which it was to 
be divided. No syllable of its proceedings was to reach the pubhc. 

Shortly after the promulgation of the Constitution followed 
the nominations. The two Consuls, Cambaceres and Lebrun, 



28o The Last Years of the Consulate [1804 

were appointed grand dignitaries, the former Arch-Chancellor 
of the Empire, the latter Arch-Treasurer. Joseph Bonaparte 
v/as elevated to the post of Grand Elector, and Louis to that of 
Constable. Talleyrand, who had taken a prominent part in the 
establishment of the new constitution, had also set his hopes 
upon one of these offices of grand dignitary, largely because it 
yielded a yearly income of a third of a milhon francs ($65,000), 
but he was disappointed; he remained Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, and, according to the provisions of the constitution, the 
office of minister and that of grand dignitary could not be filled 
at once by the same person. Fouche, on the contrary, received 
the reward he had been working for; he was again made Min- 
ister of Police, and from thenceforth stood in the front rank 
among those with whom the Emperor took counsel. Fourteen 
generals were appointed marshals of France: Jourdan on ac- 
count of his victory at Fleurus in 1794, Berthier for his ser- 
vices rendered as Chief of the General Staff, Massena for Rivoli, 
Zarich and Genoa, Lannes and Ney for divers brilliant actions, 
Augereau for Castiglione, Brune for the affair on the Helder in 
1799, Murat for his management of the cavalry, Bessieres for 
his command of the Guards, Davout for his deeds in Egypt, 
and in addition to these Bernadotte, Soult, Moncey, and Mortier. 
The court of the new Emperor was, moreover, organized on 
quite as magnificent a scale as the state. It included a Grand 
Almoner (Cardinal Fesch), a Grand Marshal of the Palace (Duroc), 
a Grand Chamberlain (Talleyrand), a Grand Master of the 
Hounds (Berthier), a Grand Master of the Horse (Coulain- 
court), a Grand Master of Ceremonies, and in addition to these 
a perfectly endless train of Prefects of the Palace, court ladies, 
and minor functionaries. Napoleon showed marked preference 
in securing for these positions persons bearing names of ancient 
Uneage. Nor did he fail in finding descendants of noble famiHes 
eager to enter his service At the court of the little Brienne 
cadet who had once been the target for the jeers of the young 
nobility now figured a Salm, an Arenberg, a La Rochefoucauld, 
and a Montesquiou. He had forgiven them now, but not, to be 
sure, until he had brought them completely into subjection. 



Mt.34:] Imperial Etiquette 281 

Among the court officers that of Master of Ceremonies became 
of special importance This was bestowed upon a converted 
emigre, Monsieur de Segur, who had at one time represented 
Louis XVI. at the Russian court. With his experience of the 
old court Ufe de Segur soon became one of the most sought after 
and one of the most harassed of men. For etiquette had be- 
come a matter of profound study at the Tuileries. Enormous 
volumes on the subject of ceremonial during the reign of Louis 
XIV. were consulted, extracts made from them, and formal dress- 
rehearsals instituted. Madame Campan, formerly first lady- 
in-waiting to Marie Antoinette and now principal of a school for 
young ladies, was summoned to court and taken into counsel. 
Naturally the new empire of the parvenu provided ample ma- 
terial for secret ridicule and all manner of witticisms at the capi- 
tal. Among other things it was said that Liberty had made 
but a brief appearance in Paris; entering by the "Barriere de 
PEnfer" she had vanished again by way of the "Barriere du 
Trone." A caricature devised by some satirist represented a 
woman well known about town who had been condemned for 
the theft of a diadem; she was now making an appeal to the 
new Emperor asking whether such a transgression be really 
deserving of punishment and soUciting a new trial. These were, 
however, only occasional voices finding but httle popular re- 
sponse. When the question was put to the French people, 
not as to whether Napoleon should be Emperor, — that ap- 
peared to be a matter of course, — but as to whether the imperial 
dignity should be made hereditary in his family, there were 
but two thousand five hundred "noes" against three million 
five hundred *'ayes.'* * 

France had thus declared itself in favour of the hereditability 
and permanence of the Revolutionary Monarchy with aU its 
consequences. Now the most momentous of these conse- 
quences was war. In the constitution of the year 1804 the 
most striking feature is the distinction made between '^Empire" 

* These were the figures given in the " Moniteur." A detail not without 
interest is the fact that from among two hundred Paris lawyers only three 
voted "yes." 



282 The Last Years of the Consulate [1804 

and "Etat" (Empire and State). What constituted the State 
of France was well recognized ; the Revolution had marked out 
its boundaries with the Alps, the Rhine, and the Pyrenees. But 
what was the extent of the Napoleonic Empire? Where were 
its boundaries? Had it, indeed, any? 

This uncertainty was an earnest of war instead of that peace 
which was so ardently desired. As long as the Empire shall 
last it will continue to be at war, and when it ceases to be vic- 
torious, it will disappear. When the time came for selecting 
the design for the new seal of state the committee in charge 
proposed as a heraldic device a "Hon in repose." These words 
Napoleon crossed off with heavy strokes and scrawled hastily 
above them: " an eagle in flight."- 



CHAPTER XI 

THE WAR OF 18G5 

But a few weeks after his elevation to the imperial dignity 
Napoleon betook himself to the camp at Boulogne, there to 
distribute crosses of the Legion of Honour to officers and soldiers 
who had distinguished themselves in the recent war. The 
same insignia were used in decorating the common soldier as the 
officer who commanded him, a most remarkably judicious 
measure, observing the Revolutionary principle of equality and 
at the same time flattering the ambition of the lowHest. To 
appreciate the pride which was engendered by this popular 
decoration, held as it was in respect by the whole nation, one 
should read the narrative of Captain Coignet, who received 
the cross as a simple trooper. From henceforth this feeling of 
pride crowded out every other sentiment in the army. To the 
enthusiasm for hberty which had animated the soldiers of 
Revolutionary times now succeeded the love of glory and the 
striving to distinguish oneself and to be distinguished. The 
commanders, hkewise, became as amenable to Napoleon's will 
as were the rank and file of the army. Now was the time when 
he first spoke to them of the ' ' Empire of Europe " of which the 
various countries were to fall to his generals as fiefs, bringing 
before their eyes glorious prospects of magnificence and riches. 
It depended only upon them whether they would help him and 
themselves to obtain all this. And they needed no further 
urging. It was thus that the republican army became impe- 
riahzed, and faithful to the spirit of imperialism does it remain 
as long as a single ray of glory rests upon the ''Little Corporal." 
Said Joseph Bonaparte at this time, speaking to the Prussian 
ambassador: "It is this great train of forces, always kept in the 
hope of advancing at the soimd of his voice and in his footsteps 

283. 



284 The War of 1805 [I804 

to the acquisition of fresh laurels and further riches, which 
constitutes the real power and security of my brother." 

The army on the northern coast, one of the finest and best 
ever at Napoleon's disposal, was placed under the command 
of Marshals Bernadotte (who occupied Hanover), Ney, Soult, 
Davout, Augereau and the General of Division Marmont. The 
infantry was unceasingly practised in sea-service on the flat- 
boats, and everything appeared to indicate that England was 
to be made to suffer in her own territory for the serious losses 
which she had inflicted, since the reopening of hostilities, upon 
the commerce of France and Holland and their colonies. There 
were officers in the army who regarded the enterprise as ex- 
tremely hazardous, while others, on the contrary, considered it 
practicable; the latter, according to Marmont, constituting the 
greater number. The crucial question, however, yet re- 
mains as to whether Napoleon planned actually to make the 
expedition across the Channel, or whether, in accordance with 
the instructions forwarded to Otto in October, 1802, it was his 
intention merely to keep England ^'in constant fear" of an in- 
vasion. The latter presimiption is not lacking in support of a 
weighty character. It has already been seen how gladly he 
avoided this enterprise in 1798 on account of the innumerable 
difficulties involved. These difficulties were doubtless yet 
before his eyes. He said on one occasion to his brother Joseph 
that he had no thought of conducting the expedition in person, 
but was intending to entrust it to Ney, who was, moreover, not 
to be sent to England, but to Ireland. The most complete un- 
certainty prevails in his letters concerning the time which 
would be required for making the passage. When Fulton sub- 
mitted to him his project for a steamboat which would have 
made him independent of wind and weather and assured his 
superiority to the English upon the sea, their own element, his 
response was simply to dismiss the inventor as a "charlatan" 
without investigation of the matter. Finally he asserted in 
later years that there had never been any serious intention of 
making the invasion. Further, the observations noted down by 
keen-sighted persons of his time— Madame de Remusat, Miot 



^T. 33] The Projected Invasion of England 285 

de Melito, General Hulot, and the diplomatists Lucchesini and 
Metternich — contain more than one passage indicating doubt 
as to whether this project, annoimced with so much rhetorical 
pomp and devised with all possible care, ever had been in- 
tended for actual execution. In any case the outcome of it 
was that action was postponed from the autunm of 1803 to the 
spring of 1804, and then again to the following autumn, being 
destined even then to non-fulfilment.* 

But even thus a double purpose had been accompUshed. In 
the first place the steps taken had been really successful in 
arousing the fears of the English. An army of volunteers had 
been organized and drilled at great expense for a war of defence; 
the coast was fortified and a large part of the British fleet held 
inactive in the Channel. In the second place it had been pos- 
sible for Napoleon, under pretext of this invasion, to assemble a 
powerful army which might, if occasion offered, be put to use on 
the Continent. In January, 1805, at a session of the Council of 
State in which the budget was under discussion the Emperor 
made the following statement: "For two years France has been 
making the greatest sacrifices which could be asked of her, and 
she has borne up under them. A general war upon the Continent 
would demand no more. I have the strongest army, the most 
complete military organization, and I am now placed just as I 
should need to be if war were to break out on the Continent. 
But in order, in times of peace, to be able to assemble such 
forces, — to have 20,000 artillery horses and entire baggage 
trains, — some pretext must be found for creating and assembling 
them without allowing the Continental powers to take alarm. 
Such a pretext was furnished by this projected invasion of Eng- 
land. I am well aware that to maintain all these artillery horses 
in time of peace is to throw thirty millions to the dogs ; but to- 
day I have twenty days advantage of all my enemies, and I 

♦Lucchesini, for instance, writes, May 17th, 1804: ''I cannot often 
enough repeat the statement that, with circumstances as they at present 
are, the secret desire of the First Consul is for a Continental war. It re- 
lieves his honour from being compromised by all the ado that has been made 
in announcing this invasion. 



286 The War of 1805 [1803 

could be a month in the field before Austria would have bought 
artillery horses. I should not have been able to say this to you 
two years ago, and yet that was even then my sole aim." * 

Such, then, were the mihtary preparations made for the Con- 
tinental war so long planned by Napoleon, but the diplomatic 
proceedings have yet to be considered. Napoleon's first political 
steps taken after the outbreak of hostilities with England were 
distinctly offensive in nature. The occupation of the German 
Electorate of Hanover implied at bottom a violation of peace 
with the German Empire, and, had that Empire not been at the 
point of dissolution, this act would in itself have sufficed to 
bring about open warfare. But under these circumstances the 
head of the German Empire had become indifferent to such 
attacks as were not aimed directly at Austria. In Prussia, to 
be sure, the Minister, Haugwitz, had advised that the Prussian 
troops forestall the French in the occupation of Hanover, but 
the other councillors of the cabinet and Queen Louise were op- 
posed to this step, while Frederick WilUam III. himself declared 
that not until a Prussian subject had been killed on Prussian 
soil would he depart from his neutrality. There was indeed 
still a German Empire, but a German policy had long ceased to 
exist. 

But the occupation of Naples was destined to entail more 
serious consequences than that of Hanover. This affected Russia, 
and that in more than one respect. In the first place the Consul 
had pledged himself, in the secret treaty of October 11th, 1801, 
to leave unmolested the kingdom of Queen Caroline, and this 
agreement he had now violated. In the second place the occu- 
pation of Taranto put a check not only upon the English on the 
island of Malta, but also upon the Russian troops on the island 
of Corfu, where they had been stationed since the war of 1799. 
Finally, the French position on the Adriatic was of special signi- 
ficance, since it favoured the plans which Napoleon cherished in 
regard to the Orient, these being diametrically opposed to those 
of the Empire of the Czars. And here again the poHcy was 

* Miot de Melito, who heard the Emperor make this speech, quotas 
the above in his Memoires (II. 258). 



JET.S4] Napoleon and Russia 287 

nothing else than the contmuance of that of the Directory, 
whose secret alUances with the factious elements of the Balkan 
Peninsula were instrumental in precipitating the last war with 
Russia. Already the diplomatists were making announcement 
in their reports of Napoleon's designs in regard to the Morea, 
nor were they mistaken in their surmises, for we have, for in- 
stance, his letter of February 21st, 1803, to Decres, the Minister 
of the Navy, in which he commissions the latter to fit out a ship 
with arms and munitions for the rebellious Suliots as well as 
for the inhabitants of the Peloponnesus who were at war with the 
Turks. At Ragusa, whose Senate had established relations 
with Bonaparte during the course of the campaign in Italy and 
had since remained entirely devoted to him, the French Consul, 
Bruyere, had been commissioned to bribe the Bishop of Monte- 
negro to dehver into the hands of the French the mountains and 
the Gulf of Cattaro, a scheme which was discovered by Austria 
in June, 1803, and reported at St. Petersburg. There Alexander 
had resumed the poUcy of Catharine II. which aimed not only to 
conquer Constantinople, but had other aspirations equally high, 
her ambition having been to establish an ascendant position 
on the Mediterranean. The Czar was much offended at these 
machinations of Napoleon's, and the effects soon became appar- 
ent. The Consul had no wish to break with the Czar; on the 
contrary, he had counted from the outset upon Alexander's pre- 
serving a neutral attitude and had chosen him as arbiter in his 
quarrel with England. But the Czar, wishing to remain en- 
tirely imhampered, had refused that office and had instead 
proffered his services as mediator. Yet the conditions which 
he proposed at Paris and London in August, 1803, already 
clearly indicate a prejudice on his part against France. He did 
indeed demand that England should evacuate Malta, in exchange 
for which that coimtry should receive the island of Lampedusa, 
but on the other hand, according to his proposition, France was 
at the same time to evacuate Hanover, Switzerland, and Upper 
and Lower Italy, retaining only Piedmont, for which the French 
were, however, at last to indemnify the former king. Such a 
programme was clearly designed with a view to resistance against 



288 The War of 1805 [1804 

the encroachments of Napoleon. He refused the acceptance of 
these terms, whereupon Markoff, the Russian ambassador, left 
Paris. The rupture between the two powers had taken place.* 

At the first sign of troubled relations with France, Russia 
had taken steps toward winning Austria and Prussia to her 
cause, but at first without success. Prussia remained neutral 
for reasons already given, and it was not until the following year, 
May 24th, 1804, that she consented to form a defensive alHance 
with the Czar, to be in force only in case Napoleon should at- 
tempt to extend his power beyond Hanover or directly attack 
Prussia. Frederick William then directed his efforts in Paris 
to prevent either of these contingencies, and he received satis- 
factory assurances there, June 1st, 1804. 

Austria, on the other hand, had been too much weakened 
by the recent war to think so soon of taking up arms again. 
Although Russia's change of policy was welcomed with lively 
satisfaction in Vienna, the Austrians were determined not to be 
led into assuming an offensive attitude toward France, but were, 
on the contrary, ready to make advances toward Napoleon and to 
yield more than he required in order to make certain of leaving 
him no pretext for hostile action. At the very opening of hos- 
tilities between England and France Francis II. had closed his 
ports to ships of both nations, a measure particularly disadvan- 
tageous to the English. To Madame de Stael, the enemy of 

* Although the real cause of the breach has for years been known, 
one nevertheless frequently meets in the most recent books with the 
assertion that the animosity of Alexander I. toward the Corsican was due 
to his indignation at the execution of Enghien. Now in the Memoirs 
just published of Prince Adam Czartoryski, Russian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs in the year 1804, there is a document clearly setting forth Russia's 
Oriental policy of that time: "The body of the territory of Turkey in 
Europe should be divided into small states with local governments all 
united in a federation over which Russia might be assured of decisive 
and legal influence through the title of Emperor or Protector of the Slavs 
and of the Orient which should be conferred upon His Imperial Majesty. 
. . . Austria, in case it should be necessary to procure her assent, might 
be appeased with Croatia, a part of Bosnia and Wallachia, Belgrade, 
Ragusa, etc. Russia would have Moldavia, Cattaro, Corfu, and, above ail, 
Constantinople and the Dardanelles with the neighbouring ports, giving 
us the ascendency there." 



Mr. 35] The Creation of the Empire of Austria 289 

Napoleon, was refused permission to reside in Austria. The 
same precaution was taken in respect to the Due d'Enghien, who, 
in the winter of 1803-4, wished to travel to England by way of 
Vienna. Books were forbidden in which the ruler of France was 
attacked. The wearing of Bourbon orders was prohibited to 
French Emigres, and approach within a limit of fifty miles of 
the French and Swiss boundaries was interdicted to them. 
When the princes of South Germany had begun to incor- 
porate the knights of the Empire and the latter sought protec- 
tion of Austria and actually obtained a re-enforcement of 
Imperial troops on the Austrian frontier France categorically 
demanded the abrogation of that measure, and to this the Cabi- 
net of Vienna at once acceded. Again, when the territory of 
the German Empire was trespassed upon in the arrest of Enghien, 
the Emperor Francis, at the instigation of Russia, made at first 
Bome feeble remonstrance, but, when it was learned in Vienna 
that the execution of the Prince had taken place, the court con- 
tented itself with saying that public policy sometimes imposed 
"harsh necessities," and declared the affair to be one in which 
France alone was concerned. Even Napoleon's title of Em- 
peror was cheerfully acknowledged, though on condition that 
Napoleon should in return sanction the Empire of Austria, newly 
constituted August 10th, 1804, pronounce it upon an equality 
with France, and yield precedence to Emperor Francis II. as 
head of the German Empire. After some hesitation Napoleon 
consented to these terms. No one knew as well as he for how 
short a time existence was yet to be vouchsafed to the German 
Empire, and, as if to show how small a value was to be attached 
to this formal concession, he betook himself just at this time — 
September, 1804 — ^by way of Belgium to Aix-la-Chapelle, to 
hold court in the old imperial palace of Charlemagne among his 
German subjects and to receive their homage. Did it not seem 
like an insult to Austria to demand of her sovereign, who yet 
wore the crown of the Carolingians, that the document in 
which he recognized the new French Empire should be sent to 
precisely this place? But Austria was ready to make this con- 
cession also for the sake of peace, and promptly at the time 



290 The War of 1805 [1804 

appointed her ambassador made his appearance at Aix-la- 
Chapelle. 

Against such comphance all the pressure which could be 
brought to bear by Russia and England was futile. It was in 
vain that Friedrich Gentz again called attention to the revo- 
lutionary and subjugating character of French policy and 
showed that the Empire itself was nothing but the Revolution 
again. under another form. For, said he. it was not in oppo- 
sition to the revolutionary powers that Napoleon had reached 
his new dignity, but thanks alone to their aid. He had not 
commissioned the army to proclaim him Emperor, but had 
founded his elevation upon the popular sovereignty of the 
Revolution, so that it was nothing else than giving sanction to 
the Revolution to accord recognition to the new Empire. The 
most determined resistance must be opposed to it, and, above all, 
Austria and Prussia must stand and act together. But to this 
view of matters the authorities in Vienna could not, for the time 
being, be aroused. They would be content if France only did 
not interfere with interests specifically Austrian. The occu- 
pation of Hanover might, so far as they were concerned, make 
difficulties for Prussia; they had no objection to seeing their 
ancient adversary put to some trouble; and if Russia's schemes 
in regard to the Orient were deranged, that was, after all, nothing 
to the disadvantage of Austria. 

But the calm of neutrality was to be vouchsafed for a short 
time only to the Court of Vienna. Soon after his elevation 
to the Imperial throne Napoleon made direct assault upon 
the sphere of Austrian interests, and just at the point indeed 
where that power had always been most vulnerable — ^in Italy. 
Austria still owned territory in the northern part of the penin- 
sula, and every new encroachment there was a threat to her pos- 
sessions. Meanwhile the following events had taken place. 
In May, 1804, the new Emperor of the French had already said 
to the Charge d'Affaires of the Italian Republic that it was not 
fitting that he should at the same time be Emperor and Presi 
dent of a Republic, and in case he were to continue to assure to 
this RepubUc the benefit of his rule the Consulta of Milan might 



Mt. 35] The Treaty between Austria and Russia 29 1 

consider the matter and submit to him its proposals. The Aus- 
trian ambassador had been apprised by Melzi in Milan of this 
new development, and the question was now debated in Vienna 
as to what designs Napoleon had upon Italy. It soon be- 
came clear that here also the aim was to establish a hereditary 
monarchy by means of which Italy was to be bound perma- 
nently and more closely than ever to France. But this was 
directly contrary to Austria's designs, since she was determined 
on no account to yield forever the hope of regaining her ascen- 
dency on the peninsula. In the treaty of peace with France of 
December, 1802, she had, it is true, recognized Napoleon's presi- 
dency for life, but that did not preclude the possibility of car- 
rying out these plans for the future, while the establishment 
of a Bonaparte dynasty in Italy would put a definite end to 
any such prospects. So thoroughly disquieted were the Aus- 
trian authorities over this matter that Cobenzl even declared 
that the future fate of the Republic was the touchstone whereby 
Napoleon's real intentions might be discovered; should he do 
away with the independence of Lombardy he would proceed 
to make all Italy tributary to himself, nor rest content until he 
had extended his sway over North and South Germany and 
conquered the Morea and Egypt. It was this danger which 
now roused Austria from her lethargy and led her to draw closer 
to Russia, whose support in case of need would be indispensable. 

November 6th, 1804, the two powers concluded a treaty 
which was. however, purely defensive in character and was to 
come into force only in case France were to be guilty of making 
further encroachments whether in Germany, in Italy, or in the 
Orient, but which, in case of victory to the allies, was to assure 
extension of the Austrian boundary to the Adda and the return 
of the Archdukes to Tuscany and Modena, as well as the re-estab- 
lishment of the kingdom of Piedmont. The question of the 
Papal Legations which had been so much disputed was left to 
agreement between the two contracting parties. To guard 
against sudden invasion the Austrian garrisons in Venetia were 
re-enforced on the pretext of establishing a sanitary cordon. 

While the eastern powers were thus arming themselves against 



292 The War of 1805 [I804 

further encroachments on the part of France, Pope Pius VII. 
was making preparations in Rome for the journey to Paris for 
the coronation of Napoleon. This ceremony had seemed neces- 
sary to the Emperor in order to lend glory and splendour in the 
eyes of the world to his self-imposed dignity. Only under pro- 
test and after prolonged controversy in regard to the form of 
oath to be administered had the vicar of Christ at length con- 
sented to undertake the arduous winter journey in order to 
anoint him who had but shortly before been accounted guilty 
of a bloody crime. His decision was doubtless influenced by 
two contrary emotions, fear and hope: fear of bringing upon 
himself by refusal the wrath of the mighty potentate, and of 
being thus eventually despoiled of the States of the Church; 
and hope of obtaining new possessions, perhaps regaining the 
long-desired Legations, and having Europe see how the most 
powerful of her rulers, the adherent of the Koran in 1798, 
would bend his knee before the Bishop of Rome. Nor was the 
Pope alone in his decision, for the majority of the College of Car- 
dinals, and with them the gifted Secretary of State, Consalvi, 
were in favour of the journey's being undertaken, and before the 
end of November, 1804, the Pope arrived in Paris. But here 
he at once became aware that every token of subordination, even 
to the most trifling details, was being carefully avoided by Na- 
poleon.* In one matter only did he yield submission. Jo- 
sephine, who had long been in dread of a separation, had re- 
vealed to the Pope that she had been united with her husband 
by civil marriage only and obtained from the Holy Father his 
promise that he would make the coronation conditional upon 
the previous consummation of a religious marriage. The Em- 
press hoped thus to bind her husband irrevocably to herself, a 

* Savary relates in his "M^moires " that in the drive with the Pope 
from Fontainebleau to the capital the Emperor even took the seat of 
honour in the carriage, and this assertion has been accepted by Lanfrey 
and repeated in his biography. Other authorities, however, make state- 
ments to the contrary. Consalvi in his "M^moires " makes complaint 
only in a general way of "little inconsiderate acts " on Napoleon's part 
toward his guest which were intended to remove from his mind any illu- 
sions which he might entertain in regard to his own superiority of position. 



^T. 35] Napoleon Crowned by the Pope 293 

hope later doomed to disappointment. For the time being, 
however, she was in so far successful that the church marriage 
was solemnized in secret by Fesch on the day before the coro- 
nation of the Imperial couple, which took place December 2d 
in the cathedral of Notre-Dame. It was observed that Napo- 
leon kept the Pope awaiting his appearance, and that instead 
of allowing the pontiff to place the crown of golden laurel upon 
the imperial brow, as had been arranged, the candidate himself 
seized the diadem and set it upon his head before Pius could 
reach it. Not even in this formahty would he yield pre-emi- 
nence to any one. The Pope recognized that his hopes had been 
but vain. The role which he had been called upon to play in 
Paris had been detrimental rather than advantageous to his 
prestige. This indeed he did accomplish: that the French 
bishops, who had sworn fidelity to the Civil Constitution and 
were therefore classed as heretics, were brought to return to the 
fold of the Roman primate ; but of his other demands there was 
granted and assured only one, and that of very secondary 
importance: the re-establishment of the Gregorian Calendar 
with the understanding that, beginning with January 1st, 1806, 
the Revolutionary Calendar should be abandoned. The saints 
of the Church and their festal days again obtained recognition 
and honour in France. To this Napoleon had no objections. 
Was not his own precursor and ideal, Charlemagne, also of their 
number? 

And now that the papal benediction had consummated the 
estabhshment of the Empire the Italian question had also in its 
turn to come up for solution. The Italians were well content 
that the Republic should remain in the form of a kingdom under 
French dominion, but they protested against further payment 
of tribute and demanded assurance that the territory of the 
state should not suffer diminution and that French officials 
should be superseded by natives of the country. It had 
been Napoleon's original plan to turn over this vassal Idngdom 
to one of his brothers. Joseph or Louis, but both refused the 
dignity, being unwilhng to renounce their claims upon the throne 
of France; these two men, who but ten years before had been 



294 The War of 1805 [I805 

at a loss where to look for daily bread, now spurned a crown. 
Exasperated at this unlooked-for opposition to his wishes, the 
Emperor determined upon himself assuming the title of King 
of Italy and entrusting to a viceroy the government in his stead. 
This post was to be occupied by Eugene Beauharnais, who, to- 
gether with Murat, was now raised to the rank of Prince of the 
Empire and Grand Dignitary of France. This project was dis- 
closed to a body of Italian delegates who had come to Paris, 
whereupon they, on March 5th, 1805, officially and formally 
offered the crown to Napoleon. On the following day he an- 
nounced to the Senate that he accepted the office, and on May 
26th crowned himself in the cathedral of Milan with the iron 
crown of Lombardy as King of Italy. He is alleged to have 
pronounced at that time in a strikingly menacing tone the 
ancient formula: ''God has bestowed it upon me; woe to him 
who shall lay hands upon it! " 

That which had been so much dreaded in Vienna had thus 
come to pass; for no doubt existed in the mind of any one 
there but that Napoleon meant by ''Italy" something quite 
different from the territory comprised within the limits of the 
Cisalpine Republic. Henceforth he proceeded in a manner 
more than ever disregardful of every Austrian interest. Hardly 
more than a few weeks had elapsed after the coronation in Milan 
before he conferred upon his sisters the territories of Piombino 
and Lucca, and introduced into Parma and Piacenza the French 
code of laws, finally arousing the greatest excitement through- 
out Europe by taking away the independence of the Ligurian 
Repubhc through the simple process of incorporating with France 
the land and city of Genoa. All of these acts were in direct con- 
flict with the treaty of December 26th, 1802, to which Austria 
had been forced to submit, while the erection of the kingdom 
of Italy and its union with France was in addition a flagrant 
violation of the Peace Convention of Luneville, which had ex- 
pressly provided that the territories of Austria and France 
should remain separated from one another by intermediary 
states. From this time Francis II. trembled not only for the 
influence which he had hoped to regain in Italy, but for what 



iET. 35] The Coalition of 1805 295 

had been left of his possessions there, — for Venice. And indeed 
tidings were soon brought from Milan to the intent that Napo- 
leon was planning the acquisition of that territory also, and 
proposed to offer Servia and Bosnia to Austria in compensa- 
tion. As an offset to the sanitary cordon estabhshed by Aus- 
tria, Napoleon posted two armies, each numbering 30,000 men, 
at Verona and Alessandria, and they, under the guise of manoeu- 
vres, rehearsed again the battles of Castiglione and Marengo. 
To an Austrian general who came to present salutations Napo- 
leon made answer by alluding to the Austro-Russian alhance, 
adding that he had no dread of war, knowing how it should be 
carried on. 

While Napoleon was thus challenging Austria in Italy, 
Russia and England were most actively engaged in endeavours 
to force Emperor Francis into declaring war. In England 
Addington's peace-loving ministry had been forced to give 
place during the preceding year, 1804, to that of Pitt with its 
aggressive policy, the first act of which was to organize a coali- 
tion against France. It was not long before the British Cabinet 
had estabhshed an understanding with Sweden, where reigned 
Gustavus IV., one of Napoleon's bitterest foes, and this step 
was soon followed by a treaty of alliance with Russia, dated 
April 11th, 1805, which had as its basis a general uprising of the 
Continental States against the dominion of the Corsican. It 
was part of the project to induce Prussia and Austria to enter 
the coahtion. But all attempts to persuade Prussia ended in 
failure. Frederick Wilham felt peace to be sufficiently assured 
to Northern Germany by the defensive treaty entered into 
on May 24th of the preceding year; he refused to make attack 
upon France; indeed, under the influence of Hardenberg, he 
allowed himself to become involved with Napoleon in negotia- 
tions having for their object the acquisition of Hanover. With 
Austria, however, the efforts were successful. It was certainly 
no slight demand upon this power to change from the attitude 
of defence which she had hitherto assumed to one of aggression 
against Napoleon. For at that time the Austrian army num- 
bered hardly more than 40,000 men under arms without a single 



296 The War of 1805 [I805 

battery completely equipped with horses, to say nothing of the 
deplorable state of the finances. Archduke Charles, the only 
veteran commander at the disposal of the government, had, just 
at this critical time, instituted a radical reform of the army 
requiring for its execution a series of years of peace, and he 
advised strenuously against war with a man whose superiority 
on the field he acknowledged without reserve. But England 
and Russia made every effort to quiet these scruples, the former 
by offers of large financial support, and the latter by promises 
of re-enforcement to the Austrian forces from the Russian army 
and of securing the co-operation of Prussia even should it prove 
possible only through coercion. But, in spite of all, the two 
powers were unable to persuade Austria to the decisive step 
imtil Pitt had declared that the English subsidies were avail- 
able only for the expenses of a war which should be begun before 
the termination of the year 1805, and Alexander I. threatened to 
withdraw from the project entirely in case there were any further 
hesitation. It was a sort of diplomatic surprise which placed 
the Austrian Cabinet where it must choose between the two 
alternatives of regaining, by aid of a coalition of the great 
Powers, its former possessions and status in Italy, including 
possibly even a part of Bavaria, and, in case Prussia continued 
to withstand the advances of the Powers, Silesia likewise, — 
or of losing this powerful support and being exposed entirely 
alone to the attacks of Napoleon. Under such constraint, on 
July 7th, 1805, Francis II. resolved upon entering the coalition, 
and gave orders for the mobilization of the army. General 
Mack, who was regarded as a genius in matters of organization, 
and who, in opposition to Archduke Charles, was convinced of 
the practicability of putting the Austrian army in marching order 
within the allotted time, now received commission to accom- 
pUsh this feat. War on the Continent, then, was no longer a 
matter of doubt. This outcome was satisfactory to England, 
as relieving her of the fear of French invasion; it was equally 
so to Russia as a means of turning Napoleon's attention from 
the Orient; and France was about to engage in a conflict ardently 
desired by her sovereign as an excuse for abandoning the haz- 



Mr. 35] England or Austria? 297 

ardous project of invasion in favour of certain triumph else- 
where, while Austria had nothing to lead her to take part beyond 
her sanguine hopes of victory and of territorial acquisitions. 

England's negotiations with the Powers on the Continent 
had remained no secret to Napoleon. To avoid the appearance 
of being the aggressor in the coming war he had addressed a 
letter in January, 1805, to George III., exhorting him to the 
maintenance of peace, which in contents and purpose closely 
resembled that former document by means of which he had 
so dexterously brought about the war of 1800.* The reply 
was to the effect that England must first come to agreement 
with the Continental Powers with which she was maintaining 
confidential relations. This was equivalent to open acknowl- 
edgment of the project of a coalition. Moreover, in February 
Pitt had demanded and received from Parliament the sum of 
five and a half million pounds sterhng for secret purposes; this 
was a subsidy for Austria's assistance. Napoleon might there- 
fore feel assured that the Continent was making preparations for 
resistance against him. In spite of this, it was, according to 
his correspondence, his intention to make a descent upon Eng- 
land in the middle of August with the combined Spanish and 
French fleets. Or was this only artifice, with the intention, 
perhaps, of keeping England in suspense up to the last possible 
moment and of lulling to rest the uneasiness of Austria? That 
remains to be seen. 

On July 16th the Emperor issued orders to Admiral Villeneuve 
to join forces with the Spanish squadron at Ferrol, to assemble 
with these the squadrons at Rochefort and Brest, and under 
favourable conditions— Nelson having been lured away to the 
West Indies — ^to make his appearance in the Channel. This 
letter contains a very remarkable postcript: the Admiral, in 
case of change in the situation through unforeseen contin- 
gencies, was rather to return to Cadiz. f 

* See page 194. 

t The passage reads literally: "If, in consequence of battles sustained, 
of considerable separation of ships, or of other contingencies which have 
not been foreseen, your situation should be considerably altered, ... in 



298 The War of 1805 [1805 

On July 20th Berthier received instructions to prepare for 
embarkation a part of the army at Boulogne for use in any 
exigency. But, strange as it may appear, it was at just about 
this time that Napoleon began systematically to force the war 
with Austria. By August 2d Lucchesini, the Prussian ambassa- 
dor, announced to the home authorities that French newspapers 
were filled with affronts toward Austria and Russia, and that 
the Emperor — as he had long surmised — appeared to be incit- 
ing the Continental war. This conjecture proved correct, for 
on the following day Napoleon instructed his ambassador in 
Vienna to demand of Francis II. that he should withdraw to 
their cantonments in Bohemia and Hungary the troops garri- 
soning Venice and the Tyrol. Failure to comply would be re- 
garded as an indication that he was not desirous of remaining 
at peace with France. This summons was repeated some days 
later, couched in more pressing terms, and again on August 13th, 
in the most peremptory manner possible. On that same day 
Napoleon wrote to Talleyrand that he was determined upon 
attacking Austria, and upon being in Vienna before November, 
in order to advance thence against the Russians, when he should 
be satisfied with nothing less than comphance on the part of 
the Austrian government with a demand to disband the army. 
He must have assurance on this subject within two weeks, or 
else — and this was to be imparted by the minister to the Aus- 
trian ambassador — Emperor Francis should not celebrate the 
Christmas festival in Vienna.* 

The fortnight's respite allowed to the Austrian Cabinet 

this case, which with God's help will not arise, it is our wish that, after 
having raised the blockade of our squadrons at Rochefort and Ferrol, 
you should come to anchor preferably in the port of Cadiz." 

* In this letter is to be found amongst other statements the following : 
"The explanations made by Monsieur de La Rochefoucauld [the French 
ambassador at the Austrian court] in Vienna, and my first communication 
[of the 3d instant] have opened this question; the communication which 
I sent you shortly afterwards [of the 7th instant] has continued this 
question, and this which I send you to-day [of the 13th instant] should 
close it. You know that it is one of my principles to pursue the same 
course as the poets do to prepare a dramatic conclusion. Impetuosity 
does not lead to the desired end." 



^T. 36] The Blow Strikes Austria 299 

passed, but Villeneuve did not make his appearance in the 
Channel. He had in fact found in his way the obstacles which 
had been anticipated, and had supposed himself authorized to 
turn back to Cadiz. Napoleon pretended the utmost wrath at 
this conduct on the part of his admiral. As a matter of fact 
it could not have caused surprise and must on the contrary have 
been a source of satisfaction to him. On the very next day 
after the arrival of Villeneuve's despatches, August 23d, he 
charged Talleyrand to prepare the manifesto declaring war 
against Austria. In it he was to take as key-note the allegation 
that Emperor Francis had thrown his troops into Italy and the 
Tyrol just at the moment when the French forces were being 
embarked for the invasion of England. That was, to be sure, 
absolute falsehood, for the Austrian preparations dated from 
months previous and had also been observed by Napoleon for 
that length of time, while the embarkation of the army at Bou- 
logne was not carried out until August, — the last orders dating 
from the 20th to the 22d. Moreover, he had been negotiating 
with Prussia as early as the middle of July to arrange to have 
the troops of Frederick William reheve his own in the occupa- 
tion of Hanover, which is evidence in itself that he was even at 
that time counting upon the march toward the east. These 
facts tempt one to think that this whole proceeding of em- 
barkation was nothing but a pretext for the sake of giving some 
apparent basis to his accusation against Austria, and of being 
able to say in his manifesto that the course pursued by Vienna 
had hindered him in his great undertaking against England and 
compelled him to carry the war into Austria.* 

On the evening of August 27th the Emperor signed the 
official marching orders directing the steps of the entire army 
toward the east. Three days earher, on the 24th, Marmont 
had already received secret commands to proceed by forced 

* Later, in 1811, he went through the same manoeuvre when he wrote 
to Decres, the Minister of the Navy, in these words: *'It is even my inten- 
tion to embark 20,000 men upon the vessels, frigates, and transports of 
these two squadrons, and to keep them thus embarked for a month or six 
weeks, so that the menace may be real." See also, in regard to 1805, Piou 
des Loches, ''Mes Campagnes," p. 137. 



300 The War of 1805 [i805 

marches to Mainz. The camp at Boulogne was broken up. 
The Continental war had begun. 

Down to the most recent times the statements of General 
Daru have been recounted and believed, according to which the 
idea of a Continental war was first conceived by Napoleon after 
the arrival of the despatches from Villeneuve and the plan of 
campaign dictated extemporaneously at a single stroke as if 
moved by sudden inspiration. That forms a part of the Napo- 
leonic legend. The war had been for years foreseen and the 
manner of its execution of course maturely weighed and resolved 
upon. But even in this case Napoleon's foresight and calcula- 
tion are none the less amazing. For events were to prove him 
correct in his reckoning: November, 1805, actually did find him 
in the heart of Austria, and his opponent did not, as a matter of 
fact, celebrate the Christmas festival in his capital. There has 
probably never been another man who understood measuring 
with such precision his own forces against those of the rest of 
the world. People have thought that they saw in this something 
preternatural. But Napoleon formed no exception to the rest 
of humanity. It was only that in him certain human attri- 
butes were developed to an extraordinary degree which lent to 
his personality something surpassingly great, even gigantic. 
He could still see clearly when the sight of others was dim^ 
and what was to most people mere chaos presented itself to his 
eye in clear and distinct outlines. General Rapp recounts in 
his Memoires a characteristic occurrence. One day Cardinal 
Fesch wished to make some expostulations in regard to the pohcy 
which the Emperor was pursuing. Hardly had he uttered a 
couple of words, however, when Napoleon led him to the win- 
dow and asked him: "Do you see that star?" It was broad 
daylight. ''No," replied the Cardinal. "Very well, then; so 
long as I remain the only one who can perceive it will I go my 
way and permit no manner of comment." Thus with a firm and 
steady hand, generally without others suspecting his designs, 
did he trace out his course into the future. 

While the French army was advancing toward the Rhine as 
quietly as possible under forced marches such as had until then 



^T. 36] The Austrian Plan of Campaign 301 

been unheard of even under Napoleon's leadership, Austria was 
also making preparations for the contest, and on September 3d, 
1805, issued a declaration of war against France. On the same 
day Cobenzl, the minister, informed the French ambassador 
that Austria was assembling her forces ''in order to aid in estab- 
Hshing in Europe a state of affairs conformable to the treaties 
which France had broken in violation of international law.'' 
On September 8th the troops of Emperor Francis crossed the Inn. 
It would be natural to suppose that Austria would have in- 
formed herself exactly by this time in regard to the strength 
of the Boulogne army, and have concluded that it would take the 
most direct route, so that Germany would be made the principal 
field of operations. But such was not the case. Instead of this 
Italy was the point always kept in mind in Vienna even from the 
mihtary standpoint. A plan of campaign sketched by Arch- 
duke Charles had been adopted as early as July for the guidance 
of the Austrian forces, and according to this three armies were 
to be stationed in Italy, in the Tyrol, and on the Inn, and opera- 
tions were to be begun by the strongest of these, the one in 
Italy. This army, under the command of Archduke Charles, 
was to establish itself securely in Lombardy, while the German 
army, having effected a junction with the Russians, was to 
advance into Southern Germany, and the third, under Archduke 
John, through Switzerland. In particular it was decided to 
press forward as rapidly as possible through Bavaria and be- 
yond the Iller, so as to carry the war into foreign territory and 
to make sure of the troops of Elector Maximilian Joseph of 
Bavaria, who was friendly to France. No engagement, how- 
ever, was to be ventured before the arrival of the Russians, but 
rather, if necessity demanded, the army was to retreat behind 
the Inn. According to the military convention between these 
two powers the Russians were to set forth toward Austria in three 
distinct armies and in such manner that the van of the first, 
numbering something over 50,000 men, should reach the Inn on 
October 16th. At the decisive point, therefore, the forces 
were insufficient on account of their separation. Archduke 
John, who had taken part in the deliberations, says in his Me- 



302 The War of 1805 [i805 

moirs: "Austria counted upon the Russian auxiliary troops 
already on the march, and, though knowing perfectly at what 
time they were to be looked for on the Inn, failed to take pre- 
cautions in the intervening time during which her active and 
indefatigable adversary might appear with his mobile and well- 
equipped forces." This was perhaps a cardinal blunder, but 
another of equal importance was committed in failing to appoint 
to the command of the German army the general who had for- 
merly on several occasions defeated the French on German soil 
— ^in sending Archduke Charles to Italy, while Mack, as Quarter- 
master General to the Emperor, was to conduct operations at 
the point of critical interest. The young Archduke Ferdinand 
of Modena-Breisgau was with the army solely as representative 
of Francis II. and under instructions to submit without reserva- 
tion to such dispositions as should seem good to Mack. The 
last-named was well known to Napoleon; an irresolute char- 
acter, puffed up with conceit, who considered himself vastly the 
superior of any adversary and who now, on account of his skill 
as an organizer, possessed the unlimited confidence of his sov- 
ereign. It was after the NeapoHtan campaign of 1799, when 
Mack had been sent to Paris as prisoner of war, that Napoleon 
had made his acquaintance and expressed himself in regard to 
him to Bourrienne in these words: " Mack is one of the most 
mediocre men that I have ever seen in my life ; presumptuous 
and vainglorious, he thinks himself efficient in every respect. 
It would please me to have him sent some day as opponent to 
one of our good generals ; that would be something worth seeing. 
He is self-important and that leaves nothing more to be said. 
Unquestionably he is one of the most incapable men in exist- 
ence. To add to this he is usually unlucky." And now this 
insignificant creature stood opposed to the all-powerful com- 
mander himself. 

Mack proceeded on the assumption that the French would 
leave a strong army behind on the shores of the Channel to protect 
the country against an invasion of the English, while another 
army would have to be left within the country itself to prevent a 
threatening revolutionary movement; Napoleon would therefore 



.Et. 36] Bavaria Sides with Napoleon 303 

not be able to appear in Germany with any very considerable 
forces, nor before the arrival of the Russians upon the scene 
of action.* Relying upon this supposition, Mack hurried for- 
ward with troops hastily collected, poorly equipped, and defi- 
cient in numbers, to take advantage of the possibility of invad- 
ing France before the forces of the enemy should be concen- 
trated. Moreover, following Napoleon's example, he had re- 
solved upon supplying the armies by means of requisitions, a 
step which from the outset produced tremendous confusion. 
The course of wisdom would have been to await behind the Inn 
the coming up of the Russians, but, his desire of securing the 
aid of the Elector's troops being allowed to override all other 
considerations, he pressed on into Bavaria, where his hopes were 
after all doomed to disappointment. For the Elector Maxi- 
mihan Joseph, though bound by ties of kinship to Russia, was 
more firmly linked by his interests to the cause of France and, 
after some wavering, allowed himself to be won over by the latter. 
He ordered his troops to retire before the Austrians, concluded 
an alUance with Napoleon, whose army then in passing through 
absorbed that of Bavaria. This step shattered the plans of 
the Austrians, but Mack hastened onward nevertheless, hoping 
to gain the bank of the Iller and fortify it, since he assumed that 
the enemy would advance through the Black Forest. 

When, on September 19th, Archduke Ferdinand came to take 
command, he found the bulk of his army, about 60,000 men 
strong, on the march between the Inn and Munich, while trust- 
worthy information announced to him that Napoleon had set 
out from Boulogne with the entire army of the coast, amounting 
to 150,000 men, and might appear on the Iller by October 10th. 
This was radically different from all that Mack had assumed. 
Under these conditions the Austrians by advancing farther 
would involve the risk of being still more widely separated 

* The English did as a matter of fact plan a descent upon Quiberon 
and asked for the Austrian General Radetzky as head of the general staff 
The unfounded report of a revolt against Napoleon in France had long 
been spread abroad by their agents. According to Radetzky's Memoires, 
recently pubUshed, this was one of the causes which induced Mack's 
premature advance into Germany. 



304 The War of 1805 [I805 

from the allies who were following them, and thus overpowered 
in their isolated condition. This fact was promptly recognized 
by the Archduke, who ordered the army to halt. But Mack in- 
duced Emperor Francis, who was just then for a short time with 
the troops, to order the command to halt recalled, and in the 
last week of September the principal force of the army was 
actually assembled on the Iller, so as to rely upon Ulm as a 
support if the enemy should advance by way of Stuttgart, or 
upon Memmingen in case he should come by Strasburg and 
through the Black Forest. He counted particularly upon Ulm, 
which place had, upon his recommendation, been surrounded 
in 1796 with new defences. It never crossed his mind, however, 
that, should the French troops stationed in Hanover and Hol- 
land but march southward, his line of retreat must inevitably 
be endangered. 

At the same time that the Austrians were gathering on the 
Iller, the principal body of Napoleon's army was crossing the 
Rhine between Kehl and Mannheim. They had marched by 
night as well as by day almost without sound. To give tidings 
of its movements was strictly forbidden to the newspapers. It 
consisted of five divisions of cavalry commanded by Murat and 
five army corps under orders of Ney, Lannes, Soult, and Da^ 
vout. Two other corps, under Marmont and Bemadotte, ad- 
vanced from the north toward Wiirzburg. A seventh, under 
Augereau, constituted the reserve in Alsace. Auxihary troops 
furnished by Southern Germany increased the size of the army 
by 28,000 men. All told Napoleon had at his command more 
than 200,000 warriors, a splendid and imposing army upon 
which he never wearied of congratulating himself. The com- 
manders of the various corps were for the most part no older 
than himself, and Davout even a year his junior, while Mar- 
mont was but thirty-one years of age; but all were experienced 
soldiers and completely devoted to the man who was their leader. 
The "Italian Army," cut off as it was from the "Grand Army," 
was expected to carry on its operations alone under the com- 
mand of Massena. 

Hardly had the Emperor learned, by means of the field tele- 



^T. 36] Mack's Delusion 



305 



graph and excellent spies, that Mack was marching upon Ulm 
while the Russians were still far from reaching the Inn, when he 
determined upon passing to the left of the Black Forest and 
crossing the Danube below Ulm, so as to thrust himself between 
the Austrians and their allies and defeat each of them sepa- 
rately. Murat with the cavalry reserve was commissioned 
to confirm Mack in his illusions by demonstrations in the Black 
Forest, making it apparent that the French were coming from 
that quarter and masking the advance of the four corps along 
the left bank of the Danube. This manoeuvre was carried out 
with the utmost precision. On October 7th Davout, Soult, 
Lannes, and Ney reached the Danube, their corps forming a 
line reaching from Heidenheim to Ottingen, while Bernadotte 
had followed the direct road from Wiirzburg to Ingolstadt 
through the Prussian principality of Ansbach, Marmont being 
stationed a little to the west at Neuburg. Two days later the 
army had crossed the river and now advanced from the east upon 
Ulm. Bernadotte and Davout alone remained behind to keep 
watch upon the Russians, who were, moreover, not yet in sight. 
To prevent the possibihty of the enemy escaping into the Tyrol 
Soult was ordered to seize Memmingen with his corps. 

Of these movements Mack did not remain in ignorance. 
He was kept informed of them by Schulmeister, a spy serving 
both of the contestants and who acquired a certain notoriety 
during the Napoleonic wars. But, instead of realizing that the 
French army was bent upon his capture. Mack deluded himself 
with "nothing but a dream," — as he himself later denominated 
the insane notion, — ^that Napoleon was on the retreat toward 
France, whither he had been recalled by the danger of revolution 
and the fear of an invasion of the British.* The Austrian 

* The opinion, frequently expressed, that Schulmeister misled Mack 
into the supposition that the enemy was retreating into France has been 
proved erroneous. French discontent with Napoleon was in Austrian 
governmental circles a fixed idea having important political consequences. 
(Cobenzl to Kutusoff, October 12th, 1805, in Angeli, " Ulm und Austerlitz," 
Militarzeitung, 1878, p. 302.) Schulmeister's reports were correct. 
It was not until Mack sent him to Stuttgart " to gather information 
concerning the revolt of the French against their Emperor " that this 



3o6 The War of i8o^ {1805 

troops, thought he, could do no better under such circum- 
stances than to remain concentrated at Ulm, whence they could 
harass and pursue the flank of the French as they hurried past. 
The idea was in itself an absurdity; for him, Mack, to pursue 
Napoleon, and that with an army which had in its haste been 
obhged to forego all that was most essential; which through 
forced marches and countermarches had lost almost all power 
of endurance and possessed only a feeble reserve artillery with 
entirely insufficient ammunition, and among whose regiments 
there were several which marched absolutely barefoot and had 
at their disposal nothing but the cartridges in their pouches! 
It was in vain that Archduke Ferdinand, who appreciated the 
distress and danger incurred, opposed this foolhardy project; 
in vain that all the generals of inferior rank protested against 
it; Mack obstinately persisted in maintaining that the French 
army was in retreat. 

Meanwhile the various French corps, like the fingers of a 
grasping hand", were encompassing the enemy; they threw 
back into Ulm every advanced division, and finally bombarded 
the city and called upon it to surrender. The victory gained by 
Ney at Elchingen on October 14th effectively contributed to 
this result. It was with the utmost difficulty that the Arch- 
duke, acting upon his own responsibility, succeeded in cutting 
his way out with two battalions and eleven squadrons by way 
of Goppingen to Nordlingen and thence into Bohemia. Not 
until then did Mack rouse from his dream. On October 16th 
he declared himself ready to enter upon negotiations, and on 
the 17th they were concluded. If within a week — so read the 
terms — ^there arrive no relief, the army at Ulm shall be prisoners 
of war with the exception of the officers, who shall be allowed to 
go free upon parole ; an entrance shall be opened to the French, 
enabhng them to station a brigade in the fortress. But, as if 
this ignominy were still not sufficient, Mack, in an interview 
with Napoleon, allowed himself to be persuaded into agreeing 
that the capitulation should take effect as early as October 20th. 

wary man gave up the cause of Austria as lost and thenceforth served 
Napoleon alone. 



^T. 36] The Surrender of Ulm 307 

On that day three Austrian corps, still numbering 23,000 men, 
laid down their arms before the enemy. "The shame which 
overwhelms us," wrote the Austrian Captain de L'Ort in his 
journal, "the mire which chngs to us, leaves spots which 
can never be cleansed. While the battalions were defiling past 
to lay down their arms, Napoleon, in the simplest garb, sur- 
rounded by his marshals adorned with gold and embroideries, 
conversed with Mack and several of our generals whom he called 
to himself after they had filed past. The Emperor, in the uni- 
form of a common soldier, wearing a gray cloak scorched at 
elbows and skirts, a hat without any distinctive mark crushed 
down upon his head, his arms crossed behind his back and warm- 
ing himself at a camp-fire, talked with vivacity and presented 
an aspect of good-nature." He had won an almost bloodless 
victory. "I have accomplished what I set out to do," he had 
written on the preceding day to Josephine, "I have destroyed 
the Austrian army by means of marches alone." And, in 
fact, except for the corps of Ejenmayer, which was advancing 
along the Inn, the re-enforcements which had drawn near from 
the Tyrol but had now again withdrawn thither, and for the 
small detachment with which the Archduke had made his escape, 
Austria had lost all her forces upon the scene of operations north 
of the Alps.* 

Naturally the catastrophe at Ulm had its reactionary effect 
upon the other army divisions. Archduke Charles found him- 
self compelled to abandon his secure position behind the Adige 
in order to withdraw his troops from Italy with the least possible 
loss. A successful encounter with Massena at Caldiero on 
October 30th and 31st enabled him to make an orderly retreat, 
even though not without considerable losses, and to effect a junc- 

* Mack made an attempt later to justify himself. He endeavoured 
to lay the blame upon the conduct of the Archduke, upon that of his 
generals, or the violation of the Ansbach territory on the part of the 
French. But investigation soon disclosed the frailty of these subter- 
fuges and recognized in him alone the culprit. He was deprived of rank 
and honours and sentenced to two years' imprisonment. History has 
since that time wholly and unreservedly confirmed this judgment of 
condemnation. 



3o8 The War of 1805 [i805 

tion at Marburg on November 20th with Archduke John, whose 
continuance in the Tyrol had Hkewise become impossible. The 
fate of Mack had thus overthrown the entire Austrian plan of 
campaign: from his attitude of offence Emperor Francis had 
been reduced to that of defence, and his remaining hopes now 
depended solely upon the Russians, since Archduke Charles 
was three times as far away from the capital as was the enemy, 
and want of supplies necessitated his approach to the Hun- 
garian frontiers. It was a hard fate to be obliged to rely upon 
foreign troops for defence. Moreover, the aUiance with Russia 
had already ceased to be of a very deep-seated nature, since 
Alexander at heart resented Austria's aspirations toward domi- 
nation in Italy as much as ever Paul I. had condemned them. 
Still for the present the common danger continued to hold the 
aUies closely bound to one another. 

But almost at the same moment that the coalition against 
France received so rude a blow upon the Continent, it gained 
upon the seas a victory which must remain forever memorable. 
Villeneuve had remained with the combined French and Span- 
ish fleets ever since August in Cadiz, followed unremittingly by 
Napoleon's resentment. Writing to the Minister of the Navy 
after his departure from Boulogne, the Emperor said of the Ad- 
miral: ''Villeneuve is a wretch who ought to be ignominiously 
dismissed; lacking all gift at combination, without courage 
and without general interest, he would sacrifice everything to 
save himself." It is easy to recognize now how far from genuine 
was this wrath and how glad the Emperor was, in secret, to be 
at last rid of the project of invasion. To his hard heart it was 
not a matter of the slightest importance that his selection of a 
scapegoat should be an innocent man. To the admiral, whom 
he ought to have discharged if his guilt had really been so great, 
he now gave orders to sail from Cadiz toward Naples to the 
support of Saint-Cyr, and to attack the English on the way at 
any time when he should have the advantage in point of num- 
ber of ships. Villeneuve represented in reply that his squad- 
ron was in the worst of condition, that the Spanish ships in 
particular were manned chiefly by sailors who had never been 



^T. 36] The Battle of Trafalgar 309 

through a naval manoeuvre, leaving the chances in battle very 
much against him. All quite without avail. He had to set 
sail and to prepare forthwith for combat, since Nelson confronted 
him almost immediately after leaving port with but twenty -seven 
ships of the hne to oppose to Villeneuve's thirty-three. The 
British vessels were, to be sure, admirably equipped through- 
out and manned by experienced seamen under command of the 
admiral of greatest genius belonging to the foremost seafaring 
nation in the world. The result was inevitable. Nelson 
departed somewhat from the usual form of attack, a fact which 
did not escape Villeneuve, but with his inferior material he was 
unable to meet the blow, and thus was lost to Napoleon the naval 
battle at Cape Trafalgar on October 21st, 1805. Of the French 
ships eighteen fell into the hands of the enemy, eleven fled back 
to Cadiz, while the remaining four beat out to sea and were 
eventually captured like the first. More than seven thousand 
Frenchmen fell in this furious battle, the English losing hardly 
a third as many, though among them was one man who more 
than equalled a fleet in value — Nelson himself. Villeneuve 
did not long survive him. Tormented and crushed by the 
wrath of his sovereign, — who could not forgive the admiral 
for the error which he had himself committed, — life became 
insupportable, and he committed suicide upon his return from 
captivity. It is said that the Emperor would never allow the 
21st of October to be recalled to his mind, and that the victims 
of this disaster never received any but ungracious recognition 
at his hands. And it must be admitted that at Trafalgar more 
had been decided than the outcome of a battle. The fate of 
an entire continent hung upon the fact that henceforth British 
supremacy on the seas was incontestable and a direct invasion 
of England was therefore scarcely to be regarded as a possibility. 
This circumstance overclouded the success at Ulm. New 
victories would have to be won to re-establish the glory of the 
Empire. But Napoleon, knowing as yet nothing of the defeat 
and loss of his fleet, hastened to pursue the Russians, who had 
indeed reached the Inn and there united themselves with Kien- 
mayer's corps, but upon hearing the fate of Mack had at once 



3IO The War of 1805 [1805 

begun a retreat. It was his hope that these forces of the enemy 
would make a stand against him on the Traun or on the Enns, 
whence, having beaten them, he would proceed in triumph 
straight toward the capital and there dictate terms of peace. 
But Kutusoff, the leader of the Russians, whom Emperor Fran- 
cis had appointed general-in- chief of the combined army, 
sought before all else to retire where he could effect a junction 
with the second Russian army advancing under Buxhoewden; 
he was not to be overtaken, and eventually slipped across the 
bridge at Krems to the left bank of the Danube, whence he pro- 
ceeded in a northeasterly direction toward Briinn by way of 
Znaim. Murat with his cavalry had pressed the most closely 
on the heels of the enemy, being unremittingly urged to haste by 
his brother-in-law. But he now drew down upon himself bitter 
reproaches for hastening on to Vienna instead of following up 
the foe upon the other bank of the river. From the convent 
of Melk Napoleon wrote him on November 11th: ''You received 
orders to follow close upon the Russians. ... I try in vain to 
find an explanation of your conduct. . . . You have lost me two 
days and have thought only of the vainglory of entering Vienna. 
But no glory is to be gained where no danger is." 

The Emperor saw at once that this course had imperilled an 
unprotected division marching on the farther side of the river 
under command of Mortier, which as a matter of fact came near 
being wiped out by the Russians on that very day near Durrn- 
stein. It made no amends for this reverse tJiat at the same 
time Davout near Leoben came upon an Austrian corps com- 
manded by Merveldt which had separated from Kutusoff at 
Steyer in order to protect the approaches to the Alps, and forced 
it into a retreat which soon became a flight toward Graz. 

But in spite of all Napoleon found means of turning the new 
situation to account. If Murat was now on the march to Vienna, 
he must make sure there of the passages across the river and 
thence make his way, followed by two army corps, northwest- 
ward toward Znaim, there to cut off from Kutusoff the way into 
Moravia. Since haste was a prime consideration, much de- 
pended upon preventing the Viennese from destroying the Tabor 



^T. 36] Murat's Trick 3 1 1 

bridge. To the accomplishment of this task Murat showed 
himself fully equal. On the 13th he entered the city and 
marched directly through it to the bridge which spanned the arm 
of the river in three divisions. The garrison, under command 
of a Prince of Auersperg, was drawn up on the opposite bank 
with orders upon the first approach of the French to set fire 
instantly to the arches, which had been covered in advance 
with inflammable materials. But Murat succeeded in deluding 
the Austrian commander into the belief that negotiations for 
a suspension of hostilities had been concluded, offering an imme- 
diate prospect of peace. Auersperg and his officers, with the 
exception of Kienmayer, beUeved these assurances the more 
readily as General Bertrand pledged his word of honour as to 
their truth. The bridge was not fired, the French passed over 
it, and the Austrian General barely got his troops away along 
the road to Briinn. 

The statements made by Murat were nothing but a trick. 
It was true that Emperor Francis had opened negotiations on 
November 3d, but these had come to naught in view of the 
demands of Napoleon, which had been nothing less than the 
cession of Venetia, the Tyrol, and Upper Austria, and the hopes 
of the Austrians again depended solely upon Kutusoff's effect- 
ing a junction with the second column and then striking a decisive 
blow with the combined forces which should compel the enemy 
to give way. 

To Napoleon, on the other hand, everything depended upon 
getting the Russians between two fires. One part of the French 
army were in pursuit of them, while Murat operated against their 
right flank with the corps of Davout and Lannes. It seemed 
for a time as if this plan were going to be successful and that 
the decisive moment was at hand. Kutusoff, who clearly rec- 
ognized his situation, had retreated by forced marches, but in 
consequence his troops were in urgent need of some days of rest. 
He was, it is true, far in advance of the French who were pur- 
suing him, but he was notwithstanding in imminent danger from 
the corps advancing from the south. This must at all hazards 
be evaded. For this purpose Bagration, one of Kutusoff's 



312 The War of 1805 [I805 

generals, was detailed with some thousands of men to intercept 
and detain Murat on the road by which he was advancing, and 
so protect the repose and further advance of the main army. 
To the north of Hollabrunn, Murat, who had with him at the 
time only a part of Lannes' corps, came upon the enemy and, 
thinking himself confronted by the bulk of the hostile forces, 
did not venture to attack until re-enforced. To gain the time 
necessary for the remainder of the corps to come up he made 
pretence of proposing an armistice, and to this Kutusoff, to 
whom nothing could have been more opportune, consented, 
though purposely delaying his reply. A document was there- 
upon drawn up according to which the Russian pledged himself 
— with no less fraudulent intention — to march out of Austria 
as soon as Napoleon should have ratified the treaty. The 
Russian had thus gained the days of respite needed by the 
army. When the tidings reached Napoleon at Schonbrunn he 
was beside himself with rage at this successful stratagem on 
the part of the enemy which had enabled him, by leaving Ba- 
gration behind, to escape to the north, where at Porlitz, near 
Briinn, he effected a junction with the Viennese garrison and 
another at Wischau with the second Russian army. It was no 
consolation that on November 16th Bagration was overcome 
by Murat with a force greatly superior in number to the Rus- 
sians, who were thereby forced to retreat. The name of Holla- 
brunn was not to be inscribed on the Arc de Triomphe in 
Paris. 

Napoleon had not accomphshed his purpose. Kutusoff had 
escaped and might now, protected by the cannon of Olmiitz, 
safely await re-enforcements, which had been already brought 
within no very considerable distance by General Essen, while a 
force of 45,000 men under General Bennigsen was advancing 
from Breslau. In Bohemia Archduke Ferdinand had assem- 
bled a corps which formed in a manner the right wing of the 
Russo- Austrian position. Archduke Charles was marching 
toward Marburg with the intention of reaching Vienna by way 
of Kormend and Raab. Moreover, the political situation of 
the allies had also changed materially for the better. Prussia 



^T. 36] Prussia Leans towards the Coalition 3 1 3 

seemed at last convinced in spite of all. The absolute disre- 
gard of formalities on the part of the French before marching 
through the territory of Ansbach had suddenly changed the 
feeling of Frederick William III. The neutraUty upon which 
he prided himself as the supreme achievement of his political 
course had been violated and his self-esteem thereby much 
injured. He now assented to Russia's urgent petition for pas- 
sage for her troops, and allowed himself to be persuaded by 
Emperor Alexander, who came to Berlin toward the end of 
October, not indeed into immediate participation in the war, — 
from that he was held back by Hardenberg, — ^but at least into 
making a compromise according to the terms of which Prussia 
was to demand of Napoleon the liberation of Naples, Holland, 
and Switzerland, the disunion of the Italian and French crowns, 
and the indemnification of the King of Sardinia, — in short, the 
restriction of the French system of expansion, — and, in case 
of refusal, to enter the coalition with a contribution of 180,000 
men (November 3d, 1805). Count Haugwitz was despatched 
to lay the matter before Napoleon. He was given until the 
middle of December to decide the question, the Prussian army 
standing equipped ready at any moment to take part in the 
conflict. The convention had this great advantage for the 
Russians now at war, that, in case of being beaten in Moravia, 
they could retreat into Silesia and there be supported by an 
army of about 50,000 men. 

As will be readily seen, Napoleon's situation was by no 
means favourable. He had hoped to dictate terms of peace in 
Vienna, and now instead he had been obliged to extend his line 
of operations far beyond what he had purposed and to detach 
many of his troops to serve as protection to his flanks. Ney 
had marched toward the Tyrol, Marmont toward Styria, Da- 
vout toward the Hungarian frontiers, and Bernadotte toward 
Bohemia, so that there now remained at his immediate disposal 
only the corps of Murat, Lannes, and Soult. Fully appreciating 
the situation in which he thus found himself, he learned just at 
this time of Prussia's sudden change of policy and of the defeat 
at Trafalgar, and realized that his most earnest efforts must now 



314 The War of 1805 [isos 

be directed toward finding Bome relief from these accumulated 
difficulties through division among his enemies. In spite of the 
refusal of Francis II. to conclude peace on the before-mentioned 
conditions, Napoleon had not broken off all relations with the 
headquarters of his opponent, and after the seizure of Vienna 
had even addressed himself once more to the Emperor of Austria 
with such result that the Austrian diplomat Stadion came 
accompanied by General Gyulai to the French headquarters at 
Briinn with a view to entering upon negotiations. They were 
commissioned to act in conjunction with Haugwitz, the Prus- 
sian negotiator, who now approached with intentional slowness. 
It is a matter of profoundest interest to study the way in which 
Napoleon set to work to prevent this co-operation. His first 
step was to send the Austrian ambassadors to Talleyrand at 
Vienna under pretence that he was himself about to repair 
thither; meanwhile he issued orders to have Haugwitz detained 
at Iglau and at the same time sent his adjutant-general, Savary, 
to Alexander L, who had now joined the Russian army, to ask 
for an armistice and a parley, in which — as he intimated to the 
adjutant of the Czar — ^he purposed to surrender Turkey to 
Russia. Should Alexander consent to the proposed terms and 
conclude peace, Austria might be harassed to the uttermost; 
should he not, a new basis would of course have to be found 
upon which to treat with Austria. The latter alternative was 
the outcome of his diplomacy. The Czar remained firm, and 
on November 30th Napoleon directed Talleyrand in writing to 
cease to demand from Austria the whole of Venetia and the 
Tyrol, but merely the districts of Legnano and Verona for 
the kingdom of Italy, and Augsburg, Eichstadt, the Breisgau, 
and Ortenau for his South German aUies. But Stadion also 
remained immovable, at least he would not enter upon nego- 
tiations without the co-operation of Haugwitz. The latter had, 
however, received from his king oral instructions to preserve 
peace whatever the circumstances, and having observed in 
Briinn preparations for an early encounter between the armies, 
was evidently determined to learn the outcome before commit- 
ting himself and was not to be coerced into premature action. 



^T. 36] The Russian Advance 3 1 1; 

Beyond saying to Talleyrand, in conversation with him on 
December 1st, that his sovereign ardently desired peace and 
was ready to make contribution toward its re-estabUshment, 
he would give no indication of his mission. 

But while Napoleon thus vainly strove to improve his situ- 
ation, the adversary himself took steps which helped him out 
of his predicament. With his reduced forces Napoleon had 
not dared to follow up the Russians beyond Briinn and attack 
them in their secure position protected by a stronghold. What 
had been, however, beyond his most sanguine hopes now took 
place: the Russians came to him. To their misfortune the 
Czar had set himself at the head of his troops, and this young 
prince, devoured by ambition, was urgently desirous of winning 
the glory of having defeated a Bonaparte in the field. His 
plan was to take the offensive in spite of the fact that the only 
rational course lay in standing upon the defensive until the arrival 
of the re-enforcements, the nearer approach of the Archdukes, 
and imtil Prussia should be ready to take part in the action. 
There were indeed at the headquarters of the allies many who 
uttered warnings, but there were also numbers who advised the 
step. Kutusoff was in favour of further delay, but nevertheless 
too truly a courtier to offer decided opposition to the wishes of 
his sovereign; glad to be reheved of the responsibility, he gave 
his acquiescence to Alexander's project. Among those fore- 
most in promoting the same was the Austrian Colonel Wejrrother, 
who had been assigned to the Czar as chief-of-staff — a second 
Mack in point of immoderate ambition and self-conceit. He 
had already on a former occasion as adviser of Wurmser and 
Alvinczy found himself confronted by Napoleon during the 
Italian campaign, and later he had occupied toward Suvaroff 
the position which he now filled toward Alexander. It was 
Weyrother's proposition to advance against the enemy, over- 
power his right flank, and cut off his communication with Vienna. 
This scheme might possibly have met with success at a later 
day with Archduke Charles near at hand. Its execution was 
now, to say the least, premature. Weyrother, however, insisted 
upon a decision and, in secret with Alexander, elaborated a plan 



2i6 The War of 1805 [I805 

of battle, Emperor Francis — who was also with the army — 
being kept in complete ignorance of it all. 

For Napoleon, on the other hand, nothing could be more im- 
portant than to defeat the allies at the earliest possible moment, 
— ^before the Russian re-enforcements should arrive, before 
Archduke Charles should advance farther north, and before 
Prussia, as he now also began to fear, should decide upon taking 
active measures.* He was therefore all the more astonished 
to learn that the foe was advancing to meet his wishes. When 
he heard through a deserter on November 27th of the forward 
march of the Russians he was at first completely incredulous. 
Segur relates in his ''Memoirs" that *'to Berthier this seemed 
BO improbable that he gave orders for the arrest of the bearer 
of the tidings, but his story was almost immediately confirmed 
by advices from Marshal Soult, who had been attacked at Auster- 
Htz." Napoleon at once gave orders for his advance-guard to 
retire with all haste before the enemy, in order to infuse into the 
latter a yet greater degree of confidence, while he took up his 
position on both sides of the highway between Briinn and Auster- 
litz, his army extending southerly to Sokolnitz and Tilnitz. He 
next drew to himself all available troops; Davout and Ber- 
nadotte were summoned, and by December 1st the latter had 
already reached the convent of Raigern.f Napoleon then pro- 
ceeded to mark out his plan of battle also. The movement of 
the enemy against his right wing had not long remained unob- 
served by him, and it was upon this that he based his scheme of 

* "Bonaparte's interests demanded that no time should be lost; ours, 
that time should be gained. He had every occasion for venturing a decisive 
battle; we, for avoiding the same. Your Imperial Majesty will recall that 
I, at the time, repeatedly made representations to that effect and im- 
parted them also to every one who would listen to me. The right course 
was to wear out the enemy by means of skirmishes, always keeping the 
bulk of the army beyond his reach; to conquer Hungary and establish 
connections with the Archduke." (Czartoryski to Emperor Alexander, 
April, 1806.) 

t ** If you are about to give battle," said Napoleon once at about this 
time, "assemble all your forces, omitting none whatever; a single bat- 
talion sometimes decides the day." 



^T. 36] Austerlitz 317 

action. As he said to his generals, this which he was resolved to 
gain was to be no ordinary battle, but a decisive action which 
should not permit of the enemy's withdrawing and gathering 
anew; for every orderly retreat of the Russians which left them 
in fighting trim, since it did not improve his own situation, 
might prove ruinous to him. For this reason he refrained from 
occupying the secure position which offered itself on the plateau 
of Pratzen, but left that to the enemy, even inviting attack upon 
his right wing by advancing it and exposing its flank in order 
to confirm Alexander in his purpose to surround it and thus 
induce him to make a wide circuit involving the weakening 
of his centre ; this enfeebled centre was then to be broken through 
and the battle thus decided. It was therefore with boundless 
satisfaction that on December 1st he saw the Russians already 
making actual dispositions for executing this flank movement. 
^'That is a wretched move!" exclaimed he to those about him, 
trembling with joy and clapping his hands. ''They are walking 
into the trap! They are dehvering themselves over! Before 
to-morrow evening this army is mine!" And of a truth, on 
December 2d, the ''sun of Austerlitz" witnessed before its 
setting the destruction of the aUied armies. The attack upon 
their centre, stripped of all cavalry, had been undertaken with 
great vigour by Soult and had proved completely successful. 
The hostile line was broken, the left wing entirely severed and 
put to rout, the right thrown back upon AusterUtz. The Rus- 
sians had suffered the loss of about 20,000 men, and the Austrian 
corps under Liechtenstein in the neighbourhood of 6000. The 
former, cut off from their line of retreat toward Olmiitz and hav- 
ing parted with all artillery, munitions, and baggage, moved in 
confusion along the road toward Goding and HoHtsch. "Neither 
regiments nor army corps existed any longer in the army of the 
alUes," says Czartoryski, "there remained only hordes of men 
going off in disorder, marauding as they went and thus increas- 
ing still further the desolation of the country. In the villages 
as we passed along was to be heard nothing but the confused 
cries of people seeking in drink forgetfulness of their mis- 
fortunes." 



31 8 The War of 1805 [I805 

One of the most brilliant of victories* had been won for 
France. " Soldiers," said the victor, addressing his troops, " I am 
satisfied with you! In the battle of Austerlitz you have justi- 
fied all my expectations of your intrepidity ; you have adorned 
your eagles with immortal glory. . . . Soldiers, when the im- 
perial crown was placed upon my head by the people of France 
I relied upon you for preserving to it always that refulgent glory 
which alone could give it value in my sight. . . . When every- 
thing shall have been accomplished necessary to the assurance 
of happiness and prosperity to our country I will lead you back 
to France; there you will be the object of my most tender care. 
My people will look upon you with joy, and it will be enough for 
any one of you to say, 'I was at the battle of Austeriltz,' to draw 
forth the reply, * Here is a brave man. ' " 

Napoleon had been wholly correct in saying that the victory 
of December 2d was to be no ''ordinary" one. The result of 
the battle was to bring peace. Shortly before, as has been 
seen, he had been driven by his dangerous position to modify 
his demands in proposing terms of peace. The situation of 
affairs was now totally changed. On December 3d Napoleon 
was already writing to Talleyrand at Vienna: "All negotiations 
have become null and void, since it is evident that they were 
nothing but a stratagem intended to lull me to sleep. Say to 

* Military writers are wont to date from Austerlitz a new epoch in the 
history of warfare. Jomini said that the great field-battles of our day 
date from 1805. A recent historian of the Napoleonic wars carries out 
the idea thus: "In this first of the Napoleonic battles are at once recog- 
nizable all those characteristics which distinguish more modern battles 
from those of the period of Frederick the Great. In the latter the entire 
army was set in motion as a whole and could and must remain throughout 
the course of the battle within the grasp of the commander, capable of 
manoeuvring according to his wishes. Were its close relations broken 
up at any point, its cause was lost. In modern battle the centre may be 
broken through while victory is carried off by the encompassing wings; 
one wing may be annihilated while the other crushes the enemy; indeed 
in a well-conducted battle some such success is always yielded to the 
enemy upon some portion of the field, in order to be able to bring to bear 
a superior force at the point selected for administering the decisive blow." 
Yorck von Wartenburg, "Napoleon als Feldherr," I. 241. 



Mt. 36] Negotiations for Peace 3 1 9 

Monsieur de Stadion that I have not been duped by their arti- 
fice, that it was for that reason that I sent them back from 
Briinn, and that now that the battle is lost the conditions can 
no longer remain what they were." 

At the headquarters of the allies it was agreed upon that 
Emperor Francis should ask for a conference with the conqueror 
and demand an armistice. The request was granted, and on 
December 4th the interview took place at Nasiedlowitz on the 
highroad between Austerlitz, where Napoleon had taken up his 
residence, and Holitsch, whither the allied monarchs had retired. 

Much that is false has been circulated in regard to this meet- 
ing. The Emperor of the French conducted himself in a manner 
by no means brusque and discourteous, as has been narrated, 
but was on the contrary most affable and gracious. He was 
prepared to grant the desired suspension of hostihties in case 
the Russians would at once return homeward. The question 
of peace was also discussed. Were Russia willing to conclude 
peace at once without delay in company with Austria, — though 
with the proviso that its territory should be closed to the Brit- 
ish, — Austria should be released from any cession of lands what- 
soever; but should Russia choose another course, a separate 
agreement would necessitate to Austria the surrender of Venetia 
to the kingdom of Italy and of the Tyrol to Bavaria. The 
latter condition, — in regard to the Tyrol, — at the earnest en- 
treaty of Francis, Napoleon consented to set aside. Upon his 
return from the conference the Emperor of Austria at once 
acquainted his ally with the demands made by the victor, at 
the same time assuring him that he was ready to continue the 
struggle if Russia would stand by him. But to that Alexander 
was in no wise to be persuaded. Inconsiderate as he had been 
in bringing about the danger, he was just as little inclined to 
take upon himself the consequences of his folly. But neither 
was he wilHng to make peace under the conditions offered, since 
English commerce was nothing less than a vital question to 
Russia. There remained then nothing but for him to place in 
safety the fragments of his army. The answer which he sent 
to Emperor Francis was that Austria might no longer count 



320 The War of 1805 [I805 

upon him, and on December 6th he took his departure. On 
the same day the armistice between France and Austria was 
signed.* 

In the negotiations for peace Austria had now, besides her 
own forces, only the friendly offices of Prussia to count upon. 
But these also were to be denied her. Napoleon had taken the 
precaution to have inserted in the instrument regulating the 
armistice a clause to the effect that while the treaty should be 
in force no foreign troops should set foot upon Austrian soil, 
and then forthwith proceeded to enter into negotiations with 
Haugwitz alone. If now Haugwitz remained faithful to his 
secret orders to maintain peace with France, nothing could be 
done with the ultimatum which he was charged to tender to 
Napoleon. On the other hand. Napoleon was now no longer will- 
ing to allow Prussia to maintain a neutral position, but de- 
manded that she should form a close offensive and defensive 
alliance with himself. According to this proposal Frederick 
WilUam would be bound to surrender to France the part of the 
duchy of Cleves situated on the right bank of the Rhine, the 
fortress of Wesel, and the principaUty of Neufchatel, and to 
Bavaria the margraviate of Ansbach; he might retain Hanover, 
already occupied by his troops; the British were to be denied 
access to its shores; further, he was to recognize the "kingdom 
of Bavaria" in the extent to which it should attain through 
Austrian concessions. This compact was signed by Haugwitz 
on December 15th, 1805, and thenceforth Austria had lost her 
Prussian support. She was now given up defenceless and alone 
to the will of the conqueror. 

* Even in the most recent publications one meets with the statement 
that immediately after the battle Austria drew away from Russia, whereas 
in point of fact it was the Czar who left his ally in the lurch. This is 
testified to even by authorities emanating from the Russian camp, such, 
for instance, as J. de Maistre and Czartoryski. The bold reproach which 
was later made by the Russians in official form against the Austrians — 
that they had not fought bravely at Austerlitz — met with cutting irony 
from Napoleon in the '' Moniteur." ' ' Those who saw the battle-field," said 
he therein, "will testify that at the spot where the chief collision took 
place the ground was covered with Austrians, while at other points it 
was covered only with Russian knapsacks." 



^T. 36] Negotiations with Austria 321 

The question now was whether Napoleon himself desired 
to bring about peace at once, or whether he would profit by 
favourable circumstances to continue the war against Austria, 
subduing her still further with a view to puting an end forever 
to her power. In his military surroundings there was no lack 
of voices, notably that of the self-seeking Murat, who coun- 
selled taking the latter course. Talleyrand, on the contrary, was 
emphatically of the other opinion. He was an avaricious man, 
certain of rich pecuniary returns in case of an agreement being 
brought about, and he skilfully persuaded the Emperor to 
decide upon terminating a war which he had, moreover, advised 
against from the outset. ''It is to the interest of France," said 
he to Napoleon, ''that I want to sacrifice the interests of your 
generals, in regard to which I feel not the slightest concern. 
Reflect that you lower yourself in taking the same ground as 
they, and that you are too great to be merely a soldier." These 
words produced the desired effect, and Napoleon declared him- 
self ready to conclude peace. The negotiations were allowed 
to proceed, but now he would no longer consider the imposition 
of less rigorous conditions. When Prince Johann Liechtenstein, 
the new negotiator of the Austrian Emperor, arrived in Briinn 
Napoleon had ceased to be satisfied with his former exaction 
of the Italian territory of Venice, but now required Venice with 
the same extent in which it had been ceded to Austria in 1797, 
that is to say, including Istria and Dalmatia. Shortly after he 
repudiated the promise which he had made to Francis II. on 
the Austerlitz highway, and demanded the Tyrol for Bavaria. 
This was followed within a short time by further requirements — 
the district of the Inn and Austria's consent to the dispossession 
of the Royal House of Naples. Before the great battle Napoleon 
would have contented himself with a war indemnity of five mil- 
lion gulden ($2,000,000) ; fifty milHon francs ($9,500,000) was his 
present demand, from which he was with difficulty persuaded to 
abate ten millions. "Every hour witnesses the birth of new 
exactions," wrote Liechtenstein from Pressburg, where he had 
been negotiating with Talleyrand ever since December 20th. Per- 
plexity and discouragement prevailed at Holitsch, where Em- 



322 The War of 1805 [i805 

peror Francis awaited the outcome. In his despair he even 
considered for a time taking up arms again.* But Archduke 
Charles was most strenuous in his advice against such a course, 
having been convinced ever since the capitulation at Ulm that 
Austria could have no hope of success except by means of the 
pen, and Francis yielded to his representations. Cobenzl, the 
Minister, who was singled out by pubUc opinion as the obstacle 
to agreement with the enemy, was compelled to resign his office 
and was succeeded by Count Stadion. Soon afterwards, on 
December 26th, the treaty of peace was signed at Pressburg.f 
Before its ratification Archduke Charles was commissioned 
to make efforts in a personal interview with Napoleon to obtain 
more moderate terms. The conference took place, but was 
productive of no result, and on New Year's Day, 1806, the 

* Napoleon declared at a later date, in conversation with the Bavarian 
Minister Montgelas, that his army, "weakened by its victories, was very 
unfavourably located, between the fortress of Olmiitz — which it was 
hardly possible to besiege in winter-time with the hostile army close at 
hand — and the Austrian capital, populous, ill disposed, and difficult to 
control; that thereafter its dispositions seemed unsafe and badly sup- 
ported, all the more so because Russia, still hostile, might at any moment 
order an advance of her forces; and finally, that, though Prussia had 
indeed signed a treaty, it had not yet been ratified, and through its rela- 
tions with the two emperors that power might have prepared for him 
embarrassments of the worst order. It was, therefore, when the cir- 
cumstances were rightly considered, a matter for self-congratulation 
that the Austrian court offered so little steadfast opposition and so eagerly 
desired the termination of the war. (Montgelas, " Denkwiirdigkeiten " 
(1887), p. 124.) Radetzky also bears witness in his Recollections 
that at the time Vienna was in a ferment. 

t Recent Austrian historians have named December 27th as the date 
of signature to this instrument, but this is inexplicable. The following 
passage from Napoleon's letter of December 25th, 1805, to Talleyrand 
directing the Minister to sign the treaty on the following day, may be 
quoted for its illustration of Napoleon's character: "Finally — should it 
be impossible to append your signature at once — wait and sign it upon 
New Year's Day; for I have my prejudices and am very glad that the 
peace should date from the renewal of the Gregorian calendar, which 
betokens, I hope, as much good fortune to my reign as it has enjoyed under 
the old one [i e . , the Revolutionary calendar]. To sum up : sign to-morrow 
if you can, or else on the first day of the year." 



^T. 36] The Treaty of Pressburg 323 

monarch of Austria set his name to one of the most onerous 
treaties which that power has ever concluded. Emperor Francis 
dehvered back all that he had received in the Treaty of Campo 
Formio as belonging to Venice, both the Italian territory and all 
its dependencies, and Venice, Istria, Dalmatia, and Cattaro were 
united with the kingdom of Italy. It was only with great re- 
luctance that Napoleon left to him Trieste, which, according to 
Joseph Bonaparte, he had intended to use as a base in a new 
undertaking against Egypt and India. Austria, furthermore, 
gave her assent to all the changes and estabUshments in Pied- 
mont, Genoa, Parma, Lucca, and Piombino, and acknowledged 
as kings the Electors of Bavaria and Wiirtemberg, to the 
former of whom she gave up the Tyrol with Vorarlberg, Brixen, 
Trent, Passau, Eichstadt, Burgau, and Lindau, besides counties 
and possessions of lesser importance; while to the latter she 
relinquished five cities on the Danube with their territories, 
the counties of Hohenberg and Nellenburg and a part of the 
Breisgau. Baden received another portion of the Breisgau, the 
Ortenau, the city of Constance, and the island of Mainau. The 
King of Bavaria was to surrender Wiirzburg to the Archduke 
Elector of Salzburg, who was in his turn to pass on this terri- 
tory to Austria. 

The Austrian Power was thus crowded out of Italy and 
Germany, while the French sphere of action now extended at 
the south as far as the Balkan Peninsula; Austria had been 
compelled to give up about 23,000 square miles of territory, 
m.ore than two and a half million souls, and nearly fourteen mil- 
lion gulden of annual income, and for this enormous loss she 
received compensation amounting to almost nothing. In re- 
gard to this point, indeed, Talleyrand was not of the same mind 
as his lord. He had interceded in behalf of Austria and written 
to Napoleon even at the opening of the campaign: '^At the 
present day the Turks are no longer formidable, they have 
themselves everything to fear. But the Russians have taken 
their place; Austria is still the chief bulwark which Europe 
has to oppose to them, and it is against them that we ought now 
to fortify her." He proposed later, during the course of the 



324 The War of 1805 [I805 

negotiations; to indemnify the power at Vienna with Moldavia, 
Wallachia, Bessarabia, and Northern Bulgaria. But his propo- 
sition was not received with favour, either by the Austrians — 
who rightly foresaw in it only a cause of dispute and wrangling 
with Russia, and were at the same time not yet ready to give up 
definitely their position as one of the Great Powers of Central 
Europe — or by Napoleon, whose plans included the curbing 
of the power of the Czars also at some future day beneath his 
own sceptre. This was the great gulf separating him from 
Talleyrand, as from all patriotic Frenchmen: they desired, 
of course, a strong, national, predominating France, but at the 
same time admitted the existence of a system of counterbalanc- 
ing powers, while the Emperor saw in all Europe nothing but 
his own personal domain. In France the Revolution was ex- 
tinguished and no one had any further sympathy with its 
spirit of conquest; but in Europe this spirit was yet ahve, em- 
bodied in a single man, to be sure, but this man, with mighty 
power, arrogated to himself dominion over the entire Continent. 



CHAPTER XII 
NAPOLEONIC CREATIONS. BREACH WITH PRUSSIA 

The battle fought on December 2d, 1805, is one of the four 
pre-eminently decisive in effect upon the career of Napoleon as a 
monarch. Marengo had secured to him his control over France, 
Austerlitz established his ascendency in Europe; the work of 
Austerlitz was undone at Leipzig, and what Marengo had given 
was finally lost at Waterloo. For a moment his entire scheme 
of personal dominion throughout the world had wavered in the 
balance in Moravia. For the most important effect of the 
successfully conducted retreat of the Russians was to put in 
question Napoleon's prestige with his army, upon whom alone 
he might depend for the realization of his dream. The masterly 
manoeuvres at Ulm, the surprise of Vienna, and the seizure of 
the bridges of the Danube were regarded as mere premises lack- 
ing a conclusion, and in the army voices were already raised in 
criticism. Then came the victory, thrust upon the Corsican 
by the astounding foolhardiness of his adversary, which re- 
moved the danger which had threatened his standing among 
his troops. 

Nor was the army alone in feeling this effect; throughout 
the French people public opinion was again, by this victory, 
turned to the Emperor's favour. No war had ever been more 
unpopular in France than this. The rigidly enforced conscrip- 
tion had been endured with ill-concealed impatience, and a 
serious financial crisis following close upon it had reawakened 
the scarcely laid doubt as to whether the prevailing system and 
the man who represented it really gave promise of abiding pro- 
tection to material interests; the expedition against San Do- 
mingo began to be recalled as a very expensive venture which 
had cost 50,000 men and 60,000,000 francs; the loss to com- 

325 



-^26 Napoleonic Creations [isoe 

merce with the East consequent upon the naval war was com- 
puted, as also the deficit resulting to France through the rapid 
occupation of the colonies by EngHshmen; even the most zeal- 
ous champions of the Napoleonic system were not wholly averse 
to entertaining the thought of Joseph in the seat of power should 
Napoleon lose his life in battle. But every such consideration 
was put to flight when word was received of the sudden victory 
and peace so soon after extorted. The French as a people were 
far too proud, too vain, not to lay claim to a man who gave 
commands to monarchs, who made and unmade kings, and 
through whom the name of France had been exalted beyond 
any point ever reached under any of her former rulers. Ac- 
cording to the testimony of an eye-witness: ''The French, trans- 
ported by the tidings of such a victory, leaving nothing to be 
desired since it terminated the war, were again fired with en- 
thusiasm and there was no need for encouragement to popular 
rejoicing. The nation identified itself once more with its suc- 
cessful army. This moment I regard as the cuhnination of 
Bonaparte's prosperity, for the mighty deeds of their monarch 
were at this time approved and adopted by the greater part of 
the people." Napoleon was extolled by. the national public 
bodies in most extravagant terms. According to them his 
renown had overshadowed all other immortal names, and admi- 
ration and wonder could but blush to remember previous objects 
of regard, etc. 

The French people while thus acclaiming the conqueror were 
acting under a twofold delusion. In the first place they did not 
suspect that this continental war had been long planned by the 
Emperor, the campaign carefully devised, and the crisis brought 
about by his own machinations, but believed the statements 
published by his obedient creatures, that he had been the party 
threatened and attacked and that his people could not enough 
admire the ready art with which he had been able to make a 
defence against the conspiracy of all Europe. The second error 
of the French people consisted in regarding Napoleon as their 
Emperor who vanquished the enemy in order to insure glory, 
prosperity, and peace to the country to the left of the Rhine, 



iET.36] Naples 327 

while he had in reahty long since ceased to be the Emperor of 
France except in name. To those acquainted with Napoleon's 
secret intentions before the campaign it will be no matter of 
surprise that he made use of his victories to advance interests 
quite unrelated to the exaltation of the power of the French 
state or the diminution of that of Austria^ interests entirely 
incomprehensible except from the standpoint of one aspiring to 
establish an empire not limited by the Gallic boundary-lines. 

During the negotiations with the Austrian envoys, upon 
one occasion before the battle of Austerlitz, the kingdom of 
Naples had come under discussion. After that event the sub- 
ject was not again touched upon. Napoleon now considered 
himself strong enough to carry out his intentions throughout 
all Italy without the consent of the Court of Vienna. Hardly 
had the signatures been appended to the treaty of peace at 
Pressburg when he announced on the day following — and, char- 
acteristically enough, in a mere military order issued to the 
army — ^that the Bourbon dynasty in the kingdom of Naples 
had ceased to reign. The pretext for this step had, it must be 
acknowledged, been furnished by the Neapolitan court itself. 
Pressed by both English and Russians, Queen Caroline had de- 
termined upon risking all to gain all and, setting aside the prom- 
ise made to France in August to remain neutral, opened the 
port of her capital to Russian and British troops. This had 
taken place in the midst of the war, and hence Napoleon's course 
in sending Massena with a large body of troops across the Nea- 
poUtan frontier was capable of justification according to the laws 
of war. The outcome of it was that the effects of the victory of 
Austerlitz made themselves felt here as elsewhere, for the Czar, 
still crushed by his defeat, recalled his troops from Naples to 
Corfu, and the English, following his example, also evacuated 
the port and sailed for Sicily, leaving to the mercy of the exas- 
perated foe those whose fate had been confidingly put in their 
keeping. No answer was received to the letter in which the 
queen made submission to the Emperor imploring his clemency, 
and in the middle of February, 1806, Joseph Bonaparte, who 
had put in an appearance with the army, took, as Imperial Vice- 



328 Napoleonic Creations [I8O6 

roy, immediate possession of the capital whence the legitimate 
reigning family had shortly before taken flight. Only a few 
weeks later, before the end of March, and the Bourbon troops 
which offered resistance on the peninsula had been overcome 
and Sicily alone was left under dominion of Caroline and the 
English. 

On March 30th. 1806, Napoleon apprised the Senate by 
letter of his determination to set his brother Joseph upon the 
throne as monarch of Naples and Sicily. This meant, as the 
letter itself implied, that the kingdom would henceforth be in- 
cluded within the sphere of Napoleonic power, since it expressly 
stated that the new king of the Two Sicilies should remain a 
Grand Dignitary of France. In view of this the law providing 
that the two crowns, the French and the NeapoHtan, should 
never be united upon one head might as well never have existed.* 

Together with this decree there were submitted to the Senate 
several others concerning Italy. One of these dealt with the 
question of incorporating the Venetian territory with the king- 
dom of Italy. Another had as its object the assignment of the 
principality of Guastalla to the Princess Borghese and her hus- 
band. Still others disclosed an entirely new and special pur- 
pose on the part of the head of the State. Napoleon, that is 
to say, proposed to found within the limits of the newly-con- 
quered Venetian territory twelve titular duchies: Dalmatia, 
Istria, Friuh, Cadore. Belluno, Coneghano, Treviso, Feltre, 
Bassano, Vicenza, Padua, and Rovigo, and four similar ones in 
the kingdom of Naples: Gaeta, Otranto, Taranto, and Reggio, 
one in the principahty of Lucca, and three in Parma and Pia- 
cenza. One fifteenth part of the revenue from these lands was 
to serve as endowment to the incumbent. Besides these Napo- 
leon reserved to himself domains in Venetia amounting in value 
to 30,000,000 francs, and in Lucca amounting to 4,000,000, and in 
addition 1,200,000 francs annual tribute to be furnished by' 

* Louis Bonaparte and Murat, the Emperor's brother-in-law, likewise 
retained their French dignities upon becoming European monarchs at 
this time; that is to sav, they remained subjects of him who bore the 
title of Emperor of the French. 



^T. 36] The Situation of the Pope 329 

the kingdom of Italy and 1,000,000 by Naples. These titled 
estates and these funds were intended for use as rewards for 
conspicuous acts of service. The recipients of these favours — 
and who these were to be will shortly appear — acquired thereby, 
it is true, no prerogatives of any kind, but title and revenue were 
assured to the heirs in direct male line. This new feudal system 
had little more than the name in common with the ancient 
and obsolete one and should not be confused with it. Of 
especial significance, however, was the international element 
in it, for, according to it, citizens of one state could be trans- 
ferred with their claims to another, French marshals and offi- 
cials might acquire a legitimate share in state revenues of Italy, 
and but little later in those of Poland and Germany also — 
an additional proof that Napoleon's idea of an empire had long 
since been extended beyond the boundaries of France. Madame 
de Remusat, speaking in her ''Memoires" of the new nobility, 
pauses to remark: "Our country came before long to seem to 
Napoleon nothing more than a great province of the empire 
which he had resolved upon bringing into submission to him- 
self." 

But in nothing did this imperial design disclose itself more 
clearly than in Napoleon's conduct toward the Pope. After 
the expulsion from Naples of the legitimate Royal House the 
entire Italian peninsula had become subject to the will of 
the conqueror with the exception of the States of the Church. 
It soon became evident, however, that herein also the rule was 
to be carried out, and all misgivings on that score received but 
too speedy confirmation in the bestowal of the Neapolitan 
principalities of Ponte Corvo and Benevento upon the French 
dignitaries Bernadotte and Talleyrand, without regard to the 
suzerainty of the Pope. It yet remained to be seen whether 
Pius would consent to play a role like that of Joseph Bona- 
parte as vassal king under Napoleon. Acceptance of this ar- 
rangement would mean possible continuation of the temporal 
power of the Pope, rejection, supposably its sacrifice to the 
design of the great potentate for a world empire. That the 
Pope could not be counted upon as a docile tool in the hands of 



330 Napoleonic Creations [I8O6 

the Corsican had already been shown in the recent war when 
Pius, demanding for himself unconditional neutrality, had 
raised a protest against the French, who, disregarding his atti- 
tude, occupied Ancona on their way toward Naples. Far from 
submitting quietly to such abuse, he had publicly affirmed that 
as the father of all believers, to observe political impartiality 
was his duty. In addition to these acts of contumacy Pius, 
adducing the decisions of the Council of Trent, had refused in 
June, 1805, Napoleon's request to dissolve the marriage of his 
youngest brother Jerome with Miss Patterson, an American. 

Such perversity on the part of the pontiff exasperated the 
Emperor, who considered himself, in contrast with his republican 
predecessors, to have made sufficient conciliatory advances. 
After his victory over the coalition he had the statement pro- 
mulgated at Rome that he had occupied Ancona because the 
military forces of the Papal See would have been insufficient 
to hold the port against the English or the Turks, — i.e., against 
Protestants and Infidels, — and because he. Napoleon, regarded 
himself as protector of the Church. Notwithstanding all this, 
Pius still refused to comprehend and, with unruffled suavity, 
requested the return of the Legations as compensation for his 
good offices at the time of the coronation. And this time Na- 
poleon spoke in terms quite unmistakable. Writing February 
13th, 1806, he says: ''All Italy is to be subject to my law. I 
shall in no wise interfere with the independence of the Papal 
See, but upon condition that your Holiness shall show toward 
myself in things temporal the same respect which I observe 
toward your Holiness in things spiritual. . . . Your Holiness 
is sovereign of Rome, but I am its emperor." And to Fesch, 
who was now his representative at the Papal court, he gave 
orders to demand the expulsion of all subjects of England, 
Russia, Sweden, and Sardinia, and the closing of the port of 
Rome to ships of these nations, adding that Joseph had instruc- 
tions to uphold him by force of arms. The Roman pontiff was, 
moreover, to trouble himself no further with political affairs, 
since his protection had been assumed by Napoleon against the 
whole world. ''Say to him," he continues, "that my eyes are 



Mt.sq] Holland 331 

open and that I do not allow myself to be imposed upon ex- 
cept in so far as I desire; say to him that I am Charlemagne, 
the Sword of the Church, their Emperor, and that I propose to 
be treated as such." 

Among those surrounding Joseph at this time was Miot de 
Mehto, who says that Napoleon spoke freely in his correspondence 
with his brother in regard to his real intentions. He had thoughts 
of going to Rome in order to have himself crowned as Emperor 
of the West, which would imply the entire relinquishment 
of temporal power on the part of the Pope, who would have to 
be satisfied with the chief spiritual authority alone and a few 
million francs income as compensation. This scheme had been 
confidentially revealed in Rome, but the cardinals had declared 
against it and were resolved rather to die than to live under 
such conditions. The strictest secrecy was maintained about 
the whole matter. Only to the second letter above mentioned 
did Pius reply to the effect that Napoleon was indeed Emperor 
of the French but in nowise Roman Emperor, and that any such 
close relation with himself as he demanded would deprive the 
Papal See of its authority in other countries. One concession, 
however, was made to the oppressor: Consalvi, the Pope's Sec- 
retary of State, having been indicated by Napoleon as the mov- 
ing spirit in the resistance to him, was deposed from his office. 
Relations remained strained and eventually resulted in com- 
plete rupture. For the present, however, the Emperor turned 
his attention to the extension of his system in another direc- 
tion. 

Holland was now the objective point. This state, having 
once come within the sphere of French influence, had been 
obliged to undergo the same changes in its constitution as France 
itself. Eventually, as has been seen, the Batavian Republic 
had been established there with a sort of consular constitution 
having a Grand Pensionary at its head. Ever since June, 1803, 
this government had sided with Napoleon in times of war. 
Two years from that date, while the main army was fighting 
under Napoleon in the east, his brother Louis was given the 
task of defending the country against the English and Swedes. 



33 2 Napoleonic Creations [18O6 

No engagement took place, the battle of Austerlitz making 
it unnecessary, and Louis returned to Paris to the disgust of 
his imperial brother, who was planning to set him also upon a 
throne and had fixed upon that of Holland as best adapted to 
his purpose. In January, 1805, it had already been rumoured at 
The Hague that the French Emperor was intending to set up 
a monarchy again in Holland. Louis, to whom the idea of 
becoming a king in Holland was as little attractive as that of 
mounting a throne in Italy, was unwilling to give encourage- 
ment to such reports by remaining in the country. But with 
Napoleon objections of that kind on the part of his brothers 
were no longer allowed to stand in the way of his designs. The 
banishment of Lucien served as a warning to the perverse; 
the choice lay between exile and implicit obedience. Like 
Joseph, Louis ended by choosing obedience and declared him- 
self ready to assume the crown of Holland. As for the Dutch, 
scant regard was vouchsafed to their preferences. One who feels 
himself sufficiently superior to laws and treaties to treat them 
with disdain has no need for anything more than a pretext for 
proceeding as he thinks fit. The Grand Pensionary Schimmel- 
penninck, having discovered what was being plotted in Paris, 
sent thither a deputation of Dutch notables with Admiral Ver- 
huell at their head to avert the threatened danger. On March 
14th, 1806, Napoleon wrote to Talleyrand in regard to the 
matter: "I saw M. H. Verhuel this evening. Here, in a couple 
of words, is what I have reduced the question to : Holland is 
without executive power, she must have such, I will give her 
Prince Louis. A compact shall be made according to which the 
religion of the country shall be respected ; the prince will retain 
his own and each part of the nation will retain its own. The 
present constitution will remain in force, with the only differ- 
ence that in place of a Grand Pensionary there will be a king. 
Indeed there is nothing to prevent giving him the title of Stadt- 
holder. ... In all foreign relations, in the government of the 
colonies, and in all affairs of state the acts will be in the name of 
the stadtholder or king. Make me a draft of this scheme and send 
a clever person to The Hague to attend to this business. . . . 



Mt. 36] Louis Bonaparte King of Holland 333 

Ihis is a matter upon which my mind is made up — either that 
or incorporation with France. The arguments to be brought to 
bear with the Dutch s^re that otherwise I will not see that a single 
one of the colonies lost to England is restored to them when 
peace is made. On the other hand, if my terms are accepted, 
I will not only assist them to regain all the colonies, but even 
give them to understand that I will add Friesland besides. As 
you see, not a moment is to be lost." It was useless for the 
deputies to refer to the treaty of 1803, in which Napoleon had 
solemnly promised them the reacquisition of the colonies in 
return for their support of him during the war, to say nothing 
of Ceylon, which under favourable circumstances he was also 
going to procure for them. It availed nothing to adduce the 
treaty of 1795 with its first article reading: "The French Re- 
public recognizes the Republic of the United Provinces as a free 
and independent power and guarantees to it that liberty and 
independence." Napoleon was not to be moved, and when the 
negotiations at The Hague began to drag, since the people were 
absolutely opposed to the idea of a monarchy, he threatened 
them with measures so severe that they at length yielded to his 
wishes. The same people which in former times had laid waste 
its own country in order to save it from the cupidity of Louis 
XIV. now complied without resistance. The Dutch Council of 
State authorized the Grand Pensionary to sign a treaty with 
France according to which Louis Bonaparte became king of 
Holland (May 24th, 1806), and on June 5th a deputation an- 
nounced at the Tuileries that "after mature deliberation" it 
had been decided that for the future a constitutional monarchy 
was best adapted to the needs of the country, and that the mis- 
sion of the deputation was to beseech the prince to found such 
an one. To this solemn address the Emperor replied in words 
no less impressive, and Europe counted one more amongst her 
list of kings. After the audience, it is true, Napoleon threw 
aside the mask and called upon his little nephew, Louis's son, 
to recite to the Empress and the ladies of the court the fable 
about ^'The frogs who desired a king." After all did the people 
of these nations deserve anything better than the mockery of 



234 Napoleonic Creations [I8O6 

this solitary upstart who belonged to none of them and yet had 
subjugated them all? 

Nor were the Germans to be spared the ignominy of being 
counted among the nations tributary to the Corsican. In his 
correspondence with the Pope there is frequent reference to 
Germany, and its perusal leaves the impression that the writer 
did not regard himself as other than lord of that nation also. 
In his letter of February 13th, 1806, for instance, he blames the 
advisers of the head of the Church as the cause of Germany's 
persistence in reUgious anarchy. ''If your Holiness," he pro- 
ceeds, ''would recall to mind what I said in Paris, religion in 
Germany would be organized and not in its present wretched 
condition." This is a part of the same letter in which Napo- 
leon declared himself to be Emperor of Rome, Emperor of the 
West, and Charlemagne, who likewise had held sway over 
Frankish, Italian, and German lands. And in point of fact did 
matters not stand very much as he thus claimed? In 1805 the 
princes of Southern Germany, as if feudal vassals, had followed 
the call to arms of this foreigner who promised them protection 
and profit and who led them against their own imperial sover- 
eign, who was no longer in a position to extend such protection 
and whose aim was rather toward the weakening than upbuild- 
ing of the secular states of the Empire. Upon the re-establish- 
ment of peace Napoleon rewarded his German adherents with 
enlargement of their borders, elevation of rank as princes, and 
the conferring of "sovereignty." The 14th article of the Treaty 
of Pressburg ran as follows: "Their Majesties the Bangs of 
Bavaria and Wiirtemberg and His Serene Highness the Elector 
of Eaden will enjoy complete sovereignty over the territories 
ceded to them, as also over their former states, including all 
rights proceeding therefrom and which have been guaranteed 
to them by His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of 
Italy, in like manner as similar privileges are enjoyed by His 
Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria and His Majesty 
the King of Prussia in respect to their German lands. His 
Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria pledges himself 
not to hinder, either as Emperor or Estate of the Empire, the 



Mt. 36] Alliances with German Princes 335 

execution of decrees which they may have made or may make 
in consequence." Certainly from that side everything had been 
made safe. But so much the more felt was the pressure soon 
brought to bear by the overpowering authority proceeding from 
the west. When, in February, 1806, the King of Bavaria ven- 
tured modestly to make objections to having his troops detailed 
from Germany to join the French army in Italy, he met with the 
humihating response that he need not flatter himself that Ba- 
varia had been elevated to a kingdom out of consideration for 
himself, this change having been made solely as a result of the 
French system. Accordingly what in respect to Austria was 
designated as ^'sovereignty" was shown in respect to France 
to be nothing else than vassalage. 

But in order to secure permanency to these conditions and 
to make certain of the fidelity of his German adherents Napo- 
leon resolved upon two measures. The first consisted in uniting 
with his own the families of the South German princes. As 
early as 1804, soon after his coronation as Emperor, he had 
meditated establishing a relationship with the ancient reigning 
houses of Germany, and had at that time proposed at the Elec- 
toral Court a marriage between his stepson Eugene and the 
Princess Augusta of Bavaria. Indeed it appears from the re- 
cently pubhshed Memoirs of the Bavarian Minister Montgelas 
that he had already at this time taken steps in Munich to- 
ward bringing about an offensive and defensive alliance, and 
had held out to Maximihan Joseph hopes of elevation to the 
dignity of king in case of the consummation of this marriage, 
upon which it is evident that Josephine had set her heart. This 
proposal was at the time neither accepted nor rejected by the 
Elector, and decision of the question merely postponed. But 
immediately after the opening of negotiations at Pressburg 
Napoleon returned to the subject. The Elector might indeed 
still hesitate, but he could no longer refuse, and on January 14th, 
1806, the marriage of the Viceroy took place. The same princess 
had been before this time sought in marriage by the hereditary 
Prince of Baden; he was now promised the hand of Josephine's 
niece; Stephanie, who, however, accepted this engagement only 



336 Napoleonic Creations [I8O6 

with reluctance, being loath to leave Paris, where, according 
to report, she was on terms of intimacy with the Emperor.* 
And so also with the third court of South Germany. Ever 
since October, 1805, a family alliance had been meditated and 
agreed upon : Jerome was to marry Katharine, the only daughter 
of Frederick, King of Wiirtemberg, a project which was car- 
ried out in 1807, the bridegroom having meanwhile himself 
been made a king. 

The second method of subjecting Western Germany per- 
manently to his will was suggested to Napoleon by the designs 
of the governments preceding his own. This was to consist in 
uniting the southern and middle German states in a special 
league independent of Prussia and Austria, and in subordinat- 
ing this league by treaty to the control of France. This was a 
French idea of long standing, having been formulated in the 
seventeenth century and later adopted by the Revolution. In 
the correspondence between Talleyrand and Sieyes in 1798 there 
is frequent reference to the advisability of founding a third 
German state of this kind, the control of which should remain in 
the hands of France. Later, after Napoleon had divided up the 
German ecclesiastical states according to his own good pleasure, 
he took up this scheme with Talleyrand. Both then had inter- 
views in Mainz with the Archbishop, Dalberg, the only one of 
the clerical electors who had escaped the general secularization. 
'^They represented to him," wrote the Bavarian Minister Edels- 
heim to the Russian ambassador in Vienna, ^'that, since France 
could not tolerate constant encroachments from Austria and 
Prussia upon the possessions of the other German princes and 
states, it was an urgent necessity that a firm and imposing con- 
federation should be formed against enterprises of that nature, 
a confederation to be composed of all the states of the Empire, 
exclusive of the two powers already mentioned, and to be able 
in case of need to furnish 150,000 men. Should the princes 
be so blind to their own interests as to be unable to come to an 
agreement in the matter, Napoleon would make over to the 

* Indeed until our own day the belief has survived that Kaspar Hauser, 
the mysterious foundUng of Nuremberg, was her son and Napoleon's. 



^T. 36] The Confederation of the Rhine 337 

Elector of Bavaria the entire country lying between the 
Rhine and Austria, since he would rather deal with three powers 
than with these small and good-for-nothing states powerless 
through their disunion." 

Now, whatsoever else may be made a matter of reproach 
to these '^ small and good-for-nothing states," it cannot be said 
that their princes were "bUnd to their own interests." Ac- 
cordingly when the victor of Austerlitz renewed his proposition 
Bomewhat later he found Little Germany quite ready to accede 
to his demands. Indeed it did not wait for advances to be 
made. In April 1806. Dalberg addressed a memorial to Napo- 
leon which serves in a measure to explain to us the latter 's allu- 
sions in his letters to Pius Vll. ''The worthy German nation," 
this document reads, ''groans in the misery of political and 
religious anarchy; be thou. Sire, the restorer of her constitu- 
tion." And what did Dalberg mean by this? Rehgious an- 
archy was to be dispelled through the establishment of a na- 
tional German church of which he was to be the head, and he 
actually succeeded in furthering this plan so far as to induce 
Napoleon to write to Fesch at Rome that if the Pope did not 
yield the religious affairs of Germany would be regulated with 
Dalberg as primate. 

As for temporal affairs, the Electoral Arch-Chancellor de- 
sired, as he wrote to the French ambassador Hedouville. "that 
the Western Empire should live again in the Emperor Napoleon 
such as it had been under Charlemagne, composed of Italy, 
France, and Germany." For the time being, at least. Napoleon 
himself could desire nothing more. He appointed to Talley- 
rand and Labesnardiere the task of preparing the draft of a 
federal constitution, and had it signed on July 12th, 1806, by 
the ambassadors of the different states party to it. And now, 
just as had been the case four years previous, German emis- 
saries courted favour and consideration at the hands of the 
minister, offering unstinted gold to obtain the promulgation 
of a political existence to which honour was a stranger. In this 
all did not meet with success. For when the document came 
to be signed it was discovered that a long array of principalities 



338 Napoleonic Creations [I8O6 

and dukedoms, hitherto subject only to the German Empire, 
had been absorbed into the territories of the princes of the 
Confederation and made subservient to them, — had been me- 
diatized, — ^that is to say, a foreign ruler, without a shadow of 
right and acting purely according to preference, had done away 
with a number of poUtical units in Germany for the benefit of 
others whose submission to his will he thereby purchased. 
Among the most highly favoured were Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, 
and the new ''grand duchy" of Baden, Nassau, Hesse-Darm- 
stadt, and Dalberg,now ''Prince Primate," to whom fell the city 
and territory of Frankfort on the Main. In addition to these 
the Confederation included several smaller princes who. through 
bribery or other means, had protected themselves against medi- 
atization. Among these were Arenberg, Liechtenstein, Sahn, 
Hohenzollern. and Von der Leyen. The Elector of Hesse did 
not join the Confederation. In his place a new sovereign was 
appointed: the Duke, or rather now "Grand Duke," of Cleves 
and Berg, those strips of land which had been ceded by Prussia 
and Bavaria in the preceding year and which had been trans- 
ferred by Napoleon in March, 1806, to his brother-in-law Murat. 
In the first two articles of the Act of Confederation these princes 
declared that they were separated wholly and forever from the 
Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, that they thereby 
formed a special alliance under the name of the Confederation 
of the Rhine, and should recognize no further claim upon them- 
selves put forth by the ancient imperial power; that they were 
independent of foreign powers with the sole exception of France, 
whose Emperor, as Protector of the Confederation, was to de- 
termine upon the admission of new members to the same, to 
appoint the Prince Primate, and direct the equipment of the 
troops of the Confederation. Each of the princes had a speci- 
fied quota of troops to furnish: Bavaria 30,000, Wiirtemberg 
12,000. Baden 8000, Darmstadt 4000, Berg 5000, and Nassau, 
together with the remaining small states, 4000 men — forces over 
which Napoleon from that time assumed absolute control and 
made use of in all his wars, for, as set forth in Article 35, an 
alliance between the French Empire and the states of the Con- 



^T. 36] Dissolution of the Old German Empire 339 

federation of the Rhine had been entered into according to 
which ''every Continental war involving any one of the parties 
to the treaty became at once common to all the others." 

The military forces of the conqueror had thus been increased 
by an army and the territory under his pohtical authority 
enlarged to the extent of fifty thousand square miles with 
eight millions of souls. On August 1st, 1806, the official 
communication of the Constitution of the Confederation was 
made to the Diet of Ratisbon by the Confederation and its 
Protector with the declaration that the old Empire was to be 
regarded as no longer existing. 

The question now was as to what attitude the two great 
German powers would assume toward this new order of things. 
Austria's monarch was still Emperor of Germany, and the 
dissolution of the Empire had been resolved upon entirely with- 
out his foreknowledge. To this empty title, to be sure, no im- 
portance had for a long time been attached in Vienna, not since 
1802, when foreign influence had made itself felt in German 
affairs and, with the help of the Germans themselves, had 
become paramount in the politics of the Empire. The defence 
of Italy had been undertaken with zeal, but there would have 
been much greater reluctance to entering upon a war for the 
benefit of Germany. Moreover, in the Treaty of Pressburg, — 
particularly in the before-mentioned Article 14, — ^the abdica- 
tion of the German Emperor had already been indirectly an- 
nounced, and such delay as was occasioned at the Court of Vi- 
enna was due to the hope of securing compensation of some kind 
for the renunciation of the imperial diadem. But Napoleon 
had no thought of purchasing. His method was to demand 
categorically of Vincent, the Austrian ambassador to Paris, 
that his master should resign without further ado and recognize 
the Confederation of the Rhine. Without even awaiting the 
arrival in Paris of the delegate from Vienna sent to negotiate 
in the matter^ the official act was signed at the French capital 
and the Austrian cabinet thus confronted with an accom- 
plished fact. Francis II. had no choice but to deliver through 
his envoy at Ratisbon a note bearing the date August 6th, 



340 Napoleonic Creations [isoe 

1806, to the intent that he regarded as dissolved the ties 
which had until then united him with the German Empire, 
and that he resigned his crown. The old German Empire was 
no more. 

In this interview with Vincent Napoleon had assumed a 
severe and threatening tone and intimated that his army was 
standing in readiness to enforce his demands at any moment 
by overrunning Austria. Nor were such words without founda- 
tion in fact, for the victorious host had not by any means re- 
turned to France, nor even so much as completely evacuated 
Austria, for a powerful garrison was maintained within the fron- 
tier fortress of Braunau. This last fact was the result of circum- 
stances involving all Europe. It has been seen to what a degree 
the ire of Russia had been roused against Napoleon through 
the intrigues of the French in the Adriatic and Ionian seas, 
where Russia had schemes of her own. Anxiety in regard to 
Napoleon's intentions in the East was further aroused at the 
Russian court by his demand that Dalmatia and Cattaro should 
be included with Istria in the territory promised to him in 
the Treaty of Pressburg. This led to Russia's withdrawal 
from Naples in order to establish herself more securely at Corfu 
and thus be prepared to close the Balkan Peninsula against 
French influence, and, with the same end in view, a Russian 
squadron cruising in the Adriatic received orders to occupy 
the Gulf of Cattaro. It was urged that the time appointed for 
delivering the same to the French was passed and that the coast 
therefore was now to be regarded as belonging, not to Austria 
but to France, that is, to the enemy, whereupon the Austrian 
commander promptly relinquished the place to the Russians. 
At this Napoleon was fairly beside himself with rage, and, insist- 
ing upon his treaty with the Court of Vienna, he demanded of 
the latter that it should drive out the enemy in order to deliver 
to him the Gulf, threatening to retain his troops in Braunau until 
after this should be accomplished. All appeals made by Austria 
to Russia to induce her to give up the Gulf were unavailing; 
nothing but evasions were to be extorted from St. Petersburg. 
Napoleon, however, carried out meanwhile to the letter his 



^T. 36] The Situation of Prussia 341 

threat of maintaining troops in Southern Germany, a fact which 
hastened in no small degree the accomplishment of his project for 
a confederation of the states of the Rhine. 

The true importance of this military occupation of South- 
ern Germany lay in the fact that through it not Austria alone, 
but also the state of the Hohenzollerns, the second great power 
in Germany, was held in check. When last mentioned Prussia 
was in a predicament. The narrow-minded determination of 
its sovereign to preserve the peace with Napoleon, coupled with 
circumstances resulting from the battle of Austerlitz, had com- 
pelled Haugwitz to sign the Treaty of Alliance at Schonbrunn, 
December 15th, 1805. This outcome was not without its draw- 
backs. For one thing the covenant binding her to an offensive 
and defensive alliance with Napoleon made Prussia appear 
quite too • thoroughly a partisan of France, a circumstance 
which could not but be prejudicial to her standing as a Euro- 
pean power; furthermore, through the immediate transfer of 
Hanover to Prussian administration entanglements with Eng- 
land must inevitably follow. To avoid these difficulties Haug- 
witz, upon his return, himself proposed to the king that he should 
not ratify the treaty exactly according to its original wording, 
but in a somewhat altered form. In place of "offensive and 
defensive alliance" the word "alliance" alone was substituted, 
while it arranged that Hanover should be delivered to Prussia 
only upon the cessation of hostilities between France and Eng- 
land, being meanwhile merely occupied by Prussian troops. 
The aim was thus to make sure of the Guelph Electorate with- 
out becoming involved in a European war on its account. With 
the document thus modified Haugwitz took his departure for 
Paris, and such misgivings as to its reception by Napoleon 
as had been harboured at home by Minister Hardenberg were 
dispelled by the arrival just at this time — about January 20th, 
1806 — of a lettter from Talleyrand to Laforet, the French am- 
bassador at Berlin, telling of the readiness of the Emperor to 
come to an agreement with Prussia. Actuated by these wel- 
come tidings he even went so far as to advise disarmament, 
a proposal which was so promptly carried into effect that before 



342 Napoleonic Creations [isoe 

the end of January the greater part of the Prussian army had 
actually been disbanded. 

But affairs had meanwhile taken an unexpected turn in Paris. 
Far from being ready to accept the emendations made at Berlin, 
Napoleon was determined upon having Prussia absolutely upon 
his side in order to make her weight felt in the approaching 
negotiations with England. For this reason he not only re- 
jected the treaty in its altered form, but declared as null and 
void the agreement of December 15th, since it had not been 
ratified within the stipulated time. In its place he forced upon 
the envoy another document which contained, indeed, no allu- 
sion to an ''offensive and defensive alliance, " but imposed con- 
ditions far harder than those of the Treaty of Schonbrunn: 
Prussia had now to cede Valengin in addition to Neufchatel, and 
to renounce all claim to compensation for Ansbach, which had 
been turned over to Bavaria ; furthermore, she was to recognize 
and to defend just as before the integrity of Turkey, to take im- 
mediate possession of Hanover, and to close to England the 
ports on the North Sea, the mouths of the rivers flowing there- 
into, and the port of Liibeck. Disaster was plainly written on the 
very face of such a document, for if the defence of Turkey was 
more than likely to provoke a quarrel with Russia, the closing 
of these ports must inevitably mean war with England. Yet 
in spite of all Haugwitz affixed his signature to this treaty on 
February 15th, 1806, nor did Frederick William refuse to ratify 
it. With his army upon a footing of peace and the French 
troops stationed in Southern Germany no choice was open to 
him.* 

* An Austrian officer, travelling at that time upon a secret mission 
in Southern Germany, writes from Munich, March 31st 1806 "Moreover, 
the truly admirable position held by the French army in respect to 
Prussia seems not to have been accorded sufficient attention. With 
his army so extended that the two extremes touched Aupterlitz at one end 
and Bregenz at the other, Bonaparte withdrew his forces from Austria in 
columns by a flank movement All of a sudden, through Augereau's 
move [upon Frankfort], the army was placed in a threatening attitude, 
having Frankfort as its centre with the Upper Palatinate and the Weser 
at the extreme ends and leaving it in possession of all streams and heights 



^T. 36] The Death of Pitt 343 

And now followed the result to which all these events had 
been leading. Prussia's occupation of Hanover had been ac- 
cepted at the outset by England without any token of hostility, 
but the closing of the ports of the Elbe, Weser, and Ems engen- 
dered the wildest excitement. At once, early in April, 1806, 
without waiting for a formal declaration of war, the British 
ministers, certain of the absolute concurrence of Parliament, 
sequestrated all Prussian merchant-vessels lying in her ports, — 
there were some hundreds of them, — and gave chase to those 
upon the open sea. This alone involved a loss of many millions 
to Prussia, without taking into account the vastly more grievous 
loss which must inevitably be sustained by Silesian commerce 
as a result of the closing of the northern seaports. All this 
calamity for the sake of Hanover, the possession of which was 
after all not so sure a thing as had been assumed by those in 
Berlin who favoured the idea of an alliance with France. What 
would happen if, for instance, England and France should 
come to a reconciliation? Would Napoleon, out of consid 
eration for Prussia, be deterred from returning the Electorate 
if the question of peace depended upon it? And indeed indi- 
cations all pointed to some such adjustment of differences. 

The victories of the Emperor had not unnaturally awakened 
a feehng of deep uneasiness in London. It was with true heavi- 
ness of heart that Pitt witnessed the peace made with Austria, 
the Russians returning home, and the disintegration of the 
coalition which, at bottom, had been of his making. Ailing 
as he was in body, he completely succumbed to these un- 
expected blows, and died January 23d, 1806. Shortly before 
his end, as his glance chanced to fall upon a map of Europe, he 
gave orders to roll it up, since there would be no occasion to use 
it during the course of the next ten years. It was as a true 
prophet that this man of genius quitted the scene. There was 

from which Prussia could be intimidated. Berlin, it was reckoned, 
could be reached in ten marches, and they counted upon but one battle 
between Wiirtemberg and Breslau. Prussia, whose attention was kept 
occupied with negotiations during all these manoeuvres, awoke too late 
to a realization of her situation and was compelled to subscribe to all 
conditions imposed upon her." 



344 Napoleonic Creations [I8O6 

in the Grenville ministry, which succeeded that of Pitt, an 
element friendly to France, led by Fox, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. This man has already been noticed as an enthusiastic 
admirer of the hero of the 18th of Brumaire. He now made 
approaches to the government at Paris in a manner smacking 
of the romantic, by giving information of a conspiracy against 
the life of the Emperor, which, although apparently nothing 
more than a concoction of his own brain, was received graciously 
by Napoleon, who was well pleased to accept the pretext as 
genuine and made a courteous reply. Shortly afterwards Lord 
Seymour, Earl of Yarmouth, one of the Englishmen arrested 
in Paris at the opening of the war, was commissioned by the 
London cabinet to open negotiations with Talleyrand. By 
June, 1806, these had been entered upon. It was scarcely feasible 
to withhold Malta from the victor of Trafalgar if he were to be 
asked to give back the conquests he had made, and Napoleon's 
minister made a direct offer of the island to the Englishman, 
proffering in addition — as though no treaty of alliance between 
Prussia and France had ever existed — the return of Hanover 
to its hereditary sovereign. The possession of Sicily, moreover, 
was to remain in the hands of its Bourbon king, provided 
England would acknowledge Joseph's sovereignty at Naples. 

Of all this no word reached Berlin for some time. Never- 
theless the king could not overcome his distrust of an ally who 
imposed upon him conditions so hard. He turned to Russia 
for countenance and support. Duke Charles of Brunswick 
was despatched on a secret mission to St. Petersburg, there to 
obtain above all else a promise from Alexander I. to respect the 
integrity of Turkey, lest in the end Prussia be driven to making 
war against him. But such an assurance was not to be gained. 
So much progress only was made toward an understanding 
between them that the two sovereigns exchanged declarations 
according to which the Czar promised to use all his powers to 
preserve the state of Prussia independent and inviolable, while 
Frederick William bound himself not to make war against 
Russia if perchance hostilities should arise in consequence of an 
attack upon Turkey by France (July 1st, 1806). The surest 



/Et. 36] Negotiations with Russia 345 

guarantee of tranquillity to Prussia would indeed have lain in 
the establishment of peace between France and Russia, and for 
a time it seemed as if this were to be the actual outcome. Alex- 
ander, having heard of negotiations between Napoleon and Eng- 
land, was determined, in case they should result in reconciliation, 
not to be left alone to sustain the war against the formidable 
Emperor. For this reason the Russian ambassador Oubril now 
betook himself to Paris, and there indeed, on July 20th, 1806, 
concluded a separate treaty according to the terms of which 
Russia was to relinquish Cattaro and withdraw to the Ionian 
Islands, in return for which France was to evacuate Germany 
within three months and also release the recently occupied Re- 
pubhc of Ragusa. Both parties acknowledged the independ- 
ence and integrity of the Porte. King Ferdinand was to receive 
the Balearic Islands as compensation for his former kingdom 
of Naples and Sicily. To this treaty, which reminds one of that 
which Count St. Julien was once inveigled into signing, there 
was lacking nothing but the signature of the Czar. 

But with neither Russia nor England was peace to follow 
in spite of all these negotiations. For scarcely had the Russian 
envoy arrived in Paris, as a preliminary to the establishment 
of amicable relations, when Napoleon began to retract, one 
after the other, every concession he had made to England and 
finally insisted upon the cession of Sicily to Joseph. The 
effect of this was to disconcert Fox, and when the Constitution 
of the Confederation of the Rhine became fully known, giving 
France ascendency upon the Continent and at the same time 
surrendering further territory to French commerce, he gradually 
withdrew altogether from the agreement, and the negotiations 
were at length brought to a close without result. His death 
also followed shortly after, and with him disappeared almost 
the last man across the Channel upon whom Napoleon could 
count as disposed toward reconciliation. From thenceforth he 
was never to find another in all Great Britain. 

It was just at this time, too, that the war party in Russia 
regained the ascendency. Alexander, who did not rehsh the 
idea of having his hands tied in the Orient nor of being beguiled 



346 Napoleonic Creations Usoe 

out of the possession of Cattaro, refused his sanction to the 
treaty signed by Oubril.* Moreover, a deep impression had 
been made upon him in learning of the disruption of the ancient 
German Empire, of which he had been pleased to regard himself 
as the guarantor. He had it announced in Paris that he would 
conclude the treaty of peace only upon condition that France 
would renounce all claim upon Dalmatia and Albania, restore 
Sicily to King Ferdinand, and finally indemnify the King of 
Sardinia for the loss of Piedmont. He was perfectly aware that 
Napoleon would never consent to such terms, and it was with 
the same breath that he gave orders to mobilize the army and 
push it forward to the Prussian frontier. 

During all the time that these changes were taking place in 
the political situation of the Great Powers, Prussia had been 
bending in sorrow and anguish beneath the yoke of her alliance 
with France. It is said that after the signing of the compact 
tears were more than once seen in the eyes of the king. Had 
not certain possessions been given in exchange for uncertain? 
The relinquished districts, such as Ansbach, had been forthwith 
occupied by the French, and yet to this insatiable ally even 
these promised to be insufficient. In the immediate vicinity 
of the new duchy of Berg there were three abbeys to which 
there were rich coal-fields appertaining; these had fallen by 
inheritance to Prussia in 1802 and no longer belonged to Cleves 

* In the negotiations between Oubril and the French it is noticeable 
that he definitely refused to treat for peace in conjunction with England. 
It was in vain that the British ambassador used his persuasions; he 
was acting under orders. It is even yet not entirely clear to what cause 
should be ascribed this determination on the part of the Czar. No mis- 
take, however, will be made in assuming that Russia was unwilling to 
reveal to England her posture of attack in regard to Turkey. Certain it 
is that Paget, the English ambassador at Vienna, ''upon his knees" 
entreated Count Raaumoffsky, the representative of Russia, to evacuate 
the Gulf of Cattaro, and all to no avail. (Martens, "Recueil des traites 
et conventions conclus par la Russie avec les puissances etrangeres," 
II. 504.) Oubril learned to his cost how thoroughly the Czar was 
resolved upon keeping this port, for, having allowed himself to be cajoled 
in Paris into promising its relinquishment, he lost favour with his prince 
and was deprived of his office and dignities. 



^T. 36] Prussia Reduced to Desperation 347 

except in the matter of provincial representation. In spite of 
this fact, Joachim I. — as Murat was now called — simply or- 
dered his troops to occupy these territories, and was brought to 
evacuate them only by dint of positive reclamation by the 
Prussian government. Essen, the property of one of these ab- 
beys, formed the connecting link between Cleves and the Prus- 
sian county of Mark. Now Napoleon's policy aimed hkewise 
at the acquisition of this county, since it was essential to his 
plans to strengthen Murat 's jurisdiction in order to establish a 
firm foothold for himself in Northern Germany such as he had 
already obtained in the south. With this in view the French 
ambassador in Berhn received explicit instructions to incite 
Prussia to open warfare with Sweden in order to take from 
her Swedish Pomerania. while Prussia herself should relinquish 
the county of Mark to the Duke of Berg. It was with difficulty 
that the court at Berlin was able to resist these demands. To 
add to his other offences Napoleon did not give up to his brother- 
in-law the fortress of Wesel belonging to Cleves and situated on 
the right bank of the Rhine, but — in direct violation of the 
Treaty of Paris — occupied it with his own troops in order to 
secure also a military point of support in the north. 

At the conduct of France in this matter, taken with the 
vexatious tone adopted by her in the documents which were 
interchanged, fears began to make themselves felt in Prussia 
that Napoleon was but seeking a pretext for bringing about 
a rupture of the peace in order to extend his power beyond the 
Prussian boundaries. By the beginning of July the question 
was already under consideration whether it were not best to 
make mihtary preparation against such a contingency. Tid- 
ings arriving from Southern Germany ill calculated to calm such 
fears seemed to confirm the advisability of being in readiness. 
Napoleon himself assumed the task of announcing in Berlin the 
founding of the Confederation of the Rhine, only seeking to 
moderate the impression which such tidings must create by 
proposing that Frederick William III. establish a similar league 
on his own account in the north. Hardly, however, had this sug- 
gestion been taken into consideration in Berlin, before it had to 



348 Napoleonic Creations [I8O6 

be rejected again; for, late in July, Lucchesini sent word from 
Paris that Lord Yarmouth had confided to him that the Em- 
peror was about to restore Hanover to England. Hanover! 
without which Prussia could have no hope of holding a position 
of importance in Northern Germany, for the possession of which 
she had made such tremendous sacrifice of territory, possessions, 
and esteem, and of which Napoleon had but just asseverated 
that he had no thoughts of denying her ! Was there then any re- 
spect in which reliance could be placed on Napoleon? Moreover, 
other alarming reports began to pour in from all sides. From 
Westphalia General Bliicher sent notification that the French 
were being re-enforced in Wesel and on the Lippe, a fact which 
could have but one signification — an attempt to take the 
Mark and Westphalia from Prussia for Murat. From Ratisbon 
and Munich news came that French troops had occupied Wiirz- 
burg, and tidings from everywhere agreed that they were ad- 
vancing upon Saxony and Prussia. What was to be believed 
of all this? Could these reports actually be true? And why 
not? In their weakness the people could not but feel wholly at 
the mercy of this power advancing totally regardless of cause 
or right, and, as if in a fever, the one thought prevaihng was 
but to escape in some way from this helpless condition. Even 
Haugwitz advised — as he had before done in 1803 — to arm and 
prepare for war, and this time — feeling himself injured and 
deceived in the conduct of France — ^the king yielded. Lucche- 
sini's despatch had reached Berhn on August 6th; four days 
later Frederick WiUiam wrote to the Czar asking his support 
and saying that Napoleon had offered Hanover to England 
without equivalent, and this to all intents and purposes meant 
that he had resolved upon annihilating Prussia. For, should 
the Emperor actually deprive the state of the Electorate, he 
must be prepared to see Prussia's king at the head of all his 
other enemies in the next war, and so, in order to avert this 
danger. Napoleon intended to avail himself of so favourable an 
opportunity as the present to destroy him singly. On August 9th 
orders to mobilize the army were issued in Berlin, and the French 
ambassador was notified that preparations were being made 



^T. 37] Did Napoleon Want War? 349 

for war because various measures taken by Napoleon must be 
regarded as aimed against Prussia; for even were they nothing 
more than demonstrations, the necessity was nevertheless laid 
upon the country of making a counter-display lest, as had 
occurred on a previous occasion — in February — it be forced 
to suffer under the constraint of such demonstrations. 

And was Prussia justified in these forebodings? Did Napo- 
leon really want war? Yes and no. He wanted war because 
it constituted part of his system. Ever since the time of the 
Directory the revolutionary policy had been planned upon the 
idea of some day crowding Prussia, as also Austria, as far as 
possible toward the east. Of Napoleon particularly it is said 
that he had borne a grudge against Frederick William III. ever 
since the latter's equivocal attitude in the previous year, and 
that, in February, 1806, the King of Bavaria had already been 
led by Napoleon to entertain hopes of Bayreuth, although it 
was certain that Prussia would be no more willing to part with 
it without a struggle than with Hanover. But it is quite an- 
other question whether it was Napoleon's plan to make war just 
then in the summer of 1806 against the principal power of 
Northern Germany. It would seem, indeed, rather unlikely 
that he had any such intention. True, his army was maintain- 
ing in Germany an attitude of offence toward Prussia also, but 
its location there — aside from the financial importance of sus- 
taining troops at foreign cost — was on account of Austria. 
After the consent of Francis 11. to the formation of the Confed- 
eration of the Rhine, followed by the conclusion of the treaty 
with Oubril involving in its conditions the evacuation of Ger- 
many by the French, Napoleon really made preparations for 
withdrawing his troops. On August 17th he wrote to Talley- 
rand and Berthier in regard to the matter and instructed the 
latter to send home the Austrian prisoners of war. Hearing 
just at this time of the mobilization of the Prussian army, he 
simply laughed at it as the outcome of an unjustifiable alarm. 
Even as late as August 26th he wrote to Berthier at Munich; 
"The Berlin cabinet is seized with a panic of fear. It imagines 
that in our treaty with Russia there are clauses which wiU de- 



35^ Napoleonic Creations [I8O6 

prive Prussia of several provinces. To that must be attributed 
the absurd military preparations which it is making and to 
which no attention should be paid, it being my unfeigned pur- 
pose to recall my troops to France." But a week later the 
question had taken a totally different turn. News had arrived 
from St. Petersburg that the Czar refused to accept the treaty 
of July 20th, and at this the preparations suddenly assumed a 
new meaning in Napoleon's estimation, since, from the coinci- 
dence of the two facts, he concluded that there must be an 
understanding between Russia and Prussia, especially as, simul- 
taneously with the Russian courier, there arrived General 
Knobelsdorff from Berlin demanding in the name of his sov- 
ereign the evacuation of Germany. It was further assumed in 
Paris that England also had given up all thought of making 
peace with France, so that it is not astonishing that Napoleon 
should infer the existence of a new coalition similar to that of 
the preceding year, except that in this Austria was replaced 
by Prussia. Under this supposition — which was moreover a 
mistaken one — he at once countermanded the marching orders 
issued to the army in Germany and refused to Knobelsdorff 
the fulfilment of Frederick William's request so long as the 
Prussian army should remain upon a footing of war. Prussia 
must begin by laying down its arms. 

With his cold, clear glance the French Emperor surveyed 
the whole situation. He saw but two possibilities before him, 
and these he submitted to his ambassador at Berlin in a letter 
of September 12th, 1806, in which he wrote: ''Either Prussia 
has taken up arms simply from fear, — in which case, since there 
no longer exists any cause for alarm, the troops will be dis- 
banded, especially as they occasion great expense, — or else 
Prussia has meant so to place herself for the time being that 
agreements which she has already made or proposes to make 
with Russia, England, and Sweden shall come to light. In the 
latter case the policy of the Emperor demands that he should 
take advantage of the favourable time of year to reach Berhn 
before the Swedes and Russians, to scatter the Prussian army 
as he has scattered the Austrians, to attack his enemies before 



^T.37] Public Feeling in Germany 351 

they can unite, and overcome them singly. The question 
reduces itself, then, to these two conditions; it admits of no 
third. 'Possibilities,' 'probabilities,' 'persuasions,' 'inmost 
convictions' are in the eyes of His Majesty nothing more than 
idle fancies by which he does not allow himself to be misled. 
If perchance . . . any hypothesis besides those mentioned 
might be admitted, it could only be this, that the same Provi- 
dence which has always hitherto guided the Emperor has 
decreed that Berlin shall fall beneath his blow on the anniver- 
sary of the day upon which he entered Vienna." 

Everything now depended upon whether the King of 
Prussia would accede to the demands of the Corsican. He had 
in reality taken up arms " from fear," but the same fear with- 
held him now from laying them down again. And besides this 
fear was concern for the position of the state as a power which 
seemed to be threatened in Hanover, so recently acquired; 
concern for the honour and majesty of the throne; and, finally, 
respect for a popular sentiment demanding resistance to France, 
which now for the first time made itself plainly felt. 

For there was no denying that among the German people 
there was growing up a reaction of the nation against Napoleon's 
system of international conquest. Through the absolute arbitra- 
riness with which the Emperor had cast off the republican forms 
of the Revolution he had made himself enemies of the democrats 
of Southern Germany, those who, even at the time of the Direc- 
tory, had been full of enthusiasm about the "liberating" policy 
of France; his despotism and bovmdless ambition had exas- 
perated those who valued the independence of their nation, 
who clung to their hereditary dynasties, and who regarded with 
disfavour their diminution. To be sure, besides those who were so 
opposed to Napoleon there were millions who, destitute of politi- 
cal sentiment of any kind, lived only for material gain and en- 
joyment, and would therefore prefer slavish tranquillity under 
the iron hand of the foreign power to the struggle for inde- 
pendence and freedom of action; and then again there were 
serious-minded men in whom the principle of equality had en- 
gendered sympathy with France, who saw their ideal in the 



352 Napoleonic Creations [isoe 

cosmopolitan union of the nations however brought about, and 
who therefore felt no antipathy to Napoleon, regarding him as 
the instrument through whom this was to be accomplished. 
But it was against just such as the last-mentioned that some of 
Germany's best thinkers now entered the arena in the early 
part of the year 1806 : Schleiermacher, with his sermons upon 
the value of nationality ; Fichte, with his speeches addressed to 
German warriors; Ernst Moritz Arndt, with his book on ''The 
Spirit of the Times" and his crushing denunciation of the Cor- 
sican's ambition for universal dominion. Thus it was in the 
north. In the south appeared pamphlets and fugitive com- 
positions deploring unreservedly the contemptible attitude of 
the nation. For it was felt to be ignominious and disgraceful 
that, in spite of the conclusion of peace, Napoleon should leave 
his army as a matter of course to domineer and support itself 
upon German soil. The French Emperor was aware of this new 
popular movement and did not underestimate it. but he hoped 
by means of a solitary example of inexorable severity to par- 
alyze it at a blow. Consequently he instructed Berthier to 
proceed according to martial law against the Nuremberg pub- 
lishers of these political libels, that is to say, to summon them 
before a military tribunal and have them shot at the expiration 
of twenty -four hours. As he wrote to the Major-General, 
August 5th, 1806, ''the sentence will mean that wherever there 
is an army, it being the duty of the commmander to provide 
for its safety, such and such individuals convicted of having 
tried to excite the inhabitants of Suabia against the French 
army are condemned to death." This might, perhaps, have 
been reasonable in time of war and in a hostile land, but here, in 
the midst of peace and in the country of an ally, such a pro- 
ceeding was nothing else than absolute barbarity. It was not 
to be long ere a victim was found. One of the pamphlets, en- 
titled "Germany in her Deep Abasement," had been written by 
one YeUn of Ansbach and was not at all an incendiary docu- 
ment. A Nuremberg bookseller, Palm, had published and cir- 
culated it and was now on that account arrested and, declining 
to save himself by flight, was shot in Braunau on August 25th, 



iET. 37] The Prussian Patriotic Party 353 

1806. A tempest of indignation and despair swept over all 
Germany. What the execution of d'Enghien had been to the 
nobility the murder of Palm now was to the people. It was 
this occurrence more than any other which fostered the German 
hatred of the French, so that Frederick Gentz in writing from 
Saxony to Starhemberg, the Austrian diplomat, could say: ''The 
war is to be a national war to the full intent of the word; within 
a short time all Germany will be taking part in it. The recent 
crimes of the French, and most of all that one of which the news 
has just filled all minds with horror, have incensed the nation to 
such a degree that, following upon the first success scored by 
the Prussians, a repetition of the Sicilian Vespers will every- 
where be seen." 

Even the leading circles of Berlin could not shut themselves 
away from these floods of popular feehng. Opposed to the 
^'Frenchmen," — as the peace-loving adherents of a neutral 
policy had been dubbed, — there had existed here for several 
years a "war party" which had counselled a close defensive 
aUiance with Austria in 1804 and had been unreservedly in 
favour of joining the coaHtion in the following year. The hour 
of triumph had finally arrived to these advocates of resistance, 
who numbered among them such men as Stein, the Minister of 
Finance, Generals Bliicher, Riichel, and PfuU, the scholars Jo- 
hannes von Miiller and Alexander von Humboldt, with many 
others. Indeed, even at court, among those nearest to the 
king, the party counted its supporters: Queen Louise, the Prin- 
cesses William and Radziwill, Princes Louis Ferdinand, William, 
Henry, and the Prince of Orange — all acknowledged adherence 
to it and urged that the state should rise warlike in self-defence 
rather than continue to sink peacefully into decay. But that 
which produced the deepest impression upon the mind of the 
tranquillity-loving king was the fact that, especially in the army, 
a feeUng of positive antipathy to France was making itself 
evident, taking in some cases the form of serious deliberation 
and in others that of arrogant presumption; it turbulently de- 
manded the dismissal of Haugwitz and idolized Hardenberg, 
who had drawn upon himself the hatred of Napoleon, even in 



354 Napoleonic Creations [I8O6 

some cases overstepping the bounds of discipline. This had 
been hitherto unheard of in the Prussian army, and so overcame 
Frederick WiUiam with astonishment that for a moment he con- 
sidered abdicating the throne. Of disarmament in response 
to Napoleon's demand no thought could now be entertained. 
A refusal was sent in response to it, and, solely for the sake of 
gaining time, Prussia renewed her demand in Paris for the 
withdrawal of the French army, this time in the form of an ulti- 
matum, giving Napoleon until October 8th to return a decisive 
answer. 

Only with reluctance and justifiable apprehension had the 
king allowed himself to be persuaded into this course. Russia 
he might indeed reckon upon as friendly, but support from the 
Czar could not, under the most favourable circumstances, reach 
the seat of war before the end of November. With England 
the existing quarrel must first be settled before there could be 
hope of receiving from her the subsidies indispensable to the 
course now entered upon. There remained as an ally only Sax- 
ony, which was exasperatingly slow about making her prepara- 
tions for war, while the Elector of Hesse, selfishly regarding only 
his own interest, remained neutral. For the rest Prussia had 
but her own forces to rely upon. These Frederick WiUiam did 
not overrate.* During the long years of peace which had 
elapsed the defects in the military administration had become 
ineradicably fixed; the army was practically without a com- 
mander, for the only person qualified for the position — ^the Duke 
of Brunswick — ^was irresolute and enfeebled by age and — as a 
contemporary justly observed — '^ better fitted to receive than 
to issue orders." So situated it certainly was an act of colossal 

* Montgelas says in his ** Memoirs" that "the King was by nature 
and principle opposed to all warlike undertaking and yielded rather to 
impulse from without than to any fixed conviction of his own. He 
feared Napoleon's superior genius and had little confidence in his own 
army, which seemed to him not in condition to carry on war with success. 
It is almost beyond question that he betook himself to the army with the 
idea that he should lose a battle and thus be furnished with a pretext for 
concluding peace, since then the most incredulous would be convinced 
that resistance was impossible." 



^T. 37] War with Prussia Begins 355 

audacity for the Prussians to set themselves up against the 
ever-victorious leader of the French, and for a long time he him- 
self could not be brought to beUeve that they had any such 
intention and simply designated the undertaking as insane. 
On September 10th he wrote to Berthier: ''Say in strict con- 
fidence to the King of Bavaria that if I have a quarrel with 
Prussia — which I consider most unhkely — but if ever she should 
be guilty of such madness, he shall have Bayreuth." Within 
his inmost soul, however, there was nothing he so much dreaded 
as that Frederick WiUiam should, after all, decide to disarm and 
so deprive him of the favourable opportunity for overcoming 
him while single-handed. The Prussian army, especially its 
cavalry, enjoyed an excellent reputation throughout Europe, 
and Napoleon, who shared the general opinion of it, was not with- 
out disquietude. So much the more, therefore, did it behoove 
him to be on the alert to catch and destroy this army by itself. 
To accomplish this end the Prussian envoy to Paris was de- 
tained there in suspense without explanation, while the French 
ambassador to Berlin was directed to allow himself to be drawn 
into no agreement of any kind, but rather to feign illness if no 
other way of escape presented. And for this end the available 
forces had already been started weeks before in all possible 
quietness and secrecy in the direction of the Rhine and toward 
Aschaffenburg, in order to reinforce the army in Germany by 
100,000 newly levied troops. For this it was that the Emperor 
himself suddenly left Paris on September 25th, without noti- 
fying the Senate, and journeyed in haste to Mainz, where he 
issued the final orders. The war had begun. 



CHAPTER XIII 

FROM JENA TO TILSIT 

The good opinion of the Prussian army which Napoleon 
entertained impelled him now to proceed with still greater cau- 
tion than in the preceding year against the Austrians. For in 
this army he saw the creation of the great Frederick whom he so 
warmly admired, and its generals, if observant, might have 
accquainted themselves with his strategic manoeuvres during the 
campaigns of 1800 and 1805 and have prepared themselves for 
defence against them. He wrote to Soult that he had disposed 
his forces so as to outnumber those of the enemy, because he 
proposed to leave nothing to chance and meant to attack the 
adversary with twice as many men as he could muster wherever 
he should make a stand. It was with eight corps (including the 
Guard) under command of the most trusted leaders, a strong 
cavalry reserve under Murat, and a Bavarian auxiliary contin- 
gent, — ^in all with about 200,000 men, — that he planned to 
attack Prussia, and that from the direction of Southern Germany 
on the line between Bamberg and Berlin, which he had weeks 
before ordered studied in detail by French officers. He ex- 
pected to make this advance between the Thuringian Forest and 
the Erzgebirge with a force and rapidity which, with the heart 
of the Prussian kingdom so seriously threatened, should impel 
his opponent, whom he supposed in Thuringia, to withdraw to 
Magdeburg in order to hasten thence to the protection of the 
capital. These were still his plans when he wrote from Stras- 
burg to the King of Holland. His line of retreat would be toward 
the Danube in case the enemy should meet him earlier than he 
had planned for, and, should this way be cut off through an 
advance of the enemy toward Southern Germany, he would pass 
over and beyond him along the line between Leipzig and Frank- 

356 



.Et. 37] Napoleon's Plan of Campaign 357 

fort to the Rhine, which river was to be defended by his brother 
Louis from Wesel to this point, while a special corps under 
Mortier was to stand guard in the vicinity of Mainz. Thus 
prepared against all contingencies he could push forward his 
whole army toward the east without leaving occupied the space 
between the Rhine and Franconia. For to him that was the 
point of supreme importance, — and this he had learned from 
experience in the preceding year, — to keep all parts of his army 
directly under control ^'as a major does his battalion." On 
October 5th, 1806, he communicated his orders to the various 
corps of the army: they were first to march in three columns 
toward Coburg, Lohenstein, and Hof, whence they were to pro- 
ceed toward Gera by way of Saalfeld and Schleiz under his 
direction. Meanwhile the whereabouts and purposes of the 
enemy must be clearly ascertained. 

But as to these his opponent was, alas, almost as much in the 
dark as Napoleon, and at the Prussian headquarters there was 
no appearance of a fixed plan of action. Only a year previous 
an army of 250,000 men had been levied ; the present enumera- 
tion revealed scarcely the half of that number, and in any case 
it was vastly inferior to that arrayed against it. The King had 
entrusted the supreme command to the Duke of Brunswick, 
the same man who had commanded the German army in 1792 
and 1793, but, unwilling to absent himself from the field of 
honour, he joined the army in person. The fact of his pres- 
ence was not without unfortunate consequences. His military 
surroundings prejudiced him against the measures taken by the 
commander-in-chief and, as a result of the weak and irresolute 
character of the Duke, it soon became a question — as it was 
expressed by one of the officers present in a letter of October 
6th — ''whether 'headquarters' was to be regarded as meaning 
the King or the Duke." This officer was none other than Colonel 
Scharnhorst, chief of the general staff at headquarters. He had 
already, weeks before, elaborated a plan of attack whose high 
value has found appreciation in later criticism; the army, 
according to this, should cross the Thuringian Forest in order 
to gain the plain beyond, where the excellent cavalry might be 



358 From Jena to Tilsit [I8O6 

used to the best advantage. The army would thus have been 
two weeks ahead of the enemy in making its way to this region, 
giving promise of a successful encounter. But the King clung 
with such pertinacity to the thought of peace that he was ready 
to sacrifice anything rather than appear to violate it. He was 
desirous of waiting until after October 8th, which was the date 
set for the reply of France to his ultimatum. But no reply 
arrived. Instead of it came the French themselves, making 
the execution of Scharnhorst's plan impossible. For the ad- 
vanced position along the Thuringian Forest was senseless 
unless the army were taking the offensive, while, in consequence 
of this period of waiting, the Prussians were forced upon the 
defensive, to which the position which they then held — with 
their centre under Brunswick at Erfurt, the right wing under 
Riichel at Gotha, and the left under Hohenlohe at Weimar — 
was thoroughly unfavourable. When it was learned, then, that 
the French were marching upon them in the east, it was the 
opinion at headquarters — that is to say, of Scharnhorst and 
Brunswick — ^that it was best to venture an attack of the entire 
army upon Napoleon's flank; but in this also the commander- 
in-chief was not allowed to have his way. It was only after 
prolonged discussion that it was decided to send Hohenlohe 
ahead to the Saale, where his troops engaged on the 9th at 
Schleiz the French middle column, and on the 10th at Saal- 
feld, their western column. It was here at Saalfeld that 
Prince Louis Ferdinand, who commanded the vanguard, was 
killed — an event more demoralizing in its effect upon the army 
than the loss of the battle. Several of the generals demanded 
categorically the removal of the commander-in-chief, attrib- 
uting to him all the mistakes in the conduct of the war, whereas 
the only one which could really be ascribed to him lay in hav- 
ing yielded to obey where he should have commanded. 

While matters were thus shaping themselves in the most 
unfavourable way for the Prussians, Napoleon had been ac- 
quainting himself, on his way to Gera, in regard to his opponent, 
whose principal force he concluded to be at Erfurt. He at once 
recognized the possibility of outflanking him. On October 12th 



^T. 37] The Battle of Jena 359 

he gave orders for the whole army to abandon its northward 
course and wheel about to the left in the direction of the Saale, 
this being the same manoeuvre which he had executed the year 
before after crossing the Danube, and in 1800 when beyond the 
Po. Before the close of the same day Murat reached Naumburg 
with his cavalry. When word of all this was brought to the 
Prussian headquarters indescribable consternation prevailed. 
No hope of escape from being surrounded by the enemy remained 
to the Duke except in decampment that very night. But, as 
if the necessity for this step were not obvious enough to the 
most undiscerning, it was not until after nine precious hours 
had been wasted in discussion that it was put into execution, 
during all of which time the enemy was inexorably drawing 
nearer. So it was that Davout, hastening ahead toward the 
west with his corps, encountered at Auerstadt the main body 
of the army under Brunswick while on the march, and that at 
Jena Napoleon with the bulk of his troops came upon Hohenlohe, 
who was to conduct the rear-guard and protect the retreat of 
the army toward the north. 

At both points battle was waged on October 14th. Napo- 
leon had for days been longing for such an encounter. He 
supposed himself to be now in face of the principal force of his 
adversary, and, drawing to himself all the corps at his dis- 
posal, he attacked Hohenlohe with a number vastly superior 
to those opposed to him. Early in the morning, while it was 
yet dark. Napoleon rode up to the troops commanded by Mar- 
shal Lannes, who were to be the first to come under fire, and 
reminded them of the victories of the previous year, saying 
that matters now stood exactly as they had at the time when 
they captured Mack. This corps then, in company with the 
advance-guard under Ney, so stout-heartedly withstood the 
attack of the entire hostile army as to enable the Emperor to 
hold the Guard in reserve until the arrival of fresh forces.* 

* It was on this occasion that from the ranks of the Guard there 
suddenly resounded behind Napoleon an impulsive cry of ''Forward!" 
whereat the Emperor rebuked the over-confident speaker with the obser- 
vation that he should wait until he had commanded in twenty battles 
before venturing to advise him. 



360 From Jena to Tilsit [I8O6 

With these the task of overcoming the enemy was soon accom- 
pHshed. Hohenlohe, recognizing the greatness of the danger, 
had sent to summon the assistance of Riichel with his army, 
but the latter was prevented from coming to his rescue by a 
contrary order from the commander-in-chief, and when, later, 
he arrived in spite of it upon the field of battle, Hohenlohe 
had already been overpowered and there was no possibility of 
changing the outcome of the battle. Napoleon^s cavalry threw 
itself upon the Prussians as they began to give way, and the 
army turned and fled in wild confusion. 

While this was taking place near Jena, Brunswick had 
joined battle with Davout at Auerstadt, and, in spite of the 
advantage which Prussia here enjoyed in point of numbers, — 
she had 35,000 against 33,000 of the French, — ^in this action 
also she was defeated. The advantage had been with the Prus- 
sians in the early part of the battle, and victory must have 
been theirs had General Kalkreuth brought his reserve force 
of 18,000 men into action. He failed to do so because he re- 
ceived no orders to that effect, and no orders could reach him 
because the general-in-chief, mortally wounded, was no longer 
able to issue commands and there remained no sort of unity of 
direction. It had thus become impossible for the troops to 
clear the way for themselves through Naumburg, and the King, 
who now assumed supreme command, ordered a retreat to 
Weimar, where he hoped to find the detachments of Riichel and 
Hohenlohe intact; the wiser course, which would have been to 
swerve toward the north, he refused to consider for a moment. 
But instead of finding comrades he came upon the enemy; it 
was a moment of most cruel disappointment and at the same 
time of great personal danger. Headquarters and the rem- 
nants of the army were soon in irrepressible flight before the 
pursuing French. Instead of reassembling, the army dissolved 
almost completely, desertion became general, and discipline a 
thing of the past. Of the original 130,000 soldiers there soon 
remained only 10,000 of the regular troops, who, conducted 
by Hohenlohe, described the arc of a great circle through 
Nordhausen, Magdeburg, and Neu-Ruppin to Prenzlau in the 



^T. 37] Prussia's Fall 361 

Ukermark [northern Brandenburg], wliere tliey were finally 
brought to capitulation by Murat, who asseverated to the German 
general that his corps was surrounded by 100,000 French sol- 
diers, a statement as completely without foundation in fact as 
the romance he had invented the year before of a conclusion 
of peace when the question involved was the taking of the bridges 
over the Danube at Vienna. Other smaller detachments sur- 
rendered likewise, that of Bliicher, however, not without heroic 
resistance — a notable exception. Added to these disasters 
came the deUverance to the enemy of all the most important 
fortresses throughout the land, and the haste manifested in 
their surrender by those in command was a disgrace without 
parallel in history. Thus it was at Erfurt and again at Magde- 
burg. — whither had fled for safety a reserve army which had 
suffered defeat at Halle, — and the same was true of Stettin 
and Ciistrin. "Those were days of horror," wrote Captain von 
Gneisenau to a friend; "better a thousand times to die than 
experience them again. These will make an extraordinary 
page in our history." 

There being now nothing further to bar the way, Napoleon, 
surrounded by pomp and splendour, rode triumphantly into 
Berlin on October 27th, 1806. As Coignet reports: "The Em- 
peror was proud in his modest apparel, with his Httle hat and 
penny cockade. His staff, on the contrary, was in full uniform, 
and to the foreigners it was a curious thing to see in the most 
meanly clad of them all the leader of so fine an army. ' ' On the 
previous day he had stood beside the tomb of Frederick II. in 
Potsdam; the effect of the admiration which he professed for 
the dead hero was, however, marred by his act in taking 
thence Frederick's sword and sash and sending them as a gift 
to the Invalides at Paris. 

Arrived at Berlin he computed the measure of his victories. 
They had delivered into his hand all Prussian territories as far 
as the Vistula, and it was not exaggeration when on November 
12th he proclaimed to the world at large from the residence of 
the Hohenzollerns : "The entire kingdom of Prussia is in my 
power." The only question was whether it would so remain. 



362 From Jena to Tilsit [I8O6 

Prussian arms could, it is true, no longer hope to avert the down- 
fall of the Fatherland, for, except for a little band of 15,000 
men and a few fortresses in Silesia and on the Baltic Sea, the 
armed forces of the country had been dispersed and annihilated. 
But there were other enemies still left to Napoleon. One of 
these — Russia — had already declared itself Prussia's friend and 
champion, while another — England — ^might become such at 
any moment. For it was part of the Napoleonic system that 
his policy must always embrace the whole continent and there- 
fore never could deal with one opponent alone. 

On the day after the battle, the aid-de-camp of the con- 
quered king had arrived at the French headquarters with an 
appeal for peace. This Napoleon declined to grant, saying 
that he had already gained too great advantages not to follow 
them up as far as Berlin; peace would there more easily be de- 
termined upon. Frederick William then sent Lucchesini to 
him with full powers to sign prehminaries of peace. Hanover, 
Ba5rreuth, and all territory west of the Weser, besides a hand- 
some sum of money as war-indemnity, were what they were 
prepared to pay for the privilege of being left undisturbed. 
But the conditions imposed by the enemy were far beyond 
anything conceived by Prussia. He demanded all territory 
to the left of the Elbe up to Magdeburg and the Altmark, 100,- 
000,000 francs war-indemnity, and, over and above this, Prussia's 
consent that Saxony and the German countries beyond the Elbe 
should become identified with the Confederation of the Rhine. 
Lucchesini and von Zastrow, the Prussian minister, had agreed 
without undue delay to accept these harsh terms, a resolve to 
which they were the more readily brought by a rumour which 
had gained currency that the Emperor was about to re-establish 
the ancient kingdom of Poland, of whose lands Prussia now 
owned vast stretches, including Warsaw and Posen. But by 
this time Napoleon had concluded to impose conditions even 
more severe. Hohenlohe had meanwhile capitulated, and the 
French columns had reached out even as far as the Vistula. 
Success so vast ought surely to be employed to some better ad- 
vantage than simply to make peace with Prussia alone! The 



Mt. 37] Napoleon and Poland 363 

Emperor increased his demands, and finally stopped talking of 
peace altogether ; for the present he would grant nothing but a 
suspension of hostilities, and that only under the most oppressive 
conditions : the French were to occupy the whole country up to 
the Bug River, eight fortresses were to be surrendered, — Danzig, 
Kolberg, Thorn, and Grand enz among them, — while the Russians, 
who were already standing upon East Prussian soil, were to be 
ordered out of the country by the King. Even this was agreed 
to by the envoys who signed the treaty on November 16th. But 
the King would none of it. He recognized that in such condi- 
tions the aim was none other than the complete disarmament 
of Prussia and separation between the courts of Berlin and St. 
Petersburg. Relying upon Russia's aid, he determined to risk 
resistance to his mighty foe. When Napoleon learned of Fred- 
erick WilHam's refusal to ratify the treaty, he drafted a procla- 
mation embodying for the House of Brandenburg the same 
deadly intent as had been conveyed in the Decree of Schon- 
brunn in respect to the Court of Naples : that it had ceased to 
reign. This difference, however, existed between the two occa- 
sions: at the time of the former, toward the end of December, 
1805, the decisive victory had already been gained, and in this 
case the battle was yet to be fought. For the time being the 
proclamation was not made public. 

For Napoleon everything depended upon vanquishing the 
ever-advancing Russians. This task he did not confide to his 
army alone. He proceeded at once with a scheme for playing 
off the Poles against the empire of the Czar. Under his protec- 
tion there arose a committee of insurrection at Warsaw, and a 
deputation of the high nobility from Posen, which appeared in 
Berlin on November 19th, received from him the assurance that 
France had never acknowledged the partition of Poland and 
that he himself, as Emperor of the French, would feel a deep in- 
terest in seeing the national throne re-established. On Novem- 
ber 25th he repaired in person to Posen in order to stimulate 
the insurrection to a yet greater degree. Many were the tokens 
of homage bestowed upon him as the liberator of the Father- 
land, and he was unsparing in his use of encouraging words until 



364 From Jena to Tilsit [I8O6 

an enrolment of volunteers was under way in Warsaw which 
furnished a national guard of 60,000 men. Not that he had the 
sHghtest intention of furthering the ideal aim of the Polish nation ; 
sentiments of that kind had long before ceased to appeal to him, 
and, as he was shortly to make evident in Spain, he was fast 
reaching the point where he was no longer able even to under- 
stand them. In Poland he saw nothing more than an instrument 
convenient to the furtherance of his policy, one which should 
now be made to serve his ends against Prussia and Russia, but 
which he was resolved to set aside as soon as its utility to him- 
self should be exhausted. A single unfortunate feature in these 
plans lay in the fact that Austria, like the other two states, now 
included extensive PoHsh territories, at that time reaching 
northward to the Bug River, and would necessarily be affected 
by a national uprising upon its borders, while Napoleon had 
every reason for remaining on the best possible terms with the 
power on the Danube in order to be safe from attack upon his 
flank. Accordingly, through General Andreossy. his ambassa- 
dor at Vienna, he had the suggestion made to Stadion, the Aus- 
trian minister, that Austria should exchange her Polish provinces 
for Prussian Silesia. But Russia, Hkewise on the alert, had at 
the same time sent Pozzo di Borgo, a fellow countryman of Napo- 
leon's, as her envoy to the Viennese court. Austria, thus ap- 
proached by both of the rival powers, declined to Hsten to either 
and remained neutral, contenting herself with pushing a corps 
of observation gradually forward toward the Prussian frontier, 
partly to prevent a revolt in Galicia and partly in order not to 
be unarmed while watching further developments in the northeast. 
Napoleon was now prepared to play a second trump against 
Russia in the shape of the Eastern question. It has been already 
repeatedly intimated that it was Napoleon's purpose to include 
Turkey in his system of universal sovereignty of Europe; this 
was really the ultimate cause of hostilities with Russia. It 
was, then, but natural that after his victorious campaign of 
1805 he should take up this plan again. In January, 1806, the 
generals of his suite had already begun to make conjectures 
that he was meditating an expedition to Turkey, and by the 



.Et. 37] Napoleon and Turkey 365 

following May the Prussian envoy reported to his government 
that the Emperor was planning alliances with the Porte, with 
the Republic of Ragusa, and with Persia, and that General Se- 
bastiani had imparted to him Napoleon's conviction that Russia 
would have to be crowded back behind a barrier erected be- 
tween the Baltic and the Black Sea. This same Sebastian! was 
sent soon after this on a special mission to Constantinople; he 
was instructed, in case the Czar should refuse to make peace with 
France, to incite the Porte against him, and he was actually in 
so far successful as to induce the Sultan, Selim III., against 
the letter of an earUer treaty, to dispossess the Woiwodes of 
Moldavia and Wallachia, who were partisans of Russia, whereat 
the Czar, who had long been waiting merely for a pretext, sent an 
army down to the lower Danube. On November 11th, 1806, 
Napoleon wrote from Berlin to the frightened Grand Seignior 
that all Prussia was subject to him and that he was following 
up his advantages at the head of 300,000 men, adding that Fate 
had ordained the continuance of the Turkish Empire and had 
chosen himself as its saviour; that now was the moment for ad- 
vancing to the Dniester with an Ottoman army, whilst he was 
himself operating against Russia from the region of the Vistula. 
Of course his object was simply thus to divide the Russian forces 
so that they might not all stand opposed to him at once and at 
the same time to fasten Austria's poHtical attention upon the 
Danube, since Vienna could not view with unconcern any en- 
croachments of Russia upon Turkish territory. In both at- 
tempts he was successful. Alexander I. declared war against 
the Porte and despatched 80,000 men against that power, and 
through the progress of the Russian troops upon the lower Dan- 
ube Austria actually was prevented later on from making a 
close alliance with her northern neighbour against Napoleon. 
The attempt to entice Vienna with Silesia as bait had indeed 
miscarried, but the same end had been reached by awakening 
her apprehensions in regard to Russia. 

But Great Britain, the most powerful enemy of Napoleon's 
poHcy, was just awakening to the fact that her formidable 
opponent had laid in ruins a state upon the Continent, On 



366 From Jena to Tilsit [I8O6 

November 21st a decree was issued from Berlin to all the world 
declaring England to be in a state of blockade and closing to her 
the Continent as far as it lay within the circle of Napoleonic 
supremacy. It will be remembered with what precision Bona- 
parte had devised this programme back in 1802 upon the first 
indications of renewed hostilities. ''If England attempts to 
kindle war upon the Continent, her course will compel the First 
Consul to conquer all Europe." These had been his words in that 
memorable letter written by Talleyrand to Otto.* The Emperor 
was well on his way toward the fulfilment of that threat, and 
Great Britain must, of course, suffer the consequences. ''The 
British Isles," so reads the decree of Berlin, "are from the 
present time in a state of blockade; all commerce with them 
is forbidden; letters and parcels bearing an English address 
shall be confiscated, as also every English warehouse upon the 
Continent, whether upon the territory of France or that of its 
allies; the same shall be true of all English merchandise; all 
English vessels, as also those coming to the Continent from 
English colonies and bonded ports, shall be refused entrance to 
any European port. Any English subject found upon French 
soil shall be made prisoner of war." This decree was preceded 
by the statement that, since the English had arbitrarily ex- 
tended the rights of war upon the sea to cover also private prop- 
erty, the Emperor had concluded to repay them on land with 
the same coin. To the mind of this extraordinary man. with a 
determination knowing absolutely no bounds, his purpose stood 
clearly defined. Europe was to be rendered submissive to 
himself to enable him as its lord to close it against England. 
Great Britain's commerce and industries must in consequence 
stagnate and fall into decay, and if it should ever become 
possible by land to divert from her the stream of riches flowing 
in from India, the proud island realm would be conquered and 
would have no choice but to submit to him who alone remained 
to sway the sceptre over land and sea.f This goal was indeed 

* See p. 266 

t There can be no question that the Emperor was constantly intent 
upon India. His brother Joseph testified to that effect in conversation 



Mt. 37] The French Advance into Poland 367 

still far distant, and the men upon the chess-board of Europe 
must first be moved about with skill and artifice until the last 
king was checkmated; but the end seemed not unattainable, 
and it was with a mind filled with these designs tnat Napoleon 
led his army against the Russians. And were not these the 
same forces whom he had with but httle trouble vanquished 
the year previous? Moreover, since that time the self-confidence 
of his troops had but increased as a result of new triumphs' 
over the dreaded Prussian army. He, then, if any man, was 
justified in the belief that the destiny of a world lay within his 
clenched fist. 

On November 27th, 1806, the day upon which Napoleon 
reached Posen, the advance-guard of Murat's cavalry came upon 
Russian troops at Blonje to the west of Warsaw. General 
Bennigsen commanded the most advanced of the two Russian 
armies. General Buxhowden the other which was approaching. 
Before the French armies, which were being hurried forward 
by forced marches. General Bennigsen withdrew to Warsaw and 
finally across the Vistula and Narew to Ostrolenka, where he 
thought best to wait until the second column should come up 
before again moving forward. This junction of forces took 
place before the middle of December, whereupon he pushed for- 
ward mth his troops as far as Pultusk and the Ukra. The 
Russian army was re-enforced by an East Prussian corps, 13,000 
men strong, under L'Estocq, who took up his position to the 
east of Thorn, constituting a sort of right wing to the forma- 
tion. General Kamenski was commander-in-chief of the united 
forces. The French occupied Warsaw and Thorn and crossed the 
Vistula on a line between these two points: the corps of Bes- 
sieres, N^ey^ and Bernadotte turned eastward from Thorn, while 
Murat, Davout. and Lannes marched toward the north from 
Warsaw; between them Augereau and Soult advanced toward 
the Ukra, which the}^ crossed under fire from the enemy and in 
the presence of Napoleon,, who had come up by way of Warsaw. 

with the Prussian envoy at that time, and Napoleon himself told , his 
physician O'Meara at St. Helena that in 1806 after the war with Austria 
he had planned an expedition to Hindustan. In the same year three 
aprents were sent to Persia in the interest of France. 



368 From Jena to Tilsit [1806 

The Emperor, who now conjectured the principal force of the 
enemy to be at Golymin, west of Pultusk, decided upon attack- 
ing it from in front at that point with two corps, while Lannes 
with his corps should march to the right upon Pultusk and thus 
prevent the retreat of the Russians across the Narew, Soult and 
Bernadotte meanwhile directing their course around to the left, 
toward Makow, in order to cut off the road to Ostrolenka. Ijike 
all plans previously conceived by Napoleon this was based upon 
the idea of annihilating the enemy; it resulted in complete 
failure. The body of the Russian SLvmy was located, not at 
Golymin, but at Pultusk, where, on December 26th, it sustained 
an indecisive battle against Lannes, making possible its retreat 
across the Narew, and the forces with which Napoleon engaged 
on the same day at Golymin proved to be nothing more than the 
rear-guard of the hostile army and which, though beaten, was 
allowed to draw off toward the north without pursuit. With the 
enemy situated in this wise Soult's flank movement was rendered 
absolutely objectless. The Russians had thus escaped the en- 
compassing arms of the French army, while the latter had no 
other gain to show than that of a few square miles of barren 
land. 

What a change from the tales of victory during the last few 
months! And such unvarying success made Napoleon impru- 
dent. For lack of caution was clearly manifest in attempting 
to fall upon the enemy without arranging — as ever before — 
to keep the army concentrated, and again to base a double en- 
circling manoeuvre upon a supposition which had not been 
proved a certainty. Moreover, there were also attendant diffi- 
culties of which it is evident that the Emperor had scarcely 
estimated the full importance beforehand. The tract of coun- 
try in which these encounters were taking place had shortly 
before been occupied by the Russians, who on their departure 
had carried with them everything transportable and destroyed 
the rest, so that the French who followed came only upon desert 
places affording nothing in the way of food or shelter. Hunger 
confronted them. The requisition system had to be abandoned 
and storehouses established, and, as has been repeatedly testified 



Mt. 37] Hardships of the French 369 

by eye-witnesses, the only thing which saved the army from 
starvation was the spirit of speculation among the Jews. To 
add to their other misfortunes, the marshy soil was now softened 
by a sudden thaw, making the task of reconnoitring more than 
ever difficult and hampering all movements of the army. The 
entire region was like a sea of mud over knee-deep in which the 
gallant soldiers waded and, weak from hunger, dragged them- 
selves laboriously forward, while the artillery stuck fast in the 
bog and became useless. On the march toward Pultusk there 
were outbursts of direst despair, and many a valiant soldier, 
who but shortly before had courageously faced death in battle, 
now took his own life. Even the Emperor's own coach could 
go no further over roads so seemingly without bottom; a horse 
had to be led up to the carriage door, so that he could ride on to 
Pultusk where, a few days before, Lannes's soldiers, up to the 
thighs in mire, had braved the fire of the enemy for eight long 
hours. Along this road, as his troops passed before him, the 
Emperor saw the depth of misery to which they were reduced 
and overheard complaints uttered against their will by even 
those most loyal to him — the soldiers of the Guard.* This made 
a deep impression upon him. A year before — it was on the day 
before the battle of Austerlitz — he had spoken amongst his 
generals of his former plans in respect to the East. One of them 
ventured to express the opinion that the scheme might even now 
be resumed, since the army was after all on the way toward Con- 
stantinople; but he was checked by Napoleon: "I know the 
French," said he. "Long expeditions are not easily put 
through with them. . . . France is too beautiful; they do not 
like to get so far from it or to remain away for so long." How 
much more imhappy, then, their lot here under conditions so 
absolutely desperate, with every manoeuvre hampered and 

* It would be a mistake to accept the assurances of Savary and Rapp 
that in the reproaches which the troops allowed to reach the ears of the 
Emperor there existed in reaUty nothing more than the rough jokes of a 
body of soldiers. They were meant in all seriousness. Coignet, for 
instance, relates that the Guards, upon the return to winter quarters, 
met with sharp reproof that they had not held out more courageously 
in time of adversity. 



370 From Jena to Tilsit [I806 

every art of warfare laughed to scorn! * On De^rember 2d, the 
anniversary of AusterUtz, in an order of the day he had reminded 
the troops of the victory in Moravia. "Soldiers," said he, "we 
are not going to lay down our arms until universal peace shall 
have estabhshed and secured the power of our alhes and shall 
have restored to our commerce its hberty and its colonies. Upon 
the Elbe and the Oder we have gained Pondicherry, our enter- 
prises in the Indies, the Cape of Good Hope, and the Spanish 
colonies. Who would give to the Russians the right to control 
Destiny? Who would give them the right to frustrate plans so 
appropriate? They and we — are not both the soliders of Aus- 
terUtz?" But what cared these brave warriors in the swamps 
of Poland for Pondicherry and the Spanish colonies? Were 
France, perchance, in danger, or even only her glory and her 
extent, the appeal would not have been in vain. Moreover, it 
seemed as if the Russians of Pultusk really were no longer those 
of Austerlitz. They had fought and endured quite as valiantly^ 
on December 26th as had the soldiers of the invader. And 
Napoleon recognized that he durst not overstrain the bow 
which constituted his only weapon. Therefore, instead of fol- 
lowing in pursuit of the retreating enemy, he allowed the army 
to move into winter quarters. Along the Vistula from Elbing 
to Warsaw depots were set up for each army corps, but the 
troops themselves remained on the farther side of the river, 
pushed forward to a line running from the Frische Haff through 
Willenberg and Ostrolenka to Warsaw. The difficulties attend- 
ing the commissariat had made necessary this unusual extension. 
But this time of repose did not continue for long. The Rus- 
sians had retreated in two columns in the direction of Grodno 
and Bielostok, and later united under command of Bennigsen 
near Szuczyn. Through the retreat of their allies the Prussians 
under L'Estocq had likewise been crowded toward the East 
into the vicinity of Angerburg, so that communication with Dan- 

* The Duke of F6zensac alludes repeatedly in his "Souvenirs" to the 
impossibility of collecting sufficient intelligence by means of reconnois.: 
sance, and describes the extraordinary hardships attending the performance 
of the duties of an orderly. , . 



/Et. 37] Bennigsen Forces a Battle 371 

zig was entirely cut off and even the route to Konigsberg lay 
exposed to sudden attack by the French. And such an attack 
was actually attempted. Ney, whose corps was encamped 
between Thorn and Willenberg and had suffered great privation, 
acting upon his own responsibility set out with his troops toward 
the north in the early part of January, 1807, in order to find 
better quarters for them and, if possible^ to capture Konigs- 
berg — a move which greatly vexed Napoleon, by whom he was 
sharply reprimanded and ordered back to his post. In the 
course of this excursion the Marshal had, however, chanced upon 
the Prussian corps, the consequence of which was that Bennigsen 
had arisen with his entire army to destroy Ney while on the 
march in an exposed condition, and to force Bernadotte, who 
occupied the region about Elbing, back across the Vistula and 
thus re-establish communication with Danzig. His expecta- 
tion was. then, while giving protection to the fortresses and 
being at the same time supported by them, to acquire a strong 
position. By this stroke Napoleon might perhaps be induced 
to give up his threatening position at Warsaw and concentrate 
his forces farther West. 

The news of this offensive movement on the part of the enemy 
reached Napoleon in Warsaw, whither he had repaired from Pul- 
tusk in order to gain some repose for himself also. The capital 
of the former kingdom of Poland was doing its utmost to please 
and flatter him, the women being by no means the most back- 
ward in their complaisance, and it is alleged that Napoleon 
gave no cause for being considered prudish. But at the news 
of Bennigsen's proceeding he tore himself at once away and 
promptly determined upon his course of action. He, also, 
would assume the offensive. With his army united in a com- 
pact mass he would strike northwards, break through the ene- 
my's long line of march before it could concentrate its detach- 
ments for battle, and scatter its various corps. Fortunately for 
Bennigsen, this plan was revealed to him through a letter from 
headquarters to Bernadotte which was intercepted. Acting 
upon this information, he hurriedly collected about himself all 
his detachments and tried to evade the collision with the French 



372 From Jena to Tilsit [1807 

by turning northward in the direction of Guttstadt and Lands- 
berg. During his march forward he had directed the Prussian 
corps to describe the arc of a great circle about Freistadt to the 
west of Mohrungen, and this body of troops had now in Hke 
manner to hasten toward the north so as to escape the French 
and be enabled to unite itself with the Grand Army. Napoleon's 
purpose was thus already frustrated. He might, it is true, still 
overtake the enemy, but he could not surprise him; he might 
conquer but not annihilate him. With five corps he pressed on 
beyond Willenberg; a sixth remained behind on the Narew to 
keep watch; a seventh under Bernadotte, who had received no 
orders, could only follow far in the rear. It was not until Feb- 
ruary 7th. when they reached Prussian Eylau, that they came 
upon Bennigsen, who now drew up his forces for battle and on 
the same day repulsed the foremost detachments of the French 
under Murat and Soult. Meanwhile, however, came up the 
body of the French army with the exception of Ney, who had 
kept behind L'Estocq's corps in order to hinder its junction 
with Bennigsen. On the morning of February 8th the hostile 
armies were drawn up opposite one another for battle. The 
forces were about equal in number, from 70,000 to 80,000 men 
on each side; the Russians had the advantage only in point of 
artillery. The snow blown by the icy north wind did not yet 
cover the victims of the previous day's encounter, but already 
the struggle had recommenced, and this was to be bloodier than 
any of the battles yet fought. After a prolonged artillery com- 
bat Napoleon proceeded to the attack. He was prepared, if need 
be, to sacrifice his left wing in order to triumph the more deci- 
sively with his right. Augereau, who formed the connect- 
ing hnk between the centre and Davout, here rushed forward 
upon the central point of the Russian line much as Soult had 
done at Austerlitz. But how different the result! There the 
enemy gave way, while here he not only stood his ground , but 
drove back the assailant with heavy loss. Grape-shot fell like 
hail upon the corps advancing toilsomely in the face of the snow- 
storm, and, as it wheeled, the Russian cavalry fell upon and put 
to the sword half of the devoted band. On charged the horse- 



^T. 37] The Battle of Eylau 373 

men of the enemy, headed direct for the cemetery of Eylau, where 
Napoleon had taken up his station, insomuch that his suite 
already called for horses in order to remove headquarters to a 
place of safety. But the Emperor is said to have impatiently 
motioned his disapproval and contented himself with ordering 
forward a detachment of the Guard, at sight of which the troop 
of horse, now quite out of breath, turned to the right-about. But 
it was only with the greatest difficulty, and using as a screen 80 
squadrons which Murat assembled for a mighty attack, that he 
was able to fill the gap thus made in his position. At this point 
Davout entered the lists and pushed his way relentlessly for- 
ward against the left wing of the Russians, and this he succeeded 
in turning completely so that it faced northwards, whereupon 
he proceeded to cut off the enemy's fine of retreat, Bennigsen's 
army seemed lost when suddenly appeared Scharnhorst with a 
few thousands of L'Estocq's Prussians, the remainder having 
been left behind in combat with Ney; this last-comer imme- 
diately turned upon Davout and forced him back a long dis- 
tance. Orders to take part in the battle had not been received 
by Ney imtil noon, and by the time he reached the left wing 
darkness had already put a stop to the hideous carnage. 

The losses mounted up into the tens of thousands. Weeks 
afterward there yet remained mounds of unburied dead, and 
untold numbers of wounded, suffering from hunger as well as 
from their injuries, sought a miserable shelter in the roofless 
houses of Eylau or in abandoned ammunition- wagons. Auge- 
reau's corps had suffered such frightful loss as to make it neces- 
sary to disband it altogether. And all this sacrifice had been 
made for nothing! For the battle had remained indecisive. 
Napoleon for the first time had failed to win. In the first few 
hours after the battle he had even considered retreat, and wrote 
to Duroc that it would soon be necessary to transfer head- 
quarters to Thorn, and that consignments of funds might be 
retained in Kiistrin and Posen, since it was possible that he 
should retire to the left bank of the Vistula '4n order to secure 
quiet winter quarters sheltered from the Cossacks and from that 
swarm of light troops." But Bennigsen ordered it otherwise. 



374 From Jena to Tilsit [I807 

At midnight he decamped with his Russian army, and on the 
morning of February 9th the French found a clear field before 
them. Napoleon at once accepted this as a concession of vic- 
tory to himself. Scharnhorst denounced it as "a. sin and a 
shame." Napoleon, however, unhesitatingly and at once laid 
claim to the proffered laurels; his bulletin, giving a garbled 
report of the manner in which the battle had gone, announced 
to all the world his triumph, and, rather for the sake of con- 
firming his statements than with any hope of deriving profit 
from the expedition, he despatched Murat a few days' journey 
in pursuit of the retreating enemy.* This done, however, he 
withdrew his entire army behind the Passarge and had them 
there resume winter quarters, since he felt himself too weak to 
follow up the enemy. For the losses incurred in battle had 
not been alone in reducing the strength of his army. Many 
thousands, driven by hunger and want, had dropped from the 
ranks and were roving over the country, extorting, from the 
wretched inhabitants by dint of craft or violence the little yet 
remaining to them. And such was the effect of this example 
of levying contributions without authorization that the number 
of such marauders was estimated by one of the generals as reach- 
ing nearly 60,000. f Others may have been intimidated by the 

* The hand of the Bonaparte of old is at once recognizable again in 
the letter written by the Emperor to Cambaceres in which he directs 
him to insert in the "Moniteur" that the Russian army was wholly dis- 
banded; and again in the 61st bulletin, where he says that Konigsberg 
may congratulate herself that it did not come within his plans to follow 
the Russians up closely; and still again when in several letters written 
on the same day he gives different figures as the number of lost: 3000 
wounded in his account to Cambaceres, 7000 to 8000 in that intended 
for Daru. The truth was that there were three times that number. 

t This is the number according to Fezensac. How terrible was the 
destitution may be learned from Coignet's narrative. The Emperor 
himself wrote of it to Joseph and to Talleyrand. In a letter to the former 
he says: "We are living here in the midst of snow and mud, without 
wine, without brandy, without bread." France, to be sure, was not 
to be informed of their situation, and therefore one of his letters to Fouch^ 
contained also a statement to the effect that "the sanitary condition of 
the army was perfect, that it was supplied with provisions enough for a. 



^T. 37] Winter Quarters 375 

indomitable valour of the Russians, which excited even Napo- 
leon's admiration at Eylau. Others there were, as Baron von 
Gagern claims to have personally known, who openly resented 
the abominable slaughter of human beings for the sole purpose 
of ministering to the insane ambition of a single individual. Thus 
situated, the Emperor resolved upon acquiring a firm position 
in regions where it would be easier to care for the troops and 
to assemble re-enforcements so as to march against the enemy, 
when the awful winter should have passed, with forces greater 
than his. He would, no doubt, have even better preferred to 
withdraw to the other side of the Vistula, as he was counselled 
to do by his generals, including even the pliable Berthier. But 
that would have looked like retreat before the Russians, whose 
commander-in-chief had not neglected to proclaim himself 
victor of Pultusk and Eylau. Therefore there must be no fur- 
ther concessions; the army had to remain posted between the 
Vistula and the Passarge facing eastward, with Ney's corps as 
van-guard pushed forward as far as Allenstein on the Alle, while 
another under Massena still remained unchanged in position 
on the Narew. This arrangement afforded the advantage, — 
and it was the only gain resulting from the last battle, — that 
the Russians were thus cut off from the route to Danzig, whose 
fortress was now most zealously besieged. 

Napoleon selected Osterode as the place for his headquarters. 
And even here for weeks at a time there was not more than just 
enough to support the army, and he and his officers frequently 
subsisted upon what the soldiers tracked down and brought 
back. At first he had to be satisfied with a barn as dwelling- 
place until something more suitable could be found. It was 
not until early in April, when he moved into the castle of Fink- 
enstein, that his surroundings became in anywise comfortable. 
Nevertheless he endured the misery of the hard winter with a 
cheerfulness of spirit which was an example to his officers, while 
physically the toils of the campaign seemed rather beneficial to 
him than otherwise; he later asserted that he had never felt 

whole year, and that it was absurd to imagine that in a country like 
Poland there could be any lack of bread, meat, and wine." 



376 From Jena to Tilsit [I807 

better in his life. Osterode was the scene of much animation. 
Innumerable messengers came and went. Here the Emperor 
developed a marvellous rapidity of execution, and Savary was 
not without grounds for the assertion in his Memoirs that 
Napoleon would have required at the least three months in a 
large city for the business which he accomplished in less than 
one in this little hole of Osterode, where he had everything 
immediately at hand and could at once set it in motion. And 
there was plenty of occasion for unceasing labour, for Napo- 
leon's political situation corresponded with the military outlook 
and was not a whit more encouraging. Turkey had not been 
successful in overcoming Russia and in compelling her to put 
forth a great display of forces upon the lower Danube; on the 
contrary, the advantage there lay entirely upon the side of the 
northern power, so that the Czar might consider transferring 
half of the corps from that expedition to the northern theatre 
of war. From Austria, whose attitude had remained uncertain, 
came tidings of armament which were exaggerated by the envoy 
Andreossy in his reports into readiness for war. The Swedes 
were advancing upon Stralsund, and a way must be found for 
warding off or at least paralyzing their attack. England was 
announcing to the world at large that she was on the point of 
sending an expeditionary corps to the North Sea coast of the 
Continent, which made it necessary for France to post an army 
of its own under Brune at the points threatened. Even Spain, 
heretofore so submissive, seemed about to raise difficulties. To 
add to these perplexities, at the news of the retreat to the Pas- 
sarge rentes had fallen at the exchange in Paris, and with them 
confidence in the Emperor. Without question, then, Napoleon 
had plenty to do if he were going to improve his situation or 
even to prevent being attacked during the next few weeks which 
he needed for strengthening his army. 

His first step was to renew advances to Frederick William. 
Immediately after the battle of Eylau — as if Scharnhorst's 
valorous deed had brought Prussia to life again — that state 
acquired new importance in the eyes of the would-be conqueror, 
and from the battle-field itself he wrote to Talleyrand at War- 



jet. 37] The Treaty of Bartenstein 377 

saw, directing him to re-establish relations with the Hohenzol- 
lerns. Indeed, so much in haste did he feel to have this accom- 
pUshed that the way via Poland came to seem too long, and a 
few days later he sent his aid-de-camp, Bertrand, direct to the 
King at Memel to offer him the restitution of all his territory as 
far as the Elbe if he would conclude a separate treaty of peace 
with France. But Frederick William held stanch to his ally, 
and notified his adversary of this determination by a special 
messenger, whereupon Napoleon declared himself willing even 
to take part in a congress relative to Ihe negotiation of a general 
peace, provided only — and to him that was the important point 
— an armistice should be agreed upon relegating the French be- 
hind the Vistula, but the Russians behind the Niemen. But 
this also he was unsuccessful in obtaining. Instead, Prussia and 
Russia allied themselves only the more closely by a treaty 
signed at Bartenstein, April 26th, 1807, according to the terms 
of which England, Sweden, Austria, and Denmark should be 
solicited to unite once more with the original parties to the 
treaty in forming a great coalition of liberation with the object 
of driving out Napoleon from Germany and Italy. Under no 
circumstances, however, was either Russia or Prussia to con- 
clude a separate peace with France. 

Rebuffed by Prussia, Napoleon turned to Austria. He com- 
missioned Andr^ossy to demand from that country that it should 
at last make a positive declaration of its intentions; he was, 
moreover, to state that the Emperor of the French was still will- 
ing and ready to conclude an alliance for the sake of which he 
would give up Silesia, which had been nearly completely con- 
quered by his troops, — meaning those of the Confederation of 
the Rhine, — and even, in case of necessity, to exchange Dal- 
matia for some equivalent. But Austria turned a deaf ear to 
these proposals also. Vienna, where Archduke Charles was 
foremost in .counselling against taking part in the war, was 
prepared to offer nothing beyond her mediation, and submitted 
the following as basis for the same: a readjustment of German 
affairs, the integrity of Turkey, the division of Poland as here- 
tofore, and the participation of England in the negotiations. 



37^ From Jena to Tilsit [I807 

(April 3d, 1807.) And even to these conditions Napoleon waS 
disposed to accede, if for nothing more than the sake of having 
nothing to fear from Austria during the next few weeks ; but to 
the mediatorial proposals of Vienna Russia and Prussia replied 
with a pressing invitation to take part in the Treaty of Barten- 
stein. This again Emperor Francis felt called upon to refuse, 
considering that it would be better to wait until Napoleon had 
been defeated before taking the step, while Russia, being too 
weak to bring about this result unaided, wanted Austria's help 
precisely on this account. It was, then, vastly to the advan- 
tage of France that Austria decided upon remaining neutral. 
''This was," says Montgelas in his Memoirs, ''at all events 
the greatest service ever rendered to Napoleon, for he would 
never have been able to resist an attack from Austria." The 
French Emperor could hardly bring himself to believe in such 
good fortune and felt by no means secure in respect to his 
right flank. 

So much the greater his zeal, therefore, in attempting to instil 
new life into the Turkish forces and in organizing in the East a 
great coalition against Alexander. He tried to bring about an 
agreement between the Porte and Persia, so that the latter also 
might take up arms against Russia. "Persia also must be 
roused" — ^were his directions sent to Sebastiani — "so that it 
shall direct its energies against Georgia. Prevail upon the 
Porte to give orders to the Pasha of Erzerum to march with all 
his forces against that province. Maintain the good will of the 
Prince of the Abkhasians, and persuade him into taking part 
in the great diversion against the common enemy." Even this 
seemed to him not enough. Toward the end of April there 
arrived at Finkenstein a messenger from the Shah, and with hini 
Napoleon concluded a treaty in which he bound himself to 
compel the evacuation of Georgia by Russia and to send cannon 
and artillerymen to the King of kings. The latter was in 
return forced to pledge himself to break off his relations with 
England, to confiscate all British merchandise and to refuse 
entry into her ports to all British vessels, to stir up the Afghans 
and the peoples of Candahar against England, and to send an 



^T. 37] Treaty with the Shah of Persia 379 

army against India. ''And if" — so reads Article 12— ''the 
Emperor of the French should desire to send an army by land 
against the English possessions in India, the Shah of Persia, 
as a good and faithful ally, shall grant them free passage through 
his dominions, in which case a special agreement shall be made 
in advance stipulating as to the route to be taken by the troops, 
the supplies and the means of conveyance to be furnished, as 
well to what auxiliary troops it would be expedient for His 
Majesty the Emperor of Persia to unite with this expedition." 
Truly a marvellous spectacle, this — of a man in the midst of such 
embarrassments, where the advance of a single Austrian army 
corps might mean catastrophe, making agreement with an 
Oriental monarch concerning the most distant object of his 
aspirations. This is precisely what constitutes historical great- 
ness: the ability to keep the ultimate aim in view even in ad- 
versity, and to see over and beyond present calamity into the 
far-distant future. 

But the matter of paramount importance was after all for 
him to strengthen his army with fresh troops at the earliest 
possible moment so that his opponent, who was likewise mak- 
ing ready, might be outnumbered and so remain during the 
engagement now imminent. For this purpose he summoned 
from France and Italy everything available in the way of mili- 
tary forces, replacing them there with 80,000 men of the levy of 
18{)8. accorded him by the Senate, which in the last months of 
the preceding year had granted his demand for the levy of 1807. 
From Spain and from the Confederation of the Rhine he like- 
wise demanded new auxiliary troops. He was thus enabled not 
only to create a reserve army in Germany to keep watch upon 
Austria, but to increase the corps laying siege to Danzig and 
make to his main army the addition of from 160,000 to 170,000 
men— a figure to which Russia was far from attaining. And 
when, on May 24th, the proud fortress on the Baltic was 
brought to yield, another detachment which had been engaged 
there was released to swell the command upon the Passarge. 

And while the French army was thus increasing in strength 
the winter drew to a close. It had been a terrible enemy to the 



380 From Jena to Tilsit [im 

invaders, but, on the other hand, a faithful ally to their oppo- 
nents, the only trouble being that they had not been able to 
appreciate it at its true worth. During the long weeks of cold 
Bennigsen had taken not a single serious step to hinder the 
enemy's task of replenishing his army. In February, having 
begun to follow the French, he had been advised to make an 
onset also upon them at this time, so as to drive them behind the 
Vistula, or at least to protect Danzig by contesting their control 
of the Frische Nehrung; but he neglected everything of this 
kind and contented himself with forming plans of attack, some- 
times upon Ney, who occupied an advanced position, and again 
upon Elbing, each of which he would in the end discard, so that 
Scharnhorst was persuaded that the Russian general was resolved 
not to risk the loss of his reputation of having never been defeated 
by a Napoleon. It was only when Danzig had fallen and the 
enemy stood opposed to him stronger than ever, when the advent 
of favourable weather had made the roads passable and the 
maintenance of the army less difficult, when the ground was 
once more in fit condition for precise reconnoitring and for 
rapid manoeuvre, when Napoleon had determined upon his own 
method of attack, — in short, when it was entirely too late, — ^that 
Bennigsen began to bestir himself. Now he proposed to fall 
upon the advance-guard under Ney, annihilate it and then pro- 
ceed with his forces against the main body of the army. But 
the intrepid Marshal fought his way most gloriously back to 
the main army. With this the Emperor was now, in his tpm, 
moving forward, contriving at the same time to slip in between 
Bennigsen and the Prussian corps and driving both before him. 
The situation was again as before Eylau. 

Napoleon's design was to outflank the enemy upon the left 
while holding his attention absorbed at the front and, the victory 
gained, to drive him back against the Russian frontier. There 
was this peculiarity about the plan — and it has been for this 
reason condemned by the greatest military critics — that it left 
a way of escape open to the enemy, while, if the encircUng move- 
ment had been carried out by the right wing, the Russians would 
have had no choice but to take the road to Konigsberg, where 



Mt.z7] Friedland 381 

they could have been utterly destroyed through the numerical 
superiority of the French. The question arises whether, per- 
chance, Napoleon did not intentionally avoid the annihilation 
of Alexander's army. There may have been a revival of an 
idea which had often occupied his mind and which had found 
expression even before the battle of Austerhtz, — of coming to 
terms with the Czar. And that is by no means an improbable 
explanation of his conduct at this time. Certain it is that at 
Eylau the Russian army had greatly impressed him, and he was 
assuredly obeying something beyond the mere inspiration of 
the moment when he wrote to Talleyrand on March 14th : ' ' I am 
of the opinion that an alliance with Russia would be most advan- 
tageous if it were not for the absurdity of it and if any reliance 
could be placed upon that court." There was besides this a 
special reason for such a course, for just at this time — ^in the 
early part of June, 1807 — Napoleon's purposes in regard to 
Turkey cam.e to shipwreck. The Sultan SeHm III., as the result 
of a mistrust but too well justified, had refused the offer of a 
French auxiUary corps of 25,000 men under command of Mar- 
mont, while his own general had conducted the war against Rus- 
sia in an indolent fashion, not preventing the enemy from press- 
ing forward as far as Orsowa, and it was but a short time after 
this that the janizaries, opponents of all reform, had stripped 
the Sultan of his power and set up as his successor on the Bos- 
phorus Mustapha, of whom Sebastiani wrote on Jime 1st that he 
was hostile to France and that no influence was to be obtained 
over him. Under such circimistances was it not perhaps the 
part of discretion to execute his designs upon Turkey by uniting 
with Russia for the present rather than by striving against her — 
that is, to come to terms with the Czar at the expense of the 
ungrateful Moslem who so httle understood assuming the role of a 
wiUing tool for the furtherance of French pohcy? And would it 
be expedient, if this were the end in view, to attempt the de- 
struction of the Russian army? 

But be this as it may, the fact remains that the Emperor 
sent one portion of his army to the left, northwards, to surround 
the enemy, another detachment under Victor against the Prus- 



382 From Jena to Tilsit [i807 

sians, leaving Ney and the Guards to protect the rear, wliile he 
himBelf with three corps tried to overtake Bennigsen. In the last 
he was, indeed, successful on the evening of June 10th at Heils- 
berg, but here the enemy had entrenched itself strongly and re- 
pulsed the French as they approached. Only the fear of being 
surrounded on the north then compelled the Russian, in spite of 
his victory, to draw farther back along the right bank of the Alle, 
while Napoleon, grown cautious, awaited the coming up of Ney 
and the Guards, whom he had summoned before following Bennig- 
sen upon the left bank. On June 14th the latter reached Friedland 
on the route from Bartenstein to Wehlau. At this point he crossed 
the river in order to attack the French while on the march^ hoping 
to demolish the vanguard under Lannes and break through the 
line. The manoeuvre was, however, so slowly executed that while 
the action with Lannes was yet in progress the other French corps 
had time to come up and be set in battle array by Napoleon. The 
Russian had now no choice but to accept battle, — and he lost it, 
not, however, without vaHant defence. For Ney, who advanced 
with his command against the left wing of the Russians, was at first 
thrown back and the battle was saved to the French only by the 
audacious act of Napoleon, who, recognizing the danger, rushed 
with his reserve corps through the midst of the fleeing soldiers to 
renew the attack. A heavy cannonading brought the Russians 
upon this side to yield, and at this Bennigsen was compelled to 
order the retreat of the centre and right wings through Friedland 
and across the Alle. But now the French pressed on in pursuit 
from everywhere, so that the crossing of the river could be but 
imperfectly accompHshed, and one detachment of the Russian 
troops was perforce left on the further side of the river to destruc- 
tion by the enemy's cannon. On the same day the Prussian corps 
also sustained defeat by itself at the hands of the encircliug army; 
it was driven back under the very ramparts of Konigsberg, and 
escaped only with greatest difficulty and almost disbanded to 
Tilsit on the Niemen, where, on June 18th, Bennigsen also arrived 
on his retreat. The latter, having crossed the river, destroyed 
the bridges behind him. 



iET. 37] Truce with Russia 383 

On the day following this victory Napoleon wrote to Josephine : 
"My children have appropriately celebrated the anniversary of 
Marengo; the battle of Friedland will contribute to the fame and 
glory of my people as much as the other. The entire Russian 
army put to rout, 80 cannon seized, 30,000 men killed or captured, 
25 of their generals killed, wounded, or taken prisoner, the Russian 
Guard demohshed — ^this makes a sister worthy of Marengo. 
Austerhtz, or Jena ! " This account was to some extent exaggerated. 
Bennigsen's army had, it is true, been thoroughly scattered during 
the action, but by the time it reached Allenburg in its flight it had 
already gathered again, so that it was able to proceed thence in 
tolerable order. Their losses were, indeed, so great that the 
general-in-chief proposed to the Czar to enter into negotiations 
for peace, but his intention in suggesting this course was only with 
a view to securing time for re-enforcement. For, in the first place, 
he was certain of finding on the farther side of the Memel L'Es- 
tocq's corps of Prussians and a reserve body of Russians under 
Labanoff, and, in the second, the army had not been crowded 
away from its fine of operations, so that Napoleon might still look 
forward to the possibihty at any time of a new engagement against 
which he also was having preparations made to the west of Tilsit, 
The worst feature of the situation lay in the attitude of complete 
dissatisfaction prevailing throughout the Russian army and partic- 
ularly among the officers, who almost without exception belonged 
to the party headed by the Grand Duke Constantine and who 
condemned ''fighting for foreign interests." And this feeling 
manifested itself with a freedom defying all discipHne. It is even 
claimed that Alexander was pointedly reminded of the fate of liis 
father. Even in the days immediately after the battle there is 
said to have been carried on a correspondence between Constantine 
and Murat in consequence of which Prince Labanoff was sent on 
June 19th to conclude a truce with Napoleon. The latter demanded 
as a condition the surrender of certain Prussian fortresses which 
had not yet fallen, among others Kolberg and Graudenz. Having 
no power to regulate the disposal of these strongholds, the envoy 
turned homeward, but the Emperor at once sent Duroc after him 
commissioned to say to the adversary that Napoleon was ready for 



384 From Jena to Tilsit [1807 

a cessation of hostilities even without these concessions if Russia 
would enter into negotiations for a separate peace. This offer 
was made known to the Czar, who agreed to accept it. On the 
21st the truce was signed, and on the 24th Labanoff returned to 
Tilsit with written instructions for proposing an alliance and an 
interview between the two sovereigns. 

This course was, indeed, directly contrary to the wording of the 
Treaty of Bartenstein signed on April 26th, and in reality treachery 
to Prussia. But in regard to that the Czar did not greatly concern 
himself. After all, as he might have argued, had not that treaty 
remained practically nothing more than a pious wish? Supposing 
he had formed the plan now as in 1805 of marching as it were at 
the head of the legitimate powers of Europe against the usurper 
in order to compel his descent from the pinnacle upon which he had 
placed himself, would it not be but too evident that Europe was 
not supporting him? 

England had taken up arms in a way far too half-hearted and 
incomplete to be able to take an active part in the conflict, and 
now had become in addition obdurate in the matter of money, 
for to Russia's appeal for an indispensable subsidy of 6,000,000 
pounds she had returned a refusal. On the other hand British 
supremacy on the sea bore heavily upon Russian vessels and oc- 
casionally made itself very grievously felt. Nothing more was 
needed to create an aversion to England in the mind of the Czar. 
But if England had acceded only conditionally to the Treaty of 
Bartenstein, Austria, as has been seen, had refused absolutely to 
give it adherence. It was only after the possibility of a separate 
peace between France and Russia had been brought to the at- 
tention of the Court of Vienna that an envoy was despatched to 
Alexander, there to reawaken hopes of Austria's co-operation; 
but he came too late. In view of the neutrality of the power on 
the Danube Gentz had already in April counselled the Czar in a 
memorial to conclude peace with Napoleon and save for the future 
his forces which now, without assistance from Austria, were be- 
ing uselessly squandered. These representations are said to 
have made a profound impression upon the young monarch.* In 

♦Martens, Recueil, VI. 419. Gentz advised the Czar to impel 



JE.T.S7] Napoleon and Alexander at Tilsit 385 

the case of Sweden, too, there was an obstacle to perfect agree- 
ment. This state had, to be sure, taken part in the war against 
Napoleon. But Finland was still a Swedish province, and Finland 
lay in the path of what was called the "natural expansion "of 
Russia. And herein lay the element of discord in Russian poU- 
tics: that in fighting in behalf of the ancient order of things in 
Europe she was defending a cause to which her own interests urged 
destruction and those who are prone to condc nm the character of 
Alexander as vacillating and untrustworthy will do well to lay the 
blame not upon him alone, but upon the political aim of his em- 
pire as well. He was now personally under pressure from that 
party which demanded peace, and under this combination of cir- 
cumstances it is not a matter for astonishment that he should 
accept the proposals of the enemy. 

He further expressed a desire for an interview with Napoleon 
to which the latter readily consented.* On the 25th of June 
took place the meeting between the two Emperors. Upon a raft 
in the middle of the Niemen was erected a magnificent tent in 
which the interview might go on without witnesses. Both mon- 
archs were conveyed thereto in small boats accompanied by the 
acclamations of their respective Guards lining the opposite banks 
of the river. The conference lasted for more than an hour,dur- 

Austria to take part in the war by declaring in Vienna that he would 
otherwise share with France what no one would assist Russia in defending. 
Alexander appears to have followed this advice, for, toward the middle 
of the month of May, his ambassador, Pozzo di Borgo, had a conversation 
with Stadion in which he represented to him that, in case of Austria's 
refusal, peace might very possibly be agreed upon without the co-opera- 
tion of that power: "which would remain excluded from a system estab- 
Ushed under circumstances which she alone would have caused to be so 
unfavourable." 

* This is at least according to what Napoleon himself wrote to Talley- 
rand on June 24th, 1807. (This is confirmed by the instructions of the 
Czar to Labanoff in which he said : " I like to entertain the hope that we 
shall easily come to an agreement with the Emperor Napoleon if we can 
confer without any intermediary." Taking the hint, Napoleon proposed a 
personal interview through Duroc, June 24th. Martens, Recueil des 
Trait^s et conventions conclus par Russie avec les puissances etrangdres, 
XIII. 298, 299.-^B.) 



386 From Jena to Tilsit [1807 

ing which time the retinue remained waiting outside of the tent, 
and within this hour the face of the world was changed. Of 
exactly what took place on this occasion we have no direct 
record. It was alleged by some that they caught the opening 
of the conversation. According to these accounts Alexander 
accosted Napoleon with: "I hate the English as thoroughly as 
you do, and I will second you in everything you are willing 
to undertake against them"; to which Napoleon replied: "In 
that case there will be no difficulty in adjusting matters between 
us, and peace is made." And naturally! For why continue at 
war if he could now obtain peacefully that which he had de- 
termined by conquering and overmastering Russia to compel 
her to give — her accession to the blockade of the Continent in 
case England should refuse to accept the conditions imposed? 
Assuming that this was to be the outcome, he now doubtless re- 
sumed the project of a march upon India which had never 
ceased to occupy his mind and to participation in which he had 
won over Alexander's father in his day. Concessions were 
furthermore made upon both sides. The Corsican agreed to 
sacrifice the integrity of Turkey, — that point which had been 
the cause of contention between the two powers in July, 1806, — 
renounced the idea of a re-establishment of ancient Poland, and 
assigned Finland to Russia, in return for which the Czar de- 
clared himself ready to accept all changes which Napoleon 
should make in the south, in Italy or in the Iberian peninsula, 
a basis for agreement being thus furnished with which both 
parties were, for the time being, content. It is indeed open to 
question whether all these considerations were brought up dur- 
ing that first interview, but it is certain that they were zealously 
discussed during those weeks of famihar intercourse between 
the two sovereigns. On June 26th Frederick William also was 
granted an interview with Napoleon, though only in the char- 
acter of a protege of the Czar's and not as a sovereign of equal 
rank pleading his own cause. 

Two weeks were thus spent together in Tilsit before the 
treaty of peace was signed. Napoleon displayed his utmost 
graciousness of manner so as to captivate the Czar, and a prince 



^T. 37] The Peace of Tilsit 387 

so vain could not but be gratified and allured by the fact that 
the victor offered to him, the vanquished, the homage of his 
friendship. Both sides were, moreover, obliged to yield upon 
certain points which held concealed the germs of future discord. 
Napoleon, to be sure, no longer laid stress upon the re-establish- 
ment of Poland, but he was none the less opposed to having the 
duchy of Warsaw fall back into the possession of Prussia; he 
had involved himself too deeply with the Polish patriots to ad- 
mit of that. He even went so far at first as to suggest that 
Poland be united with Prussian Silesia to form a kingdom which 
should be assigned to his brother Jerome, but he soon recognized 
that the time had not yet come for his purpose of extending his 
power as far as the Vistula, and withdrew his proposition. Silesia 
remained the property of Prussia, and the duchy of Warsaw fell 
to the King of Saxony, though with the provision that it should 
not be incorporated with his state. Only the Polish crown lands, 
of some 27,000,000 francs value. Napoleon reserved to himself 
for future use in rewarding his generals. For Jerome a com- 
pensation was provided by uniting the Prussian territories west 
of the Elbe with lands from the electorate of Hesse and duchy 
of Brunswick to form a kingdom of Westphalia.* On the other 
hand Alexander had counted as a certainty upon securing Con- 
stantinople, and had been likewise obliged to yield. At last, on 
July 7th, 1807, matters had reached a point where it was possible 
for the diplomats Talleyrand and Kurakin to append their signa- 
tures to the documents. 

Of these there were two, a peace convention and a treaty of 
offensive and defensive alliance. In the former were taken up 
and dealt with all stipulations involving Prussia. It was herein 

* Westphalia was to consist of the states of Brunswick- Wolf en- 
biittel, the Alt-Mark, and the territory of Magdeburg to the left of the 
Elbe, the territories of Halle, Hildesheim, and the city of Goslar, the 
petty state of Halberstadt and Hohenstein, the territory of Quedlinburg, 
the county of Mansfeld, the Eichsfeld, the cities of Miihlhausen and 
Nordhausen, the county of Stolberg, the states of Hesse-Cassel, the 
former Hanoverian principalities of Gottingen and Grubenhagen with 
Hohenstein and Elbingerode, the bishoprics of Osnabruck and of Pader- 
born, Minden, Ravensberg, and the county of Rittberg-Kaunitz. 



388 From Jena to Tilsit [I807 

stated that: "Out of regard for His Majesty the Emptor of all 
the Russias, and wishing to give proof of his sincere desire to 
unite the two nations by the hnks of an unalterable trust and 
friendship/' the Emperor of the French now restored to Frederick 
William his territories lying east of the Elbe except for the 
circle of Kottbus, which was to go to Saxony, and the Polish 
provinces of South Prussia and New East Prussia, of which the 
circle of Bielostok was to fall to Russia, while the remainder 
went to make up the duchy of Warsaw just mentioned. The 
Czar, moreover, recognized Joseph as King of Naples, and pledged 
himself to recognize him as also Lord of Sicily as soon as a com- 
pensation should be found for its legitimate prince. Russia 
also gave her acquiescence to the establishment of Louis as King 
of Holland, and that of Jerome as King of Westphalia, as well as 
to the Confederation of the States of the Rhine. Cattaro and 
the Ionian Islands were to be Napoleon's in return for the release 
of Danzig. He undertook to mediate between Russia and Tur- 
key, while Alexander was to bring about peace between France 
and England. 

Thus was it with the peace convention. The question wae 
here still left open as to what was to take place in case England 
and Turkey did not consent to the conditions imposed by the 
mediating powers. To this the answer was contained in the second 
instrument — ^the secret treaty of alliance. In this the contract- 
ing parties pledged themselves to mutual support whether offen- 
sive or defensive, the first object of their attack being England if 
that power should not have accepted by November 1st, 1807, the 
Russian terms of peace, which demanded nothing less of Great 
Britain than that she should restore to France and her ally all 
conquests which she had made since 1805 and grant complete in- 
dependence upon the sea to all flags, upon compliance with which 
conditions Hanover should again be hers. The Porte was to be 
next in order in case the mediation of France should have led to no 
satisfactory result within three months of the conclusion of the 
Treaty of Tilsit. In the first event Russia pledged herself to break 
off all relations with England, to use her power in the system of 
Continental blockade, and, in combination with France, to compel 



iET. 37] The Treaty with Prussia 389 

likewise Denmark, Sweden, Portugal, and Austria to take part in 
the war against England's commerce. In the second event Russia 
and France were to unite their forces to snatch from Turkey all her 
European possessions with the exception of Constantinople and 
RoumeHa. Should Denmark. Portugal, or Sweden offer resistance 
to the demands of the allies, the country so resisting should be 
invaded by war conducted by both powers; should Sweden alone 
refuse to comply, Denmark should be constrained to carry on the 
contest against her.* In a special agreement, which was probably 
only verbal, a division of Turkish territory is said to have been 
arranged ; but although Napoleon showed a disposition to favour 
the designs of the Emperor of Russia, he would not consent to 
having the project clearly and distinctly formulated. 

Two days later, on July 9th. 1807. peace was likewise signed 
with Prussia. It was without avail that, unmindful of the re- 
peated affronts which had been offered her through Napoleon s 
bulletins, the young and beautiful Queen Louise appeared before 
the powerful enemy to her country to entreat for it a fate less hard^ 
or at least the restitution of Magdeburg. She could obtain noth- 
ing beyond mere civilities and vague promises to which the Em- 
peror paid not the sHghtest regard next morning. His stipulations 
in regard to Prussia remained precisely as had been before agreed 
upon with Alexander. It is scarcely necessary to say that the 
unhappy country was obliged to bind itself to keep all ports 
closed against England and, in case John Bull should fail to 
comply with the terms of peace imposed, to enter into a league 
with France and Russia for the purpose of carrying on war 
against him. 

These were the essential points in the Treaty of Tilsit. An 
attempt has been made to see in this a division of the mastery of 
Europe according to the principle that Napoleon yielded to the 
Czar the eastern haff of the Continent, while reserving to himself 

* The authentic wording of the treaty of alliance has here been 
followed. Since the publication of the German edition of this book, when 
the text of the secret treaty was for the first time published complete, 
it has been published by Vandal, "Napoleon et Alexandre I.,'* p. 515, and 
by Martens in his Recueil, XIII. 322. 



390 From Jena to Tilsit [i807 

undisturbed dominion over the west. But the facts in the case 
would not bear out this idea in all particulars. In spite of every- 
thing the difference between victor and vanquished is clearly dis- 
cernible in the documents. Napoleon made not the least show of 
withdrawing from Turkey, and through his alliance with Persia 
he still maintained a firm foothold in the East. Moreover, the 
duchy of Warsaw was now ruled by one of the princes of the Con- 
federation of the States of the Rhine, — for such had the new ' ' king " 
of Saxony become in December. 1806, — and was thus under direct 
influence of his policy. Here was a card which might be played 
against Russia at any time when he should feel so inclined. And 
Russia herself was at the mercy of France, at least in the matter 
of her industries, from the moment in which the war against Eng- 
land's commerce began. No! In the treaty of July 7th, 1807, 
there was nothing which looked like renunciation or change of 
purpose on the part of Napoleon. His concessions to Russia 
meant nothing more than a pause on the way to universal do- 
minion. As far back as 1803, when war with England had be- 
come inevitable, the First Consul is said to have made approaches 
to Alexander I. with proposals culminating in a combined at- 
tack upon Great Britain and which were probably similar in 
nature to those of Tilsit. Cobenzl, the Austrian minister and 
a clear-sighted diplomat, at that time expressed himself in re- 
gard to Napoleon and his purposes in these words: "Never 
has any one laid himself more open to the suspicion of aspiring 
to a universal monarchy, and a man must begin by being one 
of two to finish by being the only one." 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE SITUATION OF AFFAIRS IN FRANCE. BAYONNE AND 

ERFURT 

It would be, however, not only a mistake, but an injustice to 
Napoleon's powers of penetration, to assume that he had allowed 
himself to be persuaded by the demands of his external policy 
alone to the conclusion of peace with Alexander in 1807 in- 
stead of abiding by his original intention of unshackling Poland 
and, in alliance with that hereditary enemy of Russia, extend- 
ing his own dominion by conquest to the farthest borders of the 
Continent. That which more than aught else determined him 
to arrest his course at the Niemen was consideration for public 
opinion in France, knowing that he durst not forfeit all favour 
and kindly feeling on the part of his people; for he was already 
on the highway to such an outcome. The French had refused 
their sympathy with the war of 1805, and it was only through 
the marvellous victories of the Emperor, coupled with many an 
addition to the contents of the state's treasury, that they could 
be reconciled to it. But when, a year later, these cruel wars 
broke out afresh, the people began to see that their soldiers were 
no longer fighting in the interests of their country, but were 
wasting their blood only for the sake of the boundless ambition 
of this foreigner; that his policy was not, as he pretended, the 
policy of France. Henceforth no success however great could 
alter the popular feeling. A contemporary relates that even 
the victory of Jena made absolutely no impression in Paris. 
On the other hand, dissatisfaction with the Empire steadily in- 
creased, though in secret. But however anxiously concealed 
from the innumerable spies in his employ, the facts still came 
to Napoleon's ears; here it was the audacious joke of some idler 
on the boulevard which was reported, there the cutting witti- 

391 



392 



Affairs in France [i807 



cism of an inhabitant of the Faubourg St. Germain, or perchance 
a newspaper article not discreetly enough revised : — nothing es- 
caped the vigilance of his informants. But even without spe- 
cial reports of this kind he would have been aware that the 
French people, whose sons he had demanded to fight his bat- 
tles, no longer made the sacrifice with the conviction that it 
was for the good of the nation, but that it was inwardly threat- 
ening to turn completely from him. Such a symptom as this 
he was too discerning to underestimate. Although he felt him- 
self able to cope with any popular uprising through the mighty 
army which he had attached to himself personally, he had never- 
theless learned too much from the Revolution not to reckon the 
current of popular sentiment as a distinct and important poUt- 
ical factor. It was appalling to consider what would become 
of him if France should eventually cease to honour his drafts 
upon the future. Such an eventuality must on no account be 
allowed to occur. And it was because he knew the craving for 
peace existing among the French people and its horror of in- 
cessant war that he made peace with Russia and, even before 
leaving Tilsit, took steps for spreading abroad in France the re- 
port that the war of blockade was nearing its end. Then he 
returned to Paris to prove himself the solicitous administrator 
and bring about forgetfulness of his career as a conqueror. 

Here he was greeted with an enthusiasm outwardly similar 
to that of a year previous; there were illuminations and accla- 
mations, speeches and addresses somewhat more bombastic 
even than those of the former occasion, which had even then 
been lacking in spontaneity. For instance, the President of the 
Court of Appeals declared to his face that Napoleon had ceased 
to belong to ordinary human history, but should be classed 
among the heroes of antiquity. He hstened with a serious coun- 
tenance to such disquisitions, and was doubtless no less serious 
in his contempt for an orator capable of such servility. At the 
opening of the Corps Legislatif he read a speech from the throne 
in which he expressed to the French the pride and satisfaction 
felt in the nation by its monarch, and in the Coimcil of State was 
drawn up a report setting forth the blessings conferred by the 



iET. 37] Guiding Public Opinion 393 

imperial government. Such reports had repeatedly been made 
before this imder the Empire. The first time was toward the 
close of 1804 and the second in March, 1806, after the Peace of 
Pressburg, in both of which cases the key-note had been the 
same: that Napoleon was indefatigably intent upon promoting 
the well-being of his people, but was nevertheless constantly 
interrupted in this task by disturbances from without. The 
result had been that France had turned with fury against these 
antagonists and hailed with acclamation the commander who 
promptly and brilHantly overcame them. So had it been even 
in 1805, but at present matters wore a different aspect. The 
next year, in order to be beheved when asserting that the Em- 
peror had no further plans of conquest and no longer desired 
the bloody laurels which others had compelled him to pluck, 
the Minister of the Interior had to seek an entirely new funda- 
mental principle for use in his public declarations. This new 
theme was soon found, and now the story ran: that even if 
Europe had been so wicked as to force war upon the Emperor, 
he had not been prevented by it from the fulfilment of his duties 
as a ruler, especially as the war itself had been carried on solely 
in the interests of France. This text was further varied by the 
Minister in his representations of 1807, in which he said of Napo- 
leon that: ''While he was seeking out the soldier in his tent 
amidst the snows of Lithuania, his eyes were resting in France 
upon the cottage of the poor, upon the workshop of the me- 
chanic; . . . while, as for us, we realized his absence only in 
hearing of his exploits." True, certain branches of industry had 
suffered, but this was nothing but a passing inconvenience, for 
the war in progress was a war for commercial independence, and 
every conquest made in it by the Emperor was a future gain to 
French traffic. Moreover, it was no small merit on the part of 
the monarch to have removed to such a distance the scene of 
operations that, ''while the rest of Europe was writhing in the 
torments of war, France, serene and confident in her power, 
could look into the future with the feeling of security which is 
the result of a happy past, desiring peace without being tired 
of the war and aspiring to that high destiny which has been pre- 



394 Affairs in France [1807 

pared for her by him in whom she has placed her confidence, 
her glory, her affection. This expectation of a great people 
has been fulfilled, her fondest hopes surpassed. The hour of 
prosperity has come, who will venture to prophesy its termina- 
tion?" 

Though essentially hypocritical, these assurances did never- 
theless contain two statements not unsupported by fact: in 
the first place Napoleon did himself consider the commercial 
war against England to be an enterprise actually conducive to 
the welfare of France, and in the second, even during the 
course of the war he had not, as a matter of fact, dropped 
from his shoulders the burden of the administration in France. 
For Cambaceres, though appointed Napoleon's representative, 
was such in form only, and the couriers to Warsaw, Osterode, 
or Finkenstein were charged with questions in regard to even 
the most insignificant details. From such a distance it was 
nevertheless impossible to undertake any very vigorous meas- 
ures, and it was only now upon his return that the undivided 
attention of the monarch could be accorded to affairs of the in- 
terior. Napoleon well knew how little had been accomplished 
by the fine words of his minister; France must be convinced by 
acts and deeds that only under his own guidance could she be 
assured of prosperity and honour. 

He demanded at once upon his arrival to be furnished with 
the figures as to the exports and imports of French commerce, 
and to be informed how Italy and the Confederation of the 
Rhine could be made serviceable to it. The new commercial 
code was published. The bank was ordered to reduce the ra,te 
of discount. To check impoverishment and to help the needy 
state workshops were opened in all departments for those who 
were in distress, and work renewed upon public constructions 
planned and begun after the victorious campaign of 1805; these 
included roads over the Simplon and Mont-Genis, new canals, 
telegraph lines for the acceleration of correspondence, the resto- 
ration of the Basilica of St. Denis, — particularly the cr3rpt which 
was used as the tomb of royalty and which had been destroyed 
by the Revolution,— the founding of a new city in the Vendee, 



iET. 37] The Jewish Question 395 

the erection of monumental arches of triumph in Paris, the con- 
tiQuation of the quais on the banks of the Seine, the embelUsh- 
ment of the capital by a wide street running from the Tuileries 
to the boulevards (the Rue de la Paix), the completion of the 
Louvre, the laying out of a park on the Rue de RivoH, the build- 
ing of the Pont des Arts, the Pont d'Austerlitz, and the Pont 
d'Jena, the raising of a column of triumph on the Place Ven- 
dome, besides many other works of the same order. All these 
provided labour for many hands, and prevented general distress, 
so that it was possible to forbid beggary. 

Among public abuses there was one especially which had 
fixed Napoleon's attention even before the outbreak of the war 
with Prussia. This was the condition of unremitting poverty 
prevailing among the peasants of the eastern departments, the 
cause of which was eventually found to he in the exploita- 
tion of the people by the Jews through usury. For, ever since 
the National Assembly in 1791 had accorded to the IsraeUtes 
civil rights similar to those of all other Frenchmen, there had 
poured in from foreign countries to the eastward streams of 
Jewish tradesmen who had settled in the departments on the 
Rhine and here for the most part carried on a business of 
usurious money-lending. Especially after public security had 
been re-estabhshed by Bonaparte in the interior did they mass 
themselves in the German-speaking provinces. According to 
an official account submitted to Napoleon by the Minister of 
the Interior in April, 1807, the sums demanded upon mortgages 
by the Jews since 1799 amounted, in the Alsatian department 
of the Upper Rhine alone, to more than 23,000,000 francs, and 
Marshal Kellerman set at something more than 70 per cent 
the rate of interest customarily extorted by them. Most of 
them were successful in evading military service. For a moment 
Napoleon had thought of declaring null and void all debts upon 
mortgages at usurious rates, but upon further consideration 
vouchsafed to apply measures somewhat less severe. An as- 
sembly of Jewish Rabbis — a sort of revival of the great Sanhe- 
drim of Jewish history — was to take counsel together to find a 
remedy against this evil, and, in fact, a series of resolutions 



396 



Affairs in France [1807 



was drawn up by this body in Paris, March, 1807, forbidding 
their fellow believers to exact usury as sinful and urging the 
youth of the nation to learn handicrafts. Thus stood matters 
at the time of the return of the Emperor from his campaign. 
These resolutions seemed to him, however, to offer too httle 
guarantee, and he ordered elaborated an exceptional law bear- 
ing upon the Jewish population, which was to remain in opera- 
tion for a first period of ten years and of which the essential 
features were the following: Interest at more than 5 per cent 
should be reduced by the proper authorities, while that at more 
than 10 per cent should be declared usurious and the debt can- 
celled; no Jew might carry on business without a license from 
the proper authorities, and none lend money upon a mortgage 
without an act attested before a "notary; Hebrews not yet 
resident in Alsace at the moment when this decree was put in 
force — ^it was promulgated March 17th, 1808 — could not estab- 
lish themselves there; in other departments they were allowed 
to settle only on condition of becoming landowners; every 
Israelite must perform military service and was debarred the 
privilege of hiring a substitute. It is not to be denied that this 
law was contrary to the Napoleonic Code, but it was effectual. 
Reports from the eastern departments showed improvement 
even within a few years, and Napoleon was enabled to allow of 
exceptions being made to a constantly increasing extent until 
the state of complete equaHty before the law was again attained. 
The Emperor's concern for the material prosperity of the 
French was closely aUied with his financial poUcy. Up to this 
time he had carried on his wars without substantially increasing 
the taxation and without assuming debts. ''As long as I live,'^ 
he wrote on May 18th, 1805, to Barbe-Marbois, ''I shall issue 
no paper.'' No method seemed to him so certain to mitigate 
the aversion felt by the people toward his wars as to prove that 
they demanded no pecuniary sacrifice. The system of requisi- 
tions in foreign countries had until now made it possible to abide 
by this policy, and it was further relieving the country of a heavy 
burden to have the greater part of the standing army remain, 
even in peace, without its borders. But this was, after all, far 



Mt. 37] Financial Policy 397 

from sufficient, for in 1805 a painful experience had been under- 
gone. The taxes had not been increased at the opening of the 
war, but money was nevertheless an imperative necessity. 
It had therefore been derived at this time from the cash ad- 
vanced to the government by an association of financiers, with 
the banker Ouvrard at their head, who had been accustomed to 
discount the assignments by the receivers of taxes of the income 
due in the course of the ensuing year. This same company man- 
aged incidentally also the financial affairs of the Spanish crown 
by advancing the subsidies exacted by France from Spain, tak- 
ing repayment with substantial interest upon the arrival of the 
silver fleet from America. But the war now declared upon 
Spain by England prevented the conveyance of the ingots, 
plunging the company into difficulties from which it was to be 
extricated only by aid of the Bank of France, which was, for 
this purpose, compelled to exhaust its supply of ready money. 
A crisis was the immediate consequence, bringing in its train 
bankruptcy to many important houses; capitalists throughout 
the country became uneasy. It was just at the time that Napo- 
leon was negotiating for peace with Austria in December, 1805. 
His presence in France became indispensable, and, as Montgelas 
asserts, it was this consideration more than any other, accord- 
ing to his own later testimony, which impelled him to the con- 
clusion of the Treaty of Pressburg, an opportunity which the 
Austrians might easily have turned to account by occasioning 
delays which would have caused serious embarrassment to Na- 
poleon. But such a predicament must never again befall. On 
that occasion the proclamation of peace, the newly established 
confidence of the people, and the 40,000,000 francs of Austrian 
war-indenmity had averted disaster. Now, after the second 
victorious campaign, the milHons exacted from Prussia, Poland, 
and Westphalia were taken to estabhsh not only a war- 
treasure, but Hkewise a ^'Service Bank" {Caisse de Service) 
which should make imnecessary the assistance of bankers in 
the future, and even furnish advance moneys upon the taxes. 
There was further established a treasury board {cour des Comptes) 
which was to assume control of the administration of finances. 



398 



Affairs in France [1807 



The Emperor was thus enabled to demonstrate to the French 
people that his wars not only demanded no new sacrifices on 
their part, but that they might with their results actually be 
advantageous to the pubHc finances. Nor was the encouraging 
aspect of affairs delusive, for the material situation of the coun- 
try continued to make real improvement. Commerce did in- 
deed suffer from the blockade, while the advanced prices of 
sugar and coffee bore hard upon all classes, but, on the other 
hand, the exclusion from Europe of English manufactures was 
helping to build up French industries. Hopes of universal 
peace and the re-established credit of the state contributed to 
raise the price of government 5 per cents to 93 in 1807, a 
point to which they were destined never again to rise during 
the reign of the Emperor. 

But Napoleon knew only too well that a people of so high a 
grade of intelligence as the French craved not material pros- 
perity alone, but was sensible of other needs which were not to 
be satisfied with money and bread. Precisely what these were 
he was confident that he knew. When in 1797 at the close of 
the Italian war he for the first time considered making himself 
master of France and set that as his goal, he expressed himself 
in confidence to Miot in the following words: ^'The French want 
glory and the satisfaction of their vanity, but as for liberty 
they have no realization of what it means.'' And from that 
time he' had adopted this maxim as his guide. From every 
battlefield he had sent to assure them of the glories of their, arms 
and thus ministered to their national pride. His next care was 
to make provision for their personal vanity. On August 12th, 
1807, he addressed to Cambaceres a most extraordinary epistle 
in which he said : ' ' Since it is part of human nature for a man 
to wish to leave to his children some token of the esteem in which 
he has been held, as well as to provide for them a suitable and 
sufficient inheritance," he reserved to himself the right to confer 
other titles of nobility upon such as had rendered service to the 
state in the same way as the titular duchies had been founded 
in the previous year. Ministers, senators. Councillors of State, 
presidents of the Corps Legislatif, and archbishops as well, 



/Et. 38] The New Nobility 399 

should be granted the right to the title of Count, which might 
be transmitted to their heirs in accordance with the laws of 
primogeniture provided the testator could entail with it a yearly- 
income of 30,000 francs ; the presidents of the electoral colleges 
and courts of justice who were appointed for hfe, the attorneys- 
general, and mayors of the most important cities of the country 
should be made Barons and might Hkewise transmit the title by 
entail if endowed with a yearly income of 15,000 francs; the 
members of the Legion of Honour might transmit their knight- 
hood with an income of 3000 francs, while a Grand Dignitary 
must be able to leave an income of 200,000 francs to his heir in 
order to preserve to him the title of Prince. Now all this was 
diametrically opposed to the laws of inheritance as set forth in 
the Napoleonic Code. The Emperor, however, tried to make the 
matter acceptable to the Senate by clearly pointing out to that 
body that no manner of political privilege was associated with 
these hereditary titles any more than with the new feudal 
duchies, and that the fundamental law of equality thus remained 
absolutely inviolate. Allured by the title of Count, the senators 
yielded consent, and in March, 1808, the law went into effect.* 

* Shortly after his promulgation of the decree respecting the new 
nobility Napoleon expressed himself to Madame de R6musat somewhat 
as follows: ''Liberty is a need felt by a class small in number and gifted 
by nature with abilities above those of the common run of humanity. 
It can thus be restrained with impunity. Equality, on the contrary, 
pleases the multitude. I do not in the least offend against it in bestowing 
titles which are accorded to such and such persons without regard to the 
question of birth, which is just at present out of fashion. These titles 
are a sort of civic crown; they can be earned by good works. Moreover, 
clever men will give to those whom they govern the same impulses which 
they themselves have. Now my own impulse is altogether upward, and 
a similar one is needed to give a like impetus to the nation. . . . Not that I 
fail to see that all these nobles, and especially these dukes that I create 
and upon whom I bestow such enormous dotations, are going to become 
somewhat independent of me. Decorated and wealthy, they will attempt 
to escape my grasp and probably assume what they will call the spirit 
befitting their rank. Still they will not run so fast but that I shall know 
how to come up with them well enough." In later years, however, after 
his fall, he did characterize it as a mistake after all to have made his 



400 Affairs in France [I807 

But these distinctions accorded to civil functionaries were trifling 
as compared with those which Napoleon allotted to his com- 
panions-in-arms. Now began the bestowal of the long list of 
Italian titles upon his marshals: Soult became Duke of Dal- 
matia; Mortier, Duke of Treviso, Savary, Duke of Rovigo; 
Bessieres, Duke of Istria; Duroc, of Friuli; Victor, of Belluno; 
Moncey, of Conegliano; Clarke, of Feltre; Caulain court, of 
Vicenza; Massena, of Rivoli; Lannes, of Montebello; Mar- 
mont, of Ragusa; Oudinot, of Reggio; Macdonald, of Tar an to; 
Augereau, of Castiglione; Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte Corvo; 
Davout, Ney, and Lefebvre had acquired ducal titles in Germany: 
those of Auerstadt, Elchingen, and Danzig respectively; while 
Berthier had secured for himself the principality of Neufcha- 
tel.* With these titles were presented rich estates from the 
domains which the Emperor had reserved to himself from Poland, 
Italy, aud Germany, and which were to be hereditary with the 
titles according to the laws of primogeniture. For the time 
being the Emperor dispensed 11,000,000 francs among these 
favourites, one half in cash and the rest in securities. Berthier 
was the recipient of a million, while Ney, Davout, Soult, and 
Bessieres each received 600,000 francs, Massena, Augereau, Ber- 
nadotte, Mortier, and Victor each 400,000, and the others 200,000 
francs. t Provision was further made for the entire victorious 

instruments independent through wealth. Berthier, the one whom he 
had endowed the most splendidly of all, was the first to desert him. 

* Besides these military dukes there were also created a certain number 
from amongst the civilians: Cambaceres was made Duke of Parma; 
Maret, of Bassano; Lebrun, of Piacenza; Fouche, of Otranto; and Cham- 
pagny, of Cadore. 

t The incomes of the marshals were some years later increased to a 
considerable extent, so that Berthier, for instance, as Prince of Neufchatel, 
Vice-Constable, Marshal, and Grand Huntsman, was annually in receipt 
of 1,355,000 francs; Davout, Duke of Auerstadt, and Prince of Eckmiihl, 
of 910,000 francs; Ney, Duke of Elchingen, and after 1812 Prince of 
Moskowa, of 728,000 francs; Massena, Duke of Rivoli, and after 1809 
Prince of Esslingen, of 683,000 francs As for the civilians, under 
the Empire the emoluments of the office of Minister averaged not less 
than 200,000 francs, while the Minister of Foreign Affairs received even 
more. Ambassadors, who were called upon to represent the power of 



Mt. 38] Rewards to the Army 40 1 

&Tmy. Of the 18,000,000 francs which was employed for this 
purpose 12,000,000 fell to the rank and file, and was so appor- 
tioned that the wounded received a triple share, the remain- 
ing 6,000,000 being distributed among the officers. Such sol- 
diers as had lost a Hmb in the campaign were allowed pensions 
of 500 francs, while officers, commissioned and non-commis- 
sioned, who had particularly distinguished themselves were 
granted annuities up to 10,000 francs. Naturally the object of 
all this was but to make the more certain the loyalty of the 
army the less confident the Emperor became of his grasp upon 
the sympathies of the other part of the French people. It had 
been, moreover, for a long time his endeavour to denationaUze 
the army as far as possible, so that it should not cease to serve 
his international schemes. On this account also — and not alone 
for reasons of finance and foreign poHtics — did he leave the 
Grand Army in Germany and Poland, which countries it was 
to evacute only w^hen Prussia should have paid off the exorbi- 
tant sum which he had demanded as war-indemnity. Only 
the Guard had been allowed to return home, where it had been 
given strict orders to hold itself to the greatest possible extent 
aloof from civil fife. 

In his care for the material interests of the French, for their 
thirst for glory, and for their vanity, Napoleon felt that he had 
done enough for this country of France which he had once cjmi- 
cally called his mistress and which was so devoted that she was 
ready to sacrifice for him her treasures and her blood. He still 
held firmly to his idea that Hberty was no requisite of the com- 
mon people, but only a pretence of those whom he disdainfully 
styled' 'Ideologists," upon whose shoulders he laid the blame of 
the anarchy of the Revolution, and against whose influence upon 
pubhc opinion he waged war with all his force. Hence arose his 
measures against the press, against newspapers and books, which 
became from year to year more severe; hence his solicitude to 

the Emperor in the most splendid manner at foreign courts, were furnished 
with a salary more than sufficient, as, for example, in the case of Caulain- 
court, who was now sent to Russia with an annual stipend of from 700,000 
to 800,000 francs. 



4ol Affairs In France [Uol 

withhold from all publicity the discussions of his laws, hence his 
attempts against the independence of the judiciary which could 
provide a refuge to the opponents of his system of compulsory 
benefits, and hence also his plan for protecting the coming 
generation from all temptations of imrestricted mental activity 
by means of a correct and uniform method of instruction. In all 
of these directions he displayed an indefatigable zeal which must 
not be passed over without comment in an historical sketch. 

Mention has already been made of Napoleon's antipathy to 
Madame de Stael, whom he compelled to leave France and event- 
ually sentenced to perpetual banishment ''because," as he inti- 
mated, ''she inspired thought in people who had never taken it 
into their heads to think before or who had forgotten how." He 
wrote from Finkenstein to Fouche that, much to his satisfaction, 
she was no longer talked about.* Chateaubriand, who, in 1802, 
had dedicated his "Genie de Christianisme " to the "Restorer 
of ReHgion," had brought himself into disfavour with the Em- 
peror by an adverse criticism of the d'Enghien episode and was 
likewise soon after obhged to leave his native country because his 
influence in the salons of the opposition party in Paris seemed 
dangerous. An article on Spain which he wrote in the "Mer- 
cure de France " shortly before Napoleon's return in 1807, and 
which contained allusions not to be misunderstood, had the fur- 
ther result of depriving him of his property. A still harder fate 
would have been his but for the friendship of Fontanes, who, 
hke many another, had gladly put his talents at the service 
of the all-powerful Emperor. Jacques Delille, the author of 
"I'Homme des Champs" and "T Imagination" and the trans- 
lator of the ^neid, escaped unscathed only on account of the 
high esteem in which he was held and the un censurable nature 
of the matter of which he treated. His example was followed 
by a number of poets who carefully avoided every political and 
social problem and confined themselves to subjects of an indif- 

* Madame de Recamier and Madame de Chevreuse shared the same 
fate as Madame de Stael. Even when stricken with mortal illness Madame 
de Chevreuse was not allowed to return to Paris that she might consult 
her physician, and died in exile. 



>Et. 38] The Censureship of Literature 403 

ferent or inferior order which, as if in compensation, they 
treated in a masterly way, and it is perhaps safe to ascribe in 
some measure at least to that time of restricted thought and 
hampered imagination the high value already attached in 
France to the art of pleasing expression and perfection of form 
in and for itself. Upon the stage, to which the Emperor devoted 
special attention, he wished to see no subjects presented which 
dealt with '' times too near the present"; they must in any case 
belong to a period before Henri IV., for which popular character 
he entertained the most decided aversion. ''I see," said he one 
day, " that you are playing a tragedy of Henri IV. That period 
is not yet distant enough to fail to awaken the passions. What 
the stage requires is antiquity." Not until Mozart's " Don 
Juan" had been demonstrated to him to be not dangerous to 
'Tesprit public" could authorization be obtained for its produc- 
tion. Drama and comedy casting reflections upon modern 
life were in hke manner interdicted, '*' because," as Madame 
de Remusat explains, '^ no one dared to exhibit upon the boards 
the weaknesses and foibles of the various classes of society when 
all society had been renewed by Bonaparte, whose work had to 
be respected." 

With such a fate for ^' belles-lettres" no one could doubt as 
to what would be that of the daily press. The beginnings of 
newspaper censorship under the Consulate have already been 
considered. Under the Empire there remained at the end of a 
short time but four independent papers in Paris : the " Citoyen 
Frangais," the " Mercure de France," the '* Journal des Debats," 
and the " Pubhciste." Even the names were displeasing to 
the Emperor, who wanted nothing to do with " Citoyens " and 
" Debats," and, in fact, the " Citoyen " was compelled to change 
its appellation to '^ Courrier Frangais, " while the ''Journal des 
Debats" had to become the "Journal de I'Empire." These 
papers stood in constant danger of being suppressed. When, 
in 1805, they ventured upon one occasion to make some ob- 
servations in regard to the luxury displayed at court, the editors 
were informed " that the Revolutionary times were past and 
over and that there now remained but a single party in France, 



404 Affairs in France [isor 

which would never suffer the newspapers to say or do anything 
contrary to its interests." A year later Napoleon wrote to 
Talleyrand: ''It is my intention to have the political articles 
for the ' Moniteur ' written by officials in the Foreign Office, and 
after I have observed for a month how these are done I shall 
forbid the other newspapers to discuss poUtics otherwise than 
in imitation of the articles in the ' Moniteur/ " But when, as a 
result of these restrictions, the contents of the Paris papers be- 
came destitute of force or meaning he was no better satisfied 
than before. He wanted to be extolled. 

And just as he had prohibited all critical discussion of his 
government in Uterature and periodical pubhcations did he 
want to impose silence also in the Tribunate, the one body to 
which the right of discussion still legally remained as provided 
for in the Constitution. He determined to make this impossible 
even behind closed doors. Accordingly at its last session in 
December, 1807, a decree of the Senate was submitted to the 
'^ Corps Legislatif " pronouncing the dissolution of the Tribunate, 
the members of which were appointed to office among the vari- 
ous sections of the ''Corps Legislatif," while its president was 
called to the Senate, and, further, fixing the age hmit for mem- 
bership in the '^ Corps Legislatif " at forty years. Napoleon, who 
was himself at that time but thirty-eight, knew full well how 
much youth was disposed to be precipitate in dealing with po- 
litical projects, and wished to see only sedate and tranquilly- 
disposed men in this body, which for appearance^ sake was still 
called legislative, but was such only in name. His will alone 
gave laws to France, all else was mere unessential form. Hence 
he was able to issue a decree by which he evaded the irremovabihty 
of judges, guaranteed by the Constitution, by requiring every 
judge to pass through a period of five years' probation before 
he could be recognized as definitely irremovable, the final de- 
cision to come from a commission of ten senators appointed 
by the Emperor. Hence it was, also, that imprisonment for 
political offenders again became a possibiHty. And every- 
where the Senate co-operated with obsequious assiduity, heed- 
of the concealed aversion of unprejudiced minds for 



iET. 38] A System of Repression 405 

such boundless servility. What mattered it to the senators 
that their conduct was regarded with contempt as expressed, 
for instance, by Joseph Chenier in his '' Tiberius" where, speak- 
ing of the Roman senators, he says: 

"They daily seek their own opinion in mine eyes, 
Reserving to the wretched their hireling insolence, 
Flattering in their discourse, in their very silence cringing, 
Fearing to think, to speak, perform an act. 
'Tis I must blush for them, since e'en to blush 
They lack the courage " ? 

But Chenier was sufficiently mindful of his own advantage 
to keep his ''Tiberius" secure in his own possession imder lock 
and key, while his '' Cyrus" eulogized the Emperor. And what 
mattered it that the words '' despotism" and 'Hyranny" were 
whispered about? They were only whispered, and for that 
very reason could not be far-reaching in their effect. As one 
day Suard, one of the most respected pubhcists, was speak- 
ing to Napoleon in terms of admiration regarding Tacitus and 
his descriptions of the Roman emperors, his Majesty rephed: 
" Excellent, but he ought to make clear to us how it was that 
the Roman people tolerated and loved even the bad emperors. 
That is the point upon which it was of consequence to inform 
posterity." And here he hinted at the real foundation of his 
own power, for he was perfectly aware that the moment was 
not yet come when France could get on without him. He made 
frequent comparisons of his own government with that of the 
Roman emperors, especially with that of Diocletian. ''You who 
are so well acquainted with history," said he to Narbonne in 
1814, "are you not struck by the points of resemblance be- 
tween my government and that of Diocletian, by this close- 
woven net which I spread to such a distance, by these ubiquitous 
eyes of the Emperor, and by this civil authority which I have 
known how to maintain in all its force in an Empire absorbed 
in war? I have many traits in common with Diocletian from 
Egypt to lUyria, only I neither persecute the Christians nor 
abdicate the imperial throne." * Madame de Remusat lamented 
* Villemain, Souvenirs, p. 177. 



4o6 Affairs in France [i807 

to Talleyrand upon one occasion at about this time that, al- 
though she had no choice but to remain at the French court, 
she could not help hating the Emperor for his evil qualities, — 
for he sowed discord between friends and between man and 
wife, and made the most of the weaknesses of his attendants, 
so that he might govern them, thus divided, all the more surely. 
To this replied the diplomat, who was also far from being kindly 
disposed toward Napoleon: ^' Child that you are, why is it 
that you are always putting your heart in all that you do? 
Trust me, do not compromise it by feeling any attachment for 
that man, but be assured that, with all his faults, he is still very 
necessary to France, which he knows how to uphold and to this 
object each of us ought to contribute all in our power. . . /' 
Therein lay the secret of the Emperor. 

With such precautions, then, Napoleon might rest content 
that not so much as a breath of adverse criticism would reach 
the mass of the French people to disturb the respect and esteem 
with which it regarded his government. But besides this he 
had for a long time cherished the idea of protecting the rising 
generation from the outset against any assaults of that kind by 
bringing them up to believe in imperialism, much as the Jesuit 
schools trained its disciples to ultramontanism. Beginnings 
toward the establishment of such a system had already been 
made in the time of the Consulate and have already been 
alluded to; they were now completed by the institution of the 
"University." A special circumstance added its weight to the 
furtherance of this project. In 1804 the great diocesan semi- 
naries had been founded in conformity with the stipulations of 
the Concordat. Only a short time afterwards the clergy had 
associated with them the so-called "little seminaries," which, 
like the state ''lycees," or colleges, were preparatory to the 
higher professional studies. These ecclesiastical schools, like 
the secondary schools of the state, were open to all and were 
the better attended as the instructors made the most of their 
opportunities for finding fault with the methods of teaching as 
well as the morals of the imperial institutions. But criticism 
was not to be tolerated by Napoleon, who now proposed to have 



.Et. 38] The Imperial University 407 

the entire administrative organization regarded as his personal 
achievement, and a plan was maturing in his mind for ridding 
himself with the least possible delay of this competition in the 
education of the French youth. On May 10th, 1806, he issued 
a decree that a corporation should be established under the 
name of the "Imperial University," to which should be given 
exclusive charge of public instruction and the whole educational 
system. In the report made by Fourcroy, the Director of the 
Section of Instruction, occurred this statement: "His Majesty 
desires a corporation whose teachings are not exposed to every 
fever of fashion, which shall keep on when the government rests 
from its labours, and of which the management and the regula- 
tions shall be so national in character that none will inconsid- 
erately lay hands upon it to interfere in its workings. If this 
hope should be realized His Majesty expects to find in this 
corporation a guarantee against the pernicious theories of 
universal revolution. His Majesty proposes to carry out in a 
state containing 40,000,000 inhabitants all that has been en- 
joyed by Sparta and Athens and what the religious orders have 
striven with but imperfect success to attain. ' ' On March 17th, 
1808, this statute, having been elaborated, was promulgated 
without authorization of the legislature. From this time the 
university included all branches of public instruction now mon- 
opolized by the state — all institutions of learning from the 
primary school up to the faculties of the learned professions.* 
It was provided with its own budget in the form of an endow- 
ment of 400,000,000 francs in government stocks, and this 
was to be separate from the state budget, ''so that education 
might not have to suffer under the temporary distresses of state 
finances." At the head of the corporation, formed of the entire 
scholastic profession of France, there stood a Grand Master 
appointed by the Emperor, and with him a Chancellor and a 
Treasurer, besides a University Council consisting of thirty 
members, of which ten were appointed by the Emperor for fife 

* To this rule there were excepted only certain higher technical schools, 
such as the "Ecole poly technique," which was organized on a military 
basis, the scientific schools, and the great ecclesiastical seminaries. 



4o8 Affairs in France [I807 

and the remaining twenty by the Grand Master for a year's 
time. This Council was to draw up the regulations for the schools, 
to decide upon text-books and methods of instruction, and to 
exercise disciplinary power over the members of the University, 
that is, over the whole body of instructors in France. A part 
of this number — for instance, the professors at the ^'lycees" — 
had to pledge themselves to celibacy. All were free from the 
performance of military service. The teachers of the secondary 
schools were trained for their calHng in the "Ecole Normale." 
Those particularly distinguishing themselves there were awarded 
— aside from promotion — titles of honour by the Grand Master 
and became titular officers of the University. The sphere of 
instruction throughout the whole country was divided up into 
districts called "Academies," each presided over by a Rector 
and an Academic Council resembling the Grand Master and 
Council of the University.* The whole system of pubhc in- 
struction was then henceforth as strictly centrahzed and ruled 
with the same spirit of absolutism as the other departments of 
government. The institution has since that time received high 
commendation and has been condemned with equal vigour. 
One thing is certainly true, that young men attending the 
"lycees" learned more than the sons of the aristocratic families 
who were taught at home. The one fault of the system lay in 
the fact that the uniformity of the requirements left all too little 
scope for originality on the part of the teacher, and, if one of 
the principal tasks of education consists in the development 
and mental stimulation of individual talents so that these may 
at some future time be of the greatest possible service to the 
general good, there can be no doubt that herein the system was 
more than a failure, for the exact contrary was the result attained 

* In establishing the University Napoleon had in mind only the 
instruction of boys. He would not tolerate the idea of pubUc schools for 
girls. ''I do not think that there is any occasion for considering the 
method of instruction for girls," was his reply when his attention was 
called to this deficiency; "they cannot be better brought up than by 
their mothers ; public education is not suitable for them, since they are 
not called upon to take part in pubhc life." It was evident that Madame 
de Stael was not to be put out of his mind. 



^T. 38] The Catechism of Loyalty 409 

and probably intended; for the ultimate purpose of this insti- 
tution was after all, like the others, only to subserve the Em- 
peror's own system. But even if the national government had 
rehnquished the direction of education to the corporation, and 
thus relieved itself of the burden, it still retained closely within 
its grasp the superintendence and control over the same. The 
decisions of the Grand Master had to be submitted first of all 
to the judgment of the Council of State, which had power to 
annul them, and in the departments the schools were visited 
by the prefects, who reported upon them to the Minister of 
the Interior. In fact the minister came forward to provide the 
very first text-book for the University: the catechism which 
had been brought to completion in 1806 with the concurrence of 
the Cardinal Legate Caprara, whom Napoleon had repeatedly 
assisted out of financial straits. In this catechism the political 
creed of the rising generation in France was thus formulated: 
''We owe to our Emperor Napoleon I. love, respect, obedience, 
fidelity, military service, tributes decreed for the defence of the 
Empire and of his throne; we owe to him also fervent prayers 
for his safety and for the prosperity of the state, both spiritual 
and material. We are under obligations to perform all of these 
duties toward him because God has crowned him with manifold 
gifts in war as in peace, establishing him as our sovereign, the 
instrument of His power, and giving him His own likeness upon 
earth. To honour and serve our Emperor is to honour and 
serve God Himself, and this is especially our duty because he it 
is whom God the Most High hath raised up in troublous times 
to re-establish public worship in the holy religion of our fathers 
and to be its protector. He it is who by his profound and ener- 
getic wisdom has brought back and maintained public order, 
who has defended the state with his powerful arm, and who has 
become the anointed of the Lord through consecration at the 
hands of the Pope, the sovereign pontiff of the Church Universal." 
To the question what was to be thought of those who should 
fail to perform their obligations toward the Emperor, the cate- 
chism made answer: "According to St. Paul they would sin 
against the ordinances of God Himself and draw down upon 
themselves eternal damnation." 



41 o Affairs in France Li807 

That was surely no small measure of success to have been 
attained by the famishing lieutenant of Valence, to see himself 
revered by the most cultured nation in the world as "the like- 
ness of God upon earth.'^ And yet this was but a trifle when 
compared with his inordinate ambition. The bounds of that 
state had long been to him too restricted, and to walk the earth 
simply as the image of deity was, after all, not just to his mind. 
On the day of his coronation as Emperor, in December, 1804, he 
had said to Decres, the Minister of the Navy, that he had been 
born too late into the world, in which there was no longer 
anything great to be accomplished; and when Decres replied 
that he ought to be satisfied, he rejoined: ''My record has been 
brilliant, I acknowledge, and I have had an excellent career. 
But how different from ancient times! Take Alexander, for 
instance; after having conquered Asia he announced himself 
to the people to be the son of Jupiter, and, with the exception 
of his mother, Olympias, who was in a position to know, and of 
Aristotle and a few Athenian pedants, he was believed by the 
entire Orient. Well, then, take my case! If I were to announce 
myself to-day to be the son of the Everlasting Father, if I were 
to declare that I was going to return thanks to Him by virtue 
of that fact, there isn't a fish- wife who would not jeer at me as I 
passed! The people are far too much enlightened; there is 
nothing great left to be done." In short, he was not satisfied. 

No one realized this more unmistakably than those imme- 
diately about him. From the Empress down to the meanest 
lackey the entire court had to suffer from this perpetual dissat- 
isfaction. Josephine, who well remembered how the young 
general had at one time regarded the union with herself as a 
stroke of fortune, had now sunk far beneath his level and trem- 
bled at the prospect of divorce, in regard to which Napoleon now 
first began to make intimations. Not that he desired a sepa- 
ration from the companion in life to whom he had become 
accustomed; it was only consideration for the inheritance of 
his crown which brought the idea more than formerly to mind. 
For Louis's son, the little Napoleon, whom the Emperor had 
once had thoughts of adopting, and who in gossip was spoken 



JIt. 38] Changes in Napoleon's Manner 411 

of as his own child, had died during the last campaign, while 
his Uttle brother was only an infant two years of age and of very 
delicate constitution.* Moreover, the alliance with Russia had 
suggested to him the idea of a union with the house of the Czars 
which should be ''suitable to his rank"; at least it is claimed 
that such had been under discussion even in Tilsit. Under such 
circumstances it was not easy for Josephine to assert her posi- 
tion. She was all submissiveness and pUant devotion, addressed 
the Emperor even in the most confidential intercourse only as 
"Your Majesty," having long ceased to use the famiUar ''thou" 
in speaking to him^ squandered, as she had been told to do, her 
600,000 francs, and even more of pin-money, anxiously avoided 
every occasion in which she might be in the way of her tyrannical 
lord, and remained at all times equally gracious, equally amiable, 
equally insignificant. To the whole court she set an example 
of anxious foreboding, and her apprehension at her husband's 
return as a victor was characteristic, ''for,'' said she, "the Em- 
peror is so prosperous that he will surely have much fault to find." 
And indeed the whole court was characterized by uneasi- 
ness and awe. Since the war of 1805 Napoleon was a changed 
man in one respect, inasmuch as he now carefully avoided all 
famiUarity with any one, surrounded himself with great cere- 
mony, and, if he allowed himself to be misled for a moment into 
using a tone of confidential and friendly feeling, at once effaced 
its impression by a few curt words addressed as to an inferior. 
No one of his brothers was allowed to seat himself in his presence, 
no one of them might venture to direct a word to him until 
spoken to, no one of them continued to use "thou " in addressing 
him. Frequently on reception evenings there would be many 
more than a hundred persons gathered together, of whom not 
one dared to utter a word, all awaiting speechless the appear- 
ance of His Majesty. And in case the Emperor was then in 
ill-humour on account of the insolent Enghsh papers. Which 
were severe enough in their usage of " General Bonaparte," the 
entire court was made to feel the consequences. Then he cast 

* The third son of Queen Hortense, the future Emperor Napoleon III., 
was in 1807 yet unborn. 



412 Affairs in France [I807 

off all semblance of courtesy; he would say, for instance, to a 
lady after she had stated her name : ^ ' Heavens ! I had been 
told that you were pretty," or to an old man: ''You have not 
much longer to hve," and other like urbanities. The melan- 
choly dreaminess which had characterized him at the time of 
the Consulate had thus given place to almost constant morose- 
ness, and it became more and more difficult to wait upon him. 
His manner of life was irregular. He would sometimes keep his 
Coimcil in session about him imtil far into the night without 
being himself in the least wearied thereby. And again, as fre- 
quently occurred, he would rise in the middle of the night in 
order to work, when he would dictate to his secretaries with 
such rapidity that his words could be followed only with a sort 
of short-hand; or else he would remain for hours in the bath, a 
habit he had acquired at the recommendation of his physician- 
in-ordinary, Corvisart, who was of opinion that it would tend to 
quiet his nerves. But in this he could scarcely be said to have 
been successful; his nervous irritabihty was constantly upon 
the increase, sometimes taking the form of convulsive weeping. 
The same man who had felt in perfect health in the midst of the 
fatigues and cares of the campaign and who did not move so 
much as an eyelash even at the most critical moments of a 
battle, could fly into a rage at the most trifling discomfort in 
his own palace. Many a garment did he tear to pieces in his 
impatience because it incommoded him even in the sUghtest 
possible degree, and it was understood among his attendants that 
it was necessary to supply state apparel which should be exactly 
fitting. For this reason he commonly presented rather a slovenly 
appearance, and, now that he had grown corpulent during the 
last few years, he made in walk and bearing anything but a 
majestic impression. 

But so much the more splendid became the display of the 
court about him. Upon his return to Paris he had reproached 
Fouche, his Minister of PoHce, the ''Jacobin grown wealthy," as 
he called him, with not having exercised sufficient surveillance 
over the aristocratic salons in the Faubourg St. Germain with 
their conversations and witticisms all savouring of the opposi- 



Mt. 38] Court Life 413 

tion. FoTdche at this announced to the high nobihty that they 
could disarm the anger of the potentate only by making ad- 
vances to him, and, as a result, a large number of men of an- 
cient Hneage, who had until now ranged themselves agaiast 
the government, actually had themselves presented at court, 
thus enhanciQg its briUiancy to a very considerable extent. 
Besides these additions there now came to Paris also several of 
the Princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, either to render 
personal homage to their new lord or to beg of him some new 
favour. One of the two Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg con- 
cluded that the surest way of attaining his object lay in paying 
conspicuous attentions to the Empress. Dalberg also made his 
appearance to solemnize the marriage of Jerome to the Princess 
Katharina of Wiirtemberg on August 23d, 1807. He is said to 
have stood out prominently among the other German sovereigns 
as the only one with whom an animated conversation could be 
carried on. Those veterans who had aided Napoleon in winning 
his victories, the marshals, were also for the most part at court; 
not in uniform, however, but in state dress; not as warriors, 
but as chamberlains, because Napoleon did not like to be re- 
minded of hours of more famihar intercourse on the field and 
of many a sacrifice which had been made for him there. He 
spoke of them also sometimes in a way which was by no means 
flattering. '' Davout," said he, ''is a man upon whom I might 
bestow honours, but he will never know how to wear them grace- 
fully"; Neyhad ''an ungrateful and factious disposition''; Bes- 
sieres, Oudinot, and Victor were, according to him, nothing 
more than " mediocre.'' Of them all Lannes alone had contin- 
ued to address him as "thou," to which manner of speech on 
his part Napoleon cam.e at last to be reconciled, for he was in- 
dispensable. Besides this one man hardly Soult himself had the 
courage to express an opinion differing from his in regard to 
miHtary matters. Most of the others were under the spell of 
his powerful personality. The brutal Vandamme admitted 
upon one occasion that he began to tremble when he came into 
the presence of "this devil of a man," and that Napoleon could 
drive him through the eye of a needle. 



414 Affairs in France [I807 

In the latter part of the summer of 1807 the Court was at 
Fontainebleau. There were organized theatrical performances 
by the best actors of the " Comedie Frangaise," concerts by 
the best Itahan singers, balls, hunts on horseback, and other 
like diversions. But there was not much pleasure taken in 
them. Napoleon was occupied with affairs of business here as 
everywhere else, and generally out of temper. " I pity you," 
said Talleyrand to Monsieur de Remusat, the Prefect of the 
Palace, " for you are expected to amuse the unamusable." The 
entire court suffered under it. The formal receptions or '*cer- 
cles, " where no one spoke, and the perpetual tragedies — for 
comedy was prohibited — were productive of tedium and weari- 
ness. This fact did not escape the Emperor, who asked Talley- 
rand what could be the cause of it, to which his illustrious diplo- 
mat replied: '*It is because pleasure is not forthcoming at 
beat of drum, and you always look as if saying to each of 
us, 'Come, ladies and gentlemen, forward, march!'" Talley- 
rand might venture to say more than most men. Napoleon 
affirmed that he was the only person with whom he could talk. 
There was one thing, however, which must above all be guarded 
against : he must not for a moment think himself indispensable, 
as had seemingly been threatened since the Treaty of Tilsit. 
For that reason he bestowed upon him after the war the Grand 
Dignitary office of Vice-Grand Elector with a munificent in- 
come, but deprived him of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, his 
new dignity being incompatible with the old office, which fell 
to the lot of Champagny, who had been until now Minister of 
the Interior. Talleyrand was, however, to continue his per- 
manent adviser, and at Fontainebleau he was indeed to 
be seen every evening limping into the Emperor's cabinet, 
whence he would not again appear until after long hours had 
elapsed. 

And, in fact, matter enough did the times provide for their 
discussions. 

Suddenly, in the midst of the festivities at Fontainebleau, 
arrived tidings which amazed and terrified the world at large, 
but which to Napoleon and his plans were of very special sig- 



^T. 38] England Seizes the Danish Fleet 415 

nificance: England had sent a fleet with an expeditionary- 
corps to surprise and attack Denmark, which was a neutral 
power; Copenhagen had been bombarded for three days, from 
the 2d to the 5th of September, 1807, and the Danish fleet there 
stationed carried off. Such an abrupt and swiftly-executed 
act on the part of the ever-dilatory British had been anticipated 
by no one, not even by Napoleon himself. It developed later, 
to be sure, that soon after the conclusion of the secret Treaty 
of AUiance at Tilsit the English government was, through an 
indiscretion, made acquainted with its contents and had gath- 
ered from it that Denmark was soon to be constrained to take 
part in the Continental Alliance and, with her fleet, to shut 
out British vessels from the Baltic. The London ministry had 
now warded off this stroke by the outrage committed upon 
Copenhagen. For although the energetic Frederick, Prince 
Regent of Denmark, governing in place of the dotard Christian 
VIL, now concluded an alliance with France, — on October 30th 
1807, — ^his fleet was already gone, leaving no means of guard- 
ing the passage through the Sound against the British. 

This conduct on England's part furnished the solution to 
one of the two great questions which had been left open at the 
time of the Tilsit Alliance: there was no longer any possibility 
of an amicable arrangement between Great Britain and the 
Continent while under the ascendency of Napoleon. Russia 
was obliged to acknowledge as hopeless her mission to mediate 
peace and, in accordance with the terms of the Alliance, 
to declare war against England. And this she proceeded to 
do on November 7th, 1807. It was not indeed without mis- 
givings that the Czar made up his mind to this step, for, as has 
been stated, traffic with the island realm was a necessity to 
his empire. The source of Russia's wealth lay in the export of 
the products of her rich fields and forests, which were disposed 
of through the agency of the British, who could handle them 
better and more economically than any one else; on the other 
hand, the lack of home industries made articles of British manu- 
facture indispensable to Russian consumers. Those classes of 
the population most immediately concerned — ^first of all the 



41 6 Affairs in France [i807 

landed nobility, then the merchants and the financiers — saw 
themselves threatened with enormous losses; the army, which 
had previously been itself desirous of peace,was now more than 
ever dissatisfied at the prospect of having shed its blood for 
nothing but the ruin of the country; in short, the opposition to 
the introduction of the Continental blockade was almost uni- 
versal and manifested itself here and there with suspicious open- 
ness. This feeling is supposed to have had much influence 
later in leading to the rupture with Napoleon. But, for the 
present at least, Alexander, who was convinced that it would 
be long before a successful war could be waged against the all- 
powerful French, maintained his own autocratic will, although 
he felt little personal confidence in his great ally.* The 
essential point was to him, after all, that he saw in this aUiance 
the means of obtaining possession of the Turkish principahties 
upon the Danube — ^Moldavia and Wallachia — as well as of Fin- 
land, still belonging to Sweden. 

Hardly more than a few days had passed after his rupture 
with England before he formally demanded of Savary, the 
French ambassador at St. Petersburg, that these two princi- 
palities should be united to Russia and that they should pro- 
ceed to the partition of Turkey, the plan of which had been pro- 
posed at Tilsit. For French mediation between Russia and 
Turkey, which constituted one of the stipulations of the Treaty 
of AUiance and which was to have brought about peace be- 
tween the two powers, had resulted in nothing. On August 
29th, 1807, preliminaries had, it is true, been signed at Slobosia, 
but the Czar had refused to ratify them since they contained 
no word of ceding to him the two principalities. 

This question was very soon to give rise to discord between 
the allies, not, to be sure, outspoken and pubHc, but secret. 
Napoleon was kept exactly informed concerning the current of 
the opposition in Russia by his envoy Savary, who was replaced 
at St. Petersburg in December by the ''Ambassador Extraordi- 

* In November, 1807, upon being warned by Scholer, the Prussian 
ambass^,dor, against reposing too much confidence in Napoleon, he had 
replied that in dealing with that man there could be no thought of reliance. 



Mt. 38] The Turkish Question 4 1 7 

nary " Caulaincourt^ and by Soult and Davout, who had remained 
with their corps in Poland and Prussia. He also knew, and 
that through personal experience, how suddenly the Czar might 
be persuaded into taking a pohtical course directly contrary to 
that which he had been pursuing. He was thus obHged to bear 
constantly in mind the possibility of a change of front on the 
banks of the Neva. It was, as has been said, his principle of 
guidance to treat all friends as if they might at any time become 
his enemies. And how easy it would be for Russia under pre- 
vailing conditions to change again into a foe! And he was to 
assist such an ally to greater power! He was actually to pro- 
cure the principaHties on the Danube for the Gzar and thus 
yield to him the most direct influence upon Oriental affairs, in 
spite of the fact that he so especially desired to control them 
himself! Of a surety not. He refused peremptorily to pro- 
ceed to the dismemberment of Turkey; in the first place, as he 
said, England would surely take the Hon's share in appropri- 
ating Egypt, Cyprus, etc., which would make her position in 
India invulnerable and thus put an end to his own vast schemes. 

For this reason, he believed it to be indispensable — and there 
were other reasons which argued in favour of such a decision — to 
keep his army on the watch along the Russian border-line, and 
to delay the evacuation of Prussia by the continual exaction 
of new and inordinate contributions from that state.* And 
there was still another consideration. 

As has been observed, there now prevailed in Turkey also a 
feeling of opposition to France; already the Porte had begun 
to make advances toward England and threatened to estab- 
lish friendly relations with that power. If that result should 
be brought about, British commerce, which was to have been 

* In a convention signed July 12th, 1807, the Prussian negotiator, 
General Kalkreuth, had allowed the French to impose upon him the 
stipulation that Prussia should indeed be evacuated according to designated 
times and stages, but only upon its having paid the war-indemnity in full 
or upon having furnished sufficient guarantee of its payment. But, 
since this indemnity had by order of Napoleon been arbitrarily set at over 
150,000,000 francs, there was little prospect that Frederick William III 
would ever be able to fulfil that condition. 



41 8 Affairs in France [1807 

shut out from all Europe, would thus have opened to it a wide 
access, while to Napoleon, whose thoughts were always bent 
upon an expedition to India, the sally-port toward the east 
would be closed. That was not to be tolerated. The Balkan 
Peninsula must be brought absolutely under his own control. 
For this it was that he had demanded Corfu, and for this that 
he now ordered it fortified in all haste and, immediately upon 
hearing of the Russian declaration of war against England, 
gave orders to his Minister of the Navy to assemble a fleet with 
which he might again conquer Malta and Sicily, whilst shutting 
out the British in the west from any access to the Mediterranean 
by an attack upon Gibraltar; for this he now requested of the 
Sultan permission for his troops to pass from Dalmatia through 
Albania, and for this also he re-enforced the corps in Dalmatia. 
This was expecting much of Turkey; to ask more would have 
meant driving her into England's arms. To demand that she 
should surrender the principahties on the Danube to her he- 
reditary foe would unquestionably have brought about that 
result. It may be, as Alexander afterwards averred, that Na- 
poleon was the first to speak of the Danubian principalities at 
Tilsit, but, if so, it was of course only for the sake of winning 
over the Czar to his system of opposition to England. Since, 
then, this object had been accompUshed by Russia's declara- 
tion of war against George III., there was no further occasion 
for heeding his promise. Instead of this the Corsican now 
made two moves upon the great political chess-board which ab- 
solutely checkmated Russia's Oriental schemes. 

In the first place, while making, of course, constant affirma- 
tions of his friendship to the Czar, he declared himself ready 
indeed to procure the countries on the Danube for Russia, but 
only in case that state would authorize his annexation of Prus- 
sian Silesia; otherwise, in case the Czar did not withdraw his 
troops from Wallachia, his own should continue to occupy Ger- 
many. Now Russia could not with any semblance of decency 
lend her own assistance to the spoHation of Prussia, whom she 
had taken under her protection, and accordingly decHned, leav- 
ing her divisions on the Danube, thus enabling Napoleon to 



JEr.ss] Overreaching the Czar 419 

refer in Constantinople to his own good offices and to the ma- 
Hcious Russians who did not want peace, — by means of which 
representations he was actually successful in inducing the Turks 
to keep their ports closed against the EngUsh. 

Then he proceeded to make his second dexterous move 
against Alexander. Gustavus IV. of Sweden, partly from fear 
of experiencing the fate of Denmark, and partly out of personal 
dislike of Napoleon and his system, had adhered to his alliance 
with England. Napoleon now reminded the Czar of that arti- 
cle of their agreement presupposing this case, urging Alexander 
to declare war against his brother-in-law, the King of Sweden, 
and conquer Finland for himself, saying that he would gladly 
lend his assistance, and that Bernadotte with his army corps 
in Holstein was already set apart for that purpose. Although 
the principalities on the Danube lay nearer the heart of the Czar 
than Finland, he nevertheless acceded to this proposal, and, 
while his Minister in St. Petersburg was still deluding the 
Swedish ambassador with false assurances of safety, the Russian 
troops suddenly crossed the border into Finland during the 
last week of February, 1808. Evidently he had counted upon 
the expedition as being very easy of accomjilishment, especially 
in view of the promised aid from France, and had not reduced 
his forces upon the Danube. The outcome was, however, quite 
different from what he had looked for. The Swedes, supported 
by the English, offered effectual resistance, whereat the Czar 
began to appreciate the difficulties involved in the enterprise 
and that his expeditionary army must be re-enforced. Poland 
could not be stripped of soldiery on account of the French in 
Prussia, and he thus saw himself compelled to draw his re- 
enforcements after all from the Danubian principalities, which 
meant giving up hope of conquest there for the time being. 
This measure would, it is true, not have been necessary if Berna- 
dotte had really given the promised support to the Russians. 
But he did nothing of the kind. For it was precisely the pur- 
pose of Napoleon to entangle Alexander so inextricably in the 
Finnish -undertaking that he would abandon Turkish enter- 
prise of his own accord. To Caulaincourt the Czar made com- 



420 Affairs in France [I8O8 

plaint, demanding to know why it was that, although France 
had pledged herself to give efficient support to Russia's efforts 
against Sweden, Marshal Bernadotte had suddenly ceased to 
advance. In reply the ambassador could only allege as the 
reason the difficulties in the way of crossing the Belt to Schonen. 
But this was, of course, not the true answer. That the Czar 
might have read in a letter of Napoleon's to Talleyrand, dated 
April 25th, 1808, in which he said: "You understand well 
enough that I could not as a matter of fact so lightly turn my 
soldiers upon Sweden, and that my concerns do not lie in that 
direction." On the contrary, the French divisions in Poland 
and Prussia were now concentrated and strong fortifications 
erected at the strategic point near Modlin where the Bug River 
flows into the Vistula — a precaution against all contingencies, 
for dissatisfaction was increasing daily in the land of the ally 
and there was no knowing what would come of it. Meanwhile, 
as a decoy to Russia, he instructed Caulaincourt, his ambas- 
sador at St. Petersburg, not to refuse frankly to discuss the 
partition of Turkey, but to reserve the solution of the question 
for a new interview between the two emperors. 

This attitude which Napoleon had assumed toward Russia 
must be kept in mind in order rightly to comprehend his con- 
duct of the same time toward the other states of Europe. As 
a matter of course it was impossible under existing circum- 
stances for Prussia and Austria to escape from the sphere of 
his power, for the incessant occupation of Northern Germany 
not only had the effect of holding Russia in check, but at the 
same time threatened and hampered the political affairs of the 
powers of Middle Europe. Therefore Alexander had hardly more 
than issued his manifesto against England before the Prussian 
Court at Memel was compelled to recall its ambassador from 
London on November 29th. In February, 1808, Napoleon de- 
clared without the least circumlocution to the brother of Fred- 
erick William in Paris that the question of the evacuation of 
Prussia had its own place in the great combination of universal 
policy and was not in the least a matter of money, which was 
equivalent to saying that even upon the fulfilment of all French 



^T 38] Pressure on Austria 421 

demands the King could not hope to be rid of the French in- 
vaders. 

Toward Austria Napoleon proceeded in a manner somewhat 
less summary. During the course of the last two years that 
state had completed the reorganization of its army and had 
maintained it, in spite of financial distress, undiminished in 
number. A certain consideration was therefore called for in 
deahng with this power. But it was, after all, nothing more 
than a matter of form when Napoleon suggested to the Aus- 
trian court that it should attempt to mediate peace in England, 
demand the return of the Danish fleet and, in case this were 
refused, recall its ambassador. It was in reality a command 
which Austria, hard pressed by a Franco-Russian alUance and 
threatened by a French army to the north, had no choice but 
to obey. In consequence, in January, 1808, Count Starhemberg 
demanded his passports in London and only in strictest confi- 
dence informed the government of George III. that, in spite of 
appearances, Austria remained amicably disposed toward Eng- 
land. In fact Austria was expected to account herself fortu- 
nate because in October the French had at last condescended 
to evacuate Braunau, to atone for which, however, they had 
proceeded in the regulation of the Italian boundary-line very 
much to the disadvantage of Austria. In Vienna there was, 
indeed, talk of overtures which France had made in regard to 
this matter of a division of Turkey in which Austria should be 
invited to share. Napoleon had, it is true, admitted the possi- 
bihty of such a partition and had promised to her, as he had 
to Russia, her portion in the spoil; but the Emperor had aimed 
only to excite one of these powers against the other, Turkey 
constituting for the future an excellent apple of discord, so as 
to make both serve the ends of his own policy. And when one 
hears of Stadion, the Minister, cherishing the vain hope of ob- 
taining a fat morsel including Bosnia, Servia, and a slice of Bul- 
garia besides a strip of country connecting it with Saloniki, 
and then compares with this Napoleon's promises made at the 
same time to Russia, one can scarcely restrain a smile at see- 
ing how the machinations of the Corsican, one after another 



422 Affairs in France [I8O8 

were unfailingly successful and how he never failed in finding 
dupes. 

But if Napoleon could thus impose his will upon the Great 
Powers, how much more disregardful and emphatic his deal- 
ings with the smaller states which could have no thought of 
resistance ! To begin with Italy. English wares had here found 
a place of refuge in the Tuscan harbour of Livorno. They 
arrived there under the American flag, were stored and for- 
warded from time to time as far as Leipzig. The dowager queen 
of Etruria, who, imprudently enough, had surrounded herself 
with persons ill-disposed toward France, declared it to be im- 
possible for her to close her ports to a neutral flag. Thereupon 
Napoleon, at the end of August, 1807, ordered General MioUis 
with 6000 men to march into Tuscany and confiscate all Eng- 
lish merchandise in the country, foflowing up this act by an 
announcement to the queen that she must surrender to France 
her country, for which she would find compensation on the Ibe- 
rian Peninsula according to arrangements made with Spain. On 
May 30th Tuscany, likewise Corsica and Elba, were declared 
constituent parts of France and apportioned into three de- 
partments. 

There now remained in Italy only a single small state which 
dared to defy Napoleon's system; this was that of the Pope. 
This bordered on two seas and could not be omitted in case the 
Continental system of blockade were to be rigidly enforced. 
The strained relations existing between Pope and Emperor prior 
to the last war have already been spoken of. During the war 
the French ambassador Alquier had devoted all his energies to 
the effort to induce the Holy Father to acknowledge Joseph 
as King of Naples and to participate in what was termed the 
"Italian Federation" under the suzerainty of Napoleon, or, 
in other words, in an offensive and defensive alliance with 
Naples and the kingdom of Italy. But he met with no success. 
The Pope would recognize Joseph only upon condition of a 
guarantee of his own independence and neutrality, that is, that 
he should not be called upon to join the league directed against 
England. Upon this refusal, on July 22d, 1807, Napoleon had 



iET. 38] Pressure on the Pope 423 

written from Dresden to Eugene Beauharnais a letter which 
was to be shown to Pius VII. ''The present Pope/' wrote 
Napoleon in truly characteristic style, "is too powerful. Priests 
are not quaUfied for governing. Why is it that the Pope will 
not 'render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's'? Is he 
greater here on earth than Jesus Christ? Perad venture the time 
is not far distant, if my state affairs continue to be interfered 
with, when I shall cease to recognize the Pope as anything but 
Bishop of Rome, having the same rank and privileges as the 
bishops of other states under my sway. I should not be afraid 
to unite the Galilean, Italian, German, and Polish churches in a 
council for carrying on my affairs without a Pope." Of more 
practical significance was a command issued by Talleyrand on 
the same day to the ambassador at Rome: he was to exact of 
the Holy Father the admission of twenty-four Frenchmen into 
the College of Cardinals and his bestowal of full powers upon 
Caprara, his legate in Paris, for the execution of a treaty regulat- 
ing the questions now at issue. To neither of these demands 
would the Pope accede. Instead, Bayanne, who had been none 
the less appointed by France as Cardinal, was despatched by 
the Curia to Napoleon to appease him and accord to him, if 
need be, what had been refused scarcely a year before — coro- 
nation as Emperor of the West — but on no account the increase 
in the number of the Cardinals, and the entrance into the Fed- 
eration. But this was to Napoleon, whose plans in the Medi- 
terranean have already been set forth, the essential point. 
"What is most of all important to the Emperor of the French," 
wrote Champagny to Caprara, "is that the temporal sovereign 
of Rome should act with France so that, situated in the midst 
of the great Empire, surrounded by his armies, he should not be 
foreign to his interests or to his policy. . . . The interests of 
humanity, the voices of 60,000,000 of men, are calling to him: 
'Compel England to live at peace with us, to give us back our 
ports, our coasts, our ships, our maritime and commercial rela- 
tions.' If the Pope alone upon the Continent desired to remain 
attached to these Britons, would it not be the duty of the head 
of the Empire to unite at once with the Empire that part of his 



424 Affairs in France [I807 

domains which isolated itself from it by its political attitude and 
to annul the gift of Charlemagne, which was being used as a 
weapon against his successor? . . . And yet the Emperor would 
be contented with uniting to his Empire only the legations of 
Urbino, of Macerata, and of Ancona, which are indispensable to 
him in order to unite Upper Italy with Naples." This was his 
chief requirement, but to this were attached sundry minor de- 
mands : the suppression of religious orders in Italy, the increase 
in the number of French Cardinals, and the extension of the 
Italian Concordat to include Venetia. 

The threat of annexing the three legations produced in 
Rome the most painful impression. It had not been forgotten 
there how Pius had, three years before, .made the long and 
wearisome journey to Paris and there even discredited himself to 
some extent in the eyes of the Catholic world for the sole object 
of regaining the previously surrendered territories of Bologna, 
Ferrara, and Romagna, and now for a second time was he to lose 
a portion of his territories and precisely that portion yielding 
the most revenue. The Cardinals — ^the same who out of re- 
gard for their financial advantage had before counselled in fa- 
vour of the coronation journey — now, on the same account, urged 
the Pope to yield. He at length did so, and declared himself 
ready to make common cause with France against England and 
to receive French garrisons into Ancona and Civita Vecchia. 
But Napoleon must have foreseen this compliance, for he acted 
accordingly. Without a waiting the decision of the Curia, he gave 
orders to General Lemarrois toward the end of December, 1807, 
to march without delay into the three legations in question, 
while he meanwhile prevailed upon Cardinal Bayanne in 
Paris to sign a treaty sanctioning all his demands, amongst 
others also the one requiring that in the future the College of 
Cardinals should consist of Frenchmen to the extent of one third. 
His real purpose in this course was to force the Pope from his 
conciliatory attitude into one of resistance, so as to take from 
him the whole instead of a part only of the States of the Church. 
And this purpose was accompHshed. Pius, deeply wounded at 
the arbitrary occupation of his eastern provinces, not only 



.Et. 38] The Papal States Annexed 425 

refused his ratification to the treaty just agreed upon, but would 
have no further concern in the federation against England. 
This was all that Napoleon had been waiting for. He could now 
with some appearance of truth denounce the Pope to the world 
as the hindrance in the great work of the establishment of peace, 
reason enough to justify Charlemagne the second in taking back 
the gift made by the first of that name. Before the end of Jan- 
uary, 1808, General Miolhs received instructions to occupy 
Rome, and on February 2d he entered that city. He was to 
banish from the country all non-Roman prelates, to incorporate 
the papal battalions into those of France, to dissolve the Holy 
Father's guard of nobles, and take upon himself the administra- 
tion of the affairs of the country. All this was carried into 
completion by April, 1808, the States of the Church being thus 
converted into a French province. 

Napoleon was at this time in Bayonne. He had been led 
thither by a political transaction of far-reaching significance 
in the world's history. Spain was the country concerned. Its 
king, Charles IV., had up to this time continued an incapable 
existence and the queen a shameful one, while the people had 
suffered, destitute and oppressed, under the rule of the Prince 
of the Peace, who submitted unresistingly to the hegemony of 
the neighbouring state. At the command of Napoleon the 
country had become involved in war with England after having 
sacrificed its ships, its commerce, and to some extent its colo- 
nies, in order to preserve its existence, which would otherwise 
have been imperilled by France, an existence, which had con- 
tinually to be purchased anew by the payment of high tribute 
both in men and troops. Not until the time when Napoleon 
began to make war against Prussia was there any evidence that 
the court at Madrid might cease to yield its customary submis- 
sion. At that time the Russian ambassador used all persua- 
sions to induce Spain to take part in the coalition, while the 
English threatened to foment revolt in the Spanish colonies in 
South America. The fate of the Bourbon king of Naples, Ferdi- 
nand IV., who was a brother of the Spanish king, further added 
to the fear in which Napoleon was held, and, when it became 



4^6 Affairs in France 



[1808 



known that he was going forth to contend against the renowned 
Prussian army, preparations for war began to be made in Madrid 
in the hope that he would meet with defeat; a manifesto issued 
somewhat prematurely spoke in ambiguous terms of strife which 
had become unavoidable. But this document bore a fatal date — 
October 14th— that of the battle of Jena. The news of the 
briUiant victory overthrew the entire project of resistance; the 
mobiUzation, which had been represented to the French am- 
bassador as directed against Portugal, was discontinued and 
the Prince of the Peace was again overflowing in assurances of 
his devotion to France. 

But Napoleon's ambassador had not been in the least misled 
as to the true meaning and progress of affairs. He reported 
upon them, and the Emperor read the despatch and the famous 
manifesto in Berlin just at the moment when he beheved him- 
self to be nearing his goal of universal dominion and was pre- 
paring to take his last steps eastward toward attaining it. Eye- 
witnesses declare that he became pale with excitement. Still 
he was able to master his feehngs. Spain was allowed to have 
no inkling that he had any knowledge of the change of bearing 
planned at Madrid, of which he had furthermore received con- 
firmation particularly through intercepted reports of the Prus- 
sian ambassador in Madrid. He quietly received the renewed 
protestations of devotion as if of pure gold, from which he at 
once proceeded to derive profit. He demanded that a contin- 
gent of 15,000 men should be sent from the troops now under 
arms to the mouth of the Elbe to take part in the defence 
against England, demanded that the Continental blockade 
should be strictly enforced, the Spanish fleet united with that 
of France in Toulon, and imposed upon the court of Madrid 
the burden of the maintenance of 25,000 Prussian prisoners. 
Now had there been at the head of Spanish affairs a strong 
and popular government, it might have availed itself of this 
moment to open its ports to England and declare itself against 
France. Ensuing years have proved that in this country of 
Charles IV. there was no lack of forces available for resistance, 
and who can say what might have been the effect of such a de- 



Ml. 38] Demands upon Portugal 427 

sertion after the indecisive battle at Eylau? But Spain's gov- 
ernment was weak and not in the sHghtest degree popular; 
Godoy and the guilty queen were absolutely hated and only 
the Crown Prince rejoiced in the sympathies of the people, and 
that for the very reason that the queen and the Minister were 
devising means of cutting him off from the succession to the 
throne. It was upon these contentions between government 
and people and amongst the ruling powers themselves that 
Napoleon based his purpose of bringing Spain more completely 
under his own dominion. The only question was how this was 
to be accomplished. Talleyrand would have been in favour of 
a marriage between the Spanish Crown Prince and a French 
Princess, one of the Taschers, for instance, as a means of bring- 
ing the state into the federal system of the French hegemony. 
The Emperor, however, had other views. It may be that 
upon reading Godoy' s manifesto his determination was at once 
made to deprive the Bourbons here also of the throne and give 
it to some member of his own family. The path was a devious 
one by which he ultimately reached this goal. It led in the 
first place by way of Portugal. 

In Tilsit it had been agreed in regard to the court at Lisbon 
that it should be summoned to make a declaration of war against 
England and, in event of refusal, be treated as an enemy. In 
this Spain was now called upon to co-operate. This was mak- 
ing no small demand, for the Crown Prince John of Portugal^ 
regent for his mother, who was of unsound mind, was the son- 
in-law of Charles IV.; but in spite of this fact the Spanish am- 
bassador in Lisbon associated himself with the representative 
of France when the latter demanded the closing of the ports of 
Portugal, the dismissal of the British ambassador, and even the 
arrest of all Englishmen within the country, with the confisca- 
tion of their property. In the answer returned by the Portu- 
guese Minister, who had secretly come to an understanding 
with England, he agreed to the closing of the ports, though not 
to the arrest of the foreigners, to whom, moreover, a hint was 
surreptitiously given to retire from the country at the earliest 
possible moment. This result was far from satisfactory to 



428 Affairs in France [I807 

Napoleon, who had been thus overbearing in his demands 
merely for the sake of provoking opposition, and he at once pro- 
ceeded to act. On September 30th, 1807, the two ambassadors, 
French and Spanish, left Lisbon, and on October 18th 20,000 
French soldiers under Junot crossed the border, directing their 
march upon Portugal. On October 27th a secret treaty be- 
tween France and Spain was signed at Fontainebleau in which 
the following points were agreed upon: Portugal was to be 
conquered and divided into three parts, of which the northern- 
most, lying between the Duero and Minho rivers, should con- 
stitute the kingdom of North Lusitania, to be given to the 
Queen of Etruria as compensation for Tuscany; the southern- 
most, which was formed of the provinces of Alemtejo and Al- 
garve, was to be Godoy's under the name of the Principality 
of Algarve, while the middle portion was to remain in the hands 
of France until the establishment of universal peace. The Por- 
tuguese colonies were to be likewise divided, and the King of 
Spain was to assume the title of Emperor of America. In the 
drawing up of this treaty Champagny, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, was purposely left out and Duroc ordered to put his 
name to the document ; Talleyrand also had no knowledge of it. 
The only other person in the secret was Murat, who foresaw 
here a possibility of at last gaining a kingdom for himself. No 
danger but that the treaty would receive ratification in Ma- 
drid in view of the interest in it of the Prince of the Peace, who 
had even before the last war sought vainly in Paris to get pro- 
vision made for himself at the expense of Portugal. On the 
same day the military part of the enterprise was also regulated 
in a separate convention: France was to proceed through Spain 
against Lisbon with 30,000 men, while 16,000 of the Spanish 
troops should occupy Northern and Southern Portugal. A 
special article conceded to France the right to assemble at Bay- 
onne a further force of 40,000 men, who were, however, to in- 
terfere only in case the British should attempt to land troops 
in Portugal. 

In view of these threatening hostilities. Prince John had for, 
a moment hesitated as to whether it were not better after all 



Mt. 38] The Attack on Spain 429 

to submit absolutely and unconditionally to Napoleon, but his 
decision was anticipated by the "Moniteur" of November 15th, 
1807, which read: "The Prince Regent of Portugal loses his 
throne. The downfall of the House of Braganza furnishes one 
more proof that ruin is inevitable to whomsoever attaches him- 
self to the English." There now remained to him no alter- 
native but flight, since his Uttle country could not contend 
alone against Spain and France. On November 27th the royal 
family took ship for Brazil to seek a new home beyond the seas. 
A few days later Junot with a handful of exhausted troops arrived 
at the city now without a master and without thought of resist- 
ance; the Portuguese colours were lowered from the citadel to 
give place to the tricolour of France. 

The Treaty of Fontainebleau is historically important, not 
so much for its political adjustments as for the military arrange- 
ments therein agreed upon. The Spanish troops were directed 
toward the west, which is tantamount to saying that a French 
army would be thus enabled to reach Madrid without encoun- 
tering serious resistance. And that was, as a matter of fact, 
the purpose which Napoleon had in mind. Circumstances at 
the court of Madrid were largely responsible for the fact that he 
was able to carry it out. For just at this time the internal dis- 
cord there reached its climax. Ferdinand, the Crown Prince, 
was conspiring against his mother and Godoy to get hold of the 
reins of government; the plot was discovered and a manifesto 
issued by the king proclaiming the high treason of his son. 
Both parties turned "for counsel" to Napoleon. That impartial 
adviser, thinking the time propitious for action on his own part, 
admonished Charles IV. against delaying the important expedi- 
tion against Portugal on account of palace squabbles, and gave 
at the same time secret instructions to the bearer of the letter 
to acquaint himself carefully in regard to public feehng in Spain 
and the strength of her fortresses and army. On the same day, 
November 13th, 1807, General Dupont, who commanded the 
second French expeditionary corps of 40,000 men, also received 
orders to advance across the Spanish frontier as far as Vittoria, 
although there was as yet not the slightest indication of a disem- 



43 o Affairs in France |1808 

barkation of English troops. Soon after — early in December — 
the Emperor betook himself to Upper Italy in order to meet his 
brother Joseph in Venice and offer to him the Spanish crown, an 
arrangement already agreed upon in most profound secrecy be- 
tween the two emperors in Tilsit, so that Joseph now despatched 
a trusted messenger to Alexander I. to convey to that monarch 
messages of respect which should secure the Czar's favour to 
himself in the new capacity in which he was about to appear.* 

During December and January in the neighbourhood of 
30,000 French soldiers marched into Spain and took up positions 
temporarily near Valladolid and Burgos ; Murat was made com- 
mander-in-chief. No one knew what was their purpose there. 
The Spanish people assumed that they had come to set the 
Crown Prince upon the throne and to overthrow the hated rule 
of Godoy, and welcomed them therefore with rejoicing. And 
Ferdinand himself was of the same opinion. Charles IV., on 
the other hand, in an anxious letter begged for enlightenment. 
Napoleon's answer was a lie. The troops, said he, were destined 
to prevent a debarkation of the English and were consequently 
to march on to Cadiz. Godoy, who saw to the bottom of the 
scheme, advised flight to the southern provinces, but, when 
preparations for that course were begun, the people seized the 
idea that Godoy was trying thus to make impossible the change 
of system planned by Napoleon, and proceeded to Aranjuez, 
where the court was staying, and there compelled the king to 
dismiss his minister and himself to abdicate in favour of his son. 

This development was thoroughly out of keeping with the 
plans of the Emperor. It had been his hope that the royal 
family would, like that of Portugal, actually take to flight, which 

* Upon this point the "Memoires" of Miot de Melito (II, p. 349 and 
following), the confidant of Joseph, are a witness scarcely to be disputed 
He even mentions the name of the officer who was entrusted with the 
mission to St, Petersburg. Moreover, Lucien, whom Napoleon chanced 
upon in Mantua, December, 1807, relates that he also among others 
was offered the kingdom of Spain by his imperial brother, who exclaimed : 
"Do you not see it, then, falUng into the hollow of your hand thanks to 
the follies of your beloved Bourbons and to the stupidity of your friend the 
Prince of the Peace?" 



.Et. 38] The Conference at Bayonne 431 

he would then have demonstrated in this case, as he had in the 
other, to be due to attachment to England. But now on March 
23d, 1808, immediately following Murat's entrance into Madrid, 
the new king, Ferdinand VII., also puts in his appearance amidst 
the joyful acclamations of the people. To a large proportion 
of the population it now first began to seem as if the French 
had really been preparing the way to the throne for the young 
prince. This was fatal to Napoleon's own plans. He at once 
set about devising some means of separating the young mon- 
arch from his people, whom he had not yet recognized as king. 
For this purpose Savary was sent to Madrid. He was to repre- 
sent to Ferdinand that the Emperor was himself on the way to 
Spain, and that it would be a way of ingratiating himself for 
the young king to go out to meet him and ask his recognition. 
Ferdinand thereupon actually set out for Burgos and continued 
on thence to Vittoria, without, however, seeing anything of the 
Emperor. Instead there was delivered to him here a letter from 
Napoleon to the effect that before he could sanction the accession 
to the throne he must satisfy himself in an interview with Ferdi- 
nand as to whether Charles IV. had really abdicated of his own 
free will or only under compulsion, this interview to take place 
in Bayonne. Among those about the young prince there were 
many who raised their voices in warning against undertaking 
the journey thither; the populace of Vittoria used every effort 
to prevent his crossing the frontier. But what else was to be 
done? All about the French were encamped and the invitation 
was in reality a command. "At Vittoria," said Savary at a 
later date, "I thought for a moment that my prisoner was going 
to escape me; but I managed it after all by frightening him." 
On April 14th, Ferdinand — a prisoner in truth — reached Bay- 
onne, whither Napoleon had likewise invited the king and queen, 
his parents, and Godoy. 

It will surprise no one to learn that the Prince did not find 
here what he had come to seek. Napoleon not only refused to 
him his recognition, but demanded of him outright that he 
should give back the crown to his father, confident that 
Charles IV. had no further desire to return to a country which 



43^ Affairs in France [1808 

execrated his rule and where unmistakable affronts awaited him- 
self and the Prince of the Peace. Ferdinand attempted at first 
to refuse, but when news penetrated to Bayonne of an insurrec- 
tion in Madrid which was attributed to his instigation, and when 
Napoleon threatened to treat him as a rebel, he yielded and 
returned the crown to Charles IV., who confidingly placed it in 
the hands of the Emperor. On June 6th, 1808, Napoleon set it 
upon the head of his brother Joseph.* It was not without the 
use of guile and of brutal force, to be sure, but Napoleon had 
nevertheless gained his end. The Pyrenean peninsula had now 
come indirectly under his sway. 

It was yet to be seen whether it would so remain. Were that 
the case, then the band which he had been forging against Eng- 
land was actually welded, and from the Pillars of Hercules as far 
as the Vistula the Continent was subject to his more or less per- 
emptory orders; then the colossus in the East would no longer 
venture to think of separating from him to pursue his own 
course. He must have experienced a feeling of high satisfac- 
tion in contemplating the successes of the year just past, suffi- 
cient to drive far from him any misgivings which he might have 
had as to the morality of his proceedings. He could give new 
scope to his designs. The English, either because of the attack 
directed against Sweden by Russia, or because of the events in 

* Joseph had not remained uninterruptedly the person upon whom 
Napoleon desired to confer the Spanish crown. At one time — after the 
first abdication of Charles IV. — the Emperor had offered it to his brother 
Louis in a letter of March 27th, 1808. The reason for this was, on the 
one hand, a personal resentment against Joseph, who had permitted himself 
a sHght deviation from one of the orders issued by his brother, whereat 
the Emperor had reprimanded him in harshest terms on March 25th (Du 
Casse, "Supplement k la correspondance de Napoleon I." p. 100), and 
on the other hand Napoleon had received notification of the extensive 
smuggling carried on by the English under the American flag in Holland, 
and for that reason was already cherishing the wish to incorporate that 
country completely with France. (See Napoleon's letter of March 29th, 
1808, to his Minister of Finance, Gaudin, in the 16th volume of his ''Corre- 
spondance.") Louis declined the offer, saying that he was bound by his 
oath already given to the people of Holland, and shortly afterwards 
Joseph was again restored to favour. 



Mt.ss] Project for the Invasion of India 433 

Portugal, had been brought to withdraw the larger part of their 
ships from the Mediterranean and the ocean and had directed 
them toward the north. Napoleon at once resolved to fortify- 
rapidly his already strong position in the great interior basin, to 
equip three fleets, of which two, making the circuit of Africa 
and bearing 18,000 soldiers, should set sail for India, while the 
third should start from Toulon to debark 20,000 men in Egypt. 
At the same time, as had been agreed upon at Tilsit, an expe- 
ditionary corps composed of French, Russian, and Austrian 
troops should penetrate into Turkey, — for it was with this in 
mind that Napoleon had brought up the question of its partition 
in Vienna and at St. Petersburg, — ^marci upon Constantinople 
and thence plunge into Asia, where they were to cross Persia — as 
they frankly acknowledged, although that country had been an 
ally of France since 1807 — and continue thence toward the East. 
The mere tidings that the corps was on the march, as Napoleon 
said to himself, would provoke an insurrection among the popu- 
lations of India which had been subjugated by the British; that 
insurrection would destroy the credit and influence of England, 
and that country, recognizing its ruin, would be compelled to 
sign a treaty of peace which would put an end to the tyrannical 
domination which it exercised upon the seas and would thus 
cause to disappear the last and greatest obstacle which was pre- 
venting the extension of his Empire over the entire globe. 
According to Talleyrand's statement to Metternich, Napoleon 
wrote on June 30th to Eugene Beauharnais that by October or 
November he should be in Italy, to direct from there all this 
vast undertaking.* 

* Vandal's " Napoleon et Alexandre !•' " has established the fact that 
early in March, 1808, the project of invading India formed the topic 
of long discussions between the Czar and Caulaincourt at the same time 
that the question of the partition of Turkey was being agitated. Public 
sentiment also was aroused in regard to it. Indeed in Danz's interesting 
pamphlet, pubUshed in Jena in 1808 and bearing the title "The March of 
the French upon India," this expedition is spoken of as a matter already- 
determined upon: 30,000 Russians and 30,000 Frenchmen, supported 
by Persia and countenanced by the dissatisfied Nabobs, were to put an 
end to English rule in India. The general peace so much wished for 



434 Affairs in France [isos 

But what if these successes should not prove lasting? What 
if there came to disturb his reckoning a factor which he had 
overlooked, a force which he was unable to appreciate or to 
weigh because he was himself wanting in the feelings which gave 
it birth? If he had but accepted the command of the Army of 
the West in 1795, he would have come to know in La Vendee 
from personal observation the heroic courage engendered in a 
people which had been wounded, deceived, and driven to despera- 
tion, and he would, perhaps, not have been led into the mistake 
which he now made of showing his disdain of popular feeling in 
Spain by practising deception upon it. He would perhaps have 
followed the counsel of Talleyrand and have attached the popu- 
lar young king to his family and interests in place of thrusting 
him from his throne. Ferdinand was of course a worthless char- 
acter, and Napoleon's purpose to elevate the standing and civi- 
lization of Spain an intention deserving of the highest praise, 
but the point upon which everything turned was, after all, that 
the will of a people whose power was not to be computed was 
opposing its resistance to his projects. The Emperor was to 
learn this to his cost, and that within a very short time. 

In July, 1808, Joseph made his entrance into Madrid. He 
had ceded the throne of Naples to Murat. Charles IV. with his 
wife and favourite repaired to Italy. The young prince, Ferdi- 
nand, remained under surveillance at Valengay in France. The 
new king brought with him a new constitution which had been 
deliberated upon in Bayonne by 150 Spanish notables ; he brought 
also capable ministers and the most excellent intentions to raise 
the decadent kingdom to new power and new splendour. But 
he found the country in a state of tumult. There were doubtless 
in Spain intelligent statesmen who recognized the advantage 
to their country of a newly regulated system of govermnent and 
who were ready to contribute their services toward its main- 
could be attained only through victorious combat with England. It was 
an idea of gigantic proportions thus to keep occupied in Asia the elements 
of Europe which were dissatisfied with Napoleon's hegemony, while demon- 
strating to the nations of Europe that this step was indispensable to thel" 
W^are and happiness. 



^T. 38] The Uprising of the Spanish People 435 

tenance, but their prudent judgment was more than offset by 
the wounded feeling of milhons who regarded it as a national 
disgrace which must be revenged to have been thus taken un- 
awares and duped by the foreigners. Moreover, rehgious pride 
was linked with patriotism among this people w^hich had over- 
come the unbelieving Moors and the heretical Reformation, and 
the hatred toward the foreign despot was the more pronounced 
because he it was who had robbed the Pope of his throne. In 
short, the nation "refused ratification to the Treaty of Bayonne," 
as Napoleon himself subsequently expressed it, and sprang to 
arms. 

And success crowned the effort. The revolt had begun in 
Asturias, and before the end of May had spread with furious 
rapidity. Messengers were despatched to England to ask as- 
sistance, and found ready sympathy. Everj^^here bands were 
forming, for the most part under leadership of the monks, and 
in many cities there arose Juntas, that is to say, councils gov- 
erning in the name of Ferdinand VII., who alone was recognized 
and spoken of as king. At first, it is true, the French troops 
were able to make their way throughout the country, but be- 
fore long they found themselves resisted by the "banditti." 
The population of Saragossa fought heroically against the be- 
sieging forces and compelled them to withdraw; in Valencia 
the same occurred; and although Bessieres conquered on July 
14th, on the open plain near Medina de Rio Seco, his conquest 
was counterbalanced by the loss in the mountains of Dupont^s 
entire corps of 17,000 men, which was obliged to surrender near 
Baylen on July 22d. The tidings of this event drew all re- 
maining Spain into the insurrection, so that even Joseph's Coun- 
cil of Ministers was affected by it. He himself no longer felt 
secure in the residential city, and before the end of July turned 
northward, withdrawing the entire French army behind the 
Ebro. Meanwhile the longed-for support from England had 
landed in Portugal, where, on August 30th, near Cintra, Junot 
was brought, although on terms most honourable, to surrender. 
And as if these disasters were not sufficient, the Spanish soldiers 
stationed in Fiinen, Langeland, and Jutland, upon hearing of 



43^ Affairs in France [isos 

the great revolution, at once deserted their French commanders 
and took ship upon EngHsh vessels which would bear them 
back to their native country. 

Napoleon, when leaving Bayonne in July, had felt no doubt 
that the revolt in Spain would soon be subdued, and the news 
of these events astounded and perturbed him greatly; Dupont's 
capitulation made him beside himself with rage, while the re- 
port from Cintra seemed rather to depress and discourage him, 
for there had taken place that which caused him the most pain : 
the British had again obtained mastery of Portugal, the cordon 
was broken. If this damage were to be made good, stronger 
forces must be brought to bear than had hitherto been em- 
ployed in Spain, the "Grand Army" must be partially if not 
wholly drawn thither from Germany. But this was equivalent 
to giving up his dominating position in the east by means of 
which he had for a year been holding in check three of the Great 
Powers: Russia, Prussia, and Austria. And this was the more 
unfortunate because just at this moment there were beginning 
to be perceptible smouldering fires of resistance in the two Ger- 
man states which might but too easily flame out in war if the 
pressure now held upon them were to be once removed. 

It was not without solicitude that Vienna had observed 
events occurring in Italy: the incorporation of Tuscany and 
the ejection of the Pope from his temporal dominions. Then 
followed the occurrence at Bayonne, producing a tremendous 
impression. It was useless then, apparently, to show oneself 
docile and obedient in the performance of all that seemed good 
to the all-powerful Emperor — ^useless to be allied with him, 
the risk of fallhig into his toils was not thereby lessened. All 
ancient dynasties of Europe seemed threatened by a similar 
fate, and Austria was pre-eminently a dynastic state, since it 
was in the reigning family that its dissimilar component parts 
found their chief bond of union. Therefore it was that the 
danger to dynasties was here especially regarded as a menace 
to the state, and Austria prepared for war. During May and 
June, 1808, were organized on a modern plan a reserve and a 
Landwehr, and the people crowded eagerly into the rapidly 



^T. 38] Unrest in Germany 437 

formed battalions.* Napoleon made a categorical demand for 
explanation, and in July threatened war; it was nniversally 
supposed that it must follow. But the renouncement of this 
purpose 'was for the time being necessitated through the arrival 
of the disastrous tidings from Spain. Provision for careful 
observation of Austria was, however, made by the instructions 
to Davout to move back into Silesia from Poland, while Mor- 
tier's corps was ordered to remain in Franconia. The corps of 
Ney and Victor were summoned back across the Rhine. 

Prussia was meanwhile in no less a ferment than Austria, 
though feeling was necessarily more suppressed and concealed 
on account of the presence of the French and their adherents. 
In the previous year, after the battle of Eylau, a conspiracy 
was formed under the leadership of former Prussian and Hessian 
officers to stir up a revolt throughout the territory between 
the Weser and the Elbe in case the British should land in north- 
ern Germany. Ever since the peace of Tilsit the feeling of bit- 
terness among the people had but increased under the oppres- 
sion of the French soldiery. Under the very eyes, as it were, 
of the foreigners there were held secret meetings for the pro- 
motion of hatred and of thirst for war; in April, 1808, the 
"Tugendbund'^ of Konigsberg was instituted, which, though in 
itself innocent, was later to lend its name to all secret organiza- 
tions hostile to France. Besides these the government, with 
Stein and Scharnhorst in the lead, worked at the regeneration 
of the state and its army to* strengthen both against the ap- 
proaching contest. All this could not permanently escape 

* On August 10th, 1808, the French ambassador, Andr^ossy, reported 
by letter to the home government: "From what takes place before our 
eyes and from reports arriving from all sides it would appear that Austria 
has never presented so martial an aspect as now, that the Austrian govern- 
ment has never before been the cause of an impulse such as it has now 
communicated to the nobility and to all classes of citizens. The 'Moria- 
mur' of the Hungarians under Maria Theresa surely did not call forth 
proportionally as many combatants, nor were they more promptly armed 
and drilled than the number of men that the call to arms of the govern- 
ment commissioners and the enrolment have just furnished to the militia." 
(Archives of Foreign Affairs.) 



438 Affairs in France [I8O8 

Napoleon, and, even if he had not otherwise had knowledge 
of it, an intercepted letter from the Minister, Stein, to the Prince 
of Wittgenstein dated August loth, 1808, must have revealed 
it to him, for therein was it plainly said that the national bitter- 
ness in Germany was to be encouraged, and if Napoleon should 
refuse the proposals put forward by Prussia the plans of the 
spring of the previous year should be resumed. It scarcely 
seemed possible that this was the same Prussia which he sup- 
posed iiimself to have annihilated in those two battles in Thu- 
ringia and whose very existence he had granted only as a sort 
of favour. 

And not in Germany only but even in the southeast, where 
Napoleon had expended his utmost skill in diplomacy, did the 
results of his efforts appear to be slipping from his grasp. In 
Turkey a revolt had nearly broken out, Mustapha IV. had been 
driven from the throne and his brother Mahmud II. made Sultan 
on July 28th, 1808. Under his rule France no longer found 
any sort of spirit of tractability. The ambassador was con- 
fronted with reproaches in regard to the fickle policy of France,, 
and was impressed with the idea that Turkey was intent upon 
a separate treaty with Russia rather than upon the friendship 
of Napoleon. 

The entire edifice of Napoleonic supremacy over the Conti- 
nent, so closely approaching its completion, seemed tottering. 
The Emperor at once recognized the gravity of the situation, 
but he was no less swift in perceiving the means of relieving it. 
The only power capable of preserving quiet in Prussia and 
Austria until Spain could be reduced to order was Russia. The 
thing to do, then, was to attempt to secure once more the good- 
will of that country. There was, indeed, no denying that he 
had conducted himself toward the Czar in a most equivocal 
manner, but that impression was not ineffaceable. The evacua- 
tion of Prussia was already to be regarded as a concession made 
to Alexander, and Napoleon hastened to represent it as such. 
A second concession with respect to the Danubian principalities 
would, he hoped, secure his end. Hitherto he had been putting 
off the Czar in regard to these coveted territories until the mat- 



.Et. 39] Alexander Decides for Napoleon 439 

ter could be discussed verbally between them. This interview 
should now take place. Hardly had Joseph's flight from Madrid 
been made known in Paris before an envoy, bearing the invita- 
tion to an interview in Erfurt, was despatched post-haste to 
St. Petersburg, where he was to call attention to the withdrav/al 
of the troops from Prussia and to make request of the Czar 
that he would protest in Vienna against further military prepa- 
rations. Erfurt had previously been suggested by Alexander 
as the place of meeting, and he was now urged to name the date 
for that occasion. Everything depended upon Russia's de- 
cision, for Austria also had been making approaches to the 
same power, and England had sent to ascertain the attitude it 
would assume, w^hile the King of Prussia had intimated in con- 
fidential letters that he was not disinclined to make common 
cause with the Court of Vienna. It was everywhere recognized 
that Alexander was not really at heart a party to the French 
alliance, and if he had at this time tendered his aid to the other 
powers, it is most likely that the result would have been then 
what came to pass five years later. Nothing is known of what 
took place in the council of the Czar; one fact alone has tran- 
spired: that at a certain moment Alexander was keenly im- 
pressed by a letter from Tolstoi, his ambassador in Paris, and 
particularly by the following passage: "Austria's destruction 
should be looked upon as the forerunner and means to our own." 
But the Czar was not to be prevailed upon by his neighbours. 
He knew that he was necessary to Napoleon, and that he would 
therefore be allowed his own way in his Oriental plans — ^much as 
they might be opposed to Napoleon^s desires. The war against 
Sweden had meanwhile assumed a more favourable aspect, 
and Russia was again at liberty to turn her attention toward 
the South. To desist now once again from hostilities toward 
his southern neighbours, so as to ally himself with Prussia and 
Austria in opposing France, would have postponed into the 
distant future the object so ardently coveted — the possession 
of the principalities on the Danube, and possibly also Constanti- 
nople. Moreover, Alexander was not without vanity, and he 
was anxious to demonstrate to the opposition in the country 



440 Affairs in France [isos 

by means of a striking success that he had not erred in his choice 
of the way to Russia's greatness when deciding at Tilsit to at- 
tach himself to the Emperor of the French. Of course apostasy 
now would be regarded only as an acknowledgment on his part 
that his judgment had been at fault. And the longer Napoleon 
was kept occupied in Spain the better Alexander's hopes of at- 
taining his goal in the East. Therefore nothing must be allowed 
to occur which should interrupt Napoleon in his undertaking 
upon the Iberian Peninsula; Austria and Prussia must be 
brought to a state of tranquillity, since a war brought about 
by them would call the French eastward and necessitate the 
directing of Russian forces toward the west instead of letting 
them gather in the south the laurels which had come within 
such easy reach. The interests of Alexander and Napoleon 
were thus for the time being identical upon this point, that the 
swords of the powers of Middle Europe should be kept in their 
scabbards as long as the war in Spain should continue. Hence 
it w^as that the Czar zealously dissuaded his friend Frederick 
William III. from taking part in any hostile act on Austria's 
part, and urged him to ratify that most oppressive convention 
which Prince William had signed in Paris on September 8th, 
1808, according to which Prussia had still to pay 140,000,000 
francs, to deliver to the French the fortresses on the Oder, to 
maintain the number of the army at a figure below 42,000, and, 
in case of war between France and Austria, to furnish an auxili- 
ary corps. In Vienna also he gave warning that quiet must 
be preserved so that, as he said, the painful necessity might 
be spared him of arraying his forces against Austria. This 
done he took his departure for Erfurt. 

Here, from September 27th, festivity followed upon festivity. 
It was not loiown until afterwards that the life of the Corsican 
Caesar was being threatened by Prussian conspirators. Napo- 
leon did the honours to his imperial guest with pomp and splen- 
dour as before at Tilsit. His grenadiers were selected as mili- 
tary attendants, while his political train was composed of the 
prmces of the Confederation of the Rhuie. The actors from 
the ''Com^die Fran9aise" played before "a parterre of kings" 



^T. 39] The Conference at Erfurt 441 

the masterpieces of French tragedy and upon a certain occasion 
when Voltaire's "QSdipus" was being performed, as Tahna 
pronounced the words: 

"The friendship of a great man 
Is a true gift of the gods, " 

the Czar arose and, seizing the hand of Napoleon, clasped it 
in his own, to the applause of the audience. Yet, as a matter 
of fact, there existed not the slightest trace of sympathy of 
feeling between these two men, and everything which would 
appear as the outward expression of such was simply the result 
of calculation. Alexander was at heart not in the least degree 
attached to Napoleon, whose encroachments he regarded as an 
unmixed evil. ^'The torrent must be allowed its course," said 
he one day. But each of them recognized his own advantage 
in their appearing to Europe as friendly and united, and acted 
accordingly. We are not so much in the dark as to their inter- 
views as is the case with the meeting at Tilsit. We know that 
Napoleon asked Alexander to unite with him in demanding of 
Austria the recognition of Joseph as king of Spain, and, by 
way of enforcing his demand, he was, according to Talleyrand's 
Memoirs, to post a Russian army corps in the immediate vicinity 
of the Austrian frontier. On the other hand, it is known that 
Alexander did not accept the proposal, reserving to himself 
simply liberty of action in respect to Turkey, and promising 
co-operation only in case Austria should declare war. Napoleon's 
secret object in this had been to involve Russia in war with her 
German neighbours and thus keep her forces employed so that 
they could not be directed against Turkey. Alexander, for his 
part, believed — as was whispered by Talleyrand, who had now 
already begun to side against Napoleon — that in abstaining from 
threats of any kind to Austria he should hold France in check 
with the help of Vienna and vice versa, and thus be enabled to 
pursue his own designs upon the lower Danube without having 
aught to fear from either. 

Napoleon's first scheme having thus failed, he besought the 
Czar to defer bringing about a rupture with the Porte, at least 



442 Affairs in France [isos 

until after England should have accepted or rejected the pro- 
posals of peace which they were together about to submit to her. 
But Alexander had determined upon demanding the two prin- 
cipalities of Turkey as the condition of peace, and again refused 
acquiescence, and Napoleon was once more obliged to be con- 
tent. The final result of the meeting at Erfurt was a new treaty 
of alliance signed on October 12th, 1808, and which was to 
remain secret "for ten years at least." The first matter therein 
decided was that the two powers should unite in presenting to 
England a new proposal of peace, and that upon the basis of 
present possession ("Uti possidetis")) a totally gratuitous pro- 
ceeding, since it was just this existing supremacy of France upon 
the Continent which England had been contesting ever since 
1803. In Articles 8 to 10 Napoleon then acknowledged the ex- 
tension of the Russian boundary as far as the Danube, and further 
engaged not to interfere in affairs between the Czar and Sultan, 
and to take no part therein in case of the outbreak of war be- 
tween Russia and Turkey unless Austria should molest Russia 
in her proceedings. 

There it stood now, legally drawn up and signed — the act 
providing for that against which he had for so long secretly con- 
tended : Russia was to enter into possession of the principalities 
on the Danube. For himself there had been but one thing gained , 
and for that the interview was scarcely requisite : he could now 
really proceed to the regulation of affairs in Spain without danger 
of immediate interruption by threatenings in the East. On the 
whole it was, however, nothing less than a political defeat which 
he had undergone. The Czar indeed felt that to make an en- 
trance into Constantinople was all very fine, but that there were 
also very real advantages to be derived from a conquest in which 
there was no obligation to share with others. Later, in 1810, 
Napoleon in conversation with Metternich expressed regret at 
"having been thrown out of his course" at Erfurt. Possibly his 
consequent ill-humour was the occasion of sundry unfeeling acts 
at this time of which history has preserved the record. As, for 
instance, upon one occasion he invited Prince Wilham of Prussia, 
who was present as the representative of his brother, to a rabbit- 



Mr. 39] Napoleon and Goethe 443 

hunt upon the battlefield of Jena; while another day, in the 
presence of Alexander, he called upon soldiers who were march- 
ing through the town to recount their exploits in the war against 
Russia, and rewarded some of them therefor with the order of 
the Legion of Honour. Talleyrand characterized such conduct 
very justly in saying to Montgelas: "We Frenchmen are farther 
advanced in civilization than our sovereign; he has not passed 
the stage of civilization in Roman history." 

But while Napoleon was not always extremely courteous in 
his bearing toward princes, he distinguished with special favour 
the great men of Germany whom he saw during his sojourn at 
Erfurt. On October 2d the author of "Faust" was admitted to 
audience. Goethe himself has reported in regard to the occasion 
that Napoleon greeted him with the words: "You are a man!" * 
and talked with him about "Werthers Leiden," dramatic art, 
and fate tragedy, and proposed to him the composition of a work 
in which the death of Caesar should be represented in a manner 
more worthy and imposing than had been possible to Voltaire. 
"The world should be shown," said the Emperor, — and it is not 
difficult to perceive his object, — "that Caesar would have been a 
benefaction to it, and that everything would have been very 
different if he had but been allowed time to execute his magnani- 
mous projects." A tragedy such as this would, in his opinion, 
be instructive both to kings and peoples. For what, indeed, did 
one want of fate in tragedy? Statecraft, according to him, was 
the real destiny. And just as he had summoned Goethe to think 
highly of Caesar, or, in other words, of himself, did he endeavour 
to bring Wieland to inculcate a better opinion of the Roman 
emperors than that commonly entertained. It was the same 
view about Tacitus which he had already repeatedly discussed 
with Suard, Johannes von Miiller, and others, always with the 
idea that he might eventually be compared with the successors 
of Augustus. Christianity was another of the subjects which he 
brought up in conversation with Wieland, and which he desig- 
nated as " an unsurpassable system of philosophy, since in recon- 

*"Vous 6tes un homme." See Diintzer's Life of Goethe, p. 578. 
note 3.— B. 



444 Affairs in France [I808 

ciling man with himself it at the same time secures public order 
and tranquillity to the state in the same degree that hope and 
happiness are assured to the individual." There was evident 
purpose in Napoleon's conduct in Erfurt and Weimar in mani- 
festing far greater respect to the princes among poets than to 
the different local rulers: in the first place he desired to 
show sympathy of some kind with the German nation, which was 
constantly drawnig farther from him, and next he wished the 
world to see that, in spite of crown and sceptre, he felt himself 
more closely allied with men of genius than with those whom 
birth alone had placed above the ordinary level. 



CHAPTER XV 

THE CAMPAIGNS IN SPAIN AND AUSTRIA. MARIE LOUISE 

Napoleon had obtained in Erfurt the respite of which he 
stood in need for carrying on his contest against Spain. How 
long this respite would last was indeed uncertain, and he must 
therefore be on the alert to crush out the rebellious movement 
by the most expeditious and forcible stroke possible and thus 
get back the lost throne for his brother. And this was necessary 
not only for the sake of confirming his power, but also for the 
sake of his prestige. The world must never be allowed to assume 
that he had made a mistake in robbing the Spaniards of their 
native-born king, or indeed that he were capable of a mistake 
of any kind, for he did not feel sufficiently secure, nor was he 
high-minded enough, to acknowledge an error without fear of 
detriment to himself. For this double reason he resolved to cross 
the Pyrenees himself with forces far outnumbering those of 
Spain, and prove to all Europe that resistance to himself was an 
impossibility. The troops which had undergone defeat in Spain 
had been for the most part only young, untried soldiers; those 
whom he now took with him were the unconquered veterans of 
Ulm and Austerlitz, of Jena and Friedland. It cost no small 
struggle to these troops simply to pass through their native 
country after having been absent from it for three years, and 
Napoleon tried to inspire them with enthusiasm by making 
speeches to them full of fire and flattering promises, and secretly 
gave orders to the municipal officers of the cities to honour them 
upon their march with banquets and carousals, with songs and 
speeches expressing pride in their past achievements and confi- 
dence in those to follow, seeking thus to impress the warriors 
^slth the idea that the hopes and desires of France were really 

445 



446 Campaigns in Spain and Austria [I8O8 

centred in the feats of arms which they were about to perform.* 
And with the troops went also their tried and trusted leaders: 
Lannes, Soult and Bessieres, Ney and Lefebvre, Moncey and 
Victor, all were detailed to Spain with Berthier as Chief of the 
General Staff. All together, besides the Guard and the cavalry 
reserve, there were eight army corps sent to engage in the struggle 
with the rebellious people; for even Junot, who had been de- 
feated at Cintra, was again to take part in the conflict with his 
20,000 men. An army was thus made up of more than 200,000 
combatants under leadership of the greatest of military geniuses, 
fitted out with every equipment and excellently clothed and fed. 
All these exertions put forth by Napoleon in order to regain 
the prestige which he had lost in Spain were in striking contrast 

* Two of Napoleon's decrees addressed to the Minister of the Interior 
in September, 1808, are exceedingly characteristic. "I desire," said he 
in one of them, "that you should direct the prefects of departments 
along the line of march to be unsparing in attentions to the troops and 
to use every means to keep up the good spirits animating them and their 
love of glory. Harangues, couplets, free theatrical exhibitions, banquets — 
these are what I expect of citizens in honour of soldiers who are returning 
as victors." A few weeks later he wrote : " The troops have been feasted 
at Metz, at Nancy, at Rheims. It is my wish that they should be similarly 
entertained at Paris, at Melun, at Sens, at Saumur, at Tours, at Bourges, 
and at Bordeaux, which will mean three times for the same troops. You 
will kindly send me an account of what the cost of this will be per head^ 
according to what you have authorized. Order songs made ready in 
Paris for distribution in these various cities. These songs are to recount 
the glory acquired by the army and that which is yet to be won, to extol 
the freedom of the seas which is to be the result of its victories. These 
songs are to be sung at the banquets to be given. You will have to 
order three collections of songs so that the soldier shall not hear the same 
ones twice over." These orders were carried out to the letter. F^zensac, 
for instance, mentions in his "Memoires" that "The march of these 
different corps through France was a triumphant progress. The municipal 
authorities in all cities vied with one another in showing zeal in their 
reception. Everywhere were organized military festivities; everywhere 
banquets were tendered them. Compliments, harangues, soldier songs 
followed one upon another celebrating the triumphs of the Grand 
Army and predicting others to follow." No one realized that all of this 
had been secretly prearranged by the Emperor and paid for out of his 
pocket. 



JEt. 39] Lack of Preparation in Spain 447 

to the preparations made by his opponents, which were pitifully- 
meagre . Instead of following up and turning to the best 
account their victories at Baylen and elsewhere driving the 
French completely out of the country and making provision 
for its defence, the Spaniards had given themselves com- 
pletely over to an intoxication of joy which made them forget 
all danger threatening in the future and imagine their task 
of national liberation already accomplished. Every one over- 
estimated the amount of forces at disposal, as also the 
capacity of the generals and the courage of the troops, for 
whom nothing could have been more pernicious than this 
over-hasty giving up to the triumphs already won; the va- 
rious Juntas in their rivalry worked at cross-purposes to one 
another, and the different generals likewise; the people, hereto- 
fore accustomed to the most absolute rule and now left sud- 
denly without a master, sank into helplessness and anarchy. 
"The French were welcome to enter the country if they pleased; 
they would be surrounded right and left and taken prisoners all 
at once" — this was the opinion, not as expressed by subordinates 
and the lower classes of people, but as the conclusion of a council 
of war held in September. In fact some of the newspapers even 
spoke seriously of 'breaking vengeance upon the other side of 
the Pyrenees." And meanwhile, blinded by this infatuation, 
the army — which had been ostentatiously estimated at between 
300,000 and 400,000 men, while numbering in reality little 
more than 100,000 — was left without sufficient cavalry, the 
troops were not drilled for fighting and were without clothing 
and provisions. Moreover, instead of putting it under com- 
mand of a general-in-chief, the military guidance was entrusted 
to a war-committee, which was to direct operations from Aran- 
juez, where it had established headquarters. Under such 
management there could result nothing but cruel disappoint- 
ment, the contest was by far too unequal. 

Nothing would have been more satisfactory for Napoleon than 
for the Spaniards actually to carry out their plan of marching 
forth and attempting to surround the French army. While still 
in Erfurt he gave orders to allow the left wing of the adversary, 



44 8 Campaigns in Spain and Austria [isos 

consisting of over 30,000 men under General Blake, to advance 
as far as possible toward Biscay and Navarre, so as to fall upon 
it in the rear with considerable forces which should be thrust in 
between it and the Spanish centre. But toward the end of 
October Lefebvre was tempted to offer battle ahead of time, and 
the enemy was compelled to retreat from Durango to Vahnaseda, 
thus frustrating the plans of the Emperor. Upon arrival of the 
latter at headquarters in Vittoria, on November 5th, 1808, Le- 
febvre was sternly reprimanded, but the plan for breaking through 
the line of the enemy was, after all, not given up. The Spanish 
centre, consisting of about 25,000 men, was held under command 
of Casta nos between Calahorra and Tudela on the Ebro, and 
the right wing under Palafox at Saragossa. The advance of the 
main body of the French army was now directed between Cas- 
tafios and Blake towards Burgos, while two corps were detailed 
to follow at the heels of Blake. The conquest of Burgos w^as 
brought about after the defeat of an insignificant Spanish re- 
serve army on November 10th, and at the same time Blake was 
involved in a battle near Espinosa, which he lost on the 11th. 
Cut off from his line of retreat, it was only by abandoning his 
entire baggage-train that he was able to save himself from cap- 
ture by Soult. He directed his flight toward Asturias, where 
a small Spanish corps under Romana received the fragments 
remaining of w^hat had been the left wing of the Spanish 
army. 

The next task which Napoleon now set himself was to crush 
Castaiios, who had meanwhile joined forces with Palafox. For 
this purpose he proceeded to send Ney, with his corps some- 
what re-enforced, from Burgos southeastward to Soria, so as 
to fall thence upon the rear of the enemy, or cut off his line of 
retreat, while Lannes should attack in the front from Navarre. 
The attack in front took place as arranged and was successful, 
Lannes defeating the enemy in the battle of Tudela on Novem- 
ber 23d. Palafox was obliged to retreat to Saragossa, while Cas- 
tagfios fled toward the south, where he would unquestionably 
have been captured by Ney had the latter not been deceived 
through exaggerated reports as to the strength of the enemy, 



^T. 39] The Capture of Madrid 449 

which made him hesitate and finally remain in Soria. But at all 
events the two Spanish armies had been scattered. 

There yet remained the British expeditionary corps in Por- 
tugal, to which Junot had before been compelled to surrender 
at Cintra, and which was now approaching under John Moore 
b}^ way of Salamanca, while 10.000 Englishmen were advancing 
from Corunna. Of this movement Napoleon was as completely 
in ignorance as was Moore of the defeats of the Spaniards. The 
Emperor, who had proceeded from Burgos on to Aranda, assumed 
rather that the English would march through the valley of the 
Tagus upon Madrid, and therefore bent all his energies upon 
putting himself in possession of the capital. After giving orders 
to ^loncey to blockade Saragossa he marched on toward the 
Sierra de Guadarrama, which encloses and defends the plain to 
the north of Madrid, while, preceding the main army, Lefebvre 
advanced upon its right to Segovia by way of Valladolid, and 
Ney upon its left in the direction of Guadalajara. The pass of 
Somosierra was defended by 12,000 Spaniards, who, provided 
with artillery, were in a position to make further progress an 
arduous matter to the French. The declivities and the solitary 
road here mounting abruptly were covered by sixteen cannon be- 
hind which were concealed strong detachments of infantry. The 
first thing, before dawn, on November 30th Napoleon ordered 
his tirailleurs to climb the heights, a feat successfully accom- 
plished under cover of fog; the road, although swept by the 
Spanish artillery, was cleared by the Polish horse-guards, who 
rode at a gallop into the face of the terrific fire, hewing down 
the gunners and driving back the enemy's infantry as well. 
The defenders of the pass fled in all directions without thought 
of order. The road to Madrid was free of all obstructions. 

At that capital uncontrollable excitement prevailed at the 
realization of the contrast between the self-complacent and boast- 
ful assurances with which the Juntas had until now been delud- 
ing the nation, and the fact of the French being at the gates of 
the city. The horrors of despair which this knowledge brought 
with it were of advantage only to the conqueror, who was thus 
enabled to appear as the restorer of order, and who, by the harsh 



45 o Campaigns in Spain and Austria isos 

measures with which he subdued all manifestations of anarchy, 
was successful in calming no small part of the population and even 
to some extent in vrinning them to himself. On December 4th 
the city surrendered to the Emperor, and before the close of the 
same day he promulgated four decrees calhng for a complete 
revolution of pubhc affairs in Spain: the Inquisition was sup- 
pressed and its domains declared national property; all feudal 
rights were abolished; the provincial tariffs were done away; 
the monasteries were reduced to one third of their number and, 
for such monks as desired of their own free will to enter the 
secular clergy, pensions were provided. Joseph, who followed 
his brother's victorious army, protested mdeed that these were 
encroachments upon his rights as a ruler and threatened to re- 
sign, but this privilege was denied him by Napoleon, who de- 
clared to him, as he did to the inhabitants of Madrid, that he had 
come as a conqueror, since the act of Bayonne had been nullified 
by the Spanish rebellion, and his right was that of the victor. 
In Burgos he had already published a decree of proscription, 
and those thereby made outlaws had reason to rejoice at suiTer- 
mg no greater hardship than being carried off to France, their 
property being, of course, confiscated. In this exhibition of sever- 
ity, as in every act of Napoleon's, there was a distinct purpose, 
and his aim here was to make the rule of his mild and lenient 
brother seem desirable. In a proclamation of December 7th he 
called the attention of the Spaniards to Joseph and his moderate 
and constitutional government. "It depends only upon your- 
selves," said he, "to determine whether this constitution shall 
remain your law. But if all my efforts prove vain and you will 
not justify the confidence which I repose in you, there will be 
left to me no alternative but to treat you as conquered provinces 
and to place my brother upon another throne. I shall then my- 
self assume the crown of Spain, and I shall find means of making 
it respected by the refractory, for God has endowed me with both 
power and will to overcome all obstacles." The desired effect 
was at once produced. In Madrid citizens, officials, and even the 
clergy hastened to swear allegiance to Joseph as king, and from 
the, provinces also (at least those into which the French had 



^T. 39] • Movements of the English 45 1 

already made their way) there came in the oaths which Napo- 
leon had demanded. It was through religious fervour that the 
Spanish people had been kindled into opposing the most ener- 
getic possible resistance; and it was Napoleon's design to make 
use of that same religious zeal for binding the nation into sub- 
jection by an oath based upon it. 

While affairs were being thus managed in Madrid Moore with 
his English troops had advanced to Salamanca, where, hearing 
of the various defeats of the Spanish, he had been for some time 
awaiting developments, not daring to coiitinue his march farther. 
It was a considerable time before this came to the knowledge of 
the Emperor, who had never ceased to suppose that the British 
would march straight upon the capital. Even as late as Decem- 
ber 14th he had ordered Victor and Bessieres to Talavera and 
beyond, while Ney was to leave part of his troops to cope with 
the remains of Castafios' corps and return with the other part 
to Madrid. It was not until some days later that he learned the 
true facts of the case from Soult, who was stationed near VaUa- 
dohd so as to maintain communication between the main army 
and France. These tactics on Moore's part seemed at first incom- 
prehensible, but Napoleon at once recognized how they might 
be turned to the destruction of the British. Soult, who had 
shortly before been instructed to march into Galicia, now re- 
ceived re-enforcements with orders to entice Moore as far as 
possible toward the east, whilst Napoleon himself would march 
from Madrid v/ith 40,000 men in a northwesterly direction, so 
that, after crossing the mountains, he could fall upon the rear 
of the enemy in Old Castile. 

The plan was excellent, but was destined, after all, to but 
partial success. Information had reached Moore of Napoleon's 
earher command to Soult to proceed into Galicia, and, acting 
upon this, he had not continued his advance for the present to- 
ward Valladolid, but had swerved to the north from his course 
in order to effect a junction with the forces approaching from 
Corunna before venturing an attack upon Soult. This movement 
had the effect of placuig a greater distance between hinaself and 
the army in pursuit from Madrid. Now Napoleon may very 



452 Campaigns in Spain and Austria [isos 

likely have supposed the march through the Guadarrama Pass 
and the Old Castilian plains a much simpler and easier matter 
than it proved to be, for he encountered all sorts of difficulties. 
In the mountains the troops suffered from snow-storms and sleet. 
He was obliged to order his horse-guards to dismount and break 
the way leading their horses, whilst he himself walked in their 
midst. This occurred on December 22d as they were making 
their way across the Pass of Espinar. On the following day there 
came a thaw, turning the rivers into raging torrents, and these 
had to be forded, since all bridges had been washed away, threat- 
ening a new danger. All these obstacles combined to hamper 
and impede the progress of the troops, so that it was with great 
difficulty that they finally got as far as Astorga. Moore, having 
meanwhile discovered the true situation of affairs, had bent 
his course toward Corunna ; owing to the start which he had of 
his pursuer, he was able to escape the danger of being ground to 
atoms between the armies of Soult and Napoleon, and the French 
had to content themselves with following him up closely, a task 
which the Emperor turned over to Soult alone, returning himself 
from Astorga to Benavente and thence to Valladolid. Could he 
have foreseen that the English upon reaching Corunna would 
not find the transport fleet ready and would be obliged to draw 
up in line of battle, that through Soult's dilatoriness they w^ould 
be afforded time for assuming an advantageous position, and 
finally for embarkation, he would probably have set himself at 
the head of the pursuing forces. But all this was not to be fore- 
seen, and, regarding his own work as ended, after directing Soult 
to occupy Portugal, he left the country on January 17th and 
hastened to Paris. 

He had undertaken the campaign in Spain with a twofold 
purpose; of this but one part had been accomphshed: with one 
or two rapid blows he had conquered the victors of Baylen and 
restored the halo of his own invincibility. The second was, 
however a failure: Spain's resistance had not been overcome. 
Battles had been won and armies had been beaten, dispersed, 
driven off, but the country remained unconquered, the people 
unsubdued. The remains of the vanquished armies might still 



iET. 39] Why Napoleon Left Spain 453 

reassemble in the south and strengthen themselves for new com- 
bat; the British might land with their fleet in Portugal or else- 
where. In the judgment of Jomini, the great war-critic, it would 
have required a systematic campaign of two years' duration, 
with the expenditure of from 300 to 400 milUon francs for the 
sustenance of the army, to carry through the subjugation of 
Spain. But we know how much Napoleon was pressed for time 
and upon how unsteady a basis his supremacy in Europe was 
resting. For it was one of the consequences of his world-em- 
bracing policy that it was constantly assigning new problems to 
him before he had been able to solve that upon which he was 
already engaged. 

Down to very recent times the truth of the assertion has never 
been questioned that on January 2d, 1809, Napoleon received 
letters in Astorga whose contents gave him cause for serious 
uneasiness and eventually led him to determine upon turning 
back with the Guard; in these letters there were supposed to 
have been reports of new and energetic preparations for war in 
Austria and of secret agreements between his formerly antago- 
nistic ministers, Talleyrand and Fouche, which prevented the 
Emperor from losing himself in the mountains of the west. Lan- 
frey and other historians have characterized this as mere Napole- 
onic invention and given it as their opinion that, as when facing 
the English coast in 1805, the Emperor was only in search of a 
pretext for escaping from the situation in Spain so as to acquire 
new glory as a warrior by striking another blow at Austria. This 
view is, however, not to be accepted as correct, for it has been 
shown from new historical sources, such, for instance, as the 
"Souvenirs" of Maret and docmnents of Mettemich's, that there 
was an intrigue which was by no means insignificant conducted 
by Talleyrand, Fouche, and others, who declared the Spanish 
undertaking, and, indeed, all of the world-embracing policy of 
the Emperor to be prejudicial to France. Mettemich, it must 
be admitted, exaggerated greatly in seeing in this intrigue a 
conspiracy already developed, and in a band of malcontents a 
political party bent upon revolution with whom reckoning must 
be made. In so representing matters at the court which had 



454 Campaigns in Spain and Austria [I809 

sent him out he was taking the course best adapted to lead in 
Vienna to the very mistake which had caused Mack in 1805 to 
advance as far as the lUer.* But, however this may have been, 
there was enough in the matter for the news in regard to it to 
make an impression upon the Emperor, who was by nature in- 
clined to be mistrustful, and to recall him to France just as a com- 
munication of the same order had decided him to return after 
the battle of Marengo in ISOO.f 

But of greater weight than this in determining Napoleon to 
leave Spain was the consideration of Austria's attitude. While 
he had been fighting in Spain Austria had zealously pushed for- 
ward her military preparations and appeared resolved upon 
war. And for this there was abundant justification. The fact 
that Napoleon was occupied in Spain was in itself a favouring 
circumstance. Metternich, who repaired in person to Vienna in 
order to advise in the light of what he had seen and heard, de- 
scribed the available forces of the French as scarcely superior 
in number to those of Austria, and was of the opinion that the 
Spanish war would keep busy so large a part of them ''that 
Austria's forces, inferior to those of France, as they had been 
before the Spanish insurrection, would be at least equal to 
them at the outset." In his memorandum of December 4th, 
1808, he estimated that Napoleon had at his disposal for opera- 
tions in eastern Europe only a little more than 200,000 men, 
and on the same day Francis' minister, Stadion, reported to him 
his conviction that the hour had come ''for making immediate 
use of the forces of the Austrian state, whose reconstruction had 
been so successfully persevered in ever since the beginning of the 
year. The desperate financial situation furnished another argu- 
ment in favour of decisive action. For the army could be main- 
tained at its full complement only until spring, when measures 

* "We have at last reached an epoch," said the Austrian ambassador 
in a memorandum dated December 4th, 1808, "where allies seem to be 
offering within the French Empire itself, and these aUies are no vile and 
low-born intriguers; men who might represent the nation call for our 
support ; that support is to our own interest, our one interest, and like- 
wise to that of posterity." 

t See page 203. 



iET. 39] The Situation in Prussia 455 

of some kind would have to be taken. For weeks already England 
had been besought for subsidies, but these had been promised 
only upon the actual breaking out of war. But was there, then, 
no other help besides the Spanish diversion and England's ma- 
terial support upon which Austria might rely? True, there was 
no further counting in Prussia upon the ministry of Stein, who 
had advocated a German national revolt, for Stein, at the request 
of Napoleon, had been deposed from office and had come as an 
outlaw to reside in Austria. But his downfall had, after all, 
brought about no real change of system at the Konigsberg court. 
Was it not, indeed, to be regarded as a distinct indication of 
amity that Count Goltz the Prussian minister, should frankly 
communicate to the Austrian ambassador early in December 
the fact of the convention entered into with France on September 
8th with the assurance that the king, even if not able to draw 
out at once from the obligations thus imposed upon him, would 
nevertheless seize the first propitious occasion to range himself 
upon the side of Austria? At all events this assurance was allowed 
great weight in the deliberations in Vienna. They had indeed 
no means of knowing that the ministers might not always repre- 
sent exactly the views and purposes of the King. And this was 
just what happened on the present occasion. Alexander L, on 
his journey home from Erfurt by way of Konigsberg, had invited 
Frederick William to visit him in St. Petersburg. The Czar's 
object was to remove him from his surroundings, where all were 
eager for war. and induce him to abide by the September conven- 
tion. In this he succeeded. When the King returned to his own 
country before the middle of February he would thenceforth hear 
nothing more of taking any part in warlike operations, and ex- 
horted Austria to preserve the peace, or at the utmost to limit 
her action to parrying an attack by Napoleon; he should himself 
not separate from Russia. Now the course upon which Stadion 
had fixed was based upon just the point of allowing no time to 
the foe of ancient political systems to concentrate his forces and 
prepare for hurfing himself again with superior numbers upon 
the power on the Danube. His proposal was rather to forestall 
such a possibihty by attacking Napoleon before the Spanish 



45^ Campaigns in Spain and Austria [i809 

difficulties should have ceased to engross his attention and 
while his forces were still to a great extent involved in the penin- 
sula. 

This announcement of Frederick William's meant more 
than the destruction of the hopes of Prussia which had 
been entertained in Vienna. It revealed at the same time 
that Austria had been equally mistaken in cherishing hopes 
in regard to Russia. Talleyrand's attitude toward the Czar at 
Erfurt had been made known through Metternich's communi- 
cations from Paris, and St. Vincent, the Austrian diplomat, 
upon his return from the congress, had testified that every- 
thing had not passed off with perfect smoothness between 
the two Emperors. Doubts had therefore arisen as to the 
sincerity of the friendship between Franne and Russia in spite 
of the ostentatious manner in which it was displayed, and the 
Russians began to hope that the Czar, even if not prepared to 
adopt an entire change of policy, would at least remain neutral 
in case of war between France and Austria. But to Prince 
Schwarzenberg, who had been sent as Austrian ambassador to 
St. Petersburg, Alexander, hoping to convince Austria with the 
same arguments which had proved efficacious in dealing with 
Prussia, flatly announced that he should be obliged to fulfil his 
engagements to Napoleon, since the Vienna court was unquestion- 
ably the aggressor and his mihtary support was in that case 
pledged to France by the terms of the Treaty of Erfurt (March 
2d). Now the object of the Czar was simply to procure for 
himself the widest possible freedom of action in the Orient, and 
he was in nowise concerned in furthering Napoleon's schemes of 
dominion over the world; so later, when he recognized that 
Austria was resolved upon war in spite of all discouragements, 
he vouchsafed the secret assurance that he would avoid deahng 
rigorously with her. (April 15th.) 

But even if the Czar and the King of Prussia were opposed 
to war with France, were there not among the inhabitants of 
their countri is many who felt otherwise and who were strong 
enough to co( rce their governments to take them into considera- 
tion? Indeec it is a fact of the greatest significance in history 



^T.39] Popular Feeling in Germany 457 

that at this time neither Alexander nor Frederick William did 
represent the feeling and desires of their peoples. For, just as in 
Austria public opinion had clamoured for war ever since the 
commission of the crime at Bayonne * so in Germany and 
Russia enmity toward Napoleon had become a national hatred 
which was making itself felt more and more plainly. Public 
sentiment in Prussia was clearly set forth in a letter to the Queen 
from the Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs : '' If the King delays 
any longer to fix upon a course compatible with the wishes of the 
people, who are loud in their demands for war against France, 
a revolution will be the inevitable result." Even personal ene- 
mies of Stein's, such as the Minister Beyme, importuned Fred- 
erick William to separate from Russia and accept the homage 
of the provinces which had formerly been his on the farther side 
of the Elbe. Others called his attention to the danger which he 
was incurring — that Austria, in case she should be victorious in 
this war of Uberation, might get a footing also in northern Ger- 
many, since Silesia v/as already signifying her desire to return 
under Austrian rule. Ernst Moritz Arndt, indeed, cried aloud 
to the world: ^'Liberty and Austria! shall be our battle-cry; 
long reign the House of Habsburg ! " A storm of enthusiasm swept 
over all Germany and made itself felt in Vienna in spite of the 
dissuasions and warnings of the King of Prussia, who now again 
had thoughts of abdicating just as he did previous to the battle 
of Jena. Was it then so serious an error of Stadion's when, acting 
upon this impression, he took into account the German people 
rather than its rulers, and finally succeeded in constraining even 
the cold-hearted Emperor Francis to "hold the knife, so to 
speak, to the throat of Napoleon"? (End of February, 1809.) 

Just what Austria hoped to gain by the war is to be seen from 
the instructions of January 29th given to Count Wallmoden, 
who was empowered to act as plenipotentiary in the negotiations 
with England: "to get back to the point of inward strength and 

* On March 18th, 1809, the French Charge d' Affaires wrote to the 
home Ministry from Vienna: "In 1805 the government alone advocated 
war, neither the army nor the people desired itj in 1809 it is demanded 
by government, army, and people." 



458 Campaigns in Spain and Austria [I809 

consistency at which the country stood after the last treaties 
previous to the Treaty of Pressburg, . . . but with the understand- 
ing that the right is reserved to make certain minor arrangements 
concerning the improvement of our frontier and our position 
toward Germany when a favourable opportunity shall present 
itself, particularly as two younger branches of the hereditary 
dynasty have been deprived of their rightful inheritances in the 
course of the revolutionary wars and must find, either in Ger- 
many or Italy, rehabilitation in their inherited territories or 
compensation therefor." Somewhat farther on it is declared: 
"It is Austria's desire, if she should be successful in overthrow- 
ing the tributary system of Napoleon, to see every lawful pro- 
prietor again in possession of the lands belonging to him before 
the time of Napoleon's usurpations. This principle is to apply 
first of all to Spain; then in Italy to the King of Naples, the 
Pope, and the King of Sardinia; in Germany to the King of Prus- 
sia, to the Elector of Hesse, to the Duke of Brunswick, and to 
the King of England as regards Hanover, and, lastly, to the 
present duchy of Warsaw in favour of Prussia. The court of 
Vienna extends this principle even to those princes of Germany 
whom in the approaching war it would be compelled to treat as 
foes, but whose return into their inherited lands at the close of 
the war it is ready to guarantee beforehand, although with cer- 
tain conditions more or less severe according to the conduct 
observed by them during the course of the war." * 

To what extent Napoleon was informed as to these intentions 
on the part of Austria when he so abruptly ceased operations in 
Spain it would be impossible to say with any degree of accuracy. 
It has, however, been shown that many a bit of information 
reached him, generally by way of Munich, concerning the 
country's preparations, of Austrian agitations to rebellion in 

* Austria was even prepared "to grant to the King of Sardinia an 
addition to his former territories sufficient to prevent his being compelled 
in every war to take shelter under the French flag and to serve as advance- 
guard to the French army." It was therefore at least gross exaggeration 
when, upon the basis of this very document. Austria's aim in 1809 was 
recently described as "the mastery of both Italy and Germany." (Oncken, 
Das Zeitalter der Revolution, II.) 



^T. 39] Napoleon^'s Preparations 459 

Tyrol, of secret agreements between the Tyrolese nobility and 
the government at Vienna, with various other acts indicative of 
a renewal of hostilities. During his Spanish campaign he had not 
for a moment lost sight of Austria, and although he had left only 
60,000 men in northern Germany under Davout and 30,000 in 
the south under Oudinot, he was constantly intent upon the 
strengthening of these forces, which w^ould have been by no means 
competent to resist a sudden attack of the Austrians, He de- 
manded of the Senate the conscription of 1810, and succeeded 
in having the number of annual recruits raised from 80,000 to 
100,000 men. This last measure being retroactive enabled him 
to draw 20,000 men additional from those Hable to military 
service in each of the years from 1806 to 1809. A young army 
of 160,000 men was thus collected out of which he organized a 
fifth battalion to every regiment. He further ^\dthdrew from 
Spain two divisions and the Guard, and ordered two other di- 
visions which were already on the march thither to face about 
and return to Germany, so that by the middle of April — ^the 
time at which he assumed that war would break out — he had at 
his disposal there 200,000 men exclusive of the army in Italy, 
It was announced in Paris that the Spanish affair was at an end. 
the country subdued. He was firmly resolved upon the new 
contest and was unsparing of pains in preparation for it. Here 
again he was concerned in demonstrating the inviolability of his 
supremacy: henceforward no one need cherish the hope of 
agitating with impunity against him whilst he was elsewhere 
occupied. In his eyes any state manifesting the shghtest inde- 
pendence of movement was regarded as rebelHous and deserving 
of punishment. Moreover, to this was added still another con- 
sideration. 

While in former wars the army had been self-sustaining and 
had yielded in addition very substantial financial profits/the 
Spanish campaign had not only brought into the treasury no 
war indemnity, but, on the contrary, had occasioned very great 
expenditure. The financial situation had thereby suffered greatly 
and absolutely demanded improvement. "He is in need of 
money/' said the Russian envoy Romanzoff to Metternich in 



460 Campaigns in Spain and Austria [i809 

regard to Napoleon; "he made no attempt to conceal the fact 
from me; he wants war with Austria as a means of getting it." 
In Vienna, on the other hand, Zichy, formerly Minister of Finance 
and now a member of the ministry, but not in charge of a depart- 
ment, was Ukewise crying: "War, for the business situation 
demands it!" So the great aims of world-mastery on the one 
side contending with world-liberation on the other were inex- 
tricably bound up with the material necessities of state economy. 
Strife was inevitable since both parties desired it. But to Napo- 
leon, to whom it had so often meant much, it was now doubly 
important to make out Austria as the aggressor, not only in order 
to be able to demand of Russia the help promised under those 
circmnstances, but also in order to appear again to the French 
as the one who was against his will constantly being drawn into 
war by foreign powers. To this intent he had, for instance, cir- 
culated the last week in February a report that he had sent to 
Vienna to make proposals of a most acceptable nature in the 
hope of maintaining peace — a statement true only in appearance. 
Moreover, he needed time to complete his preparations, for the 
recruits had been assembled only by the middle of February 
and needed first to be drilled. It was not until the beginning 
of March that he gave orders to concentrate forces in southern 
Germany, and not until the last days of the month did he 
arrange the strategic arrangement of his forces, which was to 
be completed by April 15th under supervision of the staff. Hos- 
tilities would not, he hoped break out before that time or pref- 
erably until even later, somewhere about the end of April or 
beginning of May, as he wrote on March 27th to Eugene Beau- 
harnais. By that time the 200,000 men of the army in Germany 
ought to be assembled around Ratisbon, which was to serve as 
headquarters, and only in case of the Austrians engaging earlier 
than had been counted upon were they to occupy the line of the 
Lech with Donauworth as point of support. Should they be suc- 
cessful in assuming the position at Ratisbon — with Davout at 
Nuremberg, Massena, in command of the forces last sent out, at 
Augsburg, and Oudinot with the Bavarian troops near Ratisbon — 
they were prepared against all contingencies. The enemy, whose 



^T. 39] Vacillation in Austria 461 

main army Napoleon knew to be in Bohemia, might either make 
an incursion into Bavaria at Cham and attempt to march direct 
upon Ratisbon, in which case the French divisions rapidly as- 
sembled would stop him in the valley of the Regen, or he might 
direct his course toward Nuremberg or Bamberg, running the 
risk of being cut off from Bohemia, or, again, he might de- 
bouch to the north toward Dresden, when the French would 
sally into Bohemia and follow him into Germany; but if the 
Austrians should arrange to outflank the French position on 
both sides, the French would proceed to attack their centre, 
keeping open a line of retreat along the Lech. Everything 
depended upon the question when the Austrians would open 
hostilities — for the first step must be left to them to take on 
account of Russia — and in what direction that step would be 
taken. 

In the offices of the Austrian quartermaster-general the 
new campaign against France had long been under considera- 
tion. A plan had been elaborated as early as October, 1808, 
according to which Davout was to be attacked in Saxony and 
the North German princes and peoples incited to rise in oppo- 
sition to Napoleon. But then had followed a long series of 
vacillations due to the fact that immediately about the Emperor 
there existed all the time two currents of opinion, one, repre- 
sented by Stadion, advocating the most expeditious possible 
offensive operations, and the other, represented by Archduke 
Charles, advocating extensive equipments for defence against 
the possibihty of Austria's being finally attacked. This inde- 
cision continued to the end of the year, and the question was 
still open when the entire month of January had passed The 
only certainty reached was that the preparations for war could 
not be completed before the end of March. It was not until 
the beginning of February that the Emperor decided upon 
taking the offensive. And now a new plan of operations was 
formed according to which one corps, under Archduke Ferdinand, 
should march toward Warsaw, another division of the army, 
under Archduke John, should penetrate into Italy and rouse 
the Tyrol to insurrection, while a corps under Hiller should 



462 Campaigns in Spain and Austria [I809 

take up its position on the Inn, but the body of the army, 
under Archduke Charles, should be concentrated in Bohemia so 
as to operate thence according to the position which the main 
force of the enemy should adopt. (February 8th.) But by 
the time that the separate corps finally began to assemble in 
Bohemia, news came of the advance of the French in Suabia 
and of Davout's march upon Wiirzburg, that is to say, of the 
concentration of the hostile army in the valley of the Danube, 
and fears began to be felt that it might press forward to the 
right bank of the river, overpower wdth its vastly superior 
numbers the solitary corps under Hiller and march direct upon 
the capital, while the main body of the Austrian army in march- 
ing from Bohemia to the Danube might encounter difficulties 
in crossing the river and arrive too late to prevent catastrophe.* 
Hence it was decided about the middle of March that, instead 
of proceeding directly against the French with seven of the 
corps which had been assembled in Bohemia, a detour should 
be made through Linz enabling them to unite first with Killer's 
detachment and so assume the offensive in crossing the Inn 
rather than by way of the Bohemian forest. Two army corps 
only which were left behind in Bohemia were ordered to take 
the direct route and march upon Ratisbon with the expectation 
that they would have rejoined the main forces before the de- 
cisive battle should take place. The result of this decision was 
that three weeks were lost in executing marches with extreme 
deliberation, giving time to the Bavarians to make all their 
military preparations, including the evacuation of Munich. It 
was April 9th before the Austrians stood at the Inn ready 
for crossing, on which day the Archduke Charles sent to Munich 
his declaration of war. 

A few days before the Prince had addressed his army in a 

* The Austrian Colonel Stutterheim claims to have learned from 
"those who were well informed" that these were the reasons which in- 
fluenced the decision, but the whole ihatter is at present still wrapped in 
darkness. The usually accepted idea is that differences in regard to the 
plan of operations arose between General Mayer on the one hand and 
Archduke Charles and his second, General Griinne, on the other. But 
this view lacks confirmation. 



jet.39] The Meaning of the Contest 463 

military order charging them with the mission of hberating 
the Continent. '^The hberty of Europe has taken refuge under 
your banners/' said he; "your victories will loose its fetters, 
and your German brothers, now still arrayed in the ranks of 
the enemy, await deUverance at your hands." Then, apos- 
trophizing Germany, he continued: ''Austria's sword is not 
drawn for the sake of her own independence alone, but also 
in behalf of the hberty and national honour of Germany." By 
a manifesto issuing from the pen of Gentz announcement was 
made to the world that it was not against France that war 
was being waged, but solely against the system of constant 
expansion which had been the cause of the prevailing confusion 
of political relations. The war which had its beginning in 
April, 1809, was then no war of state against state, no contest 
to decide the greater or less extent of a pohtical sphere of 
influence, but a struggle for the independence of the nations 
of Europe against a power which had long ceased to recog- 
nize the confines of state boundaries, but which, on the contrary, 
strove to obliterate them as far as possible and impose upon 
the different peoples the revolutionary system of centralized 
equaUty. 

Even before the hostile armies encountered one another in 
Bavaria war had already sprung into blaze elsewhere. First 
of all in the Tyrol. A deep-seated hatred against Bavarian 
rule existed in this country, particularly among the nobilit}^ 
and peasant population, and that goverimient could count its 
few adherents only in the larger cities among the citizens belong- 
ing to liberal circles. This feeling of resentment was due to 
various measures taken by Bavaria toward the tributary coun- 
try. It had divided it into three districts, had abolished its 
name, done away with the provincial diet, introduced military 
conscription^ and, more than all, had imposed ecclesiastical 
reform. Promises made by Austrian emissaries and the gov- 
ernment at Vienna served to encourage this animosity, and 
when no question remained of open war the Tyrolese peasantry 
arose and, after giving successful battle to the Bavarian troops, 
compelled them to capitulate and took possession of the capital^, 



464 Campaigns in Spain and Austria [i809 

where they were soon joined by the Austrians, whose arrival 
was hailed with shouts and rejoicing. At the same time the 
army commanded by Archduke John advancing from Carinthia 
had defeated the French under Beauhamais at Pordenone, and 
on April 16th, 1809, had overcome them a second time in the 
battle of Sacile or Fontana Fredda, driving them back as far 
as the Piave and Adige. Success had likewise attended the 
corps of Archduke Ferdinand in his advance into Poland, so 
that on April. 20th he was able to enter Warsaw. The value 
of these successes was enhanced by the fact that, in spite of 
the delay to the Austrian advance caused by the changes in 
their plan of operation. Napoleon was none the less taken by 
surprise, since he had not expected attack until some weeks 
later. Much now depended upon whether the main army of 
Austria would understand taking advantage of the favourable 
circumstances to effect rapid and decisive operations. 

Berthier was entrusted with the supreme command of the 
*' German Army" until the Emperor should himself reach the 
theatre of war. He was, however, by no means competent 
for the performance of this task. Napoleon had given exphcit 
directions to recall Davout to the Lech and there concentrate 
the army, that is, whatever the circumstances, to unite the 
forces before going into action ; but, instead of following instruc- 
tions, Berthier left Davout stationed at Ratisbon and reHed 
upon bringing Oudinot and Massena up into line with him to 
the south of the Danube. The only result of this proceeding was 
that the French army, instead of being concentrated, remained 
for several days split up into two parts liable to be overpowered 
one after the other by the Austrian army, which was moving 
forward as a single solid body. But this favourable oppor- 
tunity was neglected by the Austrians. Six days were spent, 
from April 10th to 16th, in getting from the Inn to the Isar, 
a distance covered by the French a short time afterward in two 
days' march, and when, on the morning of the 17th, the Arch- 
duke set out from Landshut northwards toward Ratisbon so 
as to take the offensive against Davout, that general had al- 
ready fallen back in spite of Napoleon's orders. The Emperor, 



-^T. 39] Napoleon Joins the Army 465 

however, arrived upon the Danube just in time to rescue his 
army from its perilous situation. 

By means of the signal telegraph Napoleon had learned in 
Paris on the evening of the 12th of the crossing of the Inn by 
the Austrians and of their declaration of war. He at once 
started for the scene of action; travelling for four days and 
nights with but short delays for rest and refreshment, he reached 
Donauworth on the morning of the 17th. Here he at once 
perceived the mistake which the Austrians had made in ad- 
vancing too slowly, and, enraged as he was at the confusion 
which Berthier's blundering had caused, the position held by 
the enemy served to reassure and calm him again. "Where is 
the enemy?" he asked as he left the vehicle in which he had 
been travelling. ''The Archduke crossed the Inn and the 
Isar," repHed Montyon, who often described the scene after- 
wards, "then swerved to the right and is now on the march 
to Ratisbon." This report seemed at first incredible to the 
Emperor, and he had to be again and again assured of its cor- 
rectness before he would put faith in it. "At these words," 
said Montyon, "the Emperor seemed to increase in stature, 
his eyes flashed, and extending his arms toward Ratisbon he ex- 
claimed, with a joy which was betrayed in look, voice, and 
gesture: "Then they are mine! That is a lost army! In one 
month we shall be in Vienna!" 

The Emperor was mistaken. Three weeks were to suffice 
for removing all obstacles to his entry into the Austrian 
capital. 

The generalship now^ displayed by Napoleon has been by 
common consent and at all times classed among the greatest 
of his achievements. It is needless to describe the campaign 
in detail. Only its results need to be indicated. 

The two French armies might even yet have been defeated 
one at a time by the Austrians, suice the distance in a straight 
line from l.andshut to Ratisbon was only seven miles and that 
from Augsburg to Ratisbon sixteen, and it has been observed 
with good reason that Napoleon had years before even less 
time and space at his disposal when in his first Italian 



466 Campaigns in Spain and Austria [I809 

campaign he defeated separately before Mantua the two Aus- 
trian armies sent to the rehef of that city. But the Austrians 
continued their advance always at the same deliberate pace, 
and furthermore, since uncertainty existed as to whether Da- 
vout were still in Ratisbon or had moved backward toward 
the west, their forces were divided so that only one half was 
directed tow^ard that city, while the other pusherl on toward 
Abensberg in order to attack the Marshal while making a 
flank movement and prevent his junction with the Bavarians.* 
Meanwhile Napoleon had begun to issue his orders from the 
hour of his arrival on the 17th: Davout was to fall back from 
Ratisbon to Ingolstadt, following the right bank of the Danube, 
and the Bavarians under Lefebvre were to keep in touch with 
him, while Massena was to advance from the Lech toward the 
Inn. The latter in particular was directed to use all possible 
expedition, since Napoleon in the end fixed upon a plan which 
enabled him not only to unite his own army, by drawing back 
the left wing and pushing forward the right, but to execute his 
favourite manoeuvre as well, of threatening the enemy in his 
line of retreat, which was in this case towards Ivandshut. All 
these movements were duly carried out amidst a series of suc- 
cessful engagements with both wings of the Austrian columns. 
It was not long before the concentration of the army had been 
effected, and by April 20th Napoleon was prepared to take the 
offensive with his whole line, Davout being on the left in the 
neighbourhood of the Laber, Massena on the right near Moss- 
burg, the Emperor at the centre with the Bavarians, and several 
French divisions across the Abens. Napoleon's sagacity in 
making this disposition of forces was clearly proved by the out- 
come, for before the close of the 20th he had already pushed 
his way between the two halves of the hostile army, throwing 
back upon Landshut one of them which had pushed forward 
to the northwest under command of Hiller, while the other, 
commanded by Charles, succeeded on the same day in taking 

* Radetzky, who himself took part in this campaign, regards this 
division of forces for the sake of taking Ratisbon as the second great 
mistake of the Austrians, the first being the march by way of Linz. 



^T 39] Napoleon's Wonderful Strategy 467 

Ratisbon. Leaving to some of the lesser forces the task of 
pursuing Hiller to Neumarkt and beyond, Napoleon himself 
at once turned against the Archduke. That general had drawn 
to himself in Ratisbon one of the two corps from Bohemia, 
which had likewise taken unnecessary time for the march, and, 
thus re-enforced, he advanced on the 22d toward the south. 
But at Eckmiihl Vandamme attacked and overcame the corps 
under Rosenberg constituting the Austrian centre, while Da- 
vout forced "back its right wing and Lannes threatened to out- 
flank its left. In spite of extraordinary bravery displayed by 
the Austrians, such an onset proved irresistible; they were 
forced to withdraw again into Ratisbon, where on the following 
day (the 23d) occurred another engagement, the loss of which 
compelled the Archduke to cross the Danube so as to make 
his way back to the capital by way of Bohemia. 

Without making any attempt at pursuit of the Prince, 
Napoleon now gave orders to advance upon Vienna. 

In later years, when in exile at St. Helena, he repeatedly 
averred that the greatest and most adroit of military manoeuvres 
had been that which he had carried out in the battles of Abensberg 
and Landshut and finally completed in that of Eckmiihl, the 
action at the last-named point particularly being in his estima- 
tion the military feat most worthy of admii-ation. And indeed 
when it is taken into consideration that less than a week before 
he had found a severed army in which the greatest confusion pre- 
vailed while confronted by an enemy with concentrated forces, 
and had within those few days found means to unite his o"^ti 
army and divide that of his adversary and then severally to 
defeat those sundered parts, there are few who would deny him 
the honour to which he thus laid claim. And next to this 
strategic genius, that which was most truly marvellous in this 
extraordinary man was his untiring energy of mind which 
allowed him no sleep, and scarcely even food, until his aim 
had been accomplished. "Work is my element," said the pris- 
oner at St. Helena. ''I was born and bred for work. I have 
known the limitations of my legs, I have knoTVTi those of my eyes, 
but I have never been able to discover my limitations for work." 



468 Campaigns in Spain and Austria |1809 

These victories in Bavaria were, moreover, important not 
only as brilliant military achievements. They constituted the 
decisive feature of the whole war, which in consequence of them 
totally lost its original character. Austria had expected to 
carry on an offensive warfare, and had made its beginnings with 
this intention; she was now thrown back upon the defensive and 
was henceforth never able to assume the offensive beyond her 
own confines. Hardly five days before she had appeared as the 
foremost combatant of all Europe, and her army was now nothing 
more than the defender of its own state ! For, as a further conse- 
quence of the disasters suffered by Charles, the Archdukes John 
and Ferdinand had been compelled to give up again the ground 
which they had gained in Italy and Poland. At the Austrian 
headquarters there prevailed the deepest dejection. From 
Cham^ whither Archduke Charles had withdrawn, he wrote to 
Emperor Francis : ' ^Another such an encounter and I shall have 
no army left. I await the negotiations for peace.'' But in spite 
of the enormous losses sustained during this campaign of five 
days' duration — and these were estimated at over 50,000 men 
— the Austrian Emperor was not yet of opinion that the 
time had come for yielding. He was at this time still under 
the influence of Stadion, who was in no wise ready to give 
up hope of a happy issue. "Everything is not yet lost," 
the minister writes to his wife, "if only we can manage 
to infuse courage into the Archduke and his army, which, 
by the way in which it has been sacrificed, has every 
reason to feel disheartened." The brother of the Premier, 
Count Frederick Stadion, was to this intent despatched to 
headquarters, and as a result the voice of the general-in-chief 
actually began to take on a more confident tone. He did in- 
deed write to Napoleon — to which no reply was ever vouch- 
safed — offering to enter into negotiations, but he nevertheless 
cherished the hope of being able to effect a junction between 
Budweis and Linz with the two corps under Hiller, which, 
falling back before Napoleon, had reached the Inn and were now 
marching down the Danube, and with their help to compel the 
enemy to retreat by threatening him in flank and rear. (Letter 



^Et. 39] The Capture of Vienna 469 

from Archduke Charles to Francis II. from Neumarkt, April 28th, 
1809.) But these hopes proved illusive. At Linz Hiller was 
unable to hold his own against the pursuing French, who far out- 
numbered him, and after a heroic combat at Ebelsberg (May 4th, 
1809) he was obliged likewise to yield the line of the Traun. It 
was not until Crems was reached that he was able to gain the 
left bank of the Danube, and here he awaited the Archduke, who 
was advancing by way of Zwettel and Meissau ; about the middle 
of May the two portions of the army were united upon the eastern 
slope of the Bisamberg, opposite Vienna. 

In conversation with General Bubna of the Austrian army at 
a later date Napoleon himself designated it as a military error 
not to have followed up the Archduke into Bohemia; he had, said 
he, long hesitated at Ratisbon, and had decided in favour of the 
advance upon Vienna only on account of the general situation 
in Europe; that is to say, in order to prevent the refractory 
elements of northern Germany from allying themselves with 
Austria. On May 13th he made himself master of the city, 
which did not oppose any very effective resistance, and proceed- 
ed again, as in 1805, to set up his court in Schonbrunn. Much 
had indeed been thus accomplished, but it was yet far from 
being a complete conquest. For the possession of the enemy's 
capital did not have full significance until the hostile army posted 
opposite the city should be likewise vanquished, and if Napoleon 
wished to continue to act upon the offensive he must risk an 
engagement, although his forces were diminished by detachments, 
Lefebvre having been sent with the Bavarians against the Tyrol 
and Bernadotte left in Linz, while Davout was but now on the 
march toward Vienna. 

He selected as his means of approach to the enemy a crossing 
to the southeast of the city near Kaiser-Ebersdorf. By this 
way, during the night of May 20th, he ordered his light cavalry, 
the corps of Massena and Lannes, and behind them the Guard 
to pass first to the large island of Lobau and thence, during 
the next night, to the northern bank of the river, all of which 
was accomplished without interference from the enemy. It 
had been the Archduke's original plan to await the onset of the 



470 Campaigns in Spain and Austria [1809 

French in a position supported by the Bisamberg, for they 
seemed to be planning to cross at Nussdorf, but upon learning 
to his surprise of their having crossed the river below Vienna and 
that they had already taken possession of Aspern and Essling on 
the morning of. the 21st, he determined upon issumg forth and 
attacking them with his superior forces. Furthermore, in order 
to make sure of remaining in this numerical superioritj^ he gave 
orders to destroy the bridge across the main stream at Ebersdorf 
by means of boats loaded with stone set floating down the river, 
thus to prevent the possibility of re-enforcements reaching the 
enemy. But this undertaking was not immediately successful. 
The French continued to hold the points which they had occupied, 
and during the course of the night Napoleon was still able to draw 
over the river enough troops to allow of his proceeding farther 
on the morning of the 22d. For the tv/o armies were as yet not 
far from equal in point of numbers, and if the brigades under 
Davout should come up so that he could count upon them. 
Napoleon felt that victory for the French was assured; Davout 
could then relieve Lannes at Essling, and the latter could be 
entrusted with the task of dashing forward and breaking through 
the Austrian centre. And in fact hardly had Davout announced 
his arrival at Ebersdorf on the other side of the river before 
Lannes on this side received orders to advance. This command 
had already been carried out with prodigious energy, and the 
Austrian line had already been forced to bend and give ground in 
the middle, so that the Archduke was able to avert catastrophe 
only with greatest difficult}^, exposing himself personally and 
bringing into action all reserve forces, when suddenly the great 
bridge in the rear of the French gave way, the troops under 
Davout were kept back on the south side of the river, and Lannes, 
unsupported by troops from Essling, was forced to retreat. But 
now the Austrians on their side with unfaltering courage again 
advanced to the attack; Napoleon was once more forced to 
assume the defensive, and the battle took on the same character 
which it had borne on the previous day. A number of critical 
moments were yet to be passed through in which the Archduke is 
said to have considered the advisability of retreat, but finall}^ the 



iET.39] Napoleon Repulsed 471 

French were compelled to give up Aspem and Essling and retire 
to the island of Lobau, a movement protected with great valour 
by Massena's troops, and in particular by the heroic General 
Moil ton.* 

For Napoleon the day was lost. His generals had covered 
themselves with glory, but the commander-in-chief had suf- 
fered defeat. He was conveyed by boat to Ebersdorf, and 
there he is reported to have sat before his improvised supper 
alone, immovable, speaking no word and staring straight before 
him until his eyes filled with tears. Was he weeping, as his 
flatterers claim, for Lannes, who was lying mortally wounded? 
Or was it another loss which extorted from him these tears? 
For there was no concealing from himself the fact that the 
fame of his irresistibility was a thing of the past. In vain did 
he proclaim to the world in his bulletin: ''The enemy retired 
from the positions which it had taken, and we remained mas- 
ters on the field of battle." No one would give credence to such 
a statement. 

Shortly before he had conferred with his marshals on the 
island of Lobau. To them he had appeared as undaunted and 
confident as ever. He had not been wilhng to agree to their 
proposition of evacuating the island; he insisted upon holding 
and fortifying it. And in this events proved him to have been 
in the right, for when, during the night of May 23d, the Aus- 
trians with two brigades attempted to wrest it from them, 
the enterprise failed. f Whether it might not after all have 

* There is, as yet, no entirely trustworthy account of the battle at 
Aspem. The decision in favour of Austria was finally brought about 
by the cavalry general, Prince John Liechtenstein, as the Archduke 
himself declared on the following day to Francis before the whole army. 
Thus Stadion, who accompanied the Emperor, wrote in a letter to his wife 
dated May 23d. 

t This was the announcement made by the Archduke himself to his 
brother the Emperor. In a memorial of the 29th submitted by Wimpffen, 
his Chief -of -Staff, occurs this statement: ''Advantage could not be taken 
of the victory, since the firm position of the enemy rendered all pursuit 
impossible; moreover, the Danube could not well be crossed as long as 
the enemy continued to maintain a considerable part of his army on this 
side of the main stream on the island of Lobau. 



472 Campaigns in Spain and Austria [1809 

been successful if greater forces had been brought to bear is 
indeed open to question. Marmont relates that the utmost 
confusion prevailed in the French army, which was compelled 
to bivouac on the island for three days until the great bridge 
could be restored, affording the enemy the opportunity for 
making a sudden attack with all the chances in his favour. But 
the Archduke contented himself with seeking out the best 
possible position on the Marchfeld and assuming an attitude 
of waiting. In his opinion the fruits of the victory should be 
sought in a diplomatic rather than a military way, that is, it 
should be made the means of obtaining the most advantageous 
possible terms of peace. He was far from confident of win- 
ning a second victory in the open field. ^' The battle of Aspern 
has softened Napoleon's heart," he wrote within the next few 
weeks to his uncle, Duke Albert of Saxe-Teschen. *'We ought 
to profit by such good fortune, which we are hardly Hkely to 
experience a second time." 

The alternating fortunes of the struggle had engendered 
throughout all Europe sensations equally fluctuating. Those 
hostile in feeUng to Napoleon, and particularly those in northern 
Germany, had been carried away with enthusiasm at the first 
successes of the Austrian troops in Italy, but especially at the 
prosperous issue of the Tyrolese insurrection. All the coun- 
sellors of Frederick William III. were now pressing in their 
advice to form an alliance with Austria. That country coimted 
upon the alliance as a certainty and, in order to clinch the bar- 
gain, offered to Prussia the duchy of Warsaw just conquered 
by Archduke Ferdinand. But in vain. The King opposed his 
counsellors; regarding the national warhke uprising in his 
country from his narrow point of view, in which Prussia alone 
was considered, he condemned it as "criminal disorder," par- 
ticularly when Schill, amidst the acclamations of the populace 
and acting upon his own responsibility, led forth his battalion 
from Berhn to help sustain the insurrection under leadership 
of Dornberg in Westphalia; and it was not until word came 
from St. Petersburg that the Czar did not intend to carry on 
serious hostilities against Austria that he reluctantly gave hig 



Mt. 39] The King of Prussia holds back 473 

consent to secret preparations for war and stopped the pay- 
ment of the tribute due to France. This was taking a step 
which must of necessity be followed by another to be anything 
else than preposterous. But this second step remained un- 
taken. The defeats inflicted upon the Austrians in Bavaria 
produced their effect, and the King persistently maintained his 
opinion that the Emperor of the French would be able to con- 
quer also an army composed, of the united forces of Prussia 
and Austria, and that it was, after all, better to be King behind 
the Oder than not to be King of Prussia at all. Even the 
battle of Aspern made no change in his views, for the fact that 
no advantage was taken of it only went to furnish the basis 
for a new argument which Frederick William urged against his 
ministers. To add to all this, the Austrian government now 
perpetrated the mistake of faiUng to accept without discussion 
the proposals made by Prussia as a condition to an alliance, and 
rephed instead with only vague and general promises, referring 
her to England in answer to her demand for arms and money. 
When, therefore, towards the middle of June, the Austrian 
Colonel Steigentesch appeared in Konigsberg somewhat too 
ostentatiously in order to conclude a miUtary convention there, 
he found that he had missed his aim and was obliged to take 
his departure again without having accomphshed what he 
came for. The King had now^ determined to await the issue of 
the next battle. In spite of the experience of 1806 he was the 
same man that he had been in 1805. It was his people only 
who had changed. 

Since the departure of the Austrians the Tjrrol had been 
occupied by the Bavarians and French, and the news was now 
received with enthusiasm in Prussia that the Tyrolese peasants 
had again risen and been victorious in the battle on Mount 
Isel on May 29th; at the same time it was learned that a de- 
tachment of Austrian troops united with a volunteer corps 
recruited by Duke Frederick WilUam of Brunswick had pene- 
trated into Saxony and Franconia, and, finally, that the Eng- 
lish were threatening to land troops at the mouths of the Elbe 
and Weser. Did it not seem as if the hour had come for striking? 



474 Campaigns in Spain and Austria [1809 

That was the ^dew taken of it at least by the Prussian Generals 
Bliicher and Biilow, who were in command in Pomerania and 
who forthwith decided upon a military uprising against Na- 
poleon, whether with or without the sanction of the King. But 
just then arrived other news which marvellously abated this 
enthusiasm. 

After the battle of Aspern the two armies had remained 
inactive near Vienna, confronting one another. The Austrian 
army refrained from assuming the offensive for the sake of 
allowing the victory of the 22d to produce its effect at a dis- 
tance and, as is asserted by one of the initiated, so as "not 
to risk the destruction of this effect by the chances of an un- 
successful battle." The Archduke called up in his defence 
the example of Fabius, ''the Delayer," who conquered Han- 
nibal. "Napoleon and I," he wrote one day in June to the 
Duke of Saxe-Teschen, "are watching one another to see which 
will be the first to commit an error of which the other can take 
advantage, and are meanwhile repairing our losses. I shall 
take no risks, for the forces which I now command are the last 
which the state can afford, but I shall use the utmost energy 
in grasping every opportunity for dealing a decisive blow." 
But Napoleon was guilty of no further mistakes during this 
campaign. He showed himself, on the contrary, most efficient 
in taking measures for entirely wiping out the consequences of 
his former error. He now drew to himself for the decisive 
conflict all troops whatsoever at his disposal: Eugene, who had 
followed in pursuit of Archduke John, approached by way of 
Carinthia mth over 50,000 men, and was by the end of May 
already across the Semmering Pass; Marmont, with 10,000 
men, was summoned from Dalmatia; Lefebvre was ordered 
from the Tyrol to Linz, where he was to relieve the forces there 
under command of Bernadotte and Vandamme, and they and 
their divisions thus set free moved up into the vicinity of Vienna. 
In order to protect these forces to the best advantage, the 
island of Lobau, where Massena's corps had remained stationed, 
was now fortified, the great bridge across the Danube protected 
by stockades and guarded by a flotilla of rowboats. No de- 



^T. 39] The Array of Forces 475 

tail toward assuring victory in the approaching encounter was 
too trifling to receive the attention of the Emperor.* 

Upon the other side of the river the Archduke had meanwhile 
also strengthened himself, summoning to his aid a distant corps 
under KoUowrat, while his brother John was approaching by 
way of Hungary, where he was joined by the "Insurrection/^ or 
provincial militia, levied by vote of the diet of the preceding year 
as contribution toward the war. All this did not take place 
without mishap. To prevent a junction between the Archduke 
John and the main army Napoleon sent out the Viceroy against 
him, and on June 14th Eugene revenged himself at Raab for his 
defeat at Fontana Fredda. John was at first compelled to 
retreat toward the east, and it was only after crossing the 
Danube and with greatly reduced forces that he at length 
reached Pressburg, whence he was again able to enter into 
communication with his brother. 

By the first days of July Napoleon was ready with his prepara- 
tions; to the 130,000 men at the disposal of the enemy he could 
oppose 180,000 besides an excellent artillery equipment, partic- 
ularly if he should succeed in striking the blow before John 
should be able to reach the scene of action from Pressburg. 
On the night of July 4th his army crossed from Lobau to 
the northern bank of the river without interference from the 
Austrians, who were misled by a demonstration made for that 
purpose at Aspern. During the following day Napoleon was 
able, without encountering any very vigorous resistance, to draw 
up his troops in battle array facing Archduke Charles, who, in 
view of the superior number of the enemy, had withdraw^l his 
forces into a position of defence on the Bisamberg and behind the 
Russbach, which runs obliquely across the Marchfeld. A con- 
siderable detachment was sent forward by Napoleon in the 
direction of the March for purposes of reconnoissance in order to 

* On May 21st he had, for instance, followed the course of the battle 
from the island of Lobau while clinging to a rope ladder; he now ordered 
conveyed thither one of the great sliding-ladders such as are used in 
gardening at Schonbninn in order to assure himself of a more comfortable 
and convenient observatory. (Archives of the War Office.) 



476 Campaigns In Spain and Austria [1809 

find out whether John were yet approaching. Upon receiving 
information of a reassuring nature from that quarter he deter- 
mined, late in the evening as it was, to make an attack upon the 
Austrians, directing the shock of his onset with superior numbers 
against the left wing of his antagonist, so as to prevent the possi- 
bihty of a junction between the two princes, while his own left 
wing under command of Massena was entrusted with the task of 
engaging and holding the main body of the hostile army. The 
attempt failed. The Austrians repelled the assault and drove 
the French back to the position whence they had advanced to the 
attack. 

Next morning the Archduke detected the weak point pre- 
sented by the enemy, and gave orders to his right wing to march 
forward along the Danube, while the centre should likewise 
advance at the same time. These combined forces Mass6na 
alone was not able to cope with, and to prevent being flanked he 
was obliged to face almost toward the river; re-enforcements sent 
to his assistance proved unable to prevent a retreat which was 
constantly assuming more serious proportions, when Napoleon 
appeared, leading a considerable portion of his army, and, after 
making a fruitless attempt to stop the advance of the enemy by 
means of his cavalry, he brought into play more than a hundred 
cannon, and with these succeeded where the cavalry had failed. 
But, in spite of this danger assaihng him in the rear, he had not 
lost sight of his aim to conquer with the right wing. About 
noon he ordered forward to Wagram and Markgraf-Neusiedl 
troops sufficient to outnumber the Austrians, assured that, once 
in possession of Wagram, he would be able to compel the re- 
treat of the Austrian right wing from its advanced position. So 
certain was he of the outcome that in the midst of the battle he 
ordered his faithful Roussan to spread out a bearskin for him 
on the ground and allowed himself twenty minutes of sound 
sleep.* Soon after this the enemy was indeed compelled to 

* There were several occasions upon which Napoleon fell asleep while 
a battle was raging about him ; for instance, three years later, at the battle 
of Bautzen. Speaking of this afterwards he said that it was a habit of no 
small advantage to the commander-in-chief. He could thus quietly 



Mt. 39] Wagram 477 

abandon the territory which it had gained, and with the suc- 
cessful storming of the heights near Markgraf Neusiedl by 
Davout the fortunes of the day were decided; far back of the 
Russbach as far as the slopes of the Bisamberg and the road to 
Briinn were the Austrians obliged to retire, although in the 
most perfect order and wdthout having been absolutely van- 
quished. Napoleon's losses had been so great as to prevent his 
risking another battle. Moreover, his immediate object had 
been attained. He had defeated the main army of his antago- 
nist and rendered impossible its junction with that under Arch- 
duke John. For when the latter reached the Marchfeld in the 
afternoon Charles had already ordered the retreat, and the newly- 
arrived corps found nothing further to be done. It has recently 
been attempted to prove that John, who was already in pos- 
session of his brother's order early on the morning of July 5th, 
could not have been more expeditious in setting out from Press- 
burg or in marching to the front, and that, even if he had arrived 
in time, there were French forces yet intact which would have 
hindered his taking part in the action. This latter point would 
demand thorough proof before it could be accepted as fact, but, 
in regard to the former, one is involuntarily impelled to ask 
whether a French general under precisely similar circumstances 
would have required quite as long for carrying out a command of 
Napoleon's, and to any one who knows the history of these wars 
none but a reply in the negative would be possible. 

But with the battle of Wagram the campaign had not even 
yet been decided. Austria had by no means been overcome. The 
Archduke had still under his command an army ready for battle, 
which he now concentrated near Znaim, whither Napoleon could 
not follow him with all his forces, since he would have to leave 
Eugene with the Army of Italy, which had decided the fortunes 
of the day on July 6th, to watch Vienna and Archduke John. 
It now happened, on July 11th, just as Massena and Marmont 
were engaging the enemy and as preparations were being made 

await the reports from the various divisions instead of allowing himself 
to be influenced and carried away by what was taking place before his 
eyes. (Las Cases, Memorial of St. Helena.) 



478 Campaigns in Spain and Austria [1809 

for another battle, that there arrived at Napoleon's headquarters 
an officer with a flag of truce to propose an armistice. Was this 
to be accepted or rejected? His generals counselled the latter, 
he decided upon the former. In this he was actuated b}^ various 
motives. In the first place he saw that by the new method of 
warfare — where the use of artillery had gradually replaced the 
use of the bayonet and which had played so important a part 
at Wagram — ^battles were being made more sanguinary without 
becoming more decisive, so that he began to lose faith in battle 
as the infallible means of success. It was but a short time after 
this, on August 21st, 1809, that he wrote to Clarke: "Battle 
should be offered only when there remain no hopes of other 
turns of fortune, since, from its very nature, the fate of a battle 
is always dubious."* Moreover, he had recently had troublesome 
experiences with his troops which further served to establish 
him in this opinion. On the 6th Bemadotte's corps had 
retreated without offering the least resistance and had to 
be dissolved, and on the following night tidings of John's 
approach had caused a panic, driving thousands to flight 
toward the Danube. The Emperor bewailed the fact that 
his soldiers were no longer those of Austerlitz. Finally, in the 
last engagement many an excellent general had fallen because 
he had been compelled to expose himself in leading forward 
troops which responded but feebly to his commands; Massena 
had been in danger of his life. The Austrians, on the other 
hand, had shown themselves worthy foemen who knew how to 
win when the forces opposed were equal in number and whom 
he had succeeded in defeating only with the greatest danger 
and difficulty in cases where he disposed of forces numerically 
superior. No, the thought of war was losing its charms for him. 
Accordingly, on July 12th, he accepted the proposal of a cessa- 
tion of hostilities, giving consent thereto, however, only at the 
price of about 80,000 square miles of territory, a condition 

* In conversation with the Austrian General Bubna some time later, 
he explained the immoderate use of cannon to which he had been driven, 
saying: "You see well enough that my infantry is far from perfection; the 
best of it, the old infantry, is in Spain." 



Mt. 39] The Truce of Znaim 479 

which Francis ratified only after prolonged refusal, and then 
with the secret resolve to continue the war. Since in this deter- 
mination the Archduke was unable to concur, the Emperor 
himself assumed the supreme command of the army and Charles 
retired completely from the leadership. 

It is easy to see that the Truce of Znaim was a long way 
yet from signifying peace. Austria built hopes upon Prussia, 
whose King seemed this time really to have made up his mind 
to interfere, and actually sent a special messenger to the Aus- 
trian camp, where the Emperor held his court. But, as events 
proved, it was after all in appearance only that this resolve had 
been taken. Austria also built hopes upon England, v/hich 
had landed a new army in Spain imder Wellesley and was 
preparing a second expedition against Holland or northern 
Germany. She further entertained hopes of support from 
Russia, which had not shown herself an overzealous partisan 
of the Corsican, and was likewise hopeful of aid from Turkey, 
but most of all she counted upon her own military forces, the 
niunber of which was to be raised to 200,000 men and put 
under command of Prince Liechtenstein. It was in order to 
conceal these hopes and preparations as far as possible that 
Francis sent to solicit peace of Napoleon. 

Now that adversary was genuinely desirous of peace for 
the very reasons which encouraged Austria to resistance, but 
he was no less careful to conceal this wish than was Francis 
to veil his warlike inclinations, in order to derive the greatest 
possible profit from the negotiations. He at first refused ab- 
ruptly to consider the proposal, spoke of a partition of Austria 
and of demanding the abdication of the Emperor, and vouch- 
safed compliance only upon a repetition of the request to enter 
mto negotiations. The plenipotentiaries of the two powers, 
Champagny and Metternich, then repaired to Altenburg, but 
their negotiations resembled a great intrigue rather than a 
serious transaction. Here again Napoleon made exaggerated 
demands, requiring the cession of all territory then occupied 
by his forces, which amounted to about a third of the entire 
reabn; to this the Austrians responded with counter-demands 



480 Campaigns in Spain and Austria [I809 

by way of prolonging the conference, and matters continued 
on in this wise until at last decisive changes in the general 
situation impelled them to proceed seriously to business. 

The English had indeed obtained some hard-won victories 
in Spain, but their effect had not been lasting, Wellesley had 
forced Marshal Soult to withdraw from Portugal and, pene- 
trating into Spain, had defeated Victor at Talavera on July 
27th and 28th, 1809, but, being threatened in his left flank by 
a movement of Soult's, he was obliged to return to Badajoz on 
the frontier of Portugal. At the same time one of the Spanish- 
armies, which had been merely dispersed by Napoleon, was 
defeated by General Sebastiani (August 11th). Soon after ca- 
lamity befell likewise the British enterprise on the coast of 
the North Sea. Instead of landing at the Elbe and summoning 
to their aid the general uprising among the German nation, 
they had, with a view only to their own interest, directed their 
course to Holland in order to take Antwerp. In this they 
utterly failed and, toward the end of August, were compelled 
to return home baffled and disgraced. In spit« of the ad- 
vances already made Frederick William III. could not decide 
to mobihze against Napoleon even upon receiving word that 
Austria was ready to continue the war, while from the Czar 
word came to Emperor Francis that he need not count upon 
Russia and had better make peace with France. How com- 
pletely changed was the aspect of affairs from what it had 
been but shortly before, and all to the disadvantage of Aus- 
tria! But the most important consideration of all was the 
fact that Austria could no longer depend upon her own forces, 
since a fearful malady had begun to rage throughout the army 
which, according to Varnhagen, who w^as then in the Austrian 
service, eventually disabled from 70,000 to 90,000 men. 

All these reasons combined to efface from the mind of Francis 
and his court at Totis all inclination for the continuance of 
hostilities, and Napoleon now threw aside pretence and ac- 
knowledged his own desire for peace. "I sincerely wish for 
peace," said he in confidence to Count Bubna, whom Francis 
had sent as his ambassador and through whom he was negoti- 



.^T.40] The Peace of Schonbrunn 481 

ating directly with Napoleon. "Until now I have had the 
support of Russia, and the Czar maintains his alliance with 
me in spite of the opposition of the nation — a course for which 
I give him due praise, for a sovereign should not concern him- 
self as to the opinion of his subjects." (No one was more con- 
cerned in respect to that than was Napoleon.) "But what 
assurance have I that everything will remain thus? As for 
Prussia, I know that she has long wavered between you and 
me." He spoke in praise of the Austrian army, saying that 
if commanded by himself it would be quite as good as the 
French and superior to all others. He abated the demands 
made at Altenburg, representing them as due to the private 
mahce of Champagny, but he still exacted the surrender of three 
and a half million of inhabitants in the west, the south, and Gali- 
cia. This he established as his ultimatum from which he was 
not again to be moved, and when Francis finally resolved to 
accept the conditions and sent Liechtenstein direct to Schon- 
brunn with full powers, — the negotiations at Altenburg having 
been broken off, — Napoleon added to this the exaction of a war- 
indemnity of 100,000,000 francs, which he later reduced to 
75,000,000, but which Champagny, by way of gratifying his 
master, caused to be again raised to 85,000,000. 

Finally, so desperate was the outlook for Austria, left soli- 
tary and disabled, that on the night of October 13th, — impos- 
sible as it was for his impoverished nation to pay such a sum, 
— Liechtenstein was brought to append his signature to even 
this condition, though subject to the consent of the Emperor. 
Napoleon did not, however, wait for this to be granted, but 
on the following morning announced by cannon to the Vien- 
nese that peace had been concluded. 

The treaty just signed despoiled the Austrian Emperor of 
more than 40,000 square miles of territory: Salzburg, Berch- 
tesgaden, and the Inn quarter fell to the Confederation of the 
Rhme, West or New Gahcia to the duchy of Warsaw, as like- 
wise the district about the city of Cracow and the circle of 
Zamosc in East Galicia, while a small strip of East Galician 
territory was made over to Russia. Into the possession of Na- 



482 Campaigns in Spain and Austria [isoo 

poleon hii'nself came Gorz, Montefalcone, and the long-coveted 
city of Trieste, besides Carniola, the district of Villach in Carin- 
thia, and all Croatian lands to the right of the Save. These 
territories together were given the name of Illyria, which was 
to have a government of its own. The integrity of what re- 
mamed of Austria was guaranteed by the Emperor of the 
French, while Francis I. gave his sanction to all changes made, 
or to be made, by Napoleon in Spain, Portugal, and Italy. As 
a matter of course Austria was now compelled to break once 
more with England and to participate in the continental 
blockade. By a secret article Francis I. further pledged him- 
self to reduce his army to 150,000 men and to pay a war- 
indemnity set by Napoleon at 75,000,000 francs, but which 
through the good offices of Ghampagny was eventually raised 
to 85,000,000. 

Before the morning of October 16th Napoleon had already 
left Schonbrunn. An incident which had taken place there 
admonished haste on his part. Three days previous, while 
reviewing the troops in the court of the castle at Schonbrurm, 
a young man had attempted to force his way to him. When 
arrested he was found to be armed with a long knife and frankly 
acknowledged that it had been his intention to assassinate the 
Emperor. The youth, Frederick Staps by name, had scarcely 
outgrown boyhood and was the son of a Protestant minister 
at Naumburg. Though calm and quiet by nature, the misery 
and distress of his native land had filled him with such un- 
speakable hatred toward the oppressor that he had resolved 
upon taking his life. Napoleon would fain have believed at first 
that this was nothing more than a case of insanity, until con- 
vinced against his will, in conversation with Staps himself, of 
the deep-rooted feeling of bitterness in Germany and of the 
extent to which it had already armed the nation against him. 
To Napoleon's question whether he would be grateful if granted 
pardon, Staps replied calmly: "I should still seek means of 
killing you.'' He was ordered shot in absolute secrecy. The 
matter was to remain entirely hushed up, but in case anything 
should transpire in regard to it, the Minister of Police was 



^T. 40] Dissatisfaction in France 483 

charged to disseminate the report that the would-be assassin 
was considered insane. And such was the success of this ruse 
that the idea was entertained for many a year that Staps was 
in custody at Vincennes. 

Once more did Napoleon return in triumph to Paris. It was 
indeed not generally known how narrowly he had escaped defeat 
in this last campaign, and even if the report had gained publicity, 
was not the treaty of peace witness to the contrary, with the 
humiliating conditions to which Austria had been obliged to yield 
consent? But the French people saw after all nothing further 
than another victorious campaign, bought with French blood, but 
redounding in nowise to the advantage of France. There have 
already been noted the first seeds of inward discontent with the 
Emperor to w^hom France was insufficient. What did all this 
amount to, all that he accomplished toward gratifying the vanity 
of the French people — of what account was all the fame and 
glory which he brought back to them as compared with the 
undeniable fact that his ambition was not satisfied with the 
French throne? A striving such as this, in opposition to national 
feehng, toward aims continually farther and farther removed, 
could not fail in the end to deprive him of popular favour. For 
there is but one thing that a people cannot pardon in its ruler, 
and that is lack of patriotism. There were, moreover, reasons 
enough besides this for awakening opposition. There still re- 
mained unfulfilled the promise given the year before that the war 
with England should shortly be terminated; it continued in undi- 
minished vigom-, precluding all business ventures of considerable 
extent. Ports which formerly existed in most flourishing condi- 
tion were now sinking into poverty and decay. Nor was the 
prospect of a cessation of hostihties any more encouraging with 
regard to the offensive war against Spain, and southern France 
was undergoing enormous losses through the breaking off of the 
lucrative trade formerly carried on between the two countries. 
A further grievance lay in the fact that the Emperor displayed a 
contempt for the middle classes which was deeply felt. The 
sons of certain privileged circles alone were admitted to the 
positions of ''auditeurs" in the Councils of State, and, since this 



484 Campaigns in Spain and Austria [i809 

was the only road to the higher offices and dignities, all other 
aspirants were obliged to content themselves with service in the 
humbler departments. And yet it was precisely those whom 
the Emperor coimted as most securely bound to himself through 
the bestowal of these privileges who were in fact among the 
most disaffected. An observant contemporary remarks: "The 
generals, as a result of their rich dotations, had an interest 
altogether apart from that of their sovereign — ^to take care of 
what they had acquired — and were for that reason the less 
willing in rendering the incessant and fatiguing service required 
of them. The partiahty shown by the Emperor for attaching 
to himself priests and 'emigres' had won for him only lukewarm 
and doubtful adherents, while giving cause for behef that he 
ignored the fundamental principle of his power — ^the Revolution 
— of which he had been the issue. The members of the ancient 
nobility with whom he was so fond of surrounding himself 
accepted, it is true, the dignities offered them, but betrayed his 
secrets on every occasion when they succeeded in acquainting 
themselves with them, flattered him grossly to his face and 
complained behind his back of their unhappy fate in having to 
serve an upstart. The clergy, in sooth, carried its servility to the 
point of absurdity in its rehgious instruction, preaching absolute 
obedience such as is favoured by every hierarchy, but bewailed 
at other times the fate of the Pope.'' And now it was just at 
this time that, as a result of an indirect order of the Emperor, 
Pius VII. was compelled to leave Rome — an act which aroused 
against Napoleon millions of pious souls. 

Under such circumstances it behooved the Emperor to seek 
some means of ingratiating himself with the French people in the 
hope of turning the tide of popular favour once more toward 
himself. There had existed for years a desire on the part of the 
general public, which was shared also by those who surrounded 
the Emperor, that he should acquire a direct heir by means of a 
new marriage. People thought that the joys of a family of his 
own would also enhance his appreciation of the state and recall 
his mind from dwelling upon the boundless extension of his 
power. And this wish was cherished the more from the fact 



^.T. 40] The Divorce 485 

that good morals did not exactly reign supreme at the Imperial 
Court, where Josephine, who had long since ceased to possess the 
affections of her husband, now rather encouraged than interfered 
with other fancies of his, solely for the sake of retaining her 
position.* There were scandalous tales in circulation, particu- 
larly in regard to the brothers of the Emperor, and the feeUng 
was that all this would come to an end upon the introduction of a 
well-regulated family life at the court. Moreover, the hope was 
entertained that a new marriage with a daughter of one of the 
monarchs of Europe would be a pledge of peace and at the same 
time act as a restraint to his lust after world-dominion. 

To this general wish Napoleon was now ready to accede. He 
appointed her son, the Viceroy Eugene, to prepare Josephine 
for the divorce which public policy inexorably demanded, 
and on December 15th summoned a family council at the 
Tuileries, where he announced his determination to enter upon 
another alliance. "The political system of my monarchy," said 
he, ''the interests and needs of my people, which have at all 
times regulated my actions, demand that I leave behind to my 
offspring — ^heirs of my love to my people — ^this throne upon 
which Providence has placed me." Since the union with his 
well-beloved wife Josephine allowed him no hope in regard to this 
matter, he should be obliged to sacrifice the tenderest impulses 
of his heart to the good of the state and loose the bands which 
united him with her. Being but forty years of age, he hoped to 
rear in his spirit and in his ideas the successors which should be 
granted him. The Empress, whom he had himself crowned, 
should retain her title. Josephine, in the midst of sobs, declared 
herself ready to make the sacrifice demanded of her by the 
state, and on the following day a Senatus consultum declared the 
Imperial marriage dissolved. One difficulty was still to be over- 
come — some way must be devised for making the matter accept- 

* In his "Souvenirs" de Broglie relates that he saw the Empress 
before the war of 1809, ''and in her train the splendid assemblage of 
maids of honour, ladies in waiting, and ladies of the palace, including 
the procession of readers which constituted the harem of our Sultan 
and which helped him to endure for a while longer the painted antiquity 
of the former Sultana," 



486 Campaigns in Spain and Austria LI809 

able to those of the CathoUc faith. For, as has been seen, an 
ecclesiastical marriage had been entered into on the day pre- 
ceding the coronation. But Napoleon declared coolly that he 
had given his consent at that time under moral coercion, and this 
was then utiHzed as an argument for the nullity of the religious 
marriage, which argument was accepted by the Chancery of the 
Archbishop in Paris before the end of January, 1810. 

Immediately after the divorce Josephine retired to Mal- 
maison. But where was the new consort to be found? Unques- 
tionably political motives had loosed the old bonds and pohtical 
motives must dictate the new. No other consideration was here 
of consequence unless, perchance, it was that of ambition in the 
upstart to connect himself closely with one of the ancient royal 
famines of Europe. Of these the most illustrious were those of 
Austria and Russia. The policy which he was then pursuing 
indicated the latter to the Emperor as the source from whence to 
draw. And indeed it is asserted that there had been talk of a 
marriage between Napoleon and the Grand Duchess Katharina 
even at the time of the interview between the sovereigns at Tilsit, 
while at Erfurt Alexander had spoken, though not without a 
certain reserve, of his younger sister, Anna. The former had, to 
be sure, been married meanwhile to], Duke George of Olden- 
burg, but Anna was still unclaimed. The question then arose 
as to how this marriage would conform with the pohtical 
situation. 

Since the events at Erfurt much had taken place which 
threatened rupture between the two countries. There had been 
the outbreak of war with Austria which the Czar would so 
gladly have prevented so as to be able to use all his forces against 
the Swedes and Turks, and there had followed French victories 
which had occasioned deep anxiety in St. Petersburg. On Sep- 
tember 19th, 1809, by the Treaty of Friederichshamm, Alexander 
had, to be sure, succeeded in forcing Sweden to relinquish 
Finland, but Turkey had opposed more successful resistance 
and had been by no means subjugated, so that in the fall of the 
year the Russian troops were again obliged to return across the 
Danube. But that which caused the Czar the most chagrin was 



/Et. 40] Approaches to Russia 487 

Napoleon's conduct toward the Poles during the course of the 
war. For, when Napoleon had seen with what intentional 
dilatoriness Russia was carrying on the war against Archduke 
Ferdinand, he turned to the national forces of the duchy of 
Warsaw under Poniatowski, summoned the West Galicians to 
assert their independence and thus accomplished by means of the 
Poles what the Russians had denied him. Two million Galicians 
added to the duch}^ of Warsaw was the form in which the 
gratitude of the Emperor showed itself. The allies of Tilsit and 
Erfurt were now mutually distrustful. But for Napoleon it 
would have been exceedingly inconvenient if Russia had for this 
reason taken up arms against him just at this time with Prussia 
standing ready prepared for war. Accordingly, on October 20th, 
1809, only a few days after the conclusion of peace at Schonbrunn, 
a despatch was sent off to St. Petersburg representing to the 
Czar how impossible it had been for the Emperor to allow the 
West Galicians, who had risen with one accord to his assistance, 
to return under Austrian dominion; that it was, however, far 
removed from his thoughts to awaken any hopes of the re-estab- 
lishment of Poland, and that he was, on the contrary, ready to 
imite with Russia in obliterating the name of Poland from history. 
(He did not suspect that Alexander would discover that he was 
at the same time sending to assure the Poles that these repre- 
sentations were not intended seriously by him.) But, in order to 
completely reassure the Czar, even before the divorce he returned 
to the marriage project in his instructions to Caulaincourt and 
asked directly for the hand of the Grand Duchess Anna (November 
22d, 1809). There would be little difficulty in making it clear 
that this offer of marriage had at this time no other object than 
to appease Russia. Princess Anna was but fifteen years of age 
and, according to Caulaincourt 's statements, not yet fully devel- 
oped. It was to be foreseen that Alexander would reply, if not 
with a refusal, at least with a request for delay which might be 
interpreted as a rejection of Napoleon's offer. And it is all the 
more impossible to believe in the sincerity of his solicitation 
because at the same time, and again before the divorce, there was 
coming to form and maturity a second project, kept in profound 



488 Campaigns in Spain and Austria [I809 

secret, for a marriage with the Archduchess Marie Louise of 
Austria. 

Ever since the lack of warmth betrayed by Russia in her 
behaviour during the summer just past, it had been evident to 
Napoleon that the alUance with that power must shortly come to 
an end, and that an implacable war must ensue over the question 
of the mastery of the world — "to see which of the two should 
finally be sole master." And when that should be the German 
powers of middle Europe, or Austria at least, must on no account 
be under Russian influence. This consideration probably sug- 
gested to the Emperor of the French the idea of a marriage with 
an Archduchess; there was besides another consideration which 
was of some importance, that this Princess belonged to a family 
of which no woman had been barren. It depended only upon 
gaining the compliance of the House of Austria. In order to 
accomplish this end all possible publicity was given to the 
Russian marriage project, so that the fear in Vienna of seeing an 
intimate alliance between Russia and France should smooth the 
way for the other courtship, or perhaps even call forth advances 
from the Austrian side. It is not yet clear from which party 
came the first decisive word, whether the suggestion was made 
to Metternich or by him to Count Laborde, a confidant of Napo- 
leon's who had been active in the matter of the negotiations for 
peace and had then remained in Vienna for some time.* In any 

* In a despatch to Schwarzenberg (Vienna, December 25th, 1809) Met- 
ternich reports an interview between himself and Alexander de Laborde, 
who had formerly been in the Austrian service and had formed many 
attachments in Vienna, particularly with Schwarzenberg among others. 
Previous to his departure Laborde had sounded him upon the possibility 
of an alliance between the two families, suggesting the marriage of the 
Austrian Crown Prince Ferdinand with a daughter of Lucien's, or that 
of Napoleon with the Archduchess Louise. The first proposition he had 
at once rejected, but not so the second. On the other hand Laborde — 
and not Narbonne as Lanfrey, Lefebvre, and others have miscalled him — 
states in a memorandum which he most probably prepared for the Em- 
peror in early December, shortly after his return to Paris, that Metternich 
had tried to persuade him to postpone his departure from Vienna, and in 
a discussion about means of establishing better relations between France 
and Austria had directly named a marriage of Napoleon to an Austrian 



-^T. 40] Negotiations with Austria 489 

case Emperor Francis and his present Minister of Foreign 
Affairs regarded a family alliance with Napoleon as a certain 
security for the state, a guarantee for its continued existence, 
and for the sake of these considerations feelings of antipathy to 
the suitor were not allowed to stand in the way. 

After the first secret parleys between the diplomats the 
matter was brought before the Countess Mettemich, who was 
then in Paris, by Josephine and Hortense themselves, while 
Eugene was commissioned with a similar errand to the Austrian 
ambassador. Prince Schwarzenberg; for Napoleon insisted that 
those most concerned should be the very ones to collaborate 
in furthering his new marriage.* His next step — ^which was 
in reality nothing more than a matter of form — ^was to hold a 
council of his ministers on January 27th in order to be able later 
to adduce the advice of his ministers when dealing with Alex- 
ander. On this occasion Maret, who had been taken into confi- 
dence by Napoleon, pleaded in favour of the Austrian and against 
the Russian marriage, and on February 7th, ISIO, the decision 
of the Emperor was imparted to his family council. Before the 
close of the same evening Schwarzenberg had signed the pro- 
visional marriage contract. The Russian project was accord- 
ingly definitely abandoned. The first proposal of Coulaincourt 

Archduchess as such a means, in case the French Emperor should really 
carry out his plan of divorce. This idea, Mettemich had hastened to 
add, was of his own devising, he being ignorant of the intentions of his 
sovereign, though he was convinced that they would be favourable to 
the project. Later, in a letter of September, 1811, to Jakobi-Klost, Metter- 
nich designated himself as the one who had proposed the marriage (M. 
Duncker, "Aus der Zeit Friedrich des Grossen und Friedrich Wilhelm- 
III.," p. 325). Finally, in his "Memoires" he again denies the statement 
and puts the initiative on Napoleon, though men well situated for knowing 
the truth of the matter, such as the Bavarian Minister Montgelas, name 
him as having been the instigator of the marriage. However it may 
have been, this much is to be inferred from all the sources : that both sides 
were more than willing to bring the matter about. 

* ''The Sovereign," said Montgelas, who was certainly informed 
with great exactitude by the Viceroy, ''did not wish to have Eugene 
appear as a victim in need of sympathy, and, on the contrary, treated it as 
a matter of importance that just those persons who were most nearly 
touched by his new marriage should outwardly assist in bringing it to pass." 



490 Campaigns in Spain and Austria [isio 

had remained long unanswered and was folJowed by an insistent 
reminder. When there came from St. Petersburg only the 
anticipated explanation from Alexander, that the Grand Duchess 
was still too young and the matter would have to be postponed, 
Napoleon at once grasped at the opportunity thus presented. 
''Postponement/' said he, "is only another word for refusal; 
moreover, I will have in my palace no foreign priests to come 
between me and my wife." An answer couched in the politest 
terms was returned to the Neva saying that the thought of the 
marriage was given up. The Czar might perhaps feel wounded 
at this, — and we know that he did feel resentment, — ^but, once 
sure of Austria, that was to Napoleon no matter for apprehen- 
sion. He had gained the object of his double dealing. 

Berthier, as Grand Ambassador, arrived meanwhile at 
Vienna in order to make the formal proposals for Napoleon, 
which were followed on March 11th by the ceremonious nup- 
tial benediction in the church of St. Augustine in the Austrian 
capital. Archduke Charles stood as proxy for his illustrious 
adversary. Thence the bridal party hastened towards France 
and was met by the Emperor on the 27th at Compiegne. On 
April 1st the civil marriage was celebrated at St. Cloud, which 
was followed next day by a repetition of the church marriage 
in the chapel of the Louvre. It was observed that the cere- 
mony was identical with that at the marriage of Louis XVI. 
to Marie Antoinette, and that the marriage articles were drawn 
up word for word like those in 1770. 

Marie Louise did not particularly please the Parisians. A 
fine-looking girl of eighteen years, she presented indeed a 
fresh, wholesome appearance with a straightforward look in 
her beautiful blue eyes, but in spite of her clear complexion 
and full red cheeks she was thought ugly and, above all, ill 
dressed. The courtiers were especially impressed with her 
excessive embarrassment. But she soon acquired dignity and 
a certain firmness of bearing, especially upon meeting with 
encouragement and great respect from Napoleon, to whom she 
saw all else bow in humblest submission. Up to a short time 
before she had hated him as Austria's bitterest foe, that is, 



-^T. 40] Marie Louise 49 1 

she had hated him as much as a child of the least passionate 
of monarchs was capable of violent feeling, and her recently 
pubhshed letters to a friend at that time show how great was 
the sacrifice which she made for the good of her country. On 
January 23d, for instance, she writes from Ofen (or Buda): 
** Since Napoleon's divorce from his wife I always open the 
Frankfort Gazette with the idea of finding the name of the 
new consort, and I acknowledge that the delay causes me in- 
voluntary uneasiness. I place my fate in the hands of 
Divine Providence, which indeed alone knows what is best 
for us. But, should misfortune will it so, I am ready to sacri- 
fice my personal well-being for the good of the state, satisfied 
that true happiness is to be found only in the fulfilment of 
duty, even if to the prejudice of one's inclinations." To this 
she added, however: "Pray that it may not come to pass." 
But it was to be, notwithstanding. 

But however much there might be found to criticise as to 
the outward appearance of the new Empress in Paris, the 
event in general was nevertheless hailed with great satisfaction. 
To be sure the irreconcilable element of the Faubourg St. Ger- 
main was indignant at this alliance between Legitimacy and 
the Revolution, and the radical Republicans likewise at the 
support thus given in Austria to the rule of their oppressor. 
But the great mass of the people rejoiced notwithstanding. 
The soldiers of the Guard themselves thought this marriage 
with a foreign princess to be a guarantee of peace. Rentes 
rose when it was learned on February 9th that the contract 
had been signed. Napoleon took immediate advantage of this 
state of feeling to repeat his old, familiar assurances. He 
gave orders to Champagny to address a circular letter to all 
foreign ambassadors asserting his love of peace: "You will 
say in it that one of the principal means of which the EngHsh 
availed themselves for kindling the continental war consisted 
in making it believed that it was part of my purpose to destroy 
all dynasties. Since circumstances have now placed me in 
the position to choose a consort, it has been my desire to de- 
prive them of the accursed pretext imder which they stirred 



49^ Campaigns in Spain and Austria [isio 

up the nations and created discord which flooded Europe with 
blood." But it was scarcely to be expected that the world 
would place confidence in these affirmations. At the Court 
of Vienna, as Metternich reports, they began asking them- 
selves what had been the scheme upon which Napoleon had 
been reckoning in making this marriage: whether it were his 
intention to sheathe the sword and really ground the future 
of France and of his family upon the principles of order and 
peace, or whether he were only counting upon drawing Aus- 
tria's forces into the service of his system of conquest. And 
that was indeed the decisive question. It was not long to 
remain unanswered. When, on March 20th, 1811, the cannon 
of the Invalides announced to the anxiously waiting people of 
Paris the birth of a Prince, to the initiated the political horizon 
was seen to be already thick with clouds again, nor had they 
any question as to the origin of the storm. And what deep 
meaning might there not lie concealed in the title which the 
Emperor bestowed upon his new-born son, "The King of 
Rome"! None but the name of the ancient mistress of the 
world seemed to him yet worthy to adorn the heir to his power. 



(3HAPTER XVI 
AT THE ZENITH 

It was a decisive factor in Napoleon's life as a ruler that at 
the very time when he supposed he had prostrated the govern- 
ments of Europe and made them harmless to his plans, he 
encountered a still unsubdued foe in the subjects of those govern- 
ments. When he declared war against the several states he had 
evidently not foreseen this persistent opposition of the people, 
and had thus committed the very same error of which his 
predecessors in the revolutionary regime had been guilty. 
Neither the Convention nor the Directory had cared whether the 
nations of Europe really desired to be freed from their princes and 
to be assembled under the leadership of the Republic. And 
Napoleon cared just as little whether they really wanted to come 
under the hegemony of the French and to receive his laws as a 
gift. He thought his ambitious schemes were sufficiently se- 
cured if he brought the several countries under constitutions and 
governments that were useful to himself because they were 
dependent on him. He had scarcely any appreciation of the 
instinct of nationality; so little, indeed, that he ignored it even 
among the French, whom he was hoping to unite with Dutch, 
Germans, and Italians in one empire for all time. This was quite 
natural. What he had once possessed in his youth, and soon lost, 
was a mere clan feeling, such as armed Italians against Italians, 
Corsicans against Genoese, dialect against dialect. Of the 
mighty patriotism which throws its bonds about all the members 
of a powerful race owning one custom and tongue, of this he had 
no knowledge. Besides, he was too ardent a disciple of the 
cosmopolitan rationalism of the eighteenth century, the doctrine 
that frowned upon the difference between races as well as 
between social classes, and cherished the ideal of a citizenship of 

493 



494 



At the Zenith [isio 



the world without distuiction of race. To this philosophy he had 
yielded homage until his mind was filled with the one dream of 
seeing all mankind reduced to a common level and subject to his 
will. Hence all that he saw was populations, not nations, and 
he thought he had subdued them when he had defeated their 
armies and humbled their governments. But when he attacked 
a people like the Spaniards, in whom the instinct of nationality 
was highly developed, they rose, burning with rage, seized the 
arms their leaders had dropped and continued the conflict with des- 
perate resolution. The same spirit of national resistance to bound- 
less ambition was soon astir everyivhere ; and it is characteristic 
of the most far-sighted enemies of the French Emperor that they 
justly valued this movement and saw in the arming of the people 
the surest means of defence. Thus Pitt in England had long 
before raised his army of volunteers, Stadion in Austria had 
insisted on creating a militia, and Schamhorst in Prussia never 
tired of calling for a law requiring universal military service. A 
deep significance lay hidden in the words of the Austrian minister 
to the Russian plenipotentiary: "We have constituted ourselves 
a nation." 

And what energy came into the conflict with this national 
element! In Spain, which Napoleon thought he had won by a 
simple military parade of Murat to Madrid, the flame once 
kindled would not be quenched; and Austria, although on the 
brink of ruin, managed, in 1809, to lead into the field forces that 
gave the great general more trouble than he had ever had with the 
armies of the cabinet of Vienna. Moreover, there were uprisings 
in the Tyrol and northern Germany, while in Russia a current of 
public sentiment sheathed the sword of the Czar against the 
troops of Austria. And was it not a fatal omen for Napoleon 
that, at the very time when national hate was arming the peoples 
of Europe, in France itself there w^as a patriotic feeling against 
the ambition of their ruler which heeded no ties of country, and 
the ideal of a national state aroused a secret but conscious oppo- 
sition to the international empire. Just as the Spanish revolt 
broke out in the spring of 1808, the police in Paris came upon the 
traces of a republican conspiracy in which even some senators — 



iET. 40] The Pope Excommunicates Napoleon 495 

among others Sieyes — are supposed to have been somewhat 
involved. 

This popular resistance of the nations to Napoleon's political 
schemes found in 1809 an ally in His Holiness the Pope. It was 
not the weapons of his secular power that he wielded, for Napoleon 
had broken them; his lands were occupied, the administration 
was in the hands of foreign officials, and it needed only the formal 
act to make the patrimony of St. Peter w^hat it had virtually been 
since April, 1808, a province of the Empire. No; he armed 
himself against the Emperor with the thunderbolts of his spiritual 
authority, which rested on a broad popular foundation. No 
sooner had the Spaniards revolted than he protested, from the 
very midst of the French troops occupying his territory, against 
the outrage on himself, and forbade the bishops in the Legations 
wrested from the Papal States to take the oath of fealty to the 
new lord. And when, after the victories in Bavaria in April, 
1809, Napoleon retorted from Vienna with tw^o decrees w^hich 
divested the Pope of all temporal sovereignty and declared the 
Papal States to be a province of the French Empire, Pius VII., 
under the impression produced by the day of Aspern, published 
against his oppressors a bull of excommunication that had been 
ready for months. This opened anew the whole great question, 
many centuries old, of the conflict between the imperial power 
and the papacy, and Napoleon was forced to seek a solution.^- 
He chose the one that conformed best with his aggressive nature 
and with the universal system of the Revolution which he repre- 
sented. 

As soon as he heard in Schonbrunn that the Pope had caused 
the bull to be posted on the doors of the churches in Rome, he 
sent to the King of Naples, who was in his confidence and had 
full charge of the Roman enterprise, secret instructions that the 
Pope must be arrested if he preached insurrection; such a course, 
he said, was not unheard of, as Philip the Fair and Charles V. had 
done so. Murat took the hint for what it was meant to be, a 
conmiand, and on the 6th of July, just as the fortunes of war. 
were deciding in favour of the Emperor at Wagram, Pius was 
arrested in the Quirinal and removed from Rome. He was taken 



496 At the Zenith [I810 

at first to Grenoble, and thence on a special order of the Emperor 
to Savona on the Riviera, most strictly guarded throughout.* 
Somewhat later, before the Treaty of Vienna, Napoleon ordered 
the cardinals and generals of religious orders, the papal court and 
archives, to be transferred to Paris, whither he also purposed to 
summon the Pope in order to have him near at hand as an instru- 
ment of his absolute will. But what if Pius refused such services ! 
Even this emergency was to be provided for. After his return 
from the campaign, and after he had fully arranged his marriage 
with the Austrian princess and thereby deprived the Pope of his 
last prop in an orthodox Catholic power, a Senatus consultum of 
February, 1810, (enacted at his instigation,) openly incorporated 
the Papal States into the French Empire, divided them mto two 
departments, and raised Rome to the rank of second city of the 
Empire. The same act provided an annual income of two 
million francs for the Pope, and bound future Popes, at their 
accession to the chair, to the Galilean articles of 1682, which had 
established the independence of the French crown of any foreign 
ecclesiastical power, the fallibility of the Church in matters of 
faith, and the superiority of the councils over the papacy, poiats 
that had been affirmed by the Council of Constance. The 
Emperor's object in pursuing this course was quite apparent: it 
was to override the resistance of the Curia by means of a sub- 
servient council. For as early as July, 1807, he had written to 
Eugene that he would not shrink from assembling in one council 
the churches of Gaul, Germany, Italy, and Poland, and get along 
without the Pope.f 

And the Pope really did resist. He not only refused to con- 
firm the divorce of Napoleon and Josephine pronounced by the 
Archbishop of Paris, in consequence of which thirteen cardinals 
declined to participate in the subsequent marriage festivities; he 
also refused to the bishops nominated by the Emperor the rite of 
investiture, a privilege reserved to him by the Concordat. The 

* Afterwards the Emperor publicly declared that the arrest, which he 
had himself secretly ordered, was a piece of folly, and at St. Helena he 
emphatically denied all complicity in the act. 

t See page 423. 



Mt. 40] The Conflict with the Pope 497 

mild-tempered man, who had not the most exact knowledge of 
canon law, was deprived of his advisers with the hope of winning 
him over more easily; Austria exerted itself to settle the dispute; 
and toward the end of the year Napoleon imposed more severe 
restrictions on his prisoner, depriving him of his papers and all 
opportunity of correspondence, and even of his writing materials; 
but all was in vain. Pius remained firm, and although he seemed 
inclined now and then to make concessions, yet the very next 
moment he would retract everything for fear of impairing the 
dignity of his position. He preferred even schism to the subor- 
dination of the Vicar of Christ to a secular sovereign. 

Under such circumstances, with the ecclesiastical confusion 
prevailing in France, Napoleon felt obhged to take some de- 
cisive step if he wanted to carry his point. He now actually 
convoked the national council. But at the very outset a pre- 
paratory commission composed of prelates urged the objection 
that even the French catechism recognized the Pope as the 
"visible head of the Church," of whom she could not divest 
herself without jeopardy; and that Bossuet, too, whom Na- 
poleon was fond of quoting as an opponent of ultramontanism, 
had asserted that the Holy Father required for the exercise of his 
ecclesiastical functions complete independence of any secular 
power whatsoever. To which, indeed, the Emperor then glibly 
replied that that might have applied in Bossuet's time, in the 
seventeenth century, when there was a considerable number of 
acknowledged secular sovereigns, no one of whom would concede 
to another poUtical superiority above the Pope; but now that 
Europe acknowledged him as sole ruler such a consideration 
had no force. Incidentally he insinuated that the successors 
of Peter "were constantly bringing discord into all Christen- 
dom in the interests of their petty Roman state that was no 
bigger than a duchy." And when in June, 1811, the prelates 
of France, i.e., of the Napoleonic Empire, assembled, with some 
ItaUans and Belgians among them, their first resolution con- 
cerned the oath of loyalty to Pius VII. It was only by men- 
aces and not until several opponents had been arrested that 
the council was brought to the point of promulgating as its 



498 At the Zenith [I810 

own a decree dictated by Napoleon, to the effect that if the 
Pope delayed investing a bishop more than six months after 
he was nominated by the Emperor the metropolitan might invest 
him. (August 5th, 1811.) Pius in Savonawas finally prevailed 
upon to give his assent to this, but only with regard to the 
bishops in France ; he made an exception of the Italian bishops 
and demanded his advisers again. This by no means ended 
the conflict. 

It was not yet decided whether Pius would be obliged to 
submit. But any one who viewed the general situation might 
venture such a conjecture. The ill treatment suffered by the 
supreme head of Catholicism, and his appeal to the faithful, 
did not produce upon them the profound, stirring impression 
which had been produced in former centuries. The world had 
become secularized to an astonishing degree. Furthermore, a 
large part of the Emperor's foes, English, Russians, and Prus- 
sians, were not in the range of the papal authority, while other 
nations, as the Catholic Poles, based their very hopes on the 
strongest union with Napoleon. Nay, even the Pope's own sub- 
jects showed little resistance to their new sovereign, and finally 
accepted with great readiness the mihtary plans of administra- 
tion, the reform of the judiciary, the improvement of educa- 
tion, the regulation of streets and rivers, the draining of swamps, 
and other valuable innovations of the godless regime. 

Only on one people, the Spaniards, if we may disregard the 
peasants of the Tyrol, did the fate of Pius VII. have an influence 
that helped to determine its political attitude. Their priests 
were unwearied in steeling their courage against the man who 
threatened, as they said, the altars as well as the thrones.* 
In the last days of the year 1808 the revolutionary Central 
Jimta, which conducted the government for the exiled King 
Ferdinand, had summoned the nation to a guerilla warfare : 
bands were to be formed under the command of a monk or a 

* In one of the catechisms composed by the Spanish priests for pur- 
poses of war, a devilish nature is ascribed to Napoleon alongside of his 
human nature, the slaying of a Frenchman is called a meritorious act, 
and to give up fighting is declared an infamy worthy of death. 



Mt. 40] Conditions in Spain 499 

trained officer for the purpose of attacking small French de- 
tachments, intercepting couriers, capturing transports of weapons 
and ammunition, and the like. The appeal met with an im- 
mediate response. The guerilla bands were everywhere and 
nowhere; they might be driven away and pursued, but could 
not be destroyed, and as a means of distressing the enemy 
they were unequalled. Soon after the call of the Junta a mani- 
festo proclaimed to the nations of Europe that in Spain the 
liberty of all nations was at stake, and appealed to them for 
support. The English, who heretofore had appeared on the 
peninsula merely as enemies of Napoleon, now entered openly 
into a friendly alliance with the Spanish insurgents and pledged 
their utmost efforts. And though they never fully met this 
pledge, — ^there were never more than 30,000 British on the side 
of the Spanish, — yet at their head was a man of genius. Sir 
Arthur Wellesley, or Lord Welhngton as he was called after 
the battle of Talavera. " If the war on the Spanish peninsula 
holds out, Europe is saved," he was wont to say, and he acted 
accordingly. With prudent calculation, staying on the de- 
fensive rather than risking his small forces in daring enter- 
prises, he held the enemy's superior force in check and accom- 
plished his object: the wound in the body of the Empire was 
kept open. Despite the 250,000 men that Napoleon had left, 
his marshals proved unable to pacify the country. At variance 
among themselves, wearied with an exhausting war that prom- 
ised no profit, they only gained unimportant successes, and 
when the Emperor returned from Schonbrunn to Paris the 
reports from the south were anything but favourable. 

It was now generally expected that he himself would go to 
Spain, bring the discordant generals to act together and win 
a final decisive victory by the force of his superior genius. But 
he did not go. Of those who knew him best some said he did 
not wish to risk his life in a country where fanaticism was 
raging, others that he was detained by his divorce and remar- 
riage. It is possible, too, that the same motive which at the 
beginning of the year hastened his return to Paris now kept 
him there, i.e., distrust of Talleyrand and Fouche, whom he 



500 At the Zenith [isio 

had observed during the Austrian campaign in secret agreement 
with Murat. In any case, he treated the Spanish affair with 
great contempt (doubtless to avoid contradicting his own posi- 
tive statement months before that he had set it aside once for 
all), and contented himself with directing the operations of his 
generals from Paris. 

At first it really seemed as if that would suffice. On Novem- 
ber 19th, 1809, the French defeated at Ocaiio the last regular 
Spanish troops, drove their remnants back to Cadiz, and brought 
Andalusia into the hands of King Joseph. There remained now 
only the guerillas and the English alUes. The former the 
Emperor heeded little. Of their terrible importance he had no 
conception, and hardly believed it when he heard that the war 
with them was far more horrible than that in the Vendee. He 
thought better of the English. "The English are the only dan- 
gerous element in Spain,'' he wrote to Berthier at the end of 
January, 1810. But ought they not to manage to overcome the 
few thousand British even without his presence, especially if he 
considerably increased(as he now did) the forces on the peninsula, 
and secured by flatteries and promises the ablest of his marshals, 
Massena, for the great undertaking of driving Wellington from 
Portugal? Ney and Junot were to command under Massena, 
while Soult, who was at the head of the army in Andalusia, was 
to proceed from there to Portugal to aid him. So confident was 
Napoleon of the result that on February 8th, 1810, he issued a 
decree which withdrew the four provinces north of the Ebro, 
Vizcaya, Navarra, Arragon, and Catalonia, from the Spanish 
administration, changed them into four French military districts, 
and clothed four generals, Suchet, Augereau, Reille, and Thou- 
venot, with the highest civil and military authority in them. 
They were to provide for the troops under them out of the 
revenues of these provinces, as the government of Joseph was not 
in a position to exploit the resources of the country so energet- 
ically as to cover the expenses of the army ; they were to receive 
orders from Paris only. In these districts the tricolour replaced 
the Spanish colours. An accompanying letter of the same 
day addressed to Berthier gave still more general expression 



-^T. 40] Spain to be Annexed to the Empire 501 

to the purpose of the Emperor to put into the hands of the 
generals the administration of all Spanish territory conquered 
by them. And suppose now the conquest proceeded; suppose 
Suchet kept pushing farther south from Catalonia and Massena 
really wrested Portugal from the English: would all Spain then 
finally come under French rule? Certainly it would; nothing 
else was the plan of Napoleon. By the separation of the four 
provinces Joseph had lost what little credit he had won by his 
moderation with the liberals of the country, and when he 
sent his minister Azanza to Paris to secure the revocation of 
the edict of February, the latter, after long delay, was finally 
informed that the Emperor had irrevocably determined to incor- 
porate the whole of Spain into France, *'^ of which it is the natural 
continuation " ; its king was to abdicate and was to wait for that 
act only until the English were driven from the peninsula.* 

All now depended on Massena and the success of his expedition. 
He was not destined to succeed. The fortresses that blocked 
the road to Portugal capitulated only after long and obstinate 
resistance ; this gave Wellington a respite, which he used in de- 
stroying, while on his methodical retreat, all the resources of the 
country, and in constructing to the north of Lisbon a triple belt 
of forts from the sea to the Tagus. At this strong position 
near Torres Vedras, despite an important success at Busaco in 
September, 1810, the French army met a signal reverse, having 

* The necessary documents even were handed to the dismayed diplo- 
mat drawn up in full, Joseph's letter of abdication and a manifesto of 
Napoleon's to the Spanish. The latter contained the following: "My 
brother has voluntarily given back to me the crown which I resigned to 
him, and has entreated me not to permit the ruin of his subjects. He is 
acquainted with your affairs, he asked my protection and insisted on my 
receiving you into my empire." A rather bold perversion of the facts! 
The contrary was the truth. Azanza in Paris had ascribed the general 
tumult to the quarrels and thefts of the French generals as its chief cause, 
and declared that Joseph's moderation was the only means of pacifying the 
country ; and he had begged the Emperor to sustain the latter actively for 
only a year longer without violating the integrity of Spain. The above- 
mentioned papers, however, never reached Madrid. They fell into the 
hands of a guerilla and were soon afterwards printed in the newspapers of 
the Spanish insurgents and in the "Courier de Londres." 



502 



At the Zenith [isio 



suffered sorely from privations on the march and having failed 
of receiving the needed support either from France or Soult; so 
that in the spring of 1811 Massena was forced to return to Spain. 
After a new defeat which he suffered in the beginning of May at 
Fuentes de Onoro he lost the supreme command, which the 
enraged Emperor transferred to Marmont. 

Portugal, then, was not conquered, England was not driven 
from the Continent; rather, the Briton had greatly increased his 
prestige by his victory over the ablest marshal of the Empire. 
The various French divisions and their unwiUing allies, on the 
other hand, suffered beyond description. Unnumbered human 
lives were swallowed up by disease, hunger, and the secret wiles 
of the foe. "This is a gruesome war," writes an officer of the 
Rhenish allies about the incessant warfare with the guerillas; 
"here there is no alternative but victory or death, and at the 
end — death after all." For instance, the regiment of the Saxon 
principalities which in the spring of 1810 arrived in Spain 2300 
strong, lost 1000 men by September, and over 1200 more were 
lying in hospitals. In October only 27 were still fit for service. 
Of the detachments sent across the border by the Emperor, but 
a fragment, and a small one at that, ever reached its destination. 
The discouragement of the warriors kept growing, and only this 
one hope made them hold on until 1812, that the great Emperor, 
the battle-winner, would surely yet come to make a glorious end 
of the desperate fighting. 

But he did not come even then, although the situation grew 
worse and worse, and for very definite reasons. He did not 
come because he regarded the war in the peninsula as only a 
side issue in the mighty feud which he was waging against 
Great Britain in all comers of the continent, a factor of secon- 
dary moment, which must at once lose all its importance as 
soon as the great duel was elsewhere victoriously concluded. 
As this claimed all his activities, he plainly felt that he could 
not afford to enter personally into the subordinate detail of 
the peninsular struggle, which would take him too far away 
from the centre of his policy and its immediate aims. In 
short, the war of commerce was the main issue in his eyes; 



iET. 40] England Nearing Ruin 503 

that was the essential feature of his poHcy. In 1810, at the 
time when he sent Massena to Lisbon, he reverted to it with 
heightened zeal, and affirmed his conviction that England was 
already so weakened financially by the blockade that only a 
few years' perseverance would suffice to exhaust her power 
completely. And indeed indications were not wantuig that 
supported this belief. The Enghsh treasury had suffered 
severely from the endless subsidies to Continental powers and 
expensive expeditions to Spain and Holland; the notes of the 
Bank of England had fallen below par 20 per cent; on the 
Continent the pound sterling, usually exchangeable for 25 
francs, was now valued at only 17 francs. A conunercial crisis 
was the necessary consequence, and there were numerous 
bank failures. A respectable opposition in Parhament was 
earnestly working against the prosecution of the war. The 
Continental blockade had not as yet been enforced with full 
rigour. Once this were done, then Napoleon felt assured that 
England would yield, sue for peace, and renounce her supremacy 
of the seas. That would naturally end the Spanish war also. 
Under such circumstances, so he argued, would it not be absurd 
to go over the Pyrenees himself, instead of arranging from 
Paris for the strictest enforcement of the blockade system? 
This would be impossible from Spain because communication 
was so difficult. No, Wellmgton was not to be defeated on the 
Iberian peninsula alone; for the physical force of this or that 
British expedition was not the real foe, but the material force 
of British wealth which equipped these expeditions, organized 
coaUtions, and incited revolts. That must be destroyed, and 
that first of all. So all turned perforce on the one question 
whether the Contuiental blockade could really be enforced so 
strictly as to destroy the national wealth of Britain, as Napoleon 
thought it could. The answer involved the fate of the world. 
It has been repeatedly pointed out in this biography that the 
idea of continuing the war of a hundred years with England 
by closing the continental market to British manufactures 
and colonial products did not originate with Napoleon, but 
was of an earlier date. As a matter of fact it had its birth 



504 At the Zenith [I810 

in the revolutionary government of France at a time when the 
young General Bonaparte was just beginning to gather his 
laurels in Italy.* The men in authority in the Republic were 
thoroughly convinced of the soundness of this idea, and the 
Emperor remained true to it as well. In his intercourse with 
individual states he constantly worked for its realization, until, 
having made himself conqueror of Austria and Prussia, he 
issued from Berlin in November, 1806, that decree of blockade 
which barred from the coasts of the Continent all ships that 
came from England and her colonies.! To this the English had 
replied in 1807 by the order that all non-French vessels (the 
French were confiscated out of hand) which wanted to trade 
with blockaded ports must first touch at London or Malta and 
secure permission at a high price. This tyrannical measure 
Napoleon met the same year with the equally rigorous decree 
that all ships which should submit to these English conditions 
or touch any British territory whatever in their voyage were 
to be regarded as denationalized and treated as good prize in 
the ports of France. By these measures the maritime trade of 
neutral powers was made so extremely difficult that the govern- 
ment of the United States actually forbade its citizens all com- 
merce with Europe. This embargo was restricted in 1809, by 
the Non-Intercourse Act, to England and France and was 
then generally evaded, for American shippers took English 
colonial products and manufactures on board and traded 
with Holland, the Hanseatic towns, and the ports of Russia 
and Prussia, making false declarations as to the place of 

* In a letter dated July 22d, 1796, Mallet du Pan writes to Thugut: 
"Hatred of England has gained new force; the preparations for a landing 
there are being continued, and a plan has been formed and partly carried 
out of closing the ports of the Continent against England." A week later 
he writes: "As far as possible the markets of the Continent will be closed 
to England, by which her revenues, her factories, in short her most important 
resources will be attacked; by this means the opposition of the British 
nation will be roused and thus its government be forced to sue for peace." 
An article in the official " Redacteur " of October 29th of the same year con- 
tains this sentence: "Our policy must limit itself to ruining the commerce 
and thereby the power of England by shutting her out of the Continent." 

t See page 366. 



^T.40] Enforcing the Blockade 505 

shipment. In the Mediterranean the neutral Turkish flag on 
Greek vessels protected the British cargoes that were smug- 
gled into Trieste, Venice, Genoa, etc. This extensive indirect 
trade sorely interfered with Napoleon's great scheme, and he 
cast about for means of crippling it as completely as the direct 
commerce with England. In March, 1810, he issued an edict 
aimed directly against the neutrals; Greek vessels in the south 
were to be most carefully searched for indications of the source 
of their cargo, while the American ships — and here the embargo 
of the government at Washington stood him in good stead — in 
all French ports and ports accessible to French arms were 
threatened with confiscation.* 

But it was not the trade of neutrals alone that disturbed 
Napoleon's poHcy against England. Side by side with it an 
immense smuggUng trade had been developed along the coasts 
of the North Sea and the Baltic which continually furnished the 
Continent with the prohibited EngUsh colonial products and tex- 
tiles — at very high prices, to be sure — while in the London ware- 
houses the home products rapidly fell in value. In 1810 the 
difference, i.e., the premium on smuggled articles, amounted to 
nearly fifty per cent on an average. In order to put a stop to 
this contraband trade, the Emperor issued August 5th of that year 
at Trianon an edict which required all merchants to pay a tax of 
fifty per cent and more ad valorem on their colonial products, 
" which were, of course, all of English origin," and also threatened 
with confiscation all storehouses of such products found within 
four days of the borders of the Empire. By this decree he practi- 
cally drove the business out of the hands of the smugglers and 
secured a considerable fund for his own treasury, "the extraor- 
dinary domain " which a Senatus consultum of January, 1810, had 
granted to him separate from the national treasury and inde- 
pendent of national control and into which this tax flowed. A 

* This measure against the neutrals also was earlier designed by the 
Directory. In the beginning of January, 1798, that body recommended 
to the legislature to seize all neutral ships which carried English wares, no 
matter who the owners were, and to close the French ports to every neutra] 
ship that had entered Enghsh harbours. The object, it was stated, was to 
protect the liberty of the seas. 



5o6 At the Zenith [isio 

later decree issued at Fontainebleau October 18th ordered all 
articles of English manufacture found either in France or allied 
countries to be burned wherever they were seized. And in fact 
during the next weeks French soldiers were seen everywhere 
crossing the border, and in concert with the customs officers 
breaking into storehouses, heaping up the fruits of British 
industry and converting them to ashes. Sugar and coffee, on 
the other hand, were carried on ammunition-wagons to Antwerp, 
Mainz, Frankfort, or Milan, where they were sold at pubhc 
auction. A premium was set on official zeal in this task ; smug- 
glers and receivers of their goods were handed over to the 
Draconian penalties of a court established in November, 1810, 
for this special purpose. To such a pitch of severity had the 
Continental system grown. In France only was it modified by the 
special provision that certain skippers there could obtain for a 
round sum (which likewise went into the privy purse of the Em- 
peror) permission to import certain classes of English products ; in 
particular indispensable provisions and dyestuffs. In this way 
the French were kept in good humour, although in other countries 
the nuisance of the ''license" system caused intense bitterness of 
feeling.* 

All these regulations, however, would fail of their object 
unless they were enforced with equal stringency everywhere on 
the Continent; i.e., unless all the powers of Continental Europe 
adopted the laws against the neutrals and the tariff of Trianon. 
Napoleon made no delay in summoning all of them to do so; 

* It is by no means to be supposed that Napoleon allowed those Euro- 
pean states from which he debarred English imports to trade freely among 
themselves Even in 1806 he made it impossible to import textile fabrics 
into France, also soda, soap, and the like. Again in 1810 the Italian 
market was closed against Swiss stuffs, and Italian raw silks, being kept 
out of Switzerland and the Rhenish Confederation by high tariffs, were 
drawn exclusively to Lyons for the purpose of enriching its manufacturers, 
while the silk-growers of Lombardy fell into poverty. So decidedly was 
Napoleon opposed to free trade that, among other things, he permitted 
no new editions of J B Say s treatise on Political Economy, which had 
appeared in 1803 It may be added that not even the "license"' system 
was originated by his government; licenses had been issued by the Direc- 
cry. 



iET. 40] The Situation of Holland 507 

some with diplomacy, others with menaces. And everything 
seemed to depend on whether they all really compUed or resisted. 
One of the states had already fallen a victim to the system — 
Holland. The Dutch had attained importance and wealth only 
through their shipping, their colonies and commerce ; these were 
their sole dependence. So, when Napoleon's laws making all 
maritime commerce impossible were enforced, their ruin was 
inevitable. Of this the Emperor was well aware. ''Holland can- 
not escape her ruin," he wrote as early as March, 1808, to his 
brother Louis when he offered him the Spanish crown with the 
object of annexing Holland to France.* For it had not escaped 
his knowledge that the Dutch welcomed American ships with 
their British cargoes, and sent the goods farther into the interior 
of the Continent in order to save at least a fraction of their once 
magnificent carrying trade. Louis declined at that time, and 
Napoleon also temporarily laid the plan of annexation aside. 
But immediately after the Austrian war he took it up again. 
His pretext now was that the Dutch had not been able to raise 
sufficient forces against the English invasion of 1809. And in 
fact it was the marsh fever rather than the troops of King 
Louis that kept the British from Antwerp and compelled them 
to beat a hasty retreat to the island of Walcheren, where one 
detachment did indeed maintain its position for a few months. 
And when Louis hastened to Paris to defend himself and his 
country from the charge of "treason against France," Napoleon 
openly conveyed to him l\is intention of incorporating Holland 
into the empire and of endowing him with a German principality. 
This one concession was granted to the King, that a Dutch confi- 
dential agent might first go to England to demand secretly the 
revocation of the Order in Council of 1807; in case of acceptance, 
he offered to open Holland and the Hanseatic towns, while in 
case of refusal he threatened to annex them to France. This 
mission, the sole aim of which was evidently to throw upon 
England the blame for the annexation of Holland, proved a 
failure, as the English government wished to negotiate openly on a 
peace basis, which Napoleon declined to do ; and the neighbour- 

* See page 432. 



5o8 



At the Zenith tisio 



ing state would surely have lost its independence at once if the 
moment when the whole world was hoping for peace and quiet 
to result from his marriage with the " daughter of the Caesars'' had 
not seemed to the Emperor inappropriate for such an arbitrary- 
act. He contented himself with forcing on Louis a treaty 
ceding to France all Dutch territory on the left bank of the 
Rhine, including Zealand, Brabant, and the part of Guelders on 
the left of the Waal; placing all the Dutch coasts under the 
surveillance of a French corps of occupation 6000 strong and of 
French customs officers; and, furthermore, binding the King to 
equip fifteen large war-ships. In return for all this the Emperor 
promised to remove the restrictions so long imposed on the 
trade of Holland with France (March 16th, 1810). 

But this promise was not seriously meant; Napoleon aimed 
merely to strike a first blow, not wishing to fell the tree at a 
single stroke. He was far from observing the stipulations of the 
treaty. The customs barriers between Holland and France 
remained in force, the French corps of troops was increased to 
four times the stipulated number, and in concert with the for- 
eign customs officers performed intolerable acts of violence, and 
complaints made to Paris met only insults. Thereupon Louis 
no Ipnger deemed it compatible with his dignity to keep the 
crown; on July 1, 1810, he abdicated in favour of his younger 
son, the older having in March, 1809, become Duke of Berg, and 
secretly withdrew to Austria. Napoleon was surprised by this 
step of his brother, and expressed himself bitterly on his ingrati- 
tude.* It was of course an embarrassing thing for him to 
appear before the world at variance with his nearest relatives. 
But that made no change in the course of events. For even 
before the news of Louis's retirement arrived at Paris, a decree 
already lay there in full form, the first provision of which read; 
"Holland is annexed to the Empire." Now it was published, and 

* See the conversation with Caulaincourt, page 27. It is interesting 
to compare this with another conversation in which the Emperor shortly 
after informed the Swedish ambassador that he had driven (I) from 
the throne his brother, whom he loved and had educated, because he 
had been powerless to deal with the Dutch smugglers. (Lefebvre, V. 73.) 



^Et. 40] Annexations to the Empire 509 

Lebrun, Napoleon's fonner colleague in the consulate, went to the 
new province as his viceroy. 

Observe the method of these usurpations. In Holland, as 
well as in Spain, his brothers disappoint the hopes of the Emperor, 
since neither Joseph nor Louis is able to escape the strong national 
repulsion toward the Empire. Instead of appreciating and 
heeding these impulses, Napoleon merely deems his brothers too 
weak, too ambitious, or too obstinate to serve him. His deep 
distrust henceforth extends even to them, and he abandons the 
family system in order to take Europe, so to speak, under his 
personal rule.* In Spain and in Holland he proceeds in the same 
way. There in February, 1810, he annexes the country as far 
as the Ebro; here in March, as far as the Waal; and at the same 
time the docmnents were already complete that were to declare 
the incorporation of both these countries in toto into the Empire. 
In Spain, to be sure, the necessary condition was not yet fulfilled, 
i.e., the expulsion of the English; but they had been obliged 
to evacuate their position in Walcheren as early as Decem- 
ber, 1809. But these annexations were not destined to stand. 

" The British Orders in Council have torn to shreds the public 
law of Europe. A new order of things reigns in the world." 
With these words it w^as that Napoleon recommended to the 
Senate to make the union of Holland with France constitutional. 
But that w^as not all the rescript contained ; he demanded not 
only the mouths of the Scheldt, the Mosel, and the Rhine as *'new 
guarantees " against England, but also those of the Weser and 
the Elbe ; and the obedient senators, in a consultum of December 
1810, actually declared both Holland and the entire German 
coast of the North Sea to be parts of the Empire, including the 
districts of Oldenburg, Lauenburg, the three Hanseatic cities, 
Hamburg, Bremen, and Liibeck, the principalities of Arenberg 
and Salm, parts of Hanover (which in January, 1810, had just, 

* In September, 1810, he said to Metternich among others: "There 
are relatives and cousins and aunts. But they all amount to nothing, I 
should not have left the throne even to my brothers. But then, time 
alone makes one wise. I ought to have appointed only regents and vice- 
roys," 



5IO At the Zenith [isio 

fallen to the share of Jerome), of Westphalia and Berg: in brief, 
more than 12,000 square miles. The new territories were to 
form three departments, with Osnabriick, Bremen, and Liibeck 
as capital cities. And for this step there was not a shred of 
lawful title, no legal ground, not even a pretext; it was purely 
arbitrary from beginning to end. In the same arbitrary way 
Napoleon at this time incorporated the Swiss republic of the 
Valais. "The annexations are demanded by circumstances," 
said the minister of the Emperor in his report to the Senate. 
But what could it be that would not be demanded by circum- 
stances? On the same ground the Emperor might justify the 
union of entire Europe under his sceptre, if he had the power 
to unite it. In this direction in fact his thoughts were tending. 
Yet not even these annexations from Germany were original 
with Napoleon, for along with the blockade system against Eng- 
land the Directory already had their eyes fixed on the acquisition 
of the North German coast, and twelve years before Sieyes had 
termed these districts the "most important part of the globe to 
France"; once possess those, and the English can be excluded 
from all Continental ports from Gibraltar to Holstein, aye, to 
the North Cape.* This progranune now seemed on the point 
of being carried out. For even Denmark, whose rule at that 
time still extended over Norway, at once complied with the 
demand of Napoleon to proscribe the cargoes of neutral ships. 
The hatred of the Danes against the English, which had gone 
beyond all bounds since the bombardment of Copenhagen in 
1807, caused Frederick VI. to overlook the serious consequences 
of such a course for his country; and besides the Danish king 
was influenced by the hope of some day attaining with the help 
of France the throne of Sweden, which must soon fall vacant. 
This expectation, however, was not to be fulfilled. For a change 
had ensued in the political status of Sweden. Even during the 
war against the Russian-French alliance, a war which resulted 
in delivering Finland to the Russians and Swedish Pomerania, 
with Stralsund and Riigen to the French, the unwise enmity of 
Gustavus IV. against Napoleon and his obstinate clinging to the 

* See page 191. 



Mr. 40] Sicily 511 

broken reed of England had brought the country into a sad 
plight. In March, 1809, he was deposed and his uncle Charles 
XIII. put in his stead. Then the Swedes had concluded peace 
with Russia and in January, 1810, with France, which gave Pome- 
rania back to them, but bound them to the strictest observance 
of the Continental blockade. Nay, more: in November, 1810, 
Charles XIII. even went so far as to declare war against England, 
shortly after he had chosen as his successor (for he was childless) 
Bemadotte, whose affr.bility had won many friends in Swedish 
Pomerania, little suspecting that he was calling to his side one 
who was anything but r. friend of the Emperor of the French.* 

As Napoleon contended with his principal enemy for mas- 
tery of the far north of the Continent, so also he strove to be 
master in the extreme south. In Sicily the British were finnly 
established, keeping the Bourbon dynasty under the pressure 
of constant interference and guardianship. From this point 
they had undertaken in 1809 an expedition against Naples, 
with the same deplorable results, however, as in that against 
Antwerp in the north. Napoleon replied by commanding his 
brother-in-law. King Joachim of Naples, to wrest Sicily from 
the English, or at least to keep their troops shut up so that 
they should send no re-enforcements to Spain and Portugal. 
This attempt to land in Sicily failed utterly in 1810. In the 
following summer it was to be repeated with the support of 
the Toulon fleet; but as the ships were unable to put out, 
the undertaking was postponed. In reality, like the conquest 
of Spain and Portugal, this, too, was a side issue; and Messina 
might be won, Hke Lisbon, in other ways.f 

* In December, 1810, a Russian ambassador in Stockholm reported 
that the Crown Prince Charles John (the name Bemadotte now bore) used 
very bitter language against Napoleon, asserting that he had been always 
given a post in the field of battle where he might easily fall (Revue His- 
torique, XXXVII. 74). It should be remembered that Bemadotte was a 
Gascon. 

t Of some interest is the rumour current at the time and reported to 
the home government by the English plenipotentiary, Lord Bentinck, 
that Queen Caroline, ever since her granddaughter Marie Louise had 
married Napoleon, had been seeking to arrive at an understanding with 



512 At the Zenith OI8IO 

One thing, however, becomes perfectly clear when we con- 
sider Napoleon's unbounded activity during this time, and that 
is, a sore disappointment was in store for those who expected 
from his connection with an old dynasty his reconciliation with 
the system of the old states, And equally astray were those 
who beheld in the birth of his son a year later a pledge of peace. 
For at that very time, the spring of 1811, his plans took their 
loftiest flight. Sooner or later Spain and Portugal would fall 
to the share of France, either through conquest — ^for Mass^na 
was still before Lisbon — or in the train of the greater events. 
From the southern extremity of the Italian peninsula to the 
far-distant north where the Continent ends in the Arctic Ocean, 
all governments were under his influence, apparently without 
any will of their own; and only the Slavic colossus of the east 
yet remained to reckon with. For what purpose had Napoleon 
bound half the Continent to march under his banner, if it were 
not to become master, at last, of the whole? 

The latest news from England served only to confirm the 
Emperor in the course he had entered upon. In that country 
the economic conditions had, in consequence of the annexation 
of the seaboard states to France, grown more and more serious. 
England, to be sure, had taken possession of most of the European 
colonies across the ocean (including the French colonies. Isle 
de Bourbon, Isle de France, and Cayenne); but the hope of a 
profitable export trade with them in manufactured articles was 
disappointed, as they were obliged to accept in exchange colonial 
products, to which Napoleon closed the European markets 

the Napoleonic dynasty against England, whose pressure she endured 
with the greatest reluctance. The plan was said to have been that her 
troops should in 1811 attack the British on the island while Murat stormed 
Messina. Then for a suitable equivalent Sicily was to be ceded to the 
latter or to Napoleon, while the Bourbon prince Leopold was to marry the 
niece of the Corsican. Satisfactory proof of these statements has not 
been adduced. The despatches of Bentinck that mention them have 
but recently been made known. But besides there was much talk of 
annexing Naples to the empire and of Murat's disgrace. The recently 
published diaries of Queen Catharine of Westphalia also make mention of 
these things. But they never came to pass; greater events thrust such 
projects into the background. 



.Et. 41] England To Be Subdued. 5 1 3 

more and more rigidly. In addition the use of machinery had 
resulted in overproduction and loss of profits. The British 
Parliament had to open a public loan for the distressed manu- 
facturers. Of course French industries suffered as well, but 
the remedy there was merely a matter of time, as the Emperor 
supposed, and a short time at that. When, a few days after 
the birth of his child, he accepted the congratulations of a 
deputation from the chambers of commerce and industry, he 
spoke with the greatest confidence of his ultimate victory. He 
now openly rejected all thoughts of peace. "You see," said 
he, "how far England has come down in the world. Louis 
XIV. and Louis XV. were obliged in their day to make peace, 
and I, too, would long ago have been obliged to seek it, if like 
them I ruled old France; but I am not the successor of the 
French kings, but of Charlemagne, and my empire is a con- 
tinuation of the empire of the Franks. In four years I shall 
have a navy. Once my squadrons have been at sea three or 
four years, then we can try conclusions with the English. I 
know I may lose three or four naval battles;* very well, I shall 
lose them ; but we are courageous, always booted and spurred, 
and we shall succeed. Ere ten years pass by I shall have sub- 
jugated England. No European state will trade with her any 
more. It is my customs barriers that do the greatest harm 
to the English. Her blockade but injured herself most by 
teaching us how w^e could dispense with her products, her 
sugar, her indigo. Yet a few years and we shall be inured to 
that. Soon I shall have beet-sugar enough to supply all Europe. 
For your manufactures you have a wide market open in France, 
Italy, Naples, and Germany.'^ Then the Emperor proceeded 
to speak of the French national treasury, and said among other 
things: "I take in nine hundred millions annually from my 
own country and have three hundred milions lying in the 
Tuileries; the Bank of France is filled with silver, while the 
Bank of England has not a shilHng. Since 1806 I have brought 
in more than a billion francs in war contributions. I alone 

* "Three or four fleets/' according to another reading. 



514 At the Zenith [I8II 

have money. Austria is already bankrupt, Russia will be, and 
England no less." * 

These last statements of the Emperor about the French 
finances call for a word of explanation. It is true that Metter- 
nich, too, who stayed in Paris for some time in 1810, formed the 
opinion that ''France is without question the richest nation of 
the Continent and can in financial matters bid defiance to any 
other." But he adds the qualification that "the coffers of the 
state are empty, those of the ruler are full." And that was pretty 
near the truth; for over against the nine hundred millions of 
revenue mentioned by Napoleon there stood in the budget of 
1811 nine hundred and fifty-four millions of expenses. And 
although the annexation of Rome, lUyria, Holland, and the 
Hanseatic department, and the new tariff, contributed to raise 
the revenues, yet the expenses of the military system had grown 
rapidly. The estimates of the Minister of War for that year 
called for 480 milhons (400 in 1810), of the Minister of Marine 
for 170 miUions (110 in 1810). To meet this situation Napoleon 
represented in a memorial of December, 1810, that a loan was 
"immoral because it burdened future generations," and proposed 
only an increase of indirect taxes (droits reunis), and in addition 
a new impost, the tobacco monopoly, (He expected this would 
yield 80 million francs.) His forecast proved to be mistaken. 
The year 1811 was favourable for wine, but not for grain. The 
drought, which ripened grapes to a memorable sweetness, with- 
ered the grain, the price of flour was almost doubled, its con- 
sumption decreased correspondingly, and with it fell the revenue 
from taxes. The year closed with a deficit of 46 millions. And 
while Napoleon's claim of 300 millions in his treasury was in 
the main correct, it is certain that only half that amount was in 
cash, the rest consisting of claims against states and private 
individuals. Evidently the brilliant picture which the Emperor 

* The speech is here given (as a fragment) in its original form as it 
was published in the Revue Critique of 1880 from two independent sources. 
The version in Thiers (XIII. 22-27) evidently represents a later revision 
in which the words of the Emperor were communicated to the diplomats 
and German newspapers. In the Memoirs of Miot (III. 189) there appears 
a third version. 



jet.41] Plans which Embraced the World 515 

had drawn of the finances of France was far from true. We may 
judge by that how severely he felt the blow when — as we shall 
hear later — Russia closed her territory to French exports, and 
how strenuous were his efforts to multiply sources of income for 
the French, and so increase their power to pay taxes, by con- 
quering new markets for their products in the East. Hence, 
just as in 1809, so three years later, the financial situation doubt- 
less helped to make war seem a necessity.* 

Any one who will compare the above address of the Emperor 
to the representatives of industry with his commands to the 
Minister of the Na\'y in the same month of March, 1811, will find 
in them the whole vast plan of universal empire set forth in the 
boldest outlines. The empire of Charlemagne no longer satisfies 
him ; not even the Continent of Europe ; no, he requires the entire 
globe to come under his iron sceptre. He proposes to have two 
immense fleets fitted out within the next three years, one for the 
ocean and one for the Mediterranean; the latter destined for 
Sicily and Egypt, the former at first for Ireland. And in case 
matters went well in Portugal and Spain, expeditions were to be 
despatched before the end of 1812 to the Cape of Good Hope, to 
Surinam, Martinique, etc., and sixty to eighty thousand men, 
"avoiding the hostile cruisers," were to be distributed over both 
hemispheres. At the same time the last decisive Continental 
war against Russia is in preparation with the purpose of coercing 
the Czar if he refuses to enter the federative system under Na- 
poleon's suzerainty, and of opening the way to the British Indies. 
With a single covetous look the Emperor encompassed the whole 
world, and so completely was he dominated by the thought of 
his coming universal rule that he no longer sought to conceal it. 
''They wish to know whither we are bound," said he. "We 
shall make an end of Europe, and then throw ourselves Uke 
robbers on robbers less bold than ourselves, and possess our- 
selves of India, of which they have made themselves masters." 

* It is stated that the minister Mollien advised the Emperor against war 
with Russia on the ground that the finances of the state needed peace; 
whereupon the latter replied: *'0n the contrary, they are falling into con- 
fusion and for that reason are in need of war." Cf . page 460. 



5i6 At the Zenith [isii 

When the Bavarian General Wrede, who was sojourning 
in Paris in the early summer of 1811, on one occasion spoke a 
word in favour of peace, the Emperor answered him with severitj^ 
in tone and glance: "Yet three years and I am master of the 
world." 

The more surely Napoleon counted on the ultimate success of 
his Continental policy against England, the more important it 
became for him to deprive British goods of their last resort, the 
ports of Russia. Hence he had to arrive at an understanding 
with Russia in order to induce her to adopt his measures against 
the neutral flag; i.e., his tariff to bar out colonial produce, and 
his decree ordering the destruction of warehouses of English 
manufactures. This could be secured by amicable means if the 
Czar yielded, or by forcible means if he resisted. Under existing 
conditions the latter was more probable. 

We have already seen the beginnings of serious differences 
between these two allied powers. They date from the war of 
1809, when Russia showed a lack of zeal in supporting France 
against Austria, and Napoleon retaliated by adding GaUcian 
territory to the duchy of Warsaw. The Emperor's marriage with 
an archduchess might also be regarded as a move in the game 
against the power of the Czar, and it is a significant fact that on 
the very day on which Napoleon summoned Prince Schwarz- 
enberg to Paris to sign the marriage contract, February 6th, 1810, 
word w^as sent to the French ambassador at St. Petersburg that a 
treaty signed by him on January 5th could not be confirmed. 
That treaty concerned Poland. Alexander I. felt keen anxiety 
lest the duchy of Warsaw should, under the protectorate of the 
French Emperor, extend some day over the entire domain of the 
old Polish kingdom, and had asked for guarantees from France on 
that point. Caulaincourt, still keeping in mind his instructions 
to keep Russia quiet, had gone into the matter and had formally 
promised that the kingdom of Poland should never be restored; 
nay, more, that the name Poland should be carefully avoided in 
all public documents. To sign this meant for Napoleon to lay 
down one of the most effective weapons against Russia, which 
he had been busily forging in the years 1806 and 1809, and to 



^T. 41] Relations with Russia 517 

guarantee besides that ho one else should venture to restore 
Poland. If there had been any necessity of making such a con- 
cession to the Czar, it would have been different. But since the 
Austrian marriage had brought the Emperor Francis over to 
the side of France there was no such necessity. In brief, 
Napoleon did not ratify the treaty, and for the sole purpose of 
avoiding offence to his ally he had a counter-proposition offered 
in St. Petersburg, wherein he offered to bind himself merely to 
support no attempt to restore the old kingdom of the Jagellons. 
This was to be incorporated in a secret treaty. But that did not 
satisfy Alexander. He desired a public treaty which would 
bind the French Emperor in the eyes of the whole world; he 
insisited on his original demand, and appealed to the promises 
which he had received soon after the peace of Schonbrimn was 
concluded.* "The Emperor," he said to the French ambas- 
sador, "gave me the most positive assurances, and at that time 
wanted to give them; why not now?" The answer, to be in 
keeping with the truth, must have run thus: Because the 
Emperor, who now deems himself "sole lord of Europe," has 
already had clearly in mind this breach with Russia and only 
wants a pretext for bringing it about as soon as it is advantageous 
to him. Of course that was not the answer of the ambassador. 
But the Russian monarch knew what to expect; for at that very 
time (April, 1811) he assured Prince Adam Czartoryski that 
Napoleon was far less concerned for the welfare of Poland than 
he was to "make use of that country as a tool at the moment 
when he should want to make war upon Russia." This moment 
had not yet arrived; but it was not very far distant. As earlj- 
as October, 1810, Mettemich had returned from France to his 
master with this conviction: "In the year 1811 the peace of 
Continental Europe will not be disturbed by any new attack by 
France. In the course of that year Napoleon will increase his 
own forces and assemble his allies for a decisive blow against 
Russia. Napoleon will open the campaign in the spring of 1812." 
The Polish question was, moreover, but one link in a long 
chain of disputes that arose between the alhes of Tilsit in the 
* See page 487. 



51 8 At the Zenith [isii 

course of the years 1810 and 1811 . An element of equal discord 
lay in Turkey, where Napoleon had in secret always opposed 
Russia most strenuously. The Russians had victoriously 
crossed the lower Danube and gained such decisive successes 
that there was a fair prospect of peace with the Porte. Napoleon 
was very sorely displeased at that prospect because it must be 
his desire to keep the Russian forces continually occupied in the 
south when he made his attack in the north. To accomplish 
this, not wishing to appear openly against his allies, he sought 
to hide behind Austria. He advised Metternich to occupy 
Servia, which Russia claimed, and promised to be an inactive 
spectator if the Court of Vienna contested the Danubian princi- 
palities with the Czar. The Emperor Francis would have none 
of this. Napoleon, however, had gained this much, that Turkey, 
being informed of the interest that France and Austria took in 
her fate, persisted in refusing the Russian demands, and the war 
went on. 

These, however, were matters of secondary importance com- 
pared with the main fact, i.e., Russia's attitude in the Conti- 
nental blockade. In the middle of October, 1810, Napoleon had 
called upon the Czar to confiscate neutral vessels found in his 
ports, as had been done since May in the ports of France and of 
countries under French influence. "If Russia confiscates them," 
runs the despatch on this subject, "she gives England the 'coup 
de grace ' and ends the war at once." And to Alexander himself 
the Emperor wrote : "It depends only on Your Majesty whether 
we shall have war or peace." The Czar refused; he could not do 
otherwise. For even the rupture of direct commercial relations 
with England had inflicted severe losses on Russia. Her natural 
products thus lost their most important market. The result 
was inevitable; three years later the deficit equalled the revenues 
and paper money fell to one fourth its nominal value. In truth, 
when Napoleon so confidently predicted the bankruptcy of the 
northern empire, he knew perfectly well the source of his ally's 
financial distress. Was the wish to increase it and hasten the 
catastrophe lurking in the demand now made on St. Petersburg 
to turn away the neutrals as well? No; the Czar could not 



Mt.u] The Breach Widens 519 

accede to that. Where in all the world was he to look for active 
support against a future attack of Napoleon if now he himself 
helped to ruin England? He replied to the proposal of France 
by declaring that he was willing to maintain now as before the 
anti-British system of the Tilsit Treaty and confiscate every ship 
that failed to give unimpeachable evidence of its nationality, 
but that he could not bring himself to go bej^ond that, as Russia 
could not dispense with the colonial produce and depended on 
the trade of neutrals; that it was by no means certain that the 
latter carried British goods only. 

This was a blow struck at Napoleon's policy in its most 
sensitive spot. For as soon as Russia tolerated neutral flags in 
her ports the Continent was opened to British exports, and 
England could derive new hope and capacity for resistance from 
the Czar's refusal. If anything had been wanting to convince the 
Imperator that he must first fight Russia if he wanted to ruin 
England and become master of the world, nothuig was lacking 
now. Henceforth, although keeping up all the formal courtesy 
and seeming candour of diplomatic intercouse, he proceeds to take 
decisive steps against his ally. Then took place the annexation 
of the North German seaboard lands, including the duchy of 
Oldenburg, whose prince was closely related to the Russian 
dynasty.* Napoleon had at the outset left the Duke the choice 
between ceding his territory for some equivalent, or receiving 
French troops and customs officers. But when the distressed 
regent, after some delay, accepted the latter alternative, he 
was informed (the same old game) that it was now too late and 
that his land was already taken into the Empire. As a compen- 
sation he was offered the petty territory of Erfurt, which had 
belonged to the electorate of Mainz, then to Pnissia, but since 1806 
had been at the disposal of the French government. The Czar 
spoke the truth when he declared to the French envoys that that 
act was a slap in his face before all Europe, and at the same time 
a flagrant violation of the Treaty of Tilsit in which Napoleon had 

* Duke Peter I., who governed for his cousin Wilham, belonged, like 
the Czar, to the house of Holstein-Gottorp ; he was the uncle of Alexander 
I., and his younger son George was the latter's brother-in-law. 



520 At the Zenith [isii 

solemnly guaranteed the integrity of Oldenb\irg He sent a cir- 
cular letter to the European powers in which he protested against 
such a violation of the rights of the house of Holstein-Gottorp 
to the duchy. "What," said this letter, ''are aUiances worth if 
the parties to them are not held by the treaties on which they 
rest?" Was this the expected rupture? No, not yet; the con- 
clusion of the protest was conciliatory in tone and emphasized the 
continuance of the alliance. But that was mere words. The 
acts of Russia hardly left an opening for an understanding. 
For on December 31st, 1810, a ukase was issued which not only 
relaxed the control over neutral ships in Russian ports, so that 
colonial produce under any pretext could be unloaded and 
forwarded south into the interior through Brody, but also made 
he importation of certain luxuries, especialty silks and wines, 
almost impossible by a high duty. But silks and wines were 
among the chief products of France and the principal articles of 
her export trade. This was another blow at Napoleon. He 
demanded the repeal of the decree, but received the simple 
answer that the measure was dictated by the bad financial 
situation of Russia. 

After this new refusal of his ally Napoleon began most stren- 
uously to arm himself in secret.* In March, 1811, Davout, who 
was on the Elbe with his army, received the command to fly 
to Danzig "in case there were to be operations against Russia," 
and there to strengthen his force of 90,000 with 50,000 Poles 
and Saxons. It was now that Napoleon spoke of his world- 
wide plans and held up to view his prospective world-monarchy. 
In March, 1811, he revealed to his adjutant-general, Narbonne, 
the purpose, long cherished and constantly reflected upon, of 
marching through Moscow to the Ganges in order to overthrow 
British rule in India. But Russia also was facing the struggle, 
and at this very time Alexander I. unfolded to the Prussian 
ambassador, as a plan of campaign, the invasion of the duchy 
of Warsaw and an advance to the Oder. Both empires were 

* In December, 1811, he admitted openly to the Prussian ambassador 
Krusemarck that ever since the appearance of the Russian ukase he had 
been quietly preparing for war. 



^T.4i] War Imminent 521 

determined on war, both were arming, Napoleon hiding behind 
the pretext that his measures were called forth by those of the 
Czar. Upon only one occasion tV^ereafter does he seem to 
have considered a peaceable understanding, and then only to 
gain time. This was when the news of Massena's ill fortune 
came to JParis. Yet he would not grant Alexander's desire to ex- 
change Oldenburg for Warsaw. He had no wish to strengthen 
Russia in the west at a time when she had just acquired Fin- 
land in the north and was in a fair way of winning the Danu- 
bian principalities in the south. Not a village of the Polish 
duchy should be yielded to the Czar's empire, he declared to 
his representative in a public audience on August 15th, 1811. 
But Alexander made no other proposition, and left unanswered 
one made by Napoleon, who, as a matter of course, demanded 
the enforcement of the blockade and promised licenses. The 
Czar found decided encouragement in the events in Spain and 
in the dissatisfaction in North Germany. He did not feel that 
war was to be avoided at any cost. Before the end of 1811 the 
French Emperor said to Krusemarck that Russia thought he 
was too busy in Spain to draw up a very formidable army 
elsewhere, but that was a mistake; that he could very well 
tolerate the English on the peninsula, as they could not drive 
out his troops; that he must first bring the war in the north 
to an end, and not until then could he turn again to the south. 
His only concern now was to gain enough time to put as many 
troops on a war footing as he deemed necessary for his de- 
cisive struggle ^dth the only Continental power not yet pros- 
trated, and to choose the moment for beginning hostilities. 
The silence of Russia toward his last overtures was used to 
represent the Czar as the real author of the war, and this be- 
came the settled conviction in the world at large.* 

* Recent attempts to make this view a part of history must seem a 
failure to any one who has an accurate knowledge of the aims and character 
of Napoleon. It is only necessary to read what Metternich wrote to 
Bubna a year later, May 13th, 1813 ; '' Napoleon should consider the efforts 
we had to make to prevent our support of France from becoming utterly 
odious. We attempted the impossible to prove that Russia was break- 



522 At the Zenith [isii 

It was indeed a gigantic army that the Imperator proposed 
to bring into the field, not less than four hundred thousand 
strong he assured the Prussian ambassador, while to the Russian 
he made it half a miUion; even this figure was finally to fall 
short of the truth. The Republic, too, had sent forth such 
masses against their foes; but with this difference, that then 
the enthusiasm of new-born freedom armed the might of the 
French people, whereas now only the iron will of the ruler 
called the reluctant hosts to arms. More and more heavily 
had his government weighed on the French since his last cam- 
paign. In the cities the least sign of discontent showing its 
head was the occasion of suspicion, persecution, and punish- 
ment. After 1811 the number of state prisoners rose to twenty- 
five hundred. They were arrested at the mere command of 
the Emperor or his minister of police, and imprisoned without 
a trial, one "because he hates Napoleon," another ''because 
he has ever since 1811 been expressing opinions hostile to the 
government in letters to his brother," a third for "religious 
views," etc. In February, 1810, a special censorship was estab- 
lished in Paris with a director-general, several auditors, and 
fifteen to twenty censors, so that the censorship should not be 
in the hands of the police. With most officious zeal everything 
was forbidden or altered that might waken even the appear- 
ance of displeasure in the all-powerful ruler. In one case, for 
example, a passage praising the English Constitution had to 
be cut out of a book; in another a title must be changed from 
" History of Bonaparte," which was not obsequious enough, to 
"Memoirs of the Campaigns of Napoleon the Great." This 
diligence of the assiduous censors extended to the farthest boun- 
daries of the Empire. After the French occupation the theatres 
of the Hanseatic cities were no longer to represent Schiller's 
"Robbers," "Maria Stuart," "Wilhelm Tell," or Goethe's 
"Faust." As for the newspapers, two of the four independent 
Paris papers, the "Publiciste" and the "Mercure de France," were 
wholly suppressed, while the other two lost their capital and be- 
ing the peace. This pretext is lacking to us in the year 1813." 
Oncken, "Oestereich u. Preussen im Befreiungskriege," II. 378. 



.Et. 41] Repressive Measures in France 523 

came wholly dependent on the government. A special bureau 
(Bureau de T Esprit public) furnished them with reports of vic- 
tories from Spain or with articles on Italian and French music, in 
order to divert the attention of the bored Parisians, while hun- 
dreds of thousands were arming themselves for the bloody 
struggle. To be sure Napoleon tried to draw the veil of forget- 
fulness over his harsh measures against the press by conferring 
honours on scholars and artists. He decorated them with the 
cross of the Legion of Honour, raised the Gros, the Gerards, 
Guerins, Lagranges, Monges, and Laplaces to the baronage, and 
regretted that Corneille was no longer alive to be raised to the 
rank of prince. 

In the country, not less than in the cities, the government 
soon was obliged to support its authority by strict measures. 
The French peasant had hitherto proved himself the most 
reliable supporter of the Emperor. This was partly due, doubt- 
less, to the fact that, being less easily moved than the towns- 
folk, he clung longer to the side once chosen, and the General 
who restored order had once been his man; but still another 
reason was the inclination of the French peasantry for military 
service, for in any case it gave a nimiber of men their support, 
and if brave men could give themselves the proper training 
it raised them to respectable situations. Napoleon could boldly 
say, as in fact he did: ''What do I care for the opinion of the 
salon and the chatterers! I do not listen to it. I know but 
one opinion, that of the peasants. The rest is of no importance." 
But even that inclination to military service had its limits 
when the villagers themselves heard more and more often of 
the innumerable victims which the frightful war beyond the 
Pyrenees was swallowdng up, and were now told that a second war 
was to begin in a distant land, of whose terrors the veterans of 
1807 had told many a story. No wonder that the conscription 
of the ages due in 1811, which was to furnish the Emperor 
with 120,000 men, met with no enthusiasm whatever. Men of 
means paid as high as 8000 francs for substitutes, and thou- 
sands of the poor took flight. For these deserters the families, 
the communes, nay, even a whole district, were held respon- 



524 At the Zenith [I8II 

sible, and this new "law of hostages" was most strictly en- 
forced by flying columns (colonnes mobiles). 

Even more heavily than on France did the hand of the "Pro- 
tector" press on the states of the Rhenish Confederation, whose 
princes received orders in April, 1811, to hold their contingents 
ready. Westphalia, which had been brought to the very brink 
of financial ruin by the extravagance of its king, Jerome, so that 
increase of taxes and forced loans could no longer delay bank- 
ruptcy, was nevertheless compelled to raise its army to 30,000, 
and also furnish supplies for 20,000 French troops with their 
horses. When Jerome remonstrated he was told that he was 
perfectly at liberty to step down from the throne. It was much 
the same in Bavaria; she had been rewarded after the war of 1809 
with the territory of the diocese of Dalberg, but on the other hand 
had been forced to cede South Tyrol to Italy and Illyria, Ulm, 
and other lesser territories to Wiirtemberg, besides assuming a 
large debt for the treasury of the Emperor and raising 30,000 
men for the war. Wiirtemberg had given up 40,000 souls to 
Baden and received 140,000 from Bavaria. Baden had to 
add to the territory of Hesse-Darmstadt in return for her 
own accessions. The Corsican had scattered the German gov- 
ernments and subjects about like chaff. To make up for the 
loss of Ratisbon, the territory of the Prince Primate was en- 
larged by the addition of Fulda and Hanau and created 
the "archduchy of Frankfort"; with the arbitrary reserva- 
tion that after the death of Dalberg the sovereignty should 
fall upon Viceroy Eugene, who had lost, as a consequence of 
Napoleon's remarriage, all prospects of succeeding to the 
Italian throne. Dalberg may have feared that the impatient 
despot beyond the Rhine might some day overlook this proviso, 
and recommended himself by the most accommodating servility, 
while his people groaned under most oppressive taxes and his 
troops were called upon to serve in Spain far more than the 
treaty required. But Saxony, above all, armed in feverish hate, 
especially in the duchy of Warsaw, M^here Napoleon heaped up 
immense stores of war materials. All who were liable to mihtary 
service were called in, and a national guard was established. 



^T. 41] The Position of Prussia 525 

Thus the governments of the Rhenish Confederation, with their 
troops, were absolutely at the disposal of the Emperor. Woe 
to them if they disobeyed ! "If the princes of the Confederation," 
wrote Napoleon in April, 1811, to Frederick of Wiirttemberg, 
"raise in my mind even the slightest doubt as to their disposition 
to arm for the common defence, they are lost, I declare it 
openh^; for I prefer enemies to im certain friends." * 

There remained, then, only the two German powers of central 
Europe, Prussia and Austria, the vanquished at the battles of 
Jena and Wagram, to be summoned to their duty. As far as 
Prussia was concerned. Napoleon had not forgotten that he had 
once conquered the country and only out of consideration left it 
free from Russia, against which he was now preparing to fight; 
nor had he forgotten that he had once encamped as victor by the 
Niemen. Might he not gain that position again, perhaps, by 
bringing Prussia, like Holland, under his immediate control? 
Such a plan ho really seems to have contemplated for a moment. 
A forged report of Champagny, dated in November, 1810, in 
which the minister suggests to the Emperor the partition of 
Prussia in favour of Saxony and Westphalia, is supposed to be 
based on reliable information on the part of the forger. At the 
beginning of 1811 Queen Katharine of Westphalia also made an 
entry in her journal in reference to the impending partition of 
the realm of the Hohenzollerns. Again, about the same time, 
the rumour was current in Spain that the rest of Prussia was to 
be given to Berthier.f But the plan was soon abandoned. It was 
quite possible that the absorption of Prussia would meet as much 
resistance on the part of the people as did that of Spain, however 
great the difference betw^een the hot-blooded southerners and 
the "sensible, cold, tolerant, self-controlled Germans," as Napo- 
leon characterized them. The wildest reports, in fact, came to 

* That this was no empty threat is shown by a passage in the diary of 
the Queen of WestphaHa, who writes in her journal on January 11th, 
1811: "The Emperor is much displeased with the Grand Duke of Baden; 
he seems to be among the princes who will disappear " (Revue histo- 
rique, XXXVIII. 95). 

t Cf. my essay, ''Stein und Gruner in Oesterreich" in the "Deutsche 
Rundschau" for 1888, p. 137. 



526 



At the Zenith [isii 



Paris as to the secret doings of the "Tugendbund/' as the sum 
total of German enemies of France were styled. No; no coup 
d'etat! Would not Prussia and Spain both after the defeat of 
Russia fall like ripe fruit into the arms of the ruler of Europe? 
It were far wiser to make the considerable auxiliary forces of 
Frederick William serve his purposes by peaceful means and so 
assure his position on the Niemen. Such was the plan Napoleon 
finally adopted; and he was successful, owing in part to the 
unhappy situation of Prussia, whose territories were threatened 
constantly by the Rhenish Confederation on the one hand, by 
Warsaw on the other, and finally by the French garrisons in 
Stettin, Kiistrin, Glogau, and Danzig; and in part to the 
unwilling support furnished to the pkns of the conqueror, as in 
1805 and 1809 by Frederick William, who mistrusted his people 
and was firmly convinced of the invincibility of the Corsican. 

It is true that in the spring of 1811, when Napoleon failed to 
answer Prussia's proposals for an alhance, there were moments 
in which not only the leaders of the patriotic party, especially 
the Minister of War, Scharnhorst, but also the prime minister, 
Hardenberg, who had returned to his post in 1810, admonished 
the king to arm and to come to an understanding with Russia; 
and in fact during the summer, with all possible secrecy, the 
military forces were increased to 100,000 men. In the autumn 
a military convention was concluded with the Czar, in which the 
latter promised to meet any attack on Prussia as an invasion 
of his own land and to push forward with all possible haste to the 
Vistula. But by that tune King Frederick William was already 
of another mind. This prince, in other respects so clear-sighted, 
who estimated the forces of Napoleon more correctly than the 
war party, was very deficient in that courage which is ready to 
take chances. When orders came from Paris to discontinue the 
armament, he comphed at once; and when Napoleon returned to 
Prussia's proposals of alhance, the King was persuaded by a court 
party, which saw in attaclmient to France the only salvation 
of the state, to open negotiations. These led, on February 24th, 
1812, to an offensive and defensive alhance with the conqueror. 
But on what terms ! At the time when Hardenberg offered the 



Mt.42] Prussia Humiliated 527 

Emperor alliance and aid from Prussia, he did so with a reserva- 
tion which was to guarantee the integrity of the country, raise 
the military power of Prussia, restore the fortress of Glogau,and 
insure some acquisitions of territory. No mention of all that 
now. Napoleon had purposely postponed resuming negotiations 
until his re-enforcements in the fortresses on the Oder, in West- 
phalia and Poland had reached the point when he could at once 
give the greatest emphasis to his demand that Prussia should 
either enter the Rhenish Confederation or make an offensive and 
defensive alliance. So the treaty of February 24th was for Prus- 
sia an unparalleled humiliation. It provided that Prussia should 
furnish a contingent for service anywhere in Europe, excepting 
Spain, Italy, and Turkey. She was to raise 20,000 men and 60 
guns against Russia under the command of Napoleon, about one 
half of her entire armament as stipulated ; the other half was to 
garrison the Silesian forts, Potsdam, and particularly Colberg 
and Graudenz, the commandants receiving their orders from 
the French general staff. The French were to march unopposed 
through the entire Prussian territory, excepting a part of 
Silesia; their generals were to make requisitions, procure pro- 
visions for the army, and preserve order and safety. The vast 
amount of provisions Prussia must furnish was to be taken aS 
part payment of the war-contribution still due. Thus the 
patriotic revival of 1811 had ended in submission, in return for 
which the king gained nothing but vague promises of increase of 
territory in case of victory, promises from Napoleon, who had 
kept saying regretfully ever since 1807, "How could I have left 
so much land in that man^s possession!" 

The resolution of the Prussian king to cling to France in the 
impending war was not a little influenced by the attitude of 
Austria. He felt convinced that it Avould not do to risk that 
"game of chance," the struggle against Napoleon's superior 
genius and forces, unless both Russia and Austria were ready 
for a united exertion of all their strength. As early as December, 
1811, Scharnhorst had actually been in Vienna in order to ascer- 
tain the temper of the Austrian cabinet, but had at last learned 
merely that Emperor Francis was not just then in a position to 



528 At the Zenith [I8II 

grant an}'- aid. The truth was that Austria was on the side of 
France. Metternich's reports to his sovereign during that period 
disclose the fact that Vienna pohtics were decidedly hostile to the 
Czar. The action of Russia against Turkey in the Danubian 
principalities was enough to separate these two powers. Then, 
again, Alexander had in the first months of 1811 resumed the 
plan which he had deliberated on with his confidant, Adam 
Czartoryski, before the war of 1805, i.e., to restore Poland and 
rule it constitutionally as a imited kingdom under Russian suze- 
rainty. This plan also gave offence in Vienna, for it involved the 
cession of Galicia by Austria; and while Russia offered in exchange 
Servia and the Danubian principalities, j^et those would have to 
be conquered first, and that was out of the question during a war 
with Napoleon. Of course Galicia might be lost to Austria even 
if the latter adhered to the French Emperor; for he was doubtless 
himself playing off united Poland against Russia, and Napoleon 
and Metternich had already had some talk of it in the summer of 
1810. But in the first place Napoleon offered Austria, which was 
so impoverished since the last war, the important province of 
lUyria with its seacoast as an equivalent for the Polish territory, 
and again as an additional reward for Austria^s co-operation 
in the war he promised further acquisitions proposed by her in 
Bavaria and Prussian Silesia, extending her border to the river 
Inn. For the dismemberment of Prussia, no matter which side 
she espoused, was for Metternich as much an assured fact as the 
victory of the French in the war with Russia.* The policy of 
Vienna must then in any case wholly depend upon that of Napo- 
leon, but even in this dependent position Metternich wanted to 
take advantage of junctures to strengthen, if possible, Austria 

* "Prussia is no longer to be reckoned among the powers," he assured 
Emperor Francis at the beginning of 1811; and in a speech in November 
of the same year he said: "Prussia is in the hopeless state of fearing 
dismemberment whichever side she may espouse." And again the same 
document contains this statement: "The antecedent probabilities, based 
on former experience, especially that of recent years, are undeniably in 
favour of French victory." Metternich at that time estimated the French 
army at from 200,000 to 300,000 men. How clearly he must have felt 
confirmed in his policy when he heard reports of double that immberl 



/Et. 42] Alliance with Austria 529 

while in subjection, as long as she could not be free. And 
Napoleon did not oppose the wishes of his father-in-law. In 
December, 1811, he declared to the Austrian ambassador: 'The 
first mistake which Prussia makes will settle the Silesian ques- 
tion." Nay, more, even if Prussia did not depart from the line 
marked out for her, he might dispose of Silesia in favour of Aus- 
tria in case of a successful war; for in that event there would be 
plenty of means of compensation, and Frederick William would 
have to put up with some other province, whereas Silesia was the 
only one that could round out the domain of Austria.* 

Thus it was that the Austrian government was induced to 
enter an active alliance with France that offered definite ad- 
vantages. This decision had already been made and announced 
at Paris when Scharnhorst came to Vienna. It is obvious that 
his mission was foredoomed to failure; nor is it less obvious 
why Mettemich, inexcusable as it may seem, advised the envoy 
of a state which he regarded as done for to join Russia; in 
other words, to make that "first mistake" which would settle 
the Silesian question in favour of Austria. f It would seem as if 
the mere name of Silesia had called to mind the times of the 
great empress who ventured three wars for the lost province; 
the Franco- Austrian treaty of alliance of 1756 was resurrected 
to serve as a model both in its stipulations and to some extent 
even in its language for the new offensive and defensive alli- 
ance. The document was signed by Schwarzenberg at Paris 

* Metternich's " Memoirs," II. 517. Maret, who had succeeded Cham- 
pagny as Minister of Foreign Affairs, proposed that Prussia might be com- 
pensated for Silesia by the Baltic provinces of Russia. 

t Schwarzenberg had the decisive audience in Paris on December 17th. 
Mettemich could not have received the report of it before the 25th. 
Until then Scharnhorst received no definite answer. On the 26th he was 
received with the statement that Austria was unable to help, and with 
the hint that Prussia would fare better in alliance with Russia than with 
any other power. See Metternich's " Memoirs," II. 517, and Lehmann's 
"Scharnhorst," II. 434. Duncker, in "Aus der Zeit Friedrich des 
Grossen und Friedrich Wilhelm III.," attributes to Mettemich the further 
statement to the ambassador that Austria would not side with France 
but remain neutral, but there is no trace of this in the reports of Scharn- 
horst, so Profe^or Lehmann kindly informs me. 



530 At the Zenith [isis 

on March 14th 1812. Austria was to support France against 
Russia with 30,000 men; these, however, unHke the Prussian 
auxiharies, were all under Austrian officers, were to take no 
commands from any French general, and were only to obey 
the directions of Napoleon. Upon the restoration of Poland 
Austria was to retain Galicia; if, however, she were willing to 
cede a portion of it, she was to receive lUyria in compensation. 
The integrity of Turkey was guaranteed, i.e., Russia was to 
acquire none of it for herself. The conclusion of the treaty 
reads: "The Emperor of the French binds himself, in case the 
war has a successful issue, to procure for the Emperor of Aus- 
tria war-indemnities and accessions of territory which will not 
only counterbalance the sacrifices made, but will be a monu- 
ment to the close and lasting ties between the two sovereigns." 
As Illyria had already been spoken of, these words can refer 
only to Silesia; for was not that "the only province that could 
round out Austria"? 

Napoleon in such ways had made sure of the central Ger- 
man powers, and now from the southern extremity of Calabria 
to the Memel, from Cape Finisterre to Bukovina, the Continent 
was obedient to his nod. He would have been glad indeed 
to receive, or rather firmly hold, Sweden and Turkey also, the old 
enemies of Russia, in his system, in order that they might 
attack the foe from the north and the south, while he dealt 
the finishing stroke in the centre. But here his fortune failed 
him. When the ambassadors of France and Russia were out- 
bidding each other in Stockholm, Bernadotte deemed the mo- 
ment favourable for endearing himself to the country he was to 
rule by gaining a large accession of territory. The Czar, on 
the one hand, offered as a reward for Sweden's support his con- 
sent to the annexation of Norway; to this Napoleon would not 
listen, as Norway belonged to Denmark, which remained loyal 
to him. He himself, on the other hand, offered to restore 
Finland to Sweden after the defeat of Russia if Sweden would 
march against Alexander with 40,000 men and at the same 
time prosecute the war against England with energy. But to 
be involved in hostilities with Russia and the British empire 



iET.42] Sweden and Turkey 531 

at the same time seemed an impossibility to the Swedish gov- 
ernment. '' We did not hide from ourselves/' we read in a sub- 
sequent report of the Swedish ministry to Charles XIII. dated 
January 7th, 1813, "the fact that a war with Russia, which 
must of necessity bring in its train hostilities with England, was 
too great a task for Sweden; that an English fleet in the Baltic 
Sea during the summer could prevent all undertakings against 
Russia; that the coasts of Sweden would meantime be at the 
mercy of the English; that commerce and coastwise naviga- 
tion would cease altogether for a time and cause great distress; 
that Sweden's great need of grain demanded continued peaceful 
relations with these very powers, Russia and England," etc. 
For such reasons, supplemented by the occupation, especially 
imprudent at this juncture, of Pomerania by the French to 
break up smuggling, and the long-continued variance between 
Bernadotte and Napoleon, the French offer was decHned, and 
on the 5th of April, 1812, the alliance with Russia was con- 
cluded. 

In Turkey, Sultan Mahmud would gladly have taken the 
hand that Napoleon finally held out to him in the first months 
of 1812; but such was the state of affairs that even this despot 
could not follow his inclination. In the preceding autumn the 
Russians had rallied their forces for a decisive blow; they had 
gained successes, and then offered peace under comparatively 
easy terms, for the express purpose of closing the war on the 
Danube before the great conflict with France began; they no 
longer demanded the two principalities. This happened at a 
moment when the Turkish treasury was empty, when the army 
was in a deplorable condition, and when the desire of the peo- 
ple for peace and rest had become universal. The reckless 
Janizaries alone still called for war. Of what use, then, was 
Napoleon's promise to give back the Crimea, Tartary, and all 
the territory Turkey had lost in the last forty years, if she could 
not furnish the 100,000 men which he demanded as auxiharies? 
Moreover, England threatened, if the Sultan accepted the 
French system, to force the Dardanelles and burn Constanti- 
nople. The Divan upon being consulted by Mahmud declared 



532 At the Zenith [I812 

for peace with the Czar, and the treaty was concluded at the 
end of May, 1812, with the provision that the Pruth should 
thenceforth be the boundary. 

Naturally Napoleon felt very keenly these diplomatic reverses 
at Stockholm and on the Bosphorus. Yet, after all, he had 
under his command an overwhelming force when he took the 
last step that should make him master of the Continent. Firmly 
resolved as he was on this step (and the objections raised by 
his ministers did not make him waver), Alexander I. was 
equally firm, for the popular opposition compelled him to re- 
sist the Napoleonic dictatorship which interfered so impudently 
with the material interests of Russia. The rupture was in- 
evitable ; all further delay was due to purely mihtary considera- 
tions. On the 30th of April, 1812, the Russian envoy in Paris 
at last delivered the ultimatum of the Czar, to the effect that 
hs would negotiate with France only on condition that the 
French should previously evacuate Prussia and Swedish Pome- 
rania, and even then he would not renounce trade with neutrals. 
In order to gain time Napoleon did not answer at once, but sent 
his adjutant-general, Narbonne, to Alexander with instructions 
which, although sent on May 3d, were antedated the 25th of 
April, as if the Russian ultimatum were yet unknown.* While 
the envoy was on his way to Wilna, Napoleon journeyed in 
May to Dresden to make a threatening demonstration, as it 
were, by displaying his forces. We may well believe that he 
flattered himself it would again overawe the foe. 

At Dresden there assembled, to do homage, the princes of 
the Rhenish Confederation, over whom the Corsican now exercised 
more absolute authority than any Roman Emperor of the German 
nation had for a long time. The last of these Emperors, Francis 
of Austria, was present also. With the King of Prussia and the 
lesser " sovereigns" he stepped dutifully into the shadow of the 
mighty upstart who had obhterated the boundaries between 
the Roman and the Teutonic elements in Europe and had united 
the forces of both for the decisive struggle over the fate of a con- 
tinent. To be sure, it was the motive of personal ambition and 

*Ernouf, "Maret, Due de Bassano," p. 374. 



iET. 42] Historical Significance of Napoleon 533 

of boundless lust of power that had set in motion these masses; 
and it was an almost intolerable compulsion that held them 
together. And yet if one, accepting the guidance of genius, 
could have mounted the heights where details are lost in the broad 
survey of the whole, he might well fancy he beheld a league of 
the civihzed powers of Europe, marshalled under the leadership 
of the greatest general of the age, to spread by conquest the 
civilization of the West over the East, and to make an end of 
international strife by bringing all nations under one sway; and 
he might be tempted to say of Napoleon with Goethe: 

" What centuries dark have long been groping after, 
By his mind's eye is seen with clearest vision; 
The small and insignificant has vanished, 
The Sea and Land alone remain contending. 
When from the Sea her shores are conquered, 
And proud waves dash themselves in vain upon them, 
Then, under guidance wise, through mighty conflict. 
Will fall the fetters from the prisoned mainland." * 

Or are these words, addressed to Marie Louise, merely con- 
ventional homage, the tribute offered by the great humanist of 
the century to the Emperor now that he has climbed to the 
highest pinnacle of power? No, to Goethe Napoleon's greatness 
was beyond question. The poet perceived exactly what consti- 
tuted his historical significance : it was his unconscious devotion 
to the ideal. "Napoleon," he once said, "who lived wholly in the 
ideal, could not consciously grasp it. He renounces all ideal 
considerations and denies that the ideal has any reality, while at 
the same time he is striving to make it real." The poet serenely 
looks above and beyond the Imperator's base conduct and his 
sordid, selfish aims. Others might speak of the horrors of war 
and the oppressive yoke of the tyrant; his eyes were fixed on the 
final goal, the union of the nations in a higher civilization. And 
from this standpomt Goethe was right in rankuig Napoleon with 
the great men of history. One and all, their only claim to such 
title is that they worked at the behest of great ideas, whatever 

* From Goethe's poem in honour of the Empress Marie Louise, July, 
1812. The last five lines refer to the contest with England, the mistress 
of the sea, and the Continental blockade. — B. 



534 ^^ the Zenith [I812 

their own immediate aims were. Alexander of Macedon, to be 
sure, burst the narrow bounds of his petty state for the mastery 
of the world and carved his name by unrivalled deeds in the mem- 
ory of the ages; but the real motive power behind him was the ex- 
pansive force of Greek culture, and in its service he undertook his 
eastern expedition. Charlemagne, again, established a mighty 
empire with his sword; but only as the submissive instrument 
of the moral ideas of Christianity, which thus conquered the new 
nations of the north. Similarly, when we see Napoleon treading 
the same path, when we see him, too, all eagerness to raise his 
own person to the very sunmiit of power and subdue the whole 
world to his will, this very will is in large part not his own, but 
only the instrument of that civilization of humanity whose de- 
velopment requires the intellectual efforts of centuries before 
it becomes the common possession of the entire race. This 
onward march is through streams of blood in any case, but, after 
all, it is in blood that the laws of humanity are written, be it One 
who sheds it on the cross, or millions that testify with their 
death. Wherever the Emperor of the French had conquered, 
there we see the impulse to a new social order; on the banks of 
the Manzanares, as well as on the Tiber, on the Rhine and on the 
Elbe, in Naples and in Poland, in Prussia and in Austria; now 
directly under the pressure of conquest, and again indirectly 
because resistance to the man of might seemed possible only if 
he were met with his own weapons. To cite but one instance, 
it was the day of defeat at Jena alone that changed the entire 
internal system of the Prussian state.* Thus it was a most 
important case in the interests of civilization that was to be 
tried in 1812 at the outposts of civilized Europe. It is a mere 
incidental detail that the prosecuting attorney who conducted 
the case with his sword demanded for his fee the sovereignty 
of the world. 

* " It is in any case remarkable that of all those who later played a 
prominent part in the reform legislation and who had previously been 
numbered among the leading men of the old regime, not one, before that 
powerful impulse, had in any way propounded plans of reform." (E. 
Meier, "Die Reform der Verwaltungsorganisation unter Stein und Har- 
denberg," p. 133.) 



^T. 42] The Power of National Feeling 535 

But the nations of Europe occupied no such lofty point of 
view. They did not inquire after the ideal mission which 
Napoleon was unwittingly fulfilling, and hence could find no 
comfort in it when, spurred on obviously by personal ambitions, 
he threatened their independence, forced their sons into the 
battlefield, restricted their commerce and industry, and waged 
war upon their religious dignitaries. They hated him bitterly. 
This hostile feeling was manifested most strongly m the two 
nations which w^ere farthest removed from the spirit of the 
revolutionary humanism and in which the prinaary instincts of 
rehgious and national feeling had been preserved in their purest 
form: Spain and Russia. The former was not yet subdued; how 
would it fare with the latter? 



CHAPTER XVII 

MOSCOW 

While Napoleon was displaying his magnificence at Dresden, 
his columns were marching to the Vistula. Such an army the 
world had never seen before. Far more than 400,000 men 
stood ready to march into Russia, and the reserves afterwards 
drawn into active service in the east raised the army of the 
northern campaign to a total of at least 600,000. For a long 
time and with great energy the Emperor had been making his 
preparations; he had put off the enemy till the last minute with 
negotiations; and he had made unprecedented demands of the 
nations, until at last he hoped by reason of undoubted superiority 
to overmaster the enemy. 

Yet he was not without his misgivings. Segur relates in his 
Memoirs that during the time of the preparations in Paris he 
would sometimes start from his thoughts in the greatest excite- 
ment and exclaim that he was not yet sufficiently prepared for 
so distant a war and needed three years more. Then, again, he 
remained impervious to warnings and objections ventured by 
others around him and sought eagerly to refute them. Foremost 
among those to give warning was Caulaincourt. He knew 
Russia and the national pride of the Russian people ; they would 
never think of peace, so he believed, as long as a single foe stood 
on the soil of the fatherland. He pointed to the doubtful 
loyalty of compulsory allies, to the hatred of the German popu- 
lation growing out of the French system of plundering, to the 
inhospitable theater of war whose horrors the campaign of .1807 
had sufficiently made known. Similarly Poniatowski described 
the pathless wastes of Lithuania, portrayed its nobility as 
already half Russian and its people as cold and unresponsive, 
and confidently declared that no great results were to be expected 

536 



JEr. 4:2] Dissuasion is in Vain. 537 

from setting them free. Segur, an older man, would then recall 
the thoughts of the Emperor to France, which must cease after 
the campaign to be France as soon as it was expanded into 
Europe. The end would then be that in the place of the mon- 
archs of the Continent he would put the generals of the Empire as 
viceroys; and these, more ambitious than the officers of Alexander 
the Great, would not wait, perhaps, for the death of their sover- 
eign in order to rule on their own account. To the same effect 
spoke Duroc also. But all had spoken in vain. Of the allies, 
Napoleon replied, he had no fears; Prussia had her hands tied, 
and the south German courts and Austria were bound to him by 
ties of family. Moreover, the Germans were of a slow-going, 
methodical nature, and he could always find time to attend to 
them. He was well aware of the ambition of his generals; but 
war was just the thing to divert their thoughts. Peace has its 
dangers no less than war. For if he should draw back his armies 
into the interior of the country, the rest and idleness would give 
rise to far too many ambitious interests and reckless passions for 
him to control. Do we not seem to be listening to the speakers 
of the Convention and the radicals of the Directory? * Is it not 
the dreamer of former days who again brings forward destiny as 
the final argument? *'I feel myself driven," said he, ''to a goal 
that I know not. ^^en I have reached it, an atom will suffice 
to overthrow me. Until then all the efforts of men avail naught 
against me." 

Having thus silenced his advisers, he turned with new energy 
to the various and countless cares of providing for the immense 
army, which must be in want of nothing. And truly the equip- 
ment was complete down to the smallest details. Besides the 
ammunition-trains for the several corps there were reserve 
depots containing milHons of cartridges at Modlin, Thorn, 
Pillau, Danzig, and Magdeburg. To transport some 1350 guns 
to Russia 18,000 horses were in readiness, and in addition siege- 
trains were ordered sent from Danzig and Magdeburg toward 
Dunaburg and Riga. As the region abounded in rivers, two 
great pontoon bridges were taken along, besides which each army 
* Cf. pp. 75 and 159. 



538 Moscow [1812 

corps had its own pontoons and tools. Prussia had to provide 
supplies of horses on the Vistula and the Oder. The greatest 
task was to furnish food for such vast masses. This called for 
the closest attention; for, as Napoleon repeatedly assured the 
generals under him, such a great host of men so close together 
could not live on the land. Thousands of wagons laden with 
flour and rice followed the French army corps, some drawn by 
oxen which were afterwards to be slaughtered. In the middle of 
January the Emperor made arrangements for storing provisions 
for 400,000 men for fifty days at Danzig and in the cities along 
the Vistula and the Oder. Prussia had to provide for twenty 
days in addition. Two great transports were to carry flour and 
biscuit by water from Elbing to Wilna. Danzig, Elbing, 
Warsaw, Thorn, Marienburg, Bromberg, and Modlin also held 
immense stores; Danzig alone having 300,000 hundredweight of 
flour and 2,000,000 rations of biscuit. In order to avoid carr3dng, 
in addition to all this, fodder for 150,000 horses, it would be 
necessary to wait for a season that would cover the fields and 
meadows with green grass. Thus the administration of the 
army exercised somie influence on politics: it delayed the cam- 
paign until summer.* The Russians did not take advantage of 
this delay and assume the offensive and push beyond the frontier, 
as Napoleon might well have feared. The "last act,'' as he 
reassuringly termed his Russian expedition, could now begin. 

Early in the morning of May 28th, the Emperor left Dresden 
and went at first to Posen, arriving on the 31st; thence he 
proceeded to Konigsberg. Narbonne had reported as the 
Czar's answer what was already known: the demand to evac- 
uate Prussia. Napoleon now took up the gaimtlet without 
more ado. He had divided his "Grand Army" into three 
parts, commanded respectively by himself, Eugene, and Jerome. 
The main army was composed of select troops, embracing the 

* S^gur (IV. 94) relates that Napoleon was detained in France two 
months longer by a scarcity of provisions due to failure of crops in the pre- 
ceding year. Per contra, Maret, in a speech of August 16th, 1811, dealing 
with the entire Russian policy, set June of the next year for the begin- 
ning of the war. (Ernouf, ''Maret," p. 304.) 



Mt.4^] The Grand Army 539 

Guard, a strong corps under Davout, another under Oudinot, 
a third under Ney, who also commanded two Wiirttemberg 
divisions, a fourth under Macdonald, to whom were assigned the 
Prussians under Grawert, and last by the cavalry reserve under 
Murat (two corps), in all 250,000 men.* To the second part 
belonged, under the Viceroy of Italy, the ItaUan and Bavarian 
corps, and also a French corps of cavalry, in all 80,000. The 
third army, under Jerome, included the Poles under Poniatowski, 
the Saxons under Rejmier, the Westphahans under Vandamme, 
who was to be the king's adviser, and a corps of cavalry made up 
partly of French and partly of Poles; this also numbered 80,000. 
The army was for the most part in good spirits, proud of their 
leader, who knew how to reward generously deeds of valour and 
in whose genius they believed more confidently than ever. Al- 
though some generals felt that the troops were too young to 
stand the hardships of war, or, hke Rapp, openly acknowledged 
that they would rather have remained in Paris, yet there were 
plenty of others that had not yet received any fiefs nor had a 
ducal coronet, and who could tell how soon another opportunity 
would come to win either? That there had been draft riots in Hol- 
land and Illyria, that thousands of French fugitives from military 
service had to be brought back in fetters, and that in the first 
few days a bloody encounter broke out between Prussians and 
French over a provision train, were after all mere incidental 
details. 

By the end of May the army stretched from Konigsberg 
and Elbing up the Vistula to Novo Alexandria, while the Aus- 
trians under Schwarzenberg gathered at Lemberg. This wide 

* Statements of the strength of the several army corps are not wholly 
consistent. The table in F^zensac's Souvenirs estimates the Guard at 
35,800, while according to authentic sources it numbered 47,000. It was 
subdivided into the division of the Old Guard, two divisions of the Young 
Guard, one of the Polish Guard, and one of the cavalry Guard. On the 
strength of Davout's corps even official sources disagree. The lists of the 
Minister of War report 72,000; Thiers, who claims to have used the tables 
of the Emperor himself gives 97,000-99,000. Approximately the last num- 
ber is named also by Napoleon in conversation with Katharine of West- 
phalia. (See her diary for 1812 in the ''Revue Historique" of 1888.) 



540 Moscow [1812 

extension of the allied lines left the Russians in doubt whether 
Napoleon would advance in the north, at Kovno and Grodno, 
or in the south, from Warsaw. They had to be prepared at 
both points to avoid being surprised, and to this end divided 
the forces at their disposal into two armies, one of which took 
its position to the north about Yilna imder the commander-in- 
chief, Barclay de Tolly, the other south of Pripet, under Bagra- 
tion. Both of these generals had distinguished themselves in 
the campaign of 1807. A third division, under Tormassoff, 
destined against the Austrians, was still in process of forma- 
tion in Volhynia. The army of Barclay numbered 127,000, 
that of Bagration 66,000; but when the latter moved north to 
join the main army, he had to leave nearly 30,000 men to Tor- 
massoff. Thus the 400,000 men of Napoleon had in front of 
them at first not quite 170,000 Russians, and divided at that. 
To be sure there was yet another Russian army in Wallachia, 
and a third, a weaker one, in Finland against the Swedes; but 
diplomacy had not yet left these free to act, they were tied 
down for the time being. Napoleon had no suspicion that he 
had such a superior force. He estimated the enemy's numbers 
at a much higher figure.* Perhaps it was this error that proved 
more fateful than any other to him and to his army. For it 
led him to draw up a plan which perhaps he would not have 
formed had he known exactly the enemy's strength, and the 
energetic prosecution of which exposed his troops to all manner 
of annoyances that a more methodical campaign might have 
spared them. This plan was to march upon Vilna by way 
of Kovno with the first army, whose left wing, under Macdonald, 
was to move across the Niemen at Tilsit, and thus break through 
between the divisions of Barclay and Bagration. The second 
and third armies, disposed in echelon to the right of the first, 
were to follow by way of Grodno, to enter in like a mighty 

* In the memoranda of two officers at headquarters are found the evi- 
dences of such an overestimate. S^gur gives 300,000 as the total number 
of the Russians, F^zensac 330,000. The latter estimated the two armies 
of Barclay and Bagration alone at 230,000. The division of Bagration 
was always kept at its original figure of 66,000. 



jet. 42] Napoleon Baffled by the Russians 541 

wedge, as it were, and widen the distance between them; so 
that then they could be separately surrounded and defeated. 
But by a strange fate the very vastness of the forces at his 
disposal was to redound to his disadvantage. The same general 
who in 1796 \vith 40,000 men had gained unheard-of victories 
over a far superior foe was destined, now that he had ten times 
that force, to fail of mastering a far weaker enemy. Paradox- 
ical as it may sound, this was the natural result. For Barclaj^ 
did not dare with his inferior numbers to give battle to the 
French single-handed. He sought by retreating to restore his 
lost communication with Bagration. But as the distance be- 
tween them was still further increased by the advancing col- 
umns of the French, they could not be united (in case Bagra- 
tion escaped the threatened investment at all) except after a 
extended detour. Thus it came to pass that, seeking con- 
stantly to effect a junction, they fell back before the French, 
refused the battle which Napoleon longed for with feverish 
impatience, kept the enemy in hot pursuit after them through 
waste lands and by desolate roads, until his provisions could 
no longer reach him, his troops broke down from exhaustion, 
and the proud army melted away to such an extent that no 
decisive advantage could be taken of the victory which it at 
length painfully secured. Such in the main was the course of 
subsequent events that preceded a catastrophe which is one of 
the most appalling in history. 

It should not be overlooked in this connection that while 
Napoleon had Moscow clearly in mind as the ultimate goal of 
his expedition, he could hardly have expected to reach that 
goal in this belated campaign. In Paris he had told his con- 
fidants that his plan aimed at driving Alexander and the Rus- 
sian power, weakened by the loss of Poland, back beyond the 
Dnieper. In Dresden he had said to Metternich that the cam- 
paign was to come to an end at Minsk and Smolensk; that he 
would make a halt there, fortify both places, take up winter 
quarters at Vilna, organize conquered Lithuania, and feed his 
army at the expense of Russia. If this should not result in 
peace, he would next year press on to the interior and, just as 



"was r: 



542 Moscow [IS12 

paiiently as in xhe irs: i: : .: :. wait for the submission of 
tie Czar. This plan, m sceor-iance with which the entire 
system of s""2T?rl:es was arranged, ^ras still in force when Xa- 
T It :. -T . . - my over the Russian frontier. In the mani- 
. :■.-. :j_:5 roint to his soldiers he called the war he 
:.^ v/::i^ ::ie ** second Polish war/' and at Mlna he 
r:.::.^ ^fASTiani that he would not cross the Diina, 
ry I.:. :-:.: river this year would be certain destruc- 
:: - T-iT ? -AT-i that he planned to wrest from Russia meant 
:nr ". ts: T~f hi which that kingdom had had in the seventeenth 
Crz: 3; —^itI. Smolensk also belonged to it; and it was in this 
dtr thi" jir rliiiiied to stay, as he said to Jomini, who \^-as to 
r- t7-tt ::_r -r^nsr-ort of provisions.* It is clear that originally 
It ^lii r 1.: m^ans planned a rapid advance into the heart of 
?. -rrla. as some military writers maintain, and it was certainly 
contrary to his long and well-considered purpose to arrive at 
Moscow so soon. It was the enemy that forced upon him this 
disaskiHis speed. But let us now proceed to the events them- 
selves. 

Early on the morning of Jtme 23d the Emperor, accompanied 
by only one general, had ascertained the most favourable poio-t for 
crossing the Xiemen soatheast of Kovno. The passage began 
about midnight over three bridges and lasted several days. Xo 
enemy was in sight; no one opposed the Erench on the opposite 
bank- But Xapoleon had counted on resistance, and now he 
hoped to meet it before Yilna, the chief city of Lithuania. 
Thither he directed his movements; there Alexander was waiting. 
The Czar had repeatedly extended his sj-mpathy to the Poles; 
now he intends at least to try to block the game of the French 

* Jomini, • Precis pt^tiqae et militaire des campagnes de 1812 k 1814," 
I. 75. He also relates a table ccmversation in Vilna in which the 
Empatw states his jAans exactly as he had to Mertemich in Dresden. "If 
31- Barclay sapposes I wonld nm aftra- him to the Volga, he is mighrily 
mw±3>kftn We ^lall foDow ^"n as far as SiiM^<aisk and Hie Dwioa, where 
a good hattie will provide ns with cantonments. I shall return with headr 
quajtezs to Vihia to spend the winter, and wUI send for a troupe of the 
Fazis Opexa and the The&tie fran^ais. The next May the business will be 
gm^bed, unless we ms^ -peace during the winter." 



^T.42j Lithuania Lukewarm 543 

linperor. In this he seenLs to be siiccectsril. For the approadi^ 
ing French anny hears but Uttle of tLe e^rpected enthiisiaan of 
the Lithuanians for the "Uberator" of Pob-xid. The Czar at 
last had to evacuate \Thia; and on June 29th Xapoleon entered liie 
citv' with his own men. There was no resistance; it was child's 
play to drive bs.ck the weak Russian posts. Xor was there in the 
city the expected enthusiasm^ nor the spirit of sacrifice diown in 
Warsaw; no, nor the many thousands of fightrncr men he had 
counted on, nor money, nor any other aid. The Emperor was 
sorely displeased. The failure of the Warsaw citii^ns to pay 
more than half the expense of the 70.000 men they fumidbed, 
thus entailing additional burdens on the French, sufficed to 
make him take a wholly different view of the restoration of the 
old Polish repubhc from that taken by the national patriots. 
"I cannot understand/' he had written to Davout the preceding 
December, "how this countn- can look forward to becoming a 
nation." He had also repeatedly spoken with contempt to the 
Czar of this desire of the Poles; and when Alexander's ambas- 
sador, Balascheff (who was minister of police and was after 
information rather than diplomatic negotiations), called upon him 
to assure him that the Czar would not think of treating white one 
enemy stood in his empire, he said, among other things, "Do you 
think I care anything for these Polish Jacobins?" It was his 
real thought that he uttered to Narbonne: "I tolerate the Poles 
only as a disciplined force on the field of battle. We shall have a 
little bit of a diet in the duchy of Warsaw, nothing more." 
But when this bit of a Warsaw diet sent a deputation to ^Tlna 
^-ith the request that he would but speak the word now, declaring 
that the kingdom of Poland was in existence, he gave an evasive 
answer^ with the rem in der that he had guaranteed the integrity 
of Austria. Such, in fact, was his agreement with Francis I. in 
Dresden.* Under these circunistances it was no wonder that 
the Lithuanians were wanting in a spirit of sacrifice. 

* The truth, of this b shown by a letter of Francis I. to his governor of 
Galicia, Count Goess, dated June 7th, 1S12, in which is this passage: 
'■'The restoration of the kingdom of Poland will probablv be one of the 
first results of the war between France and Russia. The French emperor 



544 Moscow [1812 

But there was another special reason for this. The "liber- 
ators" fell upon the land like the naost inveterate enemies. 
Thousands of hungry marauders poured through the villages, plun- 
dered the castles, and ran riot. Nay, even in the suburbs of 
Vilna, under the very eye of the Emperor, pillage was going on. 
This relaxation of discipline among both the French and their 
allies arose from two causes. In the first place, the troops, after 
crossmg the Niemen, had advanced by forced marches to over- 
take the enemy over roads perfectly sodden by continuous rains; 
progress became painfully difficult, and many, especially the 
tender recruits, not being equal to the task were left behind. 
Then, again, the supplies could not be forwarded. Wagons 
stuck fast in the mud; the oxen, being neglected, fell victims to 
disease and perished. Similarly over ten thousand horses sick- 
ened and died in the first few days from eating the wet grass. The 
transports with their great cargoes of flour got as far as the Vilna 
to be sure, but in that shallow river they ran aground, and when 
wagons at last brought their freight to Vilna, the army was no 
longer there. Great distress ensued. Even in the Young 
Guard, as its leader, Mortier, reported to the Emperor, soldiers 
actually perished from hunger; others in despair blew out their 
brains. Napoleon had to resort to the Jews, and also to counter- 
feit paper rubles which he had caused to be struck off in Paris by 
the million. Thus on the march from Kovno to Vilna a state of 
disorder had already grown up, for which there was later no 
remedy. It was the shadow of the coming event. 

But there was plenty of confusion among the enemy as well. 
In general it must not be supposed that there was any definite 
purpose in view at the Russian headquarters. It was only 

will take only an indirect part in this event, and will leave it to the assem- 
bled Polish diet and the fully authorized Warsaw ministry to organize the 
provinces formerly constituting the kingdom of Poland but now under 
Russian control. To the deputation of the diet which may venture to 
request of the Emperor the restoration of the kingdom he will reply that 
that is the business of the Poles themselves, but he must explicitly inform 
them Poland can never be understood to include the province of Galicia, 
now in the possession of Austria, since he had in the treaty of March, 1812, 
given Austria explicit guarantees for ever." (MS.) 



.Et. 42] Hardships of the March 545 

during the next few weeks that they stimabled, as it were, upon 
the right way of destroying the foe. For the moment Barclay 
concentrated the six corps of his army a few days' march beyond 
Vihia, which the French could not prevent; then, burning all 
stores and magazines behind him a la Wellington, marched hur- 
riedly to Drissa, where a fortified camp was established like 
Torres Vedras. Here he wanted to wait for Bagration, who was 
to come up with the Cossack hordes of Platoff by way of Novo- 
grudok and Vilika ; but Bagration did not come. He found the 
road already occupied by Davout, whom Napoleon had pushed 
rapidly ahead with some divisions as far as Minsk to meet the 
second Russian army, which Jerome w^as driving in from the west. 
The Russian general did not dare to fight his way through, as he 
supposed the main army of the enemy was before him, and 
turned to the south to join Barclay by way of Bobrinsk and 
Mohilev. Jerome had not hastened his advance enough to inter- 
cept him. Davout, on the other hand, still supposing the enemy 
was 70,000 strong as before, waited for the King of Westphalia to 
attack before he pushed forward; so Bagration escaped. Napo- 
leon, fairly beside himself at the dilatoriness of his brother, gave 
the chief command of the third army to Davout, and Jerome in 
chagrin returned to his kingdom. 

At the same time, about the middle of July, the Emperor 
sent Murat, Oudinot, and Ney to follow the main Russian army to 
Drissa. This step was taken too late, but the necessity of secur- 
ing supplies had de tamed them in Vilna. At Drissa they were 
to engage Barclay in front, while Napoleon with the Guards, 
three divisions of the army of Davout, and the troops of Viceroy 
Eugene would turn his flank and so cut off his communications 
with St. Petersburg and Moscow. But this plan likewise failed. 
The Russians received word that Bagration could not come up, 
abandoned their ill-chosen position after unimportant skir- 
mishes with the French vanguard and marched to the east. 
The right wdng only, under Wittgenstein, w^aited to cover the road 
to St. Petersburg, and was watched by Oudinot and Saint-Cyr. 
For the second time Napoleon's hope of forcing the enemy to 
stand had vanished. On the contrary, the Russians persistently 



546 Moscow [1812 

retreated. What a terrible loss these unsuccessful manoeuvres 
had already involved! The more they hurried forward the 
greater were the sacrifices, especially on the roads previously 
traversed by the enemy. Marauding assumed enormous propor- 
tions, especially as during the advance to the Dwina the July sun 
was intensely hot and clouds of dust made it difficult to breathe. 
General Saint-Cyr, who commanded the Bavarians, relates that 
his corps lost on an average a battalion (800 to 900 men) a day 
from the ranks; and it was the same everywhere. Those who 
remained in the ranks had a terrible struggle with want and 
misery. For weeks there had been no regular supplies. With 
meat as their sole food, for no bread and vegetables were to be 
had, the troops became so sickly that they broke down on the 
march. Finally dysentery broke out and carried off thousands. 
The cavalry were in the worst plight. Their horses, which nov/ 
had nothing to eat but old straw from the thatched roofs of 
huts, died under their riders, and the carcasses lay by the wayside, 
infecting the air. Napoleon himself suffered terrible hardships. 
He was no longer the same man that had enjoyed such health 
in the hard winter of the Polish war. A painful disease (dysuria) 
had developed in the last few years; it was especially annoying 
now, as riding was distressing. Besides, the daily reports about 
the dwindling of his army and the unceasing hunt for a decisive 
battle that kept eluding him were a tremendous strain on his 
nerves. He seemed to lose the cahn control of himself and of 
others that he was wont to display in the field. How he longed 
for a battle to put an end to the agonizing situation! ''After we 
had crossed the Niemen," wrote the artist Albrecht Adam, who 
served through the campaign in Prince Eugene's headquarters, 
and who seems to know whereof he speaks, '' the Emperor and his 
entire army were occupied with a single thought, a single hope, 
a single wish — the thought of a great battle! Men spoke of 
a great battle as of a great festival, enjoyed it in anticipation, 
and hung their heads whenever they were disappointed in their 
expectation." 

Then hope smiled again. Barclay was marching on the 
right bank of the Dwina towards Vitebsk. He had sent orders 



Mt. 42] Again No Battle 547 

to Bagration to proceed to the same place by way of Mohilev and 
Orcha. Two possibilities now lay open to Napoleon: either he 
might, by marching up the left bank, succeed in getting such a 
start of the enemy as to cross the river at Bechenkowiczi and 
attack the Russian flank; or Barclay might make a stand at 
Vitebsk, where he was expecting Bagration. The first move 
was frustrated by the rapid advance of the enemy; nothing 
remained but to follow him. But the second seemed destined 
to be realized. On the 25th of July Murat's cavalry for the first 
time met with serious resistance. The next day the French drove 
the Russian rear back to Vitebsk, and there on the 27th stood 
Barclay's whole army in battle array. Eye-witnesses describe the 
joy of the French and the satisfaction of their leader at this sight. 
The Russian general had really made up his mind to fight; for, 
knowing that Bagration was marching up from the south, he 
could not let him fall into Napoleon's hands without support. 
But again something intervened. Davout had moved eastward 
from Minsk to Mohilev and anticipated Bagration at the latter 
place. Bagration then tried, on July 23d, to force his way 
through, was repulsed, and once more turned to the south in 
order to reach Smolensk by a long detour and wait to be joined 
there by the first army. News of this movement reached 
Barclay on the night of July 26th while he was still facing the 
French in battle array. Now, he reflected, there was no sense 
in fighting; the force of the French was far superior to his own, 
and it was among the possibilities that while the battle was going 
on at Vitebsk Davout would march upon Smolensk and get 
there before him. Of course if Napoleon attacked him he 
nmst resist. But the Emperor contented himself with insig- 
nificant skirmishes on 'the 26th and 27th ; in order to gather as 
many troops as possible and treat the enemy to an ''Austerlitz" 
(as he said) for one reason, and also to avoid sending his soldiers 
worn with marching into battle in the noontide glare of a ver}^ 
hot day; perhaps also, as some have conjectured, because his 
physical and mental powers had been under too heavy a strain to 
permit of his making a sudden resolution. In any case his 
hesitation was disastrous. On the morning of July 28th not a 



548 Moscow [1812 

Russian was in sight. They had all departed during the night, 
and a thick fog that did not clear away until late in the day so 
completely veiled their retreat that there was no indication of the 
direction they had taken. 

It was a tremendous disillusion for the French. Almost a 
third of the Grand Army had melted away, more than 130,000 
names had to be struck off the army hsts, and nothing accom- 
plished yet! The cavalry was so near exhaustion that General 
Belliard openly assured the Emperor, yet six days' march and 
he would be without cavalry. Besides, they were too far from 
the wings of the army: Macdonald had sent the Prussians to 
Riga and was marching with his French troops on Jakobstadt; 
Reynier had to be left behind to watch the Russian reserve 
under Tormassoff on the Pripet; and Schwarzenberg, lastly, 
who had been marching toward Minsk to join the main army, 
had turned aside at a summons from Reynier. For on the 
same day that Napoleon was getting ready for a battle at 
Vitebsk, July 27th, a Saxon division of thirty-five hundred had 
been captured by Tormassoff, who deserved closer attention 
than the Emperor had as yet given him. He now put Reynier 
under Schwarzenberg's command, and deputed the latter to 
defeat the Russian and ''make an end of him." A like com- 
mand was given Oudinot with regard to Wittgenstein, whom 
he was to drive away from Drissa and hurl northwards into the 
hands of Macdonald. But Wittgenstein would not be hurled, 
not even when Saint-Cyr brought up reinforcements; at the 
middle of August he was still before Drissa. 

Such was the situation when Napoleon resolved at last to 
give his troops the rest they so urgently needed, to bring up 
ammunition, and to restore some order to the chaos which pre- 
vailed in the commissariat. Fortunately the country began 
to be more productive and populous about Vitebsk, and the 
people themselves were more cleanly and well-to-do than the 
brutish peasantry of Lithuania. This was encouraging, although 
it was during this very period of rest that the dysentery claimed 
most victims. Davout was summoned with his army. It is 
related that the Emperor, returning from his search for the 



/Et. 42] Napoleon Aims at Smolensk 549 

vanished Russians, excitedly dashed his sword on the table and 
exclaimed that he would stay there, collect his forces, and organ- 
ize Poland; that the campaign of 1812 was closed; the next 
one would look after what still remained to be done. To the 
same effect he expressed himself to Murat, who was for ad- 
vancing; the year 1813, said he, would see him in Moscow, 
1814 in St. Petersburg; the Russian war would require three 
years. And this was practically the order of events in his 
original programme. Only one thing was yet lacking, the most 
important, to be sure — victory, or, as he had said to Jomini, 
"a good battle." The French army did indeed he between 
the Dnieper and the Dwina, in a natural gateway that formed 
the entrance to the Muscovite empire, the goal he had fixed 
for his first great movement. But the Russian territory he 
occupied had been bought with his own losses, not his enemy's, 
making an uncertain and joyless possession. There was the 
rub. He fairly suffered torments at the thought of his shaken 
prestige. Suddenly he broke out: he would leave Vitebsk, 
too, after a short rest, and proceed on the road to Moscow. 
The enemy was before Smolensk, and he would not be willing 
to sacrifice this first truly Russian city without a fight as he 
did barren Poland, especially since his two armies were united; 
there a battle must be fought. A victory at Smolensk would 
give the key to either Moscow or St. Petersburg. Moreover, 
with the Dnieper as a protection, a stronger position for \^dnter 
quarters could be found there. But before all things the battle. 
''No blood has flowed as yet," said he to the generals opposing 
his plan, Berthier, Duroc, Mouton, and Caulaincourt, ''and 
Russia is too important to yield without a struggle. Alexander 
can negotiate only after a great battle. I shall seek this battle 
and win it before the holy city if necessary." 

As a matter of fact the Czar had no thought of negotiating; 
least of all now that the Sultan had ratified the treaty of peace 
and the Moldavian army could come north. Napoleon learned 
of this, and it was a severe blow. But its effect on him was 
to strengthen his resolution in seeking a quick, final decision. 
After a stay of two weeks he broke up the camp at Vitebsk. 



550 Moscow [1812 

His plan now was to concentrate to the south of that city the 
entire army Ijdng near it, about 190,000 men, cross the Dnieper, 
and then march forward under cover of the river along its right 
banlc to the east. He learned that the enemy had assumed 
the offensive after uniting the two armies, and were advancing 
by the direct road from Smolensk to Vitebsk; it was quite 
possible, therefore, to reach Smolensk without discovery, turn 
the left flank of the Russian and cut him off from the road to 
Moscow. This • manoeuvre — ^resembling that against Mack in 
1805 — ^was begun on the 10th of August with admirable pre- 
cision; the troops passed over the Dnieper, and on the 14th 
crossed the old Russian frontier at Krasnoi. The informa- 
tion as to the movements of the Russians proved to be correct. 
The Czar had been forced to yield to the strong sentiment 
prevaihng in the army and among the people, which demanded 
that the soil of ancient Muscovy be defended; and Barclay had 
to make up his mind to fight. To avoid altogether losing his 
communication with Wittgenstein and being outflanked on the 
right where he supposed the French were stronger, he chose the 
northwest as the direction for his advance. Only as a precau- 
tion he detached one division across the river to the left. This 
division it was that Napoleon's vanguard met on August 16th 
and drove back to Smolensk with severe loss. But meantime 
Bagration had been informed by messenger, and, perceiving the 
danger, sent back a corps with all speed to the city to ward off 
the first attack. He himself followed as fast as he could on the 
16th, having first sent word to Barclay. 

On the morning of that day the van of the French army 
arrived at Smolensk and at once began an assault on the walls. 
This was repulsed, and thereby Napoleon's plan was thwarted 
at the start, for the two Russian armies in the mean time had 
hastened up and were again in possession of this important point 
and of the road to Moscow. No less an authority than Clause- 
witz has blamed the Emperor for taking the right bank of the 
Dnieper instead of attacking the enemy in front, beating him 
and so gaining Smolensk. But that would have been what 
Napoleon was wont to call an "ordinary battle." The de- 



^T. 43] Smolensk 551 

feated enemy would have fallen back through Smolensk upon 
his base, and that was just what he wanted to prevent. Now, 
to be sure, there was nothing else to do, provided the Russian 
was accommodating enough to fight at all. He did fight, but 
only in covering his retreat. Barclay could not be induced to 
leave the city, but he sent Bagration, who was eager to fight, 
along the road to Moscow, while he kept but a single corps to 
defend Smolensk. When Napoleon was convinced that the 
enemy had no intention of fighting a decisive battle, he tried 
to force his position in order to hold him fast and compel him 
to fight. Time after time he stormed the city, but all in 
vain. The veteran officers recalled the siege of the Syrian 
fortress Acre. Nor was bombardment any more successful. 
Again the French fought a whole day with all their superior 
force the rear-guard of the retreating foe, until the latter volun- 
tarily evacuated. They did not neglect to burn the maga- 
zines and the northern quarter of the city, which consisted 
mostly of wooden houses as in all Russian cities. Smoking 
ruins the conqueror found, but again victory had eluded him. 
If he had only gone right on toward Moscow! Barclay, in 
order to evade the French batteries beyond the Dnieper, had 
described a long arc, the chord of which was commanded by 
Napoleon. He might have been overtaken easily and brought 
to bay. But the Emperor did not know the situation and 
merely sent forward Ney and Murat, who in turn had serious 
fighting only with the rear-guard of the enemy, at Valutina 
Gora, on the 19th. Barclay was at liberty to march on unim- 
peded with the main army. 

What was to be done now ? In Dresden Napoleon had said 
to Metternich that his undertaking was one of the kind that 
depended for success on patience. He who exercised that virtue 
best would have victory for his portion. He himself sinned 
grievously against that conviction. Murat himself, before the 
beginning of the assault upon Smolensk, had advised him to 
pause, since it had become manifest that the enemy would not 
give battle, but was anxious to get away. The advice was in 
vain. Later, after he had become master of the ruined city, his 



552 Moscow [1812 

generals again remonstrated. Rapp, who had come from 
the Niemen, painted the distress of the long journey, the unmmi- 
bered victims of typhus and dysentery; the thousands of marau- 
ders who dragged themselves, half-dead from exhaustion, to 
a bush to die unseen; the thousands of deserters, who organized 
in bands and ravaged villages and castles until the desperate 
people killed them. And what was Napoleon's answer? That 
he knew all that and admitted the horrors of the situation; but 
for that very reason it was no time now to delay. After the 
first victory everything would be all right again. So his first 
aim was still the victory over the main force of the enemy, and 
that was to be gained on the way east, on the road to Moscow. 
There was no further talk of remaining in Smolensk, half-burned 
as it was. 

It may excite remark that Napoleon was still so sure of his 
troops; though, of course, it was only of those whose robust 
physique and discipline had kept them in the ranks. They 
murmured indeed as they had in 1807, but they marched on, 
despite the frightful heat by day, despite the loss of sleep since 
the nights had to be given up to foraging in the surrounding 
villages, despite the gloomy prospect of not being able, perhaps, 
to endure the burden of the next day. They were chosen troops, 
vigorous and hardened veterans, those 157,000 men with whom 
he left Smolensk — especially those of Davout.* They wanted 
to be on hand in a forward movement, for behind them lay the 
horrors of the Polish wastes, while before them was battle and 
victory and honour and reward, and they must at last reach far- 
famed Moscow. 

To be sure, if Napoleon had looked into the matter more 
closely he might, perhaps, have remained at the Dnieper after 
all, or gone back to Lithuania. But his eye was as dim in 
Russia as it had been in Spain. Here, too, he saw nothing but 
an army before him that was yet to be beaten, and a cabinet to 
which he wanted to dictate terms: this and nothing more. He 

* In Vitebsk, Orcha, Mohilev, and Smolensk garrisons of about 14,000 
men were left. About an equal number had been lost in the recent fight- 
ing and on the march from Vitebsk. 



iET. 43] Russian National Feeling 553 

failed to see the new enemy that faced him the very moment he 
left Polish territory at Krasnoi and crossed the old Russian 
frontier: the strong national instinct of the Russians, which 
joined their religious fervour and their barbarism to make their 
resistance unparalleled. This feeling prevailed everywhere: in 
the army, whose strength and courage it steeled with fanaticism; 
at the court of the Czar, who could not escape its influence; among 
the masses of the people, who armed themselves by thousands 
and shouted to their ruler before the Kremlin, "Let us conquer 
or die ! " Of all this Napoleon saw nothing. And yet there was 
no lack of unmistakable signs. Was it not significant that a 
single Russian corps resisted a large army for two whole days, 
without letting them take a single prisoner? Was it not remark- 
able that the enemy let the sacred city on the Dnieper with its 
holy shrine be consumed in flames before it was suffered to fall 
into the invaders' hands? 

Russian chauvinism was already demanding a victim in its 
own camp; it was Barclay himself, the commander-in-chief. 
Being a Livonian, he seemed a foreigner to the army; at the 
court he had his most inveterate enemies in the Old-Russian 
party; he had fallen out with Bagration, and the operations of 
the army suffered from the discord between its leaders. Only 
the Czar had kept him thus far, and now even he could do so 
no longer. The fact that he had not defended with greater 
energy the city of the Holy Virgin, that he had risked no battle 
before its walls, was reckoned an inexpiable offence, and Alex- 
ander was led to believe that such a battle must have resulted in 
his favour.* Barclay was removed from command and was suc- 
ceeded by Kutusoff, an "Old Russian," a favourite of the army, 
but appointed by the Czar only under stress. We have already 
met him in 1805. His prestige permitted him to fall back still 
farther and to delay offering battle until he arrived at the broken 

* That is what the Czar wrote subsequently to Admiral Tchitchagoff 
who was leading the Moldavian army north. The letter is printed in his 
Memoirs, Barclay's justification of himself was that he was preserving the 
army for a decisive action at a suitable time; he also pointed out that 
Napoleon had but to cross the Dnieper lower down to force him out of the 
city, that his position there had never been tenable. 



554 Moscow [1812 

country near Borodino, where the Kalotza flows into the Moskwa. 
The "Sacred Heath" it was called, and the legend ran that 
never had an enemy penetrated beyond it. Here a battle 
had to be fought out, for Moscow must not fall without a blow 
into the hands of the enemy. Alexander had but recently 
given its inhabitants most definite promises of military pro- 
tection. 

On September 1st Napoleon had arrived at Gjatsk, where he 
was informed that his vanguard had met with serious resistance. 
Soon doubt was no longer possible; the enemy really was about 
to fight. The Emperor collected his army to the nimaber of 
130,000; the Russians could muster only 120,000, and of those 
10,000 were raw militia. Kutusoff, however, occupied a chosen 
position. He occupied both sides of the Moscow road behind the 
Kalotza, and had thrown up earthworks. The most westerly of 
his redoubts was captured by the French on September 5th 
after a fierce struggle : this pushed the left wdng of the Russians 
back from the Kalotza against the other lines, so that they were 
arranged in the shape of an elbow with the angle at Borodino. 
Napoleon at once formed his plan. He would not follow Davout's 
good advice, i.e., to turn the enemy's left flank; such a threat- 
ening movement might deprive him of the chance to fight. He 
would attack with a strong force both the left wing and the centre 
successively, bend it around still more, turn the front of the 
Russians thus from the west to the south, then hurl them across 
the road and drive them to the Moskwa. If Kutusoff would only 
stand firm! Napoleon was so excited by this question that he 
hardly slept that night. To add to his agitation that evening 
the news arrived that Wellington had defeated Marmont at 
Salamanca on July 22d. That loss, also, must be made good. His 
troops too could get little sleep; were they not obliged to fetch 
food for themselves and their horses? But they all came back 
and donned their best uniforms, for the long-desired festival was 
at hand. Nor can one read without deep emotion how the sick 
Germans, as well as French, crowded into the ranks of the fighting 
men. 

The battle began on the right wing, followed closely by 



^T.43] The Battle of Borodino 555 

Davout's assault on the redoubts of the left wing and again, 
before noon, by the attack of Ney and Murat on the fortified 
centre, while Eugene was gaining the village of Borodino on the 
left, the pivot of the whole movement. The fighting was fierce 
in the extreme, and the historian is uncertain whether it is the 
attack or the defence that deserves the meed of heroism. The 
Russian redoubts were carried, soon lost again, only to be won 
anew and yet again lost. The exploits of Napoleon's infantry 
and horse, in particular of the German cavalry regiments, were 
most extraordinary; and so at last he became master of the 
enemies' position. But nothing more than that. The Russians 
retired indeed, but it was only to rally again in a new position 
a mile or so away and offer new resistance. But the shattered 
divisions of Murat and Ney were in no condition to renew the 
attack. This was the moment, before the enemy had recovered 
themselves, for a strong reserve to step in and complete the 
victory. Such a reserve was in readiness, the 20,000 of the 
Guard. Murat urgently pleaded for the order to advance, but 
Napoleon refused it. /'Suppose another battle takes place 
to-morrow," he replied, 'Svhat shall I fight with?" He almost 
neglected to givp the order to cannonade the retreating centre of 
the enemy. The generals hardly knew him for the old Napoleon; 
they laid everything to the inflammation of a severe cold and the 
constant pain he was suffering, but in particular to his over- 
strained nerves, that were unequal to the new task after such 
wearing excitement.* It was only a battlefield that Napoleon 
had won on that September day, not a battle. In spite of their 
enormous losses — 44,000 in dead and wounded — the Russians 
remained overnight in their last positions, and it was not until 
the next day that they proceeded on the road to Moscow. Their 
general managed to make even the Czar believe that they were the 
victors. 

* Napoleon has been condemned by almost all military writers for 
holding back his Guard. Jomini alone finds a word of excuse for him and 
sees his mistake rather in his failure to press the Russians from the very 
outset with utmost energy on the left wing, while it was still weak. [To 
Jomini add Clausewitz. See Rose, II. 236. — 13.] 



556 Moscow [1812 

During the fighting Napoleon had not moved from his distant 
position. It was the first time he did not intervene in person, 
quite contrary to his oft-expressed conviction. No doubt he 
was in distress. But what was his discomfort compared to the 
many thousand times multipHed agony at his feet! Eylau was 
far outdone in scenes of horror. In one day there had fallen more 
than 70,000 men, dead or w^ounded; and a wound here meant but 
too often certain death. Napoleon declared the battle was the 
bloodiest he had ever seen, and the most hotly contested. He 
had gained this one point, that Moscow was now open to him. 
"Moscow! Moscow!" he is said to have ejaculated repeatedly 
the next day in great agitation. But beyond Moscow he will 
find an army of whose resisting power he had learned by expe- 
rience. It will receive reinforcements. From the south another 
army will approach which has succeeded in defeating the Turks. 
His wings and his line of retreat will be menaced by superior 
hostile forces. It had not been a victory that would bring the 
enemy to the point of yielding. There must be more fighting; 
will his army be equal to it? Only about 100,000 men were left 
to him after the slaughter. Three days before the battle rein- 
forcements of 30,000 men under Marshal Victor had crossed the 
Niemen; the Emperor ordered them to join the reserves at 
Smolensk and march forward to strengthen the main army at 
Moscow. But for the moment that is all he can command. And 
yet his eye kindles when on September 14th he loolis down from 
a height at the mighty city of the Muscovites. He had reached 
his goal. 

On the morning of September 14th Kutusoff entered Mos- 
cow, but in the afternoon left it again by the opposite gate. The 
dismay of the inhabitants remaining after the rich and promi- 
nent had taken their departure was unbounded. They, too, 
had heard of a victory at Borodino, and now the triumphing 
general was retiring and abandoning the city to the enemy! 
It was the signal for a general flight, so that the army could 
hardly make any progress; but in the hurry very little was 
saved. Immediately following the Russians the French marched 
in, Napoleon waiting until the next day; he was waiting, it is 



Mt 43] Moscow 557 

said, for a deputation from the authorities. But none appeared. 
That was the first disappointment, and others were to follow. 
The city was deserted, not a soul on the streets; all who re- 
mained hid behind window-shutters in fear. " It seemed to us," 
Adam says, in describing the entry of the troops, "as if good 
actors were to play to an empty house." The Emperor rode 
into the Kremlin and took up his residence there, keeping 
the Guards in the city; the other corps had to find shelter in the 
vicinity. It was a comfort that to all appearance food was 
plenty; there were abundant provisions and forage, and the 
soldiers began to make themselves at home in the deserted 
dwellings, enjoying some rest at last from the unutterable suffer- 
ings of the campaign. 

But there was no rest to be found in Moscow. Even before 
the entry thick columns of smoke had been seen rising here 
and there in the distance, but such a common spectacle at- 
tracted no further attention. In every city stores had been 
burned at the approach of the enemy. But soon they paid 
closer attention, as it was repeatedly announced at the 
Kremlin that there were fires at various points, and it soon 
became evident that they were occupying a doomed city. Lashed 
by the northeast trade wind, the element burst its bonds and 
spread farther and farther. At noon on the 16th of September 
the entire city was in flames, sparks flying even into the Ki'em- 
lin. At last that, too, was reported to have caught fire, and 
Napoleon, who had scarcely had time to take one astonished 
look in the home of the Czars, was forced to leave the palace 
in haste; with difficulty struggling through the confused 
masses on the streets, he reached the country-seat of Petrovs- 
koje. There he beholds the city, to possess which had been 
the very summit of his ambition, swallowed up in a sea of 
flames. And if anything could deepen the impression of this 
dread spectacle on the Emperor's feelings, it was the certainty 
which was soon felt that the conflagration was not the result of 
chance or thoughtlessness, but that the enemy himself had 
sacrificed the metropolis to prevent its stores and wealth from 
falHng into the hands of foreigners, and to make it impos- 



558 



Moscow [1812 



sible for them to stay there * Napoleon had a commission in- 
quire into the cause of the fire, and a number of incendiaries 
caught in the act were shot. But the fury of the flames was 
no longer to be checked. Not to rob the soldiers of all their 
hopes, he gave permission to plunder. The havoc wrought was 
enormous, but little was secured. Provisions were for the most 
part burned. The flames had spared the cellars, however, and 
wine and brandy was found in abundance. But the only result 
was to carry disorder to a climax, so that the few peasants who 
ventured into the city with provisions were robbed, while on 
the other hand the soldiers fraternized with some thousands of 
Russian marauders and let them come and go as if the war 
were over. 

Most earnestly did all wish it were ended; Napoleon by no 
means the least. By September 20th the fire at length subsided, 
but three fourths of the city lay in ashes. The inhabitants, 
still numbering 10,000, wandered without shelter or food through 
the streets. A battalion of the Guard had saved the Kremlin, 
to which Napoleon now returned. He could not believe that 
iUexander would leave one stone unturned to regain possession 
of his country. Daily he expected overtures for peace negotia- 
tions, but in vain. Then he tried to hasten them by writing 
to the Czar on the 20th. Moscow was burned, he said; the 
calamity might have been avoided if Alexander had sent him 
a letter either before or after Borodino; he hoped his letter 
would be kindly received. And now again he waited. Soon 
September is past and the winter is threateningly near. The 
army can be fed only by foraging parties that have to go farther 
each day; these involve great danger and often get nothing. 
A single Russian corps gives out that it captured 3000 French- 
men within three weeks. An additional source of danger was 
the peasant militia, who hid their property and defended their 

* Even Russian historians now regard it as proved that the governor 
of the city. Count Rostopchin, ordered it to be fired before he left. Un- 
questionably the recklessness of the soldiery and mob license may have 
had a large share. The sentiment of the people must also be taken into 
consideration. Many preferred to bum their houses rather than see 
them in the hands of the French. 



/Et. 43] Moscow Not the End 559 

villages. "You are the nation of the Russian faith," their 
leaders cried to them; "die for your faith and for the Czar. 
What are you Christians for if you will not suffer for the faith? 
What are you orthodox for if you will not serve the Czar?" 
Rostopchin denounced Napoleon as unbaptized, and that suf- 
ficed to make his appeal to the inhabitants of the Moscow 
government futile. At Vereia partisans surprised and captured 
the French garrison. The highroad to Smolensk had already 
become unsafe, convoys of provisions were intercepted, and 
regular courier service was interrupted. The generals advised 
a retreat to Poland; but Napoleon could not yet bring him- 
self to acknowledge his defeat before the world of which he ex- 
pected to be master at Moscow. 

"Imagine Moscow taken," he had said to Narbonne before 
the beginning of the campaign, "the Czar reconciled or sup- 
planted by a dependent government; then tell me whether an 
army of French and allies cannot push on from Tifiis to 
the Ganges, and there by mere contact destroy the whole fabric 
of mercantile greatness in India ? With one stroke France would 
have conquered the independence of the west and the freedom 
of the seas. Alexander the Great had as long a journey to the 
Ganges as I shall have from Moscow." So it was Moscow, 
always Moscow, that filled his thoughts. As the picture of 
Jerusalem once swayed the imagination of the crusaders, so now 
the holy city of the Russians swayed his. The story sounds alto- 
gether credible that was told later in the circles of his nearest 
relatives and intimates, that he took the insignia of imperial 
dignity, robe, sceptre, and crown, with him on the journey to 
Russia, in order that after he had dictated peace he might be 
proclaimed in the Kremlin on the Moskwa "the Emperor of the 
West, Supreme Head of the European Confederation, Defender 
of the Christian Religion." * Now all that was gone forever, 
peace was not assured, the Grand Army which was to have 

* "Spectateur militaire," 1887, vol. 38, pp. 378 ff. Robe, crown, and 
sceptre have never been seen again; perhaps they were lost on the retreat 
in the hurry of leaving Vilna. Cf . the description in the " Memorial " of 
the paymaster Peynisse, p. 136, and in Coignet, p. 342. 



560 Moscow [1812 

paved his way to supreme power had dwindled away, and its 
very existence was in jeopardy. 

For while Kutusoff had at first gone farther to the south east, 
he had afterwards turned west, had occupied an excellent posi- 
tion near Tarentino, south of Moscow, that threatened the 
French line of retreat, and was constantly strengthening him- 
self. Moreover, the state of affairs in both wings was wholly 
favourable to the Russians. On the Dwina Wittgenstein's force 
was increased to 40,000 as against the 17,000 of Saint-Cyr. In 
the south the Russian army from Moldavia, under Tchitchagoff, 
had effected a junction on the 20th of September with the 
force of Tormassoff, making a total of 64,000, which exceeded 
Schwarzenberg's corps by 30,000. And still no answer from 
St. Petersburg ! Napoleon was beside himself. For one moment 
he thinks even of fetching the answer in person, but in the 
next the impossible project is abandoned. Finally he must 
reconcile himself to making the overtures himself, and on the 
5th of October he sends General Lauriston to Kutusoff. He 
replies that he has no authority and can only report to the 
Czar. Another period of suspense that pretty soon ends in the 
conviction that this step was equally fruitless. 

Alexander remained firm, even though Romanzoff at the 
head of a court party friendly to France, Grand Duke Constan- 
tine, and even Alexander's mother, who most bitterly hated 
Napoleon, all spoke in favour of peace, the Czar still stood firm. 
Not because his unstable character had suddenly in the stress of 
invasion fortified itself; no, there were other reasons for his 
steadfastness. For one thing, the war sentiment among the 
people, especially after the loss of the rich metropolis, had 
increased to such a pitch that he could hardly do otherwise than 
yield to it. Then again, during the last days of August, at Abo, 
in Finland, he had met Bernadotte, who had exhorted him to be 
steadfast and had given him back the corps that was by treaty 
to help conquer Norway, This added 20,000 men who were 
hastening to join Wittgenstein. Lastly, there was doubtless no 
lack of energetic men about Alexander (one thinks involuntarily 
of Baron vom Stein, whom he had summoned in May) who 



^T. 43] Facing Disaster 561 

advised him to persevere and who may have lent a firm support 
to the wavering resolution of the Czar. So the decision was 
for war. 

Meantime Napoleon had wasted five weeks of most precious 
time dallying with the hope of peace, until at length the inexorable 
truth stood clearly before him that he must leave Moscow. Who 
would venture to paint what was passing in the mind of this man 
when he saw the proud structure erected by him to his own 
renown breaking down piecemeal; saw it with his far-sighted 
vision that descried not only the terrible danger immediately 
before him, the death-dealing winter, when the summer had 
already melted his army to half its original size ; but also all the 
remote consequences : the uprising of his compulsory allies, and 
an endless series of new struggles, and, at best, the task of con- 
quering all over again what but a few weeks ago had been in his 
possession! In vain he sought to banish the thought of his lost 
prestige, to escape being alone with it. We are told that he pro- 
longed meals beyond the usual time, something he had never 
before done; that he had a company of French actors who were 
in Moscow perform pieces before him; that he threw himself 
eagerly into plans for a new organization of the Theatre frangais 
at Paris, and the like. But at last something decisive had to be 
done. Above all, the Emperor had to become a general once 
more. The source of the whole disaster was that hitherto he had 
been too much the Emperor, too little the general.* In the 
latter character he now had to order the retreat. In the midst 
of preparations for it, at one of the daily reviews, there fell upon 
him the tidings that the Russians had assumed the offensive on 
October 16th, had surprised Murat, who had been sent south to 
watch Kutusoff, and driven him back toward Moscow with very 
heavy losses. With that vanished the last hope of peace, and it 
was settled beyond recall that fighting must be renewed. 

Since the beginning of October Napoleon had been considering 
the question by what route he should leave the untenable capital. 

* "Moscow is not a military position, but a political one," he had said 
to Daru. "People always see in me here only the military leader, whereas 
I am here in fact as Emperor." 



562 Moscow [1812 

He had three routes before his mind: one the road by which he 
had come, another leading to Smolensk via Kaluga, the third to 
the northwest through Bjeloi to Weliki-Luki, which would 
permit him to threaten St. Petersburg. At the outset he felt 
rather inclined to choose the last, because it had less the appear- 
ance of a retreat; but he soon gave it up. Nor did the southern 
route meet with his full approval. In the notes which he dic- 
tated we read: "Any movement on Kaluga is advisable only if 
it have for its object to retreat to Smolensk. But if we are 
retreating to Smolensk in any case, is it -^ise to seek the enemy 
and expose ourselves to the loss of some thousands of men in a 
march that after all would seem to be a retreat before an army 
which knows well its country and has many secret agents and a 
numerous light cavalry?" In an affair with the enemy, he 
went on to explain, one might have left on one's hands three or 
four thousand wounded with which it would be necessary to 
retreat for hundreds of miles ; this would look hke a defeat, and 
in public opinion the enemy would have the advantage even if 
he had been beaten. Therefore he would prefer to take the road 
by which they had come '^We should not have the enemy 
about our necks, we know the road thoroughly, and it is five 
days' march shorter, too." The army would carry flour for 
two weeks, and could stop at Viasma and find provisions and 
fodder." These notes are from the early part of October. Soon 
afterwards, however, he had decided for the road by Kaluga, 
particularly as the advance of the Russians made it necessary 
to support Murat. But we shall have occasion to see the force 
of the above considerations. 

On the 19th of October the "Grand Army" left Moscow in a 
southwesterly direction; the soldiers were burdened with booty 
whose weight soon wearied them in the march ; wagons in endless 
lines were loaded with the plundered splendour of the holy city, 
with articles useful and useless, with sick and wounded; foreign 
famines fleeing from the hatred of the Russians swelled the 
numbers of the camp-followers ; the whole array w^as not unlike a 
migrating tribe. In Moscow, where Mortier remained with 
8000 men, the Emperor spread the report that he would return 



/Et. 43] The Battle of Malojaroslavetz 563 

after defeating Kutusoff, and really made the latter believe he 
was coming to attack him. But he really had no such intention. 
He planned rather, in order to avoid an ' 'affair " and the thousands 
of woimded, to turn the enemy's left flank and reach Kaluga 
before him by the (new) western road, or at least to get to Juchnov 
before him and then reach Smolensk by way of Jelnia. But 
Kutusoff was not deceived very long. Soon after Napoleon, 
covered by two corps, had turned off to the west towards Borovsk 
with the bulk of his army, the news of it came to the Russian 
headquarters, and at once the Russian general started for 
Malojaroslavetz, where the two roads to Kaluga meet at the 
river Luscha. Perhaps the Emperor might have carried out his 
plan after all if his army had moved forward more rapidly. 
But what with the heavy burdens of the infantry, the poor 
horses for the cavalry, the lack of teams for the 600 cannon, the 
immense length of the train, and besides all the heavy rains and 
the muddy roads, any faster advance was impossible. The 
result was that the vanguard under Eugene entered Malojaro- 
slavetz only a little before the Russians, on October 24th. Here 
ensued a bitter struggle over an elevation occupied by the 
enemy on the other side of the river. The Russians lost the 
position and regained it repeatedly, until at length, after a 
frightful loss of life, it was finally carried and held by the Itahans 
under the Viceroy. But that was all. For Kutusoff, who had 
come up meanwhile with the whole army, held the road to the 
south, and the question now was whether Napoleon would fight 
his way through here or not. 

So the ''affair" had come off after all. The fighting of the 
24th had cost the French 5000 men in dead and wounded. 
Were it to be renewed on the next day on a larger scale, then, 
with the resistance the Russians were making, the losses would 
certainly be serious. In the council of war held by Napoleon 
scarcely more than one vote (that of Murat) was in favour of 
fighting; the great majority were decidedly against it. Even the 
bold Mouton, who in May, 1809, had saved the situation on the 
Lobau, advised the quickest possible retreat to the Niemen, and 
that, too, on the highroad by which they had come and which 



564 Moscow [1812 

they knew well. This, as we have seen, coincided with the 
Emperor's opinion. Perhaps, too, the danger he had been in 
on the 25th of being captured by a bold band of Cossacks while 
on a reconnoissance may have made an impression on him. 
His only misgiving arose from the fear of '^ having the enemy 
about their necks" if they retreated to the north. But Kutu- 
soff himself solved the question the next day by breaking camp 
and going farther south, perhaps with the object of luring the 
Emperor still farther from his base. But the latter took advan- 
tage of the opportunity thus granted to turn at once to the 
north and gain the highroad at Moshaisk. Mortier had already 
been ordered to leave Moscow on the 21st. He was to blow up 
the Kremlin first, an act of impotent rage that was only partially 
successful. On the 27th he had joined the army, which now 
proceeded westward by forced marches. It had lost a week of 
valuable time and could not venture now to stop at Viasma if 
Kutusoff understood his business.* 

What now follows is a retreat compared to which the march 
through the desert after the futile assault on Acre seems like 
child's play. Would not those who a few weeks ago had not 
given out in the haste of pressing forward to Moscow now lose 
their strength in the hurried flight of the retreat? Would not 
the cold now carry off those whom the heat then spared? Would 
not those who then withstood hardship and hunger succumb to 
them all the more surely, now that they were the pursued 

* Reports of Napoleon's attitude during these days are meagre. The 
fact that he did not follow the receding Russians (who might later come 
to a stand and give battle again) is nothing surprising, take it all in all. 
But it is certainly strange that he did not take the shorter road from 
Malojaroslavetz through Medyni to Viasma. He gave his reasons in a 
letter to Junot dated October 26th : the cold, and the necessity of disposing 
of the wounded (in fact some three or four thousand), led him, so he said, to 
go to Moshaisk. But the cold had not yet set in. Not until the 27th did 
any frost appear at night, while otherwise the weather was fine. The 
winter of 1812 came later than usual in Russia. So the second point 
alone must have been decisive, the wounded, to which Napoleon had 
assigned great importance in his notes at the beginning of October. But 
the blame may rest partly on the bad maps at his disposal and his igno- 
rance of the roads. 



^T.43] Flight 565 

instead of the pursuers? There was indeed a definite goal 
before them; they must march bravely, it was said, only as far 
as Smolensk. There was stationed Victor's corps ; there were to 
be found abundant stores — at least they had been ordered: 
there, between the Dwina and the Dnieper, they might defy the 
winter. And so the sadly demoralized army retraced the same 
via dolorosa which it had traversed two months before; past the 
horrible battlefield of Borodino, where the dead still lay unburied; 
past the hospitals, caverns of horror, from which they longed to 
take away all who were still living; past the burned cities and 
villages and all the places given over to gloomy desolation. 
After the beginning of November the night frosts began to be 
felt more and more keenly. Most of the soldiers were too 
lightly clad and suffered not a Uttle. Hunger began to pinch 
them, too, for the provisions brought from Moscow had soon 
been consumed, and it was impossible to supply themselves 
by foraging as formerly they had done, as the bands of armed 
peasants prevented it and the enemy was appearing again. 

Kutusoff, thanks to the excellent service of his fight horse, 
had received timely notice of Napoleon's departure; he turned 
about and followed him with the main army through Silenki 
toward Viasma, while the Cossack corps of Platoff harassed the 
rear-guard commanded by Davout. Napoleon gave orders to 
march as they had done in Egypt, with the baggage in the 
centre, so that in case of attack they could make front and fire 
in every direction. So they proceeded at a rapid pace. ^'The 
enemy is fieeing," Platoff reported, "as never army fled before." 
There were good reasons for such haste. By taking the shorter 
route which Napoleon had rejected, Kutusoff had reached the 
highroad near Viasma by November 3d with his vanguard and 
cut off the French rear. The only thing that saved Davout was 
that Eugene sent back two divisions from Viasma for his support. 
Napoleon was already far beyond that city with the Guard. If 
Kutusoff had attacked the French with his whole army on that 
day, he would have struck them a fatal blow; but he held back. 
Though he displayed desperate energy in resistance, he was 
hesitating in attack, and was rather disposed to promote his 



566 Moscow [1812 

enemy's flight, supposing that the latter must perish in the 
Russian winter even without his assistance. 

The fight at Viasma had cost the French 4000 in dead and 
wounded, 3000 had been taken prisoners, and the corps of 
Davout was completely disintegrated, so that Ney had to 
assume command of the rear. On the 6th of November the 
cold increased by from eight to twelve degrees, and an icy north 
wind brought dense snow.* The road grew slippery, causing 
the horses to fall in heaps, and thus depriving the hungry sol- 
diery of their only animal food; many cannon were abandoned; 
long lines of ammunition- wagons were blown up; the cavalry as 
they lost their horses had to march afoot. Discipline was 
utterly relaxed. Every one thought only of himself. The 
wounded of the last fight were left to their fate and died by the 
wayside; likewise thousands who because of cold and fatigue had 
thrown away their weapons and left the ranks. Their comrades 
drove them from the camp-fires at night ; so they went aside and 
were frozen to death in great numbers. In this way it is said that 
at a single camping-place three hundred perished in one night. 
Many a one waited for the Russians, to beg from them and 
lengthen his life a few days; but with the disappearing foe would 
vanish his last hope, if indeed a Cossack lance had not already 
taken pity on the doomed man. The greatest misery was 
endured by the rear-guard. One of Ney's officers reports of 
these days: *'The little food we had was consumed, the horses 
were falling from hunger and exhaustion and were soon devoured 
by the soldiers. Whoever departed from the road to look for 
food fell into the enemies' hands. So our men would rush upon 
any solitary fugitive and take his provisions from him by force; 
lucky for him if they left him his clothing. Thus, after wasting 
the land, we were brought to the point of destroying one another." 

At last hope seemed to beckon to the exhausted warriors 
from the rising towers of Smolensk. Of the hundred thousand, 

* In some accounts (Bausset, Guretzky-Cornitz, Berthezene) the 4th of 
November is the date when severe cold and snowfall began; most of the 
others (F^zensac, Gourgaud, Peyrusse, Coignet, Napoleon in bulletin 29) 
give the 6th. [The temperatures are probably equivalent to 14° and 5** 
Fahr.— B.] 



iET. 43] Smolensk Reached 567 

however, who had started out from Moscow scarcely fifty 
thousand still answered the roll-call, including five thousand 
calvary in a wretched state. For this last Murat was not a little 
to blame ; because quite unnecessarily he would set the poor men 
on the Cossacks, by which means they lost their horses and then 
were famished on foot. Hence they named him the ''Butcher 
of Cavalry"; of the other leaders, however, the Viceroy in par- 
ticular and the ''undaunted" Ney were held in highest respect. 
And one who follows attentively the history of this campaign 
must here give his unqualified assent to the general opinion; 
Ney, especially, performed on this retreat wonders of courage, 
sagacity, and coolness in most desperate situations. Napoleon, 
on the other hand, roused much hard feeling among the other 
troops by his favouritism for the Guard, which had been displayed 
repeatedly even during the previous summer. And now in 
Smolensk, where he entered on the 9th of November, and where 
the arrangements of the commissariat were far below his expecta- 
tions, he fu'st of all provided the Guard with rations for two weeks, 
in consequence of which the other troops, who had rations for only 
one week, fell into all manner of excesses.* In the fire-swept city 
but few houses afforded shelter from the fierce cold. Most of the 
troops had to pass the night in the open air, and piles of corpses 
lined the streets. Was this a place to go into winter quarters? 

No, the line between the Dwina and the Dnieper had already 
become untenable. While yet on the march Napoleon had 
received news from Victor that sorely troubled him. That 
general, at a call from Saint-Cyr, had hastened to his aid against 

* On the arrival of the army in Smolensk the paymaster, Peynisse, writes 
in his diary on November 10th: "At once the stores were broken into, no 
regular distribution was possible, everything was plundered. All power 
and authority of officers ceased in face of an army that was rendered des- 
perate by hunger and all manner of misery. The soldiers retained pos- 
session of the stores. Wine, brandy, rice, biscuit, vegetables, everything 
was in confusion and was trampled under foot. The enormous stock of 
provisions squandered in this way hardly sufficed for two divisions." 
Napoleon later charged his overseers with malfeasance of office and cor- 
ruption, but it was only to avoid the admission that he, the lord of the 
world, was sometimes not master of his own army. 



568 Moscow [1812 

Wittgenstein with about 18,000 men; but toward the end of 
October the two had been defeated at Tchatchniki by superior 
numbers and were obhged to retreat. This exposed the army 
returning from the north to serious danger, and Napoleon was 
in the utmost anxiety. He ordered Victor, doing it with an 
urgency that was affecting, to make a new advance and throw 
the enemy across the Dwina. But suppose he failed to execute 
that command? No, there was no tarrying at Smolensk. And 
in fact he remained only long enough for Eugene, who was 
coming up by a painful detour through Duchovchina, to 
arrive, before collecting his army after a fashion; he did not wait 
for the rear-guard. On the 13th he again left the city after 
issuing orders that the several corps should march a day's 
journey apart from each other. In view of the fact that 
Kutusoff, during the four days' halt at Smolensk, had again 
overtaken the French and might attack the army at any moment 
on the line of march, the grounds for this arrangement are not 
apparent. The conjecture may be hazarded that he did not 
suppose the enemy was as yet so near, and that his aim was to 
regulate the distribution of provisions better by means of this 
separation of the divisions. Be that as it may, the army marched 
out of the city between the 12th and the 17th of November. Of 
the 30,000 stragglers who had followed the army into Smolensk 
only a quarter now joined the rear-guard under Ney. Of the 
remainder, some had perished from cold and hurger, others 
stayed behind to plunder. They were cut down by the returning 
inhabitants, thrown into the flames, or drowned. The sick and 
wounded had been left behind in the hospitals. Many of them 
had lost their lives when at Napoleon's command the towers of 
the city wall were blown up. It was a chapter of horrors unpar- 
alleled. 

During the very first days after the exit from Smolensk the 
bitter cold began to claim its victims, and the army again began 
to disintegrate. And the enemy was close at hand, too. When 
Napoleon had reached Krasnoi with the Guard, the Russian 
vanguard seized the road behind him, and there was danger that 
the isolated corps would be successively beaten by this division, 



jet. 43] Caution of KutusofF 569 

which was 17,000 strong. To prevent this, Napoleon halted 
and waited for Eugene, who was next on the road. He had 
only 15,000 with him (so far had the Guard dwindled away), 
while Kutusoff, who was only one day's march distant from 
Krasnoi, had at his disposal fully three times as many, although 
in his hasty march through the deep snow of the country roads he 
had been obliged to leave behind at least a half of his infantry 
sick and incapacitated.* Now again, as at Viasma, the Russian 
general avoided separating Napoleon from the rest of his army 
by advancing his main force and then overpowering him, as he 
might have done. He adhered to his system, from dread, we are 
told, of the Emperor's genius, which seemed to him nivincible 
even in these straits. Emboldened by this, and also in order to 
protect Davout from the Russian vanguard. Napoleon on the 
next morning actually assumed the offensive, supposing that 
Kutusoff would withdraw his vanguard from the road at the 
prospect of a general engagement and so leave the way open. 
The venture was successful — it was the early morning of the 
17th and the cold was terrible — and Davout, too, could now 
come to Krasnoi. But now a new danger threatens Napoleon, 
that of being outflanked, and he marches on to Orsha, leaving 
Ney to his fate. The latter, after fighting several times to no 
purpose, stole over the Dnieper by night with 3000 men, but on 
the farther side fell in with Platoff's Cossacks and, after untold 
hardships, at last regained the highroad near Orsha with scarcely 
900 men. 

The cold now began to moderate, but thawing weather with 
long-continued rains turned the roads into deep mud, so that 
the soldiers found it still more painful to march, having for the 
most part nothing but rags on their feet. Of the scarcely 

* The regular Russian troops did not display in this war the power of 
endurance that was to be expected. Of 100,000 men with whom Kutusoff 
began the parallel pursuit of Napoleon, 48,000 lay in the hospitals by the 
ibeginning of December, although they were clad in fur, well fed, and had 
■not moved forward so rapidly as the enemy. In the middle of December 
only 40,000 of the 200,000 men in the Russian army were still under arms. 
Poles and Germans seem to have endured the cold best. (Bemhardi, 
Toll's Denkwiirdigkeiten, II. 352, 469.) 



570 



Moscow [1812 



25;000 men still remaining the majority threw away their 
weapons, and even the Guard began to waver. Then Napo- 
leon, who in the cold days had often marched on in front of his 
troops, clad in a cloak of Polish fur and leaning on a birch staff, 
stepped among his old grenadiers and addressed them as fol- 
lows: "You see the disorganization of my army. A wretched 
infatuation has led most of the soldiers to throw away their 
weapons. If you follow this dangerous example, there is no 
hope left. On you depends the salvation of the army." At a 
critical moment provisions were secured in Orsha by the aid of 
the Jews, and, besides, weapons and some batteries were found, 
the latter being drawn by horses belonging to pontoon-trains. 
The boats were abandoned, as it was supposed they would not 
be needed. There was the bridge at Borissov held by the 
French; and once let that river be behind their backs, then they 
thought, there was no further obstacle on the road through 
Minsk to Vilna. 

But the cup of tribulation was not yet full. On the 22d of 
November Napoleon received word that Admiral Tchitchagoff, 
who had drawn up a part of his army facing Schwarzenberg and 
Reynier on the Bug, had proceeded with the rest through Minsk 
to Borissov, had driven the French from that point, and now 
commanded the bridge. To make matters still worse came the 
tidings that Victor and Oudinot had been wholly unsuccessful in 
their operations against Wittgenstein and were marching south 
straight for the highroad. Now indeed the doom of the army 
seemed sealed. In its rear was Kutusoff, to the south and in 
front was Tchitchagoff, on the right was Wittgenstein. If the 
two latter effected a junction and opposed the French at the 
Beresina, there was no hope of escape.* The thaw and rains 
had melted the ice, the river was high, its banks were like swamps, 
and the pontoons were behind them at Orsha. 

* The Russians had acted on an excellent plan of co-operation, which 
had been communicated to the leaders of the two wings as early as Sep- 
tember. Wittgenstein was to drive back Oudinot and Macdonald, 
Tchitchagoff was to do the same to Schwarzenberg, and then the two 
were to unite at Borissov to cut off the retreat of the enemy, whom Kutusoff 
was expected to drive toward them. 



Mt.as] Napoleon's Bearing on the Retreat 571 

It was a situation to bewilder the strongest mind. Napoleon, 
whom we have seen weak and nervous on the march to Moscow 
in view of the uncertainty of the outcome, was now strong and 
prudent in face of certain failure. Since he had become the 
general once more, he threw himself into the character. Even 
his bodily ills seem to have disappeared. His health was as 
good as in the winter campaign of 1807. This point should not 
be overlooked here. His mind and energy in these days of 
extreme distress and embarrassment were as powerful as of old. 
^'He was pale," says one in his escort,''but his countenance was 
calm; nothing in his face betrayed his mental sufferings." His 
eye takes in the entire danger at a glance and discerns the only 
means of safety, if safety is still possible. First of all he must 
have those troops that have thus far faced Wittgenstein, as 
they had suffered nothing like the main army. Oudinot with 
his 8000 men is to repel the division which Tchitchagoff had 
sent across to Borissov, and if possible regain possession of the 
bridge, while Victor with 11,000 men marches southwest from 
Tchereja, where his troops are stationed, to the Beresina and 
holds Wittgenstein in check as long as possible. Meantime 
Napoleon got rid of a large part of the camp-followers that still 
clung to the army, and sacrificed half of his wagons at Bobr in 
order to have horses for the little artillery still remaining. Here 
he learns that Oudinot has secured Borissov indeed, but that 
the Russians had burned the bridge. On the very day before he 
had written to him: " If the enemy should get control of the head 
of the bridge and burn it, so that we could not cross, it would be a 
great misfortune." And now this was a reality, and a reahty 
which involved crossing a river a hundred yards wide with 
marshy banks while facing two superior hostile forces and while 
pursued by a third. 

Had the Emperor been dealing mth foes that were but half- 
way his equals, neither he nor his army would have escaped. 
He could never have reached the frontier as he did, though 
with but a small remnant of officers and subalterns; nor could 
he have fiUed up these rescued cadres to form a new army and so 
overrun Europe with new wars, as he actually did. But Kutu- 



5^7^ Moscow [1812 

soff's only thought was "not to appear at the frontier with emaci- 
ated troops/' and his piir^iit was astonishingly slow; Wittgen- 
stein was poorly informed of the desperate situation of the 
enemy, and advanced with caution instead of hastening to the 
upper Beresina; and neither of these nor the quite incompe- 
tent Tchitchagoff was of a calibre to annihilate the greatest 
general of their age. The third, whose task it should have been 
not to let the Emperor slip through, fell headlong into a trap 
set for him by Oudinot, who had been ordered to seek a suitable 
spot for laying a bridge and after this had been found — a Httle 
north of Borissov, at Studjanka — to give the enemy the false 
impression by a feint that they were going to cross south. o£ 
the city. The deception was so successfully carried out and 
was furthermore so effectively re-enforced by Wittgenstein's con- 
jecture that this was the intention of the French, of which the 
Admiral heard, that Tchitchagoff sent only a weak detachment 
north and took his main army a day's march south of Borissov 
to meet the French army in case it sought, as he supposed it 
would, a junction with Schwarzenberg. This was on the 25th 
of November, the same day on which Oudinot led his command 
north of Borissov to Studjanka and there began the construc- 
tion of two bridges, which, however, were not finished until the 
following afternoon. How they lamented now the lack of the 
pontoons! Frost had suddenly set in again, and the marshy 
banks became hard, but the floating ice was a great hindrance 
to the work of the bridge-builders, who had to stand breast-high 
in the water. And all this when every moment was precious. 
At last the crossing could begin. A number of guns that had 
been placed on the heights of Studjanka commanded the farther 
bank and kept at a distance the Russian detachment stationed 
there. Cavalry swam over and drove them away. So the path 
was open and remained open the next day. Napoleon directed 
the march over the bridge until at noon of the 27th he himself 
passed over with the Guard. At Studjanka there was now only 
the bulk of Victor's corps, whose rear-guard had arrived at 
Borissov to detain the advancing force of Wittgenstein. The 
entire army numbered hardly from 30,000 to 35,000 men 



Mt.43] Crossing the Beresina 573 

under arms.* The horde of stragglers probably amounted to as 
many more. A large part of these poor wretches were kept in 
the village across the river by hunger and cold. Many, too, of 
the Moscow fugitives that had followed the camp stayed there, 
unwilUng despite all warnings to leave their wagons, which con- 
tained their few goods and last remnant of food. It was a 
scene of woe unutterable! 

But Napoleon was not to escape in this way, without any 
hindrance from the enemy. On the very evening of the 27th Witt- 
genstein with Platoff came upon the rear-guard of Victor, about 
4000 men, which he surrounded and compelled to surrender. 
Then he proceeded unopposed to Studjanka, and held the mar- 
shal with the larger part of his forces firmly in check. At the 
same time Tchitchagoff, who had been informed of the true 
state of things, had come north along the right bank. This 
compelled the army, with the exception of the shattered corps 
of Eugene, Davout, and Junot, which had passed on via Sembin, 
to fight its way along. The two Russian leaders had agreed at 
Borissov to co-operate, and so on the 28th of November, amid 
icy weather, fighting began on both sides of the river. On the 
east side Victor with about 7000 men had to defend himself 
against several times as many, while on the west side there were 
only 17,000 to repel the onset of 26,000. Yet even this task 
was performed by these sorely-tried troops, most of whom now 
were non-French. On the right bank, to be sure, the advance 
columns at first gave way before the onslaught of the Russian 
chasseurs ; and even the Young Guard retired toward the river. 

* Accounts differ greatly, varying from 22,000 (S^gur) to 50,000 
(Fezensac). The latter figure is certainly incorrect. Moreover, Napoleon 
himself had no lists before him now. Clausewitz, writing from Borissov to 
Stein November 30th, speaks of " about 40,000." The most correct estimate 
is probably that of Chambray,who put it at 26,700 infantry and 4000 cavalry 
on the 26th of November The enumeration in Bogdanovitch (III. 271) 
is erroneous. The corps of Oudinot and Victor made up the main portion. 
The Guard had shrunk from 47,000 to 6000, in spite of special care. The 
great corps of Davout, once numbering certainly more than 70,000, now 
was reduced to 1200; while of the 30,000 men that stood under Ney at 
the Niemen, only 300 were left. 



574 Moscow [1812 

But Ney, who took the place of the wounded Oudinot, fired his 
men on to a new advance so that they repulsed the enemy and 
took a couple of thousand prisoners. Far into the night the 
struggle lasted, the Russians gaining no advantage worth men- 
tioning, and the Old Guard not entering the fight.* 

Meanwhile Victor, supported by the artillery across the river, 
had withstood Wittgenstein's feeble attacks until evening, w^hen 
he was able to use the darkness to cross the river with the rem- 
nants of his army, after having helped forward a large number 
of non-combatants over the bridge.! But he was no longer 
able to cover the passage of all the stragglers and fugitives. 
On the very morning of the day of battle, when the Russian 
artillery began to play, thousands of these rushed terror-struck 
for the bridge, where now arose a wild, inextricable confusion 
of wagons and carts that blocked the way, of frightened horses 
that trampled the sick and wounded under foot, of men that 
fought desperately for a brief span of life — all these raked by 
the enemies' fire. In the hand-to-hand struggle that ensued 
many were hurled over into the water. Many more of their 
own accord in an agony of fear entrusted themselves to the icy 
waves or the floating cakes of ice, while others were forced into 
the stream by the pressure of the throng behind them; the 
great majority perished. If anything could surpass these scenes 
in horror, it was those of the next morning, when the last armed 
detachment fought its way over the wooden structure at the 

* Whether Tchitchagoff can be charged, as he has been recently, with 
intentional neglect is as yet unsettled. The Russian commanders were no 
heroes, it may as well be said, and the French army with all its stragglers 
still gave the impression from a distance of a host of 60,000 or 70,000. 
Tchitchagoff hardly commanded half that number. So it is quite intelligi- 
ble, although not very much to his credit, that after at last getting his 
bearings he did not hasten to the place of crossing, but first halted (as 
Jomini relates) at Borissov to bring over re-enforcements on a rapidly con- 
structed pontoon bridge. Wittgenstein, too, for the same prudential 
reasons advanced to the Beresina far more slowly than would have been 
requisite for a complete success. 

•j- One of Wittgenstein's generals explains the timidity of that leader by 
the presence of Napoleon: "They feared him like the lion that no animal 
dares to approach." (Historische Zeitschrift, 62, 192.) 



^T. 43] The Army Fades Away 575 

point of the bayonet and then set it on fire. With a frenzied 
roar the crowds that were left behind, men, women, and chil- 
dren, flung themselves after the columns right into the flames, 
until the timbers broke and cast their despairing burden into 
the torrent. Some five thousand of them still were left behind, 
taken prisoners by the Russians. When Tchitchagoff, after the 
departure of Napoleon, arrived at the point of crossing, he found, 
as he himself relates, the ground covered with the bodies of the 
slain or frozen in all sorts of positions, the peasant huts of 
Studjanka packed with corpses. In the river were awful heaps 
of drowned soldiers, women, and children, emerging above the 
surface of the waters, and here and there riders rigid in death 
like statues on their ice-bound horses. The governor of Minsk 
had about 24,000 bodies burned here; this included only those 
picked up on the battlefield and by the banks of the river. 
Even ten years later, islets and moimds are said to have been 
visible in the Beresina, formed of the victims of those days, 
and overgrown with forget-me-nots, to call to mind, as it were, 
the most ghastly spectacle of the century. 

The glorious passage at arms on the 28th of November, by 
which the enemy's plans were brought to naught, was like the 
last flickering of life in an organism given over to death; after 
it Napoleon's military force crumbled to pieces. He no longer 
had an army, but only a following of men who under the pres- 
sure of terrible cold discarded their weapons; half-crazed or 
even wholly crazed with hunger and smitten with typhus, they 
struggled along on the road to Vilna, past Sembin and Molo- 
detchno. On the 3d of December, the thermometer standing at 
about —3°,* only about 9000 men still had their weapons; but 
before long even they were unarmed, when the temperature 
fell to 22° below zero on the 6th, and to 35° below on the 8th. 
Each successive night claimed hundreds of victims. Napoleon 
had clearly seen, the day after the battle by the Beresina, that 
nothing more was to be done with these troops. '^In this state 
of affairs," he wrote to Maret at Vilna, "it is possible that I 
may consider my presence in Paris necessary for France, for 

* These temperatures are expressed in Fahrenheit degrees. — B. 



576 



Moscow [1812 



the empire, and even for the armj." That settled the matter 
with him; and there were excellent reasons. For long before 
reaching Smolensk he had received news from the French capi- 
tal that gave him no little anxiety. A general of repiibhcan 
opinions, named Malet, who had already become involved in 
1808 in a conspiracy against the Emperor's government and 
had since then been detained under careful guard in a Paris 
maison de sante, had formed a plan with a couple of royalist 
confidants to announce the death of Napoleon and to forge 
a Senatus consultum which clothed himself with the command 
of the city and set up a provisional government of moderate 
republicans and constitutionalists with Moreau and Carnot at 
their head. With this as a basis they proposed to win over the 
municipal guard and the national guard that were in garrison 
at Paris, seize the persons of the municipal authorities and so 
overthrow the Empire. For two weeks no new^s had come of 
the Emperor. The people had at first approved the expedi- 
tion to Russia as the last decisive step in establishing a per- 
manent peace; but the persistent advance into the enemy's 
country had disturbed their minds, and the burning of Moscow 
finally dispelled all illusions and opened up a prospect of endless 
war. Malet counted on all this when he went to work early in 
the morning of October 23d. A regiment of national guards, 
the veteran municipal guard, and two generals whom he brought 
out of prison, all took his representations for the truth and 
obeyed him. They helped him to apprehend Savary , the Minister 
of PoHce, and the prefect of the Seine was so thoroughly con- 
vinced that he had a hall made ready in the Hotel de ville for 
the sessions of the provisional government. It was only at the 
commandant's office that, thanks to the presence of mind of 
two officers, Malet was seized with two companions and it was 
proclaimed to the troops standing below that the Emperor 
was ahve. ''Vive I'empereur!" they shouted back, and the 
farce was at an end. Malet and his deluded adherents were 
soon afterwards tried by court-martial and shot. 

Such was the news that Napoleon received on the march. 
What struck him about it, and what remains significant even for 



^T. 43] Napoleon Hastens to Paris 577 

history, was the circumstance that of all those who so easily 
believed in the death of the Emperor, not one remembered the 
dynasty, but each one took for granted as self-evident that a 
change of government would ensue. ''What!" he exclaimed 
in his disappointment, "my wife, my son, the institutions of the 
Empire — no one has a thought for all that I " But even this was 
not all. If such a plot could succeed in some measure as long 
as the army was known to be in the distance, what might not be 
attempted if it became known that the army no longer existed? 
Nor could its fate be kept secret. Was it not strange that he had 
met no couriers since leaving Smolensk? No, he could not wait; 
he must go on and reach Paris simultaneously with the news of 
the complete failure of the expedition and of the loss of hundreds 
of thousands of men that went with him, in order to counteract 
the impression with the overpowering force of his personahty. 
At the Beresina he had still done his duty as general ; now that 
the army was crumbling away there remained nothing for the 
mihtary leader to do except to get help for it, and that was 
possible only from a distance. The attitude of the Germans was 
an added source of anxiety. Therefore, as soon as the column 
had once reached the Vilna road at Molodetchno, he would leave 
it and hasten home. 

On the 5th of December they had arrived at Smorgoni, con- 
stantly fighting the enemy in the rear, who captured thousands 
of unarmed prisoners ; here he gathered his marshals about him 
and told them his decision. Murat was to lead the army beyond 
the Niemen. Before Vilna they would find Bavarian troops 
under Wrede and a fresh division. For the remnant of his army 
as well as for France his presence in Paris was indispensable. 
From no other point could he hold Austrians and Prussians in 
check. They would deUberate well before declaring war against 
him as soon as they saw him as the head of the French nation—^ 
he was at this moment a Frenchman through and through — and 
beheld a new army. First he had let Eugene read aloud to them 
the last bulletin, dated at Molodetchno on the 3d of December; 
it was No. 29 and contained hints, though by no means the 
undisguised truth, as to the ruin of the Grand Army. The whole 



578 



Moscow [1812 



truth is not to be found in it, and to one that knows all the 
woeful story it must seem Uke detestable trifling with misfortune 
to say: ''Men whom nature did not harden enough to make them 
superior to all vicissitudes of fate and fortime lost their cheerful- 
ness and good humour and dreamed of nothing but mishaps and 
defeats; those, however, whom she created superior to every- 
thing preserved their good spirits and behaviour and beheld new- 
glory in the hardships which they had to overcome." Nor did 
the bulletin state how the hundreds of thousands perished; 
everything was laid to the Russian cold winter. Before the 6th of 
December the army, it was impUed, was still proud, splendid, and 
victorious, until the terrible climate of the north weakened and 
consumed it. That he himself was the sole cause of this havoc 
the imperial author did not betray with a single word. Not a 
word was said of his mad rush forward beyond Vitebsk and 
Smolensk in the intense heat of the Russian summer, which had 
caused the army greater losses than the winter. Nor did he tell 
them, if the cold was responsible for the disaster, that he had 
invoked it by his obstinate waiting in the burnt-out capital. 
The world was to know one thing first of all : he was alive and 
w-ell. ^'The health of his Majesty has never been better" : with 
these words the bulletin closed. Then he took leave of his 
generals and rode away with. three companions: Caulaincourt, 
whose secretary he pretended to be, Daru and Mouton.* On the 

* Some have called this desertion; but this is just as incorrect as it 
was when Napoleon left the army of the Egyptian expedition, and even 
more so. He was sovereign and could command the army in person or 
not as he saw fit, and hence could resign the command when he would. 
And he would be in a much better position to procure succour for the 
straitened army if he hastened on in advance of it than if he stayed. The 
peculiar closing passage of the bulletin has also often been censured as 
being cynical. But it was called forth by some remarks in the letters of 
his confidential correspondent, state councillor Fievr^; on the occasion 
of the Malet fiasco he had complained that the bulletins never told whether 
the Emperor was alive, "which is after all the first thing we want to know," 
In a previous letter of October 23d he had said: "The Emperor's presence 
in Paris, provided he could get away without detriment to the army, 
would do much good." Napoleon was wont to repose rare confidence in 
this adviser. 



Mt. 43 Napoleon Reaches Paris 579 

6th he met Maret at Vilna; on the 10th, the French plenipoten- 
tiary De Pradt at Warsaw; and on the 14th, the King of Saxony 
at Dresden, where but seven months before he had graciously 
accepted, in the full splendour of his power, the homage of half the 
world. With incognito preserved he reached the French fron- 
tier, and on the 18th of December, before midnight, he entered 
Paris, where his bulletin had preceded him by a day. 

Twice on the journey home he is said to have been threatened 
with an assault on his life. The first time was on Russian soil, at 
Osmiana, where he met the combined division of Loison, and a 
French major belonging to it suggested to some German officers 
to let him share Wallenstein's fate; the second time was in 
Glogau. The statements on this point are very explicit and 
leave no doubt that the idea was entertained and discussed. 
But in neither case did it ripen into a serious purpose, and 
Napoleon escaped unharmed. Not yet was his star to disappear, 
but it was beginning to sink toward the horizon. Ruddy as the • 
orb of day at its setting, it was to flood Europe once more with the 
colours of fire and blood ere it sank forever into the western 
ocean. 



CHAPTER XVIII 
LEIPZIG 

What a painful awakening for Napoleon from his dream on 
the way to Moscow of an unlimited dominion over states and 
nations ! His prestige, won by such a long series of astounding 
military achievements, was shattered. For, although he had 
not been defeated in the last campaign, yet he had fled — whether 
from want, or cold, or sure destruction, it mattered not, he 
had fled ; and the impression could not be obliterated which this 
unheard-of event had produced on Europe. Of the "Grand 
Army," whose best elements had been victorious at Austerlitz 
and Friedland, there now survived only insignificant remnants. 
And we know what the army was to him. ''His people," was 
the apt characterization of it by Jaucourt, the friend of Talley- 
rand. An army, to be sure, was still under arms ready to serve 
his will; but in size it was not to be compared to the one he had 
lost, and, moreover, it was in the field against the English and 
Spanish. He still had allies, of course, but they were only alUes 
of his good fortune and his might; it was a serious question 
w^hether they would continue allies of his weakness. 

Reviewing the Emperor's aims in his expedition to the East, 
we find that it was not only the extension of his continental 
power over Russia that he sought, but also to shut England 
entirely out of Europe. Thus smitten in her most vital interests, 
she would sue for peace, withdraw her army from Spain, and open 
the seas to the world-wide policy of the conqueror. Perhaps 
this object would have been accomplished if Napoleon had halted 
at Smolensk according to his original plan, and then liberated 
Lithuania. He would in that case have collected his army and 
swelled it with re-enforcements ; he would have established a well- 
regulated commissariat; then with an imposing show of strength 

580 



^Et. 43] Events in Spain and America 581 

he coiild have taken up a position threatening both Russian 
capitals, and one not without influence on poHtical affairs in the 
world at large. For at the very time that he crossed the Niemen 
he found a helper in his struggle with England — ^the United 
States, which had declared war against England in June, 1812. 
For two years Napoleon had worked for this result, by promising 
the United States exemption from the decrees of Berlin and 
Milan if they would stop trading with England and her colonies 
and secure the repeal in London of the Orders in Council of 1807. 
He well knew that the EngUsh would not consent to this, at 
least not in the essential points. And in fact they not only 
refused when repeal was proposed, but took an altogether hostile 
attitude. They caused all American vessels to be searched for 
British seamen in order to press them into the English navy, and 
stirred up enemies in America against the government at Wash- 
ington. This led them in 1812 to open war, which at the outset 
cost the British some losses at sea. This new complication, 
combined with the constant decline in the financial condition of 
the island kingdom and a threatening position of Napoleon in 
Russia, would perhaps have operated in London in favour of a 
general peace, especially as the year had closed without any 
great results for England in the Iberian Peninsula. For, in spite 
of Wellington's victory at Salamanca, which procured for him the 
supreme command over all the forces arrayed against the French 
and raised the siege of Cadiz, he was finally forced by the 
blunders and selfishness of the Spaniards to retire to the Portu- 
guese frontier. But when one despatch after another brought 
to London news of the dwindUng away of the Grand Army, of 
the fruitless slaughter at Borodino, of the burning of Moscow, of 
the retreat and its horrors : then, as a matter of course, there was 
no longer any thought of peace and compromise with Napoleon. 
Nay, rather, the war sentiment now gained undisputed sway. 

Before the end of summer Great Britain had secured a 
peaceful settlement with Russia and at the same time had been 
influential in bringing about a treaty bet wen Alexander I. and 
the Spanish Regency (dated respectively July 18th and 20th, 
1812); so that while the fate of the campaign was still in the 



582 Leipzig [1812 

balance there already existed a coalition, directed not so much 
against France as a nation, as against that predominance achieved 
by Napoleon and represented in his ambitious personahty. Now 
arose the question whose answer would decide the future course 
of events: would the nations within the magic circle of Na- 
poleon's power, in view of the great losses they had suffered, 
also join the general movement, either with or without the 
consent of their governments? 

Napoleon does not seem to have discerned at once the fuU 
significance of the events in Russia. After his departure from 
the army he had still hoped that it would be easy to provision 
it and restore it to order at Vilna, that the division approaching 
to support it would bring new strength and courage, and that 
Murat, backed by Macdonald with the Prussians on the one 
side and by Schwarzenberg on the other, could maintain his 
position beyond the Niemen. When he passed through War- 
saw he assured the government there that he still had 120,000 
men. He had no thoughts of giving up his position of suprem- 
acy in Europe; not even when finally he heard that the rem- 
nants of the ''Grand Army" had been unable to keep their 
position at Vilna, but that after infecting the newly-arrived 
fresh troops with their disorder they had to be led back over 
the Niemen to Konigsberg, with untold sufferings and hourly 
losses on the road, and that the Old Guard numbered only 
400 and the cavalry of the Guard 800 horse, the remainder con- 
sisting of a chaotic mass of several thousand officers and subal- 
terns. That was a great misfortune, of course, but not so 
great as to destroy all courage. Napoleon resolved to bring a 
new army into the field and march against the Russians in 
the spring. Immediately upon his arrival in Paris prepara- 
tions for armament were initiated on a large scale, the plans 
for which he had very likely thought out carefully during the 
protracted retreat. 

The principal thing was, of course, that his government still 
had a strong enough position in France itself and the French 
people did not refuse to follow in his service. The authorities 
and institutions, as was to be expected, taking the hint, 



iET. 43] Napoleon Exalts Civil Loyalty 583 

showed no lack of devoted homage and assurances of unwaver- 
ing loyalty. In his answers to them Napoleon made some 
reference to the plot of Malet and to the attitude of the gov- 
ernment organs. ''Timid and cowardly soldiers/' said he to 
the deputation of the Senate, ''may cost a nation its inde- 
pendence, but timid officials destroy the majesty of the laws, 
the rights of the throne, and the order of society. The noblest 
death would be that of the soldier on the field of honour, if that 
of the official who falls while defending his monarch, the throne, 
and the laws were not still more glorious." In his reply to 
the address of the Council of State he inveighed against those 
who upheld the doctrine of natural rights, and held them ac- 
countable for the insecurity of pubhc institutions. "Indeed," 
he said, "who are they that have declared the principle that 
revolt is a duty? that have flattered the people by ascribing to 
them a sovereignty which they are incapable of exercising? 
Who have undermined the dignity and sanctity of the laws by 
making them dependent not on the hallowed principles of jus- 
tice, on the nature of things and of civil rights, but simply on 
the will of a collection of men who are wholly lacking in any 
understanding of civil and penal law, of administration, or of 
mihtary and political statutes? He who is called to regenerate 
a state must proceed on principles diametrically opposed to 
these. History portrays the heart of man; in its pages must 
we seek for the merits and defects of different kinds of legisla- 
tion." What was his object in such outbursts? Nothing but 
to point out clearly once more how he himself had once saved 
the state from the anarchy into which that spirit of revolt had 
plunged it. This spirit had now manifested itself again, and 
the state would certainly be ruined by it if the Emperor were 
to be forsaken now instead of being sustained with might and 
main ; and this applied equally to his son, the heir of his throne 
and of his principles. 

It now remained to be seen whether the people of France 
could be made to share that conviction. For that was neces- 
sary if Napoleon was to succeed in recovering with a new army 
his former position. 



584 Leipzig [1S13 

On his return home all the recruiting material he could 
conmiand consisted of the conscription of 1813, say 140,000 
men, most of whom reported at the military stations before the 
end of December and were listed in the cadres. Within a few 
months they would be sufficiently drilled for active service. 
Of trained soldiers there were only four regiments of marine 
artillery, 3000 gendarmes, and two battalions of the Paris 
municipal guard. These forces would not by any means be 
sufficient for the Emperor in his present situation and with 
his outlook for new wars and new victories. He must have 
other and far larger forces. There were the cohorts of the 
national guards, 80,000 strong; but then they were not avail- 
able outside of France, and most of their leaders were officers 
who had been either invalided, pensioned, or discharged. 

Some remedy was required in this situation. In the first 
place the Senate was called upon to pass a decree that the co- 
horts, hke the regular line, would have to serve in foreign wars ; 
next, the "Grand Army" — whenever the chaos of stragglers 
was disentangled — must send on all available generals, staff- 
officers, colonels, and subalterns. Both these things were ac- 
complished. Nay, more: from the national guard itself there 
came in individual petitions (by order, of course) for the privi- 
lege of being led against the enemy, whereupon the Senate passed 
the necessary decree, January 11th, 1813. This also opened 
up the prospect of 250,000 men in addition; i.e., 100,000 from 
the last four age classes, which had hitherto been exempt from 
the levy, and 150,000 of the conscription of 1814, which, however, 
the Emperor would not call to arms until spring. Thus the 
material for the new army was provided, and if some squad- 
rons and a few larger bodies of troops were taken in from the 
army in Spain, a very respectable army could be put into the 
field. But Napoleon was not satisfied with that; in April he 
demanded from the Senate 180,000 men more, national guards 
and recruits, so that, taking into account desertion, incompe- 
tence, and sickness, he might have at his disposal an army of 
600,000 men for the campaign of 1813. The scarcity of horses 
he sought to remedy by purchases in France and Hanover, 



^T. 43] The Struggle for Recovery 585 

Moreover, the suggestion was made to corporations and private 
parties that they could secure special consideration by volun- 
tarily offering to the Emperor horsemen already equipped. 

Napoleon exhibited in January of 1813 the same untiring 
activity as of old, the same knowledge of his resources down to 
the smallest detail, all held ready for use by a prodigious memory. 
It is with increasing astonishment that we see this one man, no 
longer aided by the usual carefully prepared lists of troops^ 
under circumstances that would have dimmed the vision and 
disturbed the calm of any other human being, and surrounded 
by servants that were of assistance only in subordinate mat- 
ters, working with indefatigable energy to rebuild the fabric 
of his power. What a pity that this great genius for admin- 
istration, which had once brought order and strength to the 
state, was now exhausting itself in efforts that would sap the 
national forces! 

But for these new sacrifices which he demanded it was not 
enough to have gained the consent of the Senate. It was neces- 
sary also to gain the good-will of the people, or at least overcome 
its reluctance; and that was no easy task. But here French 
patriotism helped him out. Not only the Emperor but France, 
too, had forfeited by the misfortune of the last year her com- 
manding position in foreign affairs, her decisive pre-eminence 
among the nations. However deeply the people might deplore 
the unceasing state of war and its consequences, they neverthe- 
less had no desire to see their country in a state of weak- 
ness. And the consequences of her loss of power were already 
making themselves felt. 

This was true to begin with in Prussia, which had been com- 
pelled to join sides with the oppressor only by a menacing show 
of power. The people there regarded the destruction of the 
Grand Army, from which their own soldiers had escaped, as a sort 
of judgment of God, and as a sign to them to throw off at last 
the yoke of this humiliating alHance: 

"With rider and horse and all, 
So God hath caused their fall," 

as a poet expressed it. The oppressive acts of the troops as 



586 Leipzig [1813 

they marched through the country had kindled the rage of the 
people against the foreigners and roused an undying hatred in 
their bosoms that sought for expression in action. One incident 
may serve as a measure of the sentiment that prevailed in the 
Prussian corps which had been compelled to serve the enemy 
of the people. Before Riga it had certainly behaved well. But 
later when Paulucci, the Russian commandant of the fortress, 
by authority of the Czar, sought to mn over General von 
Yorck (who was in command in place of Grawert, then sick) to 
the Russian side, and exhibited a letter in which Alexander bound 
himself solemnly not to put up his sword until Prussia should 
occupy again her position of 1806; and when in December, on the 
retreat back to the south, Torek's division found before it a 
Russian division under Diebitsch, who confirmed the promise; 
when, finally, the news was positively confirmed of the breaking 
up of the Grand Army : then the Prussian general concluded at 
Tauroggen on the 30th of December, 1812, a convention declaring 
his corps to be a neutral body and binding it not to fight against 
Russia for two months, even though the King should repudiate 
the agreement and command them to join the French again. 
That was a momentous act; for it showed that even a man of 
strictest loyalty and most conservative convictions, who had a 
profound aversion to reformers like Scharnhorst and Stein, was 
forced to give way before the weight of public opinion. In 1809 
such men as Bliicher and Biilow wanted to act, "with the king or 
without," in favour of Austria ; now even a man like Yorck refused 
to fight against the Russians, whether the King approved or not. 
So the national sentiment won the day even over the monarchical. 
The cabinet of Frederick William III. began to be uncertain as to 
its forces; it must needs turn about, to regain full control over 
them. But the encouragement from that convention at Taurog- 
gen to the rest of Germany was indescribable. '* Those whose 
memory reaches back to that period," writes Ranke, "will recall 
that the news of it seemed even to those at a great distance Hke 
a flash of lightning that illumined and transfigured the entire 
horizon. While still under the French yoke, one could feel every- 
where the unwonted pulsations of the national consciousness." 



iST. 43] Throwing the Blame on Murat 587 

The impression of that same news on Napoleon was deep and 
lasting. The lessons he had received in Russia and w^as still 
hourly receiving in Spain in regard to the power of a national 
rising had at last opened his eyes, so that he did not delude 
himself as to the moral significance of the event. But in addi- 
tion to that it had also a strategical significance, and it was this 
aspect that proved fatal to him. For after the desertion of the 
corps of allies any longer stay of his broken army at Konigsberg, 
even with such re-enforcements as were sent, was out of the 
question. Murat had to retreat before the pursuit of the Rus- 
sians to Posen and give up the line of the Vistula. This is the 
point to which Napoleon directed the attention of the French. 
"Immediately after I had heard of the treason of Yorck," he 
writes on the 6th of January to Berthier, w^ho had remained 
wdth the army, "I resolved to make a communication to the 
nation, to be issued to-morrow, and order extraordinary levies of 
men." The response was the Senatus consultum of the 11th 
mentioned above, which was nowhere stubbornly opposed, so 
that Maret felt quite justified in explaining to the ambassadors 
at foreign courts that it was the intention of the French people 
not only to arm itself on a scale corresponding to its losses, ''but 
also to estabUsh its prestige, its glory, and its tranquillity secure 
against all contingencies." The Emperor assured the Prussian 
envoy at Paris, Krusemarck, that the French would follow him 
unquestioningly, and that if need be he would even arm the 
women. 

But if the people were to offer this new sacrifice of blood 
without resistance, then the prestige and renown of their com- 
mander must also be undimmed. Hence wherever opportunity 
offered positive assurances were given out that the Emperor had 
invariably defeated the Russians, that it was only the fiendish 
cold that had destroyed the army, which really had per- 
ished only after Murat took command. There has been 
recently pubUshed a conversation between the Emperor and 
one of his higher officials, Count Mole, in February, 1813, which 
shows clearly how Napoleon wished to be judged. On this 
occasion he said: ''The King of Naples is incapable of taking 



588 Leipzig [1813 

supreme command. He has lost me an army, for at the time I 
left I still had one ; now I have one no longer. After my departure 
the King lost his head; he did not know how to awe men into 
obedience, discipline grew extremely lax, in Vilna the troops 
plundered twelve miUions' worth of property, and the soldiers 
became good for nothing." 

Another means of overcoming popular dislike of these new 
armaments was found in the settlement of his contest with the 
Pope. In that way he would win over the millions of devout 
Cathohcs who had been offended by his violent measures against 
Pius VII. Would not they, too, see in the destruction of the 
army a visitation of God, who withheld his favour from a leader 
who was under the ban? Uncle Fesch, the cardinal, had the 
courage to say as much right out; that was something that 
demanded consideration. In 1811, as we have seen, the Pope 
at Savona had accepted the decree of the national council 
concerning the investiture of newly appointed bishops only 
with certain reservations; he had not recognized the council, 
and had granted the privilege of confirmation to the metropolitans 
in case of refusal on the part of the Pope only on condition that 
they performed the rite in the name of the head of the Church, 
whereas the Emperor desired the new bishops to be invested 
in the name of the Imperator. Pius, who was already regretting 
his action, refused his consent to this, whereupon Napoleon gave 
orders to bring him from Savona to Fontainebleau ; here, with. 
the assistance of some submissive prelates, new negotiations 
were begun, which the Emperor himself then brought to a con- 
clusion. He employed against his prisoner all the resources of 
his diplomatic art and craft. Now he would make demands 
without serious intent and only with a view to dropping them for 
something more important; again, he would threaten, become 
vehement, taunt His Holiness with his ignorance in ecclesiastical 
affairs; and then, again, he would spread out before him a 
glowing prophetic picture of the extension and power which the 
Church would attain by his aid — ^first and foremost, the recovery 
of Germany to the Catholic fold — if Pius would only yield to his 
wishes, renounce temporal sovereignty, accept the decree of the 



^T. 43] The New Agreement with the Pope 589 

council without ado, and establish his residence in Paris. But 
on this last point the Pope was not to be moved; he chose 
Avignon, which was not expressly mentioned, to be sure, in the 
concordat; that read as follows: ''His Holiness will exercise the 
papal authority in France and in the kingdom of Italy in the 
same form and manner as his predecessors." Having yielded this 
point, Napoleon did not insist that the renunciation of the 
patrimony of St. Peter should be explicitly set down in the 
articles; that was involved in the provisions of the agreement. 
The new concordat was signed on the 25th of January, 1813; 
the decree of the council in regard to the investing of bishops was 
included word for word. In return for his lost lands the Pope 
was to be maintained with an annual revenue of two million 
francs ; the Emperor pardoned the refractory prelates. Napoleon 
had not yet secured all that he desired; he wanted to be the head 
of the Church, somew^hat like the Czar in his own country, only far 
higher and with more universal sway as the name of the Church 
indicated, and with a world-wide mission to fulfil. Still the 
immediate advantage he was after he had gained. He had 
made his peace with the Pope, and the world could hear of it 
none too soon. Newspaper articles and church bells proclaimed 
it far and wide, and everywhere they sang '' Te deum laudamus." 
And although Pius, tormented by misgivings and remorse and 
enlightened by his old advisers, who again had access to him, as 
to the pohtical situation of Napoleon, recalled his consent two 
months later, yet meantime the news of the reconciUation at 
Fontainebleau had its effect, and the war preparations w^ere then 
for the most part completed. 

But, besides the faithful, the Emperor had to win over 
those, too, who were more concerned for this world's goods than 
for those of the next world. That was, of course, very difficult; 
for, since he had undertaken the Russian expedition with 
the expectation that it would bring in material profit and 
restore order to the finances of the state, like the wars of 1805 
and 1807, the disappointment was tremendous. And now the 
new armaments called for new and extraordinary expenses. A 
deficit of nearly 150,000,000 francs was expected for the year 



590 Leipzig [I813 

1813, and the shortage of the two preceding years, over 82,000,000 
francs, had not been made up. MoUien, Minister of the Treasury, 
a most honourable man, who had followed the policy of the 
Emperor with undisguised anxiety, advised him to increase the 
direct taxes. But Napoleon set aside that suggestion more 
positively than ever. He fought shy of touching the personal 
property of individuals. He hit upon another device: he would 
turn the communal property to some account. Several thousand 
communes possessed real estate that was not used for public 
purposes, but was leased. These lands were estimated to be 
worth 370,000,000 francs. The rentals were small, amount- 
ing to only about nine millions. But nine millions of interest 
would represent an investment of 135,000,000 in the five per 
cents, which were then selling at 75. Now if the communes had 
their nine millions of yearly income assured by entering for them 
180,000,000 in the Great Book of the public debt,then by seUing 
the lands on account of the state the 230,000,000 required would 
be obtained and the deficit covered. The sale was to be done by 
the ''caisse d'amortissement,* which in the interim issued redeem- 
able bonds bearing five per cent interest, with which the minister 
paid creditors of the state, contractors, etc., this being easily 
managed because of the sure interest. Napoleon himself pur- 
chased 71,000,000 francs' worth from the treasury of the Tuileries^ 
to raise the value of this paper. Mollien protested long against 
this arbitrary measure, which not only robbed the communes of 
their property, but also limited them for all the future to the 
above small revenue, whereas by natural processes their expenses 
would go on increasing and could be met only by increased 
assessments which would fall on individuals directly. Hence it 
was in appearance only that for the moment the individual with 
his property was not called on to contribute. But for Napoleon 
the moment was all-important. The great founder of national 
order and well-being we once knew is hardly to be recognized in 
this opportunist. Regardless of everything, now as during the 
past summer, he pushes on for that decisive victory which is to 

* See page 229. 



.Et. 43] Napoleon*s Earlier Constitutional Plans 591 

lay all Europe at his feet. Then will he restore order and pros- 
perity, but certainly not until then. 

When the new financial law had been discussed in council, it 
passed, in accordance with the constitution, to the Corps L^gis- 
latif. Before the Russian campaign this concession was no 
longer made; the financial law for 1812 had been enacted without 
consulting the deputies of the legislature. In fact Napoleon 
seems to have cherished the firm intention to dissolve the Corps 
L^gislatif entirely after his victories over Russia ; he said of it to 
Metternich at Dresden that he had muzzled it and brought dis- 
credit upon it, and now only needed to put the key of the legis- 
lative chamber into his pocket. Then he had a new programme 
in mind. " France," said he, '^ is less fitted for the form of popular 
representation than many countries. In the Tribunate there 
was nothing going on but revolution ; I established order by abol- 
ishing that body. However, I do not want absolute power; I 
want more than mere forms. I want something that will conduce 
wholly and solely to order and public prosperity. I shall 
reorganize the Senate and the Council of State. The former will 
replace the upper house; the latter, the Chamber of Deputies. I 
shall continue to appoint all the senators ; one third of the Council 
I shall permit to be elected, the rest I shall choose myself. 
These will then prepare the budget and discuss all bills. Thus I 
shall have a real representation of the people, for it will consist 
only of experienced men of affairs; no more visionary ranting, 
no glittering tinsel of theory. Then France will be well governed 
even imder an inactive ruler — for such are sure to come — and 
the usual method of educating princes will entirely suffice." This 
speech had the definite aim of showing Metternich and the world 
clearly that his work, the Empire, did not rest, was not dependent 
upon a single life. He would see to it that it should remain 
imshaken even under those emperors of his dynasty who were 
not endowed with his genius and energy. So far so good. 
But the fact that he expected national salvation only at the 
hands of bureaucrats shows that his own mind was not with- 
out its limitations; for he failed to grasp the great truth that 
only by the working together of theory and practice, only when 



59^ Leipzig ti8i3 

thinking shapes pubhc poHcy and, conversely, when political 
experience guides thinking, does a state develop a healthy life; 
whereas he, by his one-sided reliance on the practical factors of 
government, fell into as barren an extreme as the radical doc- 
trinaires that had preceded him in governing France. Had 
not the very things which he recognized as the foundations of the 
modern state and which he was spreading throughout the world 
with his armies, his officials, and his codes of laws once been the 
dream of just such visionaries as he detested so bitterly? His 
judgment of them might be never so contemptuous, and yet 
but for them and the fruit of their thinking his name might 
never have gone down to posterity. 

But these plans formed by the Imperator in the days of his 
highest glory had through subsequent events become impracti- 
cable. He now had no intention of altering the constitution. He 
did not lock up the hall of the Corps Legislatif , but rather opened 
its sessions on the 14th of February, 1813, with a speech which 
he wished to be regarded and publicly announced as a communi- 
cation to the nation. This last remnant of popular representa- 
tion was now a most welcome means of arriving at an under- 
standing. He referred them to the Minister of the Interior for 
the evidence that at no time had commerce and trade been so 
flourishing in France as at that hour. He then painted the 
course of the Russian war in the well-known colours, only that 
here for the first time mention was made of the ^^ premature 
appearance of the winter's cold," which has since managed to 
maintain itself for decades in history as an integral part of the 
Napoleonic legend. Besides that, he spoke of his peace with the 
Pope, of the English, who had again been obliged to evacuate 
Spain, where the ''French dynasty'* was now dominant and 
would continue dominant. -He said he was satisfied with the 
attitude of the aUies; he would abandon none of them and he 
would maintain the integrity of their governments. That 
meant that he proposed to hold fast to Poland, the Rhenish Con- 
federation, and Italy, in brief, the entire sphere of power that 
was his the previous year; to hold and keep it undiminished 
just as if no miserable war had weakened his forces by the loss 



^T. 43] Napoleon's Appeal to his Allies 593 

of a tried army of 400,000 men. But the world had accustomed 
him to making extraordinary plans, and for him it was in itself 
a sufficient sacrifice that he had to defer his intentions to master 
the world, for the Continental blockade could no longer be 
maintained, England continued unhindered her commerce in the 
North Sea and the Baltic, with Cadiz and the Levant, and the 
Indian project was vanishing into the remote future. He must 
first conquer, win victories unparalleled, if he was to take up that 
thread where he had dropped it. 

But supposing that Napoleon should be able to obtain from 
the French another armament for a new mihtary expedition, 
the next question was: could he also have at his disposal the 
military strength of all his allies, as in the last campaign? On 
the 18th of January, 1813, he had written to the princes of the 
Rhenish Confederation and called upon them for new contingents. 
To encourage them, he declared that the Russians had fought 
poorly and only the Cossacks had proved themselves effective 
fighters after their fashion. The Grand Army of Germany, with 
the corps of Schwarzenberg, still amounted, he declared, to 
200,000 men (!), and these he would swell before March by the 
national guards and new levies in Italy to such a point that he 
might have dispensed with further help from "his nations," but 
for Torek's defection with 20,000 Prussians. That had obhged 
the army (an army of 200,000, it is to be remembered) to 
retreat before the Russians (who fought so poorly) beyond the 
Vistula, and so the war had approached the vicinity of Germany. 
He would be ready, indeed, with all his forces to defend the 
Rhenish states, but they must also feel the necessity of taking 
their share in that task. 

The answer to this appeal was entirely satisfactory, although 
the several contingents diminished in size in proportion to the 
distance from France. The Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin 
was the only Rhenish prince who openly deserted Napoleon; 
all the rest were loyal. The most compliant, far more so than 
the Emperor's own brother Jerome, was the Grand Duke of 
Frankfort, who at once began most eagerly to equip two bat- 
talions in order to give Napoleon "opportunity for new glory." 



594 Leipzig [isis 

An oppressive excise law furnished the requisite funds. The 
King of Wiirttemberg, whose army corps of 14,000 had shrunk 
to 173 officers and 143 soldiers, hastened to assure him that 
immediately after he had become acquainted with the 29th 
bulletin he had busied himself in the effort to replace his con- 
tingent. Jerome of Westphalia again complained to his 
brother of the financial distress in his state — he himself had 
invested nineteen millions in France — ^but his brother's peremp- 
tory rebuke induced him to agree to furnish 20,000 men and 
send provision for 15,000 more to Magdeburg. As no money 
was on hand, he simply made requisitions. Bavaria, which had 
lost no less than 28,000 men, had to furnish an entire army, 
which was possible only with several conscriptions in 1813. 
Such sacrifices seemed too great to the Court of Munich, and 
the authorities refiected for a moment whether they should not 
take a neutral position; but finally, intimidated by the mighty 
armaments of Napoleon, they consented willingly to send one 
division. The rest of the contingent was gathered in a camp 
near Munich under Wrede. The Saxon court wavered even 
more than the Bavarian, as it saw Poland in the hands of the 
Russians and its own land threatened by a Russian invasion. 
Its policy was wholly dependent on that of its two German 
neighbours, Austria and Prussia. 

And that brings up the principal question: would the two 
chief German powers maintain the alliance with France or not? 
On the answer to this everything at first depended. 

Even before he wrote to the Rhenish states. Napoleon 
had made the proposal to the Courts of Berlin and Vienna 
that they reinforce their contingents. Then followed the defec- 
tion of Yorck. Could that be the answer of Frederick William 
III. ? Napoleon, with his usual distrust, might well suspect this, 
but he nevertheless accepted the assurances of the Prussian 
envoy that the King had nothing to do with that step, which 
was in fact the case. He not only had not commanded it; he 
actually felt, rather, that his poHcy had been disturbed by the 
high-handed act of his general. For, if the reports were true 
which trustworthy messengers had brought to Berlin ever since 



^T. 43] The Situation of Prussia 595 

November, 1812, as to the fate of the Grand Army, the conse- 
quence would surely be that the Russians would hasten to 
take every advantage of such an unexpected opportunity. But 
the aversion to what was called the '^ preponderance of Russia " 
was just as pronounced in Berlin as the desire to rid themselves 
of the French yoke. They did not venture even remotely to 
think of recovering Prussian territory beyond the Elbe, and 
the part of Poland lost in 1807 would doubtless now be appro- 
priated by Russia. But Poland had been the very goal of 
Hardenberg's thoughts of late; he had even fancied Napoleon 
would bestow that kingdom on Frederich William, which would 
make a bulwark against Russia. So at the close of the year 
1812 the Court of Berlin was rather disposed to reach an under- 
standing with Austria, when also there was a strongly hostile 
feeling against Russia, and a confidential agent of the King 
repaired to Vienna. Just at that time came the proposal of 
the Czar that Prussia should separate from France and join 
his party, that he would restore Prussia to the position she held 
in 1806; should the King, however, adhere to his alliance with 
Napoleon, this would be regarded as a declaration of war, in 
which case Russia claimed the right to partition Prussia. 

That was no empty threat. At the time of Alexander's com- 
pact with Bernadotte at Abo the annexation of Prussia as far 
as the Vistula was talked of, the Crown Prince of Sweden agree- 
ing to accept it in lieu of Norway, which had been promised him. 
And even now a strong party in the Czar's court were insisting 
on making the Vistula frontier a condition of peace with Na- 
poleon. This party^ which included Kutusoff and Romanzoff, 
did not, however, prevail. Alexander adopted another view 
which a young diplomat, Nesselrode, successfully advocated. 
Russia, said the latter, is in need of a long and secure peace; 
this is not to be obtained unless the preponderance of France is 
destroyed by decisive defeats and the old balance of the powers 
is restored. Russia alone is not equal to this task and needs the 
support of the central powers. This shaped the overtures made 
to Prussia. The Czar gave up all claims to East Prussian 
territory ; that, of course, did not include the duchy of Warsaw, 



596 Leipzig [1813 

which he was just entering. We learn that he was again, as in 

1811, ardently considering the project of a united Poland under 
his rule, i.e., in a personal union with Russia. As he wrote 
to Czartoryski on the 13th of January, 1813, only regard for 
public opinion at home, which was unfavourable to the Poles, 
and for Austria and Prussia, hindered him from bringing forward 
that project now. Such a plan necessarily stood in the way 
of an understanding with Frederick Wilham III., and it was 
now a question of the utmost importance whether the latter's 
envoy, Knesebeck, would find in Vienna what he was looking 
for, namely, willingness to join Prussia in an armed interven- 
tion with the twofold object of profiting by the weakness of 
France on the one hand, and of guarding against the threatened 
preponderance of Russia on the other. 

Nowhere was there greater astonishment over the issue of the 
Russian campaign than at the court of Francis I. As late as 
October, Metternich, who had seen fit to approach Hardenberg 
after the Franco-Prussian alliance had been concluded, wrote to 
him confidentially that, judging from the way the Russians 
conducted their war operations, he regarded their existence as a 
European state virtually forfeited ; and as the necessity of peace 
was being felt also in England, he purposed to agitate a general 
pacification. Such was in fact his intention. But in order to 
be able to play the role of mediator with dignity, the minister 
felt that what little army the impoverished state on the Danube 
had must be spared as far as possible, and this had been his 
constant effort throughout the campaign. As early as April, 

1812, he had told Stackelberg, the Russian envoy at Vienna, the 
ostensible provisions of the treaty of alliance with France and 
assured him that Austria would certainly not raise more than 
30,000 auxiliary troops; beyond that she would arm only in her 
own defence. Russia, to whom security along the Austrian 
frontier was as welcome as the same condition on the Russian 
frontier was to Austria, answered readily that in case of victory 
she would not act contrary to the interests of the Court of Vienna. 
So a sort of unwritten agreement was arrived at between these 
two declared enemies, and their diplomatic relations were 



Mr. 43] Metternich*s Diplomacy 597 

only outwardly broken off. This, however, was very far from 
being an understanding directed against Napoleon.* Austria 
gained the point that she could strengthen herself without any 
interference on the part of Russia. Hence she was not making 
a mere show of fighting in the war against Russia, but was acting 
simply as a power that spares what little force it has because it 
is absolutely necessary. When, however. Napoleon, after the 
campaign, demanded that his father-in-law should double his 
contingent (which had gone back to Warsaw with the Saxons 
under Reynier and with a French division), so that the Russians 
might be kept busy while he was raising new armies, this demand 
was so directly contrary to the plans of Austria that consent was 
impossible. Yet the refusal could not be expressed abruptly 
and outright, lest suspicion be roused. What was to be done? 

Metternich found an expedient in resuming in real earnest his 
plan of pacification ; he assured Napoleon through a special envoy 
(General Bubna) that only a universal peace on a broad basis 
could heal the wounds of the last campaign and establish the 
new French dynasty. At the same time he urged the British 
government to conclude peace. Napoleon did not reject this 
Austrian effort at intervention; but his utterances to Bubna left 
little or no prospect of peace. Spain, he said, would remain in 
the possession of his family, only his troops should leave the 
country ; but that only on condition that the British evacuated 
Sicily. Murat would keep Naples. He himself would not give 
up one of the countries annexed to France by Senatus consultum 
(Piedmont, Rome, Tuscany, Holland, Vallais, the Hanseatic 
territory, Oldenburg, etc.). On the other hand, if Francis 
doubled his contingent, he would furnish subsidies. His very life 
was in the thought of renewing war. As soon as this certainty 
was reached, Metternich turned all his efforts toward keeping the 
clash of arms far from Austria. He refused Napoleon's demand 
for a doubled contingent, yet by no means joined sides with his 
enemies. He shielded himself behind his role as a preacher of 

* At that very time the Austrian envoy at Stockholm, Neipperg, tried 
to break the alliance between Sweden and Russia, and this was known in 
St. Petersburg. (Martens, ''Recueil," IH. 86.) 



598 Leipzig [1813 

peace, yet carefully avoided proposing definite conditions of 
peace which he might have to defend ; for Austria was in no fit 
condition for war either financially or in military resources. He 
encouraged Hardenberg to join the party of Russia publicly, 
because that would keep the war in the north; but he would not 
exert himself to secure from Russia the cession of Warsaw to 
Prussia, which made Knesebeck's mission a failure. To avoid 
all chance of collision he sent the auxiliary corps, not from 
Warsaw to Kalisch, as Viceroy Eugene, who had relieved Murat 
as commander of the broken army, had demanded, but to 
Cracow after the close of a truce with the Russians, '^ in order to 
save it for the coming campaign," as he assured the Emperor at 
Paris. This was not as yet defection from Napoleon, but it 
was "the first step in that direction": so the French Emperor 
himself termed it. He saw at once all the disadvantages of this 
measure, which would force Eugene, by depriving him of his 
support, to recede from the Vistula to the Oder. The Russians 
would get an open road for their advance. 

But that advance in turn brought pressure to bear on the 
negotiations with Prussia and would hasten their settlement. 
Frederick WilUam III. felt keenly hurt at the exclusively 
Austrian pohcy of Metternich. That King was still of the same 
mind as in the crisis of 1805, 1809, and 1811; he was still strongly 
convinced (and not without good reason) that Napoleon was to 
be overcome only by a coalition of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, 
and it was only with reluctance that he was induced to negotiate 
separately with Russia. He had disavowed the defection of 
Yorck, and yet the same messenger who announced his discharge 
to that general was commissioned to hold out secretly to the 
Czar a prospect of alliance, provided the latter would protect him 
from Napoleon by a rapid advance and also restrict his Polish 
schemes. When Alexander gave a reassuring answer — ^he wrote 
that letter to Czartoryski on the same day — the King consented 
to go away from Potsdam to Breslau in order to get away from 
the French, who still occupied Berlin (this was on the 22d of 
January, 1813). In spite of that, he left Napoleon an oppor- 
tunity of again securing Prussia for his own interests by paying 



2Et. 43] The Uprising of the Prussian People 599 

her debt of 90,000,000 francs incurred by the immense army sup- 
pHes, or by guaranteeing to Prussia new territory. Napoleon 
did neither one thing nor the other; he contented himself with 
speaking to the Prussian envoy quite carelessly about parts of 
the duchy of Warsaw and the kingdom of Westphalia, without 
binding himself in the least, and so facihtated the quest of 
Alexander. On the day when the envoy's report arrived at 
Breslau, Hardenberg, who was already favourable to Russia, 
persuaded the King to create a military commission, of which 
Scharnhorst was made a member (January 28th) . Yet Frederick 
WiUiam had no thought as yet of fighting side by side with the 
Czar. When he mobilized the troops of the fine in Silesia and 
Pomerania (February 12th), he aimed only at guarding against a 
possible attack by the French, perhaps from Berlin, where a 
division under Grenier had arrived ; and when he sent Knesebeck 
to Alexander to negotiate for a treaty of alliance, his immediate 
object was only to propose to Napoleon, with Russia to support 
him, a truce that should keep the French troops on the left side 
of the Elbe and the Russian on the right of the Vistula, and so 
serve as an introduction to a peace, on the same basis as the 
peace of Lun^ville, perhaps, or of Amiens. For the time he had 
not the remotest intention of waging a war of extinction against 
Napoleon. 

But that was the intention of his people. Although this 
sentiment was not strong enough in the year 1809 to carry the 
Eang with it, now it was to succeed. In memorials, in peti- 
tions and addresses, in letters from devoted generals, it was 
impressed on the King that every Prussian regarded war against 
France, whose oppression had been so deeply and painfully felt, 
as a holy war. And it was seen how much in earnest the people 
were when the military commission on the 3d of February called 
upon the well-to-do and the intelligent to enter the army as 
volimteer chasseurs, and a few days later set aside all exemp- 
tions from service between the ages of 17 and 24, thus declaring 
liabiUty to service universal. They came in throngs, fired with 
enthusiasm and the martial spirit, and eagerly seized the 
weapons that were offered, while others, who could not fight with 



6oo Leipzig [1813 

them, sacrificed almost their last possessions for the sole purpose 
of resisting the French — certainly for no other purpose, whatever 
the King's decision might be. There was a revolutionary im- 
pulse in the Prussian people, just as there had been four years 
before, when Frederick William hesitated, only it was still 
stronger.* Moreover, they felt themselves to be not merely 
Prussians, but Germans first of all, and i' constituted them- 
selves a nation" as the Austrians had done in 1809, while the 
King and his confidential advisers still adhered to provincial par- 
ticularism. This national German movement among the people 
favoured the Czar to this extent, that it laid infinitely less stress 
on the possession of Polish territory than did the policy of the 
Berlin cabinet, and Alexander had but to give it active support 
to pave the way for his secret designs with regard to Warsaw. 
Accordingly he sent Stein with full powers to Kdnigsberg, to 
assemble the provincial estates and secure from them appro- 
priations and military preparations; the same Stein who was 
looked up to as the head of the national party that looked far 
beyond the boundaries of the petty German states to a united 
Germany. "I have but one fatherland," he had written in 
December, 1812, "that is, Germany; in this moment of great 
development I am utterly indifferent to dynasties." He ac- 
complished his object in Konigsberg completely. The diet 
gladly acceded to Torek's demand that his corps be filled up, 
passed a militia law drafted by Clausewitz, calling for about 
40,000 men all told, and opened the East Prussian ports. All 
this was quite independent of the court, and just as if their King 
had already definitely taken sides with Russia. 

But that was far from the case. The negotiations between 
Knesebeck and Alexander at Kalisch came to a halt, because 
the former went beyond his instructions and demanded more 
persistently than they called for that all former possessions of 
Prussia in Poland be returned to her; to this the Czar would 
not listen. Not until the Czar at the suggestion of Stein, utterly 
ignoring the troublesome envoy, had a treaty presented directly 

* See page 457. 



^T. 43] Prussia Declares War 60 1 

at Breslau did matters finally reach a settlement (February 
27th), and then it was under the pressure of the growing ex- 
citement among the people and the army. On the next day 
the convention was also signed at Kalisch. It was an offensive 
and defensive alliance, with the object of liberating Europe and 
primarily of restoring Prussia to the position she occupied 
in 1806. Russia guaranteed to her ally the possession of old 
Prussia, Frederick William gave up his quondam Polish prov- 
ince and contented himself with a strip of land which joins 
East Prussia and Silesia. Both powers were to make efforts 
to win Austria to their cause, and Russia agreed to support 
Prussia's efforts to secure subsidies from England. In order to 
restore the former power of the House of Hohenzollern, con- 
quests in North Germany were fixed upo'n, — Hanover, only, 
being excepted on account of England. In Article III. the King 
pledged himself to add to his war forces by calling out the 
Landwehr, and on the 17th of March, 1813, appeared the neces- 
sary decree, accompanied by a ringing appeal '' To my people,'' 
summoning them to a war of liberation from the long-endured 
oppression of foreign tyranny. On the same day Hardenberg 
handed to the French ambassador, Saint-Martin, the declaration 
of war. 

Thus at Breslau the German national party had won the day 
over the local Prussian party, and soon the national trend of the 
Russo-Prussian alliance found expression in a new treaty of 
March 19th, 1813. In a proclamation to all Germans of the 
Rhenish Confederation the liberation of Germany from the 
dominating influence of France was held up as an object for 
which all should work together. Any prince who failed to 
respond to the appeal within a given time was threatened with 
the loss of his territory. A few days later a proclamation of 
Kutusoff ''To the Germans" was published in which the threat 
was still more plainly uttered against those princes who ''would 
be, and remain, false to the cause of Germany " ; they were 
declared to be "ripe for annihilation by the power of public 
opinion and the might of arms in a just cause." A central 
commission of administration of four members with full powers, 



6o2 Leipzig [1813 

appointed by Russia and Prussia, — Stein at their head, — was to 
administer affairs, make requisitions, raise a militia, etc., in the 
territories occupied. This was aimed in the first instance 
against Saxony, whither the viceroy Eugene had gone from 
the Oder by way of Berlin; only to leave it again, however, 
in March at the express special command of Napoleon, and to 
take up a strong position at Magdeburg. Alexander had said 
to Knesebeck and other confidential agents that Saxony was 
much better situated than Poland for an addition to Prussian 
territory, and that may have had some weight at Breslau. 
King Frederick Augustus had gone with two regiments of cavalry 
to Ratisbon, and his minister Senfft thought the best way 
out of the difficulty was to withhold the Saxon troops in Torgau 
both from the French and the alUes, and to conclude a secret alli- 
ance with Austria which guaranteed the integrity of her (Sax- 
ony's) German possessions and granted an indemnity for 
Warsaw, in return for which Saxony would support the pacifi- 
cation scheme of Emperor Francis with 30,000 men (April 
20th, 1813). The Saxon people failed to rise and join Prussia, 
as the allies may have hoped, although the populace in Dresden, 
embittered by the blowing up of the stone bridges at the orders 
of Davout as he was retiring, welcomed the two monarchs with 
great demonstrations of joy on their entry into the city on the 
23d of April. 

While the appeal to national feeling proved a failure here, 
in other places there were uprisings which had no lasting effect 
owing to the presence of the French, e.g. in Hamburg, where a 
Cossack patrol appeared about the middle of March and was 
enthusiastically welcomed; in Oldenburg and other coast cities, 
where rash acts of violence against the French tax-collectors 
and gendarmes led later to cruel reprisals, when the Russians 
had to retire again and a French flying column appeared in 
their stead. If the King of Prussia had only changed his sys- 
tem and joined the national party two months earlier, when 
everybody was still fresh from the impression of the catastrophe 
that befell the Grand Army, he would have succeeded in win- 
ning a great following in the west German states and the appeal 



-^T. 43] Treaty between Prussia and England 603 

to the nation might have found an echo everywhere.* Now, 
indeed, when Napolon had conjured a new army out of the 
earth and had attached his vassals beyond the Rhine anew to 
his interests, this result could no longer be secured. The allies, 
if they wanted to conquer, had only themselves and the help 
of outside powers to rely on. 

The Treaty of Breslau of February 27th was to be communi- 
cated to Sweden and England as well as Austria. Those two 
nations were now brought into closer relations through the good 
offices of Russia, which had been allied with them for a year. 
England guaranteed to Crown Prince Carl John the future acqui- 
sition of Norway, and promised him the island of Guadaloupe 
and corresponding subsidies if he would enter the Continental 
war against France with 30,000 men. Napoleon, who may have 
foreseen something of the kind, had made yet one more effort, 
sending a secret messenger at the end of February, 1813, to 
effect a reconciliation with Bernadotte ; but as he again did not 
offer Norway, but only Pomerania and indefinite lands between 
the Elbe and the Oder — the well-known partition of Prussia — 
the negotiations came to nothing. On the 3d of March the 
Swedish-British treaty was concluded, and on the 23d the Crown 
Prince sent a public letter to his former sovereign renouncing his 
allegiance. Prussia also, which had hitherto been at war with 
England, now naturally entered into a treaty with that power, 
which promised Frederick William the necessary subsidies. 
And in order to hold that monarch to the project of war and so 
keep Russia on the offensive, the government in London gave up 
the scheme of founding a Guelph kingdom under a British prince 
between the Elbe and the Scheldt. Pitt's plan came to life again, 
namely, in this struggle against the preponderance of France to 
restore the balance of the powers and so reopen the old markets 
for British exports. The old map of Europe which he had 
ordered to be rolled up was brought out again ; for now it was to 
be restored. This was not at all the sentiment which Metternich 

* On the 29th of January Prince Hatzf eldt said to Napoleon in Paris that 
if the fire were now kindled in Prussia, it would inflame all Germany, and 
the Emperor agreed with him. 



6o4 Leipzig (1813 

looked for on the Thames when he offered the EngHsh govern- 
ment his good offices toward securing a universal peace, in which 
England was to induce Napoleon, by concessions beyond the 
seas, to restrict himself on the Continent and keep the peace. 
The London Cabinet rejected that altogether now. The passage 
in Napoleon's speech from the throne dealing with the future of 
Spain was enough, they said, to show that such a step had no 
prospect of success. 

This naturally reacted on the policy of the Austrian govern- 
ment. If Austria was to hold fast to the role of peace-maker, — 
which was desirable both for her own independence and in order 
to cut loose from the French alliance, — she must lay before the 
French Emperor the proposed restrictions without being able at 
first to offer anything in compensation; and, as he would hardly 
enter willingly into the plan, she must be armed, in order that 
the emphasis of powerful resources might be lent to the proposals. 
In other words, Austria had to exchange the role of unarmed 
mediation for that of armed intervention. To have the requisite 
strength, Metternich made the compact with Saxony, and tried 
to win Murat, Bavaria, and even Jerome (it is stated) to his 
party of neutral mediation. This change in policy was adopted 
in March, 1813, at the very time that Napoleon had sent a new 
ambassador. Count Narbonne, to Vienna, to hold forth there the 
prospect of a partition of Prussia and the acquisition of Silesia, 
if his father-in-law would fight again on his side with 100,000 men, 
Metternich declined, and when the envoy requested that at 
least the auxiliary forces should terminate the truce concluded 
in January, he replied that the Russians had already served 
notice to that effect; but he shrewdly concealed the fact that they 
had done so at the request of Austria and after the convention of 
March 29th, in order that the corps might retire before superior 
forces to Galicia and from there to Bohemia, where a new force 
was being armed for the purposes of the policy of mediation. 
Would that army ever see active service? That depended on 
whether Napoleon were "reasonable," as Francis I. called it, i.e., 
whether he would forego his oppressive preponderance in Europe. 
The situation was well described by Talleyrand in Paris in the 



i©r. 43] War Takes the Place of Diplomacy 605 

following words addressed to Prince Schwarzenberg on his return : 
'^'The moment has come when the Emperor Napoleon must be 
King of France." That penetrating mind knew well enough 
that this utterance gave expression to an antagonism of interests 
that could never be reconciled. 

It had originally been Napolon's plan not to open hostilities 
imtil May. As late as the middle of March he speaks of it in 
letters to Eugene, saying that he proposed to cross the Elbe 
north of Magdeburg, having with him not only the army com- 
manded by the Viceroy, but also a second to be collected in 
Mainz and Erfurt; then by forced marches he would advance 
by way of Stettin to Danzig, where Rapp was waiting with 
30,000 men to be relieved. He thought he could command by 
that time 300,000 men for that movement, enough to bring the 
lower Vistida under his control. Then the Russians would 
have to recede, and Prussia would fall into his hands ; and we have 
already seen how he divided up the state of the HohenzoUems in 
his proffers to other governments. It was a grand conception, 
but very far from being a plan of war. Soon, even in a few weeks, 
it was dropped. The alliance of the northern powers, together 
with their insurrectionary tendencies, the threatened loss of 
Saxony, but especially the increasingly manifest uncertainty of 
Austria, led to a change of plan. Napoleon arrived at the con- 
viction that the sooner he cut the web of diplomacy with his 
sharp sword the better, in order to bring the wavering to his side 
by the mandate of the conqueror and to gain control of the prop- 
erty of the vanquished. Hence he resolved on beginning the war 
earUer than he had intended. On the 15th of April, 1813, he 
left St. Cloud, and two days later he was in Mainz. 

The preparations he saw there and soon afterwards in Erfurt, 
and the troops he passed in review, could not exactly inspire him 
with confidence. His new army was to embrace twelve corps 
besides the Guard, but at first he had only seven of these at his 
disposal. Of the seven, the first was stationed in Hanover imder 
Davout to command the lower Elbe, and so could not be counted 
on for the offensive. Eugene commanded two others (number- 
ing 47,000), and the rest, nimibering about 135,000 under the 



6o6 Leipzig [1813 

Emperor himself, took up the march for Saxony by the end of 
April.* Hence there were in all only a little over 180,000 
instead of the 300,000 men on which he had counted a month 
before; and as the campaign began earlier than he had foreseen, 
their equipment left much to be desired. Above all, there was 
a great lack of cavalry. The entire army, excluding the corps of 
Davout, had only 10,000 horse, and the recruits of that body 
had hardly had time to become accustomed to their mounts. 
The infantry were late in getting their weapons, and had not been 
able to drill until they were on the march. The best artillery 
had been lost in Russia or was beyond the Pyrenees. They had 
to bring out old unwieldy cannon that had been discarded. But 
in other respects there was deficiency everywhere. Especially 
was the need of officers felt ; and though many were recalled from 
Spain, yet there were not enough. The corps of staff officers was 
particularly weak. The corps of Oudinot and Marmont had none 
at all. The sanitary corps was short of men, and the army 
administration was wretched. All in all, it was a poorly equipped 
mass of recruits that was now to renew the gigantic struggle 
for the mastery of the world. What a contrast from the year 
before ! Napoleon felt doubtless that he must throw the whole 
weight of his personal genius into the fight if he would conquer. 
"I shall conduct this war," said he, "as General Bonaparte, not 
as Emperor." 

However, one advantage he still had : he was far superior to 
his enemies in point of numbers. Such an early opening of 
hostilities caught the allies in the midst of their preparation, 
Schamhorst,. writing on the 2d of April, said that the Prussian 
army would not be able to do anything until the end of May; 

* The most thorough investigations on the French army in 1813 have 
recently been published in the " Jahrbiicher fiir die deutsche Armee und 
Marine," 1888; the figures there given have been accepted here. They 
gain in authority by their approximate agreement with the estimates of 
Jomini ("Precis des campagnes," etc., I. 237). He assigns 140,000 men 
to the Emperor and 40,000 to the Viceroy, excluding the divisions of Davout 
and Victor, The figures of Thiers are too high, those of Camille Rousset 
too low. The estimates in the contemporary German works of Clausewitz, 
Odeleben, and Muffling are altogether mistaken. 



^T. 43] The Battle of Liltzen 607 

before that much depended on fortune. The Russians, after 
the losses of the last campaign and after investing the fortresses 
still occupied by the French along the Vistula and the Oder, had 
scarcely more than 50,000 men ready for open war; these, to- 
gether with the somewhat stronger Prussian army, were advancing 
under Wittgenstein, Bliicher, and Tormassoff (the latter re- 
placing Kutusoff, who was sick, and who died the last of April), 
It was only in cavalry that the allies were stronger, having twice 
as many as the French — an advantage that was destined to have 
some influence on the progress of the war. When Napoleon now 
moved from Erfurt upon Leipzig, these armies joined their forces 
between the Elster and the Pleisse ; and Wittgenstein, on whom 
the supreme command devolved, determined to attack the flank 
of the enemy while on the march, near Pegau in the direction of 
Liitzen (May 2d). 

The French Emperor had no expectation of such a sudden 
offensive movement, although he had heard of the concentra- 
tion of the hostile forces and their position near Pegau. His 
plan was rather to come into touch with Eugene and then 
from Leipzig to fall upon the right wing and the rear of the 
enemy. On the first of May he had come upon the Russian 
vanguard at Liitzen and had driven it back eastward. Then 
Ney's corps had taken a position east of that town, while 
Eugene was advancing from Markranstadt to Leipzig, and the 
remaining corps of Marmont, Bertrand, etc., were approaching 
singly between Naumberg and Liitzen. Napoleon had just 
arrived at Leipzig the following morning, where a division of 
the enemy offered some resistance and led him to believe that 
he had a strong body in front of him, when suddenly a fierce 
cannonade in his rear undeceived him. He realized that Ney's 
troops had been attacked by superior forces. He immediately 
decided to halt the army thus surprised while on the march, 
to have Eugene advance south from Markranstadt and Marmont 
eastwards to the right of Ney, and to support Ney in the direc- 
tion of Liitzen with the Guard as a reserve. Meantime Ber- 
trand on the right of Marmont could threaten the left wing of 
the enemy, while a corps of Eugene's army under Lauriston 



6o8 Leipzig [1813 

took possession of Leipzig. This was all thought out and 
ordered in a flash. The only question was whether Ney's re- 
cruits would stand the attack of the enemy until the other 
divisions could enter the line of battle. But, though he had 
scarcely dared to hope for it, they were firm. The young, un- 
drilled, ill-fed men, who had followed the Emperor's call reluc- 
tantly and sullenly, now fought with the greatest stubbornness 
against the valour of the Prussians, and it was not until afternoon, 
after long and bloody struggles, that they were driven out of 
the villages they had occupied — Gross-Gorschen, Klein-Gor- 
schen, Rahna, and Kaja — and thrown into confusion. In the 
meanwhile, however, Marmont had been able to engage in the 
battle, and Bertrand to make a threatening demonstration; and 
when finally Napoleon, in the centre, pushed forward the Guard 
in order to recover Kaja and the other positions, and a corps 
of the Viceroy under Macdonald attacked the right flank of 
the enemy, the latter had to yield before superior forces, and 
the battle of Liitzen, or Gross-Gorschen, was won by the French. 
Napoleon had exposed himself more than ever that day, in order 
to fire his new troops. As a reward he heard from the lips 
of the youngest recruits, nay, even from the wounded and 
mangled, the enthusiastic "Vive FEmpereur!" of his old 
troopers. 

To be sure, the victory was not so complete as he had 
thought to make it by surrounding the enemy at Leipzig ; and 
it was not absolutely necessary for the allies to go back at once 
that night across the Elster and thence on to the Elbe. Na- 
poleon, who may have had about 120,000 men in the battle, 
had suffered heavier losses than the enemy; more than 20,000 
men were dead or wounded, and among them many officers, 
whom he could ill spare. No prisoners had been taken, no 
cannon captured. The lack of cavalry and the poor staying 
qualities of the raw recruits made it impossible to follow up 
the victory effectively, and the skirmishes of the next few days 
amounted to nothing. Nevertheless the victory was not wholly 
without influence on the political situation, for it brought Sax^ 
ony back to Napoleon's side. On the 8th of May the Emperor 



^T. 43] Austria's Demands 609 

entered Old * Dresden, and from there sent word to the King, 
who was staying at Prague, to declare himself either as friend 
or foe. At this, Frederick Augustus, despite his convention 
with Austria, chose the former and offered Napoleon his cavalry 
guard and the entire garrison of Torgau. Ney started for that 
fortress with three corps, both to take up the Saxon forces, and 
then by crossing the Elbe to force the allies near Dresden back 
from that river. On the 1 1th of May they did actually leave 
the New City, and the Prusso-Russian army did not come to 
a stand again until it was beyond the Spree. 

But the most important question had not been settled by 
this incomplete victory of Liitzen, as Napoleon hoped it would 
be; Austria kept right along on the course she had entered. 
Hardly had the news reached Vienna when Metternich sent 
Count Philip Stadion, the Minister of War in 1809, to the head- 
quarters of the allies to announce Austria as an armed mediator, 
and to state the conditions which the Court of Vienna would 
endeavour to enforce with all its powers. The minimum re- 
quirements were as follows: the duchy of Warsaw was to be 
dismembered, Napoleon was to give up the departments beyond 
the Rhein (Holland, Oldenburg, the Hanseatic cities) and his 
protectorate over the Rhenish Confederation, Prussia was to 
be restored and lUyria and Dalmatia ceded to Austria, which 
was also to have a new frontier toward Bavaria. New suc- 
cesses of the enemy might of course moderate these conditions, 
but they could not change the political attitude of Austria. 
They were the same conditions which Metternich had hoped 
to make acceptable to Napoleon, in case he had succeeded in 
persuading England to yield some colonies. As we have seen, 
England's refusal thwarted this plan. 

How far the battle was from bringing the Emperor Francis 
back to the dependent alliance of the previous year became 
clear to Napoleon when Count Bubna made his appearance at 
headquarters in Dresden to unfold the programme of Austria in 
the following terms : a general peace was possible only through 

* The Old City is on the south or left bank of the Elbe, and the New 
City on the north bank. — B. 



6 1 o Leipzig [1813 

cessions on the part of the Empire, for which England should 
give compensation ; but as that country refused at present, the 
Emperor must make a beginning; then the island kingdom, 
being isolated by the peace of the Continent, would in turn sub- 
mit. Must not this last remark have sounded hollow in the ears 
of Napoleon, the man who for years had in vain exhausted all 
his resources to bring about such an isolation? He came to 
the conviction that Austria was already in closer touch with 
the allies than with him, and at once decided upon his measures. 
He wrote to Francis that no one was more anxious for peace 
than himself, that he was ready to have a congress in which 
even the representatives of the Spanish insurgents might find 
seats, that he also favoured the idea proposed by Bubna of a 
truce pending negotiations; yet he would not make himself 
ridiculous in the eyes of England; rather than that he would die 
at the head of all high-spirited Frenchmen. At the same mo- 
ment he directed the Viceroy, who had gone to Italy, to gather 
a new army by the end of June at the latest, which could keep 
the 60,000 or 80,000 Austrians in check in the south; the news 
of this was to be industriously spread in Vienna, so as to in- 
timidate the government. 

But as he always had several strings to his bow, he at the 
same time made an effort to reach an understanding with the 
Czar directly, without the intrusive mediation of Austria, which 
demanded sacrifices of him. Caulaincourt was to go to the 
hostile camp with the proposals for a congress and a truce, get 
permission for an interview with Alexander I., who was with 
the army, and open up to him the opportunity 'Ho take a 
splendid revenge for Austria's foolish diversion in Russia" (as 
his instructions read). And what did the Duke of Vicenza 
have to offer? Poland to begin with. The grand duchy of 
Warsaw and the republic of Danzig were to be ceded, not 
indeed to Russia, but to Prussia, excepting a narrow strip 
that would indemnify the Duke of Oldenburg. In return Fred- 
erick William would have to cede his territory west of the Oder, 
i.e., Brandenburg with Berlin, and that part of Silesia marked 
off by a line drawn from Glogau to the Bohemian frontier. In 



Mr, 43] Napoleon's Proposals to Russia 6 1 1 

this way Prussia, whose capital would be in Warsaw, Konigsberg, 
or Danzig, would come absolutely under the influence of Russia. 
Brandenburg was destined for the King of Westphalia, and the 
Krossen district evidently for Saxony. Napoleon had no 
desire, it was said, to return to the Tilsit agreement against Eng- 
land, as his aim now was to pave the way for a general peace; 
and the Czar must hereafter find some other method of enforcing 
respect for his flag.* By these concessions Napoleon hoped to 
break up the coalition. If Poland were abandoned and the 
Continental blockade dropped, would not Russia be content? 
Were not those the principal points at issue in the dispute of 
1812? Six years ago he had gained what he now aimed at by 
the splendid victory of Friedland. Now, again, a second Fried- 
land should secure a hearing for him. His envoy was still wait- 
ing in vain for the requested interview when the die was cast 
again for war. 

On the 18th of May — the same day that Caulaincourt was 
dismissed — Napoleon sent orders to Ney, whom he knew to be 
at Luckau with the corps, to move in haste in the direction of 
Drehsa east of Bautzen; on the next day he himself hastened 
from Dresden to the vicinity of Hartha, where Wittgenstein 
had decided to risk another battle. The Russian general had 
been reinforced by new troops brought by Barclay and the 
Prussian General Kleist, and, entrenched in an excellent position 
that had become famous in the Seven Years' War, he was ready 
to receive Napoleon if he came from the west. But when it 
was learned at the headquarters of the allies that hostile forces 
were also approaching from the north, — as was indeed the case, 
since Ney, acting on the advice of his chief of staff, Jomini, had 
set out in a southerly direction even before he received the 
orders of Napoleon, — Alexander, instead of attacking Napoleon 
with a superior force, sent Barclay and Yorck against Ney. 

* Only a part of these instructions have found a place in the corre- 
spondence of Napoleon. The real peace overtures have been given by 
Lefebvre ('' Histoire des Cabinets de F Europe," V. 331), while the giving up 
of the Continental blockade is mentioned only by Jomini ('' Precis poH- 
tique et militaire des campagnes de 1812 h. 1814," I. 261), who quotes the 
proposal verbatim. 



6i2 Leipzig [1813 

Some skirmishing ensued on May 19th near Weissig and Konigs- 
wartha, which caused the French about as much loss as it did 
the allies. But it had as a consequence that the French Em- 
peror himself opened the attack on the 20th of May, in order 
to draw off the allies from Ney and leave him free to advance. 
With four corps and the Guard he made the attack from the 
west about noon, crossing the Spree at several points and driving 
back the vanguard of the enemy to Bautzen. By evening he 
succeeded in getting a strong position on the other side, and 
meantime Ney had also arrived via Klix, leaving only Reynier 
still to come. The next day was to decide matters, and the 
prospects were certainly not in favour of the allies, whose num- 
bers were now inferior. 

The Emperor's plan was to push Ney against Barclay, who 
formed the right wing of the enemy and was next to Bliicher, 
who formed the centre, and so gain control of the enemies' line 
of retreat, while he himself attacked the Russians in front and 
deceived them as to his real object by his personal presence 
there and by deploying a stronger force. He kept at work 
until early morning, and at once gave orders for the action to 
begin oti the right as a sign for Ney to advance; not until then 
did he lay himself to rest a few hours on the field of battle. 
Had Alexander seen his great antagonist sleeping so quietly, 
he would hardly have disregarded Wittgenstein's remonstrances 
and sought the decisive action at this place, as he really did 
by leaving Barclay's weak division without any reinforcements. 
The latter was in fact driven back after a few hours far beyond 
Gleina, and Bliicher's flank exposed to serious danger. But in- 
stead of boldly pushing right into Bliicher's rear, — as Jomini 
says he advised, — Ney for the first time became cautious. He 
could not of course conjecture that the enemy would leave 
his right wing so unpardonably weak, and so he waited for Rey- 
nier's arrival. When Reynier appeared at Klix he advanced 
again but no longer directly upon Hochkirch — for the favour- 
able moment was gone — but on the right against Bliicher, who 
was already turning his artillery upon him. That movement 
left the road t;o Gorlitz open, and the mass of the allies, now 



iET. 43] Results of the Battle of Bautzen 613 

vigorously pressed by Napoleon, were able in the nick of 
time to extricate themselves. They lost the battle, as they 
deserved to, but they saved their army, which was on the brink 
of destruction had not the boldest marshal of the Empire be- 
lied his reputation on that day. In vain did Napoleon press 
after the enemy. He lacked here as at Liitzen the necessary 
cavalry, and his youthful columns were exhausted with fighting. 
On the next day, the 22d of May, when he rode in person to 
the vanguard to fire their ardour against the obstinate resistance 
of the Russian rear, he lost three able generals of his staff, 
among them his trusted Duroc, whom he sincerely mourned. 

Was that such a battle as Napoleon expected by which to 
force his proposals on the Czar? Far from it. The political 
effects, in turn, were on a par with the military. Caulaincourt 
was not granted an interview with Alexander, but merely noti- 
fied that the mediation of Austria had been accepted and further 
proposals would be received only through that power. The 
allies did, however, entertain the idea of a truce, and accord- 
ingly Stadion wrote to Berthier that they were ready to come 
to negotiations on that head between the lines of the armies. 
The question now was whether Napoleon was in earnest about 
the truce. 

In the mean time, however, he had followed close upon the 
enemy, constantly fighting. He had left only Oudinot behind at 
Bautzen, whence he was directed to proceed to Berlin by way 
of Hoyerswerda. _ The allies had finally turned off to the right 
from Liegnitz and Jauer toward Schweidnitz, having abandoned 
Breslau. They were not agreed as to the continuation of the 
war. Barclay, who replaced Wittgenstein as commander-in- 
chief, was in favour of retiring to Poland with his disorganized 
Russians and Poles, to reorganize them there and provide them 
with ammunition, which was already running short. If he were 
to remain in Silesia, he needed six weeks' rest. This considera- 
tion, in view of Austria's preparations, settled the point for 
the allies, since Frederick William III. regarded with the greatest 
anxiety a possible separation of the two armies. If Napoleon 
had been aware of this critical situation of his enemies, he 



6i4 Leipzig [I813 

would hardly have done what he himself later — and others as 
well — ^termed the greatest mistake of his life. He knew nothing 
of it, and so consented to the armistice. Of course he had his 
own reasons for wishing it. In a letter to the Minister of 
War, Clarke, dated June 2d, he gives two of them: his lack of 
cavalry, which prevented him from striking a decisive blow, 
and the hostile attitude of Austria. But those were not all. 
In his own army there was but too much confusion. The 
heavy loss of officers in both battles made itself keenly felt. 
The young infantry broke down from the exertion of constant 
marching; most of the corps had a third of their men, and 
that of Ney more than half, in the hospitals. Owing to the 
distress arising from defective administration thousands deserted, 
while others scattered in unrestrained marauding in order to 
find food. Consequently, in spite of re-enforcements, the army 
had soon shrunk to 120,000 men.* Besides hostile bands of 
guerillas did much damage in the rear, cutting off convoys, cap- 
turing two trains of artillery, and the like. It seemed to Na- 
poleon foolhardy to build hopes of a third victory on such 
conditions for a foundation; for it could not be followed up 
any more than the preceding, and the losses it would involve 
would only give Austria a new advantage. One thing more. 
Reports poured in from Paris told of the most ardent longings 
for peace. Even men whose tried complaisance seldom troubled 
the Emperor with unwelcome truth, the Marets and the Sava- 
rys, urgently requested a cessation of hostilities, and he was 
obliged to take some account for the moment of public opin- 
ion in France. So on the 4th of June, when the army had 
pushed on to Breslau and Oudinot stood facing Biilow by the 
Elster, while Davout had occupied Hamburg, the armistice was 
signed at Poischwitz. According to its terms the French were 
to retire beyond the Katzbach, and the allies beyond a line 
that leads from the Bohemian frontier by Landeshut, Striegau^ 
and Canth east of Breslau to the Oder. The Oder from the 
mouth of the Katzbach north, the Saxon frontier, and then 

* Lefebvre (V. 348), who managed to secure information from the 
war archives at Paris, gives this figure for the time before the armistice. 



Mr, 43] Austria's Conditions 615 

the Elbe to the North Sea, bounded the territory to be occu- 
pied by the French army. Hostilities were to cease until the 
20th of June. 

If it had been Napoleon's purpose to break up by a sudden 
attack the game of diplomacy, and in particular to tear in pieces 
the web spun by Metternich, then his spring campaign was a 
failure. Nor had he succeeded any better in separating Russia 
and Prussia, nor in bringing Austria, like Saxony, over to his 
side. Rather, by his separate negotiation with the Czar, had 
he put in the hands of the latter a lever which he was not slow 
to bring to bear on the Court of Vienna. Great was the conster- 
nation of the Austrian government at the news of the second 
defeat, the repeated appearance of Caulaincourt at the camp 
of the allies, and the negotiations for a truce. It was feared 
that Napoleon might now turn upon Austria and compel her 
to join him; or that Russia might give up the fight, as in 1805 
and 1807. It seemed necessary, therefore, to approach the 
allies by some overt act and bind them to the cause. Hence 
Francis I. repaired early in June with his minister to Castle 
Gitschin in Bohemia, to be nearer to them. Thither came 
Count Nesselrode, sent by Alexander to induce Austria to join 
the alliance formally. He found the Emperor greatly disin- 
clined to enter the war with his poorly equipped troops as long 
as the possibility still remained of securing peace through 
negotiations. But he did obtain from Metternich a statement 
of six conditions which he declared to be essential for peace, 
and the first four of which Austria was willing to enforce by 
a resort to arms in case Napoleon rejected them: (1) the dis- 
memberment of the duchy of Warsaw; (2) the consequent en- 
largement of Prussia, to which Danzig was to be restored; (3) 
restitution of lUyria to Austria; (4) independence of the Hanse- 
atic towns; (5) dissolution of the Rhenish Confederation; (6) 
restoration of Prussia to her position in 1806 as far as possible. 
These first four conditions by no means contained what Aus- 
tria had previously proposed as the '* minimum,'^ and in so far 
the victory at Bautzen had after all influenced the power on 
the Danube. But, on the other hand, the allies now felt sure 



6i6 Leipzig [isis 

that Austria would under certain circumstances fight against 
Napoleon, but never against the allies. The latter had indeed, 
as early as the 16th of May, agreed at Wurschen on a much 
wider-reaching programme, including in addition to the above 
points the separation of Holland from France, the restoration 
of the Bourbons in Spain, the restoration of Austria to her posi- 
tion in 1805, the withdrawal of the French beyond the Rhine, 
and the liberation of Italy. But the certainty of Austria's 
co-operation, which Metternich claims to have guaranteed in per- 
son to Alexander I. at the Bohemian castle Opocno, made them 
ready to negotiate with the French in regard to a peace even 
on those conditions. For it seemed as good as settled that 
Napoleon, if victorious, would not consent to such terms. This 
peace was, to be sure to serve only as a preliminary arrange- 
ment, and was to be followed by negotiations looking to a 
definitive pacification that could not be brought about without 
the participation and assent of England. To this Russia and 
Prussia had to pledge themselves in June when they arranged 
with the London government, by treaty for subsidies, to supply 
them the funds for carrying on the war. On the 27th of June, 
1813, then, at Reichenbach, the headquarters of the allies, the 
three powers signed a secret treaty the provisions of which 
had already been formulated at Opocno and included the four 
indispensable articles of Austria together with her solemn 
promise to declare war on France at once if Napoleon should 
not have accepted these provisions by the 20th of July.* In 
that event, indeed, the three powers were to wage the war no 
longer for that modest reward, but for the entire comprehensive 
programme of May 16th; that is to say, France was to be driven 
back and confined within her natural boundaries. Moreover, 
the powers bound themselves to allow no separate negotiations 
on the part of Napoleon with any one of them. 

Napoleon had been made uneasy by Metternich's journey to 
Alexander and was not satisfied with Bubna's report; so he 

* The evacuation of the fortresses along the Vistula and Oder by the 
French was also included among the essential demands binding Austria 
to open war. 



iET.433 Napoleon and Metternich 617 

invited the Austrian minister to meet him at Dresden. Met- 
ternich came, after explaining the situation to Nesselrode, and 
on the 26th stood in the palace Marcolini in the presence of the 
Imperator. In an interview lasting nine hours, during which 
Napoleon lost his temper more than once, — going so far, in fact, 
as to call his second marriage a piece of stupidity and to charge 
Metternich with venality, — he tried to confine Austria to the 
attitude of armed neutrality; but Metternich stubbornly held to 
armed intervention. This interview has become celebrated in 
history because it was supposed to mark the decisive turn in 
the policy of Austria and in the fate of Napoleon. But such a 
view of it is incorrect. The Vienna Court had, rather, been 
yielding to pressure from Russia for some time, and any pause 
in its movement was hardly conceivable at this point; so Na- 
poleon was not so far wrong when he said of Metternich, "He 
thinks he moves everybody, and everybody moves him.'^ 
Everybody but Napoleon; for the last word he uttered to the 
minister at the close of the interview was not to be fulfilled: 
"'You certainly will not declare war on me." 

The interview in Dresden resulted in the Emperor's meet- 
ing Austria half way; he not only declared the alliance of 1812 
dissolved, but even accepted the armed intervention of Austria. 
There might be cause for wonder in this determination of Na- 
poleon, did we not find an explanation of it in a convention 
signed on the 30th of June by Maret and the Austrian minister 
providing that, in the interests of the peace negotiations to be 
carried on at a congress to meet at Prague, the truce should 
last until the 10th of August, and that Austria was to prevail 
on the allies to accept the proposal. Metternich had already 
made this proposal, as a reward for the acceptance of Austria's 
mediation, in the great interview of June 26th ; which proves that 
at that time he was still really in earnest about securing peace.* 

* The question whether Napoleon ot Metternich was the first to pro- 
pose a longer truce was long a matter of dispute. Since the publication 
of the authentic report which the minister prepared for Francis I. in 1820 
the question seems decided in favour of Metternich. In this document 
we have the answer Metternich claims to have made to Napoleon's request 



6 1 8 Leipzig [I813 

Nor did Napoleon desire war at any price. He, too, would 
perhaps have been ready to conclude peace, though he would 
have preferred it to be a general one, that would put an end to 
all hostilities and secure repose to the French people. A mere 
Continental peace that left the war with England open and the 
French colonies in English hands he cared much less for and 
would accept only under two conditions: either after a series 
of crushing victories that assured the preponderance of the 
Empire for some time to come, or in consequence of a separate 
convention with Russia, similar to that of Tilsit. Now in order 
to strike crushing blows he needed time for extensive prepara- 
tions, a period which he had reckoned at three months in his 
instructions to Caulaincourt on the 26th of May. The armistice 
of June 4th fell far short of that. Now the desired increase of 
time was within reach, and at once the Emperor seized it. 
But at the same time he hoped to find an opportunity at the 
congress to reach a separate understanding with the Czar. 
Hence he planned to send to Prague not only Narbonne, who 
was accredited to Austria, but also Caulaincourt. Of course 
not at once. He kept back the marshal until the 26th of 
July, when the extension of the armistice was confirmed by the 
signatures of the various negotiating parties at Neumarkt. 
Why was that? Did he hope to find some way of approaching 

that Austria remain neutral : ** Emperor Francis has offered the powers his 
mediation, not neutrahty. Russia and Prussia have accepted it ; it 
remains now for you to decide. Either you accept, in which case we shall 
fix a period for the duration of the negotiations, or else you decline, in which 
case my sovereign will deem himself wholly free in his plans and acts." 
That is to say, if Napoleon accepts the mediation, Austria proposes to 
allow for the necessary negotiations a time mentioned in the conditions of 
the truce. The extension of the armistice was advantageous for Austria's 
war preparations, but it was far more so to the French. If, then, Metter- 
nich made such a high bid to secure Napoleon's acceptance of mediation, 
he must have been very much in earnest in seeking a peace that would 
save his country from invasion. He himself told Hardenberg early in July 
that Emperor Francis was convinced that the whole burden of the war 
would fall on Austria, that it would bring the greatest calamities to the 
monarchy, and that to prevent this he would renounce all acquisition of 
territory. (Oncken, "Preussen im Befreiungskriege," II. 399.) 



Mt. 43] The Congress of Prague 619 

Russia even at Neumarkt? Or was he unwilling to appear 
at Prague under the fresh impression of the news from Spain 
that Wellington on the 21st of June had totally defeated the 
French army at Vittoria, far north of the Ebro, and put them 
to flight, that only a few positions were left them beyond the 
Pyrenees, and that after those fell immediate danger would 
threaten France herself? No doubt he was anxious to extricate 
himself with honour in the east; and so Caulaincourt received 
instructions "to conclude a peace that would be glorious." * 

In the capital of Bohemia Caulaincourt was soon convinced 
that there was no prospect of fulfilling his sovereign's wishes. 
Anstett, the representative of Russia, was a confirmed hater 
of Napoleon, and moreover he had agreed with Metternich to 
conduct the negotiations in the same manner as in the congress 
of Teschen in 1779; i.e., not to express their views in open 
conference, but only in wi'iting through the mediating power. 
Metternich had chosen this method in order to preclude all 
chance of secret understandings behind his back, and the allies 
had adopted it in order that Austria might more surely com- 
promise herself with France. Under these circumstances Cau- 
laincourt foimd nothing to do, and Napoleon had to give up 
his idea of a separate agreement with the Czar. The news that 
Alexander and Frederick William had conferred with Berna- 
dotte at the Silesian castle of Trachenberg on a plan of cam- 
paign completely shut off any further thought of peace. At 
the end of July Napoleon left Dresden to meet the Empress 
Regent and the minister in Mainz, to receive their reports, 
give them directions for the time of his absence on the next 
campaign, and to inspect the divisions of two new army corps. 

* Emouf , ''Maret," p. 574. The statement that Napoleon was not 
at that time averse to a general peace is confirmed by Metternich in a 
letter of June 28th from Dresden to Francis I. : " . . convinced that the 
question of a general peace would be much more easily fought to an issue 
than that of a Continental peace." (Oncken, II. 395 ) Maret even 
handed him an outline of the scheme. (Emouf, p. 565.) The positive 
statement of Napoleon at St. Helena that at Dresden he wished for a 
general peace has been made known in Montholon's " History of the 
Captivity of Napoleon at St. Helena." 



620 Leipzig [isis 

Then on the 5th of August he returned to Saxony. Only five 
days remained before the close of the congress, and it had not 
got beyond formalities. This was perfectly natural, for nobody 
was now anxious for peace. The allies had never expected it as 
a result of Austria's mediation, but had accepted her offices 
only in order to build for her "a bridge across the chasm"; 
and Metternich himself had assumed quite a warlike mood at 
the news of events in Spain. His only wish now was to con- 
vince his wavering master that reconciliation with Napoleon 
was impossible, and he finally succeeded.* Fouche, who during 
those days passed through Prague as the newly-appointed 
governor of Illyria, had told the allies a good deal about the 
precarious situation of the Emperor and the despondent feel- 
ings of his people. Even in Austria the people were in a fer- 
ment and the minister had to reckon with them. Broglie, 
Narbonne's secretary, says in his memoirs, ''We could no longer 
cross the street without being insulted." 

But the most important thing was that Napoleon became 
convinced at last that he had been mistaken about Austria's 
future attitude when he expressed himself so confidentially to 
Metternich. The reports of Caulaincourt, and especially the 
Austrian army lists which the French had managed to get hold 
of at Prague, led him to consider more seriously than before 
the possible effects of a declaration of war from that quarter. 
He suddenly saw himself face to face with a more powerful 
coalition than had ever confronted him, and that, too, of powers 
which he had hitherto supposed to be irreconcilable in their 
interests. He made one last effort to break it up. Hardly had 
he returned to Dresden when he instructed Caulaincourt to 
sound Metternich secretly as to ''how Austria understood the 
peace, and whether, in case Napoleon accepted her conditions, 
she would make common cause with him, or else remain neutral." 
But he was too late. As his answer Metternich brought forward 
not only the four indispensable articles for which Austria had 

* Wellington could therefore assert with some show of reason, after all, 
that his victory at Vittoria drove Napoleon out of Germany. (Historical 
Review, 1887, p. 598.) 



iET. 43] Napoleon Rejects Austria's Demands 621 

bound herself to fight, but the two additional ones for which 
she desired to negotiate, i.e., he demanded also the dissolution 
of the Rhenish Confederation and the restoration of the old 
Prussian state. All this was to make sure that Napoleon would 
refuse. His definite answer to these conditions, yes or no, was 
to arrive at Prague not later than midnight of August 10th. 
They were doubtless anxious hours that Metternich spent after 
sending off his ultimatum. What if Napoleon declared out- 
right and in season that he accepted? What an embarrassment 
for Austria! Yet Metternich's calculation was sound. The vic- 
tor at Liitzen and Bautzen could not accept a programme that 
disputed his control of the German troops and bade him vacate 
the fortresses on the Vistula and the Oder. '' Do they want me to 
dishonour myself? " he said to the minister in Dresden. " Never ! 
Your sovereigns born to the throne can suffer defeat twenty 
times and yet each time return to their capital. But I am a 
child of fortune; I shall have ceased to reign on the day when 
I have ceased to command respect." He was now indignant 
at the demands of Austria, which he exaggerated in his letters 
to Jerome and Cambaceres as including even the restitution of 
Venice, and just to propose something on his part he offered 
the following terms: dismemberment of the duchy of Warsaw, 
the independence of Danzig, and the restoration of Illyria with 
the exception of Trieste. These were communicated to Bubna 
at Dresden on the evening of the 9th, and he reported them in 
good time at Prague. But Napoleon's official answer did not 
arrive there until the 11th, when the representatives of France 
already had in hand their passports and also Austria's declara- 
tion of war. The congress was closed; a new terrible struggle 
was about to begin.* 

* Napoleon did not so quickly throw up the game of diplomacy. Hos- 
tilities could not commence until after a week's notice. This interval he 
used to announce his acceptance of Austria's ultimatum, for no other pur- 
pose, surely, than to throw the odium of the aggressor on other shoulders. 
But he accompUshed nothing by it. On the 16th of August, Alexander and 
Frederick WilHam having come to Prague, his envoy received a negative 
answer and his dismissal. In the year 1814 the Emperor, then dethroned, 
said to the Austrian General Koller: ''As to the congress of Prague, I con- 



622 Leipzig [I813 

We cannot be expected here to describe at length the battles 
in which the nations and governments of Europe, forgetting 
their individual quarrels, made a united resistance to the oppres- 
sive preponderance of imperial France. We can mention only 
the most important steps in the progress of events, and those 
only briefly. 

During the armistice Napoleon had made the best possible 
use of his time. The army with which he now confronted the 
enemy is estimated at 440,000 men. Of cavalry, the lack of 
which he had lamented so bitterly a few weeks before, he now 
had a superabundance; nor was there any longer a deficiency 
of artillery. And although his forces were made up of the 
youngest of the youth of France and the states of the Rhenish 
Confederation available for service, yet we have seen these 
striplings at Liitzen and Bautzen fight like veterans. They 
would do their duty again, and do it even gladly and eagerly were 
not the treasury at so low an ebb, and did but the commissary 
officials have a little more sense of honour. But money for 
the men's pay was scarce, and the corruption was incredible; 
so that the young warriors suffered excessively from hunger, 
which sent many thousands to the hospitals.* Moreover, there 
was still a great scarcity of officers and subalterns; the latter 
doubtless because the Emperor took the best material for his 
Guard, which had now grown to 58,000 (normal strength 80,000) 
and was cared for with the same solicitude as before. It almost 
looked as if the Imperator, who was free from national ties, 
meant to make a personal army of this host within a host. 
Besides this body there were fourteen army corps. One corps 
of the division under Davout, on the lower Elbe, had been de- 

f ess to have been deceived in you ; I took you still to be what I had learned 
to know you on former occasions, and you had in the mean time changed 
to your own advantage." 

* The lists show no less than 90,000 men sick, exclusive of the 440,000 
at which the army was reckoned in Germany. Corruption extended to 
the immediate circle of the Emperor. An eye-witness relates how the pay- 
master Peyrusse put into his pocket 1000 francs out of 4000 that the 
Emperor had set aside for a monument to Duroc, remarking that such 
was the custom. (Odeleben, "Napoleon's Feldzug in Sachsen," p. 255.) 



Mr AS] The Strength of the Allies 623 

tached and sent to Dresden under Vandamme. A second was 
brought from Franconia and put under Saint-Cyr. Poniatowski 
had brought 12,000 unarmed Poles through Austria, and in 
addition there were five reserve corps of cavalry under Murat, 
the Emperor manifestly intending in this way to bring this 
general out of his political vacillation and bind him to himself. 
The entire force was stationed for the most part between Dres- 
den and Liegnitz; only three corps under Oudinot were north 
of Kottbus and Kalau, facing Biilow, who was to cover Berlin. 

The allies, too, had been making mighty preparations during 
the last few months, Alexander I. had organized the recruiting 
system, so that troops could arrive from all ports of the Russia 
empire, to say nothing of the great reserves in Poland. Prussia, 
thanks to the warlike enthusiasm of her people, had done won- 
des. " We now have an army," wrote Gneisenau as early as on 
July 11th to Stein, ^'such as Prussia never had before, even in 
her most glorious days." Austria, likewise, had made all con- 
ceivable exertions. 

As to the plans for the proper utilizing of these forces (reck- 
oned at 480,000) against the dreaded Caesar, a provisional 
agreement had been reached even in June at Gitschin, when 
Francis I. first suggested the possibility of his co-operation with 
the other powers. The plans were further discussed and set- 
tled at Trachenberg, in concert with the Prince Royal of Sweden. 
There were to be three armies in the field. The main army 
was to occupy Bohemia, out of regard for Austria, which had 
been so courted and now feared a new invasion from the north 
and the occupation of Vienna by the enemy; re-enforcements 
from Silesia raised it to the desired size, and at the end of the 
armistice it numbered 230,000 men. Then a northern army 
under Bernadotte (156,000, over 40,000 of which, however, 
were detached) ; and finally a Silesian army under Bliicher (of 
95,000). The fundamental plan of strategy adopted for the 
campaign was, that if the enemy threw himself with his main 
body on any one of these armies, it should fall back while the 
other two advanced to the attack. 

Napoleon had received no information of such a plan. He 



624 Leipzig tms 

became aware of it quite late from the march of Russian troops 
toward Bohemia. He himself had never formed the purpose 
of marching on Vienna which was ascribed to him in the enemies' 
camp. His plan was quite different; he wanted Davout from 
Hamburg and Oudinot from the south to co-operate in an offen- 
sive movement on Berlin, which he thought would be successful, 
for he far underestimated the northern army and judged that 
to be the weakest point in the enemies' lines. To form a con- 
necting link between those two generals a division under Girard 
was to proceed east from Magdeburg. After the Prussian capital 
had been occupied, Kiistrin and Stettin were to be relieved at 
once and so the left wing of the entire French line would be 
pushed towards the east. In the mean time the Emperor meant 
to cover this movement by a vigorous defence against the other 
two armies, leaving the enemy to take the offensive. From 
what point the attack would be made he was not certain. To 
prepare for any emergency he took a temporary position at 
Gorlitz with the Guard, supposing that the united forces of the 
Russians and Prussians might advance from Bohemia by way 
of Zittau. He tried to secure Dresden from being surprised by 
means of earthworks and palisades, and entrusted the defence 
to Saint-Cyr, though he himself could take part in it within a 
few days. 

But the expected offensive movement of the enemy at Zittau 
did not take place. On the contrary, Bliicher had already com- 
menced hostilities on the 16th of August and had driven four 
French corps under Ney, which were immediately in front of 
him at Liegnitz, over the Bober. Napoleon wanted to retrieve 
the loss and strike Bliicher a fatal blow. But the latter at 
once became aware of his presence by the very behaviour of 
the French troops, if not by the resounding cry of "Vive TEm- 
pereur!" and discerning the purpose of a decisive movement, 
he did what had been agreed upon, and retired fighting beyond 
the Katzbach. The Emperor failed to see that this retreat was 
intentional, and so pushed on eagerly after him, until a call for 
help from Saint-Cyr unexpectedly overtook him: Dresden was 
most seriously threatened by the advance of a hostile army 



Mt,u] The Battle of Dresden 625 

from the Erzgebirge. So the issue was to be determined in 
quite a different quarter from what Napoleon had supposed. 
He left Macdonald with three corps in front of Bliicher and set 
out with the remainder to the west on the 23d of August. After 
extraordinary forced marches for three days the troops arrived 
in the vicinity of Dresden. The Emperor now conceived the 
daring plan of crossing the Elbe below the enemy, who was 
already near the city, so as to bring the hostile army between 
himself and Saint-Cyr, and thus cut off its line of retreat. 
But he was obliged to drop the brilliant conception at once ; 
Saint-Cyr was too weak to make any lasting resistance, and the 
defensive works were still incomplete, so he had to choose the 
safer way and advance upon the enemy from Dresden. All he 
did was to send Vandamme with 40,000 men to Pirna and 
Konigstein, while he himself entered the city on the forenooa 
of the 26th of August with the Guard, which had marched 
from Lowenberg in three days, over eighty-five miles. The 
corps of Marmont and Victor were still on the way. It was 
fortunate for him that at the enemy's headquarters, where 
Schwarzenberg was commander-in-chief, though with constant 
interference on the part of the three monarchs and their ad^ 
visers, the favourable moment for attack the next morning was 
allowed on trifling grounds to slip by, and the assault on the 
city was postponed until the afternoon. Not until about four 
o'clock did the allies advance in a semicircle broken by the 
dechvities near Plauen. But being without means for storming, 
and without re-enforcements on account of the scattered state 
of their forces, they were unable in spite of desperate valour to 
gain any lasting success, but just threw away their lives in the 
futile attempt to get possession of the suburbs. In the evening 
Napoleon himself issued from the gates to the attack and drove 
the Russians back on the left far beyond Striesen, the Austrians 
on the right to Lobtau and Cotta, and the Austrians and Prus- 
sians in the centre to the heights of Racknitz. The battle was 
won without the corps of Marmont and Victor, which arrived 
during the night and greatly strengthened the French army. 
On the next day the Emperor at once assumed the offensive. 



626 Leipzig [1813 

He engaged the enemy's right wing and centre, while Murat 
with his corps of cavalry pushed through between the centre 
and the left wing, which he cut off, surrounded, and routed, taking 
an Austrian division prisoners. The enemy's mistake in leaving 
his cavalry inactive in the centre greatly aided the victory of 
the French. Meantime Vandamme also had crossed the Elbe 
and engaged a weak corps of the enemy at Konigstein. Threat- 
ened in their rear, and with their left wing severely crippled, 
the allies retired. In those two days they had lost nearly a 
third of their forces in dead, wounded, and prisoners, while the 
enemy, being well protected by their position, had much smaller 
losses to report and could boast of another proud victory. 
If Napoleon had followed it up with the same skill with which 
he won it, the main army of the allies would have been over- 
taken by catastrophe that no successes of the other two armies 
could have retrieved. He did not do so. Primarily because, 
although he was certain of victory, he did not feel sure that the 
enemy, whose main forces in the centre and left wing had been 
but little engaged, would not renew the battle the next day. 
The commands he issued that evening leave no doubt that he 
expected yet a third day of fighting. And in fact the plan 
of retiring with the whole army to the heights of Dippoldiswalde 
and renewing the battle there was discussed at the headquar- 
ters of the allies far into the night. Finally, Schwarzenberg urged 
that the Austrians were poorly armed, and so ordered a retreat. 
Not until the next morning did Napoleon, riding forward to 
the line of battle of the preceding day, learn this decision when 
he saw the enemy's columns disappearing in the valleys on the 
road to Dippoldiswalde and Maxen. As Vandamme with 
40,000 men held the Pirna highroad that led by Peters walde to 
Teplitz, it was the Emperor's conviction that the allies would 
seek to reach Teplitz by shorter though less convenient roads^ 
He ordered Saint-Cyr and Marmont to follow them on the road past 
Sayda Victor, while Murat was to march to Freyberg and Frauen- 
stein and threaten their flank and rear. On the 28th he wrote 
to Vandamme, whose position near Pirna was now taken by 
Mortier, that the enemy seemed to have started in the direc- 



Mt. 44] French Defeats 627 

tion of Altenberg, and that he prevent their making connections 
with TepUtz and especially do great damage to their baggage- 
train.* He himself by no means deemed the enemy conquered, 
having just expected him to renew the battle, and evidently re- 
garded it as a great success that he had victoriously repulsed 
the assault of the main army. If he had any inkling of the de- 
jection in the other camp, the ill-feeling of the Austrians, the 
poor order on the retreat, the confused marching of the col- 
umns so that 40,000 Prussians under Kleist had to turn aside 
and climb the hills to make any progress at all, he would not 
have wavered for a moment, but completed his victory by a 
crushing blow.f 

But there was another circumstance. During the last few 
days the Emperor had been notified of a calamity that had 
befallen the army of Oudinot: it had been defeated at Gross- 
Beeren on the 23d of August by Biilow and forced to retreat 
to Wittenberg. And as if that were not enough, just now, as 
he was about joining the pursuing corps, the news arrived of a 
brilliant victory by Bliicher on the 26th at Wahlstatt on the 
Katzbach over Macdonald, whereby the eastern army of the 
French lost 20,000 men and was driven back into the Lausitz. 
Under these circumstances could he still afford to go into Bo- 
hemia? He weighed this question and answered it in a series 
of notes in the negative. For it had been his main plan origi- 

* This letter of Berthier's to Vandamme is quoted by all historians, 
even the military ones, with the meaningless clerical error "Annaberg" 
instead of "Altenberg," which alone is possible. Neither the contents of 
the letter nor Napoleon's letter to Murat on the following day leave any 
doubt on this point. The latter contains this sentence: *'Toute I'arm^e se 
retire par Altenberg sur Toeplitz." 

t An indisposition that came upon him on the 28th at noon while 
breakfasting on the road to Pirna is said to have hindered him from 
advancing and forced him to return to Dresden. So runs the legend. 
But the illness must have been of very short duration, though it may have 
a basis of truth; for he was seen riding back to Dresden "very cheerful 
and merry," and there a messenger from the Katzbach fbund him in the 
best of health. He himself, to be sure, in 1815, in speaking to some gen- 
erals sought by means of this petty accident to draw a veil over his great 
mistake as to the extent of his victory at Dresden. 



628 Leipzig 11813 

nally to remain on the defensive in the south ^nd make an 
offensive movement only in the north. Hence the Dresden affair 
he regarded as merely a defensive victory, at a time when his 
scheme of an attack on Berlin and the Oder, where the garri- 
sons could hold out no longer than October according to his 
reckoning, was on the point of miscarrying. That, therefore, 
must be the direction of his next movement with stronger 
forces and in person, whereas Dresden he merely put into a 
better defensive position. And now it was the politician in 
him that joined the strategist and led him astray; '*I can suc- 
ceed thereby in separating the Russians from the Austrians, for 
I can bring to bear upon Austria my regard for her in not having 
carried the war into Bohemia." It was his plan within the 
next two weeks to take Berlin, — supposing Macdonald to check 
Billow, — provision Stettin, destroy the Prussian defences, and dis- 
organize the landwehr. The pursuit into Bohemia was given up. 

It must be left to military experts to criticise the strategic 
aspect of this plan. Hitherto they have condemned it. And 
as if the very events themselves were to put the Emperor in 
the wrong, Vandamme in his advanced and isolated position 
met in front on the 29th of August resistance from a superior 
force of Russians and Austrians at Kuhn, and finally, on the 30th, 
was attacked in the rear, as well, by Kleist, who had got behind 
him on the Peterswalde road. His corps was annihilated with 
the exception of a small remnant, which sought safety in flight 
over the mountains. 

Nor was the enterprise against Berlin destined to be carried 
out. The commands for it had indeed already been issued 
early in September, when a gloomy report came from Macdonald 
summoning the Emperor to Bautzen with the auxiliary corps. 
He repaired thither, intending to reinforce the threatened army 
with the corps of Marmont and a corps of cavalry, thus to 
defeat the impetuously advancing Bliicher, and then move ^' in 
great haste" on BerHn. An excellent plan. But suppose no 
battle ensued? Suppose Bliicher, whose vehement energy was 
guided and held in check by the superior intellect of his chief- 
of-staff, Gneisenau, learns again, as once before, in August, of 



^T. 44] Napoleon at Dresden 629 

the Emperor's presence and retires, luring his foe after him 
into the wasted country? That was just what took place. 
Bliicher fell back from Hochkirch to Gorlitz, fighting constantly. 
This time, however, Napoleon discerned his aim and stopped 
the pursuit. He was now obliged to move against Bernadotte 
without having defeated, as he had hoped, the Silesian army. 
He gave orders to that effect, when news comes from Dresden 
of a new offensive movement of the Bohemian army. In any 
case, he would have been too late in the north for the present; 
for the impetuous energy of Biilow and the valour of the Prus- 
sian landwehr, for which Napoleon's contempt knew no bounds, 
had inflicted such a decisive defeat on Ney (now in Oudinot's 
place) at Dennewitz on the 6th of September that he had to 
take flight far beyond Torgau. "Your left flank is exposed," 
wrote the defeated marshal to the Emperor on the next day, 
"take care. I think it is time to leave the Elbe and retire to 
the Saale." * 

Before receiving this letter Napoleon had already arrived 
at Dresden, and in a reconnoissance beheld the heights of the 
mountain roads to Bohemia occupied by the enemy. For the 
allies, thoroughly elated by their own victory at Kuhn and the 
successes of the other two armies, as soon as they learned of 
Napoleon's advance against Bliicher, undertook a double diver- 
sion in favour of the latter. A division of 60,000 Austrians was to 
cross the Elbe and fall on the flank of the advancing enemy at 
Rumburg, while the remainder of the main army held in check 
the forces left at Dresden. Napoleon was aware of the intended 
diversion at Rumburg. He sought to seize the moment to 
drive the enemy back to Peterswalde and there venture an ad- 
vance into Bohemia if circumstances favoured. He succeeded 
in doing the first, but the nature of the country frustrated the 

* As to the other divisions that were to operate against the northern 
army of the allies: Girard's, on hearing of the affair at Gross-Beeren, had 
turned about and had been routed on the retreat to Magdeburg; Davout, 
on the other hand, whose corps consisted more than half of Dutch and 
South Germans, the least reliable elements of the whole army, could risk 
nothing but a weak demonstration, which was given up again after the 
defeat of Oudinot, 



630 Leipzig [1813 

latter intention, and on the 12th of September the Emperor 
was again in Dresden. When the allies, who had recalled all 
but one division of the Austrian corps at the first news of his 
presence, soon afterwards advanced anew over the mountains 
to mask Schwarzenberg's march northwest in the direction of 
Leipzig, Napoleon thwarted the scheme by making another 
sally as far as Kuhn. The enemy's position seemed to him 
still too strong for a successful attack, as he himself was obliged 
by the difficulty of procuring supplies to send two corps to the 
north to protect convoys on the Elbe. He had to content him- 
self with a "system of hither and thither" with Schwarzenberg. 
Here again he longed earnestly to be attacked, but in vain. 
The enemy evades the commander-in-chief and defeats his 
generals. 

But he cannot afford to remain idle long, as the circle of 
the hostile forces keeps drawing closer around him and he can 
provide for the masses of his troops in the restricted space only 
with daily-increasing difficulty. Ney, who had crossed again 
to the left bank of the Elbe, reported that the army of Berna- 
dotte and Biilow were planning to cross that river and were 
making preparations for it in the vicinity of Dessau, and that 
one division of Bliicher's army was approaching from the south- 
east. In the face of this danger of having his flank turned. 
Napoleon ordered a retreat to the left bank of the Elbe and 
abandoned the right. 

Ever since he had neglected the decisive moment after the 
battle of Dresden, his will-power seemed broken, and he himself 
to have become but a plaything of his enemies, tossed back and 
forth, — the people, on account of his repeated trips to Bautzen, 
jocularly called him the " Bautzen Messenger," — until at last his 
advance position was wholly untenable. Besides, the army was 
in a most uncomfortable condition, on every hand were dis- 
content and bitterness, especially among the higher officers* 
Even strangers could not help taking notice. The Wiirttem- 
berg General Trancquemont wrote to his king on the 10th of 
September: "The French generals and officers seem to me dis- 
gusted with the war, and only the presence of the Emperor can 



Mr. 44] Conditions in the Army 631 

animate the soldiers." In fact, when his eye was not resting 
on them, they threw aside their duty like a heavy burden, fre- 
quently got rid of their weapons and left the columns or stole 
away among the slightly wounded by maiming themselves. 
Hardly a month had passed since hostihties reopened, and 
already over 60,000 men and nearly 300 cannon had fallen into 
the hands of the enemy, while companies of hundreds, nay, 
thousands, of unarmed men were bound for the west. What 
drove these from the ranks was the terrible distress that set in 
when the harried lands of Silesia and Saxony had given up their 
last potatoes, and the convoys from the Elbe found it almost 
impossible to get through, now that Ney had retired. ''M. le 
Comte de Daru," wrote Napoleon himself on the 23d of Sep- 
tember to the director of the commissariat, "the army is no 
longer being fed. It would be an illusion to take any other 
view of it." But he could not help matters, and he was far 
from knomng all the wretchedness which eye-service, forgetful 
of duty, carefully tried to conceal just as it knew how to deceive 
him as to the truth of unpleasant facts.* Under such circum- 
stances it is hardly to be wondered at that of the 400,000 men 
at the Emperor's disposal at the middle of August, scarcely 
250,000 answered the roll-call at the end of September. These 
were ill supplied with clothing and shoes, and soon ammunition 
began to fail as the transports from the west were captured by 
hostile bands with increasing frequency. While the allies were 
reinforced by a corps of 50,000 Russian and Polish reserves 
under command of Bennigsen, Augereau brought only 16,000 
French troops to Leipzig. To be sure, orders were issued at 
Paris on the 27th of September for 160,000 conscripts of 1815 
and 120,000 men of the last seven age classes; but although 
the Senate at once enacted the proper decree, the new recruits 
would be of no use in the immediate future, evidently so critical. 

* Especially Bertrand, a devoted favourite without much talent or 
merit and notorious by reason of his breach of faith in 1805 in the war 
with A.ustria, sought to curry favour by such reports. It may have been 
his accounts of the battle of Gross-Beeren that led Napoleon to withhold 
reinforcements from the northern army, thus facilitating its second defeat 
by the Prussians. 



632 Leipzig [1813 

In this serious situation at the close of September, while " his 
game of chess was growing puzzling/' as the Emperor said to 
Marmont, he made another effort at diplomacy. We possess a 
letter of his to Francis I. which he sent on the 25th by the 
hand of Adjutant Flahault to the Austrian General Bubna, 
whose division was attached to Bliicher's army. The proposed 
surrender of the Polish fortress Zamsoc was made a pretext in 
this letter for speaking of peace. The envoy had in addition 
verbal instructions to give assurances that his master was now 
especially solicitous to conclude a peace, and was ready to 
make great sacrifices to Prussia and Austria, ''if they were 
willing to listen to him." But Francis I., on the 9th of Sep- 
tember, at Teplitz, had changed his position with reference to 
Russia and Prussia from that of a mere companion-in-arms to 
that of a firm ally, and he now stood by his pledges. Moreover, 
he was to conclude on the 5th of October a subsidy treaty with 
England, and five days later negotiations with Bavaria, at Ried, 
were to lead to the formal accession of that state to the coalition. 
So diplomacy fails the Emperor of the French and everything 
now depends on his military genius: that must counterbalance 
the loss of allied troops, the want of enthusiasm among his 
forces, the lack of courage and self-denial in his army. Will it 
be equal to the task? 

In September, even. Napoleon had determined to await 
Bliicher in a firm position behind the Elbe, between Konigstein 
and Meissen. ''In this position," he writes to Murat on the 
23d, " I shall follow the enemy with my eyes, and, if he leaves 
the way open for attack, shall rush upon him so that he cannot 
evade a battle." But he waited in vain. More than a week 
passed without any attack by Bliicher. What was the reason? 
Bliicher had deceived Macdonald by marching off as early as 
the 26th from Bautzen past Kamenz in the direction of War- 
tenburg, where Yorck then forced a passage in spite of Bertrand 
on the 3d of October. At the same time the Russian reserve 
army under Bennigsen had arrived at Teplitz, having come 
through Silesia and Bohemia, Bernadotte had crossed the Elbe 
at Dessau, and the main army had assumed the offensive in the 



Mr. 44] Napoleon Falls Back 633 

direction of Leipzig. Napoleon learned nothing of this until 
quite late. Even on the 4th of October he asked Macdonald 
where Bliicher's army was. When he finally knew the facts he 
was profoundly astonished; he had not credited the enemy 
with such great enterprise. Now that it was the enemy's mani- 
fest plan to effect a junction in his rear, the Elbe line could not 
be held any longer, nor could he stay in Dresden. On the 5th 
of October he conceived the plan of forming two armies; one 
under Murat, with three or four corps, he would station between 
the army of Schwarzenberg and Leipzig with orders to maintain 
a strictly defensive attitude and gradually to retire before the 
superior forces toward that city. The other he would himself 
lead with haste through Meissen and Wurzen to the support of 
Ney, then together with him push between Leipzig and the Sile- 
sian army, defeat and rout the latter, and then join Murat in 
opposing the main army of the enemy. He deviated from this 
plan later only in the one point of leaving Dresden occupied by 
two corps under Saint-Cyr. Was his object to keep more of 
Schwarzenberg's army in Bohemia? or was the protector of the 
Rhenish Confederation unwilling to leave the capital city of the 
most loyal of its princes in the hands of the enemy, and so im- 
pair his prestige? However that may be, in the decisive battle 
he had occasion to mourn bitterly the absence of 30,000 men. 
Bliicher and Bernadotte, who had joined their forces and 
determined to march together toward Leipzig, heard nothing 
for a long time of Napoleon's approach. Then the news, when 
they supposed him to be at a distance, overthrew their plans. 
Bernadotte, who had hitherto allowed the Prussians to win his 
victories for him and guarded his Swedish corps most anxiously 
from all losses, at once talked of retreating over the Elbe and 
tried to urge this course on Bliicher, but at last declared his 
willingness to stay on this side and to march south from Aken ; 
but Bliicher then proposed to evade the enemy by crossing the 
Mulde, and then in junction with the northern army to cross 
the Saale. The consequence of this bold plan was that Na- 
poleon, who had now confidently counted on a pitched battle, 
again confronted a retiring foe. Accordingly it was in the worst 



634 Leipzig [1813 

conceivable state of mind that he passed the four days from the 
11th to the 14th of October at Diiben. As he could not lay 
hold of Bliicher, the plan occurred to him to operate against 
the Silesian and northern armies, which had effected a junction 
in his rear, i.e., against Wartenburg and Dessau; then, having 
forced them back, defeated them, and driven them over the 
Elbe, to threaten Berlin, and finally to move up stream to Dres- 
den, take the garrison with him and attack the main army. 
Such extensive schemes he had to invent if he was to hold fast 
his purpose to beat the enemy separately. At first he knew 
nothing of Bliicher' s march to the Saale, where the latter was 
seeking to come into touch mth the main army. He actually 
ordered an advance to the Elbe, and as the corps of Tauenzien, 
left behind at that river by Bernadotte when he set out for 
Connern, was forced to cross over, he lulled himself in the delu- 
vsion that Bernadotte was over the river again with all his troops. 
On the morning of the 12th he learned something of Bliicher's 
real movements, only he did not suppose he was yet at Halle. 
And as Schwarzenberg kept approaching Leipzig more threat- 
eningly, the most urgent step seemed to be thoroughly to defeat 
that general southeast of the city before he had an opportunity 
to join Bliicher. But was it not already too late? Had he not 
tarried too long at Diiben, waiting for favourable news ere he 
acted? One who saw him there, as Odeleben saw him whiling 
away his time, " waiting for news from the Elbe, on a sofa in 
his room, sitting absolutely idle before a large table on which 
lay a sheet of white paper that he filled with large scrawling 
letters" — one who thus saw him, the most active man in the 
world, might well say with Marmont, '^ No one would recognize 
Napoleon during this campaign." As matters were, no further 
manoeuvre could prevent the co-operation of the enemies' 
forces. Strategically he was conquered, and his last sole hope 
lay in the decisive battle which he must now venture against 
enormous odds, 200,000 to 300,000. 

The Emperor did not, indeed, regard his situation as so pre- 
carious on the 14th, when he left Diiben and proceeded toward 
Leipzig. While he had heard by this time that Bernadotte 



jet. 44] The Situation before Leipzig 635 

was not on the other side of the Elbe, he yet beheved himself 
safe from attack on the north and west, and that in the next 
action he would have only Schwarzenberg to deal with. That 
would have been his fortune if he had not delayed so long. 
Nowhere near all of the main army had as yet arrived south 
of the city in face of Murat; Bennigsen with the reserves and 
one corps that had been watching Dresden but was now ordered 
to report, about 65,000 men in all, was still a day's march 
distant on the 16th. Moreover, Bernadotte, who as usual kept 
himself out of range, had not moved his 60,000 men forward in 
junction with Bliicher, and hence the latter, advancing with 
great caution, had got no farther than Schkeuditz by the 15th. 
Besides that Schwarzenberg had taken a position broken by 
the Elster and Pleisse rivers and the Leipzig Ratsholz; so that 
if Napoleon had arrived only one day earlier he would have 
confronted with superior forces — he had at hand 170,000 men — 
a poorly situated enemy and might have overthrown him. But 
the Guards, the troops of Mortier and Oudinot, and the divisions 
of cavalry did not join Murat until the 15th, the latter with 
three corps (Poniatowski's, Victor's, and Lauriston's) holding the 
line between the Pleisse and Liebertwolkwitz. Macdonald did 
not come up on the left wing until the next day during the bat- 
tle. Marmont had to stay north of the Parthe and try to main- 
tain his position at Mockern against greater numbers, for Bliicher 
had arrived after all. Reynier was still back in Diiben. The 
Emperor is again in the most important position, south of the 
city, facing the enemy with a powerful force; but the situa- 
tion in the north is highly critical. 

On the 16th of October the allies opened the attack at nine 
o'clock in the forenoon about the villages of Markkleeberg, 
Wachau, and Liebertwolkwitz, and the battle raged for two 
hours with the greatest stubbornness. Meantime Macdonald 
and the cavalry corps of Sebastiani had arrived, and Napoleon 
then took the offensive; he planned to break the centre of the 
enemy between Wachau and Liebertwolkwitz by an artillery 
fire from 150 guns, and then pierce it by a powerful cavalry 
charge while Macdonald turned his left flank at Seiffertshayn. 



636 Leipzig [1813 

This would throw the enemy westwards into the rivers and 
separate them from their reserves. The cannonade opened not 
far from noon, then followed the cavalry charges, which did 
throw the centre beyond Gossa. But the infantry failed to 
push into the gap quickly enough, the cavalry itself fell into 
disorder, and was repulsed by the Russian reserves hastily 
summoned from Magdeborn and a corps of Austrians which 
Schwarzenberg ordered from across the Pleisse. Under these 
circumstances it availed little that Victor, reinforced by Oudinot, 
pushed on as far as Auenhayn, and that Macdonald turned the 
right flank of the enemy as far as Gross-Possnau ; or that an 
ill-considered attack of Merveldt's Austrian corps utterly failed. 
For this very attack checked the last assault of the Guards by 
drawing it aside. A decisive victory was not therefore gained, 
only a part of the field was won. But a decisive victory with 
a rout of the enemy was just what Napoleon had to win if his 
cause was to escape a total wreck. For Marmont had mean- 
time been driven back by Bliicher after obstinate resistance 
from Mockern and Widderitsch beyond Gohlis and Eutritzsch 
to the Parthe. Hence, despite the gain of some ground at 
Wachau, the day as a whole was lost for Napoleon, as the 
next day would bring Bernadotte and Bennigsen with strong 
re-enforcements. 

Although a reconnoissance on the morning of the 17th 
showed him his desperate situation and the necessity of retreat- 
ing, there were many obstacles in the way of doing so at once. 
In the first place Reynier's corps was still behind, likewise 
Maret with the Foreign Office clerks. He had to wait for them. 
Again, would it not be a confession of defeat to sound the call 
for retreat at once? We have seen how jealously Napoleon 
guarded appearances. Finally, the troops that had fought so 
splendidly the day before were so worn out that they could not 
begin the march at once, especially as it would have to be hotly 
contested. He needed time; he must gain it. The Emperor 
summoned Merveldt, who had been captured in the affair at 
Dolitz, gave him back his sword on parole, and sent him to 
the headquarters of Francis with proposals of peace, the first 



-^T. 44] The Battle of Leipzig 637 

object of which was to secure a truce. He said to the Aus- 
trian: "I will retire, if desired, beyond the Saale; let the Rus- 
sians and Prussians retire beyond the Elbe, you Austrians to 
Bohemia, and let poor Saxony be neutral." He threw out some 
hints as to how much of his position in Europe he was ready to 
give up : Hanover to England, the German coast on the North 
Sea, all states of the Rhenish Confederation that voluntarily de- 
serted him, also Poland, Spain, and Holland, the last only on 
condition that its independence of England was guaranteed. 
Italy, however, was not to return to its former dependence on 
Austria; it would harmonize better with the European system 
if united imder a ruler of its own. This last clause robbed 
Merveldt's mission of all prospect of success. For the suzerainty 
over Italy was the very object for which Austria had been 
fighting for ten years, and it needed an Austerlitz to make her 
forego that claim. Hence the allies were soon imanimous in 
leaving the proposal without an answer. The resumption of 
fighting was postponed until the next forenoon, in order to 
await the arrival of re-enforcements. An attack by Bliicher's 
army, pushing the French beyond Gohlis and the Parthe, was 
soon abandoned. 

After waiting in vain until late in the evening for Merveldt's 
return. Napoleon began to make arrangements for the retreat. 
He ordered Bertrand, who had held Lindenau on the 16th 
against a Russian corps, to go on the Liitzen road the next 
morning as far as Weissenfels and secure that road; the young 
Guard relieved him at Lindenau. But that was all for the 
time being, and the historian is at a loss to explain to himself 
or others why the Emperor did not commence the retreat 
through Leipzig with all energy as soon as night came on, when 
Reynier had already arrived, when the troops had rested, and 
his own repute as a military leader was no longer in danger. 
Did he dread the confusion of the night march through the 
city and over the one bridge? For the building of others had 
been neglected. "The 17th passed quietly,'' says Marmont in 
his Memoirs; the enemy was awaiting re-enforcements. We, 
on our part, were busy in restoring order among our troops. 



638 Leipzig [1813 

Yet we ought to have begun our retreat on the instant, or at 
least made preparations for it so as to effect it when night came 
on. But a certain carelessness on the part of Napoleon, which 
cannot be explained and only with difficulty be described, filled the 
cup of our woes." Not until after midnight did the Emperor draw 
the army a little closer to Leipzig, but he kept it in position for 
fighting. He now resolved to secure by fighting a retreat through 
Leipzig, difficult as it was, and to engage the entire army of the 
enemy to the east and check its advance at every village, in 
order thus to make sure for one corps after another a safe re- 
treat to the west. Hence his task for the next day was merely 
a retreating battle, as it has rightly been termed, yet after all 
the grandest known in history. After Reynier's arrival and 
Bertrand's departure he still had about 146,000 men; the allies 
had more than double that number, Bernadotte having at last 
come forward, after Bliicher had magnanimously loaned him 
30,000 of his troops, and declared himself ready to fight. 

On the 18th the French army was stationed along a line 
drawn from Connewitz up the Pleisse to Dolitz, passing from 
there past Dosen to Zuckelhausen and Holzhausen, and then 
running northwards to Schonfeld and along the Parthe to the 
suburbs of Halle. Napoleon himself took his position by a tobacco- 
mill on the Colditz road near Stotteritz. The allies opened 
the attack at eight o'clock. The Austrians on the left succeeded 
in pushing beyond Dolitz, Dosen, and Lobnitz; the Russians 
in the centre in conquering Zuckelhausen and Lossinitz; and 
finally the Prussians under Bernadotte, who had crossed the 
Parthe at Taucha with 50,000 men and was advancing thence 
in the afternoon in touch with Bennigsen, drove the enemy 
back to the villages Anger, Krottendorf, and Volkmarsdorf. 
Darkness put an end to the bloody struggle. The allies, as 
may be seen, had not won the overwhelming victory naturally 
to be expected from such enormous odds, for the French still 
had possession of Connewitz and of the centre at Probstheida 
and Stotteritz. But the danger threatening his left wing, 
where a Saxon division and a Wiirttemberg cavalry brigade 
had deserted to the enemy, forced Napoleon finally to abandon 



jet. 44] The Retreat 639 

those positions also and thus acknowledge his defeat. By noon 
he had already ordered the train to retreat, and three cavalry 
corps followed in the afternoon; as night came on the great 
artillery train passed through the city, and the Emperor then 
dictated to Berthier the order for a general retreat. Odeleben 
tells us that '^a wooden stool was brought to him and on this, 
exhausted by the exertions of the preceding days, he sank in 
slumber. His hands rested, carelessly folded, in his lap; during 
these moments he looked like any other mortal man succumbing 
to the burden of misfortune. The generals stood about the 
fire, gloomy and silent, and the retreating troops marched by at 
a little distance." Then Napolon repaired to Leipzig, where 
he spent the night at the Hotel de Prusse. 

It was long after midnight before the valiant defenders of 
Probstheida and Stotteritz entered the suburbs. A rear-guard 
only was left behind to keep the enemy away from the city until 
the next noon. If a general assault followed, it was the duty 
of the last corps entering Leipzig to hold it if possible until 
midnight. But the actual events were different. In the night 
and on the next morning the troops kept pouring in at three 
gates, and as they all had to pass out of one, the resulting 
confusion was well-nigh inextricable. In the forenoon the un- 
expected advance of a detachment of Russian chasseurs from 
Rosenthal so deceived the corporal of grenadiers posted at the 
high bridge over the Elster as to the real situation that he 
blew up the bridge and so sacrificed the entire corps of the rear- 
guard. There was nothing left for those troops but to surrender. 
Their leaders sought to escape. It was here that Macdonald 
saved himself by swimming across the river with his horse; 
while Poniatowski, the noblest of the marshals of the Empire 
and one of the bravest, was drowned. The others, Reynier and 
Lauriston, both of whom were wounded, were captured. Ney, 
Macdonald, Marmont, Latour-Maubourg and Sebastiani, as well 
as others, were also wounded. Five division generals lay dead 
on the field. The two days, the 18th and 19th, had cost Na- 
poleon more than 60,000 men. Rather heavy for a fight of 
the rear-guard. But that was not all : the retreat to the Rhine 



640 Leipzig [1813 

which had now become an absolute necessity, meant the aban- 
donment of the fortresses on the Elbe, Oder, and Vistula, i.e., 
about 150,000 men. And yet another sacrifice was imposed by 
the war: his Majesty Frederick Augustus of Saxony, to whom 
Napoleon had pretended before his departure that he was 
leaving the city only to manoeuvre in the open field and that 
he would relieve it in a few days.* The King went to Berlin as 
a prisoner, and Stein, as president of the administrative com- 
mission, became the executive head of the Saxon government 
in the name of the three alUed monarchs. 

When Napoleon sought to restore some order to his retreating 
army at Weissenfels he still had about 120,000 men. But as 
soon as they were across the Saale and out of sight of the pursuing 
enemy, thousands left the ranks every day. Some of them 
threw away their weapons and deserted, others roamed about 
as marauding bands of " fricoteurs," others were left behind 
exhausted. The typhus brought on by hunger raged among 
the ranks and became thenceforth the constant companion of 
the army. Not until they arrived at Erfurt, where the dilatory 
pursuit of the enemy allowed them a two-days' rest, was it 
possible to procure supplies or rally the army. But beyond 
the Thuringian forest, around which the Emperor had gone 
at Eisenach so as to pass through Fulda and Hanau on his 
way to Frankfort and Mainz, the army was already reduced 
to hardly more than 60,000 rank and file. And even these 
had to fight their way to the Rhine; for on the 30th of October 
Wrede, with a Bavarian corps of 35,000 men, hastily marched 
from the Inn and confronted them. Bliicher had marched 
after Napoleon almost as far as Fulda; if he had kept on the 
same road, the French army would have been in a desperate 
strait, provided Wrede stood firm. But at the headquarters 
of the monarchs the view had prevailed that the common enemy 
would push for the Rhine not by way of Fulda and Hanau, but 
via Alsfeld and Giessen, and accordingly Bliicher and Wrede 
were both instructed to take the latter road. Wrede, there- 

* Frederick Augustus himself reported Napoleon's misrepresentation 
of facts to several persons, the Russian Toll and the Prussian Natzmer. 



^T. 44] Napoleon Returns to Paris 641 

fore, supposed on the 30th that he would not be engaging the 
entire French army, and made a vigorous attack. Perceiving 
his error, he still persisted from political groimds; ''our friend- 
ship is too young," said he, "for us not to exercise our good- 
will with all earnestness." On that day Napoleon himself did 
not have more than 35,000 men at hand, including the Guards, 
the rest having followed at a considerable distance. At first he 
wanted to wait for them, but yielded reluctantly to Macdonald's 
advice to attack with the Guards. The movement was suc- 
cessful. The artillery general Drouot managed to bring a large 
number of guns to bear on the enemy's left flank, and Wrede 
lost the battle after a stubborn resistance. The way to Mainz 
was now open. 

On the 2d of November Napoleon arrived at that city and 
after a few days' stay continued his journey to Paris. Of the 
half a million armed men who had crossed the Rhine in obedience 
to his command scarcely 90,000 returned, many without their 
weapons and with the poison of a deadly disease in their blood, 
which raged with terrible fury in the Rhine city and gave a 
sombre notoriety to the 'Hyphus de Mayence." An eye- 
witness speaks as follows: "The mass of men that filled all the 
houses and streets was indescribable; one saw here the half- 
dead soldiers utterly forsaken, suffering the torments of hun- 
ger, lying on hard stones under the open sky in the rain and 
cold and waiting longingly for death. They died by the hun- 
dreds every day, and they often lay unburied on the streets 
for several days." The world saw, and the Emperor, too, 
whenever he looked over the square from the windows of his 
palace, saw, how the second of his great armies was perishing. 
What must have been his feelings at the spectacle! Before the 
opening of the campaign he had declared to Count Mole at Paris, 
" Do not think that I do not possess a heart that feels like others; 
I am a very kind-hearted man. But since my earliest child- 
hood I have accustomed myself to silence that chord of my 
native, and now it is dumb." He expressed himself quite dif- 
ferently in his interview with Metternich at Dresden. The 
latter had asked him: " When the generation of Frenchmen 



642 Leipzig [1813 

which you have levied before their time shall have disappeared, 
shall you then appeal to the next generation?" Napoleon, ex- 
cited by this embarrassing question, answered: "You are not a 
soldier and do not know what a soldier's soul is. I have become 
great in camp, and a man like me cares little for the lives of 
a million men." Almost that number his two last campaigns 
had cost him. And if he now cared for the sick and wounded 
at Mainz, it was not out of humanity so much as with the 
thought of being able to use them again. For all his activity 
was ruled by the one idea expressed shortly before at Erfurt, " By 
May I shall have an army of 250,000 fighting men on the Rhine.' • 



CHAPTER XIX 

ELBA 

A SECOND year of war had thus closed with enormous losses 
for Napoleon. The national resistance of the Russians had 
forced him out of the Czar's realm by a ''via dolorosa" Without 
a parallel ; the national enthusiasm of the Germans had driven 
him back over the Rhine. The statecraft of princes and 
their cabinets vanished entirely before this elemental impulse 
of the national heart for independence of foreign tyranny. 
Vain was the resolution of Frederick William III., the wavering 
dehberation of his diplomats; he had to enter upon a war 
against his former ally. In vain had Metternich conceived of 
a separate neutral position for his master, fortified by alliances ; 
Francis I. had to give it up and draw the sword against his 
own son-in-law. In vain did Frederick Augustus of Saxony 
exhibit his loyalty to the founder of his throne; his regiment 
deserted to the enemy and left him to his fate. So also the 
WestphaHan troops, the Wiirttemberg cavalry, and the infantry 
of Baden had all gone over to the enemy long before Jerome left 
his country, the last week in October, or King Frederick I. and 
Grand Duke Charles joined the allies. Soon the entire Rhenish 
Confederation was arrayed against its protector. And as 
among the Germans, so among other peoples who had furnished 
contingents, the national party gained the ascendency. This 
was the case with the Italians, on whom the "miso gallo" of 
Alfieri had made no little impression. Murat had taken leave 
of Napoleon with his Neopolitan troops even before the battle 
of Hanau, on the pretext that the state of affairs in his king- 
dom demanded his return. But his thoughts were wider; he 
aimed not only to retain the crown of Naples, but also win the 
crown of aU Italy — ^provided that the power on the Danube 

643 



644 



Elba [1813 



did not resume its old rights. By the end of October, 1813, the 
Austrians under Hiller had already driven the troops of Viceroy 
Eugene beyond the Adige and taken possession of Trieste and 
the'' Dalmatian fortresses. The Dutch revolted openly against 
Napoleon in Amsterdam about the middle of November and 
declared themselves in favour of the ancient House of Orange. 
And while all these things were happening the Spanish national 
war had resulted under the help and leadership of England in 
new successes over the French. In September the coast fortress 
San Sebastian, and in October Pampeluna, had fallen into Wel- 
lington's hands. This opened the road all the way to Bayonne, 
and the British commander, after hearing of Napoleon's losses, 
at once set out and kept advancing persistently, contesting 
every step with Soult. Suchet at the same time, to avoid 
having his communications with France cut off, retired from 
Catalonia over the Pyrenees. 

Thus did the foreign nations rid themselves of the French 
ascendency which weighed so heavily upon them, and Na- 
poleon's most unique creation, the international Empire, fell to 
pieces under the energetic resistance of the people. His own 
fate now was in the balance. Was that nation, whose land and 
strength he had used as the fulcrum of his universal sovereignty, 
at last wearied with his rule that squandered her wealth and 
blood without stint in his unresting ambition? This time he 
could not do as he did the year before, and accuse the 
opposing elements of nature as his conquerors and as the de- 
stroyers of the second mighty army — a host that had been 
given in his charge in the hope of victory and peace. His pres- 
tige, too, which he regarded as the real basis of his power, was 
profoundly shaken. Could he a third time secure the means 
for a new war? 

The Senate, indeed, had with its usual devotion granted him 
280,000 men, even before the decisive blow on the plains of 
Leipzig. But how little that was in a war with Europe! The 
Convention had, to be sure, engaged the entire Continent, but 
that was when their forces were fresh, and inspired with the 
enthusiasm of newly-acquired freedom. Since then twenty 



^T. 44] The Financial Situation in France 645 

years of almost uninterrupted warfare had passed, the nation 
had lost her liberties again, and her enthusiasm for the man 
who restored order and gave her glory had vanished, since his 
own glory was dimmed, and in place of the long-desired rest 
and peaceful enjoyment there kept coming up new feuds and 
greater sacrifices. For the time was long gone by when the 
Emperor could lay province after province at the feet of the 
French people and assure them that all these wars would cost 
them next to nothing. In this last year he had been able to 
stop up the great gaps in the budget by laying a bold hand on 
the national domain, i.e., by ordering the sale of the communal 
lands. Now it appeared that this experiment had had Uttle 
success, and that only a small fraction of the lands could be 
turned into ready money. So, just when the state was in the 
direst condition, the necessary material resources were lacking. 
Where were they to be found, when, as a consequence of the ter- 
rible tax on human life, the fields lay fallow, industries were 
idle, and trade at a standstill? By imposing higher tariffs? 
But importations were insignificant. Or was it by increasing 
the land tax (about 30 per cent), the tax on doors and windows, 
the tax on patents and salt, and the indirect taxes? This is 
what the Senate decreed on the 11th of November. But the 
income from these would not suffice. In January, 1814, the land 
tax was raised 50 per cent, and others in proportion ; equally 
in vain. The revenue from taxes showed a falling off for that 
year of 50 per cent. The national securities fell to 50; the 
shares of the French Bank, which had once been worth 1400 
francs, now sold for but little over 700 francs. There are no 
buyers, for nobody has money to spare. The wine-growers 
keep their produce in their cellars, the warehouses of factories 
are filled to overflowing. If Napoleon decides to arm anew, he 
will have nothing at hand for the moment but his treasure in 
the Tuileries, and of the 65,000,000 francs of this the next few 
weeks will use up the larger part. 

But men, as well as money, were scarce. The conscriptions 
of October met with passable results, to be sure, for the enemy 
stood at the borders and patriotism called with loud voice. The 



646 Elba [1813 

people had in defence of the fatherland no other general in whom 
they could trust in the same degree as in the genius of the 
Emperor. Hence the mass of the French people, as is shown by 
police reports, were still good imperialists. Only in the northern 
provinces, exposed to the English and Bourbon influences, such 
as Flanders, Artois, and Normandy, and in the southern prov- 
inces of Guyenne, Gascony, and Provence, the population was 
either indifferent to invasion or even opposed to the Empire. 
In the other sections of the country the peasant gave up his last 
remaining son with resignation ; and not until a second Senate 
decree, November 15th, 1813, ordered a newlevy of 300,000 men 
from the age classes of the years 1803-1814, which had already 
served, i.e. summoned heads of families and married men, were the 
obstacles insurmountable. Those who were summoned failed to 
appear, or fled to the woods; and at the beginning of the new 
year not more than a fifth of the 300,000 men had been re- 
cruited. And the results of trying to create a new national 
guard were equally poor ; the Senate — and what did this Senate 
not consent to! — on December 17th ordered 450 cohorts to be 
raised. But the peasant knew from the experience of the last 
campaign that the Emperor made no difference between militia 
and regulars when he needed soldiers. He was ready to defend 
his farm, but not to leave farm and wife and child in the lurch 
and go to the army. Not 20,000 men were collected at the re- 
cruiting stations. And even for these few that responded to 
the new levies there was great scarcity of accoutrements, uni- 
forms, and weapons. 

In truth it was a rather gloomy prospect for the continuation 
of the war with allied Europe, even though the temper of the 
French people still favoured the Emperor and liberal agitation 
against him found no foothold in the lower orders, and though 
the Bourbons with their following of haughty aristocrats were 
still sure to find the same rooted aversion. If only France had 
not been obliged to face both sides at once, east and south, and 
if the troops of Suchet and Soult could be used against the 
allies. Napoleon kept that in mind, and therefore he deter- 
mined to release Ferdinand VII. of Spain, give him back his 



^T.44] Napoleon and the Pope 647 

country, and conclude peace with him. The treaty was con- 
cluded at Valengay on the 8th of December. But instead of 
sending the king home at once, which Wellington declared was 
the only means of making war impossible for the English, Na- 
poleon was induced by an intrigue of Talleyrand's, who was 
now trying with all the secret devices of politics to undermine 
the Emperor's position, to stipulate that the treaty be first 
laid before the Cortes in Madrid. The latter refused to accept, — 
Tallyrand had been sure of it, — negotiations were prolonged 
until January, and the armies of the south could not be with- 
drawn. 

There was still another prisoner whom the Emperor must 
think of releasing: the Pope. By the collapse of the Empire 
Napoleon's plans with regard to supremacy over the Church 
were also undermined. How much he had promised himself 
from his power over the Holy Father! ''From this moment,'' 
he said later, " I would have exalted the Pope again, surrounded 
him with pomp and homage, and made an idol of him ; nor would 
he even have missed his temporal possessions. I would have 
held my church sessions like the legislative sessions. My 
councils would have been the representatives of Christendom, 
the Pope presiding; I would have opened them and closed 
them, approved and announced their decrees, just as Const antine 
and Charlemagne did. How fruitful this would have been of 
great events! The Pope's influence over Spain, Italy, the 
Rhenish Confederation, and Poland would have drawn closer 
the ties of alliance throughout the great Empire, while the in- 
fluence exerted by the Head of the Church over believers in 
England and Ireland, Russia and Prussia, Austria, Bohemia, 
and Hungary, would have become the inheritance of France." 
But the great Empire was tottering and its influence on neigh- 
bouring lands was gone. It was restricted to the boundaries of 
France, and its sovereign could no longer think of combining 
with it the international universal system of the papacy. At 
the very beginning of the last war, Pius VII. had renounced the 
Concordat of Fontainebleau, and later, when the congress of 
Prague was in session and Francis I. separated himself from 



648 Elba [1813 

Napoleon, the Pope had appealed to His Apostolic Majesty 
of Austria for support. Now the Emperor proposed to release 
him, but again only in consideration of a treaty which should 
permanently cede the territory of the old papal state to the 
kingdom of Italy. But the Pope rejected all negotiations most 
positively, for they could not be conducted in Paris, but only 
in Rome. At that Napoleon kept him a prisoner, but did not 
thereby improve his political position, rather complicated it. 

There were only two courses open whereby to retain his 
position: either to defeat with reduced forces an enemy many 
times his superior, or conclude peace with him before he could 
cross the Rhine — the peace for which France had longed for 
many years and now, after all her losses, longed for more ar- 
dently than ever. But could peace be obtained? Would the 
powers, who had just advanced victoriously to the Rhine, halt 
there and listen to proposals? And if they did, what terms 
would they demand? Napoleon learned the answer to these 
questions about the middle of November, 1813, when a French 
diplomat. Baron de Saint-Aignan, came to Paris from Frank- 
fort, the headquarters of the allied monarchs. Saint-Aignan had 
hitherto represented the French government at the courts of 
Gotha and Weimar; he had been in Leipzig after the battle, 
and was taken by the allies to Frankfort, where they assigned 
him a role similar to that recently assigned by Napoleon to 
Merveldt. Metternich, in the presence and with the formal 
consent of Nesselrode and of the English plenipotentiary. Lord 
Aberdeen, announced to him that the powers were disposed to 
make peace if Napoleon would accept the natural boundaries 
of France, i.e., the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, as a 
basis for it, and summon a congress for the purpose of a general 
pacification. To be sure, to this offer was attached the limiting 
clause that pending negotiations war would continue; but it 
was, after all, a peace that was in prospect, and whoever sincerely 
wished the Emperor well must advise him to accept at once; 
for it was a fact, as the report of Saint-Aignan said, " that Na- 
poleon could save much evil to humanity and many dangers to 
France if he would not put off negotiations a single day.'' What 



.Et. 44] The Chance of Peace 649 

led the allies to pause and offer such terms has not yet been fully 
explained. It was asserted that the solicitude of the Emperor 
of Austria for the fate and safety of his daughter prevailed over 
other considerations. Metternich himself was of the opinion, 
as he wrote Caulaincourt in a private letter handed to the ne- 
gotiator, that the step would have no results. Was that an 
indirect hint to Napoleon to accept at once? Everything de- 
pended on his decision. 

He recognized his situation exactly. "My situation," he 
remarked to his brother Joseph at this time, "allows me no 
longer to think of sovereignty over any foreign nation; and I 
shall esteem myself fortunate if I can keep the territory of old 
France by means of the peace. Everything about me threatens 
ruin. My armies are annihilated and the losses they have suf- 
fered can be made good only with extreme difficulty. Holland 
is irrevocably lost to us; Italy is wavering; the demeanour of 
the King of Naples makes me uneasy. The re-enforcements for 
the Viceroy Eugene fail to arrive, though his need is pressing; 
the Austrians are pushing him, and the Italians under his com- 
mand waver. Belgium and the Rhine provinces give tokens of 
discontent. The Spanish frontier is in the power of the enemy. 
In such a crisis how can one think of foreign thrones? How 
can one demand of France, when she can scarcely defend herself, 
sacrifices for any other cause than her own preservation, when 
at best one can count only on such sacrifices as are indispen- 
sable for the protection of her own territory?" * And yet Na- 
poleon did not accept the proposal of peace outright. Such, 
indeed, had been his intention at the outset, and Maret had 
already drawn up the official despatch; but he bethought him- 
self of something else, and in order to gain more time for his 
armaments, so that he should not be obliged defenceless to ac- 
cept the dictation of his enemies, he sent a letter on the 16th of 

* Miot de Melito, Memoires, III. 309. Of course" we must not for- 
get that these words of the Emperor formed a prelude to the demand that 
Joseph should throw up his hopes of the Spanish crown, and hence are 
more sombre than his situation really seemed to Napoleon. Still they 
correspond exactly to the actual facts. 



650 Elba [1813 

November in which he made no mention of the basis of peace, 
but only proposed Mannheim as the seat of the congress. He 
deceived himself. Metternich took advantage of this procrasti- 
nating reply of the Emperor by using it in a manifesto of the 
monarchs to the French people. "The allied powers," it was 
declared, '^are not in war against France, but against that 
loudly proclaimed ascendency which the Emperor Napoleon 
has so long exercised beyond the boundaries of his realm, to 
the detriment of Europe and of France. Victory has brought 
the allied armies to the Rhine. The first use which their Im- 
perial and Royal Majesties made of the fact was to offer peace 
to His Majesty the Emperor of the French." The terms of 
peace were, to be sure, no longer the Rhine, the Pyrenees, and 
the Alps, as a first draft of the proclamation by Metternich 
still read. It went on: "The allied sovereigns wish France to 
be great, strong, and happy"; and then, farther on, "The 
powers guarantee to the French Empire an extension of terri- 
tory such as France never enjoyed under her kings." Thus did 
the cabinets of old legitimate Europe appeal — and this fur- 
nishes new evidence how strongly they were influenced by the 
current of public opinion at this moment — from the monarch to 
the sovereign, from the Emperor to the nation, from the ruler of 
an international empire to the French people. In this separation 
of prince and people, in this appeal to the latter as the higher 
authority, lay the whole force of the proclamation, which in 
other respects was rather weak, and it could not fail of effect. 
Napoleon was made aware of this in different ways ; the reports 
of the prefects, for example, moved him to send senators and 
Councillors of State into the provinces in order to rouse sentiment 
and make it more favourable to the imperial government; he 
could not even afford to disdain appeaUng to the old revolu- 
tionary spirit, and the long-neglected Marseillaise was ground 
out of hand-organs on the streets once more. But the extent 
to which the French were finally distinguishing between him 
and themselves appeared most clearly when the Legislative Body 
met on the 19th of December, 1813. 

Napoleon had postponed opening its sessions until that day 



.Et. 44] Napoleon to the Legislative Body 651 

in order not to face its members without any evidence of his 
love of peace. When he had sacrificed Maret, in whom pubUc 
opinion, misled by Savary, beheld an adversary of peace, by 
removing him from the conduct of foreign affairs and appoint- 
ing in his stead Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza, who was re- 
garded as an advocate of pacification; when he had ordered 
the latter on the 2d of December to write to Metternich that he 
now accepted the proposed basis of peace, and the Austrian 
minister rephed that nothing stood in the way of opening the 
congress and that England would be notified at once in order 
that she might send her representative: then, and not until 
then, did Napoleon think he possessed enough material to play 
the part, as he had in former years, of a peaceable man, whose 
good intentions were interfered with by wicked Europe. This 
correspondence was laid before the deputies, and only this — not 
the overtures of Saint-Aignan and the first procrastinating 
answer which had as good as destroyed all chance of peace. 
The Emperor, however, in the speech from the throne, assured 
them that all the original documents to be found in the port- 
folio of the ministry of foreign affairs would be transmitted to 
the Chamber, The close of his message, which appealed to the 
national honour, contained the usual demand for sacrifices, '^for 
nations act with confidence only when they bring out all their 
forces." • But the deputies did not see matters in that light. 
A report of a committee presented by Laine of Bordeaux 
defined the situation in clear and bold language: ''All means 
of resistance would be effective only in case the French were 
convinced that the government were really concerned for the 
glory of peace alone, and that their blood would be shed only 
in defence of the fatherland and her protecting laws." The 
last clause was an intimation that the French were no longer 
disposed to fight for an arbitrary ruler. Hence the Emperor 
was to be requested 'Ho care for a full and consistent execution 
of the laws which guarantee to all Frenchmen the rights of 
liberty and security of property, and to the nation the undi- 
minished exercise of her political privileges." This report was 
greeted in the committee of the whole with a storm of applause 



652 Elba [1813 

and accepted by a large majority. The partisans of the govern- 
ment worked hard to get the wording of the report changed, 
which was rather outspoken. Enough remained for the Em- 
peror in a rage to forbid its pubUcation. He closed the Legisla- 
tive Body, and told its members to their faces in a public 
audience that they were factious and that he would have 
them under surveillance. 

The dissolution of the Legislative Body roused intense indig- 
nation, especially in the provincial towns ; and it seems almost 
as if nothing but the war just then thundering at the country's 
gates, with its train of privations and excesses, saved Napoleon 
and his government from an internal crisis that was already 
drawing nigh. Now, in the hour of need, he was not so much 
a sovereign to the French people as a military leader, certainly 
the ablest of them all and in this case- the most earnest, for he 
fought for his throne. It will be no surprise to us to behold once 
more all the marvels of his genius. 

The allies had made no pause in the war, as Metternich 
had informed Saint-Aignan they would not. During the first 
week in November they had already agreed on prosecuting it im- 
mediately, despite the objections of a few old-fashioned military 
men like the Austrian General Duka. He proposed taking up 
a fortified position along the Rhine, and once even brought 
Francis I. to the point of threatening Radetzky, who preached 
the offensive, with court martial. In regard to the plan of opera- 
tions opinions were for a time divided. Gneisenau had pro- 
posed with good reason an offensive movement through Belgium. 
Schwarzenberg, on the other hand, insisted that only 30,000 
men under Biilow should proceed to Holland, but that the 
main army must try to penetrate France through Switzerland, 
which must be won to the cause of the allies and should by no 
means be left on the flank, and thence gain the plateau of Lan- 
gres. In that way, he thought, they would be nearer to the 
Austrians advancing through upper Italy and to Wellington. 
Bliicher's army should go across the middle Rhine and so cover 
the right flank. It was a methodical plan, which involved a 
loss of time and aimed more at gaining a position than at a vie- 



^T.44] The Objects of the Allies 653 

tory over the enemy. Yet the statement is incontestable with 
which Radetzky advocated it: "All the south of France, where 
now not a soldier is to be found, will be prevented from organ- 
izing, and the Emperor Napoleon will lose a considerable portion 
of his resources." 

For this was the principal object of the allied leaders, to 
prevent by breaking into France the arming of the enemy, to 
make him by this means incapable of lasting resistance and to 
dispose him more to peace.* To annihilate him or banish 
him was by no means their purpose. And they did in fact 
succeed in so far that when the two armies at the end of the 
year crossed the Rhine and (during the first half of January) 
entered France, more than a third of the country was checked 
in the midst of its preparations, while Napoleon's new army 
was in the first stages of formation. The troops of the former 
army under Macdonald, Marmont, and Victor, which had been 
left at the Rhine, and those that Ney and Mortier gathered at 
Nancy and Langres, had amounted to little over 50,000, for at 
least as many more had died from typhus in December, f These 
forces, retiring before superior numbers, marched during January, 
1814, in the direction of Vitry on the Marne. Gerard with 
a few thousand reserves and Lefebvre with the Guards added 
only about 10,000 to their numbers. The effort at a '' levee en 
masse " was a total failure, and the decree of January 3d author- 
izing it was without effect. 

Napoleon's original plan, when he heard of the advance of 
the alHes, was to let them approach near the capital, where he 
in the mean time would have stationed and built up his new 
army, and then to unite all his available forces there and seek 
to decide matters in a battle. But to prevent the allies from 
seizing too much French soil with all its supplies he gave up 

* The "military operations," writes Gentz on the 19th of December 
from Freiburg to the Princess of Wallachia, after speaking of the negotia- 
tions, "will be continued nevertheless with greater emphasis, because 
the allies hope in this way to prevent the reorganization of the army in 
the interior of France, and so confirm all the more the peaceful mood of 
Napoleon." 

t Houssaye, "1814," p. 59, now gives the official figures. 



654 Elba [1814 

this plan and determined to fight between the Seine and the 
Marne, though he had at first nothing but the remnants of the 
last army. His purpose in this was to strike the separate de- 
tachments of the enemy before they effected a junction, and, 
both for strategic as well as political reasons, to turn first upon 
Bliicher, who was moving rapidly on Saint-Dizier, while the 
main army was slowly advancing by way of Montbeliard and 
Langres. There was a variety of reasons for this delay. In 
the first place, Alexander, influenced by Laharpe, Jomini, and 
other Swiss, had long been opposed to the march through Switzer- 
land; then again, in sentimental memory of the passage over 
the Niemen on New Year's Day, he had waited until the Russian 
New Year (January 13th) before crossing the Rhine at Basel; 
and finally Metternich had directed Schwarzenberg on the 8th 
of January to advance '' discreetly," as he hoped soon to bring 
to a close the great peace negotiations. For Caulaincourt was 
waiting at Luneville for the congress to be opened and com- 
plained of the delay, as his Emperor had surely given the strongest 
evidence of his hearty desire for the establishment of a universal 
peace by sending his minister of foreign affairs with full powers.* 
Another thing hampered the operations of the main army. 
At Abo Alexander had held out hopes to Bernadotte of getting 
the French throne, and the latter had accordingly shown him- 
self very sparing toward the French throughout the campaign. 
Now this project of the Czar stood revealed and cooled Austria 
off still more, whose ardour was none too great at best. 

On the 26th of January Napoleon left Paris and on the next 

* See " Oesterreich's Teilnahme," etc., p. 790. Metternich states in 
his letter from Freiburg on the 9th of January addressed to Schwarzenberg 
that he had sent to Caulaincourt the official answer referring him to definite 
explanations in the immediate future, and a few lines in private besides. 
The latter have never been published. It would be most interesting to 
see them. Metternich's view of the situation before the arrival of Eng- 
land's minister, Castlereagh, at headquarters is also defined in a second 
letter to Schwarzenberg dated January 13th. *'To make an end, and 
an honourable one, to obtain what is desirable and advantageous without 
going to Paris, or to go to Paris if it is not otherwise to be obtained : that 
is the whole of my policy." 



iET.44] The Allies Increase their Demands 655 

morning arrived at Chalons. Blucher was on the road between 
Saint-Dizier and Brienne on that day, his object being to come 
closer to the main army. After sending Torek's corps toward 
the Moselle and leaving that of Langeron's (all but one division) 
to watch Mainz, he had only about 30,000 men at hand. Na- 
poleon thought he had still less, and determined to attack him 
although he, too, had no more than 40,000. He supposed 
Bliicher to be still at Saint-Dizier, but found only the rear-guard 
there; he hastened on after him toward Brienne, leaving Mar- 
mont behind. There an engagement took place which compelled 
Bliicher, who was just on the point of proceeding westward, to 
turn south toward Trannes. 

Meantime at the headquarters of the allies some memorable 
resolutions were reached. The English Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Lord Castlereagh, had arrived there on the 25th, and 
had at once begun to exercise a dominant influence. First of 
all he had demanded ''the uninterrupted prosecution of mili- 
tary operations," and at the same time he had given encour- 
agement for a conference of ministers who should determine 
the political course to be pursued. And so on the 29th it was 
agreed that at the congress to be opened presently at Chatillon 
the ''old boundaries of France" were to be proposed to Caulain- 
court as a basis of peace. That is to say, the conditions once 
given to Saint-Aignan, which Napoleon did not accept speedily 
enough, were retracted, and France was to be circumscribed no 
more by the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, but by the 
boundaries she had at the beginning of the wars of the Revolu- 
tion in 1792, when a legitimate king still sat on the throne. In 
favour of this proposition they urged the successes of the allies 
since November: their invasion of France, the conquest of 
Holland, and the desertion of Murat, who had entered an offensive 
and defensive alliance with Austria on the 11th of January. 
By this decision, denying to France her gains through the Revo- 
lution and restricting the state to its former territory, the 
powers, assuming that they fought out their programme with all 
their resources, undermined the revolutionary monarchy, whose 
principle had been unlimited extension of boundaries and of 



656 Elba [1814 

influence. Hence it was but consistent that at Langres the 
restoration of the old' dynasty of the Bourbons had already 
been in view. The clause: ''in case it [the dynasty] should 
be recalled by an act of the nation itself/' laid much less stress 
on the sovereign people than the appeal from Frankfort had 
done. 

These wide-reaching resolutions were to be emphatically 
supported by a victory over Napoleon during the next few 
days. He had followed Bliicher to the vicinity of Trannes, 
ever hoping to strike him a blow before Schwarzenberg arrived. 
He was disappointed. Schwarzenberg, after much crying out 
upon those who could not get quickly enough to Paris and upon 
Metternich, who had not yet secured peace, had determined 
to support Bliicher and sent him two corps that increased his 
force to 60,000, while Napoleon had only 40,000. Wrede's 
corps also hastened from Joinville, so that the dreaded Em- 
peror of the French might be confronted with more than double 
odds. What, therefore. Napoleon had thought to prevent 
had been done after all. The stubbornness with which Bliicher 
held his position at Trannes left no doubt as to the proximity 
of the main army. He had even given orders on the 1st of 
February to march west, when Bliicher took the offensive at 
La Rothiere. The entire afternoon the French troops held 
out against great odds, until towards evening their line on the 
left wing near Chaumesnil was broken by the onslaught of 
Wrede, and the reserves, led by Napoleon himself, were unable 
to repair the damage. The village, and with it the battle, was 
lost. 

It was a brilliant victory for the allies, and it might, per- 
haps, have been definitive if it had been followed up by an 
energetic pursuit. But this was neglected. The allies deemed 
Napoleon incapable of further resistance. On the very evening 
after the battle Bliicher wrote that ''it had, as it were, decided 
everything," and in eight days they would be in Paris. Con- 
sequently they neglected to push rapidly after the beaten foe, 
and thus allow him no time to restore order to his confused 
troops. Napoleon, too, felt the whole weight of the blow he 



.Et. 44] . Negotiations Fail 657 

had received. Maret, who was with him at Troyes during the 
gloomy days after the engagement and who assumed the office 
of secretary of state, relates in his Memoirs that the Emperor 
had made up his mind to the extreme of compliance and that 
he gave carte blanche to Caulaincourt when the latter requested 
definite instructions for the congress to be opened on the 5th 
of February. ''The Duke of Bassano," we read in the Memoirs, 
"handed Napoleon the letter (from Caulaincourt) and conjured 
him to yield. The Emperor at first scarcely seemed to be 
listening to him, then he pointed to a passage in Montesquieu, 
whose pages he had been turning abstractedly. *Read it,' 
said he, 'read it aloud.' The words were: 'I know nothing 
more magnanimous than the determination of a monarch of 
our time to bury himself under the ruins of his throne rather 
than accept terms that no king should listen to.'" ''But I know 
something far more magnanimous," exclaimed Maret, "that 
you make a sacrifice of your glory and thereby fill up the abyss 
which will otherwise swallow up France and you together.". 
"Well, then, gentlemen, make peace; Caulaincourt shall con- 
clude it, and shall sign everything that can bring it about; I 
will bear the shame. Only do not ask me to dictate my own 
humiliation." So Maret wrote to the minister that the Em- 
peror gave him carte blanche to bring the negotiations to a happy 
conclusion, to save the capital and to prevent a battle in which 
the very last hopes of the nation would be at stake. When 
Caulaincourt, frightened by the weight of responsibility laid 
on him, asked on the 6th of February for definite instructions 
as to how far he could go, Maret finally brought the Emperor, 
who had gone back to Nogent on the 7th, to the point of actu- 
ally "dictating his humiliation" during the night. "It was 
settled," the Memoirs proceed to relate, "that for the sake of 
peace Belgium and even the left bank of the Rhine must be 
given up, and the instructions read that the plenipotentiary 
should first offer Belgium, and then, if it was indispensable, the 
left bank of the Rhine as well. Italy, Piedmont, Genoa, nay, 
even the colonies, were to be sacrificed first of all. Napoleon 
intended to sign the new instructions the next morning. But 



658 



Elba II8U 



before the break of day tidings came that upset everything, 
and when Maret appeared in the cabinet with the document 
he found his master bending eagerly over his maps. '*I am 
concerned with wholly different matters," the Emperor shouted 
to him; '^1 am just on the point of dealing Blucher a blow." 
And nothing further was said about signing the order. Talley- 
rand was right: he could not be King of France as long as he 
was the Emperor Napoleon.* 

Shortly after the battle of La Rothiere, when the allies had 
agreed to move on Paris, they had separated the two armies. 
Schwarzenberg held the road to Troyes and Fontainebleau, 
and Bliicher marched north at first, later turning west past 
Fere Champenoise. He was to send for Yorck, who was march- 
ing from Chalons along the Marne after Macdonald, and for 
certain re-enforcements that were following along from Germany 
under Kleist and Kapzevitch. That meant slow progress for 
his division, and in fact Schwarzenberg, too, advanced but 
cautiously. Then Bliicher quite suddenly conceived the plan 
of pushing hastily forward northwest by Montmirail with two 
Russian divisions (Sacken and Olssufief), blocking Macdonald's 
road on the Marne, cutting him off from Napoleon and crushing 
him between his own force and Yorck's. He did not now wait 
for re-enforcements, which, besides, had gone in the wrong direc- 
tion by command of Emperor Alexander, and he divided his 
army into three widely separated columns. Napoleon had 
learned of this when he refused to sign the document for Maret 
on the 8th. He was going to follow the plan recommended by 
Marmont and overpower in detail the ''best army of the allies,", 
as he called Bliicher 's forces. He left Oudinot, Victor, and 
Gerard behind at Montereau with not quite 40,000 men to watch 
Schwarzenberg, and hastened with nearly 30,000 (Marmont, Ney, 
and the Guards) by Sezanne north to Champaubert. At this 
point the corps of Olssufief was marching by on the 10th of 

* Even though Maret's story be true, it must not be overlooked that 
Napoleon had been following Bliicher's movements for several days, and 
on the evening of February 7th he wrote to Joseph: "In this state of affairs 
we must show confidence and adopt bold measures." V 



Mt. 44]] The Allies Repulsed 659 

February, while Sacken had already gone ahead to Montmirail. 
Bliicher had rejected Gneisenau's advice to recall all the corps. 
So Olssufief was on that day nearly annihilated, and Napoleon, 
leaving Marmont behind, rushed on after Sacken, who met him 
at Montmirail. Here, on the forenoon of the 11th, the Emperor 
advanced his troops under cover of a splendid artillery fire, 
that prevented the enemy from breaking through. Then he 
purposely weakened his left wing to draw Sacken's attack in 
that direction, while he pressed the latter 's left with superior 
forces. That made it impossible for Sacken to join Yorck, 
who was advancing from Chateau-Thierry; the latter was driven 
back and Sacken meantime totally defeated. Both generals 
then retreated after great losses, while those of the French 
were insignificant, to Chateau-Thierry, whither the Emperor 
followed them on the 12th, but where Macdonald failed to 
intercept them. He sent the latter general with reinforce- 
ments to Montereau on the Seine. He himself did not turn 
and move at once on Schwarzenberg, for he had heard that 
Blucher, with the corps of Kleist and Kapzevitch, was ad- 
vancing in person on Montmirail, to which point Marmont was 
retiring before him. He therefore paused in his pursuit of the 
enemy defeated in the last few days and turned rapidly south 
from Chateau-Thierry, to treat this third column to the fate 
of the other two. At Vauchamps on the 14th of February, at 
noon, the French encountered the vanguard of the enemy and 
dislodged them, whereupon Blucher resolved to retreat. He 
was able to effect, it however, only at the cost of constant 
fighting with heavy losses, especially when Napoleon sent 
a corps of cavalry under Grouchy in a wide circuit to intercept 
the retreating column at Etoges. The vaHant troops, retiring 
in the best order, succeeded in breaking through, but only with 
great sacrifice of fife. They then retreated to Chalons, where 
Yorck and Sacken also met with the remnants of their forces. 
These rapidly succeeding actions at Champaubert, Mont- 
mirail, and Vauchamps have been compared with the first vic- 
tories of Napoleon as a young general; and in fact there was 
the same fire, the same bold energy, the same force of genius 



66o Elba [I814 

now, indeed, refined by a rich experience. But would all 
that suffice to bring such 'an unequal contest to a tolerable con- 
clusion? And supposing the general does his share, will not the 
Emperor interfere as he has so often in the last two years? 
After the third victory gained within the last five days, he 
could no longer afford to follow up the Silesian army. It was 
high time to turn and move on Schwarzenberg. So Marmont 
alone was left behind to face Bliicher, with orders to retreat, 
at the latter's first offensive move, slowly past Montmirail, and 
get into communication with Napoleon again. The Emperor 
supposed the main army of the enemy to be already far beyond 
the Seine above Montereau. He therefore took the troops of 
Ney and Gerard and the Guards and marched with incredible 
speed to Guignes on the Yeres, where he also found Macdonald, 
Oudinot, and Victor, and so had his entire army together with 
the exception of Marmont' s corps. His hopes had risen to the 
highest pitch; perhaps he could succeed with the second gen- 
eral as well as he had with the first; perhaps the columns of 
Schwarzenberg could be defeated in detail. Appearances favoured 
his hopes. Pushing forward from Guignes towards Nangis, 
Napoleon met at Mormant the advance-guard of the enemy's 
right wing under Wittgenstein, who was moving from Nogent and 
Provins on Paris, and annihilated it. And if Victor could only 
have advanced, as he was ordered to, on the same day over the 
Seine at Montereau, the Austrian corps of Bianchi, which had 
reached Fontainebleau and was now hastily recalled, might 
possibly have been cut off like Sacken at Montmirail. But this 
advance could not be undertaken until the next day, and then 
Napoleon led it; but Schwarzenberg had managed by that 
time to retire beyond the Seine and the Yonne with all his 
forces. 

The commander-in-chief of the allied forces had been cha- 
grined at Bliicher's ill fortune and was now in sheer despair. 
'*To avoid being beaten in detail," he wrote from Bray to Met- 
ternich, who had remained with his Emperor at Troyes, '*I shall 
limit myself to defending resolutely [" serieusement "] the bridges 
of Bray and Nugent and uniting my forces behind the Seine 



iET.4i] Divisions Among the Allies 66 1 

and Yonne." He was beside himself with rage because Alex- 
ander had, on the 9th of February, called his plenipotentiary away 
from the congress at Chatillon, and because the proposal of 
Caulaincourt, to negotiate on the basis of the ''ancient boun- 
daries" provided a truce were allowed, was not accepted. He 
now set out to make good this neglect, and got authority from 
the Czar and King Frederick William to write to Berthier on 
the 17th. In this letter he himself suggested a cessation of 
hostilities, as the plenipotentiaries at Chatillon had received 
instructions to close preliminaries on the basis of Caulaincourt's 
proposal, and should have done so on the 16th. The last state- 
ment was but a ruse, and it was at once detected by Napoleon. 
He perceived the enemy's ill-concealed embarrassment , and his 
spirits rose high. '^ According to the latest news," he wrote to 
Joseph on the 18th, ''everything is different with the allies. 
The Emperor of Russia, who but a few days ago had broken 
off negotiations because he wanted to impose on France still 
worse terms than the 'ancient boundaries,' * now wants to resume 
them; and I hope that I shall secure a peace on the basis of 
the Frankfort terms, the minimum that I can treat for with 
honour. If I had (before the last operations) signed a peace 
on the ' ancient boundaries ' basis, I would have taken up arms 
again two years later and toldthe nation that that was no 
peace, but a capitulation. In the new state of affairs I could 
no more say that, as my good fortune has returned and I am 
master of my own terms." In a similar strain he had sent word 
to Caulaincourt through Bassano after the victory of Mont- 
mirail: "There is no reasonable peace except on the terms of 
Frankfort ; any other is a mere armistice." f Caulaincourt's full 
powers were limited accordingly on the 17th, and Eugene re- 
ceived orders to bestir himself in Italy. 

* This was true, Alexander, who wanted the whole of Poland, wished 
to indemnify Austria for the loss of Galicia by giving her Alsace. His 
neighbour would thus get into a dispute with France, and very likely with 
Prussia as well, on account of encroachments on Germany. Russia would 
thus have her hands free in the Orient. (Cf. Oncken in Raumer's Hist. 
Taschenbuch, 1886, p. 34.) 

t Houssaye, "1814," p. 103. 



662 Elba [1814 

Napoleon was right : ' ' everything was different . " At the very 
time when he was fighting Bliicher sharp antagonisms had arisen 
at the headquarters of the aUies. Alexander had come forward 
with the plan to conclude no peace, but to move with utmost 
speed on Paris, put the capital under a Russian governor, and then 
let the nation decide — of course under Russian patronage — 
the question of a ruler, be it Bernadotte, the repubhc, or Na- 
poleon again. Manifestly, any head of the French nation thus 
confirmed would be the devoted ally of Russia. These plans 
were opposed by Austria in particular, which hoped rather for 
an understanding with the Bourbons, who had conceded during 
the last century her powerful position in Europe and her ascend- 
ency in Italy. It was these dissensions that caused the dila- 
tory operations of the main army. Not until they felt the pres- 
sure of Napoleon's victories over Bliicher did they begin to 
act a little more in unison, and by the middle of February 
Alexander had yielded to the requirements of the other powers. 
Negotiations were resumed at Chatillon, and the proposals of 
Caulaincourt were to be the basis. So when Schwarzenberg 
retired to Troyes — after Napoleon had defeated a Wiirttemberg 
corps at Montereau on the 18th — ^he felt that he had made way 
for peace, rather than for his conquering foe. And when he 
summoned Bliicher, who had rapidly recovered himself, to 
come up from Chalons, it was only in case of emergency. He 
would not risk a battle, although the allies certainly had 150,000 
men, while Napoleon, who was boldly moving on Troyes, could 
only command 70,000. On the 23d of February he actually 
retired to Bar sur Aube, and even had thoughts of receding to the 
plateau of Langres if the dreaded foe should follow him farther. 
But his hopes of peace were not destined to be fulfilled. The 
powers at Chatillon demanded as conditions of a preHminary 
peace the boundaries of 1792, and as a guarantee the evacua- 
tion not only of all fortresses outside of France, but also of the 
French ones of Belfort, Besangon and Hiiningen. When Cau- 
laincourt reported this he received from Napoleon the following 
answer: '^1 am so irritated by this project that I feel myself 
dishonoured by the mere proposal." He himself would send 



^T. 44] Bliicher Moves on Paris 663 

an ultimatum. But he omitted to do so; the campaign ab- 
sorbed all his energies. For things had just taken a decisive 
turn. Bliicher, who did not want to join the ignominious 
retreat, had accepted the advice of Grolmann, Kleist^s chief -of- 
staff, and obtained permission of the monarchs to march to 
the right, effect a junction with Biilow and Winzingerode, who 
were coming from Belgium, and, thus re-enforced, to move right 
on Paris. 

That was a momentous determination. For who knows 
what would have happened if Bliicher, too, had joined the 
retreat? Under the heavy burden of invasion the people had 
been roused to an intense bitterness of feeling, so that every- 
where the peasants sought to defend themselves from the 
foreign oppressor, especially since Napoleon had regained some 
of his lost prestige by means of the recent victories.* The 
popular enthusiasm for the conqueror of the foreign invaders 
increased daily; and though in December the Emperor had 
not succeeded with his levee en masse, he would certainly suc- 
ceed in part in March, at least in the eastern half of France. 
Now Bliicher's forward movement put a stop to that and 
drew Napoleon, who was anxious about his capital, away from 
Schwarzenberg. The latter, to be sure, was to be kept ignorant 
of his absence, for his personal presence was equal to an army and 
often kept the enemy from bold attacks. f He now hoped that 
Marmont and Mortier, whom he had left to oppose Bliicher, 
would succeed in checking his advance, while he himself pressed 
him from behind and so brought him between two fires — and 
all that before Schwarzenberg found out that he was gone 

* Since Houssaye in "1814" has collected authentic data on this 
point, Napoleon can no longer be charged with exaggeration in his letters. 
Even the general quartermaster of Bliicher's army wrote to Gneisenau 
''The officers scarcely dared say anything more to the troops." And 
Schwarzenberg was of the opinion that "in order to prevent excesses 
among these nationaUties in so long a line, we would have to station 
another army behind the troops in operation." However, the French 
themselves were by no means guiltless. 

t *'I have 50,000 men," he once said to General Poltaratzky, "and 
myself, that makes 150,000." 



664 ^^^^ t^^^^ 

Three corps, amounting to 40,000 men, were left under Mac- 
donald to watch the Austrian. 

But events did not turn out just as Napoleon wished. On 
the 28th Marmont and Mortier did indeed block Bliicher's road 
east of Meaux on the right bank of the Marne and dislodge his 
advance-guard. But Napoleon was prevented by a late start 
and the bottomless mud in the roads from sharing in the fight 
on that day. The Silesian army managed to escape north to 
Soissons; the two corps of Biilow and Winzingerode had just 
arrived at that important point and had forced the town to 
surrender. This was very opportune, for Bliicher had now not 
only escaped the fate prepared for him by Napoleon, but had 
swelled his forces to 100,000. And now the Emperor's situa- 
tion had in turn become extremely difficult. If he turned 
back from the Marne to face Schwarzenberg, who had again 
advanced and defeated a corps under Oudinot at Bar sur Aube, — 
and he actually thought of that, — ^then Bliicher would put Mar- 
mont and Mortier to ffight and seize Paris. He wanted to be 
easy on that head, and so gave his first attention to this foe. 
On the 7th of March a Russian corps in an advanced position 
at Craonne was driven back at a heavy cost, and two days later 
Bliicher stood ready in a strong position at Laon to offer battle. 
Napoleon had gained control of the road to Soissons, while 
Marmont was approaching from Berry on the Rheims road; 
so that the army was now moving on Laon in two divisions 
between which it was difficult to keep up communication, 
because the land between the roads was marshy and moreover 
Cossack patrols intercepted the couriers. Hence on the 9th 
Napoleon, who had twice over gained possession of the neigh- 
bouring villages of Semilly and Ardon, did not learn all day 
that Marmont did not arrive before Laon until afternoon in- 
stead of in the morning and was unable to capture the village 
of Athies until evening, and then, when he supposed the bloody 
work to be finished, as it was dark, he was driven out from it 
by the enemy and his troops fled precipitately along the road 
they had come by as far as Corbeny. Fortimately the enemy's 
pursuit was impeded by the intervention of a few thousand 



^T. 44] The Ultimatum of the Allies 665 

men who had been sent out under Fabvier to seek a junction 
with Napoleon and were on their way back. Of all this the Em- 
peror heard nothing until about midnight, as his own right 
wing had been driven out of Ardon again and so communica- 
tion with Marmont had grown more difficult. He was beside 
himself at the latter for behaving ''hke a Heutenant." Of 
course he could not divine that the Duke of Ragusa had given 
up his master's cause as lost ever since the fall of Soissons and 
the re-enforcement of Bliicher, and hence did only what was 
most necessary, and not always even that. Napoleon saw 
nothing of this, but only that he had to preserve from a destruc- 
tive pursuit an important part of his army now in disorder. 
Therefore he continued boldly standing in battle array against 
great odds on the 10th, and actually secured an orderly retreat 
on the part of Marmont. Not until then did he turn upon 
Soissons, and then only on the second day after to hasten thence 
toward Rheims to drive out a detached Russian corps which 
meantime had occupied that city. That was accomplished on 
the evening of March 14th, and at that place he gave his 
jaded troops a few days of rest. 

The allied powers had in the meanwhile adopted a new reso- 
lution, not of military strategy, but of diplomacy. This was 
necessitated by the fact that Caulaincourt had neither accepted 
the offer of February 17th nor made a counter-proposal, and 
that Napoleon himself had in a letter to Francis I. on the 21st 
designated the Frankfort programme as the ultimatum for him- 
self and France. The greatest activity in securing the resolution 
was displayed by Castlereagh, who was at last anxious to know 
what England was spending her money for. On the 28th of 
February, at the fourth session of the congress of Chatillon, 
the envoy of Napoleon was notified that he had until March 
10th at the farthest to make counter-proposals, but that these 
must agree in all essential points with its proposals of 
February 9th. The required communication failed to appear, 
and on the 9th of March the four great powers, England, Aus- 
tria, Prussia, and Russia, concluded a treaty at Chaumont that 
bound Great Britain to pay five miUion pounds annually to 



666 Elba [1814 

the Continental powers, and bound the latter to carry out by 
force of arms the programme proposed at Chatillon, i.e., the re- 
striction of France to the boundaries of 1792, and the full inde- 
pendence of Holland, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and Germany, 
though it should require twenty years to accomplish it. Each 
of the allied Continental powers agreed to contribute 150,000 
men. The treaty was antedated March 1st; but it came into 
full force only after the victory at Laon. For Schwarzenberg^ 
after having driven back Oudinot at Bar sur Aube and ad- 
vanced to Troyes on the 4th of March, had there remained 
stationary; so that the Czar and the King of Prussia thought 
that Emperor Francis had not only forbidden him to strike, 
but had even ordered him to retreat to the Rhine for the mere 
purpose of sacrificing Bliicher.* At Bliicher's headquarters the 
same opinion was held, and it was determined, as they had no 
wish to be sacrificed, to proceed more deliberately. Not until 
Schwarzenberg heard of the battle on the 9th of March with its 
favourable issue did he decide to make a further advance. 
During these days the peace congress was also dissolved with- 
out any results, as Napoleon had made no counter-proposals 
and as the suggestions which Caulaincourt offered on his own 
initiative were so wide of the programme of the allies that the 
latter broke off negotiations. 

Napoleon's unyielding attitude might seem incomprehen- 
sible if the only thing at stake were his sovereignty over France, 

* This view of the case has also passed into the works of historians. 
Perhaps it will be dislodged by the recently published correspondence 
between Schwarzenberg and Metternich during those days. Although 
Radetzky in a memorial of November, 1813, makes mention of the Prus- 
sians in these terms: "for whom, as they now show themselves, the fewest 
possible troops are to be desired in case of peace," that of itself is no suffi- 
cient basis for charging the commander-in-chief with the intentional sacri- 
fice of an entire army four months later. The military incompetence of 
Schwarzenberg, his constant dread of starvation, his fear of the lev^e en 
masse, which he sees in fancy about to be organized, fully explain his 
behaviour. Add to that, finally, that he was confirmed in his course by 
Metternich, who told him "to see safety not in battle but in the military 
attitude," and no further suspicion is needed, especially as it has no valid 
grounds. (See " Oesterreichs Teilnahme/' etc., p. 814 fif.) 



Mt.u] Renewed Efforts of Napoleon 667 

and not rather a great principle which he represented and 
which was confronted by an opposite principle in the camp of 
the alUes. It was impossible for the representative of a cos- 
mopolitan revolution, who was reaching out in every direction 
without regard to boundaries between states and social classes, 
to adapt himself to the pre-revolutionary system of a balance 
of power; and it was perfectly logical to regard a peace on the 
basis of the limited territory of the old Bourbon state only in 
the light of a capitulation. The fact that the idea of the Revo- 
lution and its inevitable consequence of boundless expansion 
had long been incarnated in this one personality, while the 
French people, on the contrary, had already returned perforce 
to the path of a national life, gave rise to a conflict that had 
to come, finally, to a settlement. At the capital the victories of 
February had restored some of the old confidence; but when 
March brought reports only of the retreat of Macdonald and 
of the defeat of Soult by Wellington at Orthez on the 
27th of February, and no reports of Napoleon, government 
securities fell to 51, and anxiety and concern reigned anew. 
Joseph, who was at the side of Marie Louise as regent, kept 
writing incessantly for peace. 

But Napoleon at Rheims thought of nothing but how to 
gain yet another favourable chance. He considered whether 
he should not in junction with Macdonald intercept the main 
army of the enemy at Meaux, in order to contest its march 
towards the capital; but he formed another and far bolder plan. 
Leaving Macdonald in front of Schwarzenberg, whom he sup- 
posed to be across the Seine above Nogent with the most of his 
army, he proposed himself to operate with 22,000 men in his 
rear on Mery or Troyes. Mortier and Marmont remained in 
and near Rheims facing Bliicher. He set out southward on 
the 17th, and on the 19th was at Plancy, while a detachment 
marched on Arcis sur Aube. The Austro-Russian army retired 
from that point at the command of the commander-in-chief, who 
wished to collect his army between Troyes and Lesmont in 
order to advance with united forces against his weaker enemy. 
Napoleon looked for no offensive movement after this retreat, 



668 Elba [1814 

but supposed the enemy was retiring to Brienne; so on the 
morning of the 20th he made up his mind to extend his original 
plan still farther; i.e., to march upon Vitry and win it back 
from the enemy that occupied it, to concentrate at that point 
the forces of Marmont and Mortier and the garrisons of Metz 
and Nancy, with Macdonald following by way of Arcis, and so 
with a compact force of 90,000 men to fall upon the communi- 
cations of the enemy in the rear. He himself planned to take 
the road from Plancy through Arcis to make more sure of keep- 
ing Schwarzenberg. But a bitter disappointment was in store 
for him. 

On the forenoon of the 20th peasants announced to the 
French advancing east by Arcis the approach of large masses of 
the enemy. Napoleon refused to believe it. He sent out his 
orderly to reconnoitre, and he not riding far enough to see the 
hostile columns, confirmed the Emperor in his error. The army 
was thus attacked while on the march by a superior force, and 
a portion of it was driven in wild confusion to Arcis. There, 
at the bridge, an officer with drawn sword — such is the story — 
stood in their way and cried: ''Who dares to cross before me?" 
They recognized Napoleon and submitted to being led back 
against the enemy. At the same time the vanguard, under 
Ney, was attacked near Torcy. That general held the place 
against great odds, and at Arcis, too, the troops fought with 
desperate valour, so that the enemy were unable to accom- 
plish anything worth mentioning, particularly because only 
Schwarzenberg's right wing had been engaged, while the left 
was on the march from the west. Napoleon was misled by 
this partial engagement of the enemy's forces into taking the 
whole affair for a rear-guard battle, which confirmed his opinion 
that the bulk of the enemy was on the retreat. He accordingly 
persisted in the direction already planned, and in all good faith 
advanced on the forenoon of the 21st against the supposed 
rear-guard of the enemy, until suddenly he saw himself con- 
fronted by the entire main army. Now it is his turn to com- 
mand a retreat over the Aube, and nothing but Schwarzen- 
berg's slow movements enabled him to bring the larger part 



^T.44] The Allies Move on Paris 669 

of his troops with comparatively httle loss to the opposite 
bank. Then indeed, when the 100,000 men finally attacked 
the 30,000, the remainder could not escape without heroic 
fighting. The battle of Arcis was lost. 

His error as to the enemy's intention had cost the Em- 
peror 3500 men. He now had to continue his march to Vitry 
on the other bank of the Aube, but he did it so rapidly that 
the allies soon knew nothing of his real whereabouts. Mac- 
donald, who had not taken part in the battle, also marched on 
the other bank of the Aube to the northeast and escaped with 
a rear skirmish. At this juncture, on the 23d of March, a 
courier was captured by the Austrians bearing a letter of Ber- 
thier to the marshal, with the information that the Emperor 
was in the rear of the army between Vitry and Saint-Dizier, and 
that his cavalry had already pushed on to Joinville. About 
the same time some Cossacks waylaid a second messenger who 
had a letter from Napoleon to the Empress at Paris which 
initiated her into his plan to move nearer to the Marne and 
his fortesses in the east '^in order to keep the enemy away 
from the capital." These letters and some others from the 
capital picturing the hopeless state of feehng that prevailed 
there and the inability of the city to defend itself; the news 
that on the 12th of March the English had occupied Bordeaux 
and the inhabitants had declared themselves for the Bourbons; 
and, finally, the reported march of Bliicher past Rheims to 
Chalons — all these put together led the alhes to abandon entirely 
the pursuit of Napoleon and to move in junction on Paris. A 
manifesto to the French, dated the 25th of March, again laid 
all the blame for the bloody war on the Corsican with his in- 
satiable ambition, and at the same time attacked the principle 
he represented. ''France," it reads, '*has only her own govern- 
ment to hold responsible for the ills she endures. Peace alone 
can close the wounds made by a spirit of universal conquest 
unequalled in the annals of the world. This peace will be the 
peace of Europe; any other is inadmissible. It is time at 
last that princes should be enabled to watch over the weal 
of their peoples without external interference or influence, that 



670 Elba [1814 

nations should respect their mutual independence, and that 
social institutions should be protected against daily assaults, 
that property be secure and commerce free." 

If the French people gave ear, they would be turning their 
backs on the political programme of the Revolution, and the 
man who had fought for it hitherto, with the whole force of 
his genius and his ambitious will, would be annihilated. 

Napoleon's course in pursuing his eastward march, after the 
second day of fighting at Arcis, when he must have been con- 
vinced of the enemy's offensiye purposes, has been severely 
censured. He should, it is hold have hastened west toward 
the capital with all available troops ; this would have given him 
a good start of his enemy, and time to adopt measures for 
defence. But however correct this reasoning may be, the 
Emperor's plan also had great advantages if chance did not 
thwart him. He had passed on from Vitry by Saint-Dizier and 
reached Doulevent, where he waited during the 25th of March 
and tried to get news of the enemy, of whose movements he was 
ignorant. The only definite information was that a strong 
corps had made its appearance in the vicinity of Saint-Dizier. 
Had the enemy divided and scattered? In that case he might 
perhaps be defeated, as at Champaubert and Montmirail. 
Napoleon at once advanced against this corps, and on the 26th 
put it to flight. It consisted of 10,000 men under Winzingerode 
which the allies had left behind to oppose the Emperor. The 
latter thought it strange that the prisoners brought in were not 
Schwarzenberg's soldiers, but Bliicher's, and his uncertainty was 
increased. He hastened back to Vitry to secure reliable infor- 
mation and found it; all statements agreed that the enemy was 
on his way to Paris in full force. What was he to do now? It 
was no longer possible to forestall their arrival at the capital; 
they had a three days' start of him. Should he turn east 
collect the garrisons and call upon the militia? Perhaps this 
last would have been successful, for the peasants in the entire 
east were ready for resistance; they were traversing the land 
and bringing in prisoners to headquarters. Hence Macdonald 
was disposed to carry the war into Alsace and Lorraine; and it 



^T. 44] The Allies Capture Paris 671 

has been conjectured, not without reason, that this idea seemed 
to the Emperor more feasible than the other, urged by Caulain- 
court, Maret, Berthier, and others about him, to save the capital 
at all hazards. He spent hours of extreme suspense shut up in 
his closet at Saint-Dizier, trpng to decide one way or the other. 
But finally he determined to go to Paris by way of Bar, Troyes, 
and Fontainebleau. The troops were set in motion on the morn- 
ing of the 28th. They marched with speed, and yet it seemed 
slow to the Emperor. On the evening of that day he received a 
letter from his former adjutant, Lavalette, now postmaster- 
general; his presence, said the letter, was absolutely necessary 
at Paris, and he must not delay an instant if he would not lose 
his capital. He learned soon after that the enemy had already 
arrived at Meaux, had defeated Marmont and Mortier at Fere 
Champenoise and were now driving them toward Paris. His 
impatience rose to a feverish pitch; arrived at Troyes, he could 
hardly sleep. He gave over the command to Berthier and rode 
on, accompanied only by the squadrons of his body-guard; at 
Villeneuve-sur-Vannes he left even that escort, and flinging him- 
self with Caulaincourt into a carriage, sped on at a furious pace. 
Meantime the allies had arrived in the immediate vicinity of 
Paris, and on the 29th Marie Louise fled with the King of Rome 
to Blois. The councillors of the regency had urged her to stay, 
but an expHcit order of Napoleon's on no account to expose 
his son to the fate of Astyanax, required his removal.* The 
impression this produced in Paris was profound; for the large 
numbers of wounded constantly coming in, the peasants fleeing 
from their homes, and the terrible prophecies of the officious 
press bureau as to the impending doom of the city, all this kept 
the population in a fever of suspense. Government securities 
fell to 45. Joseph, the Regent, who remained behind, did not 
know how to inspire confidence. His proclamation to the 
Parisians to resist the enemy, as the Emperor was at his heels, 
roused no enthusiasm; and if it had, means of resistance and 

* "I would prefer that my son were strangled rather than to see him 
growing up at Vienna as an Austrian prince/' Napoleon wrote to Joseph on 
the 8tli of February. 



672 Elba [1814 

weapons for volunteers were wanting. The fortifications were 
not completed. There were hardly more than 30,000 national 
guards in Paris. These did, indeed, fight heroically on the 30th 
of March in conjunction with the troops of Marmont and 
Mortier before the walls of the city. Not until late in the after- 
noon, when the superior force of the enemy had captured Mont- 
martre and planted there a large number of guns, did the fighting 
cease. Authorized by Joseph, who had fled at noon, Marmont 
concluded at evening the capitulation which delivered the city 
into the hands of the enemy. At the same time Mortier ordered 
one of his generals to ride in a southerly direction and arrange 
quarters for the columns retreating from Paris. At the posting 
station, La Cour de France, the messenger came in the darkness 
upon some travellers who were waiting for a change of horses, 
and was hailed by one of them. It was the Emperor, who thus 
learned of the loss of his capital. He was beside himself with 
indignation at Joseph and Clarke, the Minister of War, unjustly 
laying this loss at their door; he wanted to go straightway onto 
Paris, and would not be convinced that it was too late until the 
fires of Mortier's vanguard appeared, and General Flahault, 
whom he had sent to Marmont, arrived with a letter from the 
latter which told him that the Parisians were wholly averse to 
further resistance. Thereupon he betook himself to Fontaine- 
bleau again. 

The next morning, the 31st of March, the Czar and Frederick 
William III. made their formal entry into the conquered city. 
Emperor Francis had stayed behind at Dijon. They were 
greeted by a small but intensely active band of royalists with 
cheers for Louis XVIII. , and were completely deceived thereby 
as to the feelings of the population. The latter had grown 
wholly indifferent to the Boorbons ; they scarcely gave them a 
thought, and least of all were disposed to recall them. The old 
dynasty could count on devotion and sympathy nowhere save 
in the circle of the Faubourg St. Germain, where regret for for- 
feited privileges and narrow-minded aversion to all other classes 
of men dreamed of bringing back the good old times with the old 
court. In vain had Napoleon striven to win to his side these old 



-^T. 44] Activity of the Royalists 673 

nobles of France. Only a very few of them, who discerned with 
clear vision the trend of public affairs, acknowledged and re- 
spected his work of reform; all the rest plotted for his ruin. 
More than one submitted to be the tool of the Emperor's intriguing 
enemies, who for years had looked forward to the downfall of the 
insatiable conqueror. They now managed to masquerade before 
the foreign sovereigns as the true representatives of public senti- 
ment, and since Tallyrand, who entertained the Czar, led their 
cause, it soon gained the day. Alexander merely mentioned 
timidly and dubiously the name of Bernadotte, but learned at 
once from his host that France had no wish for another soldier. 
** If we wanted one, we would keep the one we have; he is the first 
soldier in the world. After him any other would surely not draw 
ten men to himself." It was either Napoleon or Louis XVIII. ; 
there was no third possibility. The Czar assented. In a proc- 
lamation which the allies sent to the Senate on the 31st of March 
by the hand of the Prince of Benevento, and which at once was 
posted on the walls of Paris in thousands of places, it was declared 
''that they would no longer negotiate with Napoleon Bonaparte 
or with any member of his family. And the Senate — ^the same 
body that but a few weeks before had so slavishly served its 
master and creator — first decreed, on April 1st, its own continued 
existence to be indispensable, and then proceeded to pronounce 
the deposition of the Emperor and released the nation and army 
from its oath of loyalty. The nation had no objections to offer; 
the Legislative Body confirmed the vote of the Senate, and the 
high imperial offices, the cour des comptes and the cour de cas- 
sation, passed over to the royalist camp. But would the 
army, too, his faithful instrument, submit to being wrenched 
from the hands of its leader, the master artist of war and battle? 
While still at La Cour de France Napoleon had sent Caulain- 
court to Alexander and given him full powers for a peace such as 
the allies had desired at Chatillon. Now the envoy returned to 
Fontainebleau and brought as the answer of the enemy the sub- 
stance of Napoleon's own words, that peace with him was 
nothing but an armistice, and that he stood even in the way of 
his son's recognition by the allies. Yet Alexander did not strip 



674 Elba [1814 

the messenger of all hope with regard to the regency; only the 
Emperor must first abdicate. The latter had no thought of so 
doing; he was defeated, but by no means vanquished. He still 
had troops. There was Marmont with 12,000 men at Corbeil 
and Essonnes, beyond him Mortier with 8000 ; by the 1st of April 
the head of the troops defeated at Arcis had arrived, on the 2d 
the Guards, while the rest were already on the march thither 
from Troyes. Ere long he could collect nearly 60,000 men there ; 
and he needed only to reckon in the 100,000 to which his own 
personality was equivalent, according to his own statement, and 
the experiences of this campaign, to come to the conclusion that 
there was no need of throwing up all hope. And besides, Maison 
had a detachment in the north, Augereau, who had indeed given 
up Lyons in unnecessary haste, was in the south, and Soult and 
Suchet were facing the Enghsh and Spanish. And the soldiers 
and their officers were all enthusiastic over him. He could see 
that at a review of the Guards on the 3d of April, when, in answer 
to his speech, they impetuously shouted : ''To Paris! ^' Not so, 
however, the leaders. There were indeed fiery partisans of the 
Emperor even among them, ready for any emergency, like 
Mortier, Drouot, Gerard, and others. But the most of those who 
were second in command, the marshals, dukes, princes, and 
counts, whose services and rewards were alike magnificent, had 
prosecuted the war of the previous year only with vexation of 
spirit, seeing no end to the business and yet longing so earnestly 
to enjoy in peace the fruits of their valiant labours. To go on 
fighting now seemed to them utterly hopeless. Suppose they 
did conquer; look at the sacrifices! And would there be peace 
even then? How easily a civil war might be kindled! The 
return of the Bourbons of course they were bitterly opposed to, 
but there was another way. Caulaincourt had brought back 
from Paris the idea of the Emperor's abdicating in favour of his 
son, and Napoleon had talked of it with his immediate circle. 
The marshals heard of it as they had heard of the Senate's 
decree of deposition and the proclamation of the aUies, and saw 
in it the only means of saving the present system and with it 
their own position and prestige, without exposing themselves to 



^T. 44] Abdication 675 

new toils and trouble. On the 4th of April, after the parade, 
they plucked up courage. Ney, Lefebvre, Oudinot, and Mac- 
donald appeared before the Emperor as representatives of the rest 
and broached the subject. Inasmuch as the Senate had decided 
against him, they urged, and the peace had been lost by neglect, 
nothing remained but for him to abdicate. Napoleon is said to 
have disputed the right of the Senate to deprive him of the 
crown, to have pointed out the poor position of the enemy, 
enumerated his own forces, unfolded his plan of attack; but all 
in vain. He was forced to yield, and signed the required docu- 
ment. It reads as follows : ''The allied powers having declared 
the Emperor Napoleon to be the sole obstacle to the re-establish- 
ment of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to 
his oath, declares that he is ready to descend from the throne, 
to leave France, and even to lay down his life for the good of the 
country, which is inseparable from the rights of his son, from 
those of the Empress's regency, and from the laws of the 
Empire." * 

When Napoleon made up his mind to this step he did not, to 
be sure, entirely banish the thought that the allies might reject 
this conditional abdication. He wished outright that they 
would, for then he could convince those who had urged him to 
abdicate that they had no alternative but Louis XVIII., and 
then they would no longer refuse him their support. It was 
merely following out this line of thought when, instead of sending 
Gaulaincourt alone to Paris with the abdication, he had Ney and 
Macdonald accompany him. Alexander received them and 

* It is not without interest to read the first draft of this document, 
which the Emperor wrote with his own hand, and from which he afterwards 
struck out certain passages. It read as follows : "The allied powers having 
declared the Emperor Napoleon to be the sole obstacle to the establish- 
ment of peace in Europe, and since the Emperor cannot assuredly without 
violating his oath surrender any one of the departments which were united 
with France when he ascended the throne, the Emperor Napoleon declares 
himself ready to abdicate and leave France, even to lay down his life for 
the welfare of his country and for the preservation of the rights of his son 
the King, of the Empress-regent, and of the laws and institutions, which 
shall be subject to no change until the definite conclusion of peace and 
while foreign armies stand upon our soil." 



676 Elba [1814 

seemed even on the point of wavering, especially when Macdonald 
assured him that the army could look forward only with abhor- 
rence to the return of the monarchy, which had remained a 
stranger to its warlike deeds and to its glory. But scarcely were 
the words out of his mouth before they were most strikingly 
refuted. An officer sent by Schwarzenberg reported something 
to the Czar in the Russian tongue, whereupon the latter turned 
to the marshals and said: ''Gentlemen, you base your request 
for the regency on the unswerving fidelity of the troops to the 
imperial government. Well, Napoleon's vanguard has just 
deserted him and is now within our hnes." It was indeed true. 
When Marmont had to give over the defence of the capital, he 
yielded to Talleyrand's sohcitations. "The army and people, '^ 
he wrote to Schwarzenberg, "have been released from their oath 
of fidelity to Napoleon by the decree of the Senate. I am ready 
to help in securing such a good understanding between people 
and army as shall make a civil war with new shedding of blood 
impossible." His subordinate general Souham with 12,000 men 
marched under cover of night, on the pretext of leading them 
against the enemy, right into the midst of the Austrian lines. 
When morning broke, the vaUant troopers saw with gnashing 
of teeth what their leader had done. On hearing this from 
Alexander I., Ney and Macdonald also gave up the cause of the 
Empire for lost. Doubtless persuasion and promises left their 
traces on their minds. On the way back they concluded a truce 
with Schwarzenberg without Napoleon's knowledge. 

In the mean time Napoleon heard of Marmont's desertion, and 
as his position north of the Loire had become wholly untenable, 
he had issued orders to march to Pithiviers and Orleans on the 
5th of April. At the same time he is reported to have spoken of 
throwing himself into Italy, joining Eugene, supporting the cause 
of Itahan unity with an army and with the force of his genius, 
and so gaining in place of France, which had fallen away from 
him, a new basis for his political aims, now without a country. 
But the French soldiers were not yet without a country, and on 
that rock such plans must be wrecked. Accordingly the only 
authentic order was to march to the Loire. The returning 



^T. 44] Exile 677 

marshals refused quite openly to obey it, and on April 6th they 
made a statement that nothing but the ruins of an army was 
now available, that these were surrounded, and that even if 
escape beyond the Loire were possible, nothing but civil war 
would result. They advised the Emperor to abdicate now 
unconditionally. In place of France they brought him from 
Paris the offer of the island of Elba, which Alexander wished to 
concede to him. Napoleon again hesitated. But that same day 
the Senate proclaimed Louis XVIII. king; and then, deserted by 
his captains, he wrote out a new form of abdication in which he 
'^for himself and his heirs renounced the thrones of Italy and 
France." 

With this new declaration in their hands, Caulaincourt and 
the two marshals again repaired to Paris, and there concluded on 
this basis a treaty with the alUes. It provided that Napoleon 
with the title of Emperor should be sovereign ruler of Elba, should 
have a revenue of two million francs and a body-guard of four 
hundred of his Guards, while the Empress Marie Louise was to 
have the Itahan duchy of Parma. Alexander had insisted on 
Elba despite the warning protests of Talleyrand and Metternich. 
Even Emperor Francis felt that the nearness of the dethroned 
Csesar would be a source of anxiety. And so it was not without 
strenuous opposition that to the former dictator of a continent 
this Httle crumb of land was tossed, more in mockery of the idea 
of sovereignty than to show in what narrow compass it could be 
confined. On the night of April 10th the Treaty of Fontaine- 
bleau was signed by Ney, Caulcaincourt, Macdonald, and the four 
ministers of the alUed powers. Soon afterwards Napoleon set his 
name to it, and so made his renunciation complete. What must 
have been his feelings ! Was it a resignation without any ray of 
hope that filled his mind? Or did his energetic spirit still find 
something in reserve to set over against his fate? Did he feel 
himself thoroughly conquered, — or only defeated, — ^in his hfe as 
well as on the field of battle? Some of his suite, who gave him 
their unquestioning devotion under the spell of his personality, 
could not understand how their master could keep on living. They 
thought him bent on suicide, and removed his pistols. But 



678 



Elba [1814 



those not immediately under his spell, who did not exalt him 
above all criticism, like Metternich, Fouche, and others, did not 
credit him with such thoughts. And however positively the 
story is told that the Emperor took poison on the night of the 
12th of April, the historian will not be easily convinced of its 
truth. It seems so absolutely out of accord with the whole 
character of the man, who even on St. Helena did not regard 
his role in the world as ended, that one is much more disposed to 
explain what happened as one of those attacks of sickness with 
which the mortal disease already coming upon him announced 
itself as it had done once before, after the battle of Dresden at 
Pirna, and, again, on the journey to Elba. One thing is sure, 
on the next day he had entirely recovered, and was soon full of 
new courage, full of confidence, full of hope, and anxious about 
only one thing, his life.* 

* Napoleon's secretary, Fain, was the first to speak of this attempt at 
suicide, in his "Manuscrit de 1814," published after the Emperor's 
death; it is treated more in full in Segur's "Histoire et Memoires" (VII. 
196 ff.). S^gur even claims to have his information directly from the 
Emperor's physician Ivan, who, after putting his master's life out of danger, 
would no longer be responsible for it, and then, fearful of being suspected, 
''lost his head" and ran away. But Segur's own account is not free from 
inconsistencies; moreover, Fain's story differs with regards to the sup- 
posed poison. Only the day before Napoleon had told Bausset, who brought 
him a letter from Marie Louise, how he escaped death on the battlefield of 
Arcis sur Aube, and then added: ''If I should seek death by an act of 
despair it would be a piece of cowardice. Suicide neither accords with 
my principles nor with the rank I occupy in the world." To the same 
messenger he seemed "filled with an indifference masked under the guise 
of philosophy, and with a strange confidence in destiny that regulates 
everything and which none can escape" (Herisson, "Cabinet noir," p. 
299). It was a similar impression that he conveyed to the foreign officers 
who later escorted him to Elba. To the Austrian General Koller he said 
before his departure: "There are those who would blame me for being 
able to survive my own fall ; but they are in the wrong. I see nothing great 
in ending one's life like a man who has gambled away his money." (Hel- 
fert, "Napoleon I. Fahrt von Fontainebleau nach Elba," p. 81.) This is 
hardly the language of a man who a week before wanted to kill himself. 
Meneval in his work oh Napoleon and Marie Louise (II. 115 ff.) says 
that Ivan had thrown away on the day before a part of the opiate which 
Napoleon had carried on his person ever since the Russian campaign 



Mt.u] Farewell to the Guards 679 

Even before the abdication the palace of Fontainebleau had 
lost many of its military guests ; soon the fallen Emperor was 
almost wholly deserted. Even Berthier took his leave, never to 
return. Only a few faithful ones remained until the 20th of April, 
when Napoleon, escorted by commissioners of the allies, — ^partly 
as a guard, partly for protection, — ^left the spot whence he had so 
often made known his will to Europe. Before mounting into 
the carriage he bade the Old Guard farewell. He thanked them 
first of all for the noble zeal they had displayed. Although a 
part of the army had betrayed him, he might have continued the 
war for two or three years behind the Loire or with the aid of his 
fortresses. But civil war would then have raged on the soil of 
France ; and ever since this had become clear to him, he had sacri- 
ficed all his personal rights and interests to the welfare and glory 
of the fatherland. He admonished them to persevere in the path 
of duty and of honour, and to serve faithfully the sovereign chosen 
by the nation. He might have ended his existence, but he wanted 
to live, he told them, in order to write and proclaim to posterity 
the feats of his warriors.* Then he kissed General Petit , who was 
in command of the Guards, kissed their flag, shouted a final 
greeting to his ''old growlers," and rode away. ''Nothing but 
sobbing was heard in all the ranks," Goignet writes in his journal, 
"and I can say that I too shed tears when I saw my Emperor 
depart." 

On the 4th of May, 1814, the "Undaunted" cast anchor in the 
harbour of Portoferrajo, and the dethroned Imperator stepped 
ashore. No sooner had he received a deputation of the inhabit- 

(S^gur says since the Spanish), and that the Emperor tried to poison him- 
self with what was left. Is it not a reasonable supposition that he used it 
as a means of allaying violent cramps of the stomach, and that this led to 
the suspicion of suicide? As to his anxiety in regard to his own Hfe there 
is positive evidence in Helfert, op. cit., p. 82, and Campbell, ''Napoleon at 
Fontainebleau," p. 199. 

* The text of the address as officially edited by Fain, " Manuscrit de 1814," 
has been included in the *'Correspondance," The words actually uttered 
have been appended by the commissioners KoUer (Austrian), Truchsess- 
Waldburg (Prussian), Campbell (English), to their reports and later pub- 
lished. 



68o Elba [i8i4 

ants of his miniature realm with the statement that he would 
give them the loving care of a father, than he mounted a horse 
in order to inspect the fortifications of the island. He seemed to 
be not wholly dissatisfied, but thought certain improvements 
were necessary; and in fact very soon he gave orders to equip 
the island of Pianosa on the south with two batteries. He did 
not feel safe enough. His journey through the south of France 
had made a profound impression on him, that left him uneasy for 
a long time. And in fact, despite the escort of the foreign 
commissioners, that journey had been full of danger, such was 
the fierce animosity of the people in Provence. Only by chang- 
ing his seat in the carriage, donning an Austrian uniform, and 
wearing the white cockade of the Bourbons was he able to evade 
the fury of his former subjects. More than once those about him 
saw tears of faint-hearted terror in his eyes and all the signs of 
fear in his words and gestures. Royalist agents, he had been 
informed, had roused the people against him; and he would not 
give up the conviction that the provisional government had a 
hand in it. Not until the English corvette bore him from Frejus 
— ^the same Frejus where he had once before landed on his arrival 
from Egypt — ^past Corsica to Elba, did he recover a sense of 
security and some equanimity. He consented quite readily to the 
stay of Campbell, the British plenipotentiary, at Portoferrajo; 
three weeks later came the 400 grenadiers of the Old Guard for 
whom he had stipulated in the Treaty of Fontainebleau. These 
together with a paid battalion of foreigners and the native 
soldiery made up a little army of over a thousand men, on which 
the Emperor — ^he had retained this title as his right — now 
bestowed the same eager attention that had once been claimed 
by the immense hosts of his world-wide wars. 

Yet this and his care for his little flotilla did not absorb all his 
energies. The restless man, who had to be busied about some- 
thing every moment, entered into the smallest details of his little 
government. Here, too, he had his Council of State, to which 
he called Generals Drouot and Bertrand and a dozen of the 
inhabitants. Its decrees were concerned at first with increasing 
the yield of the iron-mines and salt-works, in both of which it 



^T. 45] Life at Elba 68 1 

was successful. Then new roads were built, mulberry-trees 
planted beside them, sanitary and police measures were adopted, 
etc. But Napoleon also administered his own household in 
detail, so that he knew, for example, far better than his steward, 
Bertrand, how many mattresses, sheets and bedsteads, etc., he 
possessed. In money affairs he was most painfully accurate! 
and not without reason. The four million francs he had saved 
from his private treasure of the Tuileries would not last long, and 
Louis XVIII. did not pay the two millions of allowance stipulated 
in the treaty. Who can find fault with him, then, for collecting 
the taxes of his tiny realm without leniency? He even had to 
cut down the reduced pay of his beloved grenadiers. In the year 
1812, when he met de Pradt in Warsaw on the retreat from 
Russia, he jested about his desperate condition, saying: ''It is 
but one step from the sublime to the ridiculous." At that time 
the remark was not pertinent ; now it would be much more to 
the point. 

When the summer heat made it uncomfortable to stay at 
Portoferrajo, Napoleon withdrew to the heights of Marciana, 
where he lived with his company in tents. It was a beautiful 
spot, shaded by old chestnut trees; from there the eye could 
sweep the ocean, look over to Bastia on Corsica, and to 
Livorno in Tuscany, an outlook quite after his heart. Here he 
received a visit from the Countess Walewska, with whom he had 
become acquainted in Poland in 1807 and had since kept up 
intimate relations. She came with a boy, his son.* The pro- 
found mystery in which this visit was veiled led to the common 
opinion that it was the Empress. The latter, however, did not 
come. Her father had induced her to return to Austria, and 

* Count Alexander Florian Walewski, Minister of Foreign Affairs under 
Napoleon III., was born on the 4th of May, 1810. He was not the only 
son of the Emperor born out of wedlock. We know certainly of the fol- 
lowing: a Count Leon, bom in 1806, whose mother, Frau Revel, belonged 
in the suite of Princess Caroline; also a certain Devienne, born in 1802 at 
Lyons; and finally the son of the housekeeper at St. Helena, who after- 
wards married a Mr, Gordon. Gordon-Bonaparte died in 1886 at San 
Francisco as a watchmaker. (On this point see the periodical "Le 
Curieux," no. 8 of 1884 and no. 40 of 1887.) 



682 Elba [1814 

had cut off all communication with her husband. She sub- 
mitted to it with indifference. Seven years later, after the 
death of Napoleon, she wrote once to a friend that she never 
had cherished a warmer feeling for him, and yet she would 
gladly have given him yet many a year of happiness, '* provided 
that he stayed at a distance." Napoleon tried to console him- 
self at Elba, although he often thought of the little King of Rome 
and sorely missed receiviag letters from his wife, though that may 
have been for poUtical reasons. After the short stay of Countess 
Walewska came PauUne Borghese, who is said — on evidence 
claimed to be found in her own confidential correspondence — ^to 
have been even more than a sister to the dethroned Caesar. No 
other member of his family came, excepting only his mother, 
Lsetitia, who wanted to be near her son. and came over to Elba 
to live. 

Not that the Emperor gave up all communication with his rela- 
tives. The secret police of Livorno, particularly the French 
consul there, Mariotti, and his agents on the island, claim to 
have had information of a very active correspondence, especially 
with Murat. The latter in his uncertainty whether the powers 
would accord him the reward of his defection from Napoleon, his 
sovereignty over Naples, resumed intercourse with him. It is 
difficult to ascertain what was the nature of their negotiations 
and arrangements in detail, the more so that their correspondence 
must have been largely oral through trusted messengers. Was 
it their purpose to support a plan of insurrection in Italy, such 
as was sent to Napoleon in May, 1814, by a number of conspira- 
tors? Or was it still the other idea, of rising again to his former 
state in France? We cannot say. At any rate. Napoleon 
received at Portoferrajo many Italians during the autumn, who 
doubtless took little pains to conceal their dissatisfaction with 
the re-instated Austrian rule and of the hopes they had fixed on 
him. It is quite possible that he did not altogether repel them. 
The memory of what he passed through in Provence may 
have shaken his confidence in a reaction in France and given 
another direction to his thoughts.* But if this plan was ever 
* Livi in his "Napoleone all' isola d'Elba" has recently advocated this 



^T. 45] Life at Elba 683 

anything more than a passing thought, it certainly fell into the 
background completely when secret information and public 
prints no longer left it in doubt that the French people were 
undergoing a change of mind which could not fail to be favourable 
to himself. 

In fact the government of Louis XVIII. was growing more 
distasteful to the people every day. On the 30th of May the King 
had concluded peace with the powers, including England, which 
gave up all the colonies conquered during the war; a few days 
later he also made a sort of compromise with the Revolution by 
giving France a constitution, the Charte. Despite various faults 
and defects, this document was after all a valuable concession, 
and certainly left the people more of a share in legislation than 
Napoleon had ever granted. The King, moreover, was a man of 
discretion, who was disposed to adapt himself to the changed 
conditions ; only he was old, obtuse, and sickly, and not capable 
of checking all the reactionary elements that highly disapproved 
his compact with insurrection. Chief among these was his own 
brother, the Count of Artois, the head of an ultra-royalist party of 
emigres, who were striving to restore the old order. They com- 
promised the government and turned the people against it com- 
pletely, for there was no such thing as any great sympathy for 
the Bourbons, of whom WelHngton truly said that they were as 
great strangers to the land as though they had never reigned 
over it. The mere fact that they ascended the throne under the 
protection of foreigners was enough to discredit them. A carica- 
ture had shown Louis XVIII. mounted on a horse behind a 

view of the case. But his acceptance of the speech of Napoleon reported 
in the anonymous pamphlet, "La verite sur les Cent Jours," p. 218, as 
entirely authentic is to be questioned. For if Napoleon there really spoke 
of a united Italian kingdom with Rome as the capital, he must have wholly 
forgotten what he had said in the previous December to La Besnardiere 
about Murat, who was pursuing the same plan; viz., ''Does not this simple- 
ton see that nothing but my predominance in Europe can keep the Pope 
away from Rome? It is the wish and interest of Europe that he should 
return there." (Pallain-Ballieu, ''Talleyrand's Briefwechsel mit Konig. 
Ludwig XVIIL," p. 163.) Moreover, a plan that took in the whole of Italy 
would sever all relations with Austria, while such relations would be of 
great weight in case of Napoleon's return to France. 



684 Elba [1814 

Cossack riding over the corpses of French warriors. It was not 
wise on the part of the monarch to keep reiterating to his friend 
George, prince regent of England, his gratitude for the protection 
accorded him; and it was equally unwise to raise barriers between 
himself and the people by an antiquated ceremonial. And this 
was by no means all. The very fact that the new constitution 
was represented as a gift of the king violated the principle of 
popular sovereignty which had had its roots struck deep into the 
vanity of the people. Now, while the constitution guaranteed 
to the owners of national land undisturbed possession of their 
property, one of the ministers nevertheless expressed in the 
lower house the hope of its restoration to its ^'rightful" owners, 
i.e., the emigres. These now laid stress on their loyalty, and as 
they were for the most part incapable of official duties they 
accepted as a reward peerages, sinecures, and pensions ; enough to 
make all employed in the service of the state wish the preceding 
regime back again. The money for such large benefactions was 
secured by adding the ''extraordinary domain" of Napoleon 
arbitrarily to the civil list. And in spite of such rewards the 
returning nobles persistently strove to regain their old estates, 
in which project they received important support from the like- 
minded clergy. The latter not infrequently misused the confes- 
sional to move dying men to make restitution, by raising scruples 
as to their rights. Favoured by a devout court party, the clergy 
recorded still further successes. The abolished office of Grand 
Almoner was restored, and it hampered the efforts of the Ministry 
of Public Worship ; a poUce ordinance forbade labour on Sundays 
and holidays with penalties, although the Charte had guaranteed 
freedom of worship and although the French people had for a 
long time observed only the holidays appointed in the Concordat 
of 1801. Processions moved again through the streets. The 
reaction even went so far that a favourite actress of the Paris 
Theatre Frangais was refused Christian burial. This, indeed, 
gave rise to a public riot. 

While such arbitrary acts created disaffection among the 
bourgeois, the treatment of the army was characterized by a 
colossal stupidity. Not only did the old nobility, with the 



Mt.45] Growing Disaffection 685 

princes in the lead, make sport of the new nobihty of the mar- 
shals and generals, but the entire army was ahenated. The 
prisoners of war and garrisons of eastern fortresses, together 
with the Spanish and Italian armies, made up, on their return to 
France, no inconsiderable number. Wholesale reductions were 
made, the pay of the Old Guard was cut down, and thousands of 
officers were put on half-pay, and they had even that only as 
long as they behaved like good CathoHcs. There would not have 
been many objections to this if several thousands of royalists had 
not been appointed in their stead, a new Royal Guard created of 
emigres and nobles with splendid appointments, and a new 
military school estabhshed for nobles. All this not only entailed 
great expense, but also threatened to restore the old inequality 
between officers. And when they went so far as to abohsh the 
institutions for the education of the orphans of the members of 
the Legion of Honour, indignation knew no bounds, even among 
those not directly concerned. What wonder was it, under such 
circumstances, that the army was wholly Bonapartist, and that a 
conspiracy was formed, especially among some young generals, 
which accomplished nothing, indeed, yet was well enough known 
to keep the exile of Elba informed as to the state of pubhc senti- 
ment? What wonder, too, that his credit rose higher every day? 
''The French," says a contemporary, Fleury de Chaboulon, 
''disposed by nature to change their opinions and sentiments, 
passed from their former prejudice against Napoleon to out- 
bursts of enthusiasm in his favour. They compared the condi- 
tion of disorder and humiliation into which France had sunk 
under the King with her exaltation, her power and unity of 
administration under Napoleon; and Napoleon, whom they had 
before denounced as the author of all their woes, now seemed to 
them a great man, a hero in misfortune." Of course no one had 
any desire to recall him, but they began to excuse him and hated 
his successors. 

There were not wanting far-sighted men who discerned the dan- 
ger hidden in this change of feehng. One of the keenest, Talley- 
rand, was not in Paris at that time, but was staying at the great 
Congress of Vienna as the plenipotentiary of Louis XVIII., 



686 Elba [1815 

where questions unsolved by the war of the nations were awaiting 
settlement. His sharp eye saw on Elba the glimmer of the spark 
that might kindle to another destructive conflagration the com- 
bustible material accumulating in France, and he determined to 
stamp it out. His first thought was to have Napoleon secretly 
abducted. Mariotti, his trusted agent in Livorno, declared that 
to be very difficult, and possible onJy if the captains of one of the 
Emperor's four ships could be won over. This is said to have 
been attempted, and to have been thwarted by Napoleon's 
vigilance.* Talleyrand then turned to the powers in the Con- 
gress and proposed to them (in October, 1814) to remove the 
exile to the Azores, five hundred miles from the mainland, an idea 
that Louis XVIII. thought ^' excellent. "f ^^^ ^^e powers had 
weightier matters on hand. Russia's sole anxiety was as to 
how she could secure her Polish prize^ undivided, Prussia wanted 
to take in the whole of Saxony ; and each so positively opposed 
the other's plans that a general conflict seemed imminent. 
France wanted to break up the coalition, regain her lost prestige, 
and at the same time help out Saxony for kindred's sake (the 
mother of Louis XVIII. had been a princess of Saxony) ; Eng- 
land was working against a preponderance of Russia; and to 
Austria the growing power of her neighbours was a thorn in the 
flesh. These three powers accordingly signed, on January 3d, 
1815, a treaty binding them to extreme measures if necessary. 

* See Jung, " Memoires de Lucien Bonaparte," III. 222, and Pellet, 
"Napoleon k Tile d'Elbe," p. 62, Jung says that Captain Taillade was 
dismissed; but over against this is the statement of several authorities 
that Taillade remained in service and afterwards commanded the 
Emperor's brig on the voyage to France. 

j- In December the minister wrote to the King that he must make haste 
to get rid of the man of Elba, and of Murat ; Castlereagh had already been 
won over and only Metternich still remained opposed to it. But this zeal 
of Talleyrand's cooled off perceptibly whenever Murat' s chances at the 
Congress rose ; for the latter had held up to the avaricious diplomat pros- 
pects of a favourable sale of his princedom of Benevento. At such moments 
he could even answer Pozzo di Borgo when urged by him to lay before the 
Congress the arrest of Napoleon : " Say nothing of that, pray ; he is a dead 
man." (M. Lehman, "Tagebuch des Freih. v. Stein," in Histor. Zeit- 
schrift, N. F. XXIV. 446.) 



^T. 45] Napoleon Plans to Return 687 

While this remained a secret for a time, the differences between 
the powers were but too pubhc for Napoleon to fail of being 
informed not only of that, but also of the secret plan to remove 
him to a distance from Europe. He had learned of the latter 
as early as December, and had already prepared for a siege, 
improving his defences and letting his cannoniers practise firing 
shells. He would have liked best of all to leave Elba at once, 
but at that time it would have been foolhardy presumption. 
Now, indeed, the complications in the Congress and the change 
in France lent some support to the idea. It wanted but the 
fitting opportunity. In his interview with Fleury de Chaboulon, 
who came to Portoferrajo in February as Maret's secret messen- 
ger, he mentioned the 1st of April as the probable date of his 
departure for the mainland. By that time, he thought, the 
princes would have left the Congress, probably in anger, and 
once at home they would have no desire to plunge anew into a 
war. Only as long as they were still together was it to be feared 
that they would make it a point of honour to resist him. This 
much, at least, he felt : that Europe would not look on with a 
quiet conscience while he violated the treaty and his oath and 
instigated others to do likewise, as he now contemplated doing. 

However, shortly afterwards, before the end of February, he 
made up his mind to set to work. What led him to it so early 
has not been explained. Had he heard of the provisional agree- 
ment of the powers on the Polish and Saxon questions on the 8th 
of February, of Castlereagh's departure, and of the preparations 
of the sovereigns to leave the Congress? Did he think the right 
moment had arrived? Or was he in ignorance as to that settle- 
ment, and merely wanted to take quick advantage of the dis- 
sensions prevailing? We cannot say. We know Httle more than 
that on the 24th of February — Campbell, the British plenipoten- 
tiary, who also represented England at the court of Tuscany, 
having just gone to the mainland — Napoleon issued orders to 
his troops to be in readiness to depart, while he meantime laid 
an embargo on all vessels at the island in order to prevent any 
news from reaching the Continent. On the same evening he 
received deputations of the authorities who expressed their 



688 Elba [isis 

regrets at his departure. On the 26th, a Sunday, 1100 men with 
some cannon embarked on seven vessels ; and when darkness came 
on. Napoleon himself went on board, after bidding his mother 
and sister farewell. Both of the latter approved his plan; some 
of his courtiers, like Bertrand, had hailed it with enthusiasm, as 
also had the troops. Only the honest Drouot made no effort to 
conceal his misgivings. But who could have held back the fool- 
hardy gamester when about to make his last desperate throw? 

On the voyage they met a French cruiser steering for Livorno 
to put itself under the direction of the consul Mariotti. Its 
mission was to keep an eye on Elba; but it had come too late. 
Mariotti afterwards deplored this delay and said he would have 
hindered Napoleon's escape if he had had that ship, but that is 
a gross exaggeration. Far more correct is the answer Castle- 
reagh made in the British Parliament to the charge that he had 
let the Emperor slip; he reminded his audience that Napoleon 
was not on Elba as a prisoner, and that any restraint on him 
would have been a violation of the treaty; moreover, it would 
have been impossible to keep him under surveillance, as the whole 
English navy would not suffice to prevent the escape of one man 
from the island.* 

* See Pellet, "Napoleon k Tile d'Elbe," p. 84. The author seems fully 
convinced of Campbell's secret connivance, nay, even England's, and that 
was at the time a widespread opinion. A few days before Napoleon's de- 
parture the secret agent of Mariotti had written to his employer: "The 
departure of Napoleon under favour of the English will take place very 
soon " But who would accept the correctness of the statement with- 
out further evidence? Let any one compare with that what Napoleon 
said to Maret's messenger: "You surely will not beUeve that the police 
know everything? The police invent much more than they discover. Mine 
were certainly as good as those of these people, and yet they very often 
knew only what they learned two or three weeks later by luck, stupidity, or 
treachery." It is a fact that he represented his enterprise to be favoured 
by Great Britain, as he also claimed to be on good terms with Austria; 
but in both his aim was to mislead. The actual attitude of England is to 
be gathered from the intimate relations obtaining between that govern- 
ment and Louis XVIII., and from the diplomatic course of Castlereagh, 
who saw in the Bourbons the surest guarantee that the Netherlands, lying 
so near, just across the Channel from England, would not fall into the 
hands of the French again. 



jet.45] Napoleon Arrives in France 689 

On the 1st of March the flotilla cast anchor in the Gulf of 
Jouan, between Cannes and Antibes, and Cambronne brought the 
Guards to land. Soon Napoleon again stood on French soil. 
While still on board he gave his followers some explanations 
about the enterprise ; he told them that he counted on the surprise 
of the population, on public opinion, on the love of his soldiers, 
in short on all the Napoleonic elements in France, but above all 
on the consternation that such a great novelty (^^une grande 
nouveaute ") must produce, and on the perplexed hesitation of all 
minds under the impression of such an unexpected and audacious 
deed. But he had to take other things into account as well. He 
knew that public opinion had not turned against the new regime 
everywhere in France; that if, for example, he proceeded now 
on the highroad from Cannes leading north through Aix and 
Avignon, his venturesome enterprise would be wrecked on the 
rocks of the invincible loyalty of royalist Provence. Hence he 
could not afford to shun the hardship incident to a march over 
the still snow-covered roads of the Maritime Alps ; he must leave 
behind the cannon he had brought, and, passing through Grasse 
and Sisteron, try to reach Dauphinc, where the peasants were 
thoroughly disaffected toward the priests and emigres, and 
were desirous of keeping undisturbed possession of their farms, 
most of which had come out of the public domains. And in fact 
the inhabitants of the valleys on the way to Gap and beyond were 
exceedingly friendly and gave all possible help to the jaded 
soldiers. But the main question for Napoleon was, after all, 
whether the troops whom they should meet on the way would 
join him, as he hoped, or would be loyal to the oath of allegiance 
to Louis XVIII., which he himself had admonished them the 
preceding year to take.* If they chose the latter course, then he 
was lost. At La Mure, near Grenoble, a battahon of General 
Marchand advanced upon him, and the officers seemed more 

* " Serve faithfully the sovereign whom the nation has chosen. " These 
were his words to his grenadiers, according to the report of the Austrian 
plenipotentiary. The later officially revised version of his address in the 
palace courtyard at Fontainebleau changed this to read as follows; "Con- 
tinue to serve France." 



690 Elba [1815 

inclined to obey their orders than their sympathies. The 
decisive moment had come. Napoleon discerned it. He ap- 
proached within range, opened his gray overcoat and, offering 
his breast, shouted, ''Who among you would fire on his Em- 
peror? " At that the soldiers took off their caps, put them on 
their bayonets, and shouted "Vive FEmpereur!" They then 
mingled with the retinue from Elba and marched enthusiastic- 
ally after the beloved leader. The officers had to follow the 
revolutionary lead of their troops, and they were far from im- 
willing. 

At Grenoble, the chief city of Dauphine, where there was 
a strong garrison. Napoleon meantime had caused to be circu- 
lated secretly a manifesto to the French army. ''Soldiers," it 
began, "we have not been conquered. Two men from our ranks 
(Marmont and Augereau) have betrayed our laurels and their 
country to the princes their benefactors. And now shall those 
whom we have seen for twenty-five years roaming through 
Europe to raise up enemies against us, who have spent their lives 
in fighting in foreign armies against us and in cursing our fair 
France — shall they now claim to hold command and carry our 
eagles, into whose eyes they never could look? Your rank, your 
possessions, your glory, and the rank, possessions, and glory of 
your children have no more bitter enemies than these princes 
whom foreigners have forced upon us. Their tokens of honour, 
their rewards, and their favour are reserved for those only who 
have served them in fighting against the fatherland and against 
us. Soldiers! Come and rally under the banner of your leader. 
His existence depends wholly on yours; his rights are but the 
nation's and yours; his interests, his honour, his glory, are your 
interests, your honour, your glory. Come! Then will victory 
march on in double-quick step, and the eagle with the national 
colours shall fly from spire to spire on to Notre-Dame.^' These 
and many other things he said to the soldiers of France, and they 
listened with enthusiasm. That was the same language that 
had so often thanked them for their victories and announced 
new triumphs; the language of the man who estimated his soldiers 
at their full value, highly prized them, though it were but as 



JEt.45] Napoleon Wins the Army 691 

instruments of his greatness; whereas the protege of England 
regarded them only as a burden, if he considered them at all. 
So the garrison of Grenoble, the regiment of Colonel Labedoyere, 
went over to him; likewise the battalion of La Mure. These 
men of iron yielded to the spell of that one man, just as the 
children of Hamelin were drawn by the Pied Piper. He was 
already advancing with 7000 men toward Lyons, certain now of 
complete success. He could understand why his marshals, the 
Macdonalds, Oudinots, and others, whose careers were behind 
them and who loved the peace for which they had fought so long 
and so vahantly, did not join his cause. But others, like Mas- 
sena at Marseilles, and Ney, who had even promised boldly to 
bring the newcomer bound to the King, could not withstand 
the tide of sentiment in the army ; they, too, became imperialists 
again. 

The army, then, was his; particularly after he had assured 
them that he certainly would make no more wars, for the army 
had no desire for war. And he declared the same purpose still 
more emphatically on every occasion to the citizens of the towns, 
who, especially the well-to-do, despite much sympathy for him 
and all their aversion to the arrogance of the aristocrats, saw peace 
endangered by his reappearance. He had used the ten months 
of exile, he said at Grenoble, in reflecting on the past; the dis- 
grace that had been his lot, far from embittering him, had but 
instructed him; he saw what France needed; peace and liberty 
were the imperative demand of the times, and he would hence- 
forth make them the rule of his conduct. Similar was also the 
tenor of his addresses in Lyons, where he arrived on the 10th of 
March, and was welcomed with cheers by the people. It was 
his task now (such was the purport of his words) to protect the 
principles and interests of the revolution from the emigres, to 
restore her glory to France without involving her in war, which he 
hoped to avoid ; for he accepted the treaties arranged with the 
European powers and would live in peace with them, provided, 
of course, they did not interfere in French affairs. The French 
people must content themselves with being the most important 
nation, without making any claim to rule over the others. 



692 Elba [1815 

Here at Lyons he was already once more completely the 
monarch. He dissolved the Chambers and summoned an 
imperial assembly to meet at Paris to be made up from the 
former electoral colleges; to this he gave the Carolingian name 
''Champs de Mai." It was to change and amend the constitu- 
tion and participate in the coronation of the Empress and of his 
son. This was to intimate that on the part of Austria, at least, 
no danger threatened his enterprise, nay, even an understanding 
was to be hoped for — a gross deception, as he himself later 
admitted to some intimates. A second decree banished all the 
^migr^s that did not return until 1814, and confiscated their 
estates. In addition Napoleon abolished the old aristocracy, 
proscribed Talleyrand, Marmont and Augereau, the Duke of 
Dalberg, and others, as betrayers of France to her enemies, de- 
posed all the emigres that Louis XVIII. had appointed as officers, 
and dissolved the King's guard, the so-called "maison miUtaire" 
of the King. 

The threatened court at Paris was at first disposed to look 
upon this enterprise of the ''Man of Elba" as an adventure which 
must necessarily fail. It was firmly believed that all he wanted 
was to seek a way over the mountains into Italy, in order to 
rouse the people there into revolt; and for some time false 
reports were printed in the " Moniteur " of his impending downfall, 
even after he had already won the hearts of the army. In the 
Chambers the King found some support among the Liberals, the 
Frondeurs of 1800, led by Benjamin Constant, and those of 1813, 
led by Laine. But nothing was done aside from making high- 
sounding speeches. For all decrees — for example, that declaring 
property in the national lands inalienable and any attack upon 
it punishable with imprisonment — were too late and inspired no 
confidence because they were dictated by the need of the 
moment. As late as March 18th, when Napoleon had got as far 
as Fontainebleau, Louis wrote with his own hand a manifesto to 
the army, wherein he referred to his word which had been 
pledged for their loyalty, to civil war in the land, to the struggle 
with foreigners that again was threatened; but all in vain. A 
reserve army south of the capital likewise joined Napoleon. 



Mr 43] Napoleon Arrives at Paris 693 

The King had to think of his own safety at last, and left the 
capital on the next day. 

On the evening of March 20th Napoleon, leaning on the arm of 
one of his most loyal adherents, ascended the steps of the Tuileries. 
In the streets of the capital the commanding positions had been 
occupied mostly by the military element, who now were in 
exclusive possession. In the rest of the population there was 
more resignation than interest; no trace appeared of the enthusi- 
asm with which Paris had welcomed Napoleon in 1799 or 1806. 
*^Every one was gloomy," Broglie says, "quiet, indifferent, with- 
out complaining, without hoping, yet not without anxiety." 
And the Emperor himself, who was listening most attentively 
to the voice of the nation, received a like impression. "They 
Jet me come," said he to Mollien, "as they let the others go." 



CHAPTER XX 

WATERLOO 

"Peace and Liberty," so ran the motto with which Napoleon 
now sought to commend himself to the French and to overcome 
the distrust which met him everywhere in civilian circles. 
" Peace " ! How often had he promised it, and how often broken 
it! "Liberty"! In what various ways had he suppressed it! 
If he promised now to give it and protect it, would he be be- 
lieved? On the very day of his arrival at Paris he assured his 
faithful followers, Maret, Cambaceres, Davout, and others who 
had come to the Tuileries, that he was not proposing to renew 
the programme of the past; one must learn to profit by the ene- 
mies' mistakes and one's own; that he knew now what was to be 
avoided and what was desirable ; he had loved power only as long 
as he was planning to found a mighty empire— it was indispen- 
sable for that purpose; but to-day that was no longer in his 
thoughts. And they all trusted his words. Maret again accepted 
the office of Secretary of State, Davout was persuaded to take 
the Ministry of War, Cambaceres declared his readiness to conduct 
the business of the Minister of Justice^ Gaudin and Mollien again 
had the portfolios of Finance and of the Treasury, and Decres that 
of the Navy. But that was no difficult task, to win back those 
who were more or less thrown on him anyway. The most im- 
portant thing was to offer the people guarantees that he returned 
as an entirely different man. And here words were of no avail. 
No matter how solemnly he declared to the various deputations 
in audience that he would forget that France had ever been the 
mistress of the world; that he had long since renounced the idea 
of a universal empire, and that he thought only of the welfare 
and strengthening of the French Empire, that he no longer sought 
for absolute rule, but only for respect of personal rights, protection 

694 



tEt. 45] Napoleon to Constant 695 

of property, and free expression of opinion, for princes were but 
the first citizens of the state: it did not suffice. They wanted 
the evidence of deeds; and Napoleon gave that, too. First of 
all he accepted Fouche as Minister of Pohce, a man in whose 
past record the liberal circles saw a certain guarantee. Then 
he abolished the censorship of the press, which had been a source 
of great bitterness of feeling against the Bourbons. This cost 
him but little effort, for he rightly reasoned that after what the 
press had written against him for a year past it could do nothing 
more to hurt him, but it might say much yet about his enemies. 
But far more effective than that measure was his winning over 
in his old age the honourable Carnot, whose genius had defended 
the Republic, to become Minister of the Interior, and Benjamin 
Constant, the leader of the party of constitutional monarchy 
which had vainly opposed him at the time of the Consulate, as 
a member of the reorganized Council of State. 

Only a short time before the Emperor^s return, Constant had 
made a violent attack upon him in the ''Journal des Debats," 
which was already one of the leading daily papers, comparing 
him with Gengis Khan and Attila, and declaring in the name of 
the friends of liberty that he would never have any connection 
with him. Napoleon, acting, it is said, on the advice of his 
brother Joseph, invited him to court and spoke to him so openly 
and confidentially that the hostile tribune was won over and 
even undertook to serve the Empire. The nation, said the 
Emperor, had now enjoyed twelve years of calm from internal 
political storms, and had been resting for a year from war; this 
rest had awakened a need of active life. She was now again 
desirous for assemblies and public discussion, which she had not 
always wanted. ''She threw herself at my feet when I came 
to power; you must remember that, as you were then of tho 
opposition. Where was your support, your strength? You 
found none. T took less power than was given to me. To-da\ 
all is different. The taste for constitutions, debates, and speech ( s 
seems to have returned, after a weak government hostile to 
national interests has called forth criticisms on authority. But, 
after all, it is only the minority that wants these things; make no 



696 Waterloo [I815 

mistake on that head. The people, or, if you will, the masses, 
want only me. You have not seen how they crowded about me, 
rushed down from the mountain heights to call me, seek me 
and hail me. I am not a soldier's emperor, as has been said; 
I am the emperor of the peasants and the common people of 
France. This is why you see the people coming to me despite 
all that has happened. There is a community of feeling between 
us. I have risen from the ranks of the people, they hear my voice. 
I have had about me Montmorencys, Rohans, Noailles, Beau- 
vans, Mortemarts, but there was no sympathy between us. 
Look at these conscripts, these sons of peasants; I have not 
flattered them, have even dealt harshly with them, and yet they 
flocked around me and shouted, ' Vive I'Empereur ! ' They regard 
me as their mainstay, their deliverer from the nobility. One 
sign from me, and the nobles in all the provinces would be 
murdered. But I would not be king of a peasant war. Hence, 
if it is possible to rule with a constitution, very well, so be it. 
Because I wanted universal empire I needed unlimited power on 
which to found it. And who in my place would not have lusted 
for mastery of the world? Did not sovereigns and subjects vie 
with each other in hastening to put themselves under my sceptre? 
I met more resistance from a few unknown and unarmed French- 
men in France than from all the kings, who are so proud to-day 
because no one from the people is their equal. I am no longer 
a conqueror, cannot be one ; for I know what is possible and what 
is not; and in order to rule France alone, perhaps a constitution 
is better. Do you then consider what seems to you practicable 
and lay your plans before me; public discussions, independent 
elections, responsible ministers, free press — I accept it all. 
Along with these I desire peace; and I shall secure it by my 
victories. I would raise no false hopes in you. Although I give 
out the report that negotiations with the powers are in process, 
there are no negotiations. I look forward, rather, to a difficult 
and tedious war. If I am to hold my own, the nation must sup- 
port me. In return she will demand liberty; she shall have it.". 
Thus spoke the Emperor to Constant, who has himself reported 
the words that captivated him. The frank way in which 



yET. 45] The News Reaches Vienna 697 

Napoleon characterized his situation made an impression on him. 
He declared his readiness to prepare the outline of a constitution. 

Not ''Peace and Liberty," therefore, as it was posted on the 
walls in every corner of France, but, at the best, ''War and 
Liberty." And so it was, indeed, to be. No one could have 
less reason than the Man of Elba to expect the European powers 
to look on quietly while he was breaking the treaties he had 
made, and seizing again the sovereign power over one of the most 
restless nations of the earth, which had kept Europe busy with 
war for twenty years. Was, then, the great expenditure of 
wealth and blood, whereby the old legitimate system of a balance 
of power among the states had been restored, to have been in 
vain, just because a single man was not inclined to be content 
with the sovereignty of Elba? No one had called him, no con- 
spiracy worthy of mention, even in the French army, had desired 
his return; he had come unexpectedly in order to conquer by a 
"bluff," and his personal magnetism was needed to rouse the 
army to revolt. No; the European powers could not tolerate 
this bold intrusion upon the treaty rights that bound them. In 
the last declaration, made in March, 1814, they had solemnly 
pledged themselves never to conclude peace with Bonaparte, 
and he on his part had promised at Fontainebleau to renounce 
sovereignty over France forever. He knew well that they 
would resist his efforts. Therefore he knew also that by seiz- 
ing again the crown of France he was creating anew for that 
country enemies superior in resources and was conjuring up 
a new and frightful war. It was this which made his conduct 
a wanton outrage for which there could be no expiation. 

On the morning of the 6th of March the news of Napoleon's 
departure from Portoferrajo had reached Vienna, where the 
Congress had by no means dissolved, as he had hoped, for the 
princes and diplomats were still present almost to a man. 
Under the profound impression of that event, Russia and the two 
German powers agreed in the determination to meet the "adven- 
turer," as Emperor Francis called him, with united front. Since 
his destination at first was uncertain, and Talleyrand had men- 
tioned Italy as probable, the Austrian field-marshal, Bellegarde, 



698 Waterloo [I815 

in command there, was ordered to ''attack him at once and 
crush him." Castlereagh had gone away, but Wellington, who 
represented him, was authorized to sign such an agreement.' 
The two main questions that divided the Congress, the Pohsh 
and the Saxon, had already reached a settlement; one through 
the enforced moderation of Alexander I., the second at the 
expense of the King of Saxony, who had to consent to cede a half 
of his territory to Prussia, while Frederick William III. yielded 
his claims to the other half. And so Napoleon's reckoning on 
the dissensions of the Congress proved to be mistaken. On the 
contrary, they all had an interest now that united them in turn- 
ing unanimously against him. England was concerned for the new 
kingdom of the Netherlands ; Prussia equally uneasy about her 
Rhine province; the Czar of Russia wanted to offset the reproach 
of having brought the Corsican to Elba by a show of energetic 
hostihty to him; and Austria's monarch wished to avoid all 
appearance of interest in the son of the Revolution. On the 
13th of March the Congress issued a proclamation declaring 
Napoleon an outlaw and giving him over to public vengeance 
as 'Hhe enemy and disturber of the world's peace." On the 
25th the four great powers renewed their treaty of Chaumont 
by pledging themselves to furnish 150,000 men apiece (Eng- 
land giving an equivalent in money), and ''not to lay down 
their arms until Napoleon is rendered wholly incapable of dis- 
turbing peace again and of renewing his efforts to seize the 
supreme power in France." The other states fell into Hne. 

Thus Napoleon was proscribed by the Continent which he had 
once seen at his feet. He did his very best now to weaken the 
unfavourable impression which this judgment of the world could 
not fail to make on the French people, or perhaps to secure some 
milder statement in Vienna itself. In vain did he represent the 
declaration of March 13th as the contrivance of the agents of 
Louis XVIII. ; the truth soon became public property, when the 
foreign diplomats demanded their passports and left the country. 
In vain he assured the world that he would respect the Paris 
peace of May 30th, 1814, and wrote on April 4th to all the sov- 
ereigns that it was his dearest wish to make the imperial throne 



iET. 45] The Allies Unite Against Napoleon 699 

of France a bulwark for the peace of Europe; the only answer 
was that the powers, which had not yet put their armies on a peace 
footing, mobilized them in the direction of France. It did no 
good for him to ask Emperor Francis to send back his wife and 
son, whose coronation he had held in prospect to the French; 
child and wife remained far away; nay, Marie Louise even sent 
a written commimication to the foremost representatives of 
the powers that no power on earth could ever induce her to live 
with Napoleon again. Nor did it do any good to reveal to 
Alexander the secret offensive alliance of January 3d, in order 
to sow new discord among the allies; nor again to seek com- 
mimication with Talleyrand, who had just heard of his pro- 
scription and naturally was not to be found. The princes did 
indeed consider the question whether the fact of France's toler- 
ating Napoleon should lead to a different procedure from that 
agreed upon. But they decided, in a protocol signed by all the 
plenipotentiaries, that if such were the fact, it could make no 
difference in their plans: '^The powers are not authorized to give 
France a government, but they would never forego the right to 
prevent any tiling under the title of 'government^ from producing 
there a centre of disorder and danger for the other states." The 
offer of the Emperor to respect the peace of Paris was rejected, 
for they had signed that peace with a government that furnished 
sufficient guarantees for the peace of the Continent, and would 
never have made similar conditions with Bonaparte. Fouch^, 
who had been led at once by seeing the European powers arrayed 
against Napoleon to begin intriguing against him, and who was 
secretly in touch with Vienna, had word from Metternich as 
follows: ^'The powers will have nothing to do with him. They 
will wage war on him to the uttermost, but they do not wish to 
fight against France." So again the old essential question arose 
whether it was possible to discriminate between the two 
Napoleon and France. 

It was not long before all Frenchmen discovered that the 
Emperor's pretence of negotiations with Austria and other states 
was empty deception, and that a war was imminent which must 
be laid to his account alone and was due to nothing but his 



yoo Waterloo [I815 

reappearance. The impression of this on the people was one 
of deep-seated disaffection and was finally determinative of 
Napoleon's destiny; no other construction can be put on the 
facts. The public securities, that had risen on the basis of his 
representations, fell from 83, where they were at the beginning 
of March, to 51 in April, and this alienated all property owners, 
particularly the mass of small stockholders. And he estranged 
not only the purses of the French, but also their hearts. For a 
decade they had looked forward with longing to peace, and found 
it only when the Empire fell. It was now re-established, and 
already the necessity of more bloodshed threatened all families 
who would be affected by the dangers of war. ''I cannot con- 
ceal from you " — so ran the report of State Councillor Miot de 
Melito, whom Napoleon had sent into the northern depart- 
ments as commissioner — "that the women are everywhere 
your avowed enemies, and in France such a foe is not to be 
despised.'' The Emperor had to admit that he heard the same 
from other messengers. An Englishman wrote to Castlereagh 
from Paris, "Everybody is a prey to dejection." 

In view of this change of public opinion it was of small account 
that Napoleon was successful in suppressing forcibly Bourbon 
movements in the south, where the Duke and Duchess of Angou- 
leme gathered a few faithful adherents, and in forcing the Duke 
to capitulate and his wife to take flight. That wrested France 
from the Bourbons, but it by no means won it for the Bonapartes. 
Carnot had foreseen this weeks before when he asked Napoleon 
whether he really had any assurances from Austria ; on receiving 
a negative answer, he added: "Then you still have more to do 
than you have already done." The army alone retained its 
unwavering loyalty to its leader, but this was true only of those 
actually under arms. There was, indeed, by this time abundant 
material in the land, in the hundreds of thousands of veterans 
that had returned home from imprisonment and from the Italian 
and Spanish armies, only to be for the most part discharged by 
Louis XVIII. Would they not all hasten with enthusiasm when 
the hero of Austerlitz and Friedland set up his eagles? They did 
not, or at least only a few did ; not more than 60,000 answered the 



Mt. 45] Opposition to War 70 1 

appeal to the old soldiers, and Napoleon had counted on four 
times that number. It was a natural result. Even the most 
hardened warriors at last longed for rest, and they had but just 
begun to enjoy its pleasures when the Emperor's voice gave the 
alarm. Castlereagh's emissary at Paris reports some soldiers as 
saying: '^ We love our 'Pere Violette ' (i.e. Napoleon) much better 
than the 'Gros Papa' whom we don't know (Louis XVIII.); 
but we are sick of war, and if we have got to fight all Europe 
again, we prefer to take back the 'Gros Papa.' " So the Emperor 
could soon discover that while he had plenty of officers and the 
complete skeleton of an arm}^ there was a great lack of men to fill 
the ranks. One day he asked the paymaster Peyrusse in confi- 
dence whether people in Paris were convinced that he would 
gather a large army. ''Your majesty will not stand alone," was 
the reply. '' I am almost afraid I shall, " was Napoleon's rej oinder. 
Added to all this was the circumstance that the national 
guards in most of the cities were mostly revolutionists and took 
sides with the Imperator only if he yielded to their radical 
desires. We have no reason to be surprised that Napoleon was 
slow about arming them and did not count on them for open war. 
He was very anxious, as Mole assured Lord Holland, lest the 
republican party should get the upper hand, and deplored the 
impossibihty of bringing France to the point of war without 
resorting to expedients that he had always repudiated; he is 
even reported to have openly admitted to his suite that he would 
never have left Elba if he had had any anticipation of being 
obliged to make such concessions to the democrats.* All these 
things filled him with gloom. One of his councillors describes 
him as follows: ''He was full of anxiety; the self-confidence 
that used to be heard in his utterances, the tone of authority, the 
lofty flight of thought, all had disappeared; he seemed already 
to feel the weight of the hand of misfortune which was soon to 
be laid on him so heavily, and no longer counted on his star." 
Others speak of him as in suffering and exhausted ; due, as some 
thought, to the frequent hot baths he took, and according to 

* Reminiscences of H. R. Lord Holland, p. 166 of the German edition. 



702 Waterloo [1815 

others to a secret disease; he felt the need of more sleep. All 
thought him changed.* 

Two things first of all claimed close attention : foreign nations 
must not discover what shght results came from his appeal to 
the disciplined soldiers of France, nor how strongly the people 
were opposed to the thought of war. Hence Napoleon could not 
make up his mind to intrust to a representative assembly the 
care of drawing up the new constitution which was to make good 
his promise of a free government. What debates would ensue! 
And after all, there was the danger that the representatives of 
the people might stay his hand and wrest from his grasp the only 
expedient from which he could expect safety — victory over the 
foreign foe. No : a constituent assembly would not do. Rather 
a dictatorship, suggested Maret. But gladly as he would have 
adopted this way out, he now rejected it. He had gone too far 
in his promises, public speeches, and manifestoes to turn back. 
He had to seek some other means, and thought he had found it 
in the plan of having the proposed concessions which he must soon 
make drawn up by his councillors in the shape of a ''novella" 
[supplementary enactment] to the former constitutions issued 
during his reign, which the ''sovereign" people would simply 
adopt. That was what he had called Constant for, and the latter 
now set to work. 

On the 22d of April the work was finished, and after being 
submited to a committee of the Council of State and finally to 
the full Council, it was published under the title "Additional 
Act to the Constitutions of the Empire." It is reported to have 
been Constant's own judgment to give an entirely new constitu- 
tion, which would have disavowed, as it were, all previous legis- 
lation of the Empire; but Napoleon would not consent to that. 
He wished to explain and justify his former dictatorial pro- 
cedure, and it is interesting historically to see how he did it, for 
the reason that he sought to represent the blind impulses of 
his ambition as something premeditated, as a deliberately 

* In regard to his disease, see among other authorities the statement 
of the Austrian General KoUer in Helfert, "Napoleons Fahrt von Fon- 
tainebleau nach Elba," p. 39. 



^T. 45] The Additional Act 703 

chosen policy, destined for the highest good of the world. In 
the preamble to the new ''Act" we read as follows: ''Our aim 
at that time was to establish a great European federal system, 
which we had adopted as in accord with the spirit of the age and 
as favouring the progress of civilization. For the purpose of 
making it complete and giving it all possible extension and sta- 
bility, we delayed meantime the establishment of certain insti- 
tutions that were intended to guarantee the liberty of citizens. 
Henceforth, however, our sole aim is to promote the welfare of 
France by safeguarding her public liberties. Hence arises the 
necessity of important changes in the constitutions, senatus 
consulta, and other documents by which this Empire is gov- 
erned." Universal empire had not been Napoleon's goal, then? 
And yet he had admitted it repeatedly, and but recently to 
Benjamin Constant himself. Of course what he wanted was a 
federation of states; but they were to be subject to the absolute 
power of one man, who at will wiped out of existence individual 
members of the federation, if it was to his advantage; for 
example, Piedmont, the Papal States, Holland, the Hanseatic 
cities, Oldenburg, Hanover, the northern departments of Spain, 
and the Vallais. Who knows what others he had in mind? Of 
course it was a federation, and far be it from him to absorb 
Europe into France ; but that it should culminate in Napoleon I. 
was his aim real. Perhaps some still recalled his article pub- 
lished in the "Moniteur" in 1806, admonishing his nephew, the 
young crown prince of Holland, that he always regarded the 
duties of the regents to the Emperor as first in importance. 
And when he wanted to induce Lucien to accept a crown, had he 
not announced for his guidance "that soldiers, laws, taxes, in 
short everything in the country he ruled, was solely for the pur- 
poses of the imperial throne"?* We must grant that, along 
with all the mischief wrought by the ambitious career of this 
man of world-wide aims and unparalleled energy, there came 
valuable contributions to the development of the European 
world ; it would be rank injustice to deny it. But to say that the 
object at which he now professed to aim had always hovered 
* Lucien, " Memoires " (ed. Jung), III, 111, 326. 



704 Waterloo [1815 

before his mind as an ideal was but to devise for the occasion 
specious pretences and a lie.* 

This preamble had the subordinate aim of proving to the 
foreign nations in the most solemn way that the Empire had 
finally ended its conquering career. It was followed by sixty- 
seven articles containing the new constitution. The principles 
of "liberty" appeared in the last of these; no one was to be 
denied fair trial by law, no one was to be prosecuted, imprisoned, 
or banished, except by due process of law; freedom of worship 
and liberty of the press were both granted, the latter being left 
subject only to suits for libel; all legally acquired property was 
protected; right of petition accorded to everybody; government 
could declare martial law only in case of invasion. The former 
Corps legislatif was transformed into a representative chamber 
of 629 members chosen by the electoral colleges of the depart- 
ments; and the Senate into a chamber of peers, appointed by 
the Emperor, except such as had a seat and vote as princes of the 
reigning family; the peerage was made hereditary. The great 
privileges possessed by the former Senate were not transferred to 
the chamber of peers. Both chambers were to have their ses- 
sions in pubhc. Both had the right to initiate legislation and to 
approve the budget. The Chamber of Deputies was the special 
representative of the industrial interest. The ministers were 
made responsible and could be impeached by the Chamber; in that 
case the peers acted as judges. The right of interpreting laws, 
formerly possessed by the Senate, reverted to the deputies. A 
final article excluded the Bourbons forever from ruhng in France. 

Before submitting ]iis first draft to the Council of State, Con- 
stant had had long discussions with Napoleon on two points. 
In the first place, an hereditary peerage would not fail to aggrieve 
the liberal and democratic elements, which it was desirable to 
conciHate. But the Emperor who would not forego the advan- 
tages of an aristocracy, thought that after two or three victories 
the old French nobility would rally to him again, and then they 
would find a more suitable field of public activity in the higher 
Chamber than they could in a Senate. A second difference grew 
*See above, p. 534. 



JEIt.45] The Act is Coldly Received 705 

out of Constant's proposal to deny, in one article, the right of 
confiscation to the head of the state. Here again Napoleon 
opposed him; he could not afford, he said, to be defenceless 
against political factions; he was no angel, but a man, who was 
not accustomed to suffer attac*k with impunity. The article 
was omitted. Both of these points were noticed after the pub- 
lication of the constitution, which was presented to the French 
people for acceptance just as the laws of 1802 and 1804 had been. 
But above all, the title '' Acte Additionnel" made a bad impres- 
sion. So then the old despotic government, said the people, 
was back again; constitutions were drawn up by officials like 
administrative decrees, and then submitted to a vote of the 
people in order that all possible pressure might be brought to 
bear and a simple "yea" or ''nay'' secured, without the possi- 
bility of debates or amendments. All France was stirred with 
indignation.. ''No notice was taken of the wise and liberal 
features of the new constitution," says Broglie; "enough that it 
was imposed upon them, a 'charte octroy ee,' a new, revised, and 
improved edition of the constitutions of the Empire ; what more 
was needed to set loose the clamours of a public that was little 
concerned about the real substance of things?" 

So the new constitution failed on its publication to produce 
the effect which the Emperor had anticipated. "Liberty" did 
not counterbalance "war." This was especially manifest in 
the voting. While 3,500,000 had voted for the Consulate for life 
in 1802 and for the Empire in 1804, Napoleon now secured but 
1,300,000 votes, not counting 244,000 votes of the army. More 
than a half of the voters sullenly stayed away from the polls. 
This was a defeat that could not be concealed no matter what 
theatrical pomp of scenery was employed at the "Champ de 
Mai," held at Paris on June 1st, where the result was announced. 

An enormous concourse of people thronged the Champ de 
Mars on that day; there were thousands of voters from the 
departments, national guards, regular troops, and a vast multi- 
tude of curious spectators. After solemn mass had been cele- 
brated, the speaker for the representatives of the electoral colleges 
addressed the Emporor, saying that he might expect from them 



706 Waterloo [I815 

everything that a hero and founder of order could ever expect 
from a nation that was loyal, energetic, and unalterable in its 
desire for liberty and independence. That had a very loyal ring, 
but these words were offset by a reservation. '^ Trusting your 
promises/' it was said, ''our deputies will revise our laws with 
mature deliberation and wisdom and bring them into accord 
with the constitutional system." This meant that the task of 
framing a constitution was by no means finished, and that the 
people would take its due share in making up its bill of rights- 
Foreign relations were, however, touched upon with true patriot- 
ism. ''What do these monarchs want," it was asked, "who are 
moving upon us with such mighty engines of war? How have 
we provoked their attack? Have we violated the treaties since 
peace was declared? Every Frenchman is a soldier; victory will 
again accompany your eagles, and our enemies who reckoned 
on our dissensions will regret having challenged us." To these 
and other utterances Napoleon, after announcing the result of 
the popular vote, signing the constitution and taking the oath, 
replied in a confident tone: What did the foreigners want? 
They would hke to enlarge the Netherlands by making the 
strongholds of northern France her boundary; to divide Alsace 
and Lorraine among themselves. That must be resisted. Then, 
when this has been done, a solemn law shall combine the various 
scattered provisions of our constitutions in accordance with the 
spirit of the " Acte Additionnel." By thus representing the latter 
as something transitory Napoleon thought he could yet over- 
come the general disaffection. He even touched another and 
very delicate point. The report had been circulated that he was 
about to abdicate in view of the imminent war. This was the 
work of the arch-plotter Fouche, bringing his mighty instrument, 
the poHce, into play against the Emperor. Alluding to this 
rumour. Napoleon said that he would gladly offer his Hfe a sacri- 
fice to the foreign kings, as they seemed so embittered against 
him, but that he saw they were aiming at the fatherland. In 
other words, people were mistaken in taking him alone for the 
stone of stumbling. 

But all his words failed to calm men's minds; while other 



^T.45] Disaffection 707 

things even gave offence. To show his independent authority 
he had appeared not in the uniform of the national guard, but in 
a dazzHng and fanciful costume of royalty. This made an im- 
pression as adverse as did his using the expressions ''my people," 
''my capital," in his speech. The people never liked such 
phrases from the son of the Revolution; and least of all now. 
Even the most zealous Bonapartists could not help noticing 
that the question shouted by the Emperor to the National Guards, 
whether they were ready to defend their eagles with their blood, 
failed to call forth an enthusiastic response.* Only the Imperial 
Guards took the oath with any show of feeling. "As they defiled 
past the Emperor," says an eye-witness " their eyes flashed with a 
deep fire; one seemed to read on their lips, ' Morituri te salutant.' " 
So the solemnities of the new government had not only profited 
nothing, but they had rather intensified the opposition. On 
one only of the spectators did they make the full and lasting 
effect of grandiose power and splendour. It was a boy of seven. 
History knows him as Napoleon III. 

The strained relations between people and ruler came to Hght 
most clearly when the Chamber of Representatives assembled, 
June 3d. Napoleon had supposed originally that he could 
sufficiently recommend himself to the nation as a liberal mon- 
arch by the " Acte" and the solemn oath on the Champ de Mars. 
But when the disaffection persisted and was nourished still more 
by the press, now free from all restraint, he was obliged at last 
to yield to the universal demand for a session of the deputies. 
He called it with the greatest reluctance, for he clearly foresavv- 
the most uncomfortable debates and discussions, which would 
surely reveal the internal dissensions and insecurity of his posi- 
tion to foreign nations. If it had only been possible to guide 
and influence the assembly; but even this expedient failed on 
the very first day. The Emperor had had his brother Lucien 
appointed deputy, having become reconciled with him again — 
a still further public pledge of his liberal intentions — and wished 

* Coignet says : " The oaths were given without energy, the enthusiasm 
was weak. Those were not the shouts of Austerlitz and Wagram. The 
Emperor perceived it clearly." 



7o8 Waterloo [I815 

him to be chosen president. But no sooner was this known than 
the deputies hastened to show their constituents how independent 
they were; Lucien did not receive a single vote, and they elected 
as president Lanjuinais, one of the opposition minority in the 
old Senate, and one who had once voted against the Empire. 
Thus management of the lower chamber was out of the question, 
and the only thing left was to make a counter-check of the upper 
house, to which Napoleon now proceeded to appoint members. 
He included his three brothers still in Paris, Joseph, Lucien and 
Jerome, Uncle Fesch, Eugene Beauharnais, his Ministers, the 
loyal marshals Davout, Suchet, Ney, Brune, Moncey, Soult, 
Lefebvre, Grouchy, Jourdain, Mortier, a considerable number of 
generals headed by Bertrand and Drouot, several former senators, 
but only Monge and Chaptal of the savants, some representatives 
of the old noblesse, among whom was his master of ceremonies, 
Segur, Councillors of State, financiers, etc. Even Si eyes was 
not wanting. On the 7th of June the Emperor opened the 
sessions of both houses with a speech from the throne in which he 
omitted all the objectionable expressions of June 1st, and which 
therefore made a better impression. He and the army would do 
their duty, he said. Thereupon the Chamber of Deputies in an 
address of June 11th put all the forces of the land at his disposal 
for its defence ; but only for purposes of defense. '' For," it said, 
''not even the will of the sovereign is in a position to draw the 
nation on beyond the limits of self-defence." And such was 
their distrust in the conqueror of old that even the loyal majority 
of the House of Peers referred to the new institutions of France 
as ''furnishing Europe with the guarantee that the French gov- 
ernment can never be carried away by the seductions of victory." 

This anxiety, however, was vain. The great general, who 
departed to the army on the 12th of June, 1815, with troubled 
mind, as his suite noticed, was to return in nine days, conquered 
as never before, his power annihilated forever. 

The unfavourable foreign and domestic conditions under 
which Napoleon began his new reign had this consequence, that 
he could not command at the beginning of June the forces which 
he had doubtless counted on. To avoid appearing before 



-^T. 45] Preparations of the Allies 709 

Europe and France as the aggressor, he had delayed war prepara- 
tions for weeks, and then called them defensive, fortifying Paris 
and Lyons. Out of regard for pubhc opinion, and to avoid 
demanding sacrifices that had roused hatred against him, he had 
deferred the conscription of 1815 until the last moment. The 
result of this, combined with the partial failure of his appeal to 
the old soldiers, was that when finally hostilities commenced he 
had little more than 200,000 men available for open war. To 
be sure he might have delayed still more, gained time and 
strengthened himself ; but instead of doing that, after exhausting 
the resources of diplomacy, he assumed the defensive. And 
good reason he had. 

The allies of the 25th of March had not put the war against 
Napoleon into operation as early as they had resolved. Prussia 
alone had mobihzed her army rapidly, sent a corps stationed on 
the lower Rhine to Belgium at Wellington's request, followed it 
with three others, and soon after the middle of April had an army 
of 120,000 men in the field, ready for battle. Bliicher with his 
faithful Gneisenau again took command. At the same time 
Wellington also had gathered an army of 95,000, composed of 
English, Dutch, and Germans, from Brunswick, Hanover, and 
Nassau, destined particularly for the defence of Brussels and 
Ghent. The two generals wanted to take the offensive in order 
to leave no time for Napoleon to prepare ; but their counsels did 
not prevail at Vienna. The plan of war there adopted was based 
on great masses of troops; it contemplated advancing with the 
greatest possible assurance of victory, and hence required much 
time, as the Russians moved west very slowly and Alexander 
was hungering for the leading role he had before played, which 
the Austrians were perfectly willing to assign to him on account 
of events in Italy. For in that country Murat, just as the Vienna 
Congress was on the point of granting him the kingdom as a 
reward for his joining the coalition against Napoleon, had struck 
a blow for his brother-in-law. He pushed rapidly on to the Po, 
but then, the expected national support failing, he retired before 
the Austrians, and was defeated by them on May 2d and 3d at 
Tolentino. Nothing was now left for him but to fly to France. 



71 o Waterloo [I815 

Under the pressure of all these circumstances, the powers at last 
postponed the opening of the great co-operative movement until 
the 27th of June, when they expected to push it through with 
some 700,000 or 900,000 men. 

Should Napoleon now await the attack of the enemy? Wait 
imtil the several armies had reached points equally distant from 
Paris, and then were invading France on converging lines, the 
English and Prussians from the northeast, the Russians and 
Austrians from the east and southeast? His precarious position 
and the unwillingness of the French to fight would not permit 
him to bring on his country the burden of an invasion without 
taking some step to prevent it. Now, as the mobilizing of the 
hostile armies was not equally rapid everywhere, so that the 
English and Prussian armies stood ready while those of Austria 
and Russia were only in process of formation, the possibility 
was apparent of defeating the former by a vigorous onslaught 
before the latt-er arrived. And what might not be the political 
consequences of such a victory! Could the powers have for- 
gotten so completely and quickly their late dissensions and the 
consciousness of their conflicting interests, which had recently 
almost led to open hostility? Napoleon certainly was well 
aware that Bourbon stock had fallen in Vienna and that the 
allies were by no means united as to the future of the throne of 
France. Under such circumstances he made up his mind, con- 
trary, it is said, to Carnot's advice, to go north and take the 
offensive, striking the first blow in Belgium. To be sure his 
entire army was not available for this purpose; 20,000 men were 
necessary in the Vendee to quell a revolt which the royalists had 
kindled on the old field of their agitations; and besides that three 
corps under Suchet, Rapp, and Lecombe must try to cover the 
eastern district from the Rhone to the Meuse, so that only about 
125,000 were left him for the attack. But they seemed to him 
enough. He stationed them in all secrecy south of the Sambre, 
between Beaumont and PhiHppeville ; there were 21,000 Guards, 
five corps under Drouet, Reille, Vandamme, Gerard, and 
Mouton, and four corps of cavalry under Grouchy as a reserve. 
On the 14th he himself arrived in Beaumont; he gathered with 



JEt. 45] The Plan of Campaign 7 1 1 

his own peculiar skill all these troops close by the border, oppo- 
site Charleroi, and early on the morning of the 15th began oper- 
ations. 

WeHington and Bliicher had not remained in ignorance of the 
small forces at the enemy's command, and had therefore not 
looked for so rapid an attack. Wellington supposed, even when 
he heard of movements of the enemy and of Napoleon's arrival, 
that only defensive measures were being taken. The corps of 
both the alHed armies were widely scattered: the English, because 
their leader wanted to ''cover everything," were stationed from 
Binche, on the French frontier, west and north as far as Brussels 
and Oudenarde, with a hne of retreat past Brussels to the sea; 
the Prussian line, on account of difficulty in procuring supplies, 
stretched east from Binche and Charleroi beyond Liege, and 
their line of retreat was through that town to the Rhine. Char- 
leroi, then, the meeting-point of the roads from Brussels on the 
one hand and Liege on the other, was the junction of the two 
armies, and it was here that Napoleon proposed to break through. 
Just as in his first campaign in Italy he had broken through 
from Savona over the mountain and separated the Piedmont 
troops from the Austrians, so now he planned to separate the 
two armies; he hoped thus to defeat Welhngton and Bliicher 
singly, as he had then defeated Colh and Beaulieu and driven 
them back on their diverging Knes of retreat. On the 15th he 
occupied Charleroi with little difficulty, as the Prussians had 
neglected to fortify the Hne of the Sambre, and thought that by 
so doing he had already succeeded in surprising the enemy and 
piercing his line. But in this he was deceived. He would have 
had to advance much farther north to the Namur-Nivelles road, 
which formed the Hne of communication between the two 
armies, in order to encounter the Prussians, who were in the act 
of concentrating at Sombreffe. Wellington, far from supposing 
his colleague to be really threatened, was dominated by the idea 
that Napoleon would approach on the west, try to turn his right 
flank and cut off his retreat from the sea— a strategic blunder, by 
the way, of which his great antagonist would never have been 
guilty. He therefore neglected to concentrate his troops on the left 



712 Waterloo [1815 

on the 15th, and so the Emperor might have struck the Prussians 
alone if he had hastened forward. Nay, he might even have done 
it on the following day, if he had made haste. For Bliicher was 
in so far surprised that he was unable on the 16th to bring up a 
distant corps in time ; and it was only when Wellington, learning 
of the enemy's movements, promised to be at Nivelles the next 
morning with his army and to support him in case of attack, 
that he finally ventured to await Napoleon at Sombreffe. 

But Napoleon, still under the delusion of having completely 
surprised his two enemies, neglected to use on the 16th the 
advantage he had let slip the day before. That he might engage 
the whole Prussian army near by he had no thought; he sup- 
posed Bliicher was on his way east to gather his forces together 
there. He therefore divided his army, sent Ney in command of 
50,000 men along the road to Brussels, and gave Grouchy charge 
of a division of about the same size which was to follow the 
Prussians. He kept a reserve with himself, ready to strike here 
or there at need. Making a reconnoissance about noon at Fleurus, 
to which point he had followed the Prussians on the preceding 
day, he noticed to his astonishment that they were holding their 
ground. Still he thought it was only a corps of Bliicher's, until 
at last, at three o'clock in the afternoon, he perceived from 
Ligny that a whole army was facing him. Then, indeed, he 
deeply regretted having detached Ney. He recalled him with 
earnest messages, saying that the fate of France was in his hands 
and urging him not to hesitate a moment, but turn the right flank 
of the enemy and attack him in the rear. But this command 
could not be obeyed ; for in the first place it was given too late, 
and then, secondly, Ney had long since been engaged in fighting 
Wellington much farther north at Quatre-Bras, where some of 
the English troops were stationed. Only one of the corps as- 
signed to him (Drouet d'Erlon) was persuaded by the adjutant 
who brought the order to turn about and march to Ligny. It was 
of no use there, however, while Ney without its aid was unable 
to gain any advantage besides that of keeping Wellington away 
from Bliicher. In consequence Bliicher lost the battle, which he 
began only on the expectation of help from the English general. 



JEt.45] The Battle of Ligny 713 

And yet he was himself partly to blame. For, as the arrange- 
ment of the Prussian troops was not favourable for taking 
advantage of the promised aid of WeHingtoU; — along a re-entering 
angle from St. Amand to Ligny, Sombreffe, and Tongrinne, — 
the situation required that the battle be fought entirely on the 
defensive until the ally arrived on the scene, and to be maintained 
on the defensive if he failed to appear. But that was not in ac- 
cordance with Bliicher's temperament, and besides he had great 
odds over the enemy.* After the battle had been hotly contested 
several hours near St. Amand and especially about Ligny, during 
which the Prussians suffered much more heavily than the old 
veterans of Napoleon, the gray-headed marshal undertook to as- 
sail the right wing of the French with the reserves from his centre. 
The French parried the assault. But the Emperor had already 
noticed the weakening of the enemy's centre. He pierced it 
at once and drove the enemy in flight back to Brye. In the 
tumult at the close of the battle Bliicher fell with his wounded 
horse, and was given up for lost; Gneisenau had to give orders as 
to the direction of retreat. Unshaken by the adverse fate of the 
day, full of hope in a more glorious future, this General held fast 
to the idea of co-operating with the English, and gave Wavre, 
to the north, as the destination of the retiring army. That com - 
mand was to decide the campaign. 

Napoleon now perceived the full extent of his mistake in sup- 
posing the Prussians to have been surprised in their concentra- 
tion and to have retired on their line of operations. The battle 
of the 16th opened his eyes. Well, he had won it and put the 
enemy to flight. All was well again, and this time surely there 
was no doubt that Bliicher was marching along his line of retreat 
to rally his forces, say at Namur. General Pajol, sent along that 
road in pursuit with two divisions, ran across many fugitives 
hastening eastward, — 5000 according to report, — and that fact 
fully confirmed the Emperor in his opinion that he had at last 
rid himself thoroughly of the Prussians and could now move on 

* The Prussians had 86,000 men, the French 68,000, in the battle. Ten 
thousand of the latter stayed behind and took no part; while of the Prus- 
sians, on the other hand, 20,000 on the left wing were but little engaged. 



714 Waterloo [1815 

Wellington without being annoyed by them in the least and with- 
out any special need of haste.* During the forenoon of the 17th 
he allowed his brave soldiers, who were fagged out by the battle, 
to rest, and not until about noon did he order Grouchy with 33,- 
000 men to hunt up Bliicher and ascertain where he was rallying, 
whether he had already evacuated Namur, and in general what 
were his purposes. ''March/^ the order read, ''with all the 
forces assigned you to Gembloux." This shows plainly Napo- 
leon's confident opinion that the Prussians had gone back to 
Namur, but he might have rallied quickly — he knew Bliicher of 
old — and might soon be on the point of marching either on the 
highroad leading to Louvain, or on some other road in a north- 
westerly direction towards the English. In that case Grouchy's 
orders were to go on beyond Gembloux until he overtook him, 
and hold him in check while Wellington was crushed. All that 
called for considerable time, for Napoleon had not the faintest 
inkhng that the routed Prussian troops could be brought to order 
again on a single day on the march, and yet that is just what 
was accomplished. So completely was he under the dominion 
of this error that he could not even entertain any other idea; 
least of all the truth, that the Prussians, who had suffered a loss of 
20,000 in dead, wounded, and missing, had been able, summoning 
their utmost energy, to march straight from the field of battle 
towards their ally, to prevent his defeat in the arduous struggle 
that was imminent, and to help him, rather, to conquer. He 
did not credit his enemies with such magnificent courage. 

When Grouchy started for the east the other French troops 
were already on the march to Quatre-Bras to join Ney and follow 
WelHngton. The Enghsh commander had, at the news of the 
Prussian defeat, withdrawn north to Mont Saint-Jean and fixed 
his headquarters at Waterloo. Here the French found him in 
battle array on the 17th of June. His course in taking and hold- 
ing this position, showing he did not share Napoleon's conviction 
that he would be forced from it in the end, was based on 

* On the next morning Soult, who now took Berthier's place, wrote to 
Ney, saying among other things: "The Prussian army has suffered defeat; 
General Pajol is pursuing it on the road to Namur and Liege." 



^T. 45] The Morning of Waterloo 715 

assurances received from Bliicher, who had already gathered 
and drawn up his entire army at Wavre, that he would support 
the English with all the forces at his command if there should be 
a battle the next day. This state of things was very far from 
Napoleon's thoughts, even on the next day, when he made up his 
mind to attack the English and rout them as he had the 
Prussians. Grouchy did indeed mention in his reports that a 
Prussian column had without doubt advanced to Wavre ; but it 
was only one column, the marshal was following it and was equal 
to handhng it while Welhngton was being crushed. So little 
danger did Napoleon apprehend that on the 18th he did not even 
begin the attack the first thing in the morning, as his custom 
was, but left time for the ground to dry again after the long, 
soaking rain, so that the guns could operate more effectively. 
Could he but have guessed that Billow's corps was toiling pain- 
fully along through the same clayey soil by unbeaten routes, with 
the columns defeated at Ligny behind him, all advancing for the 
purpose of bringing down upon him such a catastrophe as has 
seldom so swiftly befallen the great men of earth, how he would 
have hastened to fight and win the victory ! 

At eleven in the forenoon Napoleon rode from Caillou, where 
he had spent the night, past Plancenoit on the Brussels road, 
until he reached the farm La Belle Alliance. Here the road 
slopes gradually into a shallow vale, and a httle less than a mile 
farther, beyond the farm La Haye Sainte, it ascends the hill that 
lies across it and on whose gentle northern slope Hes the village 
of Mont Saint- Jean. Wellington had picked out this hill for his 
defensive position; and he meant to remain on the defensive 
only, on account of his inferior forces, if for no other reason. 
He had but 68,000 men, and *was not aware that a third of the 
enemy's army was still at a distance. In excess of caution he 
had detached 19,000 men to Hal to avoid being surprised from 
the west. In reality Napoleon was stronger by only about 
4000 cavalry and artillery. To be sure, they were his best 
troops, which had long been under his command. As it was 
their own cause they were fighting for, they would fight with 
ardour and let victory be wrested from their grasp only by direst 



7i6 Waterloo [1815 

necessity. The Emperor disposed them in three lines. Two 
corps were stationed at the southern line of the vale above 
mentioned on both sides of La Belle Alliance, resting on the 
Nivelles road to the left and on the chateau of Frichemont to 
the right, with Ney in command. Behind these in the second 
line were two corps of cavalry on the wings, and in the centre as 
a first reserve along the highway two divisions of infantry and 
cavalry. And finally in the third line were the Guards as a 
second reserve, the heavy and light horse on both sides of the 
road, and the Old Guard in the centre. On arriving at La Belle- 
AUiance, Napoleon made a reconnoissance. He could not obtain 
a full view of the enemy's lines, and saw only the front that held 
the rising ground. This eminence not only shut off his view, 
but also enabled Wellington to move his divisions concealed 
and unnoticed during the action and thus transfer them to any 
point where the onset of the enemy called for greater resistance. 
The Emperor then rode down the front Hues, to inspire his men 
by his glance and words and also to show the EngHshman, who 
commanded a full view of the French army, what he had to cope 
with. He knew, perhaps, that a goodly part of WelHngton's 
troops were not very reliable, although that commander may 
have exaggerated when he called it "the worst army that ever 
stood on legs." Finally, at noon, he ordered the battle to begin. 
What an advantage the allies reaped from this delay ! 

Napoleon's principal aim, founded on the general plan of the 
whole campaign, which contemplated a complete separation of 
the two armies, was to force the left wing and then the centre 
of the enemy, and thereby drive him away from the Prussians 
and from Brussels. (The proclamation to the people of Brussels 
was printed and ready to be scattered.) To accomplish this he 
made a strong attack with his left wing on the chateau of Hougo- 
mont, which the enemy held, to attract Wellington's attention 
away from his own left; the ''main attack" was expected to 
follow at one o'clock. But this very first calculation was upset. 
The enemy had transformed the chateau into a citadel, and de- 
fended it with unexampled coolness against ever-renewed assaults, 
until at last an entire corps of the French front line melted away 



^T.45] The Battle 717 

without accomplishing anything. And as Hougomont held its 
own without the necessity of support that might weaken the left 
and centre, the French had to undertake their main attack 
against an undiminished enemy. But as if that were not 
enough, just as they were making ready to advance, the Emperor 
learned from a captured letter that he would have to deal with 
the Prussians as well, that Biilow was going to fall on his right 
flank; and as if to preclude all possibihty of doubt, masses of 
troops began to appear on the right, near the chapel of St. 
Lambert, a mile distant, which an adjutant recognized as 
Prussians. There, suddenly and close at hand, was a danger 
that he had not reckoned with in the least; within two hours 
•Billow might strike. To avoid exposing his flank, the larger 
part of the reserve under Mouton had to be sent against him 
northeast of Plancenoit; those forces could not therefore join in 
the decisive blow that was to rout Wellington. If Biilow were 
but advancing alone! If Grouchy were only holding the rest of 
the Prussians in check ! Better yet, if he were on the spot and 
could drive Biilow back! ''Delay not a moment to come and 
join us,'' was the message Napoleon now sent him. But would 
the order ever reach him? And suppose it did, could he get away 
from the enemy, whom in fact he had been told to keep in check? 
Vain hopes. Grouchy was at Wavre, having arrived by a long 
detour from the east, and vvas engaged with a much weaker 
Prussian corps, while two others had long since followed Biilow 
on the way to join Wellington, and were advancing slowly, 
indeed, on account of heavy roads, yet inexorably. 

Napoleon was not aware of his full danger when he determined 
to dispose of the enemy in front with all possible haste before the 
first cannon was fired on the right. It was explained to the army 
that it was Grouchy approaching on the right, and that victory 
was no longer in doubt. Then four divisions in closed columns 
advanced against the left wing of the enemy on La Haye Sainte, 
Papelotte and Smohain. The first point was stormed; but could 
not be held as the subsequent assault on the heights was repulsed, 
and the divisions had to fall back before the onslaught of the 
English cuirassiers. Then, while fighting was still in progress 



71 8 Waterloo [I815 

on the right, Napoleon, who was now at La Belle Alliance, tried to 
pierce the enemy's centre by a cavalry charge on the grandest 
scale. This was the culminating point of the battle. Milhand's 
corps of cuirassiers hurled themselves on the squares of the 
English, but with Httle success, for the British shot well and 
stood firm. Wellington, too, saw the danger coming and 
strengthened his centre, which was an easy task, as the left wing 
had already repulsed the attack there, and Hougomont on the 
right still held out. A new charge was made with three times 
the number, thirty-six squadrons. A very sea of horsemen 
poured over the ground and thundered in terrible billows about 
the enemy's battalions. Many of the latter were overwhelmed, 
many crumbled away, but others stood firm as a rock. And as 
Napoleon neglected to throw infantry into the gaps opened by 
the cavalry, this charge, too, failed of its intended effect. In 
fact the Emperor had exhausted his reserves, all but the Old 
Guard ; and he would not now risk them, because at about five 
o'clock Billow's batteries had begun to play and had driven 
Mouton back to Plancenoit. That point must be held at every 
cost, otherwise the enemy would fall upon the line of retreat and 
a catastrophe would be the result. For these reasons Napoleon 
held back the Guard at the one moment when it might have 
turned the tide in his favour. For the position of the English 
was by that time so sorely shaken, especially when Ney at six 
o'clock recaptured La Haye Sainte, that General Miiffling of 
Wellington's suite hastened toward the Prussian corps of Zieten 
and shouted: ''The battle is lost if the corps do not press on at 
once and support the EngHsh army." Meantime the Guard 
was busy in driving back Bliicher, who with Billow's troops had 
captured Plancenoit at last. This it accomplished at about 
seven o'clock. Carried away by this success, Napoleon again 
ordered a general advance all along the line. He gathered the 
last 5000 Guards still left for a final blow at the British centre. 
It was the act of a man in despair, for strictly speaking he had lost 
the battle when the cavalry charge failed, and it was necessary to 
retire while the loophole at Plancenoit still stood open. But if 
he did so he was conquered, and what was he good for if he was 



iET. 45] The Crash 719 

conquered? Therefore he staked everything that offered even a 
chance of salvation. With shouts of ''Vive TEmpereur!" the 
triarii of his host dashed forward. And as if fate wanted to 
deceive her spoiled favoiu'ite of old up to the last moment, on the 
right two important positions were actually wrested from the 
English, and the Guards pushed on to the very last Hne of the 
enemy. But here at last, their ranks decimated by a well- 
directed fire, they, too, weakened, fell into disorder and retired. 
Moreover, the corps of Zieten had just then arrived and joined 
in the battle. The already exhausted French troops were driven 
from the captured positions; and thus supported, Wellington's 
army, sadly shrunken as it was, even ventured to assume the 
offensive. It was now eight o'clock. Half an hour later, after 
the arrival of the third Prussian corps, Plancenoit was retaken, 
and so any orderly retreat on the part of the French was out of 
the question. The road was soon impassable, as the Prussian 
bullets were already raking it, and so the disorganized host 
swept in wdld haste to the west. 

Only two reserve squares of the Guard still held together ; in 
one of these, when the crash came, the Emperor took refuge in 
front of La Haye Sainte, where he had awaited the issue of the 
last charge, exposed to the fire of the English guns. It escorted 
him back to the heights of La Belle Alliance.* From this point 
he tried in vain to stem the tide of fugitives with the aid of his 
adjutants. He soon had to think of his own safety, and as his 
carriage at Caillou could no longer be reached, he rode across the 
fields to Genappe, guarded only by grenadiers a cheval. But so 
vigorous was the pursuit of the enemy that it was impossible to 
halt there ; and Napoleon, who was wont to suffer pain even from 
a short ride, had to stay in the saddle until five o'clock in the morn- 

* One of the two squares was broken up. The second escaped, but 
Cambronne, its commanding general, was forced to surrender. It has long 
been proved that he neither uttered the words that have been put into his 
mouth, "The Guard dies, but never surrenders," nor demonstrated their 
truth. Bertrand claimed while at St. Helena to have heard the same 
words from General Michel. But who would believe Bertrand? More 
reliable witnesses than he ascribe to General Michel a much shorter and 
more pungent expression. 



720 Waterloo [I8i5 

ing, when he found a vehicle at last that brought him to Philippe- 
ville. Then only could he give himself a few hours of rest. He 
then issued orders to the corps not engaged in the campaign of 
Waterloo, wrote the bulletins on Ligny and Mont Saint-Jean, 
as he called the battle of Waterloo, and dictated to Joseph a 
letter which shows that this man would give up hope only with 
his very last breath. Everything was not yet lost, he declared. 
If he could only succeed in imiting all forces at his disposal, he 
would still have 150,000 men, nay, 300,000 with the national 
guards and the battalions in regimental depots. If Grouchy 
were not captured, for he had heard nothing from him, it was 
possible to gather -50,000 men on the spot and hold the enemy 
in check until Paris and France had done their duty. His 
brother must see to it that the Chambers give the Emperor the 
proper support. He himself closed the letter, adding in his own 
hand, "Courage, constancy J" 



CHAPTER XXI. 
ST. HELENA 

Ever since the Emperor set out for the army, Paris had been 
anxiously waiting for news. It is enough to show the burden of 
anxiety that weighed on the people to remember that they feared 
the success of the war-lord almost as much as the defeat of his 
army. And that not only because in case of victory he would be 
the unlimited ruler again as of old, and rid himself of the bonds 
he had imposed upon himself, but also that a victory was but 
the real beginning of the war, and who knew when it would end? 
Long ago they had felt the violent contrast between their military 
glory and their distress as a nation. And had not even that 
glory been strangely dimmed during the last years of Napoleon's 
reign? Yet on the 18th of June the cannon before the Hotel des 
Invalides proclaimed a new first victory, just as the thunders of 
artillery were rolling over Mont Saint-Jean ; it was the battle of 
Ligny. So the war-god still showered upon his favourite the 
marks of his favour. Those who could rejoice at the news 
rejoiced; they were the revolutionists and excited masses of 
Paris, glad because the advocates of legitimacy and the Bourbons 
were humiliated, and the Bonapartists, who rejoiced at the 
triumph of their idol. But only two days later the picture was 
wholly changed. Dull rumours were in the air of a dreadful 
defeat, and the cannon were now silent. On the 21st all doubt 
seemed removed; the army was a wreck, the Emperor in full 
flight. It was even said that he was in Paris. What! had he 
left the army, then, instead of rallying it and opposing the 
enemy's march on the capital? Men were beside themselves at 
the thought. 

As a matter of fact Napoleon had been in Paris ever since the 
early morning of June 21st, at the Elysee, where he had formerly 

721 



^I'l ''• St. Helena [181.5 

lived. At Laon he had discussed with the officers of his suite 
the next steps to be taken, and had decided to go to the capital. 
He supposed Grouchy to be a prisoner of war, and now took in the 
full consequences of the fateful battle of Sunday. It had cost 
the French more than 30,000 men. The rest were scattered to 
the four winds, and it was with difficulty that a few thousand 
could be rallied here and there. And how easily he might have 
avoided this and have conquered a second time if he had only 
pursued the Prussians without delay after the battle of Ligny 
and then hurled his army on the EngHsh, just as he had done in 
Italy in 1796 ! The most dangerous opponent was already beaten, 
and the other, who was unwieldy in face of the new military 
tactics, and massed his forces poorly, was isolated and virtually 
lost. And then? Would it not have been possible for diplomacy 
to follow close before arms, and dissolve the alliance of the powers 
before they had gained a victory? "In all history there is no 
more decisive battle than that of Waterloo," wrote Gneisenau 
to Hardenberg on June 22d; "decisive both in its effect on the 
battlefield itself, and in its moral effect. Had it been lost, what 
would have become of the coalition with all its memories of the 
Congress? '^ But not on the enemies alone; on France, too, the 
issue of the battle of June 18th could not fail to have a powerful 
effect. The end had not been expected so suddenly. Even the 
sly intriguer Fouche, whom Napoleon did not dare to set aside, 
although he saw through him, had given him a little longer time 
in which to meet his fate; he had said to an aristocrat: "This 
man has returned madder than he went. He is making a mighty 
stir, but it will not last three months." Napoleon now saw a 
storm brewing within the country that might but too easily 
sweep him aside, unless he could lull it at the last moment. 
Hence he had hastened to Paris, and for the same reason he now- 
sat in company with his brothers and ministers considering ways 
and means, although himself extremely exhausted and nervous. 
He seemed to have found what he needed. He tried to paint 
the situation as regards defensive forces in the brightest colours, 
and then came to the final point : he needed a temporary dictator- 
ship in order to save the fatherland; he could simply assume it 



.Et, 45] Facing the Inevitable 723 

himself, yet it would be more expedient and dignified for the 
Chamber to invest him with the office. But he had scarcely 
made this suggestion when one of his most devoted followers, 
Regnauld de Saint- Jean d'Angely, announced that the Chamber 
no longer deemed it his mission to save the fatherland, and that 
he must lay his abdication before them as a sacrifice. And such 
was, in fact, the situation. Lucien, indeed, spoke eagerly of 
seizing the power, of proroguing parhament and proclaiming a 
state of siege; and Napoleon, too, began to favour this idea. 
But Davout, the Minister of War, positively refused to permit the 
army to be put to such a use. A message now arrived from 
the second Chamber, which had been in session since morning 
and had secret information of the councils at the Elysee, to the 
effect that it had declared itself en permanence, that it held every 
effort to prorogue it an act of high treason, and would prosecute 
any one guilty of the crime; further, the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, of the Interior, of War, and of Police were summoned 
before the deputies. This was a coup d'etat from beneath, in- 
tended to parry the coup feared from above, i.e., from Napoleon. 
The deputies of the people, with Lafayette at their head, revolted 
against Napoleon's law and will, for the new constitution conceded 
him the privilege of dissolving the Chambers. "I see but one 
man alone," exclaimed the republican Lacoste, ''between us and 
peace. Let him go, and we are sure of peace." So powerful 
was this current of feeling that it invaded the upper Chamber, 
and the peers adopted the resolution of the deputies. What 
was to be done? Napoleon, still sitting with his ministers, had 
forbidden them to obey the call of the rebellious Chamber, when 
news came that the latter was on the point of putting the motion 
for the deposition of the Emperor. Then Napoleon yielded. He 
sent the ministers and Lucien to the deputies with the message 
that he had created a commission consisting of Caulaincourt, 
Carnot, and Fouche, to open negotiations with the enemies and 
to end the war, so far as that was compatible with the honour 
and independence of the fatherland; that he counted on the 
patriotism of the parliament. But this did not satisfy the 
Chamber. The powers, they said, had proscribed him, they 



724 St. Helena [I815 

would not negotiate with him; hence his conunission was useless, 
and parliament itself must negotiate; and he must abdicate, or 
else he would be deposed. Then the deputies elected from their 
own number five commissioners who, together with five peers 
and the ministers, were empowered to consider means of saving 
the state. 

So passed by the 21st of June. On the next day the situation 
had grown still more acute, even his brothers now advising him to 
abdicate. The deputies waited long for a message to that effect, 
but in vain; finally one of them made the motion that the 
Emperor be requested to withdraw in the name of the public 
welfare. Napoleon delayed answering. He walked up and 
down before his ministers in the Elysee, denouncing the 
"Jacobins" with trembling voice and distorted features. His 
judgment wrestled with his ambition in a terrible struggle. He 
remained stubborn, as if he would cling to the very last moments 
of his sway, until President Lanjuinais sent the commandant of 
the Palais Bourbon, where the sessions were being held, with the 
demand that he should abdicate, as the Chamber would wait 
no longer, and would declare him an outlaw. "Hors la loi!" 
That was the shout that had greeted him on the 18th 
Brumaire, when he was seizing the reins that were now 
slipping from his hands. At that time he had coerced the 
Chamber; now the tables were turned. With that threat in his 
ears he dictated on the afternoon of the 22 d of June his abdication 
in favour of his son Napoleon II. Would the deputies take any 
notice of this last clause? For the time they merely expressed 
to the Emperor through a deputation their thanks for the 
magnanimous sacrifice he had made, and at once proceeded to 
appoint Carnot, Fouche, and Grenier, and the peers Caulaincourt 
and Quinette, members of a provisional government. It 
seemed as if the circle of events was to be complete, when 
Napoleon saw rising before him this copy of the Directory of 
Five, which he had once displaced. Even the indifferent public 
was not wanting to complete the parallel ; it looked on now as it 
had then, without any show of deep interest. An eye-witness says : 
'^Absolute quiet prevailed in the city and was not disturbed for 



^T.45] The End of the Hundred Days 725 

a moment. Tossed from government to government, back and 
forth, the people neither cared for the man they had lost nor for 
the man who was to come. They slept, expecting to be told on 
awaking whether they were to obey Napoleon II. or Louis 
XVIII." Under no circumstances, however, Napoleon I. His 
reign of a ''Hundred Days" was at an end. 

Of the population only the lowest elements, and that mainly 
from the suburbs, appeared occasionally before the palace in 
groups, shouting for a dictatorship and cheering the Emperor. 
Whether it was such utterances, or in general the embarrassment 
the provisional government felt in having the discarded Impera- 
tor still in the capital, especially after news came that Grouchy 
had saved his corps, that the troops in the Vendee were returning 
victorious, and that hence, together with the rallied fragments 
from Waterloo, an army of over 60,000 might be gathered, all 
clamouring for their leader: whatever the grounds may have 
been, he was urged to leave Paris. Davout finally succeeded 
in persuading him to this step, though, it is said, only by means 
of threats. For Napoleon, too, had learned of the presence 
of the army, and while he left the capital on the 25th of June, 
it was only to repair to the not distant palace of Malmaison 
and there await the course of events. Did he hope to be re- 
called? A part of France was still devoted to him, though it was 
but the smallest part by far. Or did he wait for the army to 
come in search of its leader? Be that as it may, he spent the next 
few days there, apparently absorbed in reminiscences of the time 
when, as Consul, he conceived in these same rooms the plans of 
his universal dominion, and in weighing the project of setthng 
in the United States if France really thrust him out. But 
meantime the enemy, Bliicher's Prussians in advance of the 
EngHsh, had kept drawing nearer, and soon Malmaison would not 
be safe. Then, at the last moment, on June 29th, just after a 
couple of French regiments had marched past with shouts of 
"Vive FEmpereur," he determined to offer his services to the pro- 
visional government as a simple general, for the sole purpose, he 
said, of saving the capital and beating the enemy while his forces 
were separated. Fouche, the leader of the Five, who had long 



726 St. Helena [I815 

since been in secret correspondence with a confidential agent of 
Louis XVIII., answered this rather naive message by saying that 
Napoleon was entirely mistaken if he thought the members of 
the government so crazy as to accept his proposal. He could 
give him only this advice, to depart at once, as the government 
could no longer be responsible for his safety. Nor was that 
untrue. We know to-day that a Prussian detachment had 
received direct orders to secure his person and shoot him. No 
sooner did the messenger return to Malmaison than Napoleon 
gave the signal for departure. He took off his soldier's coat 
and drove away in civilian garb with Bertrand, Savary, and 
Generals Becker and Gourgaud. 

He directed his journey through Tours to the port of Roche- 
fort, where two French frigates stood ready to take him to 
America, provided it was possible to escape the English cruisers. 
They proceeded slowly, making several long stops, more slowly, 
in fact, than was directed in the instructions of General Becker, 
who was delegated by the government to conduct Napoleon out 
of the country. But Napoleon could not even yet grasp the 
thought that his part had now been played to the end. From 
Niort, where two cavalry regiments had once more cheered him 
enthusiastically, he even entered into a correspondence with 
Generals Clauzel and Lamarque, who were in command in 
Bordeaux and the Vendee, with regard to the idea of marching 
to Paris against the traitorous government ; but at once gave it 
up as impossible. On the 3d of July the party at last reached 
Rochefort. Here there were new delays. Until the 8th Napoleon 
spent his time in long daily consultations with his suite, which 
included Councillor of State Count Las Cases, the young Montho- 
lon, General Lallement, and others, as to the best means of 
eluding the English. Various feasible plans were proposed. 
Some were for escaping in small ships. But he rejected all such 
proposals. Becker induced him with great difficulty to cross over 
to the Isle d' Aix ; here his brother Joseph came and said he had 
secured secret passage for himself at Bordeaux on an American 
ship. He offered to let Napoleon take his own berth, and pro- 
posed to act the part of his brother at Rochefort. But 



Mt. 45] Seeking Refuge in England 727 

Napoleon would not accept that either. At last news from Paris 
abruptly put an end to all further procrastination. On the 8th 
of July, one day after the entry of the Prussians into Paris, 
Louis XVIII. had returned under England's protection, and two 
days later the allied monarchs arrived. All further hesitation 
must now prove fatal to Napoleon. He entered into correspond- 
ence with the captain of the English ship Bellerophon that was 
blockading the harbour, and on receiving his assurance that he 
should be taken to England if he desired, he determined to imitate 
that Athenian who, being condemned and banished by his 
countrymen, sought and found a refuge among the Persians, 
whom he had fiercely fought. He had ended his career, he wrote 
to the Prince Regent of England ; he was coming like Themisto- 
cles to sit at the hearth of the British people, and placed himself 
under the protection of their laws. And with that he went on 
board the enemy's vessel on July 15th. 

Had Napoleon forgotten that the representative of Great 
Britain did not lag behind when the Vienna Congress pro- 
claimed him an outlaw? The admiral to whose fleet the Bellero- 
phon belonged had long had strict orders to seize his person and 
bring him to Plymouth. What was he counting on, then? 
For he certainly was counting on something. Now his mes- 
sengers, after their second interview with Captain Maitland, had 
reported his statement that the Emperor would be treated with 
attention in England, that in that country the monarch and his 
ministers exercise no arbitrary power, and the generosity of the 
people and their liberal opinions stand above sovereignty. Tliis 
is what he was counting on. But his calculations were fallacious. 
As soon as he left French soil he was no longer the guest, but the 
prisoner of the power against which he had most eagerly waged 
war. 

And in what a plight he was leaving the country to which his 
unconquerable ambition had brought him back! Conquered in 
the field, overrun by enemies, torn by parties which his return 
had definitely arrayed against each other : such was France after 
the day of Waterloo. No sooner had the news of the lost battle 
reached Provence than the royalist fury broke loose and began 



728 St. Helena [isis 

a slaughter among the Bonapartists, republicans, and Protestants 
of Marseilles, Nimes, Avignon, Toulouse and Toiilon, which did 
not fall behind the infamous scenes of the Jacobin Terror. 
Below raged the mob ; above, the Camarilla ; their victims were 
air who had yielded to the seductions of the Corsican. The 
names of those faithful to him were collected in proscription 
lists, and all who could not escape were executed. So perished 
Labedoyere, who had brought his regiment to Napoleon at 
Grenoble ; so also Ney, whom death had passed by at Waterloo, 
though he sought it in his despair. And the family whose 
various members had filled the thrones of Europe as long as the 
all-embracing sceptre of the greatest of them intimidated the 
world, who now in Plymouth roads was a spectacle for the 
gaping English, was now soon scattered in every direction, 
homeless as when it had been obliged to take flight from Ajaccio 
twenty-two years before. 

On the night of June 25th the Bellerophon put out to sea, and 
on the next morning reached the coast of England. The ship 
was kept here under strict surveillance a few days, until the gov- 
ernment at London should determine the fate of the prisoner. 
They would have much preferred to see him fall into the hands of 
Louis XVIII., to be executed as a rebel, as the British premier 
Liverpool wrote to Castlereagh July 20th. But Napoleon had 
escaped that fate, and whether they would or no they must take 
up the question of his future. Their decision was announced to 
him on the 30th. As it would be incompatible with their duties 
to England herself as well as to the allies of her king — so ran the 
announcement — if ''General Bonaparte" still had the means or 
opportunity of again disturbing the peace of Europe, it was neces- 
sary to limit his personal freedom. Accordingly the island of 
St. Helena had been appointed to be his future abode; the 
climate was healthy and the isolation of the island would permit 
of his being treated with greater consideration than would be 
possible elsewhere on account of necessary precautions. He 
was allowed to take with him three officers, a physician, and 
twelve servants, who could not, however, leave the island again 
except by permission of the English government. This was the 



Mr. 45] A Prisoner 729 

sentence. It could have been no great surprise to Napoleon, 
for the name of St. Helena had come up in the negotiations of 
the Congress; and his mind must have been prepared for the 
removal from Europe, as he had been threatened with it while 
still at Elba. So that when he now protested against the violence 
done him, when he appealed to the fact that he had come without 
constraint on to an English ship, and was therefore England's 
guest and not her prisoner, he could have had but one purpose, 
i.e., to impress public opinion in that country in his favour and 
to exercise an influence upon it that might at no distant date, if 
not immediately; loosen his fetters. We shall see him continue 
to live and act with this thought constantly before him. It was 
in vain, of course. The situation was not so simple as all that; 
it was not England alone that fixed his destiny. At the same 
time, August 2d, 1815, a treaty was signed in Paris by repre- 
sentatives of the allies, declaring Napoleon to be a prisoner of 
all the four powers which had concluded the agreement of the 
25th of March. To England was conceded only the task of 
guarding him and the choice of a place of confinement; the 
other governments reserved the right to send commissioners to 
his destination to make sure of his presence there. 

On the 7th of August Napoleon embarked in the ship of the 
line Northumberland which was to bear him to St. Helena. 
He had chosen as companions Bertrand, Las Cases, and Mon- 
tholon, but General Gourgaud also managed to gain permission 
to sail with him. They took their famihes along. Besides 
these, O^Meara ship's surgeon of the Bellerophon, accom- 
panied the Emperor. His farewell from Savary, whose com- 
pany had been expressly denied him by the British govern- 
ment, is described as deeply touching. ''You see, my lord,'' 
said Las Cases to the British admiral, 'Hhose who stay behind 
are weeping." Three days later, on August 10th, the North- 
umberland with her escort of two frigates had left the Eng- 
lish Channel, and the coast of Europe vanished from the gaze of 
the exile. 

On the 15th of October the gloomy island, with its walls of 
rock rising almost perpendicularly from the sea, came in sight. 



730 St. Helena [I815 

In its solitary harbour, Jamestown, the Northumberland cast 
anchor. The destined home of Napoleon, the farm-house 
of Longwood, was on an elevated plateau with somewhat 
cooler climate; but it was not ready for occupancy, and mean- 
time he found shelter in the neighbouring villa of ''The Briars" 
belonging to the merchant Balcombe. Here he was on most 
friendly terms with the inmates, played with the children and 
good-humouredly put up with their jokes. Not until December 
did he change his residence to Longwood. There, at some 
distance from the house, a military cordon was established, 
within which his movements were perfectly free; if he left it, 
an English officer was to accompany him. But this was not 
allowed when ships came in sight; at such times neither he 
nor any of his suite could hold any intercourse with the inhab- 
itants of the island. All letters addressed to Longwood or 
written there were subject to inspection by the Governor. This 
officer was not appointed in 1815, and Admiral Cockburn who 
was stationed in these waters, temporarily acted in that capac- 
ity. In November Napoleon entered a protest through his 
''master of the horse," Bertrand, against these precautionary 
measures, but it was returned to him because an "Emperor" 
Napoleon was referred to in it, whereas the admiral knew onl}^ 
of a "General" Bonaparte. This was the signal for a petty 
warfare between the colony of prisoners and the authorities, 
which only grew more bitter after the arrival of the new Gov- 
ernor, Sir Hudson Lowe, who began to administer office with 
a pedantic strictness that was unnecessary. He, too, disre- 
garded the title of emperor, and this course was, strictly speak- 
ing, not incorrect. For England had never acknowledged 
Napoleon's imperial dignity during his reign,* and had done so 
only temporarily while he was at Elba. She was now under no 
obligations whatever to acknowledge it after the violation of the 
treaty. t Lowe had once defended Capri against the French, how- 

* Cf. Rose, II. 490.— B. 

j- The question came up once at the end of 1816 between Napoleon and 
Admiral Malcolm (who replaced Cockburn) . When the admiral informed 
Napoleon that he could no longer be treated as a sovereign, he replied: 



i^T. 46] Napoleon at Longwood 731 

ever, and in the war of liberation had been assigned to Bliicher's 
headquarters. There he was very Hkely to hear reports not 
highly flattering to him who was now entrusted to his keeping. 
In any case he did his duty as governor, although with a moody 
reserve, without waste of words, always punctilious about his 
office, yet without the malignity that was ascribed to him in 
Longwood. 

In this low one-storied farm-house the company had estab- 
lished itself after a fashion. Napoleon had a rather plain bed- 
room with a bath, a salon with billiard-table on which he Hked 
to play, a dining-room, and an apartment that was called, in 
memory of old times, the 'topographical cabinet." In the 
same building lived also the two Las Cases, father and son, 
Montholon and his wife, and General Gourgaud; Bertrand and 
his family occupied a second house at some distance. As 
far as circumstances permitted the appearance of court life 
was zealously maintained, the ladies appearing at table in full 
dress, the Emperor wearing the great cross of the Legion of 
Honour. He divided his time between working on his memoirs, 
often dictating for hours without weariness to Las Cases, Gour- 
gaud, or Montholon ; billiards, chess, reading the English papers, 
which he had just learned to read for himself, and new books 
that were sent him. In the evening he would read aloud 
from Voltaire or Corneille, the Odyssey or the Bible, and was 
not exactly edified when one or another of the listening ladies 
quite disrespectfully fell asleep. No little time was taken up 
by the feud with Lowe. Napoleon sometimes indulged in a 
fit of unjust rage at that officer. Once he threatened to blow 
out the brains of the first man that crossed his threshold with- 
out his consent; another time he called the governor his execu- 
tioner. Finally, the latter showed himself no more, but simply 
took the English officer's report as to Napoleon's presence. 

"Why not? In my present situation these honours should be left me for 
my enjoyment. What harm can it do on this cliff?" When asked, how- 
ever, whether they were to term him Emperor, he had to answer with a 
negative, since he had abdicated, adding, however, that he had not been 
General since leaving Egypt. He proposed simply "Napoleon," and the 
Governor also finally adopted that. 



73^ St. Helena [1815-21 

In general it may be said that Napoleon was pursuing a 
definite, systematic line of action based on the hope of his ulti- 
mate deliverance. He would not flee, nor be set free by vio- 
lence. The opportunity for the latter was repeatedly held up 
to view; in particular, some of his faithful followers who had 
escaped to America and taken part in the revolt of Brazil against 
Portugal thought they might risk an attack on St. Helena 
from that quarter, and sent word to the prisoner by means of 
insertions in cipher in the English paper " The Anti-Gallican." 
But that was no part of Napoleon's plan. He was too much 
concerned about his personal safety for that. ''I could not 
be in America six months,'' he said to Montholon, ''without 
being attacked by the murderers which the royalist committees 
that returned to France in the train of Count d'Artois have 
hired against me. In America I see nothing but murder and 
oblivion, so I prefer to stay on St. Helena." " Murder and 
oblivion": he dreaded the one as much as the other. But that 
did not betoken any resignation; no, he rather looked with 
confidence for deliverance through the victory of the English 
Opposition, or through the exile of the B .urbons from France. 
When Lowe shortly after his arrival offered to have a new house 
erected for him within two years, he replied: "Ah! in two years' 
time there will be a change of ministry in England or else a 
new government in France, and I shall not be here any longer." * 
This conviction is in full accord with his twofold aim of creat- 
ing, on the one hand, a sentiment among the English in his 
favour, and of winning again, on the other, the lost confidence 
of the French. 

He thought the former would be accomplished if he succeeded 
in discrediting the official of the Tory ministry and represent- 
ing himself as the victim of unexampled arbitrariness. Hence 
every one of the regulations had the taint of suspicion thrown 
upon it, and its effect was exaggerated. The regulation for- 

* Lowe gave the French commissioner Montchenu his word of honour 
that Napoleon had uttered these words, although the latter subsequently 
denied uttering them. The new house was begun after all, and was com- 
pleted in 1820. 



^T. 46-51] His Relations with Lowe 735 

bidding long walks except under escort of an English officer 
Was met with the determination to forego exercise entirely; 
the evil consequences of this course on his health were then 
laid at the door of the Governor, who was thus depriving him 
of free movement, and of the government which permitted his 
health to be ruined in such a baleful climate. Once when 
Lowe, none too gently, perhaps, touched on the question of 
provisions. Napoleon ordered some of his silver plate to be 
broken up and sold in order to get some money; but his chief 
aim in so doing was to show to what sacrifices he was reduced 
by the parsimony of this regime. All this had to be speedily 
made known to the public. This was accomplished by the 
"Letters from the Cape of Good Hope,'^ which either he dic- 
tated or directed Las Cases to compose. They presented a 
long list of the sins of Lowe and the sufferings of those imder 
his protection. They were sent secretly to London, and ap- 
peared there in 1817, ostensibly as the production of an Eng- 
lishman.* The climate is there represented as baleful, the 
temperature hot and cold in sudden changes. And yet Na- 
poleon himself had said once to his suite confidentially that if 
one must live in exile, St. Helena was after all the best spot; 
the weather in fact was monotonous and not very healthy, 
but the temperature was mild and pleasant, t And — so ran 
the letters — ^what makes the chmate still more pernicious in 
its effects is the restraint on his movements and his intercourse 
with others which the new Governor imposed on the prisoner; 

* The "Letters from the Cape of Good Hope in reply to M. Warden, 
'Letters written from Saint Helena'" (London, Piccadilly, 1817), have been 
included in a retranslation into French as "Lettres du Cap de Bonne Es- 
p^rance," with the collected works of Napoleon in the last volume of his 
officially edited correspondence (Vol. XXX). They are addressed to a 
Lady C. and connect themselves with a book pubUshed in 1816 by Warden, 
ship's surgeon on the Northumberland. Lady C. manifestly means 
that Lady Clavering, a Frenchwoman, to whom Las Cases wanted to send 
secretly a servant picked up on the island. The latter, however, revealed 
the plan and so brought on the arrest of Las Cases and his separation from 
Napoleon. (SchUtter, ''Stiirmers Berichte," p. 49.) 

tLas Cases, "Memorial," Feb. 1, 1816. 



734 St. Helena ti8i5-2i 

and yet he is really no prisoner, as he voluntarily put himself 
under England's protection when it was still in his power to 
place himself at the head of the army and carry on the war. 
''It was the mistaken ideas Napoleon had formed of the influ- 
ence of a great, free, and generous people on its own government 
that led him to prefer the protection of the Enghsh laws to 
that of a father-in-law or of an old friend" (Alexander I.). 
This was intended for the same address as the closing sentences 
in which one can hardly fail to recognize Napoleon's style. 
''This spectacle of persecution and injustice has always roused 
my indignation. Judge of my feelings when I saw so basely 
tortured a man who had been victor in sixty battles, and once 
was the ruler of so many nations and kings. Then I said to 
myself: 'I honour thee still more with the thorny crown that 
foreign power has pressed on thy brow than with the many 
diadems that once adorned it.' " 

But this appeal proved fruitless. For as early as March, 
1817, when Lord Holland of the opposition brought Napoleon's 
charges, drawn up in a written statement by Montholon, before 
the upper house, the Lords supported the Ministry; and even 
some of Holland's own party voted against his motion to lay 
the correspondence with Lowe before ParHament for judg- 
ment. This disposed of Napoleon for the time being, and the 
"Letters from the Cape" fell flat. For although the Whigs 
urged in his favour that he alone of all men would be in a posi- 
tion at the head of France to hold the balance on the Continent 
against Great Britain's growing rival, Russia, yet the country 
was so tired of all hostilities that this reason for releasing the 
prisoner was given no weight.* On the contrary, the Liverpool- 
Castlereagh cabinet joined the Continental powers at the Con- 

* Cf. Schlitter, "Kaiser Franz I. und die Napoleoniden," p. 32. It is 
a striking coincidence that Napoleon, too, in conversation with Englishmen 
who visited him with passes from the governor and whom he never failed 
to greet in the most cordial manner, brought up the same point. For 
instance, in the summer of 1817 he said to Lord Amherst: "Russia is the 
power that is now most to be feared. France and England are the only 
nations for whose interest it is to oppose her plans." (Scott, Life of 
Napoleon, Vol. IX, Appendix IX.) 



iET. 46-51] The End Approaches 735 

gress of Aix-la-Chapelle in an agreement ''concerning the ru- 
mours, started in England and repeated in other parts of Europe, 
as to the treatment accorded the man whose ominous renown 
has not yet ceased to agitate the world." And the representa- 
tives of Russia, Austria, Prussia, and England declared in a pro- 
tocol issued on November 30, 1818, "that the stricter instruc- 
tions of the British government to Hudson Lowe meet with the 
unanimous approval of all the signatory powers"; further, 
" that all correspondence with the prisoner, any sending of money 
or other communication, which is not submitted to the inspec- 
tion of the governor, must be regarded as an attack on the 
public safety and punished accordingly." 

Thus did the Continent, hand in hand with England, Rus- 
sians side by side with the British, bring to naught Napoleon's 
hope of a favourable turn of affairs. So far he himself had 
reaped nothing but disadvantages. For Lowe, having discov- 
ered the secret correspondence with Europe and America, felt 
obHged to double his precautions. Las Cases had been arrested 
and sent away from the island as early as November, 1816, and a 
year and a half later O'Meara was treated in the same way. 
Perhaps both of these had counted on their removal in order 
to work as missionaries in the cause of the Exile.* In his petty 
warfare with the Governor Napoleon had imposed restrictions 
on himself that actually began to result in injury to his health; 
in particular, he omitted all exercise. He became seriously ill. 
The symptoms of a disease inherited from his father, cancer of 
the stomach, manifested themselves in frequent shooting pains 
and nausea. He himself was not unconscious of his condition, 
and the less so when he heard later that his oldest sister had 
died of the same disease. As he refused the services of the 
physicians recommended by the Governor, Fesch managed to 
send to St. Helena an Italian named Antommarchi, a surgeon 
of Corsican descent, who arrived in September, 1819. Acting 
on his advice, Napoleon changed his manner of life, cultivated a 
garden in which he worked every day, took rides on horseback, 

* Gourgaud, too, left him, ostensibly on account of a quarrel with 
Montholon. (Schlitter, "Stiirmers Berichte," pp. 122, 127.) 



736 St. Helena [I821 

and even made a sort of truce with the Governor. The latter 
on his part met him half-way, by extending to a range of thir- 
teen miles the territory on which his prisoner was free to come 
and go without a guard. Of what use would the feud be now? 
Public opinion in England remained unresponsive, and mean- 
time Napoleon's condition had become incurable and was grow- 
ing worse every day in spite of his change of regimen. 

On the last night of the year 1820 he for the last time talked 
in a confidential way of past events. Thenceforward his dis- 
ease had a rapid course. The restless, ever-busy man became 
faint and weary, lay in his easy chair, and had no more relish 
for any occupation, although he forced himself to dictate now 
and then and to arrange his papers. With difficulty could he 
be persuaded to go into the open air. He lost flesh perceptibly, 
as he could not retain any nourishment. His pulse, which had 
never been higher than sixty to sixty-five, now became feverish. 
Antommarchi having made an incorrect diagnosis, the patient 
was not satisfied and asked for an older and more experienced 
physician from the Paris Clinic. But before his wish could 
reach the Continent he had ceased to live. On the 15th of 
April, after an English army surgeon had perceived the critical 
condition of the prisoner, he dictated his testament to Montho- 
lon. In this he distributed among his most faithful followers 
the six million francs which had been deposited with the Paris 
banker Laffitte before his departure from Malmaison; also 
various relics. Soon after, the fits of vomiting grew so fre- 
quent that death was to be looked for at any moment as a con- 
sequence of a sudden failing of strength. On the 3d of May 
his mind, which had remained clear until then, began to wander. 
Two days later began the death-struggle, and on the evening of 
the 5th of May, 1821, at ten minutes before six o'clock, he died. 
After the autopsy, which was performed at his own request, the 
body was embalmed and clad in the uniform which the Emperor 
had been wont to wear; he was then buried not far from Long- 
wood. The cannons of St. Helena saluted the dead enemy, 
and Great Britain's officers stood in profound reverence about 
his fresh grave. 



Mr. 51] Shaping History 737 

The historian of Napoleon I. is not yet at liberty to lay aside 
his pen, now that the eyes of that extraordinary man have lost 
forever their fires of genius. He has still to reckon with a wealth 
of literary remains on which he must pass judgment, especially 
as they constitute an appeal to the memory of coming genera- 
tions. For only the last struggle with death put an end to his 
unceasing efforts to establish his prestige; and nowhere, per- 
haps, was he more indefatigable in these efforts than on the 
rocky island in the Atlantic. We have seen how constantly 
he busied himself in trying to turn opinion in England in his 
favour. This was the purpose of the ''Letters from the Cape," 
and every conversation with English visitors had the same 
end in view. But we have also seen him pursuing another goal : 
the French, and they above all, should recover their faith in 
him when they had once thrown off the yoke of the Bourbons. 
To gain this end he was untiring in his activity from the moment 
he set foot on the Northumberland. The works which he dic- 
tated, on board ship and afterwards at The Briars and Long- 
wood, sometimes wdth excessive haste as if to make up for lost 
time, and the interviews with his faithful followers, whose duty 
it was to give wddest publicity to his words — all these served this 
one end. First of all his fame as a general must be regarded 
as without a blemish. Hence he rubbed and scrubbed away at 
the blot of Waterloo, until he made it appear that it was not 
Napoleon who lost that battle but Grouchy, who, although 
sent after the Prussians to Wavre ( ! ), rendered the success of 
Ligny nugatory by his poorly conducted operations. And the 
fact that that success was not more decisive, so that Bliicher 
was ready to fight again two days later, was not all Napoleon's 
fault; it was the fault of Ney, who did not advance rapidly 
enough on the 16th of June despite urgent orders. No wonder 
that the brilliant plans of the Emperor came to naught under 
such circumstances!* This was what Napoleon dictated, and 

* Compare, e.g., with the facts now established, as stated briefly in 
the foregoing chapter, the following passage in Napoleon's ''Campagne 
de 1815" : "Marshal Grouchy started away mth the cavalry of Excelman 
and Pajol, the third and fourth infantry corps, and Teste's division of the 



738 St. Helena [I821 

his officers wrote it down. This was the reward of his vahant 
followers: of Grouchy, who was racking his brains in America, 
thinking how he could free his master from captivity; of Ney, 
who, almost ere his body was under the sod, was thus calum- 
niated by the very man for whom he suffered death. The 
manuscript of the ''Campagne de 1815'" was smuggled into 
Europe as secretly as the "Letters from the Cape," and was 
published in 1818 Gourgaud was named as the author, yet 
every line betrays the true author. Well, it accomplished its 
end, and did it so completely that even several decades later 
historians of distinction accepted blindly the representations 
of the captive. But other failures of his on the battlefield had 
to be glossed over. In Russia, the war against which grew "out 
of a misunderstanding," he told O'Meara, the premature cold 
was to blame for the misfortune of his army. He had made a 
careful examination of the weather records for fifty years back, 
and found that the severest cold never began before the 20th of 
December, that is, twenty days later than in 1812. With the 
thermometer at —18° Reaumur* 30,000 horses "perished in a 
single night. The artillery, ammunition, and provisions could no 
longer be transported, no reconnoissances were possible; as a 
consequence the troops fell into disorder. In the battle on the 
Moskwa he fought with 90,000 men, the Russians with 250,000; 
in the burning metropolis he risked his life in the flames, scorched 
his hair and eyebrows and clothes, etc. All this was received 
and written down with credence, and soon afterwards given 
to the world as the truth of history. 

By the way. Napoleon also dictated various other matters: 
the narrative of the beginnings of his mihtary career, his share 
in the siege of Toulon and in the Italian wars, his expedition 
into Egypt, the campaign of 1800; in short, all his achievements 

sixth. His orders were to follow on the heels of the Prussian army and 
prevent its rallying, and he was explicitly charged to keep himself always 
between the Charleroi-Brussels road and Marshal Bliicher, in order to be 
in constant touch with the army and ready at any time to join it. It was 
probable that Marshal Bliicher would retire to Wavre ; he was to be there 
at the same time." Was there ever a bolder perversion of the truth? 
* About 9° below zero, Fahrenheit. 



iET. 51] The Napoleonic Legend 739 

in the service of the Revolution. But nothing else. Why was 
this? Why not relate his great exploits at Austerlitz and Jena, 
at Friedland and in Bavaria? Did death cut short the thread 
of his narrative? Not that, for we know that in the last years 
he composed works on military history iii which he passed 
judgment on the deeds of Caesar, Turenne, and Frederick the 
Great, and all of which are preserved. What could have de- 
terred him from telling more and still greater deeds of his own? 
A simple line of reasoning, which had already been his guide 
when he escaped from Elba: it was the Revolution which was 
to expel the Bourbons, and he was the man of the Revolution; 
just see how he fought for it; none better. Not a word, there- 
fore, of the time when he himself ruled France as an autocrat; 
not a word of the wars of conquest on which he was to found 
his universal empire and which roused all Europe against liim. 
Everything was Liberty and universal Peace, that was the trend 
of his labours To be sure, occasionally a discordant note 
might steal in; as, for example, when Montholon reports a con- 
versation with an Enghsh officer in which Napoleon said that 
the less Hberty monarchs wished to give, the more assiduously 
they must speak of it, for the iron rod with which men are 
ruled must be gilded. But such slips were rare. In general 
a single theme monopoHzes all these conversations: the Bour- 
bons will be driven away, because they represent only a royalty 
of the nobles and the priests, not of the people, but the latter 
cannot afford to snatch at rule for itself, France is secured from 
such a step by her memories of the Terror under the Convention 
and of the pitiable failure of the Directory; her only safety Hes 
in a popular monarchy. '^ Under a monarchical system of gov- 
ernment," said Napoleon to his suite in the summer of 1816, 
'*the rule of my dynasty can alone furnish guarantees for the 
true interests of the people, for it is the creation of the people.'' 
When he said this he was still full of hope for himself. Five 
years later, but two weeks before his death, he gave utterance 
to the same thought ; but this time it was only in the interest 
of his son. '^ The Bourbons/' he said, 'Svill not hold out. After 
my death a reaction in my favour will set in, even in England. 



740 



St, Helena [1821 



After some civil disturbances my son will come to the throne. 
Great things are accomplished in France only when one leans 
on the masses. My son must be a man of the new ideas and 
represent the cause I made to prevail everywhere; he must 
carry out everywhere the new ideas, which obliterate the traces 
of the feudal system, make secure the dignity of man and develop 
the seeds of happiness that have been lying dormant for ages; 
he must bestow upon the people at large what has hitherto been 
the privileged possession of the few; he must unite Europe in 
the bonds of an indissoluble federation and spread the benefits 
of Christian civilization in all the still uncivilized portions of 
the globe. That must be the goal of all my son's thoughts, 
that is the cause for which I die a martyr. Let him take the 
hate with which oligarchs pursue me as a measure of the sacred- 
ness of my cause." 

His works, dictations, and judgments were intended to raise 
his image above the rude reality of facts into an ideal sphere, 
and it was the same result that he sought to accomplish also 
by his testament, always looking forward to the future of his 
dynasty in France and always with the same contempt for 
truth. In that document we read: ''I wish my ashes to rest 
on the banks of the Seine, in the midst of the French people 
that I have so dearly loved." And farther on: ''I recom- 
mend to my son never to forget that he is a born French prince, 
and never to permit himself to be used as a tool in the hands of 
the three rulers who are oppressing the nations of Europe. He 
must never fight against France, never injure her in any way; he 
must adopt my motto: 'Everything for the French people.'" 
Nay, more: to avoid hurting any of the feelings sacred to the 
people, he, the unbeliever, sent for priests to come to St. Helena 
and pray by his bier; and in his testament he wrote: "I die 
in the apostolic and Roman religion in which I was born more 
than fifty years ago." * But if there were any Frenchmen who 

* We are told that on the night of the 21st of April he received the 
sacrament, and even that he confessed, as Beauteme declares in his book, 
"Sentiments religieux de Napoleon"; but the testimony for this is not 
authentic. He did indeed ask for the Abb^ Vignali about one o'clock in the 



iET. 51] Napoleon's Injunctions to Historians 741 

found the execution of the Duke d'Enghien incompatible with 
the principles of religion, they were to learn from the testament 
of St. Helena 'Hhat it was necessary for the safety, the in- 
terest, and the honour of the French people at a time when 
the Count d'Arto's had on his own confession sixty assassins 
in his pay,*' the same Count d'Artois who was afterwards to 
become king of France as Charles X. 

Such was the intellectual legacy of the Emperor, his ambi- 
tion resorting on the very verge of the tomb to means of gratify- 
ing itself that are not permissible. And it was abundantly 
successful. When the reign of Louis XVIII. ended and that of 
his brother began, of which every honest Frenchman was 
ashamed; when, later, a new revolution only resulted in replac- 
ing a policy of folly with one of self-seeking commercialism: 
then the seed sown at St. Helena in the soil of France, deeply 
furrowed as it was by hatred and dissatisfaction, suddenly 
sprouted. The best poets of the nation clothed the legend, still 
young, in the garb of verse, and so powerfully did the memory 
of the glorious days of a greater ruler thrill all hearts that even 
the historian with his serious mission was carried along by the 
current. It really seemed as if historians of his reign had fol- 
lowed Napoleon's own precept. "A French historian who 
desires to depict the empire," he said once in 1816, — and his 

morning of the 21st; in this agree the only two sources we have for the last 
days, the diaries of Month ol on and Antommarchi. But the physician was 
present at the interview with the priest, in which Napoleon only said that 
he wanted to perform the duties prescribed in the Catholic religion, and to 
receive its consolations; he then requested him to read mass in the next 
room daily (it was read only on Sundays up to that time), to elevate the 
Host, to celebrate the mass at the head of his body when dead, and perform 
all the other customary ceremonies. On the 3d of May, as his mind 
began to wander, Vignali when alone with him gave him extreme unction, 
and reported the act to the others waiting in the adjoining room. That is 
all that can be ascertained with some definiteness ; unless, indeed, a 
remark of Napoleon's to Antommarchi be cited as evidence that he had 
abandoned his former sceptical views. "Not every one is an atheist who 
would like to be one," is his reported rebuke of the doubter. But these 
words are preserved for us only by Montholon and not by the man to whom 
they were addressed. 



742 St. Helena [i82i 

words went over the world,^ — ''will, if he is courageous, give 
full credit to the good I have done. I closed the crater of an- 
archy and brought order out of chaos. I purified the Revolution 
of its defilement, ennobled the peoples, and established the kings. 
I have awakened all ambitions everywhere, rewarded all merit, 
and enlarged the borders of glory. That is something, surely. 
And at what point can I be attacked without the historian 
finding means to defend me? In my aims? There he knows 
enough to acquit me. Or in my despotism? Then he will 
show that the dictatorship was a necessity. Should it be said 
that I impeded liberty, he will point out that license, anarchy, 
and disorder were still at the door. Should I be accused of 
having loved war too much, he will demonstrate that I was never 
the aggressor. Should I be censured for desiring universal 
empire for myself, he will show that that was the product of cir- 
cumstances and how my enemies drove me to it step by step. 
Or, finally, is my ambition the culprit?' Well, he will doubtless 
find plenty of it in me, but it is of the highest and most exalted 
character, the ambition to establish and to consecrate, in short 
the reign of reason and the free exercise of all human capacity. 
And the only regret of the historian will be that such an ambi- 
tion failed of its full reahzation." * 

That was the watchword for the historian, and so resolutely 
rang out the words of command of the immortal general that he 
was obeyed for whole decades after his death. The time came — 
it was in 1840 — when his body was brought in triumph to Paris 
and deposited under the dome of the Invalides; and a minister, 
of Louis Phihppe spoke of him in the Chamber of Deputies in the 
following terms: ''He was emperor and king, the legitimate 
sovereign of this land; as such he might rest in Saint-Denis. 
But he is entitled to more than the usual burial-place of kings." 
Nay, the hour came when the legend of St. Helena itself mounted 
the throne of France ; but when the rule of Napoleon III. proved 
incapable of maintaining what the carefully fostered Bonaparte 
tradition had so lavishly promised, then, and not until then, 
did the science of history at last come into its rights. 

* Las Cases, Memorial, May 1, 1816. 



^T. 51] The Truth of History 743 

Among the precepts which the prisoner at Longwood left for 
the guidance of him for whom he thought to prepare the way, 
and whose early end he did not divine, is the following: "May 
my son often study history and refiect on it, for it is the only 
true philosophy." 

To be sure, but only when it is true history. 



BIBLIOGEAPHY 



PREFATORY NOTE 

In preparing this bibliography the French edition of Foumier's work 
has been followed for the first two volumes (all that has appeared), as 
it contains many titles not mentioned in the German original. So far 
as has been practicable the existence of English translations of works in 
French and German has been indicated by the editor. The titles in 
the sections appended to Foumier's lists have been compiled mainly from 
Kircheisen, Bibliography of Napoleon, Leipzig and London, 1903. A 
list of the principal memoirs, etc., published since Foumier wrote follows 
the bibliography to Chapter XXI. 

E. G. B. 

CHAPTER I 

The Bonapartes in Corsica. Napoleon's Birth and Early Training 

Among the earlier works on the youth of Napoleon three may be 
mentioned in which the authors have drawn from the sources: Coston, 
Biographie des premieres annees de Napoleon-Bonaparte, Paris, 1840; 
Libri, Souvenirs de la jeunesse de Napoleon, Revue des Deux Mondes 
de 1842; Nasica, Memoires sur Tenfance et la jeunesse de Napoleon I<^'', 
jusqu'^ Fage de 23 ans, 1851. These writers are all somewhat prepos- 
sessed in Napoleon's favour. Of those hostile to Napoleon, Lanfrey 
may be named, Histoire de Napoleon P^ [Eng. tr.]. On the early 
years he is not sufficiently thorough. The first attempt to give some- 
thing new was made by Boehtlingk in Napoleon Bonaparte, seine Jugend 
und sein Emporkommen bis zum 13. Vend^miaire, Jena, 1877; 2d edition, 
not revised, Leipzig, 1883. Next comes Jung in his Bonaparte et son 
temps, 1769-1799, d'apres les documents inedits, Paris, 1880-81 [2d 
ed., 1880-1883]. The author furnishes authentic data, taken from the 
archives of the war department, and in many respects restores to order 
the chronological disorder that prevails in Coston and the authors who 
follow him. For the genealogy of the Bonapartes consult: Reumont, 
Beitrage zur italienischen Geschichte, IV, The schoolmates of Napoleon 

745 



746 Bibliography 

whom we mention are Bourrienne, who speaks of the stay at Brienne 
in his Memoires, 1st vol. [in English in many editions. Latest ed. 
by Phipps, London, 1893], and a writer signing himself C. H., who pub- 
lished in London in 1797 "Some account of the early years of Bonaparte 
at the military school of Brienne." The same work appeared in French 
trans, by Bourgoing: Quelques notices sur les premieres ann^es de 
Bonaparte, Paris, an VI. Read also: Traits caracteristiques de la jeu- 
nesse de Bonaparte, Leipzig, 1802. The Memoires of Lucien Bonaparte 
(published by Jung, Paris, 1882, volume first) give some details of the 
childhood of Napoleon ; S6gur, in Histoire et Memoires, speaks of the stay 
at the military school. For what Napoleon himself reported about the 
years of his youth, see among others; Mme. de R^musat, Memoires, I. p. 
267 and following [Eng. tr. 1894], the memoranda of Las Cases [Eng. 
tr. 1823, many eds.], and of Montholon [Eng. tr. 1846] at St. Helena, 
and Antommarchi, Les derniers moments de Napoleon. Some letters 
relating to this period will be found in Du Casse, Supplement a la corre- 
spondance de Napoleon I^^, Paris, 1887. Napoleon's early writings are 
found, in part, in Paul Lacroix, OEuvres politiques et litteraires de Napo- 
leon P'", Paris, 1840, in Kermoysan, Napoleon, 1853, and Martel, (Euvres 
litteraires de Napoleon I^^ 1st vol., 1888. 

As to the date of Napoleon's birth, it was asserted while he was still 
alive that he made himself out a year younger than he was (see the 
article Bonaparte in the "Biographic universelle" byMichaud). Boeht- 
lingk has repeated the assertion without furnishing sufficient proofs. 
Jung was the first to raise serious objections to the date, August 15, 
1769. He in fact produced a certificate from the records of civil status of 
Corte, according to which one Nabulione Buonaparte was baptized the 
8th of January, 1768. The same document reappears almost identi- 
cally — there is no difference but the name of Joseph, hardly Italian, 
placed before Nabulione — in the archives of Ajaccio, as being the cer- 
tificate of baptism of Joseph Bonaparte. Finally, Jung quotes Napo- 
leon's marriage certificate, in which the bridegroom is entered as 
having been born the 5th of February, 1768. Relying on these proofs, 
he tries to show that Napoleon was the eldest of the children of Charles 
Bonaparte, having been born in 1768, and that the father produced, 
not the certificate of his baptism, but that of Joseph, to prove that he 
was not more than ten years old, the age limit for entrance at the school 
of Brienne. There are a good many objections to this: first, there is 
in the archives of the war department, at Paris, a certificate of baptism 
drawn up on the 21st of July, 1771, to the effect that that day a son of 
Carlo Bonaparte, bom the 15th of August, 1769, was baptized and received 
the name of Napoleone. Second, in July, 1776, Charles Bonaparte, in 
his petition, asked for a scholarship in one of the royal schools for his 
two eldest sons. He must have indicated exactly the age of the children, 
and must have added to his petition the certificates of bapti m, and in fact 
there is in the archives of the war department a certified extract from the 



Bibliography 747 

certificate of baptism, witnessed June 23, 1776, of Napoleon, born "August 
15, 1769." The consideration of this request lasted years; the minister of 
war had inquiries made, demanded proofs of nobility and other things 
of that kind; at last, in 1779, in accordance with the rules, a scholarship 
was granted to one of the children, the one who was bom in 1769. How 
could the father, while his petition and all the documents relating to it 
were in the minister's portfolios, get a chance to substitute the certifi- 
cate of Napoleon's baptism for that of Joseph — that is, falsify both the 
documents? But previously, at the time of sending in the request, in 
1776, there was no reason for making this substitution. Finally, at the 
ministry, relying on the certificates of baptism, they gave the scholar- 
ship to the younger of the two children, who alone could claim it, and 
they kept the record that fixed the date of his birth. This younger son 
was Napoleon, and that is why the extract from the certificate of his 
birth is still preserved in the documents of the case in Paris. 

In the official list — of January 23, 1779 — of young Corsicans who 
were in the military schools, is found, with regard to the school at Tiron, 
in which Napoleon was to have been put at first, this statement: "Napo- 
leon de Buonaparte, born August 15, 1769. He was accepted at the nomi- 
nation of the 31st of last December and was not to be received until he 
should have given proofs of his nobility." Archives historiques, artis- 
tiques et litteraires, December 1, 1889. It can no longer be maintained 
that Napoleon was born in the year 1768, without admitting that it 
was not only the certificate of Joseph's birth, but also Joseph himself 
that was substituted. This hypothesis has found some defenders, see 
Jung, I. p. 50, H6risson, Le Cabinet noir, p. 123, only the objection will 
undoubtedly be made that it was scarcely possible that such a substitu- 
tion could have taken place in the house of the representative of the Cor- 
sican nobility at which the royal governor was a visitor every day. If 
it be urged that later Charles Bonaparte's sons furnished incorrect cer- 
tificates of baptism, the answer to be made is that this happened be- 
tween 1793 and 1796, and that at that time it was not possible for any 
one to procure extracts from the Corsican registers, for the island was 
at war with the mother country, and that it was necessary to be satis- 
fied with the somewhat vague testimony of some fellow countrymen. 
See also, on the subject of Joseph's seniority, the recollections of M6ne- 
val, in his book Napoleon et Marie-Louise, II. p. 194 [Eng. trans, by 
Sherard, London, 1894], and the 2d volume of the Memoires de Lucien 
Bonaparte published by Jung. Jung, however, has not stated his hypoth- 
esis without making certain reservations. 

[The most important general biographies of Napoleon that have 
appeared in English since Foumier wrote are : W. M. Sloane, Life of Napo- 
leon Bonaparte, 4 vols.. New York, 1896, and J. H. Rose, Life of Napo- 
leon I., 2 vols., London and New York, 1902, 

On Napoleon's birth and early training: A. Chuquet, La Jeunesse de 
Napoleon, Paris, 1897, vol. I., Brienne. F. Masson, Napoleon inconnu, 



748 Bibliography 

Paris, 1895. Contains all the authentic early writings of Napoleon. F. 
Masson, Napoleon et sa famiUe, 2 vols., 1769-1804, Paris, 1897-98. Larrey, 
Mme. Mere (Napoleonis mater), essai historique, 2 vols., Paris, 1892. 
Tschudi, The Mother of Napoleon, trans, fr. the Norwegian, London, 
1900. J. Colin, L'Education militaire de Napoleon, Paris, 1900. A. 
Foumier, Zur Textkritik der Korrespondenz Napoleons I., Vienna, 1903.] 

CHAPTER II 
The Revolution. Napoleon's Corsican Adventures. 1789-1793 

On Napoleon's activities in Corsica, principally Jung, Napoleon et son 
temps, and Lucien Bonaparte et ses memoires, 1775-1840, Paris, 1882, 
1st and 2d volumes. What he says, moreover, will serve to rectify cer- 
tain details of the elaborate discussion of Boehtlingk. Next, Bianchi, 
Lettere inedite de P. Paoli, 1790-1795, in the "Rassegna Settimanale, " 
December, 1881, eleven letters addressed to Baretti, consul at Leghorn. In 
the very short biography of Pozzo di Borgo in the "Russ. hist. Sbornik," 
II. p. 158 ff., one finds very little information, and the dates in 
it are not exact. See besides the earlier works mentioned before, 
especially Coston. In the years following there was obviously a de- 
sire to pass over the Corsican period of Napoleon's life in silence. In 
a Histoire de Bonaparte, Premier Consul, depuis sa naissance jusqu'^ la 
paix de Luneville, a work obviously inspired, that appeared in 1802, we 
read, for example, on the twentieth page : " All the time that passed from 
the dawn of the Revolution to the famous epoch of the siege of Toulon, 
in December, 1793, was devoted by Napoleon to instructing himself in 
military tactics, which he studied in peace and in obscurity, for until 
the siege of Toulon he lived so to speak unknown." 

[Masson, Napoleon inconnu; Chuquet, La jeunesse de Napoleon, vol. II, 
La revolution, Paris, 1898; Baron J. du Teil, Napoleon Bonaparte et les 
g^n^raux Du Teil, 1788-1894, L'ecole d'artillerie d'Auxonne et le siege 
de Toulon, Paris, 1897. General works: Lavisse et Rambaud, Histoire 
g^n^rale de I'Europe, vol. VIII, "La Revolution frangaise"; Aulard, 
L'Histoire politique de la Revolution fran9aise, Paris, 1901.] 

CHAPTER III 

The Siege of Toulon and the Defence of the Convention. 1793-1795 

From this point the Correspondance de Napoleon I., published under 
the auspices of Napoleon III., becomes an important source. It begins 
with some letters written in the late autumn of 1793, before the siege 
of Toulon. Napoleon's correspondence, as we know, was subjected to 
a thorough sifting before its publication, and since, that is to say from 
1856, there have been constant rumours of papers of the first emperor 
that are said to have been destroyed. 



Bibliography 749 

The gaps, however, in the Correspondance may be filled in part by 
turning to the M^moires de Joseph Bonaparte published by Du Gasse 
[Eng. tr. of the letters in these M^moires as (Confidential Correspondence 
of Napoleon Bonaparte with his brother Joseph, etc., New York, 1856], 
to those of Bourrienne, and to the oflficial documents furnished by Coston 
and by Jung. Other sources are: the ffiuvres de Napoleon in the Cor- 
respondance, XXIX; the Memoires attributed to Robespierre's sister; 
those of Marmont, which give (I. p. 120) Dugommier's report of the siege 
of Toulon; of Doulcet de Pont^coulant; of Hyde de Neuville, and those of 
the Duchess d'Abrantfes (wife of Junot) [Eng. tr. Familiar Memoirs, Lon- 
don, 1835]. Upon the different phases of party politics the following 
may be consulted with profit: Louis Blanc, Histoire de la Revolution 
franxjaise, vols. XI, XII; Sybel, Geschichte der Revolutionszeit [Eng. tr. 
by Perry, London, 1867]; Mortimer-Temaux, Histoire de la Terreur; 
H. Taine, Les origines de la France contemporaine, la Revolution, III 
[Eng. tr. by Durand]; H61ie, Les Constitutions de la France; C. Rousset, 
Les volontaires de 1791-1794. La Correspondance de Mallet du Pan 
avec la cour de Vienne, 1794-1798 (2 volumes), published by Andr6 
Michel, contains nothing with regard to Napoleon at the time of the 13th 
of Vend^miaire, except a very short notice to the effect that he was a " Cor- 
sican terrorist." It would seem from this that it was not till the Italian 
campaign that his name became known to the general public. A reminis- 
cence of Mme. de Rdmusat further confirms us in our supposition. She 
says (Memoires, I. p. 142) : *' I know that my mother was astonished that 
the widow of M. de Beauharnais should have married a man so little 
known." 

[P. Cottin, Toulon et les Anglais en 1793, d'apres des documents 
inedits, Paris, 1898; Chuquet, La jeunesse de Napoleon, vol. Ill, Toulon, 
Paris, 1899; Spencer Wilkinson, Napoleon, the First Phase, Owens Col- 
lege Historical Essays, London, 1902; the text of the Constitution of 
1795 in English in Roelker, The Constitutions of France, Boston, 1848.] 



CHAPTER IV 

Josephine. 1796 

On society and the salons after the Terror, see: Goncourt, Histoire de 
la Society frangaise sous le Directoire, and especially the works of a German 
scholar, Adolph Schmidt, Tableaux de la Revolution frangaise and Pariser 
Zustande wahrend der Revolutionszeit, remarkable volumes upon which 
iare based a large number of French books that are at present under- 
mining the revolutionary legend. On Napoleon before his marriage, see 
the Memoires of Joseph, of Bourrienne, the picture that Stendhal makes 
of the year 1795 in his Vie de Napoleon, and last Hochschild, Desir^e, 
reine de Sii^de, 1889. On Josephine: Napoleon I et Josephine, lettres 
authentiques [for Eng. trans, see Hall, below], 2 vols., Paris, 1833; then 



750 Bibliography 

the Memoires sur Josephine et ses contemporains by Mile. Ducrest, the 
memoirs of Dufort de Cheverny and of Mme. de R€musat; Aubenas, 
Histoire de Timperatrice Josephine, 2 vols., Paris, 1858-59 (an apology). 
It was on the basis of this publication and of original documents 
published later that Imbert de Saint-Amand wrote his - Jeunesse de 
Fimperatrice Josephine, Paris, 1884. This, however, is the work of 
a literary man and essayist rather than of an historian. We mention 
also the article Josephine in the " Biographie universelle " by Michaud. 
The Memoires of Josephine, which appeared in 1827, are apocryphal 
[Eng. tr. by J. M. Howard, Phil., 1848]. The letters in which Napoleon 
complains of the unfaithfulness of Josephine do not appear in the Cor- 
respondance. The letter to Joseph, mentioned by us, does not appear 
except as an extract from Coston and in the Memoires du roi Joseph. It 
has not been published in full except by Pertz in the " Abhandlungen der 
Berliner Akademie," 1861, p. 221, and in Du Casse, Les rois freres de 
Napoleon, p. 8. 

[J. Turquan, La gonerale Bonaparte — L'imperatrice Josephine, 2 vols., 
Paris, 1895, 1896, Josephine de Beauharnais, 1763-1796; F. Masson, Jose- 
phine de Beauharnais, 1763-1796 — Josephine, imperatrice et reine, 2 vols., 
Paris, 1899, 1900; H. F. Hall, Napoleon's Letters to Josephine, 1796- 
1812, for the first time collected and translated, London, 1901; J. S. C. 
Abbott, Confidential Correspondence of the Emperor Napoleon and the 
Empress Josephine, etc.,, etc., New York, 1856; F. Masson, Napoleon et 
les femmes, vol. I, Paris, 1893, Eng. trans., London, 1894; A. L^vy, 
Napoleon intime, Paris, 1893, Eng. trans, by Simeon as Private Life of 
Napoleon, London, 1894; Bondois, Napoleon et la society de son temps, 
Paris, 1895.] 



CHAPTER V 

The Campaigns in Italy and the Peace of Campo Formic. 179fr-1797 

For the history of the campaigns of 1796-1797 the chief source from 
which we have drawn is the Correspondance, both the official edition 
of the letters and the earlier edition, Correspondance inedite, officielle et 
confidentielle de Napoleon Bonaparte [ed. by Beauvais, Paris, 1809-1820]. 
To complete it, several important documents may be found in Hueffer, 
Ungedruckte Briefe Napoleons aus den Jahren 1796 et 1797 (Archiv 
fiir ocsterreichische Geschichte, XLIX) [Vienna, 1872], which relates es- 
pecially to the diplomatic negotiations of the summer of 1797. [In English 
there is "A Selection from the Letters and Despatches of the First Napo- 
leon," D. A. Bingham, 3 vols., London, 1884.] Further, the memoires of Mar- 
mont, Mass^na, Landrieux (these last in the Revue du cercle militaire, 
1887), Desgenettes. Consult also the earlier technical writings of Clause- 
witz, Jomini [Eng. tr. by Halleck, New York, 1864], Ruestow, Lossau, and 
the recent book by Yorck von Wartenburg, Napoleon als Feldherr, 



Bibliography 75 1 



first vol., Berlin, 1885 [Eng. tran--., London, 1902], and Malachowski's 
pamphlet, t^ber die Entwicklung der leitenden Gedanken zur ersten Cam- 
pagne Bonapartes. Vortrag, Berlin, 1884, and Hans Delbrueck, Uber 
den Unterschied der Strategie Friedrichs des Grossen und Napoleons 
historische und politische Aufsatze, 1887. Up to the present time we 
have no complete history of the events of the war during those years, 
written after a thorough study of the documents of the archives of the 
war department [yet see below]. Certain episodes have been treated 
by Pellet, Bonaparte en Toscane en 1796, Revue bleue, 1887; Pierron, 
Les m^thodes de guerre actuelles, appendix Litta Biumi, Delia battaglia 
de Montenotte, Milano, 1846; Corte, Battaglia di S. Michele et Mondovi, 
Torino, 1846; Sforza, Sull' occupazione di Massa di Lunigiano da Fran- 
zesi nel 1796, lettere d'un giacobino, Lucca, 1880; Kappelin, Bataille de 
Castiglione; the same, Bataille de S.-Georges, Paris, 1843; and Relation 
de la bataille d'Arcole, Paris, 1810; von Rothenburg, Die Schlacht bei 
Rivoli, Leipzig, 1845; Belloc, Bonaparte et les Grecs, Paris, 1826; Anto- 
nopoiilos, Bonaparte et la Grece, "Nouvelle Revue," 1889. On Venice: 
Romanin, Storia documentata di Venezia; Dandolo, La caduta della 
republica di Venezia, 1855; Bonnal, La chute d'une republique, Paris, 
1885. The memoirs of Manin, last doge of Venice, are deposited in the 
archives of that city. For the events of which Paris was the theatre and 
which are connected with those of the war, see the memoirs of Camot, 
of Lar^vellifere-Lepeaux, Paris, 1895, the recollections and the corre- 
spondence of Mallet du Pan, the memoirs of Bourrienne, of Mathieu 
Dumas [Eng. tr., London, 1839], and of Hyde de Neuville; then the reports 
of Bayard, October, 1796, on the internal condition of France, in Bail- 
leti, Preussen und Frankreich, 1795-1797, I; Barb^Marbois, Journal d'un 
deporte; Dufort de Chevemy, Memoires; Lacretelle, Dix ans d'epreuves; 
Barante, Souvenirs; also the newspapers, the "Moniteur" and the "Re- 
dacteur" (organ of the Directory). Among the narrative histories the 
following are authorities: Von Sybel, Geschichte der Revolutionszeit, 
IV, fourth edition; Jung, Bonaparte, etc., Ill, gives some new informa- 
tion; Boehtlingk, Napoleon Bonaparte, 2d vol., and Taine, Les origines 
de la France contemporaine. La Revolution, III [Eng. tr. by Durand]. 
new points of view. On the foreign policy see : H. Hiiffer, Osterreich und 
Preussen gegeniiber der franzosischen Revolution bis zum Friedea von 
Campo-Formio, and the articles by A. Sorel, in the "Re\Tje historique," 
especially in the 17th and 18th volumes and in the number for Novem- 
ber, 1885. For certain special subjects: Sciout, Le Directoire et la Repub- 
lique Romaine ("Revue des questions historiques, 1886"); the same, 
Pie VI, le Directoire et le grand due de Toscane (ibidem); the same. La 
Republique frangaise et la R6publique de Genes (ibid., 1889) ; Boulay de 
la Meurthe, Quelques lettres de Marie Caroline, Reine des Deux-Siciles 
(Revue d'histoire diplomatique, 1888); and Amtliche Sammlung von 
Akten aus der Zeit der helvetischen Republik, vol. I, 1886. 

[H. H. Sargent, Napoleon Bonaparte's First Campaign, London, 1895; 



7^2 Bibliography 

A. Sorel, Bonaparte et Hoche en 1797, Paris, 1896; A. Sorel, L'Europe 
et la Revolution frangaise, V^"^® partie. Bonaparte et le Directoire, 
1795-1799, Paris, 1903; J. Colin, Etudes sur la campagne de 1796-97 en 
Italic, Paris, 1897; F. Bouvier, Bonaparte en Italic, 1796, Paris, 1899; 
G. Fabry, Histoire de Tarmee d'ltalie, 1796-97, 3 vols., Paris, 1900, 
1901, pub. under the supervision of the historical section of the Gen- 
eral Staff; J. H. Rose, cd., Col. T. Graham's Despatches on the Italian 
Campaign of 1796-97, "Eng. Hist. Rev.," vol. XIV, 111-124, 321-331 ; 
Kuhl, Bonapartes erster Feldzug, der Ausgangspunkt moderne Kricg- 
fiihrung, Berlin, 1902; L. Sciout, Le Directoire, Paris, 1895, 2 vols.; 
C. Tivaroni, Storia del risorgimento Italiano, vol. II, 2 parts. L'ltalia 
durante il dominio francese 1789-1815, Turin, 1889-1890; P. Gaffarel, 
Bonaparte et les republiques italiennes, 1796-1799, Paris, 1894; E. 
Gachot, Histoire Militaire de Massena, 1st vol., La premiere campagne 
d'ltalie, 1795 a 1798, Paris, 1901; M. Herbette, Une Ambassade Turque 
sous le Directoire, Paris, 1902; The Dropmore Papers, vol. Ill, Eng. 
Hist. MSS. Com., Report on the MSS. of J. B. Fortescue, Esq., preserved 
at Dropmore, London, 1899.] 

CHAPTER VI 
Egypt. 1798-1799 

Upon the attitude maintained by Napoleon during the winter of 
1797-1798 until his departure for Toulon our information is still inade- 
quate. There are the Memoires of Barras, ed. by G. Duruy, 4 vols., 
Paris, 1895-1896 [Eng. tr. by C. E. Roche, 4 vols., London, 1895-96]; the 
Memoires of Talleyrand, ed. by the Due de Broglie, 5 vols., Paris, 1891- 
92 [Eng. tr. by A. Hall, 5 vols., London, 1891-92]. Those of Lar^vel- 
lifere-Lepeaux are not very trustworthy. 

In addition there are the recollections of Mathieu Dumas [Eng. tr. 
1839], Thibaudeau, Miot de Mglito [Eng. tr. New York, 1881],Bourrienne 
[Eng. tr.], the Considerations sur la Revolution frangaise by Mme. de 
Stael (II) [Eng. tr. London, 1821], the reports of the Prussian envoy to 
Paris, Sandoz Rollin, published lately by Bailleu; and the correspond- 
ence already mentioned of Mallet du Pan with the court of Vienna, furnish 
many interesting data. See also Barante, Histoire du Directoire, III. 
Hiiffer, in Der Rastatter Kongress, vol. 2; Jung, in Bonaparte et son 
temps, vol. 3; and Boehtlingk, in Napoleon Bonaparte, vol. 2, have tried, by 
making researches in the archives, to fill up the gaps that exist in spite 
of these publications. Boehtlingk especially has taken hold of it with 
a great deal of penetration, but on many points he has gone much far- 
ther than sound criticism can justify. This applies especially to one 
of his theses; he maintains that it is not the fact that Bonaparte, to ad- 
vance his personal interests, simply took advantage of the policy of con- 
quest of the Directory, a policy which undermined the principle of Euro- 
pean balance, and founded his ambitious aims upon it; but that he him- 



Bibliography 753 



self was the author of this policy and consequently the real promoter 
of the war of 1799. Boehtlingk pretends, moreover, that Bonaparte, 
working with Bernadotte, arranged the Vienna affair. He gives no 
proof of it, any more than he does of his hypothesis that the murder of 
the French ambassadors at Rastatt was the work of this same Bona- 
parte who enjoys complicating and entangling everything. See Wegele, 
Zur Kritik der neuesten Litteratur liber den Rastatter Gesandtenmord 
in the "Historische Zeitschrift," 1881, and Boehtlingk, Napoleon Bona- 
parte und der Rastatter Gesandtenmord, Leipzig, 1883. For the Egyp- 
tian expedition, the most important publications are first of all the Cor- 
respondance de Napoleon I (4th and 5th vols.), the Correspondance in^dite, 
officielle et confidentielle, de Napoleon Bonaparte, 1819, 5th and 6th 
vols., and the Letters from the Army of Bonaparte in Egypt, London, 
1798-1799. In addition, the memoirs of Bourrienne (which one should 
not consult without comparing them with A. B., Bourrienne et ses erreurs), 
those of Marmont, of Savary [Eng. tr. London, 1828], Lavalette, Beau- 
hamais (Napoleon's stepson, who was with him in the Egyptian cam- 
paign), of Miot, Mme. de R^musat, and the recollections and notes of a 
French superior officer of which Gopcevic has made use for his article 
in the "Jahrbiicher fiir die deutschen Armee und Marine," 1880, 35th 
and 36th vols. See also the Correspondance secrete d'un chevalier de 
Malte sur les causes qui ont rendu les Frangais maitres de I'isle, Paris, 
1802; Doublet, Memoires historiques sur I'invasion et Toccupation de 
Malte en 1798, published by Panisse-Pastiz (hardly a conclusive justifi- 
cation); Gall6, L'armee frangaise en Egypte, from the specifications of 
Captain Vertray, of the division Regnier, Paris, 1883, La cour de la Gar- 
dioUe, Quatre Lettres sur Texpedition d'Egypte; Richardot, Nouveaux 
memoires sur l'armee frangaise en Egypte, et en Syrie, Paris, 1848; Niel- 
losargy, Memoires secrets sur I'expedition d'Egypte, published by Beau- 
champ, Paris, 1825; Pelleport, Souvenirs, I; and the Despatches and Let- 
ters of Nelson, published by Nicolas [London, 1844-46]. Historical works: 
besides those already mentioned of Sybel, Hiiffer, Jung, Boehtlingk, 
we will mention specially: Mathieu Dumas, Les campagnes d'Egypte 
et de Syrie; Besancenet, Le general Dommartin; Martin, Histoire de 
I'expedition frangaise en Egypte, vol. 11,^ Paris, 1815, 1816; Boulay de la 
Meurthe, Le Directoire et I'expedition d'Egypte, 1885 (a publication that 
deprives Meneval of all authority); Sur le retour du General Bonaparte 
d'Egypte, "Spectateur militaire," 1840, 15th of May. Further, Wilson, 
Historical account of the British expedition to Egypt, London, 1803; 
Payol, Kleber, sa vie, sa correspondance, 1877; Ernouf, La vie de Kleber, 
1867; Jomard, Souvenirs sur Gaspard Monge et ses rapports avec Napo- 
leon, Paris, 1853; Pongerville, G. Monge et I'expedition d'Egypte, Paris, 
1860. As to the Arabian historians, we should mention Gabarti and Na- 
coula el Turc, whose works have been translated into French. The 
scientific results of the expedition are recorded in the voluminous Descrip- 
tion de I'Egypte, 2d edition, 1821-1830. 



754 Bibliography 

[H. Htiffer, Der Rastatter Gesandtenmord, mit bisher ungedruckten 
Archivalien und Nachwort, Bonn, 1896, Fr. trans, in Rev. Hist., vol. 61; 
K. T. Heigel, Zur Geschichte des Rastatter Gesandten-Mordes am 28. 
April, 1799, " Hist. Vierteljarhschr.," 1900, 478-499 (further refs. in Kirch- 
eisen, p. 50); Thoumas, ed., L' Agenda de Malus, souvenirs de 1' expe- 
dition d'Egypte, 1798-1801, Paris, 1892; Guitry, L'Armee de Bonaparte 
en Egypte, 1798-99, Paris, 1898; E. de Villiers du Terrage, Journal ct 
souvenirs sur I'exp^dition d'Egypte, 1798-1801, Paris, 1899; C. de La 
Jonquifere, L'Expedition d':&gypte, 1798-1801, 2 vols., Paris, 1900-1901, 
under the supervision of the historical section of the General Staff; 
F. Rousseau, Les Successeurs de Bonaparte en Egypte, Kleber et Menou, 
"Rev. des quest, hist.," vol. 67, 554-599, Paris, 1900; Thunnan, Capt., 
Bonaparte en figypte. Souvenirs du Capitaine Thurman, publ. par. Comte 
Fleury, Paris, 1902; Constance H. D. Giglioli, Naples in 1799: An Account 
of the Revolution of 1799 and of the Rise and Fall of the Parthenopean Re- 
public, London, 1903; A. Sorel, L'Europe et la Revolution frangaise, V« 
partie: Bonaparte et le Directoire, 1795-1799, Paris, 1903; Rousseau, 
Klgber et Menou en Egypte depuis le depart de Bonaparte, aoiit 1799- 
septembre 1801, Documents, Paris, 1900.] 



CHAPTER VII 

The Coup d']6tat and the Consulate. 1799 

On French politics in 1799: Sybel, Geschichte der Revolutionszeit, 
vol. 2 [Eng. trans.]; Boulay de la Meurthe, Le Directoire et I'ExpMition 
d'Egypte; Lanfrey, Histoire de Napoleon I, vol. 2 [Eng. tr. London, 
1871-72]; the despatches of Sandoz Rollin in P. Bailleu, Preussen und 
Frankreich von 1795-1807, I; the letters of the Swedish envoy, Brink- 
mann, in Llouzon-Leduc, Correspondance diplomatique du Baron de 
Stael-Holstein et du Baron Brinkmann, Paris, 1881. On the internal con- 
dition of France: Taine, Les origines de la France contemporaine. La 
revolution. III [Eng. tr.]; F61ix Rocquain, L'etat de la France au 18 
brumaire, Paris, 1874; Thiers, Histoire du Consulat et de F Empire, I 
[Eng. tr. by Campbell]. On the Coup d'J&tat: the Memoires of Lucieh 
in Jung's edition (Lucien Bonaparte et ses Memoires, I and III) (where, on 
page 90 fT., Lucien reviews the events of the 19th of Brumaire) ; those of 
Gohier, of Marmont, Joseph Bonaparte, Bourrienne (consult A. B., Bour- 
rienne et ses erreurs); the Memoires of Hyde de Neuville, of Mme. de 
R^musat [Eng. tr.]; the Memorial de Sainte-H61ene of Las Cases [Eng. 
tr.New York, 1823, frequently repub.]; the "Moniteur" for the year VIII; 
Duvergier de Hauranne, Histoire du gouvernement parlementaire ; the 
notes published by Ludovic Lalanne and attributed to the scholar Fau- 
riel, on Les derniers jours du consulat, Paris, 1886 [Eng. tr., London^ 
1885], 1st part, entitled Esquisse historique des pronostics de la destruc- 
tion de la R^publique k dater du 18 Brumaire; the text of the constitu- 



Bibliography 755 

tion in H61ie, Les constitutions de la France [Eng. tr. of Constitution of 
1799 in Roelker, The Constitutions of France, Boston, 1848]. 

[A. Vandal, L'Avenement de Napoleon, Paris, 1902; Aulard, Histoire 
politique de la Revolution frangaise, Paris, 1901; Aulard, ed., Registre 
des deliberations du Consulat provisoire, pub. by the Societe de 1' his- 
toire de la Revolution, Paris, 1894; Lavisse et Rambaud, Hist. g6n. de 
I'Europe, vol. IX, Napoleon, Paris, 1897; A. Aulard, Paris sous le consulat, 
T.I, Paris, 1903; A. Sorel, L'Europe et le Directoire, V® partie, Paris, 
1903; E. Gachot, I.es Campagnes de 1799, Souvarow en Italia, Paris, 1903.] 

CHAPTER VIII 

War and Peace. 1800-1802 

On the campaign of 1800: La correspondance de Napoleon I®'", volume 
6, the memoirs of Generals Kellerman, Victor, Marmont, and Mass^na; 
the recollections of a soldier in the Cahiers du capitaine Coignet, Paris, 
1883 [Eng. tr. by Mrs. Carey as Narrative of Captain Coignet, New York]. 
General narratives are to be found in Sybel, V; Jomini, Histoire des 
guerres de la Revolution; Yorck, Napoleon P^ ^Is Feldherr [Eng. tr. 
London, 1903]. On the battle of Marengo, see the narrative in the 
" Osterreichische militarische Zeitschrift" of 1823 and the article Zum 
80. Jahrestag der Schlacht bei Marengo in the Jahrbiicher fiir die 
deutsche Armee und Marine, 36th vol. For the immediate consequences 
of the battle, see the article by A. Fournier, Die Mission des Grafen 
Saint-Julien im Jahre 1800 in "Historische Studien und Skizzen," 
pp. 179-209, 1885. On the battle of Hohenlinden, see: Tessier, La 
bataille de Hohenlinden et les premiers rapports de Bonaparte avec 
le general Moreau in the "Revue historique," IX (from the memoirs 
of General Decaen, who took part in it), and A. Schleifer, Die Schlacht 
bei Hohenlinden, Erding, 1885. For the diplomatic history consult espe- 
cially Du Casse, Histoire des negociations diplomatiques relatives aux 
trait^s de Mortfontaine, de Luneville et d' Amiens, Paris, 1855, 3 volumes; 
also the account of the negotiations in Lefebre, Histoire des cabinets de 
I'Europe, I; Sybel, V; Lanfrey, III; Thiers, II and III. For certain 
points of detail: Bemhardi, Geschichte Russlands im 19. Jahrhundert, 
II; E. Daudet, Les Bourbons et la Russie pendant I'emigration, "Revue 
des deux mondes," 1885; Tatischeff, Paul I et Bonaparte, "NouveUe 
Revue," 1887; E. Paul, Das Projekt einer Occupation Indiens in Jahre 
1800, "Deutsche Revue," 1888; Tratchevski, L'empereur Paul et Bona- 
parte, "Revue d'histoire diplomatique," 1889; the same. Relations diplo- 
matiques entre la Russie et la France a Tepoque de Napoleon I^"", I, 
1800-1802, "Recueil de la Societe russe"; Baumgarten, Geschichte 
Spaniens, I; Bemhardi, Napoleons I. Politik in Spanien, "Hist. Zeit- 
schrift," vol. 40; Noorden, Der Riicktritt des Ministeriums Pitt, 1801, 
"Hist. Zeitschrift," vol. 9; Larsson, Sveriges deltagande i den vapnade 
neutraliteten, 1800, pub. 1888, 



756 Bibliography 

Among the abundant literature on the Concordat may be mentioned: 
d'Haussonville, L'Eghse romaine et le premier Empire, vol. I; Theiner, 
Histoire des deux concordats conclus en 1801 et en 1803; Cretineau- 
Joly, Memoires du Cardinal Consalvi; Ranke's essay on Consalvi in vol. 
40 of his works; Boulay de la Meurthe, La Negociation du Concordat, 
"Le Correspondant," 1881, 1882; Lucien Bonaparte, Memoires, vol. 2, ed. 
Jung. Some other titles may be found in Lacombe, Essai d'une biblio- 
graphie des ouvrages relatifs k I'histoire religieuse de Paris pendant la 
r^vohition 1789-1802, Paris, 1884. 

[H. Hiiffer, Quellen zur Geschichte des Zeitalters der franzosischen 
Revolution, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1900; H. H. Sargent, The Campaign of 
Marengo, London, 1897; E. Gachot, La deuxieme campagne d' Italic, 1800, 
Paris, 1898; De Cugnac, Campagnes de I'armee de reserve en 1800, 2 
vols., Paris, 1900-01, under the supervision of the historical section of 
the General Staff; H. M. Bowman, The Preliminary Stages of the Peace 
of Amiens, Toronto, 1900; M. Philippson, La patx d' Amiens et la 
politique generale de Napoleon P^", ''Revue hist.," vols. 75 and 76; 
A. Sorel, La paix d' Amiens, " Rev. des Deux Mondes," 1 and 15 of Aug. 
and of Sept. 1902; L. M. Roberts, The Negotiations preceding the Peace 
of Luneville, 1801, Trans, of the Royal Hist. Soc, New Ser., vol. 15; The 
Paget Papers: Diplomatic and other correspondence of the Right Hon. 
Sir Arthur Paget, 1794-1807, vol. II, London, 1896 (Sir Arthur Paget 
was the English Ambassador at Vienna) ; Boulay de la Meurthe, Docu- 
ments sur la negociation du Concordat et les autres rapports de la 
France avec le Saint-Siege en 1800-01, 5 vols., Paris, 1891-97; L. S6ch€, 
Les origines du concordat, 2 vols., Paris, 1894; Debidour, Histoire des 
rapports de Teghse et de I'etat en France, 1789-'70, Paris, 1898; A. Aulard, 
Paris sous le consulat, Paris, 1903; Mathieu, Le Concordat de 1801, ses 
origines, son histoire d'apres des documents inedits, Paris, 1903.] 

CHAPTER IX 

The New France and Her Sovereign. 1802 

On the political reorganization as a whole: Felix Rocquain, L'etat 
de la France au 18 brumaire; Thiers, Histoire du Consulat et de TEm- 
pire, vols. I-III [Eng. tr.]. On Thiers, see Barni, Napoleon et son 
historien, M. Thiers, 2d ed., Paris, 1869; Lanfrey, Histoire de Napoleon pr, 
vol. 2 [Eng. tr.]; A. E. Blanc, Napoleon P^', ses institutions civiles et ad- 
ministratives, Paris, 1880, a eulogy exhibiting only the good side of 
things, yet useful as a general survey; Taine, Les origines de la France 
contemporaine, "La regime moderne," I, Paris, 1890 [Eng. tr. by Durand], 
a very brilliant analysis of the creative work of the Consulate, finely 
conceived, but dominated exclusively by a single point of view as regards 
Napoleon. Extracts from the Memoires of Pasquier and of Chaptal are 
an important feature of the work. [Pasquier, Histoire de mon temps, 



Bibliography 757 



M^moires, 6 vols., Paris, 1894-95, vol. I; Eng. tr. by Roche of first three 
vols., London, 1893; Chaptal, Mes Souvenirs sur Napoleon, Paris, 1893.] 

Among the contemporary accounts may be mentioned; JuUien, Entre- 
tiens politiques sur la situation actuelle de la France, Paris, an VIII 
[1800]; Frankreich im Jahre 1800, Briefe deutscher Manner in Paris, 
Altona, 1800; Panckoucke, La republique consideree dans ses divers 
gouvemements comme elle est, apres ce qu'elle a ete, 1801; Gabriac, 
Voyage de la duchesse de Guiche en France, 1801, ''Revue d'histoire 
diplomatique," 1889; Peuchet, Essai d'une statistique generale de la 
France, Paris, an IX [1801]. On the organization of the system of 
administration: Locr6, Proces-verbaux du Conseil d'Etat, I; Aucoc, Le 
Conseil d'Etat, avant et depuis 1789; Pelet de la Lozfere, Opinions de 
Napoleon au Conseil d'fitat. In addition the Memoires of Roederer, 
III; of Thibaudeau; of Broglie, I [Eng. tr.]. See also Ernouf, Maret, due 
de Bassano. On the financial reform, the Memoires of Gaudin, due de 
Gaete; also Gaudin' s Notice historique sur les finances de la France, 
1800-1814, written before the Memoires; MoUien, Memoires d'un ministre 
du tresor public; Bosse, Ubersicht der franzosischen Staatswirthschaf t,^ ' 
1806-1807; Stourm, Les finances de I'ancien regime et de la Revolution, 
2 vols., Paris, 1885; A. Wagner, Die franzosische Besteuerung seit 1789, 
in his " Finanzwissenschaft, " vol. IV, 1888; Ch. Nicolas, Les budgets 
de la France depuis le commencement du XIX® siecle; Vuhrer, His- 
toire de la dette publique en France, 2 vols. ; Poinsard, Le credit public et 
les emprunts sous le Consulat et 1' Empire, in " Annales de I'Ecole fibre des 
sciences politiques," 1890. 

On the reforms in the administration of justice; Schafifner, Geschichte 
der Rechtsverfassung in Frankreich; S6vin, Etude sur les origines r^vo-i 
lutionnaires des Codes Napoleon, new ed,, Paris, 1879; Troplong, De 
r esprit democratique dans le Code Civil (extracts from this will be found 
in S6vin); Rehberg, IJber den Code Napoleon und seine Einfiihrung in 
Deutschland; Th6zard, De I'influence des travaux de Bigot de Preameneu; 
P^rouse, Napoleon et les lois civiies. 

On the reforms in public instruction: Hahn, Das Unterrichtswesen | 
in Frankreich, mit einer Geschichte der Pariser Universitat, I, Breslau, J 
1848; Alb. Duruy, L'instruction publique et la Revolution; Liard, L'en- 
seignement superieur en France de 1789 k 1889, I, 1888; Beauchamp, 
Recueil des lois et reglements sur I'enseignement superieur; P. Dupuy, 
L'ecoie normale, in "Revue Internationale de I'enseignement superieur," 
1883. 

On the legislative opposition and the purging of the Chambers: 
Thibaudeau, Memoires sur le Consulat; Mme. de Stael, Considerations 
sur la revolution frangaise, 3 vols. [Eng. tr. London, 1818]: Fauriel, Les 
derniers jours du consulat, ed. by Lalanne [Eng. tr. London, 1885]; Camilla 
Jordan, Le Consulat h. vie; Mme. de G6rando, Lettres; Ste.-Beuve, Ca- 
mille Jordan, ''Lundis," XII; Laboulaye, Benjamin Constant; K^lie, 
Les Constitutions de la France. 



758 Bibliography 

On the censorship of the press: Welschinger, La censure sous le 
premier empire, Paris, 1882. 

On the conspiracies : Fescourt, Histoire de la double conspiration de 1800 ; 
Destrem, Documents sur les deportations du Consulat in the "Revue 
historique," vol. VIII; Gaffarel, L'opposition militaire sous le Consulat, 
in ''La Revolution frangaise," 1887, pp. 10-12; and the Memoires of 
General Rapp. The Memoires of Fouch6, Paris, 1828-29, although not 
authentic, are not without value, since their author, A. de Beauchamp, made 
use of authentic documents [cf. P. J. Proudhon, Commentaires sur les 
Memoires de Fouche, ed. by Rochel, Paris, 1900]. 

[R. Stourm, Les Finances du Consulat, Paris, 1902; E. Jac, Bonaparte 
et le code civil, *' De F influence personelle exercee par le premier Consul 
sur notre legislation civile," Paris, 1898; E. Daudet, La Police etles Chouans 
sous le consulat et I'empire, Paris, 1893; E. Guillen, Les conspirations mili- 
taires sous le consulat et I'empire, Paris, 1894; P. Corr^ard, La France 
sous le consulat, Paris, 1899; A. Aulard, Paris sous le consulat, Paris, 
1903.] 



CHAPTER X 
The Last Years of the Consulate. The Emperor. 1802-1804 

On the internal condition of France — A. Impressions and reports of 
foreigners who visited France and Paris: Hase, Briefe und Tagebiicher 
von 1801 und 1802 in the "Deutsche Revue," 1881; F. J. L. Meyer, 
Briefe aus der Hauptstadt und dem Innern Frankreichs, geschrieben 
im J. 1801, 2 Theile, Tiibingen, 1802; J. F. Reichardt, Vertraute 
Briefe aus Paris, geschrieben in den Jahren 1802 und 1803, Hamburg, 
1805; Une ann^e d'une correspondance de Paris, ou lettres sur Bona- 
parte, reprinted from the "Courrier de Londres," London, 1803; 
A. V. Kotzebue, Erinnerungen aus Paris im Jahre 1804, Berlin, 1804; 
Schlabrendorf, Napoleon Bonaparte u. d. Franz. Volk unter seinem 
Consulate, ''Germanien," 1814 [ed. by Reichardt]; J. G. Rist's Lebenserin- 
nerungen, herausgegeben von G. Poel, Gotha, 1880. B. French sources: 
the "Moniteur," the official organ after 1799; the Correspondance de 
Napoleon I, vol. VII [Eng. tr. of selections by Bingham]; Fauriel, Les 
derniers jours du Consulat, ed. by Lalanne, Paris, 1885 [Eng. tr. 1885]; 
the Memoires of Bourrienne [Eng. tr.]; (down to 1802 they are more 
trustworthy than after that date); those of Lucien in Jung's edition, 
which is unfortunately very deficient in critical spirit; Thibaudeau, 
Memoires sur le Consulat; the Memoires of Mme. de R6musat [Eng. 
tr.]; the Memoires of Miot De M^lito [Eng. tr.]; the Considerations sur 
la revolution frangaise de Mme. de Stael [Eng. tr.]; the letters of P. 
L. C«.<irier, written in 1804, in his G^uvres completes. Further, Mont- 
gaillard, De la France et de 1' Europe sous gouvernement de Bonaparte, 



Bibliography 759 



Paris e\, Lyon, an XII (1804) ; Forneron, Les 6migr6s ct la Societe fran^aise 
sous Napoleon I®*", Paris, 1890; Gaffarel, L'opposition militaire sous le 
Consulat, in "la Revolution Franyaise," sixth year, No. 10; Debidour, 
Le general Fabvier, in the "Annales de I'Est," January, 1887, based on 
Fabvier's letters; L'opposition litteraire sous le Consulat in "La Nouvelle 
Revue," 1889; Doinel, Les conspirations dans le Loiret sous le Consulat, 
in "La Revolution Frangaise," 1888; Welschinger, La censure sous le 
premier Empire, 1882; Thiers, Histoire du Consulat et de I'Empire, vols. 
Ill and IV [Eng. tr.]; Lanfrey, Napoleon I, vols. II and III [Eng. tr.]. 

On Foreign Relations : A. In general, in addition to the treaties in De 
Clercq, Recueil des traites conclus par la France (the first vol. stops 
with the year 1803) and the Correspondance de Napoleon I^^", vol. VIII, 
the very important work of Lefebvre, Histoire des cabinets de TEurope. 
B. With Italy: Botta, Storia d'ltalia dal 1789 al 1814 [Eng. tr. Lon- 
don, 1828]; Castro, Storia d'ltalia dal 1799 al 1814, Milan, 1881; the same, 
Milano durante la dominazione napoleonita, 1880 ; Francesco Melzi d'Eril, 
Memorie, Documenti e lettere inedite di Napoleone I e Beauharnais, ed. 
Giov. Melzi, 2 vol., 1865; Bonacossi, Bourrienne et ses erreurs; Dejob, 
Mme. de Stael et I'ltalie, with a bibliography on the influence of France 
on Italy, 1796-1814, Paris, 1890. C. With Switzerland : Vuillemin, Histoire 
de la Confederation Suisse; Muralt, Hans von Reinhard, Zurich, 1839; ibid., 
Bonaparte, Talleyrand et Stapfer, Ziirich, 1869; Luginsbul, Stapfer, 1887. 
D. With Germany: Hausser, Deutsche Geschichte, with full notes 
from the literature of the subject; Ranke, Hardenberg und der preus- 
sische Staat, works, vol. 47; Martens, Recueil des traites conclus par la 
Russie, first section (Austria); vol. II; Foumier, Gentz u. Cobenzl, Ge- 
schichte der osterreichischen Diplomatie von 1801 bis 1805. E. With 
Spain: Baumgarten, Geschichte Spaniens seit dem Ausbruch der franz. 
Revolution, I; Bemhardi, Napoleon I und Spanien in the "Historische 
Zeitschrift," vol. XL, 

On the constitutions of the Italian States, of Holland, and of Switzer- 
land: Poliz, Europaische Verfassungen. 

On Napoleon's colonial policy: H. Adams, "Napoleon at St. Domingo," y 
in his Historical Essays ; Tessier, Le general Decaen aux Indes, " Revue | 
historique, " XV. On Toussaint I'Guverture the "Revue de I'Agenais," 
1884, contains documents; Schoelcher, La vie de Toussaint I'Ouverture. 

On the strained relations with England (besides the Correspondance, 
VII, and the "Moniteur" for 1803): Browning, England and Napoleon 
in 1803, London, 1887, with Lord Whitworth's despatches; Lord John 
Russell, Memorials and Correspondence of Ch. J. Fox, vol. 3 ; The Annual 
Register, or A View of the History, etc., for the year 1803; the Letters and 
Despatches of Lord Castlereagh, vol. V; Stanhope, Life of Pitt, IV; Ash- 
ton, English Caricature and Satire on Napoleon I., London, 1885; Max 
Duncker, "Die Landung in England" in his Abhandlungen aus der neuen 
Geschichte; Seeley, A Short History of Napoleon I., 1886; Ompteda, Die 
Ueberwaltigung Hannovers durch die Franzosen, Hanover, 1866, On 



760 Bibliography 

the Channel flotilla: Chevalier, Histoire de la marine frangaise sous le 
Consulat et le premier Empire, 1886. On the conspiracy of Georges and 
his associates the documentary material will "be found in " Proces instruit 
par la cour de justice criminelle contre Georges, Pichegru, Moreau, etc.," 
8 vols., Paris, 1804; further, the work of Desmaxest (one of the directors 
of the poHce), Quinze ans de haute police sous Napoleon; the recollections 
of Fauriel in his Last Days of the Consulate (to be used with caution) ; the 
Memoires of Miot, and of Hyde de Neuville. On Georges in particular: 
G. de Cadoudal, Georges Cadoudal et la chouannerie, Paris, 1887 — the 
last two chapters are, naturally enough, not impartial. On the affair of 
the Due d'Enghien: Nougarlde de Fayet, Recherches historiques sur le 
proces du due d'Enghien, Paris, 1886; Boulay de la Meurthe, Les der- 
nieres annees du due d'Enghien, Paris, 1886, an exhaustive survey of 
the literature of the subject; Fournier, in the '' Revue historique," October, 
1887, a review of Boulay de la Meurthe; Welschinger, le due d'Enghien, 
Paris, 1888; Hyde de Neuville, Memoires, I. 

On the establishment of the Empire: Thiers, vol. V; Miot de M^lito, 
II; Mme. de R6musat; the ''Senatus Consultum" of May 18, 1804, in 
H^lie, Les constitutions de la France; Rocquain, Notices sur Napoleon 
P^ in the "Revue de France," March, 1880; Napoleon's conversations 
with the ship's surgeon of the ''Northumberland" in 1815, recently 
published by H^rrisson, " Le Cabinet Noir," 1886. Among the accounts 
of foreigners, those of Lucchesini are especially important. They have 
been published by Bailleu in his Preussen und Frankreich, 1795- 
1807, vol. II, 1877; in addition, the despatches of the Envoy of Hesse, 
Malsburg, in the ''Deutsche Revue," Oct., 1884. The satirical com- 
ments of the Parisians were derived from an unpublished letter of the 
Swede, Brinckmann, to Count Philip Stadion. 

[Hase, Briefe von der Wanderung und aus Paris, Leipzig, 1894; P. 
Miiller, L'espionnage militaire sous Napoleon I«^: C. Schulmeister, Paris, 
1896; L. Pingaud, Un agent secret sous la revolution et I'Empire, le Comte 
d'Antraigues, Paris, 1903; J. Turquan, Le monde et le demi-monde sous 
le consulat et I'empire, Paris, 1897; A. T. Mahan, The Influence of the 
Sea Power on the French Revolution and the Empire, 1793-1812, Boston, 
1892; E. Desbrifere, Projets et tentatives de debarquement aux iles britan- 
niques, 1793-1805, 3 vols., Paris, 1901 ; J. Leyland, Ed. Despatches and 
Letters relating to the Blockade of Brest, 1803-1805, Navy Records Soc, 
London, 1899; P. Marmottan, Bonaparte et la republique de Lucques, 
Le royaume d'Etrurie, Paris, 1896; P. Schweizer, Geschichte der Schwei- 
zerischen Neutralitat, Frauenfeld, 1893-95; W. Oechsli, Die Schweiz in 
den Jahren 1798 und 1799, Ziirich, 1899; K. T. Heigel, Deutsche Geschichte 
vom Tode Friedrichs des Gr. bis zur Auflosung des alten Reiches, vols. 
I and II, Stuttgart, 1899; H. A. L. Fisher, Studies in Napoleonic States- 
manship: Germany, Oxford, 1903; E. Denis, L'AUemagne, 1789-1810, Fin 
de I'ancienne Allemagne, Paris, 1896; G. Roloff, Die Kolonialpolitik 
Napoleons I., Munich, 1899; H. Froidevaux, La politique coloniale d 



Bibliography 76 1 



Napoleon 1% "Rev. des questions historiques," April, 1901; W. M. Sloane, 
Napoleon's Plans for a Colonial System, "Am. Hist. Rev.," April, 1899; 
H. de Poyen, Les guerres des Antilles de 1793 k '15, Paris, 1896; H. Adams, 
"Napoleon at St. Domingo," Historical Essays, New York; H. Adams, 
History of the United States, vols. I and II, New York; G. Roloff, Zur 
Napoleonischen Politik v. 1803-1805, "Hist. Vierteljahrschr.," V. 1902; 
M. M. P. Dorman, A History of the British Empire in the Nine- 
teenth Century, first vol. 1793-1805, London, 1902; G. S. Ford, Hanover 
and Prussia, 1795-1803; A Study of the Prussian Neutrahty System, 
Columbia Univ. Pub., New York, 1903; S. B. Fay, The Execution of 
the Due d'Enghien, "American Historical Review," July and October, 
1898.] 



CHAPTER XI 

The War of 1805 

On the preliminary history of the war of 1805, besides the letters of 
Napoleon in the Correspondance, vols. 8, 9, and 10, and the Lettres in- 
^dites de Talleyrand a Napoleon, 1800-1809, published by P. Bertaud, 
there are the Memoires of Miot de M^lito, one of the most important 
and most trustworthy sources for this period; the Memoires of Mme. 
de R^musat, of Savary, due de Rovigo, of Hulot in the " Spectateur mili- 
taire" for 1883; the correspondence of Villeneuve in Jurien de la Gravifere, 
Guerres maritimes. On the project to invade England, the article of Max 
Duncker, mentioned above under Chap. X, which is, however, not con- 
clusive. On Pius VII. in Paris, the Memoires of Consalvi, Cr6tineau-Joly, 
and the great work of Hausson villa, I'Eglise romaine et le premier Empire; 
also, " Paris zur Zeit der Kaiserkronung," extracts from the letters of an 
eye-witness, Cologne, 1805. On the formation of the third coalition; 
Martens, Recueil des Traites, I; Neumann, Recueil des traites conclus 
par I'Autriche; Martens, Recueil des traites conclus par la Russie, II and 
VI; Tatistchefif, Alexandre et Napoleon d'apres leur correspondance 
in^dite, from the archives of St. Petersburg, published in "La Nouvelle 
Revue," 1890; in addition, the correspondence of Adam Czartoryski with 
Alexander I., published by de Mazade, 1865; the Memoires of Czartoryski, 
1887 [Eng. tr. London, 1888]; the recollections of Rasumovski in his 
biography by Wassiltchikow, in Russian, 1887; and the reports sent from 
Paris by Markow, in the "Archiv Worontzova," XIII, XIV, 1879; also 
the memoirs of Hardenberg, edited by Ranke ; the reports of Lucchesini in 
Bailleu, II; the Letters and Despatches of Lord Castlereagh, V; Cobbett, 
''Parliamentary Debates," vol. VI, London, 1806; the "Annual Reg- 
ister," 1803-1805. 

General works: Lefebvre, Histoire des Cabinets de I'Europe; Ranke, 
Hardenberg und die Geschichte des preussischen Staates von 1793-1813; 



762 Bibliography 

the critical essay by Max Duncker, Graf Haugwitz und Freiherr von 
Hardenberg in the " Abhandlungen a. d. neueren Geschichte," and his 
review of Ranke's work in the '' Mittheilungen a. d. historischen Littera- 
tnr," sixth year; Bernhardi, Geschichte Russlands im 19. Jahrhundert, 
II; Beer, Zehn Jahre osterreichischer Politik; Fournier, Gentz und Co- 
benzl, Geschichte der osterreichischen Diplomatie von 1801-1805; Stan- 
hope, Life of Pitt, vol. IV. On the war of 1805, besides the correspond- 
ence of Napoleon and the correspondence of Talleyrand with Napoleon, 
mentioned just above, the Memoires of Marmont, Rapp, S6gur, Savary, 
and F€zensac; Piou des Loches, Mes campagnes, 1792-1815, the cahiers of 
Capitaine Coignet [Eng. tr. as "Narrative" of, etc.]; Correspondence 
of Davout, pub. by de Mazade, 1885, 4 vols., and Mont^gut, Le marechal 
Davout, Paris, 1882; in addition the Memoires of Czartoryski [Eng. tr.], 
and his account of the month of April, 1806, in his " Correspondence with 
Alexander"; the memoirs of de Maistre (cf. von Sybel's article in the 
"Historische Zeitschrift," 1859), Materiaux pour servir k I'histoire de 
la bataille* d'Austerlitz recueillis par un militaire, 1806, with a very in- 
structive map ; Stutterheim, La bataille d'Austerlitz, par un militaire t^moin 
de la journee du 2 decembre 1805, Hamburg, 1806; the Recollections of 
Radetsky in the "Mittheilungen des k.k. Kriegsarchivs," 1887; Bernhardi, 
Denkwiirdigkeiten des Generals Toll, 2d ed., Leipzig, 1865; further, Michai- 
lowski-Danilevski, La campagne de 1805; Angeli, Ulm und Austerlitz, in 
"Streffleur's Militarische Zeitschrift," 1877, 1879; Einsiedel, Der Feldzug 
der bsterreicher in Italien 1805, Weimar, 1812. Details drawn from the 
papers of the Archduke Charles are given in Wertheimer, Geschichte 
Osterreichs und Ungarns im ersten Jahrzehnt des 19. Jahrhunderts, vol. 
I, a work of no value as regards the great international diplomatic 
questions; Yorck, Napoleon als Feldherr, vol. I [Eng. tr.]; Mack's own 
defence in the "Historische Taschenbuch" of Raumer, 1873; Diefifenbach, 
K. L. Schulmeister, der Hauptspion, Parteiganger, Polizeiprafekt und ge- 
heime Agent Napoleon I, 1879. On the attitude of Prussia: Die preus- 
sischen Kriegsvorbereitungen und Operationsplane 1805 in the "Kriegs- 
geschichtlichen Einzelschriften," part I, Berlin, 1805; Bailleu, Preussen 
und Frankreich 1795 bis 1807, vol. II; M. Lehmann, Scharnhorst; Bail- 
leu, Prinz Louis Ferdinand in the "Deutsche Rundschau," 1883, On 
South Germany among other things the Denkwiirdigkeiten of Montgelas, 
1887; Perthes, Politische Zustande u. Personen in Deutschland zur Zeit 
d. franz, Herrschaft. 

[The works mentioned above of Desbrifere, p. 760; of Dorman, 
p. 761 ; of Mahan, p. 760; the Paget Papers, p. 756; H. Ulmann, Russisch- 
preussische Politik unter Alexander I. und Friedrich Wilhelm III. bis 
1806, urkundUch dargestellt, Leipzig, 1899; A. T. Mahan, The Life of 
Nelson, the Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain, Boston, 1897; 
G. Roloff, Zur Napoleonischen Politik v. 1803-1805, "Histor. Viertel- 
jahrschrift," 1902; P. C. AUombert and J. Colin, La Campagne de 1805 en 
AUemagne, vols. I and II, Paris, 1903.] 



Bibliography 763 



CHAPTER XII 

Napoleonic Creations. Breach with Prussia 

On public opinion in France in 1805 and 1806: the reports of Lucchesini 
and the letters of Hauterive to Talleyrand in Bailleu, Preussen und Frank- 
reich, vol. II; MoUien, Souvenirs d'un ministre du tr^sor [new ed. by 
Gomel, 1898]; the Memoires of Mme. de R6musat; the Souvenirs of Ba- 
rante. On France and Naples: Helfert, Konigin Karoline von Neapel; 
Boulay de la Meurthe, Quelques lettres de Marie Caroline, Reine des 
Deux-Siciles, in the "Revue d'histoire diplomatique," 1888; Coletta, His- 
toire du royaume de Naples, 3 vols.; the Memoires of King Joseph, ed. 
by Du Casse; the Memoires of Miot de Mdlito [Eng. tr.]. On the relations 
with the Pope : in addition to the Correspondance de Napoleon I^^, the 
Memoires of Consalvi; d'Haussonville, L'eglise romaine et le premier 
Empire; Artaud, Histoire du Pape Pie VII. On the establishment of 
the kingdom of Holland : King Louis's Documents historiques et reflexions 
sur le gouvernement de la Hollande, Paris, 1820; further, Alb. Reville, 
La Hollande et le Roi Louis, in the "Revue de Deux Mondes," 1870; 
F^lix Rocquain, Napoleon I^r et le Roi Louis. On the Confederation 
of the Rhine: Hausser, Deutsche Geschichte, vol. II, and the literature 
given by Dahlmann, Quellenkunde zur Deutschen Geschichte; in iad- 
dition, Perthes, Pol. Zustande und Personen zur Zeit der franz Herr- 
schaft, 2 vols. ; J. G. v. Pohl, Denkwiirdigkeiten aus meinem Leben und 
aus meiner Zeit, 1840; the Memoirs of Montgelas; the letters of a secret 
agent of Austria in 1806 in Fournier, Historische Studien und Skizzen; 
Schlossberger, Briefwechsel der Konigin Katharina u d Konigs Jerome, 
I; the same, Politische Correspondenz Napoleons u Konig Friedrich I. 
v. Wiirtemberg (it contains little that is new and important); Gbcke, 
Das Grossherzogthum Berg unter Joachim Murat 1877; Baulieu-Mar- 
connay, K. F. v. Dalberg, 2 vols ; in addition, Bailleu, Fiirstenbriefe an 
Napoleon I. in the "Historische Zeitschrift, ' 1887; Strippelmann, Beitrage 
zur Geschichte Hessen-Kassels, part II, Marburg, 1878; Baader, Streif- 
lichter auf die Zeit der tiefsten Emiedrigung Deutschlands, oder die 
Reichstadt Niirnberg von 1801-1806, Niirnberg, 1878; Mejer, Zur Ge- 
schichte der romisch-deutschen Frage On the French Army in South 
Germ^any: among others, the Souvenirs militaires de F^zensac and the 
Correspondance de Napoleon 1^^ On the strained relations with Eng- 
land: Lord John Russell, Life and Times of Fox, 1859; Cobbett, Parlia- 
mentary Debates, VI; Sir G. Jackson, Diaries and Letters, I; Lefebvre, 
Histoire des Cabinets de I'Europe, III. On the negotiations with Rus- 
sia: Bignon, Thiers, Bernhardi, and Martens, Recueil des trait^s conclus 
par la Russie, VI. The origin of the French-Prussian War is not yet 
adequately explained, since Haugwitz burned up the documents. StiU 
some of the most essential documents are in the second volume of Bailleu, 



764 Bibliography 

Preussen und Frankreich von 1795-1807. See further the Memoirs 
of Hardenberg edited by Ranke and the critical remarks of M. Lehmann 
in the "Historische Zeitschrift," Neue Folge, vol. Ill; Lombard, Mate- 
riaux pour servir a I'histoire des annees 1805, 1806, 1807; the letters of 
Gentz to Starhemberg in the " Mittheilungen d. Instituts f . osterr. Ge- 
schichtsforschung," 7th year; in addition, Ranke, Hardenberg und der 
preussische Staat; Hausser, Deutsche Geschichte, I; Hoppner, Geschichte 
des Krieges von 1806 und 1807; M. Lehmann Scharnhorst, I; Bailleu, 
Prinz Louis Ferdinand in the "Deutsche Rundschau," 1887. 

[The works above mentioned of Heigel, p. 760 ; Fisher, p. 760 ; Denis, p. 
760; Rolofif,p. 762; Ulmann, p. 762; Marmottan, p. 760; Desbrifere, p. 760; 
L. de Lanzac de Laborie, La domination frangaise en Belgique, Directoire — 
Consulat— Empire, 1795-1814, 2 vols., Paris, 1895; S. Balau, La Belgique 
sous r Empire et la d^faite de Waterloo, 1804-15, 2 vols., Paris, 1894; 
L. Wichers, De regeering van Koning Lodewijk Napoleon, 1806-10, 
Utrecht, 1892; E. Barone, Studi suUa Conduta della guerra 1806 in Ger- 
mania, 2 vols., Torino, 1900; J. Strickler, Amtliche Sammlung der Acten 
aus der Zeit der Helvetischen Republik, Berne, 1895; H. v. Zwiedineck- 
Siidenhorst, Deutsche Geschichte von der Auflosung des alten bis zur 
Errichtung des neuen Kaiserreichs, vol. I, "Die Zeit des Rheinbundes 
und die Griindung des deutschen Bundes, 1806-15," Stuttgart, 1897; 
A. Bonnefons, Un allie de Napoleon: Frederic Auguste, premier roi de 
Saxe et grand-due de Varsovie, 1763-1827, Paris, 1902.] 



CHAPTER XIII I 

From Jena to Tilsit 

On the campaign in Thuringia: primarily the Correspondance de 
Napoleon I^''; the military writings of Clausewitz-Lossau, Charakteristik 
der Kriege Napoleon I., vol. 2, "an eye-witness of the battle of Auer- 
stadt"; Math. Dumas, Precis des evenements militaires, vol. 18; Hopf- 
ner, Geschichte d. Krieges von 1806 u. 1807; P. Foucart, La campagne de 
Prusse en 1806, 2 vols., Paris, 1887 and 1890; C. v. d. Goltz, Rossbach 
und Jena, 1883; Yorck, Napoleon I. als Feldherr, vol. I [Eng. tr.]; Heimann, 
Der Feldzug v. 1806 in Deutschland; Dechend, Beitrage zur Geschichte 
des Krieges von 1806-1807; Lettow-Vorbeck, Der Krieg von 1806 und 
1807, 1st vol. 2d ed. 1899 up to the battle of Auerstadt [vols. II-IV, Berlin, 
1892-1896, carry the narrative through to Tilsit]; in addition, Riihle von 
Lilienstern, Bericht eines Augenzeugen vom Feldzuge 1806 (written under 
the influence of Massenbach, an officer of Hohenlohe's staff, whose ideas 
were far from clear); Massenbach, Geschichtliche Denkwiirdigkeiten 
(confused and unreliable) ; Miiffling, Der Operationsplan der preussisch- 
sachsischen Armee 1806, Weimar, 1806; Muffling, Aus meinem Leben, 
1851, unreliable; Plotho, Tagebuch wahrend der Kriegsoperationen, 1806, 



Bibliography 765 

iind 1807, Berlin, 1811; Ledebur, Erlebnisse aus den Kriegsjahren 1806 
und 1807, Berlin, 1855; Borcke-Leszczynski, Kriegsleben des Johann v. 
Borcke, 1806-1815, Berlin, 1888; Erinnerungen aus dem Leben des Gen- 
eral-Feldmarschalls Hermann v. Boyen, vol. I, Leipzig, 1889; Gentz, 
"Tagebuch im preussischen Hauptquartier," in his collected works ed. 
by Schlesier; Tiedemann, Denkwurdigkeiten ; Gentz and Mayer von 
Heldenf eld, Berichte iiber die Schlacht bei Jena in the " Mittheilungen des 
k. k. Kriegsarchivs," 1882; Burckhardt, Aus den Tagen der Schlacht 
bei Jena, "Neues Archiv. fiir Sachs. Gesch.," IV. See also the later judg- 
ment in retrospect of Schamhorst on this campaign, which has been 
published by Lehmann in the "Histor. Zeitschrift," Neue Folge, XXIV; 
the Correspondence of Davout and the judgment of Mont^gut on Davout 
in S^gur, Histoire et m^emoires, vol. 3 [Eng. tr. by Patchett-Martm, 
London, 1895]; F^zensac, Souvenirs militaires; Piou des Leches, Mes 
Campagnes; Coignet, Cahiers [Eng. tr. as "Narrative"]; Pertz, Gneise- 
iiau, vol. I; Lehmann, Schamhorst, vol. I. On the war in Poland, in 
addition to the works just mentioned : Foucart, La Campagne de Pologne, 
Paris, 1882; R. T. Wilson, Brief Remarks on the Character and Composi- 
tion of the Russian Army, and a Sketch of the Campaigns in Poland, 1806- 
1807 ; the Memoires of Count Oginski, of Eugen von Wiirtemberg, of Ben- 
ningsen in the anonymous " Beitrage zur Geschichte des Kriegs von 1806 
und 1807," Breslau, 1836; Grolmann, Tagebuch iibex d. Feldzug d. Erb- 
grossherzogs von Baden, 1887. On Napoleon's policy during this war: 
Bertrand, Lettres inedites de Talleyrand; Lefebvre, Histoire des Cabi- 
nets de r Europe, vol. 3 in the second edition, where there is an admirable 
exposition of the extremely complicated situation of affairs, needing only 
slight corrections; Vandal, Napoleon et Alexandre I®^, vol. I, De Tilsit 
k Erfurt, Paris, 1891; Tatistcheff, Alexandre I^f et Napoleon in the 
"Nouvelle Revue," 1888; Bailleu, Preussen und Frankreich, vol. II; 
Beer, Zehn Jahre osterreichischer Politik; Thiers, vol. VII; Ranke, 
Hardenberg und Preussen, vol. Ill; Bernhardi, Geschichte Russ- 
lands, vol. II; "The Annual Register for the Year 1807"; Diaries and 
Letters from the Peace of Amiens to the Battle of Talavera, London, 
1872; De Maistre, Memoires politiques, letters written in the spring of 
1807; Czartoryski, Memoires [Eng. tr.], vol. II; Bernhardi, Denkwiir- 
digkeiten Tolls; the Memoires of Savary [Eng. tr.] become more reliable 
for this period; Barante, Souvenirs, vol. I; Gagern, Mein Anteil an der 
Politik, vol. I; Countess Voss, Neunundsechzig Jahre am preussischen 
Hof, 1876; Hardenberg's Memoirs, ed. by Ranke, especially vol. V 
with the documents; the Tagebuch of Schladen; G. Horn, Das Buch v. d. 
Konigin Luise, 1883; Martens, Recueil des traites conclus par la Russie, 
vol. VI; Emouf, Maret, due de Bassano; Meneval, Napoleon et Marie 
Louise [new ed. as Memoires, Paris, 1894, Eng. tr. London, 1894]; Boppe, 
La mission de T adjutant-commandant Meriage k Widdin, 1807-1809, 
in the "Annales de I'Ecole politique"; Gardane, La mission du general 
Gardane en Perse sous le premier Empire, Paris, 1865. For further 



766 Bibliography 

details on the relations of Napoleon to the Shah Feth-Ali, see Gaffarel, in the 
"Revue politique et litteraire," 1878. On the treaties of Tilsit see De 
Clercq, Recueil des traites de la France, vol. II; Garden, Histoire generale 
des traites de paix, vol. X; Bignon, Histoire de France, vol. VI; Lefebvre, 
Histoire des Cabinets de I'Europe, vol. Ill; Thiers, Consulat et Em- 
pire [Eng. tr.], vol. VII; Vandal, Napoleon et Alexandre P^: this work 
and also the articles of Tatistcheff in the "Nouvelle Revue," 1890, con- 
tain the authentic text of the secret treaty of alliance which was first 
published by me. [It will be found in the German and French editions 
at this place, but is omitted here. — B.] 

[The works above mentioned of Heigel, p. 760; Denis, p. 760; Fisher, 
p. 760; Zwiedeneck-Sudenhorst, p. 760; H. v. Treuenfeld, Auerstadt und 
Jena, Hanover, 1893; Lewal, La veillee d'J^na, ]6tude de strategic de 
combat, Paris, 1899; E. Leydolph, Die Schlacht bei Jena, 2d ed., Jena, 
1901 ; E. Driault, Napoleon k Finkenstein (avril — mai 1807) d'apres la cor- 
respondance de Fempereur, les archives du minist^re des affaires etran- 
geres, les archives nationales, '' Rev. d'histoire diplomatique," vol. XIII, 
Paris, 1899; F. Loraine Petrie, Napoleon's Campaign in Poland, 1806-07, 
London, 1903.] 



CHAPTER XIV 

The Situation of Affaiks in France 

For the internal conditions in France see the references given for 
Chapter IX; in ad i; ion, Thiers, vols. VI-VIII, with Barni, Napoleon 
I«' et son historien M. Thiers; Lanfrey, vols. III-IV [Eng. tr.]; Taine, 
Le regime moderne [Eng. tr.]; "Le Moniteur," la Correspondance de 
Napoleon I", vols. XIII-XVII; the Memoires of Mme. de R^musat 
[Eng. tr.]; the Memoires of Mme. Avrillon (who was lady's maid to 
the Empress Josephine); the Memoires of Beugnot [Eng. tr.]; Souvenirs 
of the Due de Broglie [Eng. tr.]; V^ron, Memoires d'un bourgeois de 
Paris, vol. I; Faber, Notices sur I'interieur de la France; the Considera- 
tions of Mme. de Stael, vol. II [Eng. tr.]; the despatches of Mettemich, 
in the second vol. of the " Nachgelassene Papiere " [Eng. tr. as "Me- 
moirs"]; Pelet de la Lozfere, Opinions de Napoleon au Conseil d'Etat; 
the Memoires of VitroUes, vol. II, p. 443 ff.; Welschinger, La Censure 
sous Napoleon P""; Sainte- Beuve, Chateaubriand et son groupe litteraire, 
2 vols.; Merlet, Tableau de la Htterature frangaise, 1800-1815, Paris, 
1877; B. JuUien, Histoire de la poesie k Tepoque imperiale; Vauthier, 
Lemercier; Nodier, Souvenirs; Brunetifere, Etudes critiques sur F histoire 
de la litt^rature frangaise, 1880; Boissonade, La critique htteraire sous 
le premier Empire; Fauchille, La question juive sous le premier Empire, 
1886; Taine, "NapoMon Bonaparte" in his Le regime moderne, vol. I. 

On the relations with the Powers m general: Lefebvre, Histoire dea 



Bibliography 767 

Cabinets, vol. Ill of the second ed., Paris, 1866-69; Vandal, Napoleon et 
Alexandre P'", vol. I, a work based on the documents in the archives of 
St. Petersburg and Paris and the notes of the most distinguished diplo- 
matists, in which the author sets forth in detail the situation in 1807 and 
1808. The only criticism to be made is that the author takes too literally- 
some of the documents in the archives. In addition, Tatistcheff, Alex- 
andre 1^^ et Napoleon; Talleyrand, Memoires, ed. by Broglie [Eng. tr,], 
London, 1891-92, vol. I; Memoires of Field-Marshal Count von Stedinck, 
Swedish Minister to Russia; Bemliardi, Geschichte Russlands im 19. 
Jahrh., vol. 11. 2. On the relations with Prussia: G. Hassel, Geschichte 
der Preuss. Pohtik, 1807-1808, vol. I; and the article of Duncker, "Preus- 
sen wahrend der franzosischen Occupation" in his Aus der Zeit Fried- 
richs des Grossen und Friedrich-Wilhelm, III. 3. On the relations with 
Austria; Beer, Zehn Jahre osterreich. Politik, and the same. Die oriental- 
ische Politik Osterreichs seit 1774; the Memoirs and reports of Metternich 
in the second vol. of his " Nachgelassene Papiere " [Eng. tr. as " Memoirs"]. 
4. With the Pope and Italy in general: Haussonville and the writers 
previously mentioned; in addition, Mayol de Lup6, Un pape prisonnier 
In the " Correspondant," 1884 and 1885; Castro, Storia politica moderna 
d'ltalia dal 1799 al 1814; Corracini, (La Folic) Histoire de I'administra- 
tion du royaume d'ltalie; Sclopis, La domination frangaise en Italic, pub. 
by the Academic des sciences morales et politiques, 1861; Castro, Milano 
durante la dominazione napoleonita. 5. With Spain: Baumgarten, 
Greschichte Spaniens, vol. I — all the Spanish memoir literature is mentioned 
in it; Bernhardi, Napoleon I. Politik in Spanien, "Histor. Zeitschrift," 
vol. 40 . The most important general history is Laf uente, Historia general de 
Espafia, Especially instructive is Rehfues, L'Espagne en '08 ou recherches 
sur I'Etat de I'administration, de^ Sciences, etc., etc., faites dans un voyage 
k Madrid en I'annee '08, Paris, 1811: in addition, the Memoires of Joseph 
and those of Miot de M^lito, vol. Ill; Escoiquiz, Exposition sincere des 
raisons et des motifs qui engagerent S. M. C. le roi Ferdinand VII a faire 
le voyage de Bayonne en '08, trad, de I'espagn. par J. M. de Carnero, 
Toulouse, 1814; the letters of Murat to Savary, from Madrid, 1808, "Mit- 
theilungen des Instituts f. osterr. Geschichtsforschung," 1880; Southey, 
History of the Peninsular War, London, 1823; Thiers, vol. VIII, needing 
correction in many details. On the interview at Erfurt, besides the 
works already mentioned on the foreign relations of France: Hausser, 
Deutsche Geschichte, vol. Ill; the memoirs of the Germans, Miiflaiing, 
F. de Miiller, and Steffens; the memoirs of Metternich, particularly for 
the part played by Talleyrand in vol. II of his "Nachgelassene Papiere" 
[Eng. tr. " Memoirs"]; Talleyrand, Memoires, vol. I; Count Choiseul-Goufl&er, 
Reminiscences sur Napoleon et Alexandre I®^; Meneval, Napoleon et 
Marie-Louise, 3d vol. [Eng.tr. as "Memoirs"]; Ernouf, Maret, due de Bas- 
sano; the Memoirs of Montgelas; Bittard des Fortes, Les preliminaires 
de I'entrevue d'Erfurt, "Revue d'histoire diplom.," 1890; Descrip- 
tion des f^tes donn^es k LL. MM. les empereurs Napoleon et Alexandre 



768 Bibliography 

par Charles Auguste, due de Saxe-Weimar, 1809; Souvenirs de I'entrevue 
d'Erfurt par un page de Napoleon, the " Correspondant," 63d vol. 

[V*® de Broc, La Vie en France sous le premier Empire, Paris, 1895; 
A. Lemoine, Napoleon I^'" et les Juifs, Paris, 1900; J. L^mann, Napo- 
leon et les Israelites, La preponderance juive, 2"^® partie, son organi- 
sation, 1806-15, Lyon, 1894; Ph. Sagnac, Les Juifs et Napoleon, 
1806-1808, Rev. d'hist. mod. et contemp., vols. II and III, 3 arts.; A. 
Fischer, Goethe und Napoleon, eine Studie, Frauenfeld, 1899; Le Lieut.- 
Col. Clerc, La Capitulation de Baylen — Causes et Consequences, Paris, 
1903; J. Jordan de Urries, Memorias dal Marques de Ayerbe sobre la 
estancia de don Fernando YII en Valengay y el principio de la guerra de 
la independencia, Saragossa, 1896.] 



CHAPTER XV 

The Campaigns in Spain and Austria. Marie Louise. 1808-1810 

On the campaign in Spain see the works mentioned for Chapter XIV, 
and in addition the Correspondance of Napoleon^ vols. XVII and XVIII; 
Ducasse, Les rois freres de Napoleon, I; Yorck, Napoleon als Feldherr, 
vol. II ; Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula ; the Correspondance 
of Davout; souvenirs of Fezensac; the cahiers of Captain Coign'^t [Eng. 
tr. as ''Narrative"]; the "Letters from Spain by German Soldiers" in 
Bernays, Die Schicksale des Grossherzogtums Frankfurt u. s. Truppen. 
On the expedition against Sir John Moore : A Narrative of the Campaign 
of the British Army in Spain commanded by Sir John Moore, London, 
1809. On the causes of the war with Austria: Metternich, Nachgelassene 
Papiere [Eng. tr. as " Memoirs"] — the despatches of vol. II are often at vari- 
ance with the recollections in vol. I, cf. Bailleu, DieMemoirenMetternichs 
in the "Histor. Zeitschrift," Neue Folge, vol. VIII; the reports of Fred. 
Stadion, sent from Bavaria from 1807 to 1809, " Archiv f iir osterr. Ge- 
schichte," 63d vol.; the Denkwiirdigkeiten of Montgelas; in addition, 
Thiers; Bignon; Beer, Zehn Jahre osterr. Folitik; Wertheimer, Geschichte 
Osterreichs u. Ungarns im ersten Jahrzehnten des 19. Jahrh., vol. II, 
based on the memoranda of Archduke Charles and following them too 
closely; Albert Jager, Zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges von 1809, "Sitz- 
ungsberichte " of the Vienna Academy. On the attitude of Russia: 
Bernhardi, Geschichte Russlands, vol. II; Mazade, Alexandre P^ et le 
Prince Czartoryski; Czartoryski, Correspondance in vol. II of his Me- 
moires [Eng, tr.]; the Souvenirs of de Maistre. On the attitude of Prussia: 
Hassel, Gesch. der preuss. Politik seit 1807, vol. I; the articles of Max 
Duncker, "Preussen wahrend der franz. Okkupation" and "Eine 
Milliarde Kriegsentschadigung, welche Preussen an Frankreirh gezahlt 
hat," in his "Aus der Zeit Friedrich d. Grossen u. Friedr. Wilhelm III., 
vol. I; Max Duncker, "Friedr. Wilhelm im Jahre 1809" in his Abhand- 



Bibliography 769 

lungen aus der neueren Geschichte; Ranke, "Hardenberg und die Ge- 
schichte des preussischen Staates von 1793-1813," Sammtl. Werke, vol. 
48; A. Stern, Abhandlungen und Aktenstiicke zur Geschichte der preus- 
sischen Reformzeit ; M. Lehmann, Scharnhorst, 2d vol.; Boy en, Erinne- 
rungen, 1st vol.; Martens, Reeueil des traites conclus par la Russie, 6th 
vol.; H. V. Kleist, Politische Schriften und andere Nachtrage zu seinen 
Werken, ed. by R. Kopke, Berlin, 1862. On the campaign in Bavaria and 
in Austria, in addition to the military works which have been mentioned 
before: 1. French authorities: the Correspondance de Napoleon P^; 
Pelet, Memoire sur la guerre de 1809 en Allemagne, 4 vols., 1825; Cadet 
de Gassicourt, Voyage en Autriche, 1818; S^gur, Histoire et Memoires, 
3d vol.; Marmont, Memoires, 3d vol.; Rapp, Memoires; in addition, the 
Correspondance of Davout and the Memoires et Correspondance of Prince 
Eugfene, vol. IV. 2. Austrian authorities: Stutterheim, La Guerre de 1809 
entre FAutriche et la France ; in addition, Der Feldzug des Jahres 1809 in 
Siiddeutschland in Streffleur's ''Osterr. milit. Zeitschrif t, " 1862. Stutter- 
heim is continued by Welden, Der Krieg von 1809 zwischen Osterreich und 
Frankreich von Anfang Mai bis zum Friedensschlus, 1872. On the battle 
of Aspern or Essling in particular: Schels, Die Schlacht bei Aspern am 
21. u. 22. Mai 1809 in Strefileur's '' Zeitschrif t, " 1843; Angeli, Wagram, 
Novelle zur Geschichte von 1809 (Mittheilungen des k. k. Kriegsarchivs, 
1881); Varnhagen, Die Schlacht bei Wagram, in his Memoirs; Ruble 
von Lilienstern, Reise eines Malers mit der Armee im Jahre 1809, vol. Ill, 
also his art. in ''Pallas," 1810; Hormayr, Lebensbilder a. d. Befreiungs- 
Kriegen, 3 vols. ; Hormayr, Kaiser Franz und Metternich ; Archduke John, 
Das Heer von Innerosterreich; F. de Gentz, Tagebiicher, 1st vol. The 
reports of Count Hardenberg in the archives of Hanover are pretty nearly 
in accord with Gentz's diary. Some extracts from them will be found 
in Oncken, Das Zeitalter der Revolution, des Kaiserreichs u. der Befrei- 
ungs-Kriege, 2d vol. The diary of Mayer de Heldensfeld, which is in the 
archives of the war department at Vienna, is not accessible to scholars. 
The Erinnerungen of Radetsky in "Mittheil. des k. k. Kriegsarchivs," 
1887; Radetsky, Denkschrift liber die osterr. Armee nach der Schlacht 
bei Wagram, ''Mittheil. des. k. k. Kriegsarchivs," 1884; in addition, 
the very instructive report of an Austrian officer on Die Armee Napoleon I. 
im J. 1809, mit vergleichenden Riickblicken auf das osterreichische Heer 
(ibid. 1881) ; Wertheimer's Geschichte Osterrichs und Ungarns im ersten 
Jahrzehnt des 19. Jahrh., based on the memoranda of Archduke Charles, 
is not impartial. Interesting details from the papers of Archduke John 
will be found in Krones, Geschichte Osterreich im Zeitalter der fran- 
zosischen Kriege, Gotha, 1886; and in Zwiedineck-Siidenhorst, Erzherzog 
Johann im Feldzug 1809, Graz, 1892. In his review of Krones in the 
"Histor. Zeitschrift," 1887, Fournier has published the letters of Arch- 
duke Charles after the battle of Essling (Aspern). The letters of Stadion 
to his wife which are referred to in the text are still unpublished. Others 
of his letters may be found in Thurheim, Ludwig, Fiirst Starhemberg, 



770 Bibliography 

Graz, 1889. On the agitation which prevailed in Germany at this time, 
in addition to the works mentioned above on the attitude of Prussia, 
see Hausser, Deutsche Geschichte, 3d vol., where the literature is indi- 
cated in detail, and also Steindorff's edition of the Quellenkunde of 
Dahl m ann- Waitz, Gottingen, 1894. On the uprising in the Tyrol and 
the literature of it: Egger, Geschichte Tirols, 3d vol., and C. Clair, Andre 
Hofer et I'insurrection du Tyrol en 1809, Paris, 1880, On the Peace 
of Schonbrunn, the works of Thiers and of Bignon, both of whom 
made use of the memoranda of Champagny; Ernouf, Maret, due de Bas- 
sano, based on Maret's recollections; Beer, Zehn Jahre osterreichischer 
Politik; Kiinkowstrom, Aus der alten Registratur der Staatskanzlei; 
Gentz, Tagebiicher, 1st vol.; Fournier, Gentz und der Friede von Schon- 
brunn, "Deutsche Rundschau," 1886; Bj-ones, Zur Geschichte, etc., and 
Foumier's review in the ''Histor. Zeitschrif t. " Mettemich's Memoirs 
are quite unreliable. The private correspondence of Prince Johann 
Lichtenstein for this year was burned after his death. On Staps' attempt 
at assassination: Fr. Staps, erschossen zu Schonbrunn bei Wien auf 
Napoleons Befehl im Oktober 1809, eine Biographie a. d. hinterlassenen 
Papieren seines Vaters, Berlin, 1843; in addition, the Memoires of Rapp 
and the Memorial of the treasurer, Peyrusse. On Marie Louise : Helfert, 
Marie Louise; Correspondance de Marie Louise, 1799-1847, Lettres 
intimes, 1887; the despatches of Metternich in vol. II of his "Nachge- 
lassene Papiere" [Eng. tr. as " Memoirs"]; Mettemich's letters to his friends 
among the diplomats in Hormayr, Lebensbilder a. d. Bef reiungskriegen ; 
Vandal, Pro jet de mariage de Napoleon I®^ avec la grande duchesse Anne 
de Russie, in the '' Correspondant," 1890; Wertheimer, Die Heirat der 
Erzherzogin Marie Luise mit Napoleon, ''Archiv f. osterr. Geschichte," 
64th v.; Welschinger, Le divorce de Napoleon, Paris, 1889. Both these 
works are deficient i'n their treatment of the political causes. Also, Duhr, 
Ehescheidung und 2. Heirath Napoleon I., "Zeitschrift fiir katholische 
Theologie," 1888; Lefebvre, Histoire des Cabinets de FEurope, 5th vol.; 
Ernouf, Maret, due de Bassano; Barante, Souvenirs, 1st vol.; Broglie, 
Souvenirs, 1st vol. [Eng. tr.]; Montgelas, Denkwiirdigkeiten. 

[C. Oman, History of the Peninsular War, vols. I-II, London, 
1903; Balagny, Campagne de I'Empereur Napoleon en Espagne 1808- 
1809, par le Commandant brevets Balagny, Paris, 1902, vol. I; J. 
Gomez de Arteche, Guerra de la Independencia, Historia mili- 
tar de Espana de 1808-1814, 14 vols., Madrid, 1903; Marshal Jour- 
dan, Memoires militaires (guerre d'Espagne) ecrits par lui-m^me^ 
publ. par le manuscrit orig. par le V*^ de Grouchy, Paris, 1899; 
W. Tomkins, Diary of a Cavalry Officer in the Peninsular and 
Waterloo Campaigns, London, 1894; H. de Jomini, Guerre d'Espagne, 
Extrait des Souvenirs inedits (1808-14), pub. par F. Lecomte, Lausanne, 
1892; E. Guillen, Les Guerres d'Espagne sous Napoleon, Paris, 1902; Pardo 
de Andrade, Los guerrilleros gallegos de 1809: cartas y relaciones escritas 
por testigos oculares, 2 vols., Cormua, 1893; Geoffrey de Grandmaison, 



Bibliography 77 1 



Savary en Espagne, 1808, " Rev. des quest. hist.," vol. 67, 1900; the same, 
Talleyrand et les affaires d'Espagne in 1808 d'apres des documents in^dits, 
ibid., vol. 68, 1900; L. Lecestre, La guerre de la Peninsule d'apres de la 
correspondance in^dite de Napoleon, ibid., April, 1896; Saski, Campagne 
de '09 en Allemagne et en Autriche et en Hongrie, 3 vols., Paris, 1899-1902, 
pub. under the supervision of the historical section of the General Staff; 
A. Menge, Die Schlacht von Aspern am 21. und 22. Mai 1809, Berlin, 
1900; A. Strobl, Aspern und Wagram: Kurze Darstellung, etc.,Wien, 1897; 
H. Schmolzer, A. Hofer und seine Kampfgenossen, Innsbruck, 1900; F. 
Masson, Josephine imperatrice et reine, Paris, 1900; Calmet de Santerre, 
Le divorce de I'Empereur et le code Napoleon, Paris, 1894; Vandal, 
Napoleon et Alexandre I®^, vol. II, 1809, Le second mariage de Napo- 
leon, Paris, 1893; the same, Negociations avec la Russie relatives au 
second mariage de Napoleon, '' Rev. hist.," vol. 44, Paris, 1900; A. Becker, 
Der Plan der zweiten Heirat Napoleons in " Mittheilungen des. Inst, 
fiir Osterr. Geschichtsforschung," vol. 19, Innsbruck, 1898; H. Wel- 
schinger, Le roi de Rome, 1811-1832, Paris, 1897; E. Wertheimer, Der 
Herzog v. Reichstadt, ein Lebensbild, Stuttgart, 1902; A. Liimbroso, 
Napoleone II, Roma, 1903; Sassenay, le Marquis de. Napoleon P^ et la 
Fondation de la Republique Argentine, Paris, 1892.] 

CHAPTER XVI 

At the Zenith. 1810-1812 

For the negotiations with the Pope: Haussonville, L'Eglise romaine 
et le premier Empire, vols. Ill and IV (fundamental). Also, Majol de 
Lup6, Un Pape prisonnier, in the " Correspondant " for 1887; H. Chotard, 
Le Pape Pie VII. k Savonne, 1887 (based on the correspondence of the 
prefect Chabrol and the memoirs of Lebzeltern); De Pradt, Les quatre 
Concordats; Mettemich, " Nachgelassene Papiere," vol. II [Eng. tr. by 
Napier as ''Memoirs," etc., London, 1880]. For relations with Spain: 
The Memoires of Joseph Bonaparte and of Miot de M€lito [Eng. tr.]; 
Gurwood, Wellington's Despatches; Baumgarten, Geschichte Spaniens 
vom Ausbruch, etc., vol. I; Thiers, Consulat et Empire [Eng. tr. by Camp- 
bell, London, 1862], vol. XII; Maxwell, Life of Wellington, London, 
1839-1841; Pertz, Die politische Bedeutung des Jahres 1810 (paper before 
the Berlin Academy of Sciences, 1861, containing the negotiations with 
Asanza from Stein's papers). On relations with Holland: Jorissen, 
Napoleon I. et le Roi de HoUande, 1868; F. Rocquain, Napoleon I. et le 
Roi Louis, 1875; Louis Bonaparte, Documents historiques et Reflexions 
sur le gouvernement de la Hollande, 1820, vol. Ill (Napoleon denied 
their authenticity in his will, but it has been fully established by later 
research); Du Casse, Les rois f reres de Napoleon I. (Appendice). On the 
States bordering the North Sea: Hausser, Deutsche Geschichte vom 
Tode, etc., vol. Ill; Correspondance de Napoleon P"*, vol. XXII; Have- 



772 Bibliography 

mann, Das Kurfiirstenthum Hannover unter zehnjahriger Fremdherr- 
schaft, 1803-1813, Jena, 1867; Monckeburg, Hamburg unter dem Drucke 
der Franzosen 1806-1814, Hamburg, 1863; Wohlwill, Die Verbindung 
zwischen Elbe und Rhein durch Kanale und Landstrassen nach den 
Projekten Napoleon I. (Transactions of the "Verein fiir Hamburger 
Geschichte," 1884, part 4). On the Continental system: Kiesselbach, 
Geschichte der Kontinentalsperre, 1849. On Napoleon's relations with 
Denmark and Sweden: Garden, Histoire generale des Traites, vol. 
IX; Lefebvre, Histoire des Cabinets de I'Europe, 1866-9, vol. V; 
Thiers, vol. XII; Swederus, Schwedens PoHtik und Kriege, 1808-1814 
(German tr. by Frisch, 1866) ; A. W. Schlegel, Uber das Kontinentalsystem 
u. d. Einfluss auf Schweden, 1814; Schinkel, Minnen ur Sveriges nyare 
historia, Upsala, 1800 (contains letters of the Swedish envoy from Paris 
in the year 1810, unfortunately translated into Swedish); Suremain, 
Memoirs (MSS.; extracts were published in the "Revue contemporaine " 
for 1868); Almfelt, La diplomatic russe k Stockholm en 1810 ("Revue 
historique," 1888, vol. XXXVII. In regard to Naples: Helfert, Konigin 
Karoline v. Neapel u. Sicilien, 1878 (the earlier literature is quoted in 
this work); by the same author also, Maria Karolina v. Osterreich: 
Anklagen u. Verteidigung, 1884; 0. Browning, Caroline of Naples (in 
" English Historical Review," 1887, no. 6, based on the despatches of 
Bentinck) . On Napoleon's entanglement with Russia : Correspondance de 
Napoleon I®^; Memoires of S6gur [Eng. tr. of first part by Patchett-Martin, 
London, 1895], of Villemain, and of Czartoryski [Eng. tr. by Gielgud, 
London, 1888]; Bernhardi, Geschichte Russlands, vol. II; Lefebvre, vol. 
V; Thiers, vol. XIII; Ranke, Hardenberg u. Preussen (vol. 48 of his com- 
plete works, 1879); Jomini, Precis politique et militaire des campagnes 
de 1812 k 1814, 1886; Martens, Recueil des traites conclus par la 
Russie, vols. Ill and VII; Bogdanovitch, Geschichte des Feldzugs i, 
Jahre 1812 (German tr. by Baumgarten, 1862-3), vol. I. In the "Sbornik" 
of the Russian Historical Society are published the reports of Kurakin 
and Tchernicheff ; Harnack, Zur Gesch. u. Vorgesch. d. Krieges von 1812, 
"Historische Zeitschrif t, " 1889, vol. LXII; Diplomatische Geschichte 
d. Krieges von 1812, in Streffleur's "Ost. mil. Zeitschrift" (wholly devoid 
of scientific value). On internal affairs in France before the war in the 
north: Thiers, vol. XIII; Lanfrey-Kalckstein, Gesch. Napoleons I., vol. 
VI; Forneron, Les ^migr^s et la societe frangaise sous Napoleon P^, 
vol. Ill of his Hist. gen. des emigres; Welschinger, La censure sous 
le premier Empire, 1882; same author. La direction generale de I'impri- 
merie et de la librairie in the periodical "Le Livre," 1887 and 1890; 
V^ron, Memoires d'un Bourgeois de Paris, 1856-7, vol. I; Correspondance 
de Napoleon P'"; Fiev6e, Correspondance et relations avec Bonaparte, 1837, 
vol. Ill (1809 to March, 1813); MoUien, Souvenirs d'un ministre du tresor, 
1845. On relations with the states of the Confederation of the Rhine. 
Perthes, Politische Zustande u. Personen in Deutschland zur Zeit der 
franzosichen Herrschaft, 1863, vol. II; Winkoop, Der Rheinische Bund, 



Bibliography 773 

1810-12; Memoires et correspondance du Roi Jerome; Du Casse, op. 
cit.; Gocke, Das Konigreich Westfalen, 1888, and Das Grossherzog- 
thum Berg, etc., 1877; Beaulieu-Marconnay, Karl von Dalberg und seine 
Zeit, 1879; Bemays, Schicksale des Grossherrzogtums Frankfurt, 1882; 
Schlossberger, Polit. u. milit. Korrespondenz Friedr. v. Wiirtemberg mit 
K. Napoleon I., 1805-13, 1899, and also Briefweehsel d. Konigin Katha- 
rina v. Westfalen, 1887; Montgelas, Denkwiirdigkeiten ; La Baviere en 
1812 et 1813, " Revue contemporaine, " 1869; Wohlwill, Weltbiirgerthum u. 
Vaterlandsliebe der Schwaben, 1875. On the alliance with Prussia and 
Austria: Ranke, Hardenberg; Duncker, Preussen wahrend der franzos. 
Okkupation (from the time of Frederick the Great and of Frederick 
William III.); Lehmann, Scharnhorst, 1887, vol. II; Delbriick, Gneisenau, 
1882, vol. I; Alfr. Stem, Abhandlungen u. Aktenstlicke zur Geschichte 
der preussischen Reformzeit, 1807-13; Martens, Recueil des traites conclus 
par la Russie, vol. VII; Bignon, Histoire de France, etc., 1838-50, vol. 
X; Metternich Nachgelassene Papiere, vol. II [Eng. tr.]; Binder von 
Kriegelstein, Precis des transactions du Cabinet de Vienne de 1806 k 
1816, ' ' Steiermark. Geschichtsblatter," 1884; Martens, op, cit. Ill; Ernouf, 
Maret; Oncken, Osterreich und Preussen im Befreiungskriege, 1876-9, 
vol. II; Foumier, Stein u. Griiner, Zur Vorgeschichte d. Befreiungskriege, 
"Deutsche Rundschau," 1887. 

[In addition to the works mentioned earlier in the supplementary 
sections: A. Pirk, Aus der Zeit der Not, 1806-15; Schilderungen 
zur preussischen Gesch. aus dem briefiichen Nachlasse des Feldmar- 
schalls Niedhart von Gneisenau, Berlin, 1900; A. Kleinschmi dt, Ge- 
schichte des Konigreichs Westphalen, Gotha, 1893; R. Holzapfel, Das 
Konigreich Westphalen, Magdeburg, 1895; F. Thimme, Die innern 
Zustande des Kurfiirstentums Hannover unter der franzosisch-west- 
phalischen Herrschaft, 1806-'13, 2 vols., Hannover, 1893-95; A. 
Lnmbroso, Napoleone I e I'lnghilterra, Saggio suUe origini del blocco 
continentale e sulle sue conseguenze economiche (Bibliog.), Rome, 1897, 
reviewed and summarized by W. M. Sloane in the "Political Science 
Quarter] >-," June, 1898; Hitzigrat, Hamburg und die Kontinentalsperre, 
Hambu ;, 1900; J. H. Rose, Napoleon and English Commerce, "Eng. 
Hist. Rev.," VIII, 1893; the same. Life of Napoleon L, II, 95-115, Lon- 
don, 1902; A. Vandal, Napoleon et Alexandre I®*", vol. Ill, La rupture, 
Paris, 1896; F. Masson, Napoleon chez lui, la Journee de I'Empereur, 
Paris, 1894 [Eng. tr. as Napoleon at Home, London, 1894]; J. de la Ru- 
pelle, Les finances de guerres de France, 1796-'15, "Annales de I'Ecole 
libre des sciences pol.," Oct. 1892 and Jan. 1893; Geoffrey de Grandmaison, 
Napol6on P^ et les cardinaux noirs, Paris, 1895; Margueron, Campagne 
de Russie, I®'' Partie, Tom. I-III, Jan. 1810— Jan. 1812, Paris, 1897-1900.| 



774 Bibliography 



CHAPTER XVII 
Moscow. 1812 

The literature on the Russian campaign is enormous; only the most 
important is given here. Besides vol. 24 of the Correspondance of Napo- 
leon the materials comprise the memoirs of his generals, the narratives 
of the Russian generals, the accounts of German and French officers, 
also the official Russian sources, all of which have been made the basis 
of recent historical works on the war. Much of the French material may- 
have got lost on the retreat. 

I, Memoirs and documents, a. From French side: Du Casse, 
M^moires et Correspondance du Prince Eugene, 1858-60; Memoirs 
of Rapp, 1823; Gouvion Saint-Cyr, 1829-31; S6gur (vols. 4 and 5 
of Histoire et Memoires); Bausset, Paris, 1827 [Eng. tr. Philadelphia, 
1828]; Constant, Paris, 1830-31 and 1894 [Eng. tr. London, 1830, new ed. 
1894]; Gourgaud, Napoleon et la Grande Armee en Russie ou examen 
critique de I'ouvrage de Segur, Paris, 1825 [Eng. tr. Paris, 1825]; Fain, 
Manuscrit de 1812, Paris, 1827; Villemain, Souvenirs contemporains 
1855-6 (based on reminiscences of Narbonne); Davout, Correspondance 
(ed. Mazade, 1885), vol. Ill: Blocqueville, Le Mar^chal Davout, Paris, 
1879-80, vol. Ill (containing his letters to his wife) ; Peynisse, Memorial 
et Archives, Carcassonne, 1869; F^zensac, Souvenirs militaires, Paris, 
1870 [the Journal de la Campagne de Russie en 1812, first pub. in 1850, 
Eng. tr. by KnoUys, London, 1852]; Denni^e, Itineraire de I'Empereur 
Napoleon pendant la campagne de 1812, 1842 ; Coignet (already an officer 
in this campaign), Cahiers, 1889 [Eng. tr. as Narrative of Captain C.]; 
L^her, Lettre d'un capitaine de cuirassiers sur la campagne de Russie, 
Paris, 1885 ; Vaudoncourt, Memoires pour servir a F histoire de la guerre entre 
la France et la Russie en 1812, London, 1815; Labaume, Relation cir- 
constancee de la campagne de Russie en 1812, Paris, 1814, and later [Eng. 
tr. London, 1815, ed. by Parker, 1844]; Larrey, Memoires de chirurgie 
mihtaire, 1812-18 [Eng. tr. by Hall, Baltimore, 1814; by Waller, London]; 
Bourgeois, Tableau de la campagne de Moscou, Paris, 1814; Puibusque, 
Lettres sur la guerre de Russie, Paris, 1816 and later, b. From the 
Allies: V. Lossberg, Brief e in die Heimat geschrieben wahrend d. Feld- 
zugs 1812 in Russland, Cassel, 1844; Wolzogen, Memoiren des Generals 
v. Wolzogen, Leipzig, 1851 ; Ponitz, Militarische Brief e eines Verstorbenen, 
Adorf, 1841-5; Roos, Ein Jahr aus meinem Leben, St. Petersburg, 1832; 
Von Meerheim, Erlebnisse eines Veteranen der grossen Armee wahrend des 
Feldzugs in Russland im Jahre 1812, Dresden, 1860; Theodor Goethe, 
Aus dem Leben e. siichsischen Husaren, Leipzig, 1853; Funck, Erinne- 
rungen aus dem Feldzuge des sachsischen Corps 1812, Dresden, 1829 
Legler, Denkwiirdigkeiten aus dem russischen Feldzuge, Glarus, 1868 
Leisnig, Erinnerungen e. sachsischen Dragoneroffiziers, Leipzig, 1828 
R5der v. Bomsdorf, Mitteilungen aus dem russischen Feldzuge, Leipzig, 



Bibliography yj^ 

1810; Stoltyk, Napoleon en Russie, Paris, 1836; Albrecht Adam, Aus d. 
Leben e. Schlachtenmahlers, Stuttgart, 1886 (he was in Eugene's head- 
quarters at Moscow); Wessenberg, "Denkschrift uber den russischen 
Feldzug" in the '' Deutsche Revue" for 1881. c. From the Russian camp: 
Herzog Eugen v. Wurtemberg, Memoiren, Frankfort, 1862 (cf. Helldorf, 
Aus d. Leben des Prinzen Eugen v. Wurtemberg) ; Bemhardi, Denkwiirdig- 
keiten d. Generals Toll, Leipzig, 1865, vols. I and II; Tchitchagoflf, Me- 
moires inedits, Berlin, 1855 (cf. Hamack, Zur Vorgeschichte u. Gl«sch. 
d. Krieges v. 1812, in " Hist. Zeitschrift," vol. LXI). The numerous un- 
printed journals of Russian generals have been used by Bogdanovitsch 
(see infra) ; Wilson, Narrative of Events during the Invasion of Russia, 
London, 1860. [Also, Private Diary during the Campaigns of 1812- 
1814, London, 1861.] 

II. Historical narratives of the campaign: Cham bray, Histoire de 
Texpedition de Russie, 3 vols., Paris, 1823 and later (fundamental). 
The works of the Russian historians Buturlin, Paris, 1824, Michai- 
lowsky-Danilewsky [Ger. tr. Leipzig, 1840]; Ker- Peter, Smitt, Leipzig, 
1861, are all superseded by the comprehensive narrative of Bogdano- 
vitsch, based on authentic sources in the Russian archives for military 
topography, but without making use of Napoleon's correspondence. 
Yorck uses the latter and is accordingly fuller on certain points in his 
Napoleon als Feldherr, 1887-8, vol, II [Eng. tr.]; also Thiers, XXII and 
XIV; Jomini; Forster, Napoleons I russischer Feldzug, 1857; Beitzke, 
CJesch. d. russ. Krieges, Bremen, 1883; Clausewitz, Hinterlassene Werke, 
1862-89, VII [Eng. tr. of part on Russian camp., London, 1843]; Lanfrey- 
Kalckstein, VI. Tolstoi's little book, Napoleon et la campagne de Russie, is 
an attempt as brilliant as it is unsuccessful to combine fiction and his- 
tory. Special phases of the* war: a. Preparations and beginning of cam- 
paign: De Pradt, Histoire de I'ambassade dans le Grande-Duche de 
Varsovie en 1812, Paris, 1815, and later [Eng. tr. London, 1816]; Bignon, 
Souvenirs d'un diplomate, Paris, 1864; Lensky, Notice historique, sur les 
armements qui eurent lieu en Lithuanie pendant I'occupation frangaise 
en 1812; Ernouf, Maret, due de Bassano; Zusammenstellung d. diplom. 
u. milit. Massnahmen Napoleon I. zur Einleitung des Feldzuges 
von 1812, "Jahrb. f. d. deutsche Armee u. Marine," 1878; Liebert, Die 
Riistungen Napoleons fiir d. Feldzug 1812, appended to part 9, 1888, of the 
" Militar-Wochenblatt." h. On the battle of Borodino: Pelet, La Bataille 
de la Moskwa, ''Spectateur militaire," 1881; Hofmann, Die Schlacht 
bei Borodino, Coblenz, 1846; Ditfurth, Die Schlacht bei Borodino, Mar- 
burg, 1887; Roth von Schreckenstein, Die Kavallerie in d. Schlacht a. d. 
Moskwa, Miinster, 1858; Uber d. Mitwirkung d. sachs. Kiirassier-Brigade 
i. d. Schlacht a. d. Moskwa, ''Osterr. Militar-Zeitschrift," 1824. c. On 
the burning of Moscow: Histoire de la Destruction de Moscou en 1812; 
Rostopchine, La v6rit4 sur I'incendie de Moscou, Paris, 1823; Surrugue, 
Lettres sur I'incendie de Moscou, Paris, 1823. d. On events at the 
crossing of the Beresina cf. the general histories, in particular Bogda- 



776 Bibliography 

novitsch, and the recollections of participants; also Mosbach, Der 
ijbergang iiber die Beresina aus ungedruckten Denkw. d. polnischen 
Obersten Bialkowski, Streffleur's "Osterr. militar. Zeitschrift," 1875; 
Clausewitz (who was with Wittgenstein), "Uber die Schlacht a. d. 
Beresina," letter to Stein, published in the "Hist. Zeitschrift" for 1888; 
Pfuel, Der Riickzug d. Franzosen a. Russland, ed. Forster, Berlin, 1867. 

e. On the share of the Allies in the campaign: Welden, Der Feldzug d. 
Osterreicher gegen Russland i. J. 1812, Vienna, 1870; Angeli, Die Teil- 
nahme d. osterr. Auxiliarkorps im Feldzuge Napoleon I. gegen Russland, 
*' Mitteilungen des k. k. Kriegsarchivs," 1884; Droysen, Leben d. Feld- 
marschalls Yorck, Leipzig, 1890; Guretzky-Comitz, Gesch. d. ersten 
Brandenburger Ulanenregiments, Berlin, 1866; Cerrini, Die Feldziige 
d. Sachsen 1812 u. 1813, Dresden, 1821; Zezschwitz, Die Feldziige d. 
Sach. 1812 u. 1813; Burkersroda, Die Sachsen in Russland, Naumburg, 
1846; Holtzendorff, Gesch. d. konigl. sachs. leichten Infanterie; Liebenstein, 
Die Kriege Napoleons gegen Russland 1812 u. 1813, Frankfort, 1888; 
Minckwitz, Die Brigade Thielmann im Feldzuge v. 1812, Dresden, 1879; 
Krauss, Gesch. d. bayrischen Heeresabteilung im Feldzuge gegen Russ- 
land, Augsburg, 1857; Heilmann, Feldmarschall Fiirst Wrede, Leipzig, 
1881, and Die Bayrische Kavallerie-Division Preysing i. J. 1812, "Jahrb. 

f. d. deutsche Armee u. Marine," vol. 7; Miller, Darstellung d. Feldzuges 
d. franzos. verbiindeten Armee gegen d. Russen i. J. 1812 mit besondere 
Riicksicht auf d. Teilnahme d. kgl. wiirttembergischen Truppen, Stutt- 
gart, 1823; Bernays, Die Schicksale des Grossherzogtums Frankfurt und 
seine Truppen, Berlin, 1882; Biidinger, Die Schweizer i. Feldzug v. 1812, 
" Histor. Zeitschrift," XIX. 

III. On Malet's plot: Lafon, Histoire de la conjuration du general 
Malet, Paris, 1814; Histoire des societes secretes de I'armee et des con- 
spirations militaires qui ont eu pour objet la destruction de gouveme- 
ment de Bonaparte, Paris, 1815; Desmarest, Quinze ans de haute police, 
Paris, 1833, new ed. 1900; Savary, Memoires, Paris, 1829, vol. VI [Eng. 
tr.]; Fi^v^e, Correspondance et relations avec Bonaparte, III; Hamel, 
Histoire des deux conspirations du general Malet, Paris, 1873; Passy, 
Frochot, prefet de la Seine, Evreux, 1867; A. Duruy, "La conspiration 
du general Malet" in his Etudes d'histoire militaire, Paris, 1888. On 
the attempts to assassinate Napoleon: Bernhardi, Toll, vol. II; Senfft, 
"Memoires," Leipzig, 1863; Bernays, Schicksale, etc.; Forster, Napoleon 
I. russischer Feldzug; Bourgoing, Itineraire de Napoleon de Smorgoni 
h Paris, Paris, 1862. A narrative by Wousowicz on Napoleon's journey 
back to Paris, which Emouf quotes in his work on Maret (p. 467), I have 
not had access to. 

[A. Vandal, Napoleon et Alexandre 1^^, III; A. Maag, Die Schicksale 
der Schweizer-Regimenter in Napoleons I Feldzug nach Russland, 
1812, Biel, 1890; G. Bertin, La campagne de 1812 d'apres des temoins 
oculaires, Paris, 1895; M. Exner, Der Anteil der Konigl. Sachsischen 
Armee am Feldzug gegen Russland, 1812, Leipzig, 1896; H. B. George, 



Bibliography 777 

Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, London, 1899; J. Ullmann, Studie iiber 
die Ausriistung und das Verpflegs- und Nachschubwesen im Feldzuge 
Napoleon I. gegen Russland im Jahre 1812, Wien, 1891; Sergent F. Bour- 
gogne, M^moires 1812-1813, ed. by Cottin and Renault, Paris, 1898 
[Eng. trans. London, 1899]; Von der Osten-Sacken, Milit. polit. Geschichte 
d. Befreiungskrieges im Jahr 1813, vol. I, " Vom Njemen bis zur Elbe," 
Berlin, 1902; A. de Pastoret, De Witebsk k la Beresina, "Rev. de 
Paris," Ann^e 9, 'l\ 2, 1902; G. Fabry, Campagne de Russie, 1812, Opera- 
tions Militaires, 1-10 aout, Paris, 1902.] 



CHAPTER XVIII 

Leipzig. 1813 

I. Before the spring campaign, a. On Napoleon's war preparations 
and the internal political measures to promote them: his Correspond- 
ance; Councillor of State Fiivie, Correspondance et Relations avec Bona- 
parte, vol. Ill; Memoires of Savary and MoUien, Paris, 1837, new ed. 
1898; Fain, Manuscrit de Fan '13, Paris, 1824; Thiers, vol. XV; Lanfrey- 
Kalckstein, vol. VI; Rousset, La grande armee de 1813, Paris, 1371; Pelet, 
Tableau de la Grande Armee en 1813. The most complete, howe r, is Die 
franzos. Armee i. J. 1813, Berlin, 1889. h. On the defection of Prussia: 
Droysen, Yorck, I; Eckardt, Yorck und Paulucci, Leipzig, 1865; Ebeling, 
Yorck's Konvention von Tauroggen, " Jahrb. f. d. deutsche Armee u. Ma- 
rine," XXXVIII; Natzmer, Aus d. Leben O. v. Natzmers, Berlin, 1876; 
Henckel v. Donnersmarck, Erinneioingen aus meinem Leben, Zerbst, 1847; 
Ranke, Hardenberg; Duncker, Preussen wahrend der franz. Okkupation 
in his Aus d. Zeit Friedrich d. Grossen u. Friedrich Wilhelm III.; 
Lehman, Scharnhorst, II, presents a different view; Oncken, Oster- 
reich und Preussen im Befreiungskriege, 2 vols. ; a condensed account in 
his Das Zeitalter d. Revolution, d. Kaiserreichs, u. d. Befreiungskriege, 
1884-6, vol. II; Stem, Abhandlungen und Aktenstiicke, etc , containing 
reports of the French ambassador in Berlin ; Aegidi, Knesebecks Sendung 
i. d. russ. Hauptquartier, "Hist. Zeitschrift," XVI; Lehman, Knesebeck 
u. Schon, Leipzig, 1875; Pertz, Das Leben Steins, Berlin, 1849-55, vol. Ill; 
Martens, Recueil des traites conclus par la Russie, vols. VII and III; 
Emouf, Maret. c. On the uprisings and armaments in Germany: Gilde- 
meister. Finks u. Bergers Ermordung, Bremen, 1814; Rist, Lebenserin- 
nerungen, Gotha, 1880; Wohlwill, Die Befreiung Hamburgs am 18. Marz, 
1813, Hamburg, 1888, and Z. Gesch. Hamburgs i. J 1813 ("Transactions 
of the Vereinf. Hamb- Gesch.," 1888); Vamhagen, Denkwiirdigkeiten, vol 
III; Lefebvre, op. cit. III. On Prussian armaments in particular: Hausser, 
Deutsche Geschichte, vol. IV; Ompteda, Politischer Nachlass, Jena, 1869; 
Steffens, Was ich erlebte, Breslau, 1840-4, vol VII; Lehmann, Vorstel- 
lungen u. d. Ausbruch d. Krieges von 1813, " Hist. Zeitschr., " XXVII; fur- 



7/8 Bibliography 

ther, the biographies : Delbiiick's Pertz-Gneisenau ; Euler's Jahn, Lehmann*s 
Schamhorst; Wigger's Bliicher, Schwerin, 1870-9; Eyssenhardt's Niebuhr, 
Gotha, 1886; Vamhagen's Biilow and his Tettenborn, etc.; Ziehlberg, 
Ferdinande von Schmettau; Koberstein, Liitzows wilde verwegene 
Jagd in ''Preuss. Bilderbuch," 1887; K. v. L. Adolf, Liitzows Freikorps, 
Berlin, 1884. d. On the Saxon question and the formation of the co- 
alition: Flathe, Gesch. Sachsens, Gotha, 1873, vol. Ill; Senfft, Memoires; 
Castlereagh's Correspondence, London, 1851-3; Bemhardi, Gesch. Russ- 
lands, Leipzig, 1863-77, vol. II; Apergu des transactions politiques du 
Cabinet de Russie in the " Sbornik " of the Russian Hist. Soc, vol. XXXI; 
Garden, Hist. gen. des Traites, vol. XIV; Thorsoe, Danske Stats politiske 
historie 1800-1814, Copenhagen, 1873; Nielsen, Bidrag til Sveriges poli- 
tiske historic 1813, 1814 ; v. Schmidt, Schweden unter Karl XIV. Johann, 
Heidelberg, 1842; Touchard-Lafosse, Hist. Charles XIV, 1838; also the 
work of Schwederus above mentioned, and lastly Lefebvre, vol. V. 

II. Spring campaign of 1813; Only a few memoirs are available. 
Marmont and Saint-Cyr furnish but little material; S^gur and F€zensac 
were not on the scene of war; the Memorial of Peyrusse is of little account 
here. The only French sources of considerable importance are the Me- 
moires of Eugene (ed. Du Casse), the papers of Davout (ed. Mazade and 
Blocqueville), and especially the reminiscences of the Saxon officer Ode- 
leben in Napoleons Feldzug in Sachsen [Eng. tr.]; consult also the work 
of Fain mentioned above, Norvin's Portefeuille de 1813, and above all 
the Correspondance de Napoleon L, vol. XXV. On the other side: 
Bemhardi, Toll; Muffling, Aus meinem Leben, 2d ed., 1855; Eugen v. 
Wiirttemberg's Memoiren, vol. Ill; Wolzogen, Memoiren; Helldorff's 
Eugen von Wiirtemberg: Prittwitz, Beitrage z. Gesch. d. J. 1813; 
Wilson, Private Diary of 1812, 1813, 1814. General works; Schulz, 
Gesch. d. Feldzug v. 1813; Miiffling, Zur Kriegsgesch. d. Jahre 1813 u. 
1814; Friccius, Gesch. d. Krieges i. d. Jahre 1813 u. 1814; Michailowski- 
Danielewski, Denkwiirdigkeiten a. d. Kriege v. 1813 [German tr. 1837]; 
Plotho, Der Krieg in Deutschland u. Frankreich 1813 u. 1814, 1817; 
Beitzke, Gesch. d. Freiheitskriege (2d ed. by Goldschmidt, 1883; 
Charras, Histoire de la guerre de 1813 en AUemagne, 1870; Bog- 
danovitsch, Gesch. d. Krieges v. 1813 [German tr. by A. S., 1863-9]; 
Jomini, Precis politique et militaire des Campagnes de 1812 k 1814; 
Yorck, Napoleon als Feldherr [Eng, tr. ), vol. II. On the battle of Baut- 
zen in particular: Meerheimb, Die Schlachten bei Bautzen am 20. u. 21. 
Mai 1813, Berlin, 1873. 

III. The period of the truce and Austria's defection: Correspondance 
de Napoleon I., vol XXVI; Bignon, Histoire de France, vols. X and XII; 
Thiers, vol. XVI (based on information given by Mettemich). On the 
other side •. Emouf , Maret, with memoranda of the minister's, and Metter- 
nich, Nachgelassene Papiere, vols, I and II [Eng, tr ]. The report of the 
interview of June 26th at Dresden, composed in 1820, is found in Helfert, 
Marie Louise, in the appendix; Broglie, Souvenirs, vol. 1, 1886-7 [Eng. tr.]; 



Bibliography 779 



Radetzky, Denkschriften milit.-polit. Inhalts, 1858; cf. Wehner, Uber 
zwei Denkschriften Radetzkys a. d. Friihjahr 1813; Hormayr, Lebens- 
bilder a. d. Bef reiungskriege ; Gentz, Depeches inedites aux Hospodars 
de la Valachie, ed. Prokesch, 1876-7, vol. I; De Clercq, Recueil des trait^s 
de la France, vol. II; Martens, Recueil, as above, vol. III. General 
accounts are given in Oncken, Osterreich und Preussen, etc., as above, 
fundamental, although not final; Ranke, Hardenberg; Lefebvre, vol. V. 
On life at the court of Napoleon in Dresden: Odeleben, Napoleons Feld- 
zug in Sachsen. 

IV. The fall campaign of 1813: In addition to works already named 
we have here again the Memoires of Marmont, vol. V, F^zensac, S^gur, 
Saint-Cyr, and Berthezfene; also Du Casse, Vandamme. The foregoing 
are on the French side. On the side of the Allies: Reiche, Memoiren, 
ed. Weltzien, 1857; Colomb, Aus dem Tagebuche d. Rittmeisters v. 
Colomb 1813 u. 1814, Berlin, 1854; Blasendorff, Fiinfzig Briefe Bliichers, 
"Hist. Zeitsch.," LIV; Radetzky, Erinnerungen in ''Mitteil. d. k. k. 
Kriegsarchivs, " 1887; Prokesch-Osten, Denkwiirdigkeiten a. d. Leben 
d. Fiirsten. v. Schwarzenberg, new ed. 1861 ; Thiele, Erinnerungen a. d. 
Kriegerleben eines 82jahrigen Veteranen d. osterr. Armee, Vienna, 1863; 
Heilmann, Fiirst Wrede, 1881; Bianchi, Duca di Casalanza; Richard 
Metternich, Osterr. Teilnahme a. d. Befreiungskriegen, 1887 (with letters 
from Gentz, Metternich, and Schwarzenberg). Supplementary to the 
narratives in the general histories of this special campaign we have: 
Londonderry, Narrative of the War of 1813 and 1814; Burghersh, Opera- 
tions of the Allied Armies under Prince Schwarzenberg and Marshal 
Bliicher, 1822; Hofmann, Gesch. d. Feldzuges v. 1813, Berlin, 1843; 
Pelet, Tableau de la grande armee en septembre et octobre 1813 (not 
reliable); Gesch. d. Nordarmee i. J. 1813, Berlin, 1859; Aster, Schilde- 
rung d. Kriegsereignisse in u. um Dresden, 1856; Wagner, Die Tage 
v. Dresden u. Kulm; Aster, Schilderung d. Kriegsereignisse zwischen 
Peterswalde, Pirna, Konigstein u. Priesten, und d. Schlacht bei Kulm, 
1845; Helfert, Die Schlacht bei Kulm; Kleist, Von Dresden nach 
Nollendorf, supplement to *' Militarwochenblatt," 1889, 3; Helldorf, 
Z. Gesch. d. Schlacht bei Kulm, 1856; Mirus, D. Treifen b. Warten- 
berg, 1863; Schell, D. Operationen d. Korps Bubna, "Osterr. mil. 
Zeitschr.," vol. III. On the battle of Leipzig, first of all, Aster, Die 
Schlachten bei Leipzig, 2d ed., 1856; in addition, the works of Hofmann, 
1835, Naumann, 1863, and Wuttke, 1863; Dorr, D. Schlacht bei Hanau, 
1851; Bochenheimer, Gesch. d. Stadt Mainz, 1813 u. 1814. 

[E. Wiehr, Napoleon und Bernadotte im Herbstfeldzuge, 1813, Berlin, 
1893; G. von Schimpf, 1813; Napoleon in Sachsen, Dresden, 1894; G. 
Bertin, La campagne de 1813, publ. d'apres des temoins oculaires, Paris, 
1896; F. Luckwaldt, Osterreich und die Anfange des Befreiungskrieges 
von 1813: Vom Abschluss der AUianz mit Frankreich bis zum Eintritt 
in die Koahtion, Berlin, 1894; G. Fabry, Journal des Operations des 3. 
et 5. corps en 1813, pub. of the Hist. Sect, of the Gen. Staff, Paris, 



780 Bibliography 

1902; Foucart, Bautzen: Une bataille de deux jours, 20-21 mai 1813, 
Paris, 1897; the same. La poursuite jusqu'^ rarmistice 22 mai — 4 juin 
1813, Paris, 1901; A. G., Strategic napoleonienne, La campagne d'au- 
tomne de 1813 et les lignes interieures, Paris, 1897; Friedrich, Der 
Herbstfeldzug 1813, vol. I, Vom Abschluss d. Waffenstillstand bis z. 
Schlacht bei Kulm, Beriin, 1902.] 



CHAPTER XIX 

Elba. 1814 

I. Before the renewal of the war. On the first negotiations for peace : 
Castlereagh's Correspondence; Metternich, Memoirs, vols. I and II, cf. 
Bailleu, Metternich's Memoiren in "Hist. Zeitschr,," XLiV; Rich. Met- 
ternich, Osterreichs Teilnahme, etc.; Fain, Manuscrit de 1814; Ernouf, 
Maret; Bignon, Histoire de France, vol. XIV; Angeberg, Le Congres de 
Vienne, vol. I; Oncken, Aus den letzten Monaten d. J. 1813, ''Hist. 
Taschenbuch," 1883, and Das Zeitalter d. Rev., u. d. Befreiungskriege, 
1884-6, 2 vols. On internal relations in France: Correspondance de 
Napoleon I., vols. XXVI and XXVII; Buchez et Roux, Histoire Parle- 
mentaire de la Rev. frangaise, vol. XXXIX, Bulletin des lois; Memoirs 
of Mollien, Miot, Bausset, Savary; Meneval, Napoleon et Marie Louise, 
1845, vol. II; B^ranger, Ma biographic, 1859; Rodriguez, Relation de ce 
qui s'est passe k Paris k Tepoquc de la decheance de Buonaparte, 1814 
Journal d'un prisonnier anglais, in " Revue Brittanique," vols. V and VI 
Journal d'un ofiicier anglais pendant Ics quatre premiers mois de 1814 
ibid., vol. IV; V6ron, M^moires d'un bourgeois de Paris, vol. I; Broglie, 
Souvenirs, vol. I; Thiers, vol. XVII; Vaulabelle, Hist, des deux restaura- 
tions; Lubis, Hist, de la restauration, 1848; Houssaye, 1814, Paris, 1888 
(fundamental for internal history), in which the literature for the local 
history for that year is indicated. 

II. The war in France. On the campaign: Correspondance, vol. 
XVII; M^moires du roi Joseph, 1855; Memoirs of Marmont, Belliard, 
Pajol, Lavalette, Koch, Fabvier, Journal des operations du 6^*"® corps; 
Girard, La campagne de Paris en 1814; Beauchamps, Histoire des cam- 
pagnes de 1814 et 1815; Vaudoncourt, Histoire des campagnes de 1814 et 
1815; Du Casse, Le general Arrighi. Sources other than French, besides 
the works already cited: Danitz, Gesch. d. Feldzugs v. 1814, 4 vols.; 
Schels, Die Operationen d. verbiindeten Heere gegen Paris, "Osterr. 
mil. Zeitschr.," 1845; Thielen, Der Feldzug d. verbiindeten Heere; Schulz, 
Gesch. d. Feldzugs v. 1814, 2 vols. ; Nostiz, Tagebuch, " Kriegsgeschicht. 
Einzelschiften," vols. 5 and 6; Delbriick, Gneisenau, vol. II; Colomb. 
Bliicher in Brief en; Boie, Die Stunde d. Entscheidung vor Beginn d. 
ungl. Kampfe i. Febr. 1814, "Jahrb. f. d. deutsche Armee u. Marine," 
1878; Danilewsky, Der Feldzug in Frankreich; Bogdanovitsch, Gesch. 



Bibliography 78 1 

d. Kriegs v. 1814 (German tr. 1866) . On diplomatic negotiations during 
the war, in addition to above-cited sources: Oncken, Lord Castlereagh 
u. d. Minister-Konferenz zu Langres, "Hist. Taschenb.," 1885, and his 
Die Krisis d. letzten Kriegsverhandlungen mit Napoleon I., ibid., 1886; 
Houssaye, 1814, based on the protocols of the Congress of Chatillon; 
Pons de I'H^rault, Le Congres de Chatillon, 1825; Lap6rouse, Le Congres 
de Chatillon. On Napoleon's fall, besides the more general Avorks already 
named: Memoires of Bourrienne, 1829-31 [Eng. tr, b}^ Phipps, 1889]; 
A. B., Bourrienne et ses erreurs, vol. II; Talleyrand, Lettres inedites 
k la Princesse de Courlande, ''Revue d'histoire diplomatique," vol. I; 
VitroUes, Memoires et relations pohtiques, 1884, vol. I; De Pradt, R^cit 
des ^venements qui ont amene la restauration de* la royaute; Rapetti, 
La defection d'Essonnes; Chateaubriand, Memoires d'Outretombe [Eng. 
tr. by Texeira de Mattos, 1902]. The Souvenirs du Due de Vicence 
by Mme. Sorr are not authentic. Also the following newspapers: Moni- 
teur. Journal de 1' Empire, Gazette de France, Journal des Debats. Pam- 
phlets against Napoleon are exceedingly numerous. A collection of 
them with excerpts is given by Germond de Lavigne, Les Pamphlets 
de la fin de I'Empire, des 100 jours et de la Restauration, 1879. 

III. Napoleon at Elba. On the journey to Elba: Helfert, Napoleons 
Fahrt von Fontainebleau nach Elba, 1874, based on reports of the Austrian 
plenipotentiary. General KoUer; "Waldburg-Truchsess, plenipotentiary 
of Prussia, N. Bonapartes Reise v. Fontainebleau nach Frejus, Berlin, 
1815; Campbell, England's plenipot.. Napoleon at Fontainebleau and 
Elba, 1869; J. Fabre, De Fontainebleau k I'ile d'Elbe, 1887— worthless. 
On his residence at Elba: Correspondance, vol. XXVII; Campbell's Notes; 
Pichot, Napoleon k Tile d'Elbe, 1873, based on preceding; Peyrusse, 
Memorial, 1869. Also, Lancelotti, Napoleon auf Elba, Dresden, 1815; 
Foresi, Napoleone I. all' isola dell' Elba, 1884; Livi, Napoleone all' isola 
d'Elba, 1888; Pellet, Napoleon k I'ile d'Elbe, 1888 (these last two works 
rely too much on reports of the secret police) ; Napoleon's own dictated 
narrative under the title L'ile d'Elbe et les Cent Jours in vol. XXXI of 
his "Correspondance" (Hke all his dictations, biassed by a distinct 
purpose, unreliable); Jiing, Lucien Bonaparte et ses Memoires, vol. Ill; 
Fleury de Chaboulon, Memoires de la vie privee, du retour et du regne 
de Napoleon en 1815, London, 1820 [Eng. tr. London, 1820] — describes 
his mission at the behest of Maret; H^risson, Le Cabinet noir, 1887; also 
Thiers, vols. XVIII and XIX; Lubis, vol. Ill; Vaulabelle, vol. II; Lan- 
frey-Kalckstein, vol. VII. The literature on the Vienna Congress does 
not belong here ; yet cf . for Talleyrand's attitude on the question of Elba 
Pallain, correspondance de Talleyrand avec Louis XVIII., and M. Leh- 
mann, D. Tagebuch d. Frh. v. Stein wahrend des Wiener Kongresses, 
"Hist. Zeitschr.," 1888; also Fournier, Talleyrand in "Deutsche Rund- 
schau," 1888. With regard to the blunders of the Bourbons, cf. the 
Memoirs of Vitrolles, vol. II, of V€ron, vol. I, of Broglie, vol. I, and of 
Montgelas. 



782 Bibliography 

[F. von Hiller, Geschichte des Feldzuges '14 gegen Frankreich unter 
besonderer Beriicksichtigung der Anteilnahme der Konigl, wiirtembergi- 
schen Truppen, etc., Stuttgart, 1893; G. Bertin, La campagne de 1814, 
d'apres des temoins oculaires, Paris, 1897; A. Fournier, Der Congress 
von Chatillon, Die Politik im Kriege von 1814, Vienna, 1900; Das Nachtge- 
fecht bei Laon am 9. Marz 1814, in series of monographs pub. by the 
General Staff, Berlin, 1890; G. Roloff, Politik und Kriegfiihrung wahrend 
des Feldzuges von 1814, Berlin, 1891; A. Chuquet, L' Alsace in 1814, 
Paris, 1900; H. Houssaye, Napoleon a Tile d'Elbe, ''Rev. Hist.," vol. 
51, Paris, 1893; A. Fournier, Marie Louise et la chute de Napoleon, " Revue 
hist.," mai — juin 1903; L. G. Pelissier, Le registre de Tile d'Elbe, Lettres 
et ordres inedits de Napoleon pr, 28 mai 1814—22 fevr. 1815, Paris, 1897; 
A. Pingaud, Le congrds de Vienna et la politique de Talleyrand, *' Revue 
hist.," vol. 70, Paris, 1900; Coxrespondance diplomatique des ambas- 
sadeurs et ministres de Russie en France et de France en Russie avec 
leurs gouvemements de 1814 k 1830, ed. by A. Polovtsoff, vol. I, 1814- 
1816, edit, ae la Soc. imp. d'nist. de Russie; Correspondance diplomatique 
de O^ Pozzo di Borgo, ambassadeur de Russie en France et du C*® Nessel- 
rode depuis la restauration des Bourbons, etc., 1814-1818, 2 vols, Paris, 
1890, 1897.] 



CHAPTER XX 

Waterloo. 1815 

I. The Hundred Days' reign: Correspondance, vol. XXVIII; Napoleon, 
L'ile d'Elbe et les Cent- Jours, in Correspondance, XXXI. In particular 
on Napoleon's journey from Cannes to Paris: A. D. B. Mounier, Une 
annee de la vie de I'Emp. Napoleon, 1815; the Memoirs of VitroUes, vol. 
I, Villemain, vol. II, Broglie, vol. I, Lucien Bonaparte, vol. Ill (ed. Jung.), 
Fleury de Chaboulon, vols. I and II, Peyrusse, Mollien, Miot de M^lito, 
vol. Ill, V^ron, vol. I. Further, Benjamin Constant, Memoires sur les 
Cent-Jours, 2d ed., 1829; Sismondi, Notes sur I'Empire et les Cent-Jours, 
"Revue historique," IX, and letters to his mother, ''Revue hist.," VI — 
unreliable ; Hobhouse, the substance of some Letters written by an English- 
man at Paris during the last reign of Emperor Napoleon, London, 1817 
(cf. Napoleon's comments in Correspondance, XXXI); Davout, Corres- 
pondance, vol. IV, ed. Mazade; Blocqueville, Le Marechal Davout, vol. 
IV; B^ranger, Ma biographic; Lord Holland, Foreign Reminiscences, 
London, 1851; Picaud, Carnot, 1885; F. v. Weech, Franzosische Zustande 
wahrend d. hundert Tage u. d. Okkupation, " Hist. Zeitschr.," XVI, 1866, 
based on Wellington's Supplementary Despatches, X. In addition, the 
narrative histories, Thiers, vol. XIX, Vaulabelle, vol. II, Lubis, vol. Ill, 
Bignon, vol. XIV; Thibaudeau, Hist, du Cons, et de I'Empire, vol. X; 



Bibliography 783 



H€lie, Les Constitutions de la France, 1875-9; Politz, Europaische Ver- 
fassungen, 1833, vol. Ill; Archives parlementaires, 2^™^ serie; Germond 
de Lavigne, Les pamphlets de la fin de TEmpire, etc. In addition to 
the newspapers already named, L'Aristarque, L'Independant, LePatriote 
de '89, and Le Nain Jaune, comic. 

II. The campaign of 1815. Napoleon's Correspondance is hardly 
of account here. His narrative of the war, dictated to Gourgaud at St. 
Helena and afterwards published under the latter' s name as La campagne 
de 1815, has served as the basis for several historical works, that of Thiers 
among others, although it at once provoked other writers to reply and 
to correct its misstatements. Among the latter cf. in particular: Grouchy, 
Observations sur la relation de la camp, de 1815 publi^e par Gourgaud, 
Paris, 1819 ; Heymfes, Relation de la campagne de 1815 pour servir a I'histoire 
du Marechal Ney, Paris, 1829; D'Elchingen, Documents in^dits sur la 
campagnes de 1815, Paris, 1840; Gerard, Quelques documents sur la 
bataille de Waterloo, Paris, 1829. Cf. also the Memoirs of Berthezfene, 
Lamarque, Fleury de Chaboulon, etc. Our knowledge to-day is based 
chiefly on Charras, Hist, de la campagne de 1815, 5th ed., 1868, and 
OUech, Gesch. d. Feldz. v. 1815, nach archivalischen Quellen, Berlin, 
1876, although they are not wholly free from prejudice in their criticisms. 
All the older general works have been superseded by these and by the 
following: Quinet, Hist, de la campagne de 1815, Paris, 1862; Chesney, 
Waterloo Lectures, 3d ed., 1875; Gardner, Quatrebras, Ligny, and Water- 
loo, Boston, 1882; Yorck, Napoleon als Feldherr, vol. II [Eng. tr.]. Some 
earlier works deserve consideration on account of the abundant ma- 
terial they contain from original sources : Sibome, History of the War in 
France and Belgium in 1815, 3d ed., London, 1848, cf. Fransecky in the 
"Militarwochenblatt" for 1845; Clausewitz, "D. Feldz. v. 1815," in 
Hintergelassene Werke, vol. VIII, 1862-89; Plotho, D. Krieg d. Ver- 
biindeten gegen Frankreich i. 1815, Berlin, 1818 ; Wagner, Plane d. Schlach- 
ten u. Treffen; Hofmann, Z. Gesch. d Feldz. v. 1815, 2d ed., 1849; 
Schulz, Geschichte der Kriege, vols. XIV and XV; Loben-Sels, Precis de 
la camp, de 1815, La Haye, 1849, Dutch view; Pringle, Remarks on the 
Campaign of 1815; Jomini, Precis poUt, et milit. de la camp, de 1815, 
Paris, 1839 [Eng. tr. New York, 1853]; Cerens, Dissertation sur la par- 
ticipation des troupes des Pay-Bas a la campagne de 1815, 1880; La Tour 
d'Auvergne, Waterloo, Etudes de la campagne de 1815, Paris, 1870 (under 
Bonapartist influence). Also, Wellington's Despatches, ed. Gurwood, 
vol. XII, and Supplementary Desp., vol. X; Reiche, Memoiren, ed. Welt- 
zien, Leipzig, 1857; MUffling, Aus meinem Leben; Pertz-Delbriick, Gnei- 
senau, vol. IV; Delbruck, D. Leben d. F.-M. Gneisenau, vol. II, 1882; 
M. Lehmann,Zur Gesch. d. Feldz. v. 1815, ''Hist. Zeitschr.," 1877; Bern- 
hardi, Gesch. Russlands, vol. I; Treuenfeld, Die Tage v. Ligny u. Belle- 
Alliance, Hanover, 1880. On the beginning of the flight of the French: 
Btidinger, Wellington (in the appendix). On Cambronne and the de- 
struction of the Guard: Knesebeck, Leben d. Freih. Hugh v. Halkett, 



784 Bibliography 

Stuttgart, 1865; Poten, article, ''Halkett" in AUgem d. Biograpliie; 
Fransecky in the " Militarwochenblatt " for 1876, no. 47. On Murat: 
Helfert, Joachim Murat, seine letzen Kampfe u. s. Ende, Vienna, 
1878. 

[J. C. Ropes, The Campaign of Waterloo : a Military History, Boston, 
1892; Wolseley, Field Marshal Viscount Lord, The Decline and Fall of 
Napoleon, London, 1895; H. Houssaye, 1815, Waterloo, Paris, 1898 [Eng. 
tr. London, 1900]; W. O'Connor Morris, The Campaign of 1815, London, 
1900; E. L. S. Horsburg, Waterloo: a Narrative and a Criticism, London, 
1895; G. Bustelli, L' Enigma di Ligny e di Waterloo: Studiato e Sciolto, 
3 vols., Viterbo, 1897; A. Lumbroso, La campagne de Murat en 1815, 
Paris, 1899. In addition to the earlier works mentioned by Foumier, 
attention may be called to the observations on the Hundred Days to 
be found in John Quincy Adams's Memoirs, vol. Ill, Philadelphia, 
1874.] 



CHAPTER XXI 

St. Helena. 1815-1821 

On the last days in France: Fleury de Chaboulon, vol. II; Sismondi; 
Savary, vol. Ill; Lucien, vol. Ill; Miot, vol. Ill; VitroUes, vol. Ill; 
Montholon, History of the Captivity of Napoleon at St. Helena, London, 
1846, vol. I; Las Cases, Memorial de Ste. H41ene, vol. I, Paris, 1823 [Eng. 
tr.]; Villemain, vol. II; Lafayette, Memoires, Paris, 1837 [Eng. tr. London, 
1837]; Broglie, vol. I [Eng. tr.]; Vill^le, Memoires, 1888-90; Quinet, Hist, 
de la camp, de 1815; Castlereagh's Correspondence; finally, the news- 
papers above mentioned and the pamphlets in Germond de Lavigne's 
collection. As to Napoleon's residence at St. Helena, the above-men- 
tioned works of Montholon and Las Cases are important sources; but 
the most thorough is Forsyth's History of the Captivity of Napoleon 
at St. Helena, 1853, 3 vols., based on the English Government docu- 
ments. The Lettres du Cap de Bonne Esperance, dictated by Napoleon 
(included in Correspondance, vol. XXXII) and pubhshed in 1818, laid 
the basis for the legend of martyrdom, which was also confirmed by 
O'Meara, Napoleon in Exile, or a Voice from St. Helena, London, 1822, 
2 vols., and by Antommarchi, Derniers moments de Napoleon, Paris, 
1825, 2 vols. Cf. also: Capt. Maitland, Narrative of the Surrender of Bona- 
parte, London, 1826; Warden, Surgeon of the "Northumberland," Letters 
Written on board H. M. S. " Northumberland" and at St. Helena, London, 
1816; Abell (the younger daughter of Mr. Balcombe), Recollections of 
the Emperor Napoleon during the first three years of his captivity on 
the island of St. Helena, London, 1844; Henry (an officer of the garrison 
of St. Helena), Events of a Mihtary Life, vol. II, London, 1843; valuable 
contributions also in Scott's Life of Napoleon, 1827, vol. IX; Yonge, The Life 



Bibliography 785 

and Administration of Robert Banks, second Earl of Liverpool, 1868, 
3 vols., vol, II; Schlitter, Die Berichte d. k, k. Kommissiirs Frh. v, Stiir- 
mer aus St. Helena, 1816-1818, Vienna, 1888, and Kaiser Franz I. u. d. 
Napoleoniden v. Sturz Napoleons bis zu dessen Tod, Vienna, 1888. Na- 
poleon's dictations on the history of his times appeared first as Memoires 
pour servir k I'histoire de France sous Napoleon, ecrits a S'® H^lene par 
ses generaux qui ont partag^ sa captivity, et publies sur les manuscrits 
corriges de la main de Napoleon, Paris, 1823, 8 vols. 

[Lord Rosebery, Napoleon, the Last Phase, London, 1900; Napoleon's 
Last Voyages: Diaries of Admiral Sir T. Ussher on the " Undaunted," and 
J. R. Glover, sec. to Admiral Cockburn on the " Northumberland, " London, 
1895 ; La captivite de Sainte-Helene, d'apres les rapports inedits du Marquis 
de Montchenu, commissaire du gouvernement du roi Louis XVIII. dans 
Tile; public par G. Firmin-Didot, Paris, 1894; Napoleon, extracts from the 
''Times" and "Morning Chrionicle," 1815-1821, relative to Napoleon's 
life at St. Helena, London, 1901; Le prisonnier de Sainte-Helene, les 
rapports officiels addresses par le commissaire russe M. de Balmain, de 
1816 k 1820, a M. de Nesselrode, '* Revue bleu," from May 8 to June 12, 
1897; A Diary of St. Helena, 1816-17, the Journal of Lady Malcolm, 
containing the conversations of Napoleon with Sir P. Malcolm, ed. by 
Sir A, Wilson, London, 1899; G. de Gourgaud, Sainte-Helene, Journal 
in^dit de 1815 a 1818, 2 vols., Paris, 1899, Eng. tr. Chicago, 1903; Talks 
with Napoleon. His Life and Conversation at St. Helena. The Original 
Record made by Napoleon's physician, Dr. B. E. O'Meara, ''The Century 
Magazine," vol. 37; R. C. Seaton, Napoleon and Sir H. Lowe, London, 
1898; J. H. Rose, Napoleon's Detention at St. Helena, "Owens College 
Historical Essays," London, 1902; P. Holzhausen, Napoleons Tod im 
Spiegel der zeitgenossischen Presse und Dichtung, Frankfort, 1902.] 



LIST OF THE PRINCIPAL MEMOIRS, CORRESPONDENCE, AND 
BIOGRAPHIES WHICH HAVE APPEARED SINCE THE 
PREPARATION OF FOURNIER'S BIBLIOGRAPHY AND 
WHICH FOR THE MOST PART HAVE NOT BEEN IN- 
CLUDED IN THE SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES. 

Alexandre F^ et Napoleon d'apres leur correspondance in^dite de 
1801 k 1812, ed. by S. Tatistcheff, Paris, 1891. See also Vandal's Napo- 
leon et Alexandre P^; Barante, A. G. P. B., Baron de, Souvenirs, publ. 
par son petit fils C. de Barante, 4 vols., Paris, 1890-94; Barras, P. J. 
F. N., Comte de, Memoires, publ. avec une introduction par G. Duruy, 
4 vols., Paris, 1895-96, Eng. tr. by C. E. Roche, London, 1895-96. 
Bernadotte: Schefer, Bernadotte roi, 1810-18-44, Paris, 1899; L. Pin- 
gaud, Bernadotte, Napoleon et les Bourbons, Paris, 1901. Boulard, Baron 



786 Bibliography 

de, M6moires militaires, Paris, 1892. L. H. L. von Boyen: Erinnerungen 
aus dem Leben des General-Feldmarschalls H. von Boyen: Aus seinem 
Nachlass im Auftrag der Familie, hrsg. von F. Nippold, 3 vols., Leipzig, 
1889-90; F. Meinecke, Das Leben des Generalfeldmarschalls H. von 
Boyen, vol. I, Stuttgart, 1896. Brune: P. Marmottan, Le Marechal 
Brune et la Marechale Brune, Paris, 1900. Castellane, Marechal de, 
Journal de, 1804-1862, Paris, 1895-97, vol. I; Chaptal, Jean A. C, 
Comte de Chanteloup, Mes Souvenirs sur Napoleon, publ. par. son 
arriere-petit-fils le Y^^ A. Chaptal, Paris, 1893. Davout: Comte Vigier, 
Davout, Marechal d'Empire, due d'Auerstadt, prince d'Eckmiihl, 1770- 
1823, par son arriere-petit-fils, avec introd. par F. Masson, 2 vols., Paris, 
1898. Dedem de Gelder, Baron, Memoires, Un general hoUandais sous 
le premier Empire, Paris, 1900; J. P. Dellard, General, Memoires mili- 
taires sur les guerres de la republique et de I'Empire, Paris, 1892. Des- 
boeufs, Capt., Les Etapes d'un soldat de I'Empire, 1800-1815, Souvenirs 
du Capitaine Desbceufs, publ. par C. Desboeufs, Paris, 1901. Desver- 
nois. General Baron, Memoires, publ. sous les auspices de Mme. Baussu- 
Desvernois, d'apres les manuscrits originaux avec introduction p. A. 
Dufoury, L'expedition d'Egypte, Le royaume de Naples, 1789-1815, 
Paris, 1898. Eugene de Beauharnais : H. Weil, Le prince Eugene et Murat, 
vols. I-V, Paris, 1902. Fantin des Odoards, General, Journal, Etapes d'un 
officier de la grande armee, 1800-1830, Paris, 1895. Friedrich August 
of Saxony: Bonnef ons, Un Allie de Napoleon, Frederic- Auguste, premier 
roi de Saxe et grand-due de Varsovie, 1763-1827, Paris, 1902. Friedrich 
Wilhelm III: Brief wechsel Konig F. W. III. und der Konigin Luise mit 
Kaiser Alexander I., hrsg. von P. Bailleu, Leipzig, 1900. Gentz, F. v.: 
E. Guglia, F. v. Gentz, eine biografische Studie, Vienna, 1901. Gneisenau: 
H. Delbriick, Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Neidhart von Gnei- 
senau, 2d ed., Berlin, 1894. Gourgaud, Baron, Sainte-Helene, Journal 
inMit de 1815 k 1818, 2 vols., Paris, 1899, Eng. tr. by Latimer, Chicago, 
1903. Jerome Bonaparte : J. Turquan, Le roi Jerome, 1784-1860, 
Paris, 1903; M. S. Kaisenberg, Konig Jerome Napoleon, ein Zeit- und 
Lebensbild nach Briefen, etc., Leipzig, 1899. Johann, Archduke of Aus- 
tria: F. Ritter von Krones, Aus dem Tagebuche Erzherzog Johanns von Os- 
terreich, 1810-15, etc., Innsbruck, 1891 ; P. Heinrich, Erzherzog Johann, 
Vienna, 1901. J. B. Jourdan, Marshal, Memoires militaires (guerre d'Es- 
pagne), ecrits par lui-meme, ed. by Viscount de Grouchy, Paris, 1899. 
Karl Friedrich, Grand-duke of Baden, Politische Correspondenz, 1783- 
1806, ed. by Erdmannsdorffer and Obser, vols. Ill and IV, 1797-1804, 
Heidelberg, 1893-96. Karl, Archduke of Austria: H. Ritter v. Zeissberg, 
Erzherzog Carl v. Osterreich, ein Lebensbild, etc., 2 vols., Vienna, 1895; 
M. Edler von Angely, Erzherzog Carl von Osterreich als Feldherr und 
Heeresorganisator, etc., 6 vols, in 5, Vienna, 1896-97. J. B. Kleber, 
General: H. Klaber, Leben und Thaten des franzosischen Generals J. 
B. Kleber, Dresden, 1900 ; P. HoU, Le General Kleber, notes et souvenirs 
publ. k r occasion du centenaire de sa mort, Strassburg, 1900. Lannes, 



Bibliography 787 

Marshal: Thoumas, Le Mar^chal Lannes, Paris, 1891. L. M. de La R6vel- 
lifere-L6peaux, M^moires, publ. par son fils sur le manuscrit autographe 
de Fauteur, etc., 3 vols., Paris, 1895; Lejeune, General, Memoires, publ. 
par G. Papst, 2 vols., Paris, 1895, Eng. tr. by A. Bell, 2 vols., London, 
1897 Macdonald, Marshal, Souvenirs, avec une introd. par C. Roussol, 
Paris, 1892, Eng. tr. as Recollections, by S. L. Simeon, London, 1892 
and 1893; Marbot, General, Memoires, 3 vols., Paris, 1891, Eng. tr. by 
A. J. Butler, 3 vols., London, 1892-3 and 1897. Marie Louise: F. 
Masson, L'Imperatrice Marie-Louise, Paris, 1902. Massena, General: E. 
Gachot, Histoire Militaire de Massena, La premiere campagne d' Italic, 
1795-1798, Paris, 1901. Meneval, Baron de, Memoires pour servir a 
rhistoire de Napoleon 1^^ depuis 1802-1815, publ. par son petit-fils, 
le Baron M. J. E. de Meneval, 3 vols., Paris, 1894, Eng. tr. by Sherard, 
3 vols., London, 1894. Montgaillard, Comte de, Souvenirs, publ. d'apres 
des documents inedits, extraits des archives du ministere de I'interieur, 
Paris, 1895; Memoires diplomatiques, 1805-1819, Extraits des archives 
du ministere de I'interieur, ed. by C. Lacroix, Paris, 1896. Moreau, General: 
Le General Moreau, 1763-1813, par J. Dontenville, Paris, 1899. Napo- 
leon: Lettres inedites de Napoleon, An VIII, 1815, publ. par L^on Le- 
cestre, 2 vols., Paris, 1897, Eng. tr. by Lady Mary Loyd, London, 1897; 
Lettres inedites de Napoleon, publ. par. L. de Brotonne, Paris, 1898; 
Correspondance inedite de Napoleon P^ avec Caulaincourt, 1808-1809, 
pub. by A. Vandal, "Revue Bleue," 1895. Nelson, Horatio, Admiral: 
A. J. Mahan, The Life of Nelson, the Embodiment of the Sea Power of 
Great Britain, 2 vols., Boston, 1897; J. K, Laughton, Life of Nelson, 
London, 1894, 2d ed. 1900. Ney, Marshal: H. Welschinger, Le Marechal 
Ney, 1815, Paris, 1893. Norvins, J. M. de Montbreton de. Souvenirs d'un 
historien de Napoleon, Memorial publ. avec un avertissement et des 
notes par L. de Lanzac de Laborie, 3 vols., Paris, 1896-97. Oudinot, 
Marshal: G. Stiegler, Recits de guerre et de foyer, Le Marechal Oudinot, 
due de Reggio, d'apres les souvenirs inedits de la Marechale, Paris, 1894, 
Eng. tr. by A. T. de Mattos, New York, 1897. Pasquier, Baron, Histoire de 
mon temps, Memoires, pub. par le due d'Audiffret-Pasquier, 6 vols., 
Paris, 1894-95, Eng tr. by C. E. Roche, vols. I-III, London, 1894. 
Peyrusse, Baron, Lettres inedites ecrites a son frere Andr6 pendant 
les campagnes de I'Empire, de 18C9-1814, publ. d'apres les manuscrits 
originaux, avec une notice sur Peyrusse par L. G. Pelissier, Paris, 1894. 
Patocka, Comtesse de, Memoires, 1794-1820, publ. par C. Stryienski, 
Paris, 1897, Eng. tr. by Strachey, London, 1900. Pozzo di Borgo, Comte: 
A. de Maggiolo, Corse, France et Russie, Pozzo di Borgo, 1764-1842, 
Paris, 1890. Rasumovski, Comte A., Correspondance politique de. in vol. 
II of Bruckner's French ed. of Wassiltchikow's Les Razoumowski, Halle, 
1894. Richelieu, Due de : L. de Crouzaz-Cretit, Le due de Richelieu en 
Russie et en France, 1766-1822, Paris, 1896. Sieyes, E. J.: A. Neton, 
Sieyes, 1748-1836, d'apres documents inedits, Paris, 1900. Stael, Mme. 
de : Paul Gautier, Madame de Stael et Napoleon, Paris, 1903. M. Lehmann, 



788 Bibliography 

Freiherr vom Stein, vols. I and II, 1757-1808, Leipzig, 1903. Talleyrand, 
C. M. due de, M^moires, publ. par le due de Broglie, 5 vols., Paris, 1891- 
92, Eng. tr by A. Hall, 5 vols., London, 1891-92. Thi6bault, Baron, 
M^moires, publ. sous les auspices de sa fille Mile C. Thiebault d'apres 
le manuscrit original par F. Calmettes, 5 vols., Paris, 1893-95. Thiel- 
mann. Baron: H. von Petersdorff, General J. A. Frhr. von Thielmann, 
ein Charakterbild aus Napoleonischen Zeit, Leipzig, 1894. Toussaint 
L'Ouverture : V. Scholcher, Vie de Toussaint Louverture, Paris, 1889. 

In Kircheisen's Bibliography, under the respective titles and also on 
pp. 170, 171, will be found references to the critical examinations to which 
many of these memoirs have been subjected. Additional titles of minor 
memoirs are given by Vast in Lavisse et Rambaud, vol. IX, pp. 117, 118. 



INDEX 



Aargau, the, 109, 120. 

Abdication, the, of Napoleon, 675. 

Abensberg, battle of, 467. 

Aberdeen, Lord, 648. 

Abo, interview at, between Berna- 
dotte and Alexander, 560, 595. 

Aboukir, defeat of French fleet 
near, 132 f., 141; brilliant victory 
of Napoleon at, 148, 150, 151. 

Abrial, 231. 

Abrantes, duke of, 45. 

Achmed Pasha (Jezzar), 135 f.; in- 
cursion of, into Egypt, 137. 

Acqui, in Italy, 48, 80. 

Acre, siege of, 141 if.; siege of, 
raised, 145, 147, 151, 193 

Act, additional, to the Constitu- 
tions of the Empire, 702, 705. 

Act of mediation, 257. 

Adam, Albrecht, 546, 557. 

Adda, the, 81 &., 200, 291. 

Addington, 214; remarks of, on 
peace with France, 217; yields to 
public opinion, 264. 

Adige, 84 ff. ; proposed Austrian 
boundary, 99, 101, 108 f.; Brune 
crosses, 206; as Austrian bound- 
ary, 207 

Adrianople, 144, 

Adriatic Sea, mastery of, 95, 111; 
English fleet absent from, 99, 286, 
340. 

Aguesseau, d', ordinances of, 231. 

Aix-la-Chapelle, 289 f. 

Ajaccio, 2, 3; Napoleon returns to, 
25. 

Ajaccio, club in, 26, 30, 35; pious 
Catholics in, 31 ; estate of Volney 
at, 113, 127, 155. 

Alba, 80. 

Albania, 346. 

Albanian sharpshooters at Acre, 
143. 

D'Alembert, 13. 

Aleppo, 144, 



Alessandria, 80, 199, 201. 

Alexander the Great, ideal of Na- 
poleon, 95; estimate of, by Ray- 
nal, 124 f., 129, 191. 

Alexander I., Czar, 208; succeeds 
Paul I,, 214; releases Enghsh 
ships, 214; England seeks peace 
with, 215; Napoleon seeks good 
will of, 215; renounces support of 
Bourbons, 217; assent of, to Ger- 
man question expected, 260; re- 
sumes policy of Cathari: 13 II., 287, 
313; refuses terms proposed by 
Napoleon Nov., 1805, 314; de- 
feated at Austerlitz, 317, 319, 
320, 327, 344, 346, 348, 350, 354, 
365, 376, 381, 383, 384; at Tilsit, 
385 ff., 416 £f., 430, 433 n., 438 
ff., 455 ff., 473, 480 ff., 515, 516, 
517, 518, 519, 521, 528, 530, 540 
ff., 553 ff., 560, 561, 581, 586, 591, 
594, 599, 600, 610 ff., 654, 658; 
his plan for advance on Paris 
opposed by Austria, 662, 666; 
enters Paris, 672 ff., 709. 

Alexandria, Napoleon arrives at, 
128; capture of, 129; disappoint- 
ment caused by, 130, 148; Sir 
Sidney Smith at, 149 f . ; French 
defeated before, 215; surren- 
dered, 216; English refuse to 
evacuate, 266; Napoleon leaves, 
151; defenceless, 152; voyage 
from Toulon to, 154. 

Alfieri, on United Italy, 253. 

Algarve, 428. 

Allies, the, 580, 582, 593; army 
of, under Wittgenstein weaker 
except in cavalry, 607; re- 
enforced, 611; Barclay replaces 
Wittgenstein as com.-in-chief, 
613; terms to be offered Napo- 
leon, 616; strengthened and im- 
proved, 623; chief com. in hands 
of Schwarzenberg, 625 ; dejection, 
789 



790 



Index 



Allies — Continued. 

627; reinforced, 631, 637, 648; 
manifesto of, to the French peo- 
ple, 650; cross Rhine and enter 
France, 653; issue manifesto to 
the French, 669; move on Paris, 
669 ; proclamation to Senate, 673 ; 
treaty with Napoleon, 677 ; enter 
Paris, 727; sign treaty of Paris, 
729, 735. 

Alps, passage of, 197 ff. ; Swiss, 
communication by way of, 255. 

Alquier, 422. 

Alsace, Austrians driven from, 46; 
elements of discontent in, 272, 
661 n. 

Altenburg, negotiations at, 479, 481 . 

Alvinczy, character of, 89; defeat 
at Arcole, 90 f. 

America, Moreau banished to, 271; 
Emperor of, title to be assumed 
by King of Spain, 428. 

Amiens, treaty of, 217, 230, 254, 
262; stipulations of, not kept, 
264 f. 

''Amis de la Constitution," at 
Valence, 29. 

Ancients, Council of, decrees trans- 
ference of Legislature, 170 f.; at 
St. Cloud, 173 f . ; address of Lu- 
cien to, 179; ratify decree of 
provisional government, 180 

Ancona, surrendered to French, 84, 
93; impression of, on Napoleon, 
95; effect of, on Venice, 102; Aus- 
trian garrison in, 202, 330. 

Andalusia, 500. 

Andernach, 109. 

Andigne, 237. 

Andreossy, 127, 136, 364, 376, 377, 
437 n. 

d'Angely, Regnauld de Saint- Jean, 
723. 

Angouleme, Duke of, 700. 

Anna, Grand- duchess of, 486, 487, 
488. 

Ansbach, 313, 320, 342, 346. 

Anstett, 619. 

Antilles, acquired by England, 215, 
263. 

Antommarchi, 735, 736, 740 n. 

d'Antraigues, Comte, agent of 
Bourbons, 104. 

Antwerp, 480. 

Apennines, passage over, 77 ff. 



Apollonius, 211. 

Arch-chancellor of empire, 279. 

Arcis [sur Aube], the battle of, 667 f . 

Arcole, battle of, 90 f. 

Arenberg, 285, 338 

d'Argenson, Colonial idea of, 113. 

Argenteau, defeat of, 80. 

Army, rewards of, 401. 

Arnault, " Souvenirs d'un Sexa- 
genaire," 64 f . 

Arndt, Ernst Moritz, 352; battle- 
cry of, 457 

Arrajon, 500. 

Arrondissement, 223. 

d'Artois, Charles, brother of Louis 
XVI., head of RoyaUsts, 270; 
party to plot against Napoleon, 
272, 683, 732, 741. 

Ascalon, 146. 

Aspern [and Essling], battle of, 470- 
475. 

Astorga, 453. 

Aubry, 52. 

Auersperg, Prince of, 311. 

Auerstadt, Duke of, see Davout. 

Auerstadt, battle of, 359,360. 

Augereau, in Italian campaign, 80; 
bold advice to Napoleon, 86 f.; 
sent by Napoleon to Paris, 104; 
compromises Napoleon, 105 ; com- 
mander-in-chief of army of the 
Rhine, 105; radical, 167, 169, 
173; appointed marshal, 280, 284, 
367; attack upon Russians at 
Prussian Eylau, 372; becomes 
Duke of Castiglione, 400, 500, 
674, 690, 692. 

Augsburg, 314. 

Augusta, of Bavaria, 335 ff., 355. 

Aulic Council, 86. 

Austerlitz, battle of, Dec. 2d, 1805, 
316-318; one of the four decisive 
battles in Napoleon's career, 
325, 369, 370. 

Austria, war declared against, 32; 
army of, in Italy, 45; military 
preparations, 50; receives no aid 
from Russia, 77 ; neglects army of 
Italy, 77; army defeated at Lodi, 
81; efforts to regain influenre 
in Italy, 85; importance of Man- 
tua to, 87; losses of, 88, efforts to 
maintain prestige in Italy, 89; 
partition of Poland by, 91 ; agree- 
ment with Pius VI., 93; value of 



Index 



791 



Austria — Continued. 

Italy to, 96; losses of, in Italian 
campaign of 1797, 98; diplomatic 
defeat at Leoben, 99 f.; acquires 
Venetian mainland, 100; defeat 
by Hoche, 100, 107; treaty with 
France, terms of, 108 f.; pro- 
tection of Tuscany and Naples, 
125; agreement with Russia, 160; 
regains Lombardy, 162; defeated 
in Switzerland, 165; losses of, at 
Marengo, 202, 203, 204; nego- 
tiates with France, 205 ff. ; hos- 
tile to France, 249; Catholic 
principalities loyal to, 258; to be 
kept back from Rhine, 259, 261, 
287, 288 ; conciliatory attitude of, 
toward Napoleon, 288 ff., 291, 
349, 364, 365, 376-379, 384, 389, 
397; attitude of, 454-457, 460 ff ; 
campaign against, 465 ff., 477, 
492; attitude of, 527 ff.; after 
Russian campaign, 594 ff.; arms 
for purposes of mediation, 604, 
615; convinced of impossibility 
of reconciliation with Napoleon, 
620; declares war, 621; joins 

• Prussia and Russia, 632, 654, 686. 

Autun, College of, 5; Bishop of, 8, 
222. 

Auxonne, 17, 23. 

Avignon, 39, 589. 

Azauza, 501. 

Bacciochi, 247. 

Badajoz, treaty of, 210. 

Baden, 88; Napoleon in, 115, 232; 

treaty with, 260, 323; elector of, 

334, 335; becomes grand-duchy, 

338, 524. 
Bagdad, 141. 
Bagration, 311, 312, 540, 541, 545, 

550 ff. 
Bajalich, 91. 
Balearic Islands. 345. 
Balkan Peninsula, 287, 323, 417. 
Bank of England, effect of war on, 

503, 513. 
Bank of France, 229, 513, 645. 
Barante, Souvenirs of, quoted, 105, 

193. 
Barbary States, 142. 
Barb^-Marbois, 221 ; head of treas- 

ur>' department, 229, 396. 



Barclay de Tolly, 540 ff. ; deposed 
from command, 553, 611, 612, 
613. 

Bard, Fort, 199. 

Barras, leader of Thermidorians, 
49; supports Napoleon, 50; on 
committee to mamtain order, 56 
ff. ; director, 59; popularity, 61; 
relations with Josephine, 64, 76; 
Memoires quoted, veracity of, 64; 
advises Napoleon to marry Jose- 
phine, 66, 82, 96; in Directory, 
102; helped by Augereau, 104; 
chief of Directory, 115, 158; sides 
with Sieycs, 163 f. ; resigns from 
Directory, 172 f . ; charged by 
Napoleon with plot, 175, 181. 

Bar sur Aube, 662, 664, 666. 

Bartenstein, treaty of, Apr. 26th, 
1807, 377, 378, 379, 383. 

Barthelemy, charge d'affaires, 75; 
in Directory, 102; dropped from 
Directory, 104. 

Basle, 109. 

Bassano, Duke of, see Maret, duchy 
of, 328. 

Bastia, 26, 48. 

Bastille, 22, 103. 

"Batavian Republic, the," consti- 
tuted in Holland, 72; alliance of, 
with France, 119 f. ; coup d'etat 
in, 119; new constitution for, 252; 
enters league with France, 268. 
See also Holland. 

Bautzen, battle of, 476 n., 611-613, 
615, 628. 

Bavaria, 72; part of, ceded to 
Austria, 109; in Campo Formio, 
207; Austria excluded from, 209; 
treaty with France, 217; elector 
of, to be king, 320; acknowledged 
by Austria, 323; territory in- 
creased, 323. 

Bavaria, Kingdom of, to be recog- 
nized by Frederick William, 335 
ff., 342, 355; changes in, after 
war of 1809, 524; army of, in 
Russia, 546; sends one division, 
594, 604, 609; joins coahtion, 
632. 

Bavaria, Rhenish, Code Napoleon, 
in force in, 232; king of, to be 
appointed by France, 250; Passau 
allotted to, 261. 



792 



Index 



Bayanne, Card., 423-24. 

Baylen, 435. 

Bayonne, Napoleon goes to, 425; 
Spain concedes to France right 
to assemble troops in, 428; inter- 
view in, between Napoleon and 
Spanish royal family, 431, 434, 
644. 

Bayreuth, 349, 355. 

Beaucaire, abandoned by insur- 
gents. 40. 

Beauharnais, Eugene, marriage, 
335, 423, 460; defeat of, at Por- 
denone and Fontana Fredda, 
464, 474, 475, 477, 485, 489, 524, 
538, 539, 546; at Malojarosla- 
vetz, 563, 565, 567 ff., 573, 577; 
succeeds Murat as commander 
of broken army, 598; occupies 
Saxony, 602, 605, 606 n., 607, 
608 ; directed to gather new army 
in Italy to keep Austria in check 
in the south, 610, 649, 661, 708. 

Beauharnais, General, €3. 

Beauharnais, Hortsnse, married to 
Louis Bonaparte, 237. 

Beaulieu, Gen., 80, 83 ff., 89. 

Becker, General, 726. 

Belfort, 662. 

Belgium, incorporation of, with 
France, 75; session of, 92 ff., 100, 
108 f., 180; monasteries in, con- 
fiscated, 227, 649. 

Belgrade, 288 n. 

Belle-Alliance, 715 ff. 

Bellegarde, Gen., 204. 

" Bellerophon," Napoleon embarks 
on, 727, 728. 

BeUiard, Gen., 548. 

Belluno, Duke of, see Victor, duchy 
of, 328. 

Benevento bestowed upon Talley- 
rand, 329. 

Bennigsen, Gen., advances to relief 
of Kutusoff, 312; commands one 
of the Russian armies, 367; at- 
tempts to annihilate Ney on the 
march, 371; force rescued by 
Schamhorst at Prussian Eylau, 
373; decamps after battle, 374; 
slowness of, 380; at battle of 
Friedland, 382, 3S3, (31, 635, 636. 

Bentinck, Lord, 511 n. 

Berchtesgaden, 259, 261, 481, 



Berg, duchy of Cleves and, 338, 
346, 347; duke of, 508. 

Bergamo, 84, 109. 

Berher, 221 ; revises code, 231 n. 

Berlin, Napoleon enters, in triumph, 
Oct. 27th, 1806, 361; decree of, 
Nov. 21st, 1806, 366, 581, 610. 

Berne, 120. 

Bernadotte, general of revolutionary 
troops, 47; marriage of, 62; rep- 
resentative of France at Vienna, 
dismissed, 126, 159 f. ; radcial, 
167; appointed marshal, 280; in 
command, 284, 313; at Austerlitz, 
316; receives Prince of Ponts 
Corvo, 329, 337, 368, 371, 372, 
419, 420, 469, 474; chosen heir 
to Swedish throne, known as 
Crown Prince Charles John, 511; 
anxious to ingratiate himself 
with Sweden, 530, 531 ; urges Czar 
to be steadfast, 560, 594, 603; 
sends public letter to Napoleon 
renouncing allegiance, 603, 619, 
623, 629, 630, 632 ff., 662; hopes 
of French throne, 654, 673. 

Berne, treasure of, 120. 

Berthier, commanded to enter 
Rome, 119; beside Napoleon on 
19th Brumaire, 175; minister of 
war, 182; secret orders of Na- 
poleon to, 197; as witness on 
Marengo, 202 ; appointed marshal, 
280; Grand Master of the Hounds, 
280; order to prepare embarca- 
tion at Boulogne, 298; arrests 
bearer of news of Russian ad- 
vance, 316, 349, 350; martial law 
against Nuremberg publishers, 
352, 355, 375; becomes Prince of 
Neuchatel, 400; deserts Napo- 
leon, 400, 446; given command 
of German army, 464; goes to 
Vienna, 490, 500, 508 n., 525, 
549, 587, 639, 660, 669, 671, 679. 

BerthoUet, in Egyptian expedition, 
124; dispute with Napoleon, 
137; accompanies Napoleon from 
Egypt, 151. 

Bertrand, Gen., 311; sent to Prus- 
sian king with terms for separate 
treaty with France, 377, 607, 608, 
631 n., 637, 638, 680, 681, 688, 
708, 719 n., 726, 729, 730. 



Index 



793 



Bessieres, in Egyptian expedition, 
127; appointed marshal, 280; 
becomes Duke of Istria, 400, 413, 
435, 446, 451. 

Beyle, remark on Egyptian expe- 
dition, 123. 

Beyme, Prussian minister, 457. 

Bianchi, 6C0. 

Bianco, canal, 109. 

Bible, in Napoleon's library as 
''politics," 124. 

Bisamberg, Austrian armies united 
at the, 469, 475, 477. 

Blake, Gen., 448; defeated at Es- 
pinosa, and obliged to flee to 
Asturias to escape capture by 
Soult, 448. 

Bliicher, Gen., 348, 353; detach- 
ment of, surrendered after heroic 
resistance, 361; in Pomerania, 
474, 586, 607, 612, 623, 624, 625; 
victory over Macdonald at Wahl- 
statt, 627, 629; Blucher and 
Bemadotte join forces and evade 
Napoleon, 630 ff., 640, 654 ff.; 
his forces called by Napoleon 
"the best army of the allies," 
658 fif., 659, 660, 662 fT., 709; at 
Waterloo, 711 f. ; advances on 
Paris, 725, 731, 737. 

Bologna, surrendered to French, 84 ; 
Napoleon incites revolt in, 89; 
cession of, 94; ceded to Venice, 
100, 423. 

Bon, Mile., 15. 

Bon, in invasion of Palestine, 139. 

Bonaparte, family, of the nobility, 
3 ; financial straits of, 15. 

Bonaparte [Buonaparte], Carlo, 2; 
career in Ajaccio, 3; adheres to 
France, 4; Napoleon's feeling 
toward, 9. 

Bonaparte, Caroline, marries Murat, 
248; intriguing against Beau- 
hamais family, 248. 

Bonaparte, Elisa, marries Bac- 
ciochi, 247 ; salon of, 248. 

Bonaparte, Jerome, in United 
States, 247; married to Katha- 
rne of Wiirtemberg, 336, 413; 
made king, 336; kingdom of 
Westphalia fomied for, 387, 388, 
413; receives Hanover, 509, 524, 
538; given command of third 



division of the Grand Army with 
Vandamme as adviser, 539; de- 
posed from command of third 
army and returns to his king- 
dom, 545, 593, 594, 604, 611, 621; 
leaves Westphalia, 643; appoint- 
ed to house of peers, 708. 

Bonaparte, Joseph, studies of, 5, 6; 
letter of Napoleon about, 8; 
adopts military profession, 15; in 
municipal council, 26, 53; mar- 
riage, 62 ; French envoy at Lune- 
ville, 205 f . ; republican tendencies 
of, 246; in imperial constitution, 
279; appointed Grand Elector, 
280; to succeed Napoleon as 
Emperor, 279; on the power of 
Napoleon, 283 ff. ; takes posses- 
sion of Naples, 328, 330, 344, 
345; testifies to Napoleon's in- 
tentions in regard to India, 366 n. ; 
recognized as king of Naples, 388, 
422; is offered Spanish crown, 
430, 432; enters Madrid, July, 
1808, 434; withdraws with his 
army to northern Spain, 435; 
flight from Madrid, 439, 441; 
threatens to resign, 450, 500, 501, 
509, 649, 667, 671; authorizes 
capitulation of Paris, 672, 708, 
720, 726. 

Bonaparte, Josephine (Beauhar- 
nais), birth of, 63; marriage of, 
63; imprisonment, 64; relations 
with Barras, 64;* described, 65; 
impression of, on Napoleon, 66; 
marriage of, 68 ; coquettish nature 
of, 70 ff. ; conduct during her 
husband's absence, 71 ; house of, 
116; on.Egyptian expedition, 165; 
invites Gohier to breakfast, 173; 
gives audience, 244; as link be- 
tween nobility and Napoleon's 
court, 246; talk of divorce of, 
247; pleads for d'Enghien, 273; 
religious marriage of, 292 f. ; inti- 
mations of divorce, 410; marriage 
dissolved Dec. 16th, 1809, 485; 
retires to Malmaison, 486, 489, 
496. 

Bonaparte, Lsetitia, 4 ff., 15; es- 
capes from Ajaccio, 36; life of, 
at Napoleon's palace, 248, 682, 



794 



Index 



Bonaparte, Louis, judgment of, by- 
Napoleon, 27 i. ; fescues Napoleon, 
90; to succeed Napoleon as Em- 
peror, 279; appointed Grand 
Elector, 280; becomes King of 
Holland, 333, 357, 388; declines 
Spanish crown, 432 n. ; abdicates 
Dutch throne in favour of younger 
son, 508; older son of, made Duke 
of Berg, March, 1809, 508, 509. 
Bonaparte, Lucien, character for 
veracity, 14; on Josephine, 64; 
urged by Napoleon to marry 
Queen of Etruria, 70; moderate 
repubhcan, 163, 165 n., 167; in- 
forms Napoleon of Sieyes' plans, 
168; president of Five Hundred, 
171 ; saves the day for Napoleon, 
177 fif.; minister of interior, 182; 
advises appeal to nation, 240; 
republican tendencies of, 246; 
remark of, on designs of Na- 
poleon, 251 n. ; banishment of, 
332 ; declines Spanish crown, 430 
n., 488 n.; appointed deputy, 
707 ff., 723. 

Bonaparte, Napoleon III. omits let- 
ter of Napoleon from edition of 
correspondence, 46 ; connection 
with d'Enghien relics, 274 n., 
411 n., 707, 742. 

Bonaparte, Pauline, marries Gen. 
Le Clerc, 248; marries Prince 
Borghese, 248, 328, 682, 688. 

Bordeaux, army at, 269; English 
occupy, 669. 

Borissov, engagement at, 570 &. 

Bormida, 164, 200 ff. 

Borodino, battle of, 554 ff. ; repre- 
sented to Czar as Russian victory, 
555, 556, 565, 581. 

Bosnia, 111; to be offered to Aus- 
tria, 288 n. 

Bosphorus, 135. 

Bossuet, 497. 

Bottot, 172. 

Boulak, 132. 

Bourbons, 105, 106, 157, 166, 188; 
restoration of, 208 n. ; Czar re- 
nounces support of, 217; no hope 
for, 237; guarantee against re- 
turn of, 243; on, 273; plot against 
Napoleon, 270, 327; in Sicily, 511, 
616, 646, 656; attitude of popu- 



lace toward return of, 672, 683, 
688 n., 695, 700, 739. 
Bourrienne, appointed to Stuttgart, 
33, 115, 121; restrains Napoleon, 
175, 179. 
Braganza, House of, 429. 
Brandenburg, strengthened by secu- 
larization on Rhine, 259, 610, 611. 
Braunau, fortress of, 340, 352; 

evacuated by French, 421 
Breisgau, 109, 207, 314. 
Brescio, 84. 
Breslau, convention signed at, 601, 

603, 614. 
"Briars," the, 730, 737.. 
Brienne, military school at, 5, 7, 10, 

12, 280; battle of, 655. 
Brigido, Colonel, 90. 
Brindisi, occupied by French, 268. 
Brinkmann, Swede, letter on coup 

d'etat, 176, 179. 
Brittany, royalist province, 39; 

linen industry in, 225. 
Brixen, 98 ; allotted to Grand Duke 

of Tuscany, 261. 
de Broghe, 485 n., 620, 693, 705. 
Boulogne, Napoleon at, 283. 
Brueys, Admiral, at Aboukir, 132. 
Bruix, Admiral, 149; confidant of 

Napoleon, 172. 
Brumaire, 18th, 169 ff., 241; 19th, 

173 ff., 193. 
Brune, General, defeats English in 
Holland, 165; succeeds Mass^na 
in Italy, 206 ; appointed marshal, 
280; commands army of defence 
on coast of North Sea, 376, 708. 
Brunn, 310, 311, 314, 315, 316, 321, 

477. ^ 
Brunswick, Frederick William, 

Duke of, 473. 
Brunswick, Charles, Duke of, mis- 
sion to St. Petersburg, 344. 
Brunswick, Duchy of, 387. 
Brunswick, Duke of, Prussian com- 
mander, 354; at Auerstadt, 359, 
360. 
Bruyere, to secure Cattaro, 287. 
Bubna, General, 469, 478 n., 480, 

597, 609, 610, 616, 632. 
Billow, 474, 586, 614, 623, 627, 629, 
630, 652, 663, 664, 715, 717, 718. 
Burgos, conquest of, 448; proscrip- 
tion in, 450. 



Index 



795 



Busaco, battle at, 501. 

Buttafuoco, General, elected to 
States- General, 24; opposes mili- 
tia, 25, 26. 

Buxhoewden, General, 310, 367. 

Cabanis, deputy, 168. 

Cabarrus, Madame, 64, 

Cadore, Duke of, see Champagny; 
duchy of, 328. 

Cadoudal, Georges, leader of Ven- 
deans, 237 ; in plot against Napo- 
leon, 270 ff.; shot, 271; testi- 
mony against Bourbon princes, 
271 f[. 

CaffareUi, 136; death of, 143. 

Cairo, revolt against Napoleon, 135; 
Napoleon leaves, 143; divan of, 
147; surrendered, 215. 

Calendar, Gregorian, replaces Revo- 
lutionary, 293. 

Calonne, 21. 

Calvi, 2; taken by English, 48. 

Cambac^res, deputy, 57, 70; min- 
ister of justice, 182; consul, 186; 
scheme of, for code, 231 ; advises 
Napoleon against coup d'etat, 
238; advises appeal to nation, 
240; advises against trial of d'En- 
ghien, 273 ; appointed grand dig- 
nitary, 279, 374 n., 394, 398; 
becomes Duke of Parma, 400 n., 
621, 694. 

Cambronne, 689, 719 n. 

Campan, Madame, summoned to 
court of Napoleon, 281. 

Campbell, 680, 687, 688. 

Campo Formio, peace of, 72; treaty 
of, 108 ff., 116, 152, 195, 203 ff., 
207, 257, 259. 

Candia, 128. 

Cape Corso, 48. 

Cape of Good Hope, 102, 215. 

Caprara, Cardinal Legate, concurs 
in preparation of Napoleonic 
catechism, 409, 423. 

Cardinals, Napoleon demands num- 
ber of to be increased, 423. 

Camiola, 482. 

Camot, member of Directory, 68, 
76, 83; organizer of the Revolu- 
tionary army, 86; suspicions of, 
concerning Napoleon, 94; in Di- 
rectory, 102; dropped from Di- 



rectory, 104; from National In- 
stitute, 115; needed in France, 
161; minister of war, 182; at 
Talleyrand's house, 203; argues 
against Empire, 278, 576, 695, 
700, 710, 723, 724. 

Caroline, Queen of Naples, 286, 327, 
328, 511 n. 

Carrara, 99. 

Carteaux, sent against rebels at 
Avignon, 39; captures Marseilles, 
41fif. 

Cassano, 162. 

Castanos, General, 448. 

Castiglione, Duke of, see Augereau. 

Castiglione, 195, 280. 

Castlereagh, Lord, 654 n. ; influences 
the question of terms to be pro- 
posed to Napoleon, 655, 665, 
686 n., 687, 688, 698, 728. 

Catalonia, 500. 

Catechism,political,ofNapoleon,409. 

Catharine, Queen of Westphalia, see 
Wiirtemberg, Katharine of. 

Catharine II., compared to Jose- 

{)hine, 70; joins Austria and Eng- 
and, 73; death of, 92; her policy 
renounced, 287. 

Cattaro, Gulf of, to be delivered to 
the French, 287; to be retained 
by Russia, 288 n. ; united with 
kingdom of Italy, 323; Russian 
squadron ordered to occupy, 340, 
345, 346, 388. 

Caulaincourt, Grand Master of 
Ceremonies, 280; Duke of 
Vicenza, 400; succeeds Savary 
as Ambassador Extraordinary to 
St. Petersburg, 417, 419 ff.; in- 
structed to discuss partition of 
Turkey, 420, 433 n., 487, 489 ff., 
516, 536, 549, 578, 610 ; sent by 
Napoleon to Alexander, 611, 613, 
615; sent to Prague, 618; in- 
structed 'Ho conclude a peace 
that would be glorious," 619, 
620, 649, 651, 654, 655; given 
"carte blanche" at Chatillon, 
657; proposals not accepted, 661, 
662, 665, 666, 671, 673, 674, 675, 
677, 723, 724. 

Censorship of press, 403, 404, 522. 

Centralists, faction in Switzerland, 
256, 



796 



Index 



Ceremonies, Grand Master of, 280. 

Ceva, in passage over the Apen- 
nines, 79. 

Ceylon, Holland loses to England, 
215 ff.; promised to Batavian 
Republic, 268, 333. 

Chaboulon, Fleury de, 685, 687 

Chamber of Deputies, constituted, 
21; first labours, 21 f.; in new 
constitution, 167. 

Champagne, gloom of, 5. 

Champagny, becomes Duke of Ca- 
(iore, 400 n. ; minister of Foreign 
Affairs, 414; letter of, to Caprara 
about Papal States, 423, 424; 
kept in ignorance of Treaty of 
Fontainebleau, 428, 479, 481, 482, 
525. 

Champaubert, battle of, 658, 659. 

Champs de Mai, 692, 705 ff. 

Chandermagore, acquired by Eng- 
land, 215. 

Chaptal, 221. 

Charente, paper industry in, 225. 

Charlemagne, model of Napoleon, 
95, 293; Napoleon holds court 
in palace of, 289, 513, 515, 534, 
647. 

Charleroi, 711. 

Charles [Carl] John, Crown Prince 
of Sweden, see Bernadotte. 

Charles, Grand-duke of Baden, 643. 

Charles IV. disposes of Louisiana, 
268 ff., 425, 429 ff. 

Charles V., 127. 

Charles X., see Duke of Artois. 

Charles XIII., King of Sweden, 511, 
530. 

Charles, Archduke of Austria, suc- 
ceeds Wurmser in Italy, 88; de- 
feats Jourdan, 88; in Itahan 
canipaign of 1797, 97; defeat of, 
97 ft. ; in command of Austrians, 
160 ff. ; in southern Germany, 194 ; 
retires from command, 196, 307; 
advances toward Vienna, 312, 
316 ; endeavours to obtain moder- 
ation of terms of Treaty of Press- 
burg, 322, 377, 461 ; sends declara- 
tion of war to Munich, 462; 
addresses his army, 462-3, 468 ff. ; 
seeks diplomatic rather than 
military gain from Aspem, 472; 
fails to accept conditions of Prus- 



sia, 473; retires from command, 
479, 490. 

Charles XIV. of Sweden, 62 n. 

Chateaubriand, in salon of Elisa 
Buonaparte, 248; banished and 
property confiscated, 402. 

Chatillon, congress at, 655, 661; 
negotiations resumed, 662; terms 
demanded by allies refused by 
Napoleon, 662; ultimatum of 
allied powers at, 665, 666. 

Chaumont, Treaty of, 665, 666; 
renewed, 698. 

Chazal, dropped from legislature, 
239. 

Chenier, Joseph, dropped from leg- 
islature, 239; author of "Tibe- 
rius" and "Cyrus," 405. 

Cherasco, 80 

Chevreuse, Mme. de, banished, 
402 n. 

Choiseul, colonial ideas of , 113. 

Christian VII., King of Denmark, 
415. 

Church, estates of, confiscated, 
73; confusion in affairs of, 
73 ff. ; Directory encroaches on, 
93; property of, confiscated, 202; 
peace between State and, 213; 
States of, restored to Pius VII., 
213. 

Cisalpine Republic, 120; vanishes, 
162; re-established, 202; in treaty 
of Lun^ville, 252; replaced by 
Italian Republic, 253. 

Cividale, 97. 

Civita Vecchia, 127. 

Clarke, General, on religion in 
France, 212; guardian to King of 
Tuscany, 255; becomes Duke of 
Feltre, 400, 478, 614, 672. 

Clary, Julie, 62; D6sir6e, 62. 

Clausewitz, 600, 606n. 

Clerfayt, 77. 

Clergy, standing of, in France be- 
fore Revolution, 19 ff., 684, 689. 

Clev^es, 320; Cleves and Berg, duchy 
of, 338, 346 f. 

Cobenzl, negotiates with Napoleon, 
108, 115; in conference with 
Neuf chateau, 160; difficult task 
at Lun^ville, 205 ff.; agrees to 
treat separately, 206; on exten- 
sion of French power in Italy, 



Index 



797 



Cobenzl — Continued. 

254; remark on Napoleon's real 
intentions, 291 ; compelled to re- 
sign in favour of Stadion, 322; 
opinion in regard to Napoleon's 
purposes, 390. 

Cockbum, Admiral, 730. 

"Code complet," 118. 

"Code Napoleon," committee on, 
230; discussions on, 231; com- 
pletion of , 231 ff. ; credit of, due to 
Napoleon, 232, 238 n., 396, 399. 

Coignet, Captain, on Fort Bard, 199 ; 
receiving the cross, 283; remarks 
on Napoleon's appearance at 
Berlin, 3G1, 374, 679. 

Colli, Piedmontese general, 80. 

Colombier, Madame de, 12. 

Colonna di Cesare Rocca, 24. 

Commissariat, difficulties attend- 
ing, in Russian campaign, 370. 

Commission, on constitution, 185. 

Committee of public safety, ap- 
pointment of, 38; opposition to, 
39; undertakes reconquest of 
Corsica, 48; party of peace in, 
74; edict of, quoted, 75; con- 
firms nomination of Napoleon as 
Brigadier-General, 44, 53; edict 
of, on conquest, 75; Sieyes be- 
fore, 258. 

Commons, House of, 117. 

Oommunal property, sale of, 590, 
645. 

('ommunes, 183. 

Concordat, 236, 239, 248. 

Concordat of Fontainebleau, 496, 
589, 647. 

Concordat <1801), 684. 

Conde, Prince de, relations with 
Pichegru, 104. 

Condorcet, recommendations of, on 
public instruction, 233 

Conegliano, Duke of, see Moncey, 
duchy of, 328. 

Confederation of the States of the 
Rhine, 336-339; forces of, made 
useful in all Napoleon's wars, 338, 
341, 345, 347, 349, 362, 377, 379, 
388, 394, 413, 440, 481, 506 n.; 
Princes of, ordered to hold con- 
tingents ready, 524; changes in, 
after war of 1809, 524; threat- 
ened by Napoleon, 525 ff. ; sub- 



serviency of Princes of, to Na- 
poleon, 532, 592, 593, 594, 601, 
609, 615, 620, 633, 637; con- 
federation of the Rhine arrayed 
against Napoleon, 643. 

Congress of Vienna, 685, 697 ff. 

Consalvi, Cardinal, sent to Paris, 
213; favours journey of Pius VII. 
to Paris, 292; Memoires of, on 
conduct of Napoleon to Pope, 
292 n. ; deposed from office, 331. 

Conscription (1810), 459. 

Conscription of 1811, meets with no 
enthusiasm, 523; "Law of Hos- 
tages" enforced bymiUtary, 524, 
584, 645. 

Conservatives, in Corsica, 24. 

Conservatives, in control of legis- 
lature, 102; in opposition, 158 ff. 

Conservatoire des arts et metiers, 
233. 

Constable, in empire, 279. 

Constant, Benjamin, leader of 
Liberal Constitutionists, 236 ; op- 
poses Napoleon's absolutism, 236; 
dropped from legislature, 239, 
692, 695ff.,702ff. 

Constantine, Grand-duke, 383, 560. 

Constantinople, Napoleon requests 
mission at, 59; distance from 
Ancona, 95, 135; in dispatch of 
Directory, 142, 191 ; Russia aims 
to conquer, 287 ; Russia to retain, 
288 n. 

Constitution, new, formulated 1791, 
28; Paoli favours, 35; discus- 
sion on, in Souper de Beau- 
caire, 41; 1795, 54; provisions 
of latter, 54 ; provides for changes, 
69; Directory accused of violat- 
ing, 103; of year III, founded 
on reason, 116 ff., 163; require- 
ment of, for age of Directors, 118, 
166; of Sieyes, 166; of year III 
cited, 170 n. ; proposed new, 173; 
violated by Directory, 175; pro- 
posed amendments to, 179; of 
Sieyes, 182, 183; of 1795 abol- 
ishes municipalities, 223 ; of year 
VIII guarantees ownership of 
land, 228 n. ; of 1791 promises 
new code, 230; provision for 
system of public instruction, 233 ; 
forbids return of Emigres, 236; 



798 



Index 



Consti tution — Continued. 

provision of, for renewal in mem- 
bership of legislature, 238; of 
1799 hated by Napoleon, 239; of 
Empire, 278 ff. ; bishops taking 
oath of, restored to church, 293. 

Constitutional jury (Sieyes), 184; 
changed into Senate, 185. 

Consul, first, Napoleon as, 226 ff., 
231, 236, 238, 239 f., 244, 246, 249. 

Consular Guard, 200. 

Consulate, 153 ff. ; to replace Direc- 
tory, 167; retains principles of 
Directory, 188 ff. ; inherits na- 
tional domains, 229; formulates 
complete civil code, 231 ff. ; last 
years of, 242. 

Consuls, appointment of, 180; 
duties of (Sieyes), 184; first C. 
replaces Grand Elector, 184; 
duties of first C, 184 ff.; salaries 
of, 186. 

Continent, mastery of, by Napoleon, 
262, 265 n. ; to be tributary to Na- 
poleon, 267 ; from Italy to Arctic 
Ocean, under Napoleon's influ- 
ence, 512, 530. 

Continental System, 415, 416, 422, 
426, 482, 483, 503, 504, 510, 511, 
514, 516, 518, 519, 520, 580, 593, 
611, 611 n. 

Contraband trade developed, 505; 
edict against, from Trianon, 505; 
edict against, from Fontaine- 
bleau, 506. 

"Contrat Social, Le," quoted, 1; 
Napoleon's admiration for, 13. 

Convention, requires arrest of Paoli, 
35; aims to crush opposition, 
39 f. ; as centre of unity, 41 ; ap- 
points Napoleon brigadier-gen- 
eral, 43 f. ; ignorant of Napole- 
on's Italian plans, 45; factions 
in, 53; difficult situation of, 55, 
56; arrangements for defence of, 
57; saved by Napoleon, 58; ap- 
points Napoleon commander-in- 
chief, 58,; incorporates Belgium 
in France, 75; succeeded by Di- 
rectory, 76 ; instructions to armies, 
97; paper money under, 226; de- 
cree on public debt, 227; laws of 
partial, 231; work of, in public 
instruction, 233. 



Corfu, 37, 102 ; position in Adriatic, 
111; Russian troops in, 286; to 
be retained by Russia, 288, 327, 
340; ordered fortified by Napo- 
leon, 418. 

Corps Legislatif, 185; filled by- 
Senate, 187 ; membership of, 
annually renewed, 238; in im- 
perial constitution, 279, 392, 399, 
404, 591, 592, 650-652; closed, 
652. 

"Correspondence of the French 
Army in Egypt," 142. 

Corsica, war of independence with 
Genoa, 1; acquired by France, 
2; Napoleon longs to free, 9; 
''Lettres sur I'Histoire, etc.," 24; 
two parties in, 24; militia in, 
suggested by Bonaparte, 25; 
made French province, 26; ad- 
heres to Paoli, 35 ff. ; importance 
of, in Mediterranean, 95; reoccu- 
pation of. 111 ff. ; incorporated 
with France, 422. 

Corte, birthplace of Napoleon, 4. 

Corvisart, 412. 

Council of State, 185; Napoleon ap- 
points members of, 187; value of, 
to Napoleon, 221; discusses new 
constitution, 228, 285; counter- 
feit paper money used by Napo- 
leon in Russia, 544. 

Coup d'etat, first, 30; of Directors, 
104; in Batavian Republic, 119; 
Napoleon thinks of, 126; of 19th 
Brumaire, 154 ff. ; of 18th Fructi- 
dor, 157; impracticable, 163; 
considered, 166; plan of, 167; 
feared, 174; cause of , seems lost, 
177; accomplished, 178 ff. ; ap- 
proved by France, 180; cotem- 
poraneous accounts of, 181 ; con- 
fidence inspired by, 182, 192, 209; 
thought of, 276. 

"Courier d'Egypte, Le," 136. 

Coutumes, law of northeiai France, 
230; used in code, 231. 

Cretet, 221. 

Croatia, Austrian armaments in, 
89; troops in battle of Arcole, 90; 
to be offered to Austria, 288 n., 
482. 

Cromwell, Napoleon playing part 
of, 174. 



Index 



799 



Cuneo, 25. 

Curee, 278. 

Cyprus, 150. 

Czartoryski, Adam, on Oriental 
policy of Russia, 288 n. ; to Alex- 
ander I., 316 n. ; on Russian army 
after Austerlitz, 317; testimony 
to fidelity of Austrian Emperor, 
320 n., 517, 528, 596. 

Dalberg, Archbishop of Mainz, 336; 
addresses memorial to Napoleon, 
337; plans for national German 
church with, 337-8; given city 
and territory of Frankfort on the 
Main, 338; at court of France to 
solemnize marriage of Jerome to 
Katharine of Wiirtemberg, 413; 
territory created archduchy of 
Frankfort, 524; servility and 
oppression of, 524 ; equips troops 
for Napoleon, 593, 692. 

Dalmatia, Duke of, see Soult; of- 
fered to Francis II., 96, 100, 321, 
323, 328, 340, 346, 377, 609. 

Damascus, 143, 144, 

Danton, 45, 49. 

Danube, principalities on, "Code 
de Commerce" in force in, 232. 

Danzig, Duke of, see Lefebvre; 
communication with, cut off from 
allied armies, 370, 375; zealously 
besieged by French, 375; brought 
to yield, Mav 24th, 1807, 379, 388, 
610,611,615,621. 

Dardanelles, to be retained by 
Russia, 288 n. 

Daru, 374 n., 578, 631. 

Daunou, dropped from legislature, 
239 

Davidovich, 87, 89, 91. 

Davout, in Egyptian expedition, 
127; secret police agency under, 
246; appointed marshal, 280; in 
command, 284; forces Austrian 
corps to flight, 310, 311, 313; 
summoned to assist at Auster- 
litz, 316; defeats Brunswick at 
Auerstadt, 359, 360, 367, 372-3 ; 
becomes Duke of Auerstadt, 400, 
413; remains with his corps in 
Poland and Prussia, 417; or- 
dered back into Silesia from Po- 
land, 437; in Germany, 459-462, 



464, 466-7, 469, 470; storms 
heights of Markgraf-Neusiedl and 
decides battle of Wagram, 477, 
520, 539 ; appointed to command 
of third army to succeed Jerome, 
542; hinders junction of Bagra- 
tion with Barclay, 547; sum- 
moned with army to Vitebsk, 
548, 552, 554 f., 565; his corps 
disintegrated, 566, 569, 573, 602, 
605, 606, 606 n., 614, 622, 623, 
694, 708, 725. 

De Bry, 224, 

Decade Egyptienne, La, 136. 

Decadi, replaced by Sunday, 243. 

Decres, 287, 410, 694. 

Defermon, 221. 

Dego, 48 

Delille, 402 

Denmark, joins Russia against Eng- 
land, 208; takes up arms against 
England, 214; retires from league, 
216, 377, 389; attacked by Eng- 
land, 415; concludes alliance with 
France, 415; proscribes cargoes 
of neutral ships, 510; hatred tow- 
ard England, 510. 

Departments, 223. 

De Pradt, 579, 681. 

Desaix, sails from Civita Vecchia, 
127; at the Pyramids, 131, 148; 
in battle of Aboukir, 148; in com- 
mand in Italy, 200; real victor 
at Marengo, 201 ff. ; death of, 
202. 

Descartes, 233. 

Desgenettes, 137. 

Diderot, 14. 

Diebitsch, 586. 

Diocletian, Napoleon compares him- 
self with, 405. 

Direction generate de 1' Instruction 
publique, 234. 

Directory, established, 54; Napo- 
leon friend of 66; appoints Napo- 
leon commander-in-chief of Army 
of Italy, 68; endangered, 78; 
signs treaty with Sardinia, 82; 
yields to Napoleon, 83 ; charge to 
Napoleon on spoils of war, 84 ; 
mistake with regard to the 
church, 94; system of, 95; hated 
for war policy, 94; supported by 
Napoleon, 96, 103 ff. ; attempted 



8oo 



Index 



Directory — Continued. 

peace with Austria, 98; ratifies 
treaty of Leoben, 100; report of 
Napoleon to, 102; elections un- 
favourable to, 102; accused of 
prolonging war, 103; new, com- 
plies with Napoleon's wishes, 105; 
plans for Italy, lOTg anxiety of, 
concerning Napoleon, 114; Bar- 
ras, chief of, 115; welcome of, to 
Napoleon, 115; age requirement 
of, 118, 119; grants request of 
Swiss in Vaud, 120; decides on 
expedition to Orient, 122; Napo- 
leon rival of, 123; postpones in- 
vasion of England, 134; despatch 
from, 141 ff. ; letter of, recalling 
Napoleon quoted, 149; changes 
in, 155; tyranical course of, 158; 
violates constitution, 158; un- 
prepared for war, 161 ; loses pres- 
tige, 162 ff.; accused of "deport- 
ing" Napoleon, 165; to be re- 
placed by Consuls, 167, 170; 
action of, arrested, 172; ceases to 
exist, 173, 180, 188; anarchy of, 
190 n, ; concerns itself with India, 
191; German policy of, 191; con- 
trol of, over coast, 191 ; financial 
method, 193; on war footing 
with United States, 209; makes 
Rome and Naples republics, 211; 
attitude toward Papacy, 212; 
neglects religious wants of the 
people, 212; causes death of as 
many as Napoleon, 220; reforms 
police force, 225 ; arbitrary finan- 
cial course of, 226 ; sale of govern- 
ment lands by, 227; resorts to 
forced loans, 228; national do- 
mains left by, 229 ; neglects " con- 
servatoire,"' 233 f. ; law on return 
of Emigres of, 235; importance 
of Helvetia to, 256; pohcy of, 
continued, 287, 349, 351, 493, 
505 n., 537. 

Divan, of Cairo, 147. 

Dolitz, 636. 

Dommartin, General, 143. 

Dora, Baltea, 199. 

Dornberg, 472. 

Douai, Merlin de, 104. 

Drehsa, 611. 

Dresden, 536; Napoleon enters. 



May 8th, 608, 609, 611 ; battle of, 
624-7. 

Drissa, 545. 

Drouot, General, of artillery, 641, 
674, 680, 708, 710. 

Diiben, 634. 

Dubois de Crance, commissioner 
sent against Lyons, 39; reforms 
organization of army, 46; or- 
ganizer of revolutionary army, 
86. 

Duchatel, 221. 

Ducos, see Roger-Ducos. 

Dufresne, in Napoleon's council of 
state, 221. 

Dugommier, replaces Carteaux, 42. 

Dugua, General, in Egyptian ex- 
pedition, 127; at the Pyramids, 
132. 

Dumouriez, agent of Royalists, 
270; emissary of England, 272. 

Duphot, General, death of, 119. 

Dupont, General, 429, 435. 

Duroc, sent to Berlin, 209; sent to 
St. Petersburg, 215; secret police 
agency under, 246 ; marshal of the 
palace, 280, 373, 383; becomes 
Duke of Triuli, 400, 428, 537, 549; 
killed at Bautzen, 613, 622 n. 

Diirmstein, battle of, 310. 

Duteil, General, in command of 
artillery, 42. 

Ebelsberg, battle of, 469. 

Ecclesiastical schools done away 
with, 406. 

Eckmiihl, battle of, 467. 

Edelsheim, 336. 

Eggenwald, 100. 

Egypt, expedition to, 71, 95, 111 
ff., 166; Napoleon's designs on, 
113; significance of expedition to, 
123; Alexander in, 124 if.; under 
Mamelukes, 130; sufferings of 
French army in, 130; as vantage- 
ground against England, 133; 
voyage from, 154; Napoleon's 
work in, 181 If., 193; blockade 
of, by Eng., 194; conquest of, by 
England, 215; Napoleon's ex- 
pedition to, 262; report of 
Sebastiani on, 266; Davout 
in, 280; in Napoleon's schemes, 
291. 



Index 



8oi 



Egyptian troops reviewed at Lyons, 
253. 

Eichsfeld, 260 n. 

Eichstadt, 261, 314. 

El Arisch, 137; garrison of, sur- 
renders, 139; massacre of garri- 
son 140 ff. 

Elba ceded to France, 210; de- 
clared French province, 255; in- 
corporated with France, 422; 
assigned to Napoleon, 677. 

Elbe, mouth of, 191; mouth of, 
closed to England, 268. 

Elchingen, Duke of, see Ney; 
victory of Ney at, 306. 

Elliot, Sir Gilbert, 48. 

Embabeh, 131. 

Emigres, 683, 684, 685, 689, 692. 

Emperor of the Gauls, proposed 
title of Napoleon, 275. 

Emperor, Napoleon becomes, 279; 
in new constitution, 279. 

Engen, 199. 

d'Enghien, Prince, arrest of, 272; 
trial and execution of, 273 ff. ; 
excluded from Austria, 289; exe- 
cution of, 353, 741. 

England, revolution in, 21; at war 
with France, 35; Paoli in, 35; 
troops of, at siege of Toulon, 43 ; 
influence of, in Corsica, 48; co- 
alition with Russia and Austria, 
73; subsidizes Austrian forces in 
Germany, 77; withdraws fleet 
from Naples, 91 ; frustrates peace 
with Austria, 98; disappoints 
Austria, 99; communication of, 
with India, 111 ; invasion of, 114; 
constitution of, characterized by 
Napoleon, 117; invasion of, 121 
ff., 128, 134; revolt of Irish 
against, 134; Tippo Sahib enemy 
of, 138; alliance of, with Russia, 
160 ; defeated in Holland, 165 ; an- 
tagonist of France, 190 ; King of. 
Napoleon writes to, 194; claims 
of, to be isolated from her allies, 
205; seizes Malta, 208; deserted 
by Russia, 208; Napoleon aims 
at maritime supremacy of, 208 ff. ; 
Portugal to desert, 210; ports of 
Portugal and Naples closed to, 
210 ff. ; European ports closed 
to, from Holland to Sicily, 213; 



allies take up arms against, 214; 
proposals of peace, 214; acquisi- 
tions of, 215; seeks reconcihation 
in treaty of Amiens with France, 
216; with Alexander I., 215; 
peace with France of, 216 ff.; 
hostile to France, 249; aid of, 
asked from Switzerland, 257; 
European ports closed to, 262; 
opposes ascendency of France, 
262; peace with, endangered, 264; 
freedom of press in, 265; threat- 
ened invasion of, 265; forced by 
Napoleon to declare war, 267; 
plans of Napoleon against, 267; 
blockade and threatened inva- 
sion of, 269; pensions d'Enghien, 
272 ; complicity of, in plot against 
Napoleon, 271; conditions pro- 
posed by Czar to, 287; hostilities 
of, with France, 288; fails to win 
over Austria, 289 ; uneasiness over 
Napoleon's victories, 343; nego- 
tiations with Napoleon, 344-5; 
announces plan to send forces to 
coast of North Sea, 376; Berlin- 
decree blockades, 366; refuses 
subsidies to Russia, 384; attacks 
and carries off Danish fleet, 415; 
learns of contents of Treaty of 
Tilsit, 415; Russia declares war 
against, 415; affords sympathy 
to Spain, 435; lands troops in 
Portugal, 435; obtains mastery 
in Portugal, 436; sends force to 
Portugal under Sir John Moore, 
449; sends new army to Spain 
under Wellesley, 479; troops of, 
kept from Antwerp, 507; sends 
expedition against Naples, 511; 
takes possession of most Euro- 
pean colonies, 512; distressed 
manufacturers of, 513, 514, 515 
519, 521; threatens Turkey, 531 
at war with United States, 581 
secures peaceful settlement with 
Russia, 581; signs treaty with 
Sweden and Prussia, 603, 609- 
611, 616, 637, 647, 665. 

Enza, 99. 

Erfurt, interview at, 439-444, 447, 
456, 519. 

d'Eril, Melzi, chosen president 
of Cisalpine Republic, 253; re- 



8o2 



Index 



d' Erll — Continued. 
ports Napoleon's policy in Italy, 
291. 

Erzerum, Pasha of, 378. 

Espinar, Pass of, 452. 

Essen, 260 n., 347. 

Essen, General, 312. 

Essling, battle of, 470. 

Etruria, Queen of, 70. 

Etruria, kingdom of, name for Tus- 
cany, 210; queen of. Napoleon 
wants Lucien to marry, 247; 
dowager queen of, ordered to 
surrender Tuscany to France and 
receive compensation in Portugal, 
422, 428. 

Ettenheim, 272. 

Europe, Federation in, 76; balance 
of power in, 107; French mas 
tery of, 114; ruling ideas in, 116 
ports of, closed to England, 190 
Napoleon seeks mastery of, 194 
field of Napoleon's designs, 216 
future of, determined by secret 
compact of France and Russia, 
217; peace in, 217; political sys- 
tem of, impaired, 218; France to 
set up federation in, 218; peace 
in, a mere halting-place, 219; war 
declared on, by France, 226; 
Napoleon directs political course 
of, 248; war and peace in, 249; 
under a single head, 250 ; need of 
recuperation in, 251 ; Napoleon to 
change the face of, 266; nations 
of, oppose united resistance to 
Napoleon, 622; battle of, 372-5. 

Eylau, battle of, 372-5, 381, 556. 

Falkenstein, 109. 

Federalists, in Switzerland, 256. 

Feldkirch, 161. 

Fellaheen in Egypt, 129. 

Feltre, Duke of, see Clarke; duchy 
of, 328. 

Ferdinand, Archduke, in command, 
1805, 303; assembles a corps in 
Bohemia, 312, 461; enters War- 
saw, 464, 468, 472, 487, 488 n. 

Ferdinand IV. of Naples, treaty 
with Napoleon, 211. 

Ferdinand [Bourbon], King of 
Naples, 345, 346, 425. 

Ferdinand, Crown Prince of Spain, 



427, 429, 430; king, 431; confined 
within boundaries of France, 434; 
alone recognized as king by 
Spaniards, 435, 498, 646. 

Fere Champenoise, 671. 

Ferrara, surrendered to French, 84, 
94; ceded to Venice, 100, 424. 

Fesch, uncle of Napoleon, 5; keeps 
Napoleon informed on Corsica, 
25; appointed cardinal, 248; ap- 
pointed grand almoner, 280; 
solemnizes religious marriage of 
Napoleon and Josephine, 293. 
Napoleon's representative at Pa- 
pal court, 330, 337, 588, 708, 735, 

Feuillants restrain Jacobins, 29. 

Fezensac, 374, 446, 540 n. 

Fichte, addresses, 352. 

Fieore, 578. 

Filangieri, 13. 

Finances, administration of, 396-7. 

Finkenstein, castle of, 375. 

Finland, obstacle to agreement be- 
tween Russia and Sweden, 385, 
416, 419, 486; falls to Russia, 510, 
530, 540. 

"Five Hundred, Council of," 54, 96; 
majority of Moderates in, 102, 
158; coaHtion in, 163, 167, 170; 
Radicals in, 173 f. ; Napoleon at 
session of, 176; session broken up 
by soldiers, 178. 

Flahault, General, 672. 

Flanders, flatboats, of, 265. 

Fleurus, battle of, 46; victory at, 
280. 

Floreal 22d, 159, 175. 

Florence, treaty of, 211. 

Fontainebleau, Napoleon at, 17^; 
court of France at, 414; secret 
treaty between France and Spain 
signed at, Oct. 27th, 1807, 428; 
decree issued at, 506; the Pope 
at, 588; new concordat signed 
at, Jan. 25th, 1813, 589, 647, 672; 
treaty of, 677. 

Fontana Fredda, 464. 

Fontanes, 248; subjects talents to 
Napoleon's desires, 402. 

Forfait, 182. 

Fort Carr6, 46. 

Fort TEguillette, taken by Napo- 
leon, 43. 

Fort St. Nicholas, 44. 



Index 



803 



Fouche, Minister of Police, 164, 182; 
at Talleyrand's house, 203, 222; 
learns of plot to assassinate Na- 
poleon, 237; deposed from office, 
246; advises trial of d'Enghien, 
273; seeks to recover his office, 
276; included in imperial govern- 
ment, 278; becomes Duke of 
Otranto, 400 n. ; induces nobility 
to be presented at court, 412-13, 
453, 499, 620, 695, 699, 706, 
722-5. 

Fourcroy, in Napoleon's Council of 
State, 221 ; plan of education of, 
rejected by Napoleon, 235; re- 
port made by, 407. 

Fox, meets Napoleon, 217; apprises 
Napoleon of conspiracy against 
his life, 344; withdraws from 
agreements with Napoleon, 345; 
death of, 345. 

France, interposes between Genoa 
and Corsica, 2; takes Corsica as 
security, 2; despotic tendency of 
government in, 19; failure of 
harvests in, 23; favours peace, 96; 
on eve of war, 30; declares war 
against Austria, 31 ; at war with 
England, 35; plunged into war 
with Europe, 38; alHed foes of, 
43; treaty of, with Prussia, 50; 
people of, to vote on constitution, 
55; disturbance of internal af- 
fairs in, 73; question of boun- 
daries of, 74; incorporation 
of Belgium with, 75; policy 
of foreign conquest, 75; treaty 
with Sardinia, 81; effect of 
Napoleon's victories in, 81; 
peace with Wiirtemberg and 
Baden, 88; acquires Belgium, 
100, 120; treaty with Austria, 
108; Rhenish boundary, 109; re- 
tains portion of Venetian terri- 
tory, 111; treaty with Genoa, 112; 
mastery of, on Mediterranean, 
113; alliance of, with Batavian 
Republic, 119; communication 
of, with Lombardy, 120; ineffi- 
ciency of navy of, 121 ; fleet of, in 
Egyptian expedition, 124; inter- 
ference of, in Eastern question, 
125 ; Turkey declares war against, 
135; at war with Naples, 138; 



Switzerland ally of, 142; inter- 
course with, difficult, 142 ; at war 
with Naples and Sardinia, 142; 
disasters to, in Europe, 149, 157 
ff. ; hopes of, fastened on Napo- 
leon, 157; ascendency of, in Italy, 
160; declares war on Austria, 
160; losses of, in Italy, 161 ff.; 
desire for peace in, 165; pivot of 
her destinies, 168; approves coup 
d'etat, 180; notables of, 183; 
approval of new constitution, 
186; love of equality, 188; finan- 
cial distress in, 189; republics de- 
pendent on, 189; England an- 
tagonist of, 190; tragedy of 
history of, 192; firm position of 
Napoleon in, 203; negotiations 
with Austria at Luneville, 205 ff. ; 
partition of Italy, 206; suprem- 
acy of, on Continent, 209 ; Italian 
dependencies of, 210; influence 
of, in Spain, 210; becomes Catho- 
lic again, 212; clamours for peace, 
214; thwarted on Peninsula, 216; 
peace with England, 216; treaty 
of, with Russia on Emigres, 216; 
treaty of, with Turkey, and Ba- 
varia, 217; enthusiasm in, for 
Napoleon as founder of peace, 
217; supremacy of, feared, 217; 
to set up federation in Europe, 
218; recognizes no boundaries, 
219 ; reorganizing of, 221 ; finan- 
cial reorganization of, 226 ff. ; 
public debt of, 227 ff. ; survey of 
real estate in, 228; bank of, estab- 
lished, 229; credit of, 230; diver- 
sity of law in, before Revolution, 
230; changes in, in law due to 
Revolution, 231; "Code Napo- 
leon" in, 232; ifimigres flocking 
back to, 236; vote on consulship 
for life, 239 ; lost vigour restored 
to, 241 ; effect in, of peace of 1802, 
242; Europe hostile to, 249; 
hegemony of, 250; constitution 
of, model for dependent repub- 
lics, 251 ; Elba incorporated with, 
255; Switzerland submissive to, 
257 ; Alps and Rhine as bounda- 
ries of, 257; mortmain abolished 
in, 258 ; to protect Rhenish states, 
259; to decide German question, 



8o4 



Index 



France — Continued. 

260; treaty with Wiirtemberg, 
260; ports of, closed to England, 
262; ascendency of, opposed by 
England, 262; failure of, in San 
Domingo and Louisiana, 264; 
peace of, with England endanger- 
ed, 264; war declared with Eng- 
land, 267; forms league against 
England, 268 ; horror in, at death 
of d'Enghien, 274; effect of bold 
policy in, 275; receives new con- 
stitution, 278 ; vote of, on heredi- 
tability of Empire, 281; distinc- 
tion between "State" of, and 
Empire, 281 ; losses in commerce 
of, 284; sacrifices of, 285; con- 
ditions proposed by Czar to, 287 ; 
rupture of, with Russia, 288 ; pub- 
lic opinion in, 391 ; material situ- 
ation of, 398; Tuscany, Corsica, 
and Elbe declared constituent 
parts of, May 30th, 1808, 422; 
financial situation of, 459-60; 
people of, inwardly discontented 
with Napoleon, 483; people of, 
desire Napoleon to acquire direct 
heir through new marriage, 484; 
rejoicing among people of, at 
new marriage, 491; patriotic 
feeling in, against ambition of 
Napoleon, 494; financial situa- 
tion of, 514; compared with 
Austria, Russia, and England, 
513; honours conferred in, on 
scholars and artists, 523; ap- 
proved at first of expedition to 
Russia, 576; good- will of the 
people of, necessary to suc- 
cess, 585, 587; financial situa- 
tion of, 589, 590; public sentiment 
of, clamours for peace, 614; en- 
thusiasm for Napoleon gone from, 
645; financial condition of, de- 
plorable, 645; mass of people of, 
still imperialists, 646 ; resists con- 
scriptions, 646; longs for peace, 
648; attempt by Napoleon to 
rouse old Revolutionary spirit 
in, 650 ; internal crisis in, avoided 
only through external danger, 
652 ; popular enthusiasm for Na- 
poleon revives, 663 ; attitude of 
peasants in, 670. 



Francis II. [of Holy Roman Empire], 
averse to peace, 72; orders relief 
of Mantua, 87; prejudice against 
Thugut, 92; dominion of, in Italy, 
99; consents to treaty of Campo 
Formio, 109, 116; reply of, to 
Napoleon's letter on peace, 203; 
asks for extension of truce, 204; 
cedes Frickthal, 255; protests 
division of spoils, 261 ; attitude of, 
on case of d'Enghien, 289; de- 
cides to enter coalition, 296, 311, 
314, 316, 319, 322-3. 

Francis I. renounces Imperial 
Crown of Germany, 339 ff. (hence- 
forward called Francis I. of 
Austria), 349, 378, 457, 469, 471, 
479, 480, 481, 482, 489, 517, 518, 
527 f., 532, 543, 596, 602, 604, 
609, 610, 615, 617 n., 623, 632, 
636, 643, 648, 649, 652, 665, 
666, 672, 677. 

Franconia, 88. 

Frankfort, granted to Dalberg, 338; 
re-created archduchy of Frank- 
fort, 524; ultimatum at, 648, 
650 ff. ; ''old boundaries" basis, 
662, 665. 

Frederick Augustus [King of Sax- 
ony], 579, 602, 609; made pris- 
oner by allies, 640, 643. 

Frederick the Great, military theory 
of, 86, 356; Napoleon beside the 
tomb of, 361. 

Frederick, Prince Regent of Den- 
mark, alliance with France, 415, 
510. 

Frederick I., King of Wiirtemberg, 
643. 

Frederick WiUiam III., consents to 
mediate between France and Rus- 
sia, 209; indemnified by treaty 
with France, 260 ; remains neutral, 
286, 288; writes to Czar asking 
for support, 348; orders to mo- 
bilize the army issued by, Aug. 
9th, 1806, 348; considers abdi- 
cating the throne, 354; orders 
retreat to Weimar, 360; refuses 
terms offered by Napoleon, 377; 
granted interview with Napo- 
leon as proteg^ of Alexander, 
June 26th, 1807, 386; visits Czar, 
455; national feeling not repre- 



Index 



805 



Frederick William III. — Continued. 
sen ted b}^, 457; again thinks of 
abdicating, 457; condemns war- 
like uprising in Prussia, 472; 
consents to secret preparations 
for war, 473; alliance with 
Austria, 480, 526, 529, 532, 586, 
594, 595. 595, 598, 599, 600, 601, 
602, 603, 610, 619, 643, 661, 666; 
enters Paris, 672. 

Frejus, 680. 

Freron, 43, 49, 50, 58, 211 n. 

Frickthal, 109, 120; ceded to Napo- 
leon, 255. 

Friedrichshamm, treaty of, 486. 

Friedland, battle of, June 14th, 
1807, 382, 611. 

Friesland, 323. 

Frische HafT, 370. 

Friuli, Duke of, see Duroc. 

Friuh, 89, 92; duchy of, 328. 

Frondeurs, 692. 

Fructidor 18th, 104, 105, 157, 159, 
175, 212, 278. 

Fuentes de Onoro, defeat of Soult 
at, 502. 

Fulda, 524. 

Fulton, submits project for steam- 
boat, 284. 

Gaeta, 328. 

Gagern, Baron von, 375. 

Galicia, Russian troops in, 160, 364, 
481, 482, 528, 530, 661 n. 

Gallo, 99, 101. 

Garda, 86. 

Gaudin, minister of finance, 182, 
228 n., 432 n., 694 n. 

Gaza, taken by French, 139 ; march 
through, 146. 

Gembloux, 714. 

Genoa, war with Corsica, 1 ; ad- 
heres to France in Seven Years' 
War, 2 ; in operations of the Army 
of Italy, 45; Tilly at, 46; pro- 
ceedings of Napoleon against, 
112; treaty of, with France, 
112, 120; army sails from, 127; 
retained by French, 197; be- 
sieged by Ott, 198; taken by 
Austrians, 200; government of, 
changed, 255; obliged to furnish 
sailors, 269; Massena at, 280, 
657. 



Gen tin, sent to Ionian Isles, 111; 
occupies Corsica, 112. 

Gentz, answers Hauterive's pam- 
phlet on state of Europe, 218; on 
Napoleon's Empire as successor 
to Revolution, 290, 353; Czar im- 
pressed by representations of, 
384, 463, 653 n. 

George III. of England, invites 
Paoli, 48; offers ultimatum to 
Napoleon, '267, 418. 

Gerard, 653, 658, 660, 674, 710. 

German Empire, constitution of, 
imitated by Napoleon, 250; sec- 
ularization endangers, 258; in- 
terests of Austria greater than 
those of, 259; peace of, violated, 
286; concern of all Europe, 260; 
princes of, negotiate with Na- 
poleon, 260; loss of their tem- 
poral power, 261 ; sway of Na- 
poleon over, 291 ; comes to an 
end, Aug. 6th, 1806, through 
resignation of Francis II. , 340. 

Germany, republican propaganda 
in, 76, 159; policy of Napoleon 
toward, 191 ; French influence in, 
207; Austria excluded from, 209; 
Russia and France agree to de- 
cide questions in, 217; reac- 
tion of people against Napo- 
leonic system, 351 ; hatred of, 
for French fostered by murder 
of Palm, 353 ;■ principalities and 
dukedoms mediatized, 338, 349, 
350, 351, 352, 353, 418; smoul- 
dering fires of resistance be- 
coming perceptible in, 436; re- 
generation of, 437, 438, 457, 458, 
459, 460; Napoleon's opinion of, 
537, 577; national movement 
of, 600; plans for liberation of, 
601 ; awakening of national feel- 
ing in, 643. 

"Germany in her Deep Abase- 
ment," 352. 

Germany, North, occupation of, 
348, 349, 420; princes of, 461, 
469, 494, 521, 601. 

Germany, South, princes of, fol- 
low Napoleon's call to arms. 
334; Napoleon's plans to securo 
fidelity of, by marriage witli 
his own family, 335; military 



8o6 



Index 



Germany, South — Continued. 
occupation of, 341, 347, 351, 
356. 

Gibraltar, 191, 418. 

Girondists, government of, 33; de- 
feated, 38; plunge Europe into 
war, 38; fugitives incite oppo- 
sition, 39; in "Le Souper de 
Beaucaire," 41; recalled, 49; on 
expansion, 76; ideal of liberty, 
95; originate German policy of 
Napoleon, 191; in Napoleon's 
Council of State, 221. 

Gitschin, agreement of, 623. 

Gneisenau, comments on cowardly 
yielding of Prussian commanders, 
361 ; writes to Stein of excellence 
of Prussian army, 623; chief of 
staff of Bliicher, 628, 652, 659, 
663 n. 

Goding, 317. 

Godoy, "Prince of the Peace," 210; 
considers resistance to Napoleon, 
269,425; subservient to France, 
425, 427, 428, 430, 434. 

Goerz, 97. 

Goethe, his "Werther" read by 
Napoleon, 16; in Napoleon's 
libiary, 124; admitted to audi- 
ence with Napoleon, 443; repre- 
sentations of Faust forbidden, 
522, 533. 

Gohier, in Directory, 163; on age 
requirement, 166; made power- 
less, 173. 

Golo, battle at, 2. 

Goltz, Count, 455. 

Golymin, engagement at, 368. 

Gorz, 482. 

Gourgaud, General, 726, 729, 731, 
735 n., 738. ■ 

Grand Elector, in constitution of 
Sieyes, 183; in Empire, 279. 

Graudenz, fortress of, 383. 

Grawert, General, 539; succeeded 
by Yorck, 586. 

"Great Book of the Public Debt," 
227. 

Great Council, in Venice, forced to 
abdicate, 101. 

Greece, 116; "Code de Commerce" 
in, 232. 

Greeks, Napoleon opens relations 
with, 111. 



Gregorian Calendar, re-established, 
293. 

Grenier, 599, 724. 

Grenville, Lord, 344. 

Grisons, rule of, in Switzerland, 120; 
Austrian troops enter, 142. 

Grolmann, 663. 

Gross-Gorschen, 608. 

Gross-Beeren, 627. 

Grouchy, 659, 708, 710, 712, 714, 
715, 717, 720, 722, 725, 737, 738. 

Guadarrama Pass, 452. 

Guadeloupe, 215. 

Guard, complaints of, 369; alone 
allowed to return to France after 
Tilsit, 401. 

Guard, the old, 356, 369, 373, 382, 
401, 446, 459, 491, 539, 555, 558, 
565; Napoleon's favouritism for, 
567 ff., 574, 582, 607, 608, 612, 
622, 624, 641, 653, 660; Napo- 
leon's farewell to, 679, 680, 685, 
689 n. ; at Waterloo, 716, 718, 719. 

Guard, young, 539, 544, 573. 

Guastalla, 328. 

Gustavus IV. of Sweden, his alli- 
ance with England, 419, 510. 

Gyulai, General, accompanies Sta- 
dion, 314. 

Hal, 715. 

Hamburg, 602. 

Hamelin, Mme., 61. 

Hanau, 524; battle of, 640, 641. 

Hanover, French troops enter, 268; 
Bemadotte in, 284; occupation 
of, 286; evacuation of, proposed, 
287, 320, 341, 342, 343, 344, 348, 
388, 510, 601, 605, 637. 

Hanseatic Towns, 507, 515, 522, 
609, 615. 

Hardenberg, prevents Prussian par- 
ticipation in the war, 313; ad- 
vises Prussian disarmament, 341 ; 
idolized by Prussian army, 353, 
526, 595, 596, 598, 599, 601, 722. 

Hartha, 611. 

Haugwitz, advises occupation of 
Hanover, 286; sent to negotiate 
with Napoleon, 313; detained at 
Iglau, 314; compelled to form 
close offensive and defensive al- 
liance with Napoleon at Schon- 
brunn Dec. 15th, 1805, 320, 341; 



Index 



807 



Haugwitz — Continued. 

compelled to sign new treaty, 
Feb. 15th, 1806, 342; advises to 
arm and prepare for war, 348, 
353; army demands dismissal of, 
353. 

Hauser, Kaspar, believed to be son 
of Napoleon, 336. 

Hauterive, author of pamphlet on 
France, 218; programme of, 250; 
report of, from Switzerland, 257 n. 

Have, Sainte, La, 715, 717, 718, 
719. 

Hebert, 45. 

Hedouville, 337. 

Heilsberg, 382. 

Helder, the, victory on, 280. 

Helvetia, Republic of, 120; in 
treaty of Luneville, 252 ; required 
to cede Valais, 255. 

Henry, Prince of Prussia, 353. 

Herat, 214. 

Hesse, Rhenish, 232; treaty of, with 
France, 260. 

Hesse, Elector of, 338; remains 
neutral, 354, 387. 

Hesse-Darmstadt, 338, 524. 

Hildhesheim, 260 n. 

Hiller, 461, 462; defeated at 
Landshut, 466, 468; defeated at 
Ebelsberg, 469, 644. 

Hoche, conquers Austrians, 46, 49; 
general admiration of, 69; Na- 
poleon jealous of, 97; fruitless 
victory of, over Austrians, 100; 
death of, 105; military genius of, 
221 

Hochkirch, 612. 

Hohenlinden, French victory at, 
206. 

Hohenlohe, at Jena, 359; capitu- 
lates to Murat, 361. 

Hohenzollem, Prince of, 338 ; House 
of, 377, 601, 605. 

Hohtsch, 317, 319, 321. 

Hollabrunn, 312. 

Holland, conquered, 72, 120; defeat 
of Enghsh in, 165, 193, 195; 
prisoners taken in, 208; con- 
tributes to French treasury, 213; 
loses Ceylon and Cape of Good 
Hope, 215; Code Napoleon in 
force in, 232; Stadtholder of, 
appointed by France, 250; new 



constitution in, 252; Stadtholder 
of, to be indemnified, 259; ports 
of, closed to England, 262 ; evacu- 
ation of, required by England, 
267; losses in commerce of, 284, 
313, 331 ; Louis Bonaparte made 
king of. May 24th, 1806, 333; 
a victim to the "license " system, 
507; intention of Napoleon to 
incorporate, 507; annexed to 
Empire with Lebrun as Viceroy, 
508-9; draft-riots in, 539, 609, 
616 , 637 ; revolt against Napoleon 
in, 544, 649. 

Holland, Ivord, 734. 

Holstein, 191. 

Hompesch, Herr von, grand-master 
at Malta, 127. 

Hortense, see Bonaparte, Hortense. 

Hougomont, 716 ff. 

Humboldt, A. von, 353. 

Ibrahim Bey, 130; retreat of, 132; 
pursuit of, 133; learns of Turk- 
ish reinforcements, 148. 

Illyria, formation of, 482; ceded to 
Wiirtemberg, 524, 530; draft- 
riots in, 539, 609, 615, 620, 
621. 

India, communication with Eng- 
land, 111 ; route to, 113 ; in Egyp- 
tian plans, 122; proposed march 

. to, 138 ; power of England in, 138 
in despatch of Directory, 142 
Directory concerned with, 191 
Napoleon constantly intent upon, 
366, 367, 418; makes treaty 
with Persia with view to expe- 
dition against, 379; England's 
position in, would be made in- 
vulnerable by dismemberment of 
Turkey, 417, 433 n. ; steps taken 
toward expedition to, 433, 515, 
520. 

Indian project postponed into re- 
mote future 593. 

Ingolstadt surrendered, 205. 

Inn River, 109, 205 f. 

Inn, quarter, ceded to Napoleon, 
321, 481. 

Inquisition, Romish, 93. 

''Institute" in Egypt, 136. 

Instruction, public, funds dedicated 
to, 229. 



8o8 



Index 



International element of new 
feudal system, 329. 

International Empire falls to pieces, 
644. 

Interior, Army of the, Napoleon 
appointed commander - in - chief 
of, 58; Augereau commander-in- 
chief of, 104. 

Ionian Isles, ceded to France, 109; 
welcome French rule. 111, 135, 
159,345,388. 

Irish, revolt of, against England, 
134. 

Isar, French on, 205. 

Isola Rassa, revolts, 26. 

Isonzo, in Italy, 88, 97. 

Istria, offered to Francis I., 96, 100. 

Istria, Duke of. see Bessieres. 

Istria, 321 , 323, 328, 340. 

''Italian Federation," 422. 

Italian Republic, replaces Cisal- 
pine Republic, 253; Napoleon as 
president of, 290; Cobenzl on 
fate of, 291. 

Italy, Viceroy of, see Beauhamais, 
Eugene. 

Italy, attitude of. Napoleon tow- 
ard, in "Memorial," 51; cam- 
paigns in, 72 ff. ; Austria seeking 
gains in, 72; Republican propa- 
ganda in, 76 ; designs of Napoleon 
regarding, 94, 192; contributions 
levied in, 94; plans of Directory 
for, 107, 116; spirit of revolution 
in, 125; advance of Russians to, 
142; campaign in, Napoleon's 
course during, 152; revolts in, 
159; ascendency of France in, 
160; Austrian territory in, 194; 
Austria regains power in, 195; 
armies in, 197; partition of, be- 
tween France and Austria, 206; 
Napoleon's dealings with, after 
Lun^ville, 210; contributes to 
French treasury, 213 ; Russia and 
France agree to decide questions 
in, 217; king of, to be appointed 
by France, 250; extension of 
French authority in, 252; upper 
ports of, closed to England, 262; 
evacuation of, proposed, 287; 
Austrian possessions in, threat- 
ened, 290; designs of Napoleon 
and Austria upon, 291 ; troops 



from, 379, 394; boundary of, 421 
suffers under Napoleon's domi 
nation, 422, 458, 482, 524, 592 
610, 637, 643, 649, 657. 
Ivrea, taken, 199. 

Jacobins, radical party, 29 ; enemies 
of , 31 ; declare in favour of Repul> 
lie, 32; government of, character- 
ized, 38; abhorrence of, expressed, 
49; defeated, 50; revolt of, 53; 
unite with Thermidorians, 55, 76} 
have protection of Napoleon, 96; 
prevail in Directory, 102; clubs 
reorganized, 158; oppose govern- 
ment, 159; in league with Moder- 
ates, 163; in opposition, 164; 
open club, 164, 166, 167; at St. 
Cloud, 174; raise tmnult, 176; 
hatied felt toward, 181; deputies 
of, sentenced, 183; oppose Napo- 
leon's government, 236; deporta- 
tion of, 242, 270. 

Jaffa, storming of, 139; massacre 
of prisoners at, 140, 141; suffer- 
ings on march to, 145. 

Janina, 111. 

Janissaries, 381. 

Jaucourt, 580. 

Jena, battle of, 359, 360, 391, 534. 

Jews, rights of citizenship granted 
to, by Revolution, 231 ; specula- 
tion among, alone saved army 
from starvation, 369; usury 
practised by, cause of poverty in 
eastern departments, 395 ; assem- 
bly of rabbis, March, 1807, 396; 
Napoleon promulgates law bear- 
ing upon, 396; appealed to by 
Napoleon to relieve distress, 544; 
provisions at Orsha secured by 
aid of, 570. 

Joachim, King of Naples, see Murat. 

John VI. of Portugal, closes ports 
to England, 210. 

John, Crown Prince of Portugal, 
427, 428, 429. 

John, Archduke, replaces Kray, 204 ; 
defeated by Moreau, 206, 461; 
defeats French at Pordenone and 
Fontana Fredda, 464, 468; de- 
feated by Beauhamais at Raab, 
474; arrives too late to aid at 
Wagram, 477. 



Index 



809 



Jomini, 257 n., 318 n., 453; ap- 
pointed to oversee transport of 
provisions, 542, 555, 606 n., 611, 
611 n., 612, 654. 

Jordan, 143. 

Joseph II., plan of, for division of 
Turkey, 113; hopes of conquest 
of, 207; fails in diplomacy with 
Pope, 213; scheme of secular- 
ization under, 259. 

Joubert, in Italian campaign of 
1797, 97 ; in command of Dutch 
troops, 119; in command of army 
of Italy, 142; death of, 155, 161; 
succeeds Moreau, 164; defeated 
by SuvarofT, 144; confidence of 
Sieyes in, 168. 

Jourdan, victorious over Austrians, 
46; repulsed by Austrians, 76; 
defeat of^ 88; in command of 
Army of the Rhine, 142; Jacobin, 
159;* defeated by Archduke 
Charles, 161; radical, 167, 169, 
173; sentenced, 183; proclaims 
incorporation of Piedmont, 254; 
appointed marshal, 280, 708. 

Joux, fortress, 264. 

Junot, aide of Napoleon, 45; in 
Egyptian expedition, 127; secret 
police agency under, 246; crosses 
border with army into Por- 
tugal, Oct. 18th, 1807, 428, 429, 
446; surrenders at Cintra, 449, 
500, 564 n., 573. 

Juntas in Spain, 435, 449, 498, 499. 

Kaiser-Ebersdorf , 469 ; archduke 
attempts to destroy bridge at, 
470; Napoleon at, after battle of 
Aspem, 471; bridge at, guarded 
and protected by Napoleon, 
474. 

Kaja, 608. 

Kalish, 600; convention signed at, 
601. 

Kalkreuth, General, 360, 417 n. 

Kamenski, General, 367. 

Kapz^vitsch, 658, 659. 

Katharina, Grand-duchess of Rus- 
sia,_486. 

Kaunitz, 92 ; fails in diplomacy with 
Pope, 213. 

Kellerman, General, ordered to 
share command with Napoleon, 



82; order to, retracted, 83; the 
younger, at Marengo, 201, 395, 

Khiva, in plans of Paul I., 214. 

Kienmayer, 307, 311. 

"King of Rome," birth of, March 
20th, 1811, 492, 512, 513, 671, 
673, 674, 675, 682; Napoleon II., 
724, 740. 

Klagenfurt, 98. 

Kleber, general of revolutionary 
troops, 47; in Egyptian expe- 
dition, 127, 139, 143, 144; in 
battle of Aboukir, 148; left in 
Egypt, 151; assassination of, 
215. 

Klein-Gorschen, 608. 

Kleist, 611, 627, 628, 658, 659. 

Knesebeck, sent to Vienna by 
Prussia, 596, 598, 599, 600, 602. 

Knobelsdorff, General, sent from 
Berlin to demand evacuation of 
Germany, 350. 

Kolberg, fortress of, 383. 

KoUowrat, 475. 

Konigsberg, 371, 611. 

Konigswartha, 612, 

Koran, in Napoleon's library as 
politics, 124;' Napoleon refers to, 
129; Napoleon as an adherent 
of, 291. 

Krasnoi, battle at, 568-9. 

Kray, 162; in Suabia, 196; delay 
of, in receiving orders, 197; re- 
placed by Archduke John, 204. 

Krusemarck, Prussian envoy at 
Paris, 520 n., 521, 587. 

Kuhn, 628, 629. 

Kurakin, 387. 

Kutusoff, leader of the Russians 
and combined armies, 310, 311, 
312, 315; succeeds Barclay in 
command of Russian army, 553, 
554, 556, 560, 561, 563, 564, 565, 
569, 571 f., 595, 602, 607. 

Labanov, 383, 384, 

Labedoyere, Colonel, 691, 728. 

Labesnardiere, 337. 

Lacepede, 235, 

Lacoste, 723. 

La Cour de France, 672. 

Lafayette, 203, 723. 

La Fere, regiment of, 10, 12, 23, 2& 

Laffitte, 736. 



8io 



Index 



Laforet, French ambassador at Ber- 
lin, Jan. 1806, 341. 

Laharpe, 80, 654. 

Laibach, 97. 

Lam6, 651, 692. 

Lalanne, "Les derniers jours du 
Consulat," cited, 208 n.; on 
relics of d'Enghien, 274 n. 

Lallement, General, 726. 

Landshut, battle of, 476. 

Lanfrey, 453. 

Langeron, 655. 

Lanjuinais, 708, 724. 

Lannes, success of, against Papal 
troops, 93; in Egyptian expedi- 
tion, 127, 139; in battle of Abou- 
kir, 148; accompanies Napoleon 
from Egypt, 151 ; in command in 
Italy, 200; appointed marshal, 
280, 311, 312, 313; at Jena- 
Auerstadt, 359, 367, 368, 369, 
382; becomes Duke of Monte- 
bello, 400, 413, 446; only one of 
Napoleon's marshals who con- 
tinued to address him as "thou," 
413; defeats Spanish at Tudela, 
448, 467, 469; attacks at Essling, 
470; mortally wounded, 471. 

Laon, battle of, 664, 666. 

Laplace, 182. 

La Revelliere-Lepeaux, member of 
Directory, 76, 102, 158, 163. 

La Rochefoucauld, Royalist pre- 
fect, 224; figures in Napoleon's 
court, 280. 

La Rothiere, battle at, 656, 658. 

Las Cases, Count, 726, 729, 731, 
733, 735. 

Latin, acquirements of Napoleon 
in, 7. 

Latour-Maubourg, 639. 

Lauer, blunders of, 204. 

Lauriston, General, sent by Na- 
poleon to Kutusoff to make over- 
tures, 560, 607, 639. 

La Vallette, Bonaparte family at, 
40; yielded to Napoleon, 127; 
seized by English, 208, 671. 

Lebrun, consul, 186; revises code, 
231; in case of d'Enghien, 273; 
appointed grand dignitary, 279; 
becomes Duke of Piacenza, 400 
n. ; made Vicerov of Holland, 509. 

Lech, 160. 



Leclerc, General, marries Pauline 
Bonaparte, 248; expedition to 
San Domingo, 263. 

Lecombe, 710. 

Lefebvre, in Egyptian expedition, 
127; becomes Duke of Danzig, 
400, 446; reprimanded by Na- 
poleon, 448, 466, 469, 474, 611 n., 
653, 675, 708. 

Leghorn, 84; see also Livomo, 

Legion of Honour, established, 235, 
239; cross of, distributed, 283, 
399. 

Legnano, 314. 

Leibnitz, colonial ideas of, 113. 

Leipzig, 325, 607, 608; battle of, 
638, 639. 

Lemarrois, General, 424. 

Lemercier, president of Council of 
Ancients, 175. 

Leoben, preliminaries of, 99, 108, 
152; Austrian flight from, 310. 

Leopold, Grand-duke of Tuscany, 
confirms nobility of Bonaparte 
family, 3. 

L'Estocq, commander of East Prus- 
sian corps allied with Russians, 
367, 370, 372, 373; corps defeated 
by French, June 14th, 1807, 382, 
383. 

Letourneur, 76. 

"Letters from the Cape of Good 
Hope," 733, 737, 738. 

Leyen, Von der, 338. 

Liberal Constitutionalists in Cham- 
bers, 236. 

Liebertwolkwitz, engagement at, 
635. 

Liechtenstein, on appearance of Na- 
poleon, 19; commands Austrian 
corps at Austerlitz, 317; nego- 
tiator for Austria with Talley- 
rand, 321, 338; decides battle of 
Aspem for Austria, 471; given 
command of Austrian army, 479, 
481. 

Lienz, 98. 

Ligny, 712, 720, 721, 737. 

Ligurian Republic, constituted, 112; 
dissolved, 162; re-established, 
202, 210; in treaty of Luneville, 
252; new constitution for, 254. 

Literature and politics, servility 
in, 402-405. 



Index 



8ii 



Lithuania, 536, 580. 

Liverpool, Lord, 728. 

Livorr.o (Leghorn), naval battle at, 
48; English goods stored at, 422. 

Loano, victory of, 77. 

Lobau, island in Danube, 469, 471, 
474, 475. 

Lodi, victory at, 81. 

LomlDardy, 53; sought by Aus- 
tria, 72; offered to Austria, 
77; as source of supplies for Na- 
poleon, 78; sought for, from 
Francis II., 196; Republic of, 
100; communication of, with 
France, 120; regained by Aus- 
tria, 162; wanted by Austria, 194; 
Napoleon plans to enter, 197; 
new constitution for, 252, 256. 

Lonato, defeat of Austrians at, 91. 

London, preliminaries signed at, 
216; agents of Napoleon in, 271. 

Longwood, 730, 731; burial of 
Kapoleon at, 736, 737. 

Louis Ferdinand, Prince of Russia, 
353; killed at Saalfeld, 358. 

Louis XIV., colonial idea presented 
to, 113; surpassed by Napoleon, 
216; bureaucracy under, 224. 

Louis XV., 19. 

Louis XVI., good intentions of, 19; 
convokes States-General, 21 ; de- 
cides to flee, 28; accepts Con- 
stitution, 29; opposes decrees 
against priests, 32; declares war 
against Austria, 32; deposed 
from monarchy, 33; execution 
of, 35. 

Louis XVII., 54. 

Louis XVIII., 55; Royalists loyal 
to, 237, 673, 675, 681; Con- 
cludes peace with powers, 683; 
grants constitution, 683; dis- 
affection of army toward, 685; 
manifesto to army of, 692, 700; 
returns to Paris, 727, 741. 

I^ouise, Queen of Prussia, 286, 353, 
389. 

Louisiana, Spain agrees to give 
up, 210; in Napoleon's colonial 
scheme, 263; sold by Napoleon 
to United States, 268. 

Louverture, Toussaint, 263; de- 
feat, imprisonment, and death of, 
264. 



Lowe, Sir Hudson, 730, 731, 732, 
734, 735. 

Liibeck, port of, closed, 342. 

Lucca, Republic of, provided with 
constitution, 255, 328. 

Lucchesini, Prussian envoy, on 
French foreign policy, 190 n. ; 
on d'Enghien case, 275; on im- 
perial plans of Napoleon, 275; 
on state of feeling toward Na- 
poleon, 277 n. ; as to invasion of 
England, 284; sends word from 
Paris that Hanover is about to 
be restored to England, 348; 
sent with full powers to sign 
preliminaries of peace, 362. 

Lun^ville, peace of, 205, 210, 213; 
effects of, 229, 252, 255, 257 ; con- 
firms Rastatt, 258; Grand-duke 
of Tuscany in, 259. 

Liitzen, battle of, 607-8; result of, 
608, 609. 

liUxembourg, 115; sessions of exe- 
cutive at, 173. 

Lycees, established, 234. 

Lyons, 39, 157; Fesch archbishop 
of, 248; representatives of Lom- 
bardy invited to, 252 ; silk indus- 
try in, 225. 

Macdonald, General, founds Par- 
thenopean Republic, 160; evacu- 
ates Naples, 162; becomes Duke 
of Taranto, 400, 539, 548, 582, 
608, 625, 627, 628, 632, 633, 635, 
639, 640, 653, 658, 659, 660, 667 
f.,670, 675 f., 677. 

Macchiavelli, 246. 

Mack, General, 142, 160; his as- 
sumptions in 1805, 302; his con- 
duct of campaign, 303; his de- 
feat at Ulm, 306, 359, 550. 

Madrid, ministry in, 210; excite- 
ment at, on sale of Louisiana, 
269; road to, open to Napoleon, 
449 ; surrenders to Napoleon Dec. 
4th, 1808, 450. 

Magallon, at Cairo, 113. 

Magnano, Austrian victory at, 
162. 

Maillebois, Count de, campaign 
in Italy, 51. 

Mainotes, 111. 

Mainz, yielded to France, 109; 



8l2 



Index 



Mainz — Continited. 

archbishopric of, left undis- 
turbed, 260, 605. 

Maison, 674. 

Maistre, J. de, testimony of, to 
fideUty of Austrian emperor, 
320 n. 

Maitland, Captain, 727. 

Malet, conspiracy of. to overthrow 
the Empire, 576, 583. 

Maleville, 230. 

Mahnaison, park at, patrolled by 
police, 245 f., 247. 

Malojaroslavetz, battle at, 563. 

Malta, 37; letter of Napoleon on, 
112; Napoleon to seize, 122; 
captured by Napoleon, 127, 159, 
193; blockade of, by England, 
194; offered to Paul T., 208; 
Alexander I, renounces, 214; ac- 
quired by England, 215; restored 
to Kjiights of St. John, 215; on 
route to India, 264; EnglisTi re- 
fuse to evacuate, 266; evacua- 
tion proposed by Czar, 287; 
return of, offered by Napoleon 
to England, 344, 418! 

Mamelukes, 128 ff., 131,; in Sebas- 
tiani's report, 266. 

Mantua, in plans for "Army of 
Italy," 51; siege of, 86; impor- 
tance of, to Austria, 87 ff. ; ca- 
pitulation of, 91; in Cisalpine 
Republic, 109; capitulation of, 
162, 199. 

Marboeuf, Count, 3, 15; death of, 
25. 

Marceau, General, 46. 

Marchfeld, Archduke seeks po- 
sition on, instead of attacking 
French, 472, 475-477. 

Marciana, 681. 

Marengo, battle of, 200 ff., 210, 
212, 218, 253, 325. 

Maret, Secretary of State, 223; 
prepares constitution for Lom- 
bardy, 252; becomes Duke of 
Bassano, 400 n, ; souvenirs of, 
453, 575, 579; assures ambassa- 
dors that the French are arming 
on large scale, 587, 617, 636; 
removed from conduct of foreign 
affairs and succeeded by Caulain- 
court, 651; Secretary of State, 



657, 658, 658 n., 671, 687, 694, 
702. 

Marie Louise, Grand-duchess of 
Austria, marriage to Napoleon 
proposed, 488; marriage of, 490; 
not pleasing to Parisians, 491 ff., 
534, 619, 648, 667; flees from 
Paris, 671, 677, 681 f., 699. 

Mariotti, 682, 686, 688. 

Mark, Prussian county of, 347. 

Markgraf - Neusiedl, heights of, 
stormed by Davout, 476, 477. 

Markleberg, Wachau, and Liebert- 
woolkwitz, battle at, 635, 636. 

Markow,Russian ambassador, leaves 
Paris, 288. 

Markranstadt, 607. 

Marmont, aide of Napoleon, 45, 
53; rescues Napoleon, 90; in 
Egyptian expedition, 127; on 
numbers of Mamelukes, 131; 
memoir quoted, 133 f . ; in Alex- 
andria, 147; remark of Na- 
poleon to, on return to France, 
150; accompanies Napoleon from 
Egypt, 151 ; reports a remark of 
club orator, 155; general of 
division, 284, 299, 313, 381; 
becomes Duke of Ragusa, 400; 
testifies to confusion in French 
army, 472, 474, 477; succeeds 
Massena in command in Spain. 
502; defeat by WeUington, 554, 
606, 607, 608, 625, 628, 634, 635, 
636, 637, 639, 653, 655, 658, 659, 
660, 663, 664; despairs of Na- 
poleon's cause and grows negli- 
gent, 665, 667, 671, 672, 674; 
deserts to enemy, 676, 690, 692. 

Marshal, office in Empire, 279; ap- 
pointments to, 280; of palace, 
280; at court, 413; spoken of 
disrespectfully by Napoleon, 413. 

Marseilles, Jacobin club at, 31; 
Jacobins overcome in, 39; over- 
come by government troops, 40 
ff. ; importance of, 95; commerce 
of, 225, 248. 

Martinique, 63; in Napoleon's co- 
lonial scheme, 263. 

Massena, in Italian campaigns, 80, 
97 ; ordered to seize pass at Neu- 
markt, 98; enters Leoben, 99; 
checked by Austrians, 161 f.; 



ladex 



813 



MsLSsena,— Continued. 

defeats Russians and Austrians, 
165; defeats Russians, 194; in 
command in Italy, 196; replaced 
by General Brune, 206; ap- 
pointed marshal, 280; sent to 
Naples, 327, 375; becomes Duke 
of Rivoli, 400, 460, 464, 466, 471, 
474; ordered to engage main 
body of Austrians at Wagram, 
476; sent to command in Spain, 
500; battle at Busaco, 501; de- 
feated at Torres Vedras, 501; 
defeated at Fuentes de Onoro, 
502; deprived of command, 502; 
ablest marshal of the Empire, 502, 
521, 691. 

Maupeou, Chancellor, 230-31. 

Mecklenburg, Duke of, 413, 593. 

Medical school, 233. 

Medina de Rio Seco, victory of 
Bessieres at, 435. 

Mediterranean, the, 95, 112, 128; 
Russia seeks power on, 287. 

Mcias, victorious at Novi, 197; 
surprised, 199; nearly defeats 
Napoleon, 201; losses of, at 
Marengo, 202. 

Meme],377, 420. 

Menou, in command of troops of 
Convention, 55; in Egyptian 
expedition, 127; defeated in 
Egypt, 215; surrenders Alex- 
andria, 216. 

Meran, 98. 

Merlin, leader among Thermi- 
dorians, 49; in Directory, 163. 

Merveldt, General, representative 
of Austria, 99; Austrian com- 
mander at Leoben, 310; captured 
at Dohtz, 636, 637, 648. 

Mettemich, Countess, 489. 

Mettemich, doubt of , as to invasion 
of England, 284, 433, 442; 
documents of, show occasion for 
Napoleon's hasty return to 
France, 453; exaggerated ques- 
tions of political intrigue, 453-4; 
goes to Vienna to urge war 
against Napoleon, 454, 456, 459, 
479; fosters plan of marriage be- 
tween Napoleon and Marie Louise, 
488, 489, 517, 518, 521 n., 528, 
529, 529 n., 530, 541, 542 n., 591; 



plan of, for general pacification, 
596-98, 603-04, 609, 610, 615, 
616, 643, 648, 649, 650; inter- 
\'iew of, with Napoleon at Dres- 
den, 617, 620, 621, 650, 651, 652, 
654, 660, 666 n., 677, 699. 

Meurthe, Boulay de la, leader of 
Moderates, 163, 221; revises 
code, 231. 

Michel, General, 719 n. 

Milan, entry of Napoleon into, 81; 
he incites revolt in, 89 ; in Leoben 
compact, 99; in Cisalpine Re- 
pubUc, 109, 120; Austrian troops 
enter, 162; Napoleon advances 
on, 199; enters, 202; consents to 
new constitution, 252; author- 
ities at, to consider relation to 
Napoleon, 290; decree of, 581. 

Milhaud, 718. 

Millesimo, 79, 80. 

Mincio, the, 81, 202; Brune crosses, 
206 ; as Austrian boundary, 206. 

Minorca, acquired by England, 215. 

Miollis, General, ordered to march 
into Tuscany and confiscate Eng- 
lish goods, 422 ; ordered to occupy 
Rome and assume administra- 
tion of affairs of the country, 
425. 

Miot de M61ito, astonished by 
changes at Paris, 243; Memoires 
cited, 250; on state of feeling 
toward Naj)oleon, 277; doubt of, 
as to invasion of England, 284; 
speech of Napoleon quoted in 
"Memoires," 286; testifies that 
Napoleon had thoughts of hav- 
ing himself crowned Emperor of 
the West, 331, 398; testifies to 
Joseph's attempt to ingratiate 
himself with the Czar, 430 n., 
514, 649, 700. 

Modena, Duke of, concludes truce 
with Napoleon, 84; in compact 
of Leoben, 99; in Cisalpine Re- 
public, 109; Breisgau assigned to, 
207; duchy of, annexed to Ligu- 
rian Republic, 210; in Austro- 
Russian treaty, 291. 

Moderates, in league with Radicals, 
163 ; in power, 164 ; in Napoleon's 
Council of State, 221; Moreau 
leader of, 270. 



8i4 



Index 



Modlin, fortifications erected by 
French near, 420, 

Moeskirch, Austrians defeated at, 
199. 

Mohammed, 189. 

Mohammedans, respect for, incul- 
cated, 129. 

Moldavia, to be offered to Austria, 
288 n., 365, 416. 

Mole, Count, 587-8, 641, 701. 

Mollien, Minister of the Treasury, 
in charge of sinking fund, 229; 
protests against Napoleon's finan- 
cial measures, 590, 693, 694. 

Moncey, secret police agency under, 
246; appointed marshal, 280; 
becomes Duke of Conegliano, 
400, 446, 449. 

Mondovi, defeat of Austrians at, 
80. 

Monfalcone, 482. 

Monge, report of, about Napoleon, 
10; in Egyptian expedition, 
124 ; accompanies Napoleon from 
Egypt, 151, 708. 

Moniteur, the, 172, 190; informs 
Austrian ambassador, 261 ; story 
in, of plot against Napoleon, 271. 

Monk, General, 242, 270. 

Montebello, Duke of, see Lannes. 

Montenegro, bishop of, bribed, 287. 

Montenotte, 80. 

Montesquieu, 13. 

Montesquiou, 280. 

Montgelas, Bavarian Minister, Den- 
wiirdigkeiten, 322, 335, 354 n., 
378 397 489 

Montholon, 726, 729, 731, 732, 734, 
736, 739, 740 n. 

Montmirail, battle of, 659, 661. 

Mont Saint-Jean, 714, 715, 720, 721. 

Moore, Sir John, commands British 
army in Spain, 449; pursued by 
Soult and Napoleon, 451, 452. 

Morea, Napoleon's designs on, 278, 
291. 

Moreau, defeat of, 88; Napoleon 
jealous of, 97; conservative, 159; 
defeated by Austrians, 162; re- 

E laced by Joubert, 164; con- 
dence of Sieyes in, 168; ban- 
quet in honour of, 169; in com- 
mand of Switzerland, 196; army 
of, reduced, 197; grants exten- 



sion of truce, 204; defeats Aus- 
trians at Hohenlinden, 206 ; signs 
armistice, 206; troops under, 
sent to San Domingo, 263 ; leader 
of Moderates, 270; banishment of, 
271, 275, 576. 

Morfontaine, treaty of, 209. 

Mortier, appointed marshal, 280; 
at Diirmstein, 310 ; at Mainz, 357; 
becomes Duke of Treviso, 400; to 
remain in Franconia, 437; com- 
mander of Young Guard, 544; 
left behind in Moscow with 8000 
men, 562; ordered to blow up 
Kremlin on leaving Moscow, 564, 
635, 653, 663, 664, 667, 671, 672, 
674, 708. 

Moscow, ultimate goal in Napo- 
leon's mind, 541, 550; open to 
Napoleon, 556; French enter, 
556; deserted and burned by 
Russians, 557; plundered by 
French, 558, 559; retreat from, 
561 f., 576, 581. 

Moulins, in Directory, 163; made 
powerless, 173; charged by Na- 
poleon with plot, 175, 181. 

"Mountain," the, ascendency of, 
38; in "Le Souper de Beau- 
caire," 41; deposes Robespierre, 
49. 

Mount Isel, battle on, 473. 

Mouton, General, 471, 549, 564, 
578, 710, 717, 718. 

Mozart, "Don Juan" of, 403. 

Miiffing, 718. 

Miiller, Johannes von, 353. 

Munich, occupied, 203. 

Mur, 98. 

Murad Bey, Egyptian commander, 
130; offers battle, 131; defeat 
of, 131; negotiations with, 133, 
148. 

Murat, on the 13th Vend^miare, 
58; in Egyptian expedition, 127; 
in Palestine, 143; in battle of 
Aboukir, 148; accompanies Na- 
poleon from Egypt, 151; leads 
soldiers into council-hall, 178; 
marries Caroline Bonaparte, 248; 
guardian to King of Tuscany, 
255; appointed marshal, 280. 
305; hastens to Vienna, 310; 
prevents destruction of Tabor 



Index 



815 



Murat — Continued. 

bridge, 311-13; counsels con- 
tinuing war against Austria, 321 ; 
made Grand-duke of Berg and 
Cleves, 338; assumas name of 
Joachim I., 347; appropriates 
coal-fields and Essen, 347, 348, 
356, 359, 361, 367, 372, 373, 374, 
383; hopes to gain kingdom for 
himself in Portugal, 428; com- 
mander-in-chief of forces in 
Spain, 430; ceded throne of 
Naples, 434, 494, 495, 500, 511; 
talk of annexing Naples and of 
disgrace of, 512 n. ; commands 
cavalry in Russia, 539, 545, 547, 
549, 551, 555, 561, 563; "Butcher 
of cavalry," 567, 577, 582; 
saddled with blame for loss of 
the army, 587, 588, 597, 598, 
604; political vacillation guarded 
against by, 623, 626, 632, 633, 
634; leaves Napoleon before 
battle of Hanau, 643, 649; joins 
Austria, 655, 682, 686 n., 709. 

Mysore, Sultan of, 138. 

Nabulusians, 146. 

Namur, 713, 714. 

Nangis, battle of, 660. 

Naples, joins coalition, 73; agrees 
to remain neutral, 84; Queen 
of, 92 ; ambassadors of, at Monte- 
bello, 107; republicanism in, 125; 
Nelson at, 127; Knights of St. 
John under, 128; at war with 
France, 138; troops of, take the 
field, 142; declares war against 
France, 142; kinship with Aus- 
tria, 160; evacuated by Mac- 
donald, 162; Napoleon deals 
with, 210, 217; Russia inter- 
cedes for, 211; ports of, closed 
to England, 211; occupation of, 
286; dispossession of Royal 
House of, required by Na- 
poleon, 321; Napoleon an- 
nounces that Bourbon dynasty 
had ceased to reign in, 327, 340, 
345; throne of, ceded to Murat, 
434, 511. 

Napoleon Bonaparte, his family 
of noble origin, 3; character in 
boyhood, 5; early enthusiasm 



for Paoli, 5; school life at 
Brienne, 6; fondness for mathe- 
matics, 8; revolutionary ideas 
of, 10; decides to enter artillery, 
10; removes to Paris, 10; 
ficole miUtaire, 10; passes ex- 
amination. 10; commissioned 
as second lieutenant, 10; dreary 
prospects 12; possible love 
affair, 12; his ''Dialogue on 
Love," 13; works that influ- 
enced his thinking, 13; youthful 
writings of, 13, 14; extract from 
diary of, 15; double natm-e of, 
18; plans of, for gaining control 
of Corsica, 25; drills Corsican 
guard, 26; joins Paoli, 27; first 
lieutenant, 27; contracts debts, 
28; further literary projects of, 
28; subscribes to oath, 29; at- 
titude of, during early days of 
Revolution, 29; attack upon, 
in Ajaccio, 31; his embarrass- 
ment, 33; appointed captain, 
34 ; returns to Corsica, 34 ; breaks 
with Paoli, 36; plans attack on 
Ajaccio, 36; growth of ambition 
of, 37; artillery officer at Avig- 
non, 40; "Le Souper de Beau- 
caire,"40; upholds Convention, 
41; promoted in artillery regi- 
ment, 42; his share in siege of 
Toulon, 42; appointed colonel, 
43; appointed brigadier-general, 
43; disclaims nobility of origin, 
44; republicanism of, 44; his 
plan of operations for Army 
of Italy, 45; general of artil- 
lery in Army of Italy, 45; im- 
prisoned in Fort Carre, 46; de- 
clares his patriotism, 47 ; released 
from prison, 48; in expedition 
against Corsica, 48 ; ordered to 
Army of the West, 48; returns 
to Paris, 49; difficulties of his 
situation at Paris, 50; protests 
against removal to the Vendue, 
52; his letter to Joseph B., 
quoted, 53; his petition rejected, 
53; summoned to protect legis- 
lature, 56 ; saves the Convention, 
58 ; appointed commander-in- 
chief of Army of the Interior, 
58; fatalism of, 59; personal 



8i6 



Index 



Napoleon — Continued. 

description of, 61; enters soci- 
ety, 62; thinks of marrying, 
62; Mme. Bourrienne's descrip- 
tion of his appearance, 65; state 
of health of, 66; impression 
of Josephine on, 66; advised 
to marry her, 66; marriage of, 
68 ; appointed commander-in- 
chief of Army of Italy, 68; de- 
tested by Parisian populace, 69; 
his plan of campaign in Italy, 77; 
assumes conmiand of Army of 
Italy, 78; his address to Army 
of Italy, 78; theory of attack, 
79; his first success in Italian 
campaign, 80; wins confidence 
of his soldiers, 80; disobeys 
Directory, 81, 94; victory of, 
at Lodi, 81 ; his entry into Milan, 
81; makes treaty with Sar- 
dinia, 82 ; his letter to Directory 
on management of campaign, 
82; freedom of, to act in Italy, 
83; enters Venetian territory, 
concludes truce with Parma and 
Modena, 84; wonderful achieve- 
ments of, in Italy, 85; strategy 
of, 85; student of Frederick 
the Great, 86; defeats Quos- 
danovich and Wurmser, 87; 
importance of successes to, 88; 
his opinion of Austrian army, 
89; loss of, at Verona, 90; dan- 
ger of, in battle of Arcole, 90; 
at Rivoli, 91; declares war 
against Pius VI., 93; refrains 
from capture of Rome, 93 f.; 
makes treaty with Pius VI., 94; 
designs of, in Italy, 94; contri- 
butions levied by, in Italy, 94; 
his vision of Alexander the 
Great, 95; his military fame 
after Italian campaign, 96; in 
Italian campaign of 1797, 97; 
his proposals of peace to Arch- 
duke Charles, 98; his nego- 
tiations with Austria at Leoben, 
99; his diplomatic victory over 
Austria, 100; accuses Austria 
of designs on Venice, 100; de- 
clares war on Venice, 100; his 
agreement with Venetian pa- 
triots, 101; his report to Direc- 



tory, 102; supports the Directory, 
103; his manifesto to army, 
103; his memorials justifying 
his course in Venice, 104; service 
rendered by, to Directors, 104; 
pretends to the army to have 
saved the Republic, 105; holds 
court at villa of Montebello, 107; 
threatens resignation, 107; his 
negotiations with Cobenzl, 108; 
satisfaction of, on treaty of 
Campo Formio, 110; designs of, 
110; acquires Ionian Isles, 111; 
proceeds against Corsica and 
Genoa, 112; his letter to Direc- 
tory on Egypt, 112; his de- 
signs on Egypt, 113; anxiety 
of Directory concerning, 114; 
proclamation of, to fleet, 114; let- 
ter of, to Talleyrand on invasion 
of England, 114; commander- 
in-chief of Army of England, 
114; his designs for supremacy 
in France, 114; his return to 
Paris, 115; affects simplicity, 
115; his reply to Talleyrand's 
address, 115; letter of, to Talley- 
rand on Constitution, 117; "Code 
Complet" of, 117; his thoughts 
of "Coup d'Etat," 119; ap- 
pearance of, 119; plans revolu- 
tion in Switzerland, 120; Ber- 
nese treasure, 120; not admitted 
to Directory, 121; dangers to, 
from unpopularity, 121 ; argues 
against invasion of England, 
122; rival ^of Directory, 123; 
library of, in Egyptian ex- 
pedition, 124; advocates French 
interference in East, 125; tar- 
ries in Paris, 126; captures 
Malta, 127; passage of, to 
Alexandria, 128; naval genius 
of, 128; proclamation of, to 
soldiers at Alexandria, 129; 
proclamation of, to Egyptians, 
129; proceeds to Cairo, 131; his 
remark on lying, 131; his dif- 
ficulties at Cairo, 132; receives 
news of Aboukir, 133; igno- 
rance of, as to Turkey's atti- 
tude, 135; suppresses revolt in 
Cairo, 135; founds "Institute" 
in Egypt, 136; his dispute with 



Index 



817 



Napoleon — Continued. 

scientists, 137; compared to 
Mephistopheles, 137; interest in 
miracles of Moses, 137; dream of 
Asiatic conquest, 138; invades 
Palestine, 139; at siege of Acre, 
141; his plans of return to 
France, 143; his feeling at re- 
sistance of Acre, 144; his false- 
hoods regarding siege of Acre, 
147; returns to Egypt, 147; 
his brilliant victory at Abou- 
kir, 148; his remark to Marmont 
on return to France, 150; sails 
from Alexandria, 151; his dis- 
cussion of his return to France, 
151 ff. ; his course of, in Italian 
campaign, 152; in Corsica, 154; 
learns of French losses, 155; 
decides to go to Paris, 155, es- 
capes from English squadron, 
155 f. ; his letter to Directory 
announcing his arrival, 156; pro- 
fits from French losses, 164; 
renewed confidence in, 165; de- 
scribes his course to Madame 
de Remusat, 166; informed of 
Sieyes' plans, 168; favours con- 
stitutional commission, 168; ban- 
quet in honour of, 169; charged 
with execution of decree of 
council, 170; his address on 
receiving appointment, 171; his 
proclamation to National Guard, 
172; demands resignation of 
Barras, 172; outburst of, 174; 
accuses directors of plot, 175; 
danger to, from tumult, 176; wild 
language of, 175, 178; consul 
in provisional government, 180; 
in full possession of executive 
power, 181; ridicules consti- 
tution of Sieyes, 184; his letter 
to Talleyrand on legislature, 
185; master of France, 187, 192; 
his manifesto on new constitu- 
tion, 187; on vanity of French, 
188; his rapid advancement, 
188; principle of conquest in- 
herited by, 189; Prussian en- 
voy on, 190 n. ; Eastern plans 
of, anticipated, 191; partici- 
pates in plans of Revolution, 
192; his difficulties in way of 



peace in 1800, 192; needs war, 
194; his letter of , to Austria, 194; 
his insincerity in offers of peace, 
195; his secret orders to Ber- 
thier, 197; auns to be the author 
of peace, 197; his passage of 
the Alps, 199; his advance 
upon Milan nearly defeated at 
Marengo, 201; his misrepre- 
sentations on Marengo, 202; 
firm position of, in France, 203; 
his letter to Francis II. on 
peace, 203; insists on separate 
agreement with Austria, 205; 
closes armistice, 205; separates 
Russia and Austria, 208; his 
policy with absolute monarchies, 
208; strikes at England's mari- 
time supremacy, 208; raises 
enemies against Austria, 209; 
his dealings in Italy and Spain, 
210; ridicules " idealogues," 211; 
treaty with Ferdinand IV. of 
Naples, 211; religious attitude 
of, 211; recognizes political im- 
portance of Papacy, 212; his 
agreement with Pius VII., 212; 
succeeds where others had failed 
in diplomacy with Pope, 213; 
his despair at news from Russia, 
214; accepts proposal of Eng- 
land, 215; seeks good-will of 
Czar, 215; proposes to resume 
negotiations, 216; his oriental 
dream ended, 216; resumes 
support of Poles, 217; fame of, 
as establisher of peace, 217; 
aim of, in securing peace, 218; 
seeks hegemony of France, 218; 
advancing to universal dominion, 
219; reorganizes France, 221; 
chooses councillors from different 
parties, 222; re-establishes com- 
munes, 223; reorganizes "gen- 
darmerie," 225; his remark on 
taxation, 228; his management 
of national domains, 229; ap- 
points committee on code, 230; 
assists in revising code, 231; 
credit due to, for code, 232; 
work of, in public instruction, 
233 ; aim of, in decrees on public 
instruction, 234 ff. ; his attitude 
on education, 235,; repeals law 



8i8 



Index 



Napoleon — Continiied. 

excluding Emigres, 236; auto- 
cratic government of, 236; 
Jacobin plan to assassinate, 236 
f, ; orders deportation of Radi- 
cals and Jacobins, 238 f. ; his 
arbitrary acts, 238; gets rid of 
opposition in legislature, 239 
made consul for life, 239 f. 
monarchical surroundings of, 244 
intolerant of opposition, 244 f, 
moroseness of, 245; his habits 
described by Madame de Remu- 
sat, 245; mistrusts every one, 
246; ideas of honesty and ver- 
acity, 246; stepchildren of, 247; 
marriage of sisters of, 247 f.; 
mother of, at palace, 248; his 
remark on peace and war in 
Europe, 249; scheme of empire 
over Europe, 250; provides new 
constitutions for Holland and 
Lombardy, 252 f. ; presidency 
of Cisalpine Republic offered to, 
253 ; incorporates Piedmont, 254 ; 
incorporates Elba, 255; suc- 
ceeds in securing control in 
Switzerland, 256 f. ; has same 
motive as Revolution, 258; Ger- 
man princes negotiate with, 260; 
power of, felt beyond the Rhine, 
261; closes European ports to 
England, 262; colonial scheme 
of, 263 ff . ; protests against 
attacks of English newspapers, 
265; his instructions to am- 
bassador in London, 265; may 
change the face of Europe, 266; 
aims to force England into war, 
266 f.; George III. offers ulti- 
matum to, 287; arrests English- 
men in France, 267; plans of, 
against England, 267; forces 
dependent states into league, 
268; plot against 270; popu- 
larity of, increased, 271; orders 
arrest, trial, and execution of 
d'Enghien, 272; revulsion of 
feeling toward, 274 f. ; sym- 
pathy elicited by, 274 f. ; pro- 
posed imperial title of, 275 ; part 
played by, 276- corrupt muni- 
ficence of, 276; wants legitimi^te 
successor, 276; address to, from 



deputation of Senate, 277; ar- 
ranges that Republicans offer 
him title of Emperor, 278; his 
provisions for Buccessor of, 279; 
at Boulogne, 283; enthusiasm 
for, 283; remark on power of, 
283 f. ; preparations of, for con- 
tinental war, 285 f. ; Austria con- 
ciliatory toward, 288 f . ; at Aix- 
la-Chapelle, 289; threatens Aus- 
trian interests in Italy, 290; 
designs of, upon Italy, 291; 
coronation of, before Pius VI., 
292; religious marriage of, with 
Josephine, 292; concessions of, 
to the Pope, 293; challenges 
Austria in Italy, 294; plans 
against England, 297; decides 
to attack Austria, 299; his self- 
confidence, 300; his opinion of 
Mack, 302; his rapid march, 
304; his strategy before Ulm, 
306; his severity toward Ville- 
neuve, 309; demands not ac- 
cepted, 311; address to his 
troops after Austerlitz, 318; 
prevents co-operation between 
his foes, 314; culmination of 
prosperity of, 326 ; victories used 
to advance his own interests, 
327; public opinion in France 
turned to favour of, 325; de- 
clares himself Emperor of Rome, 
Emperor of the West, 334; an- 
nounces in Berlin the organiza- 
tion of the Confederation of the 
Rhine, 347; infers the exist- 
ence of a new coalition, 350; 
incredulous of Prussia's inten- 
tion to offer armed resistance 
to him, 355; starts forces secretly 
to re-enforce army in Germany, 
355; his plan of campaign 
against Prussia, 356; orders to 
various corps, 357; defeats Ho- 
henlohe at Jena, 359, 360; de- 
termines to assume the offensive, 
371 ; hastens from Warsaw north- 
wards, 372; his plan of attack 
upon Russians condemned by 
critics, but perhaps due to in- 
tention to spare Russians, 381; 
his return to Paris after Tilsit, 
392 ; his representations to people 



Index 



819 



Napoleon — Continued. 

of France in regard to war 
forced upon him, 393-4; turns 
his attention to affairs of the 
interior, 394; his financial dis- 
positions, 396, 397; provides for 
personal vanity of French, 398; 
his measures against the press, 
401; discourages discussion of 
laws, 402; restricts mental ac- 
tivity of people, 402; his inordi- 
nate ambition, 410; surrounds 
himself with ceremony, 411; his 
life and manners, 412; his 
treatment of friends, 417; re- 
fuses to dismember Turkey, 417; 
assembles fleet to conquer Malta 
and Sicily, and attack Gibraltar, 
418; asks permission of Turkey 
for passage of troops through 
Albania, 418; checkmates Rus- 
sia's Oriental schemes, 418, 419; 
demands Russia's authorization 
to French annexation of Prus- 
sian Silicia, 418; induces Turkey 
to keep ports closed against 
England, 419; "counsels" in 
Spanish affairs, 429 ; meets Joseph 
in Venice to offer him the Span- 
ish crown, 430; appoints inter- 
view in Bayonne, 431; whole 
Continent subject to orders of, 
432; forced to withdraw some of 
his troops from Germany to aid 
in Spain, 436, 437; his suprem- 
acy on Continent tottering, 438; 
his purpose in showing respect 
to poets and men of genius in 
Germany, 444; takes veterans 
to Spain to regain his prestige, 
445; severity of, 450; hastens 
to Paris Jan. 17th, 1809, 452; 
informed of Austrian agitations, 
458; demands conscription of 
1810, 459; reassembles army 
in Germany, 459; Austria to 
be considered aggressor by, 460; 
strategic arrangement of forces 
by, 460; arrives upon Danube 
just in time to rescue anny from 
peril, 465; his generalship dis- 
played in Austrian campaign, 
465; surprised at early attack 
of Austrians, 464; hastens in 



four days to Donauworth, 465; 
gives orders to advance upon 
Vienna, 467; considers battles 
of Abensberg, Landshut, and 
Ekmiihl most adroit of his 
military manoeuvres, 467; enters 
Vienna, May 13th, 1809, 469; 
draws to himself" aU troops at 
his disposal, 474; his sleep 
during battle, 476 n, ; decides 
to accept armistice, July 12th, 
1809, 478; loses faith in battle 
as means of success, 478; 
genuinely desirous of peace, 479; 
acknowledges desire for peace, 
480; announces conclusion of 
peace to Viennese, 481 ; re- 
turns in triumph to Paris, 483; 
his contempt for middle classes 
a grievance deeply felt, 483; 
rouses indignation by expul- 
sion of Pope, 484; seeks to in- 
gratiate himself with French 
people by means of new mar- 
riage, 484; divorce accepted 
by Church, Jan. 1810, 486; 
choice of new wife, 486 ; instructs 
Caulaincourt to ask for hand of 
Grand-duchess Anna of Russia, 
487; secret project for marriage 
with Archduchess Marie Louise 
of Austria, 488; his conduct 
toward the Poles, 487; abandons 
project of Russian marriage, 
489, 490; his marriage, 490; his 
letter to foreign ambassadors, 
492; lacking in appreciation of 
instinct of nationality, 493 ; denies 
complicity in arrest of the Pope, 
496; orders Papal court and 
archives removed to Paris, 496; 
private funds resulting to, from 
decree against smuggling, 505; 
issues edict against neutrals, 
505; his "license system," 506; 
summons powers of Europe to 
adopt the tariff of Trianon, 506 ; 
becomes distrustful of his 
brothers and abandons family 
system of rule, 509; "I am not 
the successor of the French 
kings, but of Charlemagne," 
513; openly rejects all thoughts 
of peace, 513, 515, 516; his plan of 



820 



Index 



Napoleon — Continued. 

universal empire set forth, 515; 
convinced that he must first 
fight Russia to ruin England, 
519, 520; sends reply to Russian 
ultimatum and starts for Dres- 
den to make threatening demon- 
stration, 532; ranked with the 
great men of history by Goethe, 
533; not without misgivings 
while at Dresden, 536; leaves 
Dresden for Konigsberg, May 
28th, 1812, 538; overestimates 
Russian forces and plans accord- 
ingly, 540; his plan of campaign, 
540-542; disaster to, through 
continued pursuit of Russians, 
541, 542; hardships and distress 
of, 546 ; expects battle at Vitebsk, 
delays attack and loses chance, 
547; his excitement at Vitebsk, 
549; declares campaign of 1812 
closed, and then decides to pro- 
ceed on road to Moscow with 
hope of victory at Smolensk, 
549 ; breaks camp at Vitebsk, 549 ; 
his plan condemned by Clause- 
witz, 550; sees before him only 
an army to be beaten and 
a cabinet to accept terms, 
552; unlike himself at Borodino, 
ill and neglectful of task, 555; 
for the first time does not inter- 
vene in person, 556; expects 
overtures of peace from Czar 
in vain, 558; wastes five weeks 
at Moscow in hope of peace, 561 ; 
orders retreat from Moscow, 561; 
his last hope of peace destroyed 
by defeat of Murat, 561; de- 
cides for road via Kaluga, 562; 
avoids meeting enemy, 563; 
rouses hard feeling by favourit- 
ism for the Guard, 567; urges 
Victor to make new advance, 
568; strong and prudent in 
face of failure, 571 ; writes to 
Maret that his presence may be 
necessary in Paris, 575-6; hears 
of Malet conspiracy, 576; at 
Smorgoni tells of his decision to 
leave troops under command 
of Murat, who is to lead them 
beyond the Niemen, 577; enters 



Paris, Dec. 18th, 1812, 579; his 
prestige shattered, 580; has no 
thoughts of giving up his su- 
premacy in Europe, 582; in- 
stitutes preparations for arma- 
ment at once upon reaching 
France, 582; his speech to 
deputation of Senate, 583; his 
speech to council of state, 583; 
activity in Jan. 1813, 585; 
impressed by news of con- 
vention of Tauroggen, 587; 
makes peace with the Pope, 588- 
9; desires to be head of the 
Church, 589; plans to dissolve 
Corps Legislatif and reorganize 
Senate and Council of State, 
591; gives up plan, 592; his 
plans formed in days of highest 
glory impracticable, 592; calls 
upon princes of Rhenish Con- 
ference for new contingents, 
593; sends to Prussia and Aus- 
tria asking reinforcement of their 
contingents, 594; his reply to 
Austria leaves little prospect of 
peace, 597; neglects chance to 
secure Prussia to his interests, 
599; sends Narbonne to Viemia 
to secure troops, 604; forced by 
alliance of Northern powers to 
open war earlier than he had 
planned, 605; makes "greatest 
mistake of his life" and con- 
sents to armistice, 614; con- 
tinues truce, 617, 618; accepts 
armed intervention of Austria, 
617; desires general rather than 
mere Continental peace, 618; 
sees himself confronted with 
powerful coalition and seeks to 
break it up, 620; his plan of 
campaign, 624; his illness on 
road to Pima after battle of 
Dresden, 627; plans enterprise 
against Berlin, but is thwarted by 
Bliicher, 628 ; enemy escapes, and 
defeats his generals, 630; orders 
retreat to left bank of the Elbe 
and abandons the right, 630; 
makes approaches to Austria 
without success, 632; counts on 
pitched battle, but enemy retires, 
633; plans to threaten Berlin 



Index 



821 



Napoleon — Continued. 

and attack main army, 634; 
strategically conquered, his sole 
hope in a decisive battle, 634; 
determined to attack Schwar- 
zenberg, who is apjjroaching 
Leipzig, 634; recognizes his 
desperate situation, 636; sends 
Merveldt to Francis with pro- 
posals of peace, 637; hints as 
to how much of his position in 
Europe he was ready to give 
up, 637; makes ready for re- 
treat, 637-8; neglectful of ener- 
getic steps until too late, 637; 
describes himself as kind-hearted 
to Count Mole, 641 ; tells Metter- 
nich "a man like me cares little 
for the lives of a million men," 
642; ruled by idea of collect- 
ing another army, 642; opposi- 
tion of European peoples to, 
643-4; his prestige shaken, 644; 
determines to release Ferdinand 
VII. of Spain to get use of 
troops in Spain, 646-7; pre- 
vented by Talleyrand, 647; pro- 
poses to release Pope on cession 
of Papal States to kingdom of 
Italy, 648; terms offered by 
allied monarchs, 648; sends 
procrastinating reply to pro- 
posed terms, 649, 650; assem- 
bles Corps Legislatif , 651 ; orders 
Caulaincourt to write Metter- 
nich of his acceptance of pro- 
posed basis of peace, 651 ; in hour 
of need the military leader rather 
than sovereign to French people, 
652; plans to collect forces at 
Paris and decide matters in a 
battle, 653; decides to accept 
terms of allies, 657; resolves 
upon dealing Blucher a blow, 658 ; 
detects desire of enemy for truce 
and determines to insist on 
Frankfort terms, 661; learns 
of Bliicher's advance on Paris 
and is forced to pursue him, 
664; hastens toward Paris, 671; 
overtures for peace, 673; forced 
to abdicate, 675; plans to operate 
in Italy, 676; offered Elba, 677; 
renounces thrones of Italy and 



France, 677; signs treaty of 
Fontainebleau, 677 ; leaves 
Fontainebleau, 679; arrives at 
Portoferrajo, 679; activity on 
Elba, 680 f.; abduction of, 
planned, 686; plans for siege, 
687; leaves Elba for Continent, 
688 ; issues manifesto, 690 ; wins 
over army, 691 ; issues decree, 
692; forms cabinet, 694; pro- 
scribed by powers, 698; grants 
new constitution, 702; takes the 
offensive against allied armies, 
710 ; at battle of Waterloo, 711 f. ; 
flight from Waterloo, 719; in 
Paris, 721; abdicates in favour 
of son, 724; leaves Paris for 
Malmaison, 725; escapes to 
Rochefort, 726; embarks on 
"Bellerophon," 727; St. Helena 
fixed upon as abode of, 728; 
embarks for St. Helena, 729; 
treatment of, at St. Helena, 730; 
quarters and activity at Ijong- 
wood, 731; plans for rescue of, 
732 ; attempts to influence public 
opinion, 733; ill-health of, 735; 
dictates testament, 736; death 
of, 736; Uterary remains of, 
737; his hopes for his dynasty, 
740 ; body removed to Paris, 742. 

Napoleon II,, see King of Rome. 

Napoleon III, see Bonaparte, Na- 
poleon III. 

Narbonne," Adjutant General of 
Napoleon, his conversation with 
Napoleon, 405, 520, 532, 538, 
543, 604, 618. 

Nasiedlowitz, scene of conference 
between Napoleon and Emperor 
Francis, 319; armistice of, signed, 
Dec. 6th, 1805, 320; terms of 
peace at, offered by Napoleon, 
319. 

Nassau, 338. 

National Assembly, suspends royal 
authority, 29; creates battalions 
of volunteers, 30; laws of, par- 
tial, 231. 

Natural boundaries, idea of Rous- 
seau, 74. 

National Council, convoked, 497. 

Nationalists, in Corsica, 24. 

Necker, 13, 21. 



822 



Index 



Neipperg, 597 n. 

Nelson, Admiral, in search of 
French fleet, 127 f. ; defeats 
French fleet, 132; at Syracuse, 
154; repulsed by French fleet, 
216; at Trafalgar, 309. 

Nesselrode, advocates junction of 
central powers of Europe against 
Napoleon, 595, 615, 617, 648. 

Neuchateau, Frangois de, received 
into Directory, 104; in conference 
with Cobenzl, 160. 

Neuchatel, Prince of, see Berthier. 

Neuchatel, 320. 

Neumarkt, pass at, 98, 195. 

NeuviUe, Hyde de, representa- 
tive of Vendeans in Paris, 237. 

Newspapers, suppressed, 238. 

Ney, marches into Switzerland, 
257, 265; appointed marshal, 
280; in command, 284, 313; com- 
mands advance-guard at Jena, 
359, 367, 375; attacked by Ben- 
nigsen, 380; attempts to find 
better quarters for troops, 371; 
lingers to harass Prussian corps, 
372, 373, 382, 437, 446; becomes 
Duke of Elchingen, 400, 413; sent 
to cut off Spanish line of retreat, 
448, 449, 451, 500, 539, 545, 551, 
555, 567, 568; left to his fate by 
Napoleon, 569; takes place of 
Oudinot, 574, 607, 608, 609, 611; 
overcautious at Bautzen, 612, 
613; defeated at Dennewitz, 
629; wounded at Leipzig, 639, 
653, 660; attacked near Torcy, 
668, 675, 677, 691, 708, 712, 714, 
716 f., 718; death of, 728, 737, 
738. 

Nile, valley of, 113; Egyptian flo- 
tilla on, 130; battle of, 132; 
delta of, 145. 

North Lusitania, Kingdom of, to 
be given to Queen of Etruria 
as compensation for Tuscany, 
428. 

North Sea, coast of, importance to 
France of, 191. 

Norwav, 530, 560, 595, 603. 

Normal School, 233. 

Notables, 183. 

Novi, defeat of French at, 155, 164, 
197 ; road from, to Genoa, 200. 



Niiremberg, publishers of, 352. 

Ocafio, battle of, 500 

Odeleben, 606 n., 639. 

Oglio, proposed boundary line for 
Austria, 99, 101, 206. 

Oldenburg, duchy of, annexed, 519; 
offered Erfurt as compensation, 
519, 521, 602, 609, 610. 

Oldenburg, Duke of, 486. 

Ohniitz, 312, 317. 

Olssufief, 658, 659. 

Om Dinar, engagement at, 131. 

O'Meara, 367 n., 729, 735. 

Orange, Prince of, 353; House of, 
644. 

Ordener, General, arrests d'En- 
ghien, 272. 

Orders in Council of 1807, 604; 
Dutch permitted to demand 
revocation of, 507, 509, 581. 

Orient, Napoleon's plan of cam- 
paign in, 121 ; Napoleon general- 
in-chief of, 122; army of, 124; 
effect of French in, 134; armj^ 
of, composition of, 152; expedi- 
tion, 194; plans of Napoleon in, 
286; policy of Russia in, 288 n., 
290. 

Orleans, Maid of, birthday of, re- 
vived, 267. 

Osterach, defeat of French at, 161. 

Osterode, Napoleon at, 375, 376. 

Ostrolenka, 367. 

Otranto, Duke of, see Fouch4. 

Otranto, occupied by French, 268, 
328. 

Ott, besieges Genoa, 198; takes 
Genoa, 200. 

Otto, French ambassador in Lon- 
don, 265, 267, 284, 366. 

Ottoman Empire, see Turkey. 

Oubril, Russian ambassador sent to 
Paris, 345, 346; refuses to treat 
in conjunction with England, 
346 n. ; promises Bay of Cattaro 
to Napoleon, 346, 349. 

Oudinot, becomes Duke of Reggio, 
400, 413, 459, 460, 464, 539, 
545, 548, 570, 571; leads his 
forces to Studjanka, 572; wound- 
ed, 574, 606, 614, 623, 624, 627, 
635, 636, 658, 660, 664, 666, 675. 

Ouvrard, 397. 



Index 



823 



Padua, 328. 

Pagerie, Joseph Gaspard Tascher 
de la, father of Josephine, 63. 

Paget, 346 n. 

Pajol, General, 713. 

Palafox, commander of Spanish 
right wing, 448. 

Palestine, invasion of, 139. 

Palm, Niiremberg bookseller, 352; 
indignation aroused by murder 
of, 353. 

Pampeluna, 644. 

du Pan, Mallet, quoted on plan of 
expansion, 76; reports French 
plans in Italy, 77; prophetic re- 
mark regarding Napoleon, 95; 
contempt expressed for Napo- 
leon, 96 ; letter on French policy, 
125; on character of Revolu- 
tion, 190; on activity of Direc- 
tory, 191, 504 n. 

Paoli, Pasquale, government of 
Corsica by, 1 ; his flight to Eng- 
land, 2; his return from exile, 
26; chosen President of Coun- 
cil, 27, 31; his altercation with 
Napoleon, 35; favours constitu- 
tional monarchy, 35; accused by 
Napoleon, 36 ; invited by George 
III., 48. 

Papacy, Napoleon recognizes politi- 
cal importance of, 212; act of 
Senatus consultum in regard to, 
496. 

Papal government, ransoms Rome, 
84; troops, cowardice of, 93; 
states, 118, 125. 

Papal Legations, in Austro-Russian 
treaty, 281. 

Papal States, vacated by Naples, 
211; attempt to include in 
"ItaUan Federation," 422; Na- 
poleon threatens to annex lega- 
tions of Urbino, Macerata, and 
Ancona in, 424; converted into 
French province, Apr. 1808, 
425, 436, 495, 496, 648. 

Paris, riots in, 22; effect of defeat 
of French troops in, 33; revul- 
sion of feeling in, 49; arms 
against the Convention, 55; so- 
ciety in, described by Napoleon, 
62; need of rest felt in, 74; 
change of affairs in, 102; popu- 



larity of Napoleon in, 115; 
Napoleon's estimate of populace 
of, 115, 121; Napoleon's trium- 
phal journey to, 157; garrison 
of, 169; quiet in, on 19th Bru- 
maire, 179; report of Napoleon's 
defeat at, 203; churcnes of, 
crowded, 212; Cardinal Consalvi 
sent to, 213; robbers in the 
outskirts of, 224; prefect of 
police in, 225; manufactures in, 
225; foreigners flock to, 242; 
changes at, 243; delegation from 
Porto Ferrajo summoned to, 255; 
fifty deputies from Switzerland 
summoned to, 257; work of 
Pichegru in, 270; arrival of 
d'Enghien at, 273; brief career 
of "Liberty" in, 281; Pius VIL 
arrives at, 292; treaty of, signed 
at, July 20th, 1806, 345, 346, 347; 
advance of allied armies on, 670; 
capitulation of, 672; treaty of, 
698, 729. 

Parma, Duke of, see Cambac^res. 

Parma, Duke of, concludes truce 
with Napoleon, 84; Prince of, 
marries Spanish princess, 210; 
principality of, ceded to France, 
210, 328; duchy of, 677. 

Parthenopean Republic, founded, 
160; ended, 162. 

Passariano, negotiations at, 108; 
peace of, 205. 

Passau, allotted to Bavaria, 261. 

Paul I., refuses to aid Austria, 91; 
prejudiced in favour of Napoleon, 
208; schemes against India, 214; 
death of, 214; defends Sardinia, 
251. 

Paulucci, 586. 

Pavia, 200. 

Peraldi, Corsican patriot, 25, 112. 

Permon, Madame, sought in mar- 
riage by Napoleon, 63, 

Persia, Shah of, Napoleon's ad- 
vances toward, 138. 

Persia, rebellion in, 191, 365; 
Napoleon tries to rouse, against 
Russia, 378-9. 

Petit, General, 679. 

Peyrusse, 567 n., 622 n., 701. 

Ph^lippeaux, at siege of Acre,141, 
143. 



824 



Index 



Philipsburg, surrendered, 205. 

Piacenza, Duke of, see Lebrun. 

Piacenza, 81, 199, 328. 

Pichegru, in army of the north, 46, 
76; relations with Conde, 104; 
president of "Five Hundred," 
104; agent of Royalists, 270; 
death of, 271 ; d'Enghien denies 
connection with, 273. 

Piedmont, 51; ambassadors of, at 
MontebeUo, 107; wanted by Aus- 
tria, 194; Napoleon in, 200; 
assessed a million and a half, 
202; fate of, undecided, 210; 
fate of, discloses Napoleon's de- 
signs, 253; incorporated as a 
French province, 253; to be 
retained, 287; in Austro-Russian 
treaty, 291, 346, 658. 

Pitt, concludes treaty with Thu- 
gut, 72; retains Malta and 
Egypt, 194; retires from British 
government, 214; death of, 343; 
succeeded by Grenville ministry 
led by Fox, 344, 494, 603 f. 

Piombino, ceded to France, 211. 

Pius VI. and VII., see Pope. 

Plancenoit, 715, 717, 718, 719. 

Platoff, Cossack corps of, harasses 
rear-guard commanded by Da- 
vout, 565, 569, 573. 

Po, the, 81, 99, 109, 200. 

Poischwitz, armistice signed at, 
614; terms of armistice of, 614. 

Poland, Austria seeking territory 
in, 72; partition of, 91, 96; 
aided by France, 159; Napo- 
leon renounces support of, 217; 
rumours that Napoleon was 
about to re-establish, 362, 363; 
Napoleon encourages insurrec- 
tion in, 364; extensive Polish 
territories included in Austria, 
364, 370; 387, 391; Napoleon's 
conduct toward, 487, 516; bone 
of contention between Czar and 
Napoleon, 516, 517; Czar recog- 
nizes cause of Napoleon's concern 
for, 517, 528, 530, 541, 543; 
Napoleon's feeling in regard to 
restoration of, 543, 549, 559, 
592, 594, 595, 596; Czar again 
considers project of united Po- 
land under Russian rule, 528, 



596, 601, 602, 610, 611, 637, 
661 n., 686. 

Polytechnic School, 233. 

Pomerania, 347. 

Pomerania (Swedish), falls to 
France from Sweden, 510; occu- 
pied by French to prevent 
smuggHng, 531, 603. 

Pondicherry, acquired by England, 
215. 

Poniatowski, commander of na- 
tional forces of Warsaw, 487, 
536, 539, 623; drowned at 
Leipzig, 639. 

Pontebba, 97. 

Ponte Corvo, Prince of, see Ber- 
nadotte. 

Ponte Corvo, 329. 

Pontecoulant, Doucet de, successor 
of Aubry, 52; Girondist prefect, 
224. 

Pope Pius VI., refuses proposals 
of Directory, 93; agreement 
with Austria, 93 ; his treaty with 
Napoleon, 94; deposed, 119, 129; 
at coronation of Napoleon, 292 

Pope Pius VII., agreement of, 
with Napoleon, 212; objects 
attained by, 293; Napoleon's 
conduct toward, 329; refuses to 
dissolve marriage of Jerome 
with Elizabeth Patterson, 330; 
his complete rupture with Na- 
poleon, 331; letter of Napoleon 
to, 334, 337; refuses Napoleon's 
demands, 423; refuses ratifica- 
tion of treaty, 425; deprived 
of temporal power, 425; allies 
himself with popular resistance, 
495; publishes bull of excom- 
munication, 495; arrested by 
Murat at instigation of Na- 
poleon, 495; resists Napoleon, 
who restricts his prisoner more 
severely, 496-98 ; Napoleon seeks 
settlement of contest with, 588; 
chooses Avignon for residence, 
589; peace made with, pub- 
lished, 589, 592, 647; refuses to 
negotiate with Napoleon and is 
kept prisoner, 648. 

Pordenone, French defeated at, 464. 

Portalis, 222, 230. 

Portugal, joins coalition, 73; to 



Index 



825 



Portugal — Continued. 
desert England, 210; contributes 
to French treasury, 213; con- 
quest of, urged on Spain, 215; 
concludes peace, 216; enters 
league with France, 268, 389; 
Napoleon makes demands upon, 
to provoke opposition, 427-8; 
John, Prince Regent of, loses his 
throne, 428-9; royal family of, 
flee to Brazil, 429, 430, 436, 449, 
452, 480, 482, 501, 502, 512 
Posen, 367. 

Poterat, Marquis of, 74. 
Pozzo di Borgo, Corsican patriot, 
25; sent by Russia as envoy to 
Vienna, 364; conversation with 
Stadion, 385 n., 386, 386 n. 
Prague, 609, congress at, 619; 
negotiations of, conducted in 
writing through Austria, 619, 
621 n., 647. 
Prairial, 1st, 50; 30th, 175. 
Preameneu, Bigot de, 280. 
Prefects of the palace, in Empire, 

280. 
Prenzlau, 361. 

Pressburg, treaty of, signed Dec. 
26th, 1805, 321-23, 334; 14th 
article of, 339; financial stress 
impels Napoleon to conclusion of, 
335, 397, 458, 475, 477. 
"Prince of the Peace," title of 

Godoy, 210, 269. 
Provence, peasant uprising in, 

23 ; central committee in, 39. 
Pro vera, 91. 

Prussia, treaty with, 50; with- 
draws from coalition, 51, 72; 
offers of, for peace refused, 73; 
purposes of, 99; plans of Di- 
rectory and of Napoleon for, 
191; joins Russia against Eng- 
land, 208; to arm against Aus- 
tria, 209; to be kept back from 
Rhine, 259; treaty of, with 
France, 260; share of, too 
large, 261; advised to occupy 
Hanover, 286; Russia tries to 
win over, 288; need of, to act 
with Austria, 290; assents to 
Russia's petition for passage for 
her troops, 313; promises to 
demand restriction of French 



system of expansion, 318 ; greater 
part of army of, disbanded Jan. 
1806, 342; ratifies treaty of 
Schonbrunn, 342 ; occupation 
of Hanover by, 343; sends to 
Russia to bring about an under- 
standing, July 1st, 1806, 344; 
the French advance upon, 348; 
refuses to disarm and renews 
demand for withdrawal of French 
army, 354; audacity in opposing 
resistance to Napoleon, 355; 
war against Napoleon begun, 
Sept. 25th, 1806, 355; King of, 
undecided, 357; in Napoleon's 
power, 361 ; appeal of, for peace 
to Napoleon declined, 362; Na- 
poleon's oppressive conditions, 
363; Queen Louise of, appears 
before Napoleon to ask mercy 
for, 389 ; Napoleon delays evacu- 
ation by continual exactions, 417; 
compelled to recall ambassador 
from London, 420; formation 
of Tugendbund in, 437; Scham- 
horst and Stein in, 437, 439, 440; 
counted upon by Austria, 455; 
elated at successes of Austria, 472, 
473; Bliicher and Biilow plan 
military uprising of, against 
Napoleon, 474; plan for parti- 
tion of, 525; territories of, 
threatened on all sides, 526; 
ofifensive and defensive alli- 
ance with Napoleon, 526; terms 
deeply humiliating to, 527; dis- 
memberment of, an assured fact 
to Metternich, 528; advised 
by Metternich to join Russia, 
529, 527, 529, 534, 537, 538; 
people of, ready to throw off yoke 
of alliance with Napoleon, 585; 
rage against foreigners, 586; 
public opinion in, forces Yorck 
to refuse to fight against Russia, 
586; proposal of Czar to restore 
to position of 1806, 586, 595; 
sends envoy to Vienna, 595; 
Czar's overtures to, shaped by 
Nesselrode's scheme, 595; treaty 
of alliance with Russia of, 598, 
599; enthusiasm and martial 
spirit of people of, 600; new 
treaty between Russia and, Mar. 



826 



Index 



Prussia — Continued. 

19th, 1813, 601 ; king of, calls out 
the Landwehr, 601 ; declaration of 
war handed to French ambas- 
sador, 601, 605, 607, 609, 610, 
615, 617, 621, 623, 624; Land- 
wehr of, 629, 632, 665; party 
to treaty with Russia and Aus- 
tria, 686, 698; mobilizes army, 
709. 

Public instruction, 406-409; girls 
not included in, 408. 

Pultusk, battle at, 368; plan of 
battle before, 367 ; valour of Rus- 
sians at, 370, 375. 

Punjab, Russian expedition against, 
214. 

Pyramids, battle of, 131; Napo- 
leon's famous remark on, 131, 
135. 

Quatre-Bras, 712, 714. 
Quosdanovich, Austrian General, 

86; defeated by Napoleon, 87; 

in command of division, 89. 

Raab, 475. 

Radetzky, criticism of Austrian 
plan of campaign by, 466 n., 
652, 666 n. 

Radicals, 29, 31; ministry of, dis- 
missed, 33; restored, 34; Na- 
poleon joins, 44; Napoleon cuts 
loose from, 50 ; rule of, in France, 
157; excluded from council, 
159; in league with Moderates, 
in Napoleon's Council of State, 
221; deportation of, 237. 

Ragusa, Duke of, see Marmont. 

Ragusa, Bruyere consul at, 287; to 
be offered to Austria, 288 n.; 
RepubUc of, 365. 

Ramolino, Letitia, Napoleon's 
mother, 3. 

Ranke, on the Convention of 
Tauroggen, 586. 

Rapp, openly acknowledges dis- 
taste for Russian war, 539; 
represents distress of troops to 
Napoleon, 552, 605, 710. 

Rastatt, congress at, 109; Napo- 
leon at, 114, 126, 159, 207; 
question of indemnity at, 257. 

Ratisbon, diet of, not to decide 



German question, 260; organ- 
ization of Confederation of the 
Rhine officially announced at 
diet of, Aug. 1st, 1806, 339; ap- 
pointed as headquarters for 
Napoleon's army in Germany, 
460 ; taken by Archduke Charles, 
466; battle at, lost bv Charles, 
467. 

Raynal, his "Histoire philoso- 
phique," 13; in Napoleon's li- 
brary, 124. 

Razumoffsky, 346 n. 

R^camier, Madame de, 61; rival 
of Josephine, 65; banished, 402 n. 

Reggio, Duke of, see Oudinot; 
dukedom of, 328. 

Reformists, in Chambers, 167. 

Reichenbach, terms of treaty of, 
signed June 27th, 1813, 616. 

ReiUe, 500, 710. 

Remusat, Madame de, 11; "M^- 
moires" quoted, 56; describes 
Josephine, 65; love letter of 
Napoleon from "Memoires" of, 
68; faithful friend of Josephine, 
70; remarks of Napoleon quoted, 
83, 105, 123, 138, 144, 188; 
lady-in-waiting to Josephine, 
245; description of Napoleon's 
habits, 245; remark on d'En- 
ghien case, 275; doubt Of, as to 
invasion of England, 284; obser- 
vation on new nobility, 329; 
Napoleon's views on new nobil- 
ity, 399 n. ; her selection of 
plays for stage, 403; disliked 
Napoleon, 405 f. 

Remusat, M. de. Prefect of Palace, 
414. 

Rentes, see Securities. 

Republic, Jacobins favour, 32; 
Napoleon opposes, 34; in 
"Souper de Beaucaire," 44; 
Napoleon useful to, 47 ; clings to 
conquests, 73; Napoleon on, in 
address to soldiers, 103; aids 
Poland, 159; changes names of 
streets, 244. 

Republican monarchy, 240 n. 

Republicans oppose empire, 277 n. 

Revolution, French, Chapter II., 
passim; spell of, on Napoleon, 
95^ relation of Napoleon to, 105, 



Index 



827 



165; established aspirations of, 
74; armies of, 85, 187; not at 
an end, 188; Consulate retains 
principles of, 189; plans of ex- 
pansion of, 191; Napoleon fol- 
lows plans of, 192; support of, 
by priests, 212; effect of, in 
Europe, 218; talent developed 
by, 221; government of prov- 
inces during, 223; suppresses 
chambers of commerce, 229 
changes law of the land, 230 
abolishes hereditary nobility, 231 
work of, in education, 233; cal- 
ender of, in use, 243; abolishes 
mortmain, 258; ejects Cardinal 
de Rohan from Strasburg, 272; 
fixes penalty of death for treason, 
273; empire founded upon, 290; 
calendar of, abolished, 293. 

RewbeU, directs foreign policy, 75; 
in Directory, 102; in Switzer- 
land, 120; director, 158. 

Reynier, in Egyptian expedition, 
127, 139; commands Saxons in 
Russia, 539, 548, 570, 597, 612, 
635, 636, 638, 639. 

Rhenish Confederation, see Confed- 
eration of the States of the 
Rhine. 

Rhenish princes, confederation of, 
191. 

Rhine, natural boundary of France, 
74; frontier of, 92; armies on, 
97, 109, 193, 195; frontier of 
France, 207, 209; ecclesiastical 
provinces on, 258; Prussia and 
Austria to be kept back from, 
259 

Rhodes, 145. 

RicheHeu, 224, 275. 

Richepanse, at Hohenlinden, 206; 
sent to Martinique, 263. 

Ricord, 44. 

Riviera, 40, 44, 48, 193. 

Rivoli, Duke of, see Massena. 

Rivoli, battle of, 91, 195, 280. 

Robespierre, leader of Radicals, 38 : 
fall of, 45, 49, 50, 60, 64, 79, 196. 

Robespierre the younger, at Avig- 
non, 41; recommends confidence 
in Napoleon, 44; Napoleon con- 
sults, 192. 

Robespierre, Mile., 44. 



Roederer, 126, 221. 

Roger-Ducos, in Directory, 163; 
in provisional government, 168; 
resigns from Directory, 172; 
ready for flight, 177; consul in 
provisional government, 180; 
withdraws from government, 
181; not prominent, 181; sena- 
tor, 186. 

Rohan, Charlotte de, marries 
d'Enghien, 272; his last message 
to her, 274 n. 

Romagna, 93, 94 ; ceded to Venice, 
100, 424. 

Roman law, in South of France, 
230; in Code, 231. 

Romanzoff, 459, 560, 595. 

Rome, fall of, imminent, 93; Ber- 
thier enters, 119, 120; negotia- 
tions and treaty on, 210, 217. 

Ronco, 90. 

Rosbach, 11 

Rosenburg, 467. 

Rosetta, 130. 

Rostopchin, Count, orders firing of 
Moscow, 558 n. ; denounces Na- 
poleon as unbaptized, 559. 

Rousseau, J. J., 1; works of, read 
by Napoleon, 13; effect of, on 
Napoleon, 14, 16; influence of, 
on ''boundary" question, 74; 
in Napoleon's library, 124; repu- 
diated as Revolutionary, 244. 

Roustan, 476. 

Rovigo, Duke of, see Savary, 
duchy of, 328. 

Royalists, emigration of, 27, 33; 
faction of, 53, 54; attitude on 
expansion, 76; in control of 
legislature, 102; vanquished, 
103; in opposition, 158; depart- 
ments of, 164; devoted to Bona- 
parte, 181 ; in Napoleon's Coun- 
cil of State, 221 ; remain loyal to 
Louis XVIII., 237; headquarters 
of, in England, 270; oppose em- 
pire, 277 n. 

Riichel, 353; commands Prussian 
right wing, 358; summoned by 
Hohenlohe, 360. 

Russia, supports Austria, 72; 
sends no aid to Austria, 77, 99; 
partition of Poland by, 91; re- 
sents French interference in 



828 



Index 



Russia — Continued. 

Eap.t; 125; Czar of, protector of 
Knights of St. John, 128; wins 
over Turkey, 135; advance of, 
toward Italy, 142; cold of, com- 
pared with heat of Syria, 146; 
enemy of France, 159; alliance 
with England and Turkey, 160; 
agreement of, with Austria, 160; 
quarrel of, with Austria, 194; 
separated from Austria, 208 ; from 
England, 208; Prussia to medi- 
ate between France and, 209; 
jealousy of, 209; intercedes for 
Naples, 211; takes up arms 
against England, 214; treaty 
with France, on emigres, 216 f. ; 
secret compact with them, 217, 
251, 261 ; admonition of, to Napo- 
leon, 256 ; House of Wiirtemberg 
related to, 260; Napoleon vio- 
lates agreement with, 286 ; occa- 
sion of previous war with. 287; 
rupture of, with France, 288; 
oriental policy of, 288 n. ; fails to 
win over Austria, 289; Austria 
concludes treaty with, 291 ; war 
party in, regains the ascendant, 
346, 350, 354, 362-390, passim; 
alliance with, proposed by Napo- 
leon, 381; concludes truce with 
Napoleon, June 22d, 1807, 384; 
declares war against England, 
Nov. 7th, 1807, 415; oriental 
schemes of, checkmated by Na- 
poleon, 418; troops of, cross bor- 
der of Finland, Feb. 1808, 419; 
Napoleon offers Danubian prin- 
cipalities to, 438; fate of Europe 
depends on decision of, 439; 
remains allied with Napoleon, 
456; national feeling not repre- 
sented by Czar of, 457, 479; 
advises Francis I. to make peace 
with France, 480, 481; distrust- 
ful of Napoleon, 487, 488, 494; 
Napoleon attempts to close ports 
of, against England, 516; refuses 
to confiscate neutral vessels, 518; 
financial situation in, 518; an- 
nexation of Oldenburg flagrant 
violation of treaty of Tilsit, 519; 
Czar addresses letter of protest 
to European powers, 520; pre- 



pares for war with France, 520; 
desire to exchange Oldenburg 
for Warsaw refused by Napoleon, 
521; attempt of Napoleon and 
Austria to make out Czar as 
party breaking peace, 521 ; sends 
ultimatum to Napoleon Apr. 
30th, 1812, 532; hatred of Na- 
poleon, 535; national pride, 536; 
Napoleon's expedition against, 
538-44, 553, 577, 581, 587, 591, 
593-618, 623, 624, 627, 632, 
636, 665; party to treaty with 
Prussia and Austria, 686. 

Saalfeld, battle of, 358. 

Sachsen, General, 142. 

Sacken, 659, 660. 

" Sacred Heart," 554. 

Saint- Aignan, Baron de, 648; urges 
Napoleon not to put off nego- 
tiations a day, 648, 651, 652, 655. 

St. Antoine, suburb of, 33. 

St. Armand, 713. 

St. Bernard, pass, 199. 

St. Cloud, chambers at, 169-173. 

Saint-Cyr, general of Revolu- 
tionary troops, 47 ; in Italy, 268, 
545, 546, 548, 560, 567, 623, 624, 
625, 626, 632. 

Saint-Germain, 243. 

Saint-Gothard, passage of, 199. 

St. Helena, 79, 146, 151, 467, 728 ff. 

St. John, Knights of the Order of, 
in Malta, 127 f . 

St. Juhen, Joseph de. Count, 204, 
345. 

Saint-Ruf, Abbe de, 12. 

St. Vincent, 456. 

Salamanca, 554, 581. 

SaUcetti, elected to States-General, 
24; advice of, on Corsica, 26; 
gives certificate to Napoleon, 
40; at Avignon, 41; clears Na- 
poleon, 44; accuses Napoleon, 
45 f.; resumes defence of Napo- 
leon, 47; accompanies Napoleon 
to Italy, 81; to manage diplo- 
macy in Italy, 82; delivers con- 
stitution to Genoese, 254. 

Salzburg, ceded to Austria, 109; 
archbishopric of, demanded by 
Austria, 259; allotted to Grand- 
duke of Tuscany, 261, 323, 481. 



Index 



829 



San Domingo, base of Napoleon's 
colonial scheme, 263, 325. 

Sandoz-Rollin, 180. 

San Ildefonso, treaty of, 210. 

San Sebastian, fortress of, 644. 

Saragossa, 435. 

Sardinia, expedition against, 85; 
king of, in plans for the army 
of Italy, 51; joins coahtion, 
73; effort to separate from 
Austria, 77; cedes St. Pierre, 
112; at war with France, 142; 
in Napoleon's course, 154; de- 
fended by Paul I., 253, 313; 
King of, 346. 

Savary, secret police agency 
under, 246; Memoires of, on 
conduct of Napoleon with Pope, 
292 n., 376; becomes Duke of 
Rovigo, 400 ; sent to Alexander I. 
to ask for armistice and parley, 
314; Turkish principalities de- 
manded of, by Czar, 416; keeps 
Napoleon informed of opposition 
in Russia, 416; succeeded, Dec. 
1807, by Caulaincourt, 416; 
sent to Madrid to induce Fer- 
dinand VII. to meet Napoleon 
in Bayonne, 431, 576, 651, 726, 
729. 

Savona, fortifications of, 45; road 
from, over Apennines, 79, 80; 
Pope at, 588. 

Savoy, incorporated into France, 
210. 

Saxe-Teschen, Albert, Duke of, 472, 
474. 

Saxonv declares herself neutral, 
88, 348 ; only ally left to Prussia 
slow in making preparations for 
war, 354; King of, to rule War- 
saw, 390 ; made a member of the 
Confederation of States of the 
Rhine, Dec. 1806, 390; arms in 
haste, especially in Warsaw, 
524; wavers in question of 
alliance with Napoleon, 594; 
policy of, dependent on Austria 
and Prussia, 594; attempts of 
Prussia and Russia to secure 
alliance with, 602; concludes 
secret alliance with Austria, 
602, 604, 606, 60S, 609; Fred- 
erick Augustus, King of, decides 



to join Napoleon, 609, 611, 615, 
620, 631, 637, 640; King of, 
sent to Berlin a prisoner, 640; 
Stein becomes executive head 
of, in name of allied monarchs, 
640; at Congress of Vienna, 
686, 698. 

Say, J. B., PoUtical Economy of, 
forbidden by Napoleon, 506 n. 

Scharnhorst, Colonel, plan of at- 
tack of, sacrificed, 357; counsels 
attack upon Napoleon's flank, 
358; rescues Bennigsen at Prus- 
sian Eylau, 373; dissatisfaction 
with Bennigsen's retreat, 374; 
valour of, 376, 494; urges Fred- 
erick William to arm against 
Napoleon, 526; goes to Vienna 
to ascertain intentions, 527, 529, 
586, 599, 606. 

Scherer, in command of Army 
of Italy, 77; refuses to carry 
out Napoleon's plans, 78; de- 
feated, 150; in command of 
Army of Italy, 161; retires 
before Austrians, 162. 

Schill, 472. 

Schimmelpennick, 332. 

Schleiermacher, sermons of, upon 
the value of nationality, 352. 

Schleiz, battle of, 358. 

Scholer, 416 n. 

Schonbrunn, 312; treaty of alli- 
ance signed at, Dec. 15th, 1805, 
320; sent for ratification in 
altered form, Jan. 1806, 341; 
revised treaty of, 342; treaty 
of, signed by Liechtenstein, Oct 
13th, 1809, 481 ; terms of treaty 
of, 481-2; Napoleon's life at- 
tempted at, 482. 

Schulmeister, a spy, 305. 

Schwarzenberg, Prince, Austrian 
Ambassador to St. Peters- 
burg, 456, 488 n., 489, 516 529, 
539, 548, 560, 570, 572, 582, 593, 
625, 626, 630, 633-636, 652, 654- 
660; suggests cessation of hos- 
tilities, 661, 662, 663, 666, 666 n., 
667, 668, 676. 

Sebastiani, report of, from Egypt, 
266; sent on mission to Con- 
stantianople, 365 ; instructed 
to rouse Persia, 378; in Spain, 



830 



Index 



Sebastiani — Continued. 

480; assured by Napoleon that 
the Dwina would not be crossed 
that year by the French, 542, 
639, 

Securities, Government, 376, 397 f ., 
590, 645, 667, 671, 700. 

S^gur, Grand Master of Cere- 
monies, 280; Memoires of, 316, 
536, 537, 538 n., 540 n., 708. 

Selim, I., overcomes Mamelukes, 
130. 

Selim III. dispossesses the Woi- 
wodes, and rouses Russian ire, 
365; induced to make war upon 
Russia from the Dniester while 
Napoleon operates from the 
Vistula, 365; unsuccessful in 
war against Russia, 376; Na- 
poleon's purposes in regard to, 
shipwrecked, 381; succeeded by 
Mustapha, hostile to France, 
381. 

Selz, conference at, 160. 

Senate, in new constitution, 167, 
184; Sieyes president of, 186; 
obeys Napoleon, 239; accorded 
right of jimendment, 276; depu- 
tation of, addresses Napoleon, 
277; acts on new constitution, 
278; in imperial constitution, 
279; co-operates with Napoleon, 
404, 583, 591; grants new levy 
of troops, 644, 645, 646; de- 

Eoses Napoleon, 673; proclaims 
«uis XVIII. king, 677. 

Senatus consultum, Aug. 4th, 1802, 
increases Napoleon's power, 240; 
decrees statue of Peace, 240 n. 

Servia, 518, 528. 

Seymour, Lord, 344. 

Shebreket, Murad, at, 131. 

Sicily, Nelson at, 127; passage 
between, and Tunis, 154; King 
of Naples flies to, 160; Napoleon 
lenient with, 211; alone left to 
Queen Caroline, 328; to remain 
to the Bourbons, 344; Napoleon 
insists upon cession of, to Joseph, 
345, 346, 418, 511. 

Sieyes, leader of Jacobins, 76; 
not in favour of constitution of 
year III, 118, 126; admitted 
to Directory, 155; chosen Di- 



rector, 163 f.; loses prestige, 
164; constitution of, 166 f.; 
plans of, 168; yields to Napoleon, 
168; resigns from Directory, 
172; advice to Napoleon, 173; 
ready for flight, 177; consul 
in provisional government, 180; 
not prominent, 181; constitu- 
tion of, 183 f. ; president of 
Senate, 186; plan of, in German 
principalities, 191; report of, 
from Berlin, 191 ; at Talleyrand's 
house, 203; his project of 
secularization, 258, 260; votes 
against new constitution, 278, 
336, 395; in conspiracy, 495, 
510, 708. 
Silesia, conquest of, by Prussia, 
72; open to Russians in case of 
defeat in Moravia, 313, 364, 377, 
387, 418, 457, 528; question of, 
to be settled by first mistake of 
Prussia, 529; to be procured 
for Austria, 530, 601, 604, 610, 
631, 661 n. 
Simplon, pass, 255. 
Slobosia, preliminary treaty of, 

416. 
Smith, Adam, " Wealth of Nations " 

read by Napoleon, 3. 
Smith, Sir Sidney, at siege of Acre, 
141; at Aboukir, 147; leaves 
for Cyprus, 150, 154. 
Smolensk, 542, 549; Russian de- 
feat near, 550; Russians evacu- 
ate, 551, 559, 562, 563, 565, 
566; supplies at, 567, 568, 
580. 
Soissons, forced to yield to allies, 

664. 
Somosierra, pass of, 449. 
Sonnini, 113. 

Soult, appointed marshal, 280; 
in command, 284, 305; atttacked 
at Austerhtz, Nov. 27th, 316; 
attack on Russian centre at 
Austerhtz, 317, 356, 367, 368, 
372; becomes Duke of Dal- 
matia, 400, 413, 446, 448; pur- 
suit of British under Moore by, 
451, 452; directed to occupy 
Portugal, 452, 480, 502, 644, 646, 
667, 674, 708. 
"Souper de Beaucaire, Le," 40 f. 



Index 



831 



Spain, troops of, in siege of Toulon, 
43; negotiations with, 50; with- 
draws from coalition, 72; Napo- 
leon interferes in policy of, 210; 
cedes Parma and Elba to France, 
210; also Louisiana, 210; cedes 
Trinidad to England, 215; urged 
to conquer Portugal, 215; con- 
cludes separate peace with her, 
216; enters league with France, 
268; forced into war with Eng- 
land, 269; threatens to make 
difficulties, 376; people of, suf- 
fering under rule of Godoy, Prince 
of the Peace, 425; in war with 
England, 425; government of, 
weak and unpopular, 427 ; called 
upon to co-operate against Por- 
tugal, 427, 429; French army 
sent into, 430; Ferdinand set 
upon throne of, 431; Napoleon 
refuses recognition of Ferdinand 
in, 431 ; Napoleon makes Joseph 
Bonaparte king of, June 6th, 
1808, 432; people of, resist Na- 
poleon, 434; revolt in, spreads, 
435 ; soldiers of, stationed abroad, 
desert French army and re- 
turn to, 435-6; lack of prepa- 
rations for war made by, 447; 
conduct of war in, by Napoleon, 
448, 452; country of, uncon- 
quered, 452; campaigns in, 458, 
459, 478 n., 479, 480, 482, 483, 
494; people of, influenced by 
fate of Pope, 498; guerilla war- 
fare in, 499, 500; last regular 
troops of, defeated by French 
at Ocaiio, 500; conquered terri- 
tory of, to be incorporated into 
France, 501, 521; hatred of 
Napoleon in, 535, 580, 587, 597, 
610; Bourbons in, 616, 619, 620, 
637, 647, 649. 

Stackelberg, 596. 

Stadion, sent as negotiator to 
Briinn, 314; refuses to act with- 
out HaugTvdtz, 314, 319; suc- 
ceeds Cobenzl, 322; approached 
by both France and Russia, 
remains neutral, 364, 385 n. ; 
duped, 421; argues for unmedi- 
ate war, 454-6 ; Emperor Francis 
under influence of, 468, 494, 609. 



Stadion, Count Fred., 468. 

Stael, Madame de, 60; statement 
of, on Bernese treasure, 121; 
remark of, on Egyptian expedi- 
tion, 123; remark of, on Napo- 
leon, 219 n. ; constant intimate 
friend of, 236; opposes Napo- 
leon's absolution, 236; excluded 
from Austria, 288 f. ; banished, 
402, 408 n. 

Stage, the. Napoleon devotes espe- 
cial attention to, 403. 

Staps, Frederick, attempts life of 
Napoleon at Schonbrunn, 482; 
ordered shot in secrecy, 483. 

Starhemberg, Count, 353, 421; de- 
mands passports in London, 420. 

States General, 19; convoked in 
1789, 21 ; character of, 21 ; session 
of 4th of August, 22. 

Steigentesch, Colonel, 470. 

Stein, minister of finance, 353; 
deposed from office, 455, 560, 586, 
600, 623, 640. 

Stephanie, niece of Josephine, mar- 
ried to Hereditary Prince of 
Baden, 335 ; alleged intimacy of, 
with Napoleon, 336. 

Steyer, armistice signed at, 206, 
310. 

Stockach, defeat of French at, 161 ; 
Austrians defeated at, 199. 

Studjanka, crossing of French at, 
572-5. 

Stutterheim, Colonel, 462 n. 

Suabia, 161, 352. 

Suchet, 500, 644, 645, 674, 708, 
710. 

Suard, 405. 

Sucy, 30. 

Suez, Isthmus of, piercing of, 113, 
122. 

Suliots, assisted by France, 287. 

Sultan, see Turkey. 

Suvaroff, General, 161; victory of, 
over Moreau, 162 ; over Joubert, 
162; opposes Austria in Italy, 
194; defeated by Massena, 194. 

Sweden, joins Russia against Eng- 
land, 208 ; takes up arms against 
England, 214, 347, 350, 376, 
377, 385, 389, 416; Gustavus 
IV. of, adheres to alliance with 
England, 419, 420, 486; change 



832 



Index 



Sweden — Continued. 

in political status of, 510; de- 
clares war against England, 511; 
Charles XIII. of, chooses Ber- 
nadotte as his successor, 511; 
concludes alliance with Russia, 
530, 531, 595, 597 n., 603. 

Switzerland, republican propa- 
ganda in, 76; treasure conveyed 
to, 95; Napoleon's influence in 
119; as dependent republic, 120 
revolt in, 159; seat of war, 161 
regained by Austrians, 162; de- 
feat of Austrians in, 165, 193 
victory of Massena in, 194 
Moreau in, 196; Landamman of 
to be appointed by France, 250 
under sway of France, 256^ 
neutrality of, \4olated, 265 ; evac- 
uation of, demanded, 267; enters 
league with France, 268; agents 
of England in, 272; evacuation 
of, proposed, 287, 313. 

Syria, Nelson sails for, 128; gov- 
ernor of, 135 f . ; Napoleon plans 
to enter, 138; Napoleon's letters 
from, 144; heat in, 145. 

Tabor, Mount, 143, 146. 

Tacitus, 405. 

Talavera, battle of, 480, 499. 

Talleyrand, 107, 111, 112; enters 
into plans of Napoleon, 112; 
paper of, on colonies, 113; 
address to Directory of, on Napo- 
leon, 116; letter of Napoleon 
to, on Constitution, 117, 126; 
ordered to deceive Sultan, 134, 
163; forced to resign, 164; 
brings Napoleon and Sieyes to- 
gether, 168; confident of Napo- 
leon, 172; ready for flight, 177; 
minister of foreign affairs, 182; 
proposes Campo Formio as basis, 
195; secures acceptance of it, 
204; assisted by Hauterive, 
218; recommendations of, in 
public instruction, 233; sarcasm 
on habitues of Napoleon's court, 
244; secures presidency of Cisal- 
pine Republic for Napoleon, 253 ; 
favour of, sought by German 
princes, 260; instigator of colo- 
nial scheme, 263; advises trial of 



d'Enghien, 273; included in im- 
perial government, 278; remains 
minister of foreign affairs, 280; 
grand chaniberlain, 280; assists 
Napoleon in forming Confedera- 
tion of the States of the Rhine, 
336; federal constitution drafted 
by Labesnardiere and, 337; 
counsels peace with Austria, 321 ; 
intercedes in behalf of Austria, 
323; becomes Prince of Bene- 
vento, 329; instructed to renew 
relations with. Prussia, 377 ; signs 
Treaty of Tilsit, 387; suggests 
marriage between Spanish Crown 
Prince and a French princess, 
427 ; kept in ignorance of Treaty 
of Fontainebleau, 428; deprived 
of ministry of foreign affairs, 414 ; 
permanent adviser to Napoleon, 
414, 419, 423, 433, 434; sides 
against Napoleon, 441; con- 
spires against Napoleon, 453; 
Napoleon's distrust of, 499, 
580, 604; "the Emperor Napo- 
leon" must be King of France, 
604; prevents restoration of 
King Ferdinand to Spain, 647, 
658, 673, 676, 677; plenipoten- 
tiarv of Louis XVIII. at Congress 
of Vienna, 685, 692, 699. 

TaUien, leader among Thermido- 
rians, 49, 57 ; secures Josephine's 
release, 64; on policy of con- 
quest, 75. 

TaUien, Mme., rival of Josephine, 65. 

Taranto, French troops main- 
tained at, 211; coast from, to 
Hanover, 265, 267; occupation 
of, 286. 

Taranto, Duke of, see Macdonald; 
duchy of, 328. 

Tasso, 124. 

Tauenzien, 634. 

Tauroggen, convention of, declares 
Torek's corps a neutral body, 586 ; 
encouragement from, to Germany, 
586. 

Tchatchniki, engagement at, 568. 

Tchitchagoff, Admiral, 553 n.; 
commands Russian army from 
Moldavia, 560; drives French 
from Borissov and bums bridge, 
570, 571, 572, 575. 



Index 



833 



Terror, Reign of, 55; effect on 
polite society of, 61, 63, 192; 
rouses opposition, 39, 63, 274. 

Terrorists, oppose Napoleon's gov- 
ernment, 236 f.; deported, 
237. 

Thermidor 7th, 49. 

Thermidorians, faction of "Moun- 
tain," 49, 53; unite with Jaco- 
bins, 55, 76. 

Thorn, occupied by French, 367. 

Thouvenot, 500. 

Thugut, prime minister of Francis 
II., 72; concludes treaty with 
Pitt, 72; informed of French 
plans in Italy, 77 ; diplomacy of, 
with Russia regarding Italy, 91; 
persistency of, 92; at Leoben, 
99, 101; difficulties met by, in 
treaty of Campo Formio, 108; 
feelings of, on treaty, 109; dis- 
regards France, 160; demands 
Piedmont, 194_; demands as- 
surances, 195; loses office, 207, 
254; fails in diplomacy with 
Pope, 213, 504. 

Ticino, 81, 200. 

Tilly, 46. 

Tilsit, 382, 383, 384; meeting be- 
tween Napoleon andAlexander at, 
385, 386; treaty signed at, 386, 
390; union with Russia by 
marriage discussed at, 411, 430, 
433, 519, 611. 

Tippoo Sahib, 138. 

Titles, 328, 329, 399-401. 

Tolentino, treaty of, 94; battle of, 
709. 

Tolstoi, 439. 

Tc rgau, 609. 

Tormassof, 548, 560, 607. 

Torres Vedras, French defeated at, 
501, 545. 

Tortona, Napoleon arrives at, 200, 
201. 

Totis, 480. 

Toulon, Jacobin club at, 31; Na- 
poleon and family withdraw to, 
36; siege of, 38; Jacobins over- 
come in, 39; Napoleon at, 123; 
preparations at, 126; projected 
return to, 134; Napoleon as con- 
queror of, 196; wretched con- 
dition of, 224. 



Trachenberg, conference at, 619; 
plans for army discussed at, 623. 

Trafalgar, 313. 

Trancquemont, General, 630. 

Trebbia, 155, 162. 

Trent, 51, 87, 261. 

Treviso, Duke of, see Mortier; 
duchy of, 328. 

Trianon, edict issued at, 505, 506. 

Tribunate, 185; opposition of, to 
Napoleon, 238; initiatiA^e for 
Empire comes from, 278; in 
imperial constitution, 279; si- 
lence imposed upon, 404. 

Triest, 102, 323, 482. 

Trinidad, ceded to England, 215, 
216. 

Tripoli, communication with, 142. 

Troyes, 666. 

Tronchet, in committee on code, 
230. 

Tudela, battle of, Nov. 23d, 1808, 
448. 

''Tugendbund," 437, 526. 

Tuileries, rabble enters, 1792, 33; 
defended by Napoleon, 58; Na- 
poleon at, 171 f. ; residence of 
consuls in, 186; residence of 
Napoleon, 244; review of troops 
at, 245; etiquette at, 281. 

Turin, road from Savona to, 79; 
Austrian troops enter, 162; Melas 
tries to reach, 199, 200. 

Turkey, destinies of, 95; crum- 
bling, 112 ; disintegration of, 134 ; 
Austria seeking territory' in, 
72; proximity of, to Ancona, 
95; downfall of, predicted by Na- 
poleon, 111; plan for division of, 
114 ; declares war against France, 
135, 137, 142; pressure upon, 
138; sends re-enforcements to 
Acre, 144; troops of, in Egypt, 
147; English join troops of, in 
Egypt, 215; treaty of, with 
France, 217; at war with Pelo- 
ponnesus, 287, 345, 346 n., 304, 
376, 377, 378, 381, 386, 388, 389, 
390, 416; makes advances tow- 
ard England, 417; induced to 
keep ports closed to England, 
419, 420, 433; revolution in, 438, 
441, 442, 479, 486, 518, 530; 
threatened by England, 531; 



834 



Index 



Turkey — Continued. 

treaty of peace with Russia con- 
cluded May, 1812, 532. 

Tuscany, treaty with France, 72; 
republicanism in, 125; Austrian 
garrison in, 202; Duke of, losses 
and compensations of, 207; in 
Luneville, 259 ; compensation of, 
261; acquisition of, by France, 
210; promised to Spanish prin- 
cess, 210; dependent on France, 
255; in Austro-Russian treaty, 
291; incorporated with France, 
422, 436. 

Tyrol, in Italian campaign, 84, 
314, 319; ceded to Bavaria, 321, 
323;; incited to rebellion by 
Austria, 459, 461 ; hatred of, for 
Bavaria, 463, 472, 473; peasants 
of, moved by fate of Pope, 498. 

Udine, 97; negotiations at, 108. 

ULm, Austrians driven to, 199; 
surrendered, 205, 524. 

United States, Napoleon makes 
approaches towards, 209 ; Jerome 
Bonaparte in, 247; opposes 
French influence in Louisiana, 
264; forbids commerce with 
Europe, 504; vessels of, threat- 
ened by Napoleon with confisca- 
tion, 505; Napoleon plans to 
escape to, 725; declare against 
England, 581. 

University, Imperial, 406 ff. 

Urbino, 93. 

Valais, 120; yielded by Helvetia, 
255 ; formed into a republic, 256, 
510. 

Valangin, 342. 

Valence, 10, 12, 30, 31. 

Valencia, 435. 

Valengay, treaty of, 647. 

Val Sugana, 93. 

Valtelline, 120. 

Valutina Gora, 551. 

Vandamme, testifies to Napoleon's 
power over him, 413, 467, 474, 
539, 623, 625, 626, 628, 710. 

Var, Melas at, 198. 

Varnhagen, 480. 

Vaubois, sails from Ajaccio, 127. 

Vauchamps, battle of, 659. 



Vaucluse, crime in, 224. 

Vaud, 120. 

Vendee, the, royalist province, 39, 
43; civil war in, 55; in revolt, 
196; pacified, 196; pacification 
of, 212; is regarded as a truce 
by Royalists, 270; Cadoudal, 
leader in, 271. 

Vendemiaire 13th, 57, 62, 78, 96, 
104,115, 159, 169, 242, 270. 

Venetia, Austrian garrisons in, 
291, 314, 319, 321, 323, 328, 424. 

Venice, sought by Austria, 72; 
territory of, 84; mainland of, 
offered to Austria by Napoleon, 
99; war declared against, ilOO; 
offered to Austria, 101; harsh 
judgment of, by Napoleon, 102; 
Napoleon's dealings with, criti- 
cised, 103; ceded to Austria, 109; 
portion of territory of, reserved 
to France, 111 ; Pius VII. elected 
in, 212; ceded to Austria, 215; 
demanded by Napoleon in treaty 
of Pressburg, 321. 

Verhuell, Admiral, sent as head of 
deputation to Paris, 332. 

Verona, Louis XVIII. at, 55, 86, 
89; counter-revolution in, 101, 
314. 

Viasma, 562; fight at, 565-6. 

Vicenza, Duke of, see Caulain- 
court; duchy of, 328. 

Victor Amadeus, signs treaty with 
France, 81; of Sardinia not 
mentioned in treaty of Amiens, 
254. 

Victor, in command in Italy, 200; 
becomes Duke of Belluno, 400, 
413, 437, 446, 451, 480, 556, 
565, 567, 568, 570, 572-5, 606 n., 
625, 636, 653, 658. 

Vielcastel, 64. 

Vienna, 76, 95; defence of, after 
Italian campaigns, 99; feeling 
at, after Campo Formio, 109, 
144; Bernadotte in, 159; plan 
of Napoleon to march on, 198; 
excitement at, on French author- 
ity in Italy, 254; archives of, 
quoted, 254; object of Murat's 
pursuit, 310, 477. 

Villach, 97, 482. 

Villars, 115. 



Index 



835 



Villeneuve, Admiral, escape of, 
133; ordered to the Channel, 
297; returns to Cadiz, 299; at 
Trafalgar, 309. 

Vilna, Napoleon hopes for resist- 
ance at, 542; no enthusiasm 
awaiting Napoleon at, 543; 
French troops to return to, 
under Murat, 577. 

Vincennes, trial of d'Enghien at, 
273. 

Vincent, Austrian ambassador at 
Paris, 339; interview of, with 
Napoleon, 340. 

Vitebsk, Barclay marches towards, 
546-7; army given rest at, 548, 
549. 

Vittoria, Wellington's victory at, 
619. 

Viscaya, 500. 

Vohiey, 113. 

Voltaire, interest of, in Corsica and 
Paoh, 1; writings read by Na- 
poleon, 13; imitated by Napo- 
leon, 211; repudiated as revolu- 
tionary, 244. 

Voltri, 80. 

Wachau, engagement at, 635 f. 

Wagram, battle of, July 5th and 
6th, 1809, 475-477, 478. 

Wahlstatt, 627. 

Walcheren, 507. 

Walewska, Countess, 681. 

Walewski, Count, 681. 

Wallachia, 288 n., 365, 416, 418, 
540. 

Wallmoden, Count, 457-8. _ 

Warsaw, committee of insurrec- 
tion at, fostered by Napoleon, 
363; occupied by French, 367; 
Napoleon in, 371; duchy of, 387; 
to be ruled by King of Saxony, 
390, 472, 481, 482, 516,^ 521; 
immense stores at, 524, 526, 543, 
595, 597, 598, 599, 600, 602, 609, 
610, 611, 615, 621. 

Wartensleben, retreats before Jour- 
dan, 88. 

Washington, death of, 209. 

Waterloo, 325, 714, 722, 737. 

Wavre, 713, 715, 717, 737- 

Weimar, 358, 360. 

Weissenburg, 46. 



Weissig, 612. 

Wellesle}^ see Wellington 

Wellington, 479, 480; sent to 
Spain, 499; acts on defensive 
and holds enemy in check, 499, 
500, 501; defeats Marmont at 
Salamanca, July 22d, 1812, 
554, 581; defeats French at 
Vittoria, 619, 620 n.; conquers 
San Sebastian and Pampeluna, 
644, 647, 653, 667, 683, 698, 
709, 710 ff. 

Wesel, fortress of, siu-rendered to 
France, 320; Napoleon does not 
give up, to Cleves, but occupies 
with his own troops, 347. 

Weser, mouth of, 191, 268. 

Westphalia, peace of, secularization 
in, 259; to be taken from Prus- 
sia, 348; kingdom of, 387; nearly 
ruined by extravagance of King 
Jerome, 524, 525, 599, 611. 

Weyrother, Colonel, 315. 

Whit worth, 249. 

Wieland, Napoleon's conversation 
with, 443. 

WiUiam, Prince of Prussia, 353, 
443. 

WiUot, General, 169 n. 

Wimpffen, General, 471 n. 

Winzingerode, 663, 664, 670. 

Wittgenstein, General, 545, 548, 
550, 560, 568, 571, 572, 573, 
574, 607, 611, 612, 613, 660. 

Wrede, Bavarian general, 516, 594, 
640, 656. 

Wurmser, repulses French army, 
77; replaces Beaulieu in Italy, 
85; defeat of, by Napoleon, 86 L; 
attempts relief of Mantua, 87; 
succeeded by Archduke Charles 
in Italy, 88; Napoleon's opinion 
of, 89. 

Wurschen, 616. 

Wiirtemberg, makes peace with 
France, 88; separate treaty of, 
with France, 260; elector of, 
acknowledged King bv Austria, 
323; King of, 334, 338, 594; 
Katharina of, married to Jerome 
Bonaparte, August 23d, 1807, 
336, 413, 512 n., 525; changes 
in, after war of 1809, 524; King 
of, arms new contingent, 594. 



836 



Index 



Wiirzburg, surrendered by Bavaria, 
323; occupied by French troops, 
348 

Yarmouth, Lord, 348. 

Yehn, of Ansbach, author of " Ger- 
many in her Deep Abasement," 
352. 

Yorck, von Wartenburg, historian, 
judgment of, on the massacre at 
Jaffa, 140, 318 n. 

Yorck, von Wartenburg, general, 
succeeds Grawert in command of 



Prussian contingent, 586; defec- 
tion of. 586, 587, 593, 594, 600, 
611, 655, 658, 659. 

Zante, 111. 

Zastrow, von, 362. 

Zichy, 460. 

Zifcthen, 718, 719. 

Znaim, 310; Austrian forces con- 
centrated at, 477; truce of Jul}' 
12th, 1809, 478-9. 

Zurich, victory of Mass6na at, 194, 
208, 280. 



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